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The conversation centers on Iran, its 47-year regime, and how to think about protest, reform, and potential change from the perspective of an Iranian-American who has lived in the United States most of his life. The speakers discuss the severity of the regime, the nature of the opposition, and the calculus involved in any push for change. - Freedom and the cost of change: Freedom is described as nasty and the regime as “nasty.” The speakers assert that the regime, including the IRGC, is not likely to give up Iran in a peaceful way. They emphasize that protests and resistance have been ongoing, and that the regime has a track record of destroying opposition. They use the imagery of public executions and a ruthless approach to suppression, comparing the regime’s behavior to a brutal, game-of-thrones-like motto. - Personal history and perspective: The guest notes his life trajectory—born during the 1978 revolution, living through the Shah’s era briefly, and then the Khomeini years—giving him a long historical frame for evaluating leadership and revolution. He remarks that he has no moral authority to tell Iranians how to protest or whether to risk their families, acknowledging the severe personal stakes for those on the ground. He stresses the bravery and resilience of the Iranian people and explains the immense pressures that drive ordinary citizens to protest. - The strategic challenge of regime change: The guest asserts that the regime wants to stretch negotiations and extend days to avoid losing resources, implying a protracted endurance tactic. He insists that replacing or reforming the regime would be extremely difficult, given the depth of the regime’s networks and its long tenure. - Reza Pahlavi and leadership dynamics: The discussion revisits Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, noting his recent high-profile activity, meetings in Washington, and televised statements. The guest acknowledges both praise and criticism of Reza Pahlavi, arguing that leadership in Iran would require clear, tough decisions and that those who criticize him must provide constructive counterarguments rather than ad hominem attacks. He discusses the complexity of leadership in exile and the challenges of returning to Iran to lead, including loyalty issues within the military and the risk of betrayal. - The US and foreign policy angle: The hosts debate what role the United States should play, including the consideration of strikes or sanctions. The guest uses a parable about a local offense (a killer in Miami) to illustrate how a country should commit to eliminating a threat without broad interference in other regions’ problems. He argues for public support of a targeted objective but cautions against broad, nation-building wars that could trigger larger conflicts. He also notes the influence of other actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and European nations, on the Iran situation, suggesting a multi-layered and opaque calculus in any action. - The question of strikes and objectives: The speakers discuss whether strikes should aim to completely destroy the regime or merely pressure it, emphasizing that the intention behind any military action matters more than the action itself. They consider the risk of a dangerous power vacuum, comparing potential outcomes to Libya or Iraq, and discuss the possibility of negotiating with a different leadership that could concede to protesters’ demands while minimizing harm to the broader population. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a favorable outcome without risking unintended consequences. - The role of sanctions and diplomacy: The sanctions are described as byproducts of the regime’s leadership and its lack of diplomacy, with the argument that sanctions affect the Iranian people more than the ruling elite. The dialogue touches on questions of accountability for the regime’s behavior and the broader regional dynamics, including public sentiment in Iran and international responses. - Mossad and external involvement: The guest asserts that Mossad and Israel are heavily involved in Iran’s internal dynamics and protests, given the existential stakes and the perception of threats against Iranian leadership. He contends that foreign intelligence communities are active in shaping events and information, including potential misdirection and propaganda. - The broader takeaway: The discussion ends by underscoring the need for multiple options and credible leadership in Iran, the difficulty of changing a deeply entrenched regime, and the reality that any transition would be complex, potentially dangerous, and require careful, strategic consideration of long-term impacts rather than quick, sweeping actions. The host reflects on the remarkable intensity and busyness of US politics and foreign policy under a dynamic administration, noting that such a convergence of domestic and international pressures makes this period historically singular.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy and its global impact. - Unpredictability as a negotiation asset: Speaker 0 notes that Trump’s rhetoric is out of the norm and concerning, citing statements about Greenland, Iran, Venezuela, and Gaza. Speaker 1 counters that Trump starts with a very tough position and then moderates it as a negotiation tactic, arguing that unpredictability has value but erodes credibility because “what he says this week will not be what he might do next week or the week after.” - Gaza, Venezuela, and Iran as case studies: Gaza is described as having no peace, only ongoing uncertainty. In Venezuela, Speaker 0 sees a new regime leader working with the old regime, making regime change unlikely; Speaker 1 cautions that Rodriguez would have to dismantle the army and paramilitaries to improve Venezuela, implying changes may be blocked by corruption and drug trafficking networks. In Iran, despite expectations of a strike, Trump did not strike, which Speaker 1 attributes to calculated restraint and the need to avoid provoking Iranian retaliation; Speaker 0 asks why, and Speaker 1 emphasizes the complexity and the risk of escalation. - Domestic and diplomatic capacity under Trump: Speaker 1 argues the administration relies on nontraditional figures (e.g., Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff) rather than professional diplomats, contributing to a lack of sustained policy execution. He notes the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council have been stripped of expertise, with many positions unfilled. He describes diplomacy as being conducted by envoy, with trusted associates who lack deep diplomatic experience. - Global power shifts and alliances: Speaker 1 says unpredictability can undermine US credibility; however, there is a real shift as the US appears to retreat from international engagement. He asserts that Russia and China have lost clients due to various internal and regional dynamics, while the US withdrawal from international organizations has allowed China to gain influence, including within the UN. He predicts that the US could become weaker in the long run relative to its previous position, even if economically stronger domestically. - Regional dynamics and potential alliances: The conversation touches on the theoretical possibility of an Islamic or Middle Eastern NATO-like alliance, led by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with potential Turkish involvement. Speaker 1 argues that such an alliance would not resemble NATO but that regional powers are likely to form bilateral and regional arrangements to counterbalance major powers like the US, Russia, and China. In the Middle East, Israel is cast as an influential actor shaping regional alignments, with Gulf states wary of Iranian retaliation and crisis spillover. - The Iran crisis and military posture: Speaker 1 explains why Gulf states and Israel did not want an immediate strike on Iran due to the risk of massive retaliation and limited US regional presence at the time. He notes the Abraham Lincoln and George H.W. Bush carrier groups' movements suggest potential future force projection, but states that any strike would likely be small if undertaken given current hardware positioning. He suggests the crisis will continue, with Iran’s internal repression and external deterrence shaping the dynamics. He also points to the 2000 missiles and the IRGC’s scale as factors in regional calculations. - Reflection on impact and timing: The discussion notes the potential for longer-term consequences in US credibility and global influence once Trumpism passes, with the possibility of the US reemerging weaker on the world stage despite possible internal economic strength. Speaker 0 closes with appreciation for the discussion; Speaker 1 agrees.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Glenn and Professor Zhang discuss the trajectory of global conflict and the transformation of the world order. Zhang presents several lines of evidence and reasoning for a destabilizing, multi-polar era that could culminate in a broader conflict akin to World War III, with 2026 identified as a period of potential flare-ups. Evidence and triggers pointing toward greater conflict: - The American National Security Strategy recently published argues that “the order has dissipated. It’s gone,” and that America must protect its own national self-interest, primarily in the Western Hemisphere, through a “mineral doctrine” and a Trump corollary to enforce it. China’s and Russia’s encroachment in South America, notably via China’s investments, is cited as a trigger for U.S. assertiveness, including the Caribbean concentration of naval assets and actions affecting Venezuela’s oil. - The Russia-Ukraine war is described as effectively over, with morale in Ukraine collapsed and large-scale desertions; Europe contemplates using seized Russian assets to fund Ukraine and avoid a peace that could allow Russia to consolidate gains. Europe’s intended loans to Ukraine and the fear that Russia could challenge European supremacy are highlighted. - In the Middle East, the Israel–Iran dynamic is seen as increasingly unstable, with predictions of Israel attacking Hezbollah and Lebanon within weeks, and ongoing friction around the Hamas peace deal. Iran is portrayed as a pivot in a broader Eurasian alliance that could threaten Western interests if Iran’s lines of trade and energy routes are integrated with Russia and China. - The overall global contest is framed as a struggle over the new world order: the shift from a liberal, rules-based order to multipolar competition where the U.S. seeks to maintain dominance through deterrence, sanctions, and allied proxies. Historical patterns and structural analysis: - Zhang invokes historical analogies, noting the rise and fall pattern of empires, the McKinder Heartland Thesis, and the dynamics of Britain’s naval supremacy that aimed to keep Eurasia fragmented to prevent a continental power from unifying the region. He argues that today China’s rise, paired with U.S. efforts to sustain dominance, pushes toward a similar pendulum where a Eurasian continental system could emerge if Russia, China, Iran, and possibly India align economically and politically. - The BRICS alliance and Iran as a pivot are emphasized: America’s debt-dominated reserve currency system pushes BRICS and Iran closer together, forming a potential continental trade network that could bypass Western-dominated channels. America’s strategy, in this view, is to “economically strangle China,” deny China access to South American minerals, and use allies to counter Beijing while promoting divide-and-rule tactics in Asia. - The discussion suggests that a war could be expanded by a domino effect: a Venezuela operation could draw Cuba, Nicaragua, Brazil, and other regional players into conflict; a wider confrontation could involve the Hormuz Strait, Odessa, and European troop commitments, creating a global escalation. Domestic dimension and leadership implications: - Zhang cites Arthur Spengler’s decline indicators for Western societies: over-urbanization, declining birthrates, extreme inequality, proxy warfare, and cultural decadence, coupled with immigration and fear-based policies that suppress open discourse (examples include social-media surveillance and visa requirements tied to political speech). - He asserts that Western leadership has become addicted to projection and proxy wars, shedding the liberal pretenses that once underpinned its strategy, and that a collapse of confidence and cohesion could accompany, or even drive, a broader conflict. Conclusion and prognosis: - The conversation converges on a bleak frame: the end of U.S. hegemony and a transition to a multipolar order with rising powers, where the possibility of a large-scale war remains real and not easily contained. Zhang argues that the current trajectory does not easily revert to a peaceful status quo and that the 2020s could be a period of sustained tensions and escalations, potentially lasting a decade or more. He acknowledges that he hopes to be proven wrong and would personally prefer a peaceful resolution, but maintains that the next period may be defined by a significant, multipolar contest in which proxies and great-power competition are central.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the unfolding Iran war three days in, arguing that the conflict has become a regional war with global economic and strategic reverberations. Key points and allegations: - Iran has targeted at least 27 bases and port facilities across the region, from Kirlik Airbase to Dubai, effectively regionalizing the war. Oil markets anticipate disruption; Europe’s open price rose about 20% on expectations of supply cuts, with a potential rise above $100 per barrel. - In the Gulf, inexpensive drones have breached what appear to be expensive air and missile defenses, affecting airstrips and airports. A large expatriate workforce in the UAE (about 4.6 million Indians and many Europeans and Americans) is stranded, highlighting economic disruption. Oil infrastructure damage is just beginning, with some Saudi refineries struck; more damage anticipated. - The war’s consequences extend beyond Iran and Israel, potentially affecting India, Northeast Asia, Turkey, and Europe. The conflict did not begin with a joint US-Israeli attack; it began with an Israeli attack, with Rubio (Secretary of State-like comment) indicating that Israel started it, which the US later joined due to perceived insufficient posture. - Reports indicate three F-15s were downed; casualties include American sailors and Marines, though the exact numbers are unclear. - The rhetoric from Secretary Hagel (likely Hagerty) and Trump about Iran as a state sponsor tied to Israel is criticized as incautious. MacGregor argues the focus should be on Pakistan and Syria (where remnants of ISIS/Al Qaeda reside), noting Pakistan’s long-standing role as an incubator of radical Islam. He views the war as primarily about Israel’s aim to destroy Iran to enable greater Israeli regional hegemony, with the US fully committed. - He predicts a long regional war and warns that logistics will be decisive: missiles are finite, and the US may exhaust its stock; many missiles used in Ukraine reduce available stock for Iran-related defense. He notes Hypersonic missiles and decoys complicate defense capabilities. - European involvement is uncertain; Britain’s rapid response is unclear, and the broader European willingness to intervene remains doubtful. China and Russia are viewed as potentially pivotal if they decide to intervene; India is suggested as a potential mediator, given cultural ties and BRICS interests. - The US’s strategic credibility and military power are questioned. MacGregor contends the US has shown unreliability, damaging its legitimacy and triggering broader regional and global realignments. He emphasizes that the world is moving toward a new order, with the end of Sykes-Picot-era maps and shifting alliances; Gulf monarchies may seek US withdrawal. - Iran’s resilience is stressed: even if the supreme leader was killed, unity of command remains, and Iran’s dispersed military network complicates US efforts. Iran’s survival could enhance its regional influence; the longer the conflict lasts, the weaker the US and Israel appear, and the stronger Iran, Turkey, and others may become. - The possibility of an escalation to nuclear warfare is raised: if Israel uses a tactical nuclear weapon to stop Iran’s missiles, Russia and China might intervene; this could force a broader confrontation. MacGregor doubts Israel’s ability to sustain a large front and warns this could lead to a strategic pivot by major powers. - On outcomes and endgames: Iran seeks US withdrawal from the region; the US’s presence is likely to be forced out as Gulf states demand it. The interview suggests a collapse of US influence and a reshaping of the Middle East, with Persia re-emerging stronger. Israel’s survival is uncertain; extended fronts and exhaustion are anticipated. - Trump’s role is described as constrained by Netanyahu: Trump is not a free agent, and there is little expectation of near-term strategic change in Washington. The potential for a negotiated end is deemed unlikely so long as Iran remains intact and steadfast. Overall, the conversation frames the conflict as a turning point: a regional war with profound economic and geopolitical ripple effects, signaling the decline of US military hegemony in the Middle East and the possible reconfiguration of global power blocs, with Iran poised to gain relative strength if the conflict persists.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the geopolitical and economic fallout from Iran’s weekend strikes and the broader shifts in global risk, energy, and power blocs. - Oil and energy impact: Iran’s strikes targeted energy infrastructure, including Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, and crude prices jumped about 10% with Friday’s close around $73.50 and current levels near $80 per barrel. Prices could push higher if Hormuz traffic is disrupted or closed, given that one in five barrels of crude exports pass through the Hormuz gates. The potential for further oil disruptions is acknowledged, with the possibility of triple-digit or higher prices depending on how the conflict evolves. - Market dynamics and energy dependence: The guest notes a hockey-stick pattern in uptrends across markets when driven by large asset holders waking up to energy exposure, referencing shadow banking as a driver of rapid moves. He points to vast assets under management (approximately $220 trillion) among pension funds, hedge funds, endowments, and insurers that could push energy markets higher if they reallocate toward oil futures and energy-related assets. He emphasizes that energy is essential for broad economic activity, and a curtailed oil economy would slow economies globally. - European vulnerabilities: Europe faces a fragile energy security position, already dealing with an energy crisis and decreased reliance on Russian hydrocarbons. Disruptions to LNG supplies from Qatar or other sources could further threaten Europe, complicating efforts by Ursula von der Leyen and Christine Lagarde to manage inflation and debt. The panel highlights potential increased debt concerns in Europe, with Lagarde signaling uncertainty and the possibility of higher interest rates, and warns of a possible future resembling Weimar-era debt dynamics or systemic stress in European bonds. - Global geopolitics and blocs: The discussion suggests a risk of the world fracturing into two blocs, with BRICS controlling more diverse energy supplies and the West potentially losing its energy dominance. The US pivot to Asia could be undone as the United States becomes more entangled in Middle East conflicts. The guests anticipate renewed US engagement with traditional alliances (France, Britain, Germany) and a possible retraction from attempts to pursue multipolar integration with Russia and China. The possibility of a broader two-block, cold-war-like order is raised, with energy as a central question. - Iran and US diplomacy optics: The negotiations reportedly had Iran willing to concede to American proposals when the leadership was assassinated, prompting questions about US policy and timing. The attack is described as damaging to public opinion and diplomacy, with potential impeachment momentum for Trump discussed in light of his handling of the Iran situation. The geopolitical optics are characterized as highly damaging to US credibility and to the prospects of reaching future deals with Iran and other actors. - Middle East dynamics and US security commitments: The strikes impact the US-Israel relationship and the US-Gulf states’ security posture. Pentagon statements reportedly indicated no signs that Iran planned to attack the US first, raising questions about the strategic calculus of the strikes and the broader risk to regional stability. The conversation notes persistent supply chain and defense material challenges—including concerns about weapon stockpiles and the sustainability of military deployments in the region. - Long-range grim projections: The discussion concludes with caution about the potential long arc of decline for Western economic and political influence if current trajectories persist, contrasted with the rise of Eastern blocs. There is warning about a possible long-term, multi-decade period of geopolitical and economic restructuring, with energy security and debt dynamics at the core of those shifts. - Closing reflections: The speakers acknowledge the unpredictability of markets and geopolitics, refraining from definitive forecasts but underscoring how energy, debt, and alliance realignments will likely shape the coming period.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

Professor Zhang and the host discuss a era of rapid systemic upheaval in world order, centered on a peaceful yet unprecedented rise of China and the broader shift of power from West to East. They explore how likely it is that such a major redistribution of international power can occur without triggering major wars among great powers. Key points from the exchange: - Mark Carney’s Davos speech is used as a reference point to counter Donald Trump’s claim that Europe and Canada have free‑ridden on American defense. Carney argues the rules‑based order benefited the American empire but that America’s attitude has shifted away from multilateralism; middle powers must build a rules‑based order to survive, potentially aligning with BRICS. He suggests the Shanghai Gold Exchange and a global gold corridor function as a multilateral, reciprocal framework that could underpin a new financial system, with China emphasizing multilateralism, cooperation, and reciprocity. A central tension is that the American empire will not fade quietly, and the National Security Strategy envisions reshaping empire rule: no more liberal order, more national self-interest, vassalization of allies, and continued strategic challenges to China in all theaters, including Africa, Europe, and South America, even if military presence in East Asia declines. - The discussion contrasts the U.S.‑led multilateral consensus (post‑1945) with the current reality: an elite, close-knit club once governed global decisions, but Trump’s outsider status disrupts that club. This disruption incentivizes Western elites to seek China as a new protector, even as systemic fragility remains due to inequality, corruption, and a large disconnect between political leadership and ordinary people. - The speakers analyze Trump’s strategy as aiming to create a “Trump world order” by replacing the global elite with a new one, reshaping NATO leadership, and supporting more amendable European politicians who favor nationalism and tighter immigration controls. They describe Trump’s broader civil‑military plan, including using ICE to pursue a harsh domestic policy, potentially enabling emergency powers, and provoking a European political realignment through backing parties like Poland’s Law and Justice, Hungary’s Fidesz, Austria’s and Spain’s right‑leaning movements. They argue Trump’s Greenland focus is intended to embarrass NATO leaders and redraw European political loyalties, not merely to seize strategic real estate. - The conversation touches a perceived internal Western crisis: elite arrogance, meritocracy’s failure to connect with ordinary people, and the growing alienation and inequality. They argue this has contributed to the rise of Trump, who some see as a messianic figure for restoring Western civilization, while others view him as seeking to destroy the existing order to rule in a new form. - The guests reflect on the 1990s warning by Richard Rorty that globalization and liberalism could spark a political radicalism among previously disaffected groups, leading to the appeal of strongmen. They connect this to the contemporary surge of nationalist and anti‑elite sentiment across the West, and the collapse of faith in liberal institutions. - Asia’s prospects are examined with skepticism about a simple East Asian century. Zhang highlights four structural challenges: (1) demographic decline and very low fertility in East Asia (e.g., South Korea around 0.6, Japan, China) and its implications for a youthful labor force; (2) high savings rates and the risk this poses for domestic demand; (3) dependence on Middle Eastern oil for East Asian economies during potential global conflict; (4) long‑standing tensions among China, Japan, and Korea. He argues these factors complicate a straightforward rise of Asia and suggests Asia’s future is not guaranteed to outpace the West in global leadership. - Zhang emphasizes the need to recalibrate values away from neoliberal consumerism toward meaning, community, and family. He argues that both capitalism and communism neglected spirituality, leading to widespread alienation; he believes a healing approach would prioritize children, family, and social cohesion as essential to human flourishing. - On Iran, Zhang suggests the United States and Israel aim to destroy and fragment Iran to render it more manageable, while Iran exhibits resilience, unity, and a readiness to fight back against continued external pressure. He notes Iranian leadership now prefers resistance after previously negotiating, and he predicts strong Iranian defense and potential escalation if attacked. He also points to an anticipated false‑flag risk and the broader risk environment seeking a new status quo through diplomacy, not just confrontation. - Finally, the host and Zhang discuss the broader risk landscape: as U.S. leadership declines and regional powers maneuver, a multipolar, chaotic strategic environment could emerge with shifting alliances. They argue for a renewed focus on managing competition and seeking a civilized framework for coexistence, though there is skepticism about whether such a framework will emerge given strategic incentives and current political dynamics.

Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn discuss the threat environment around Iran amid Trump-era tensions. - Observed mobilization: The United States has a massive military build-up in the region; allied transports appear en route to the Middle East. The impression, from Tehran’s view, is that an attack seems unavoidable, with Israel and Washington seemingly seeking regime change. - Threat framing and regime change: Sachs says Israel has pursued over thirty years to overthrow the Iranian government, with the United States broadly acting in lockstep with Israel. He notes that last summer’s effort aimed at regime change did not succeed, and that a carrier task group is now moving toward Iran, signaling imminent attack. He asserts that “the goal here has never been negotiation.” - JCPOA history and negotiations: A nuclear deal, JCPOA, was reached and ratified by UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). Trump ripped it up in his first term. Sachs argues there has never been genuine readiness by the United States or Israel for a negotiated settlement; when negotiations occurred, Israel resisted, and the attack on Iran two days before scheduled U.S.–Iran negotiations in June 2025 is cited as proof that the goal is regime change, not diplomacy. - Hybrid warfare and tactics: The plan is described as a regime change operation carried out through hybrid warfare—cyber, street unrest, economic strangulation, bombing, assassinations. Trump is characterized as blustering to pressure Iran to comply with demands that would amount to dismantling the regime. - UN Charter and legality: Sachs invokes UN Charter Article 2(4), stating that all members shall refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and argues the current posture is a gross violation of the charter. - Venezuela comparison and propaganda accusation: He likens the current stance to the coercive U.S. approach seen in Venezuela, accusing the United States of invasion, kidnapping, oil seizures, and confiscation of oil profits, with Trump claiming the money goes to him. He alleges similar propaganda is present in major media regarding Iran, including misrepresentation of economic collapse as a sign of Iranian misgovernment. - Economic statecraft and its effects: Scott Bessent, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, is cited as stating that sanctions aimed to “collapse” Iran’s currency and provoke mass unrest, enabling a political outcome favorable to U.S. aims. Sachs claims sanctions caused a December economic collapse, bank failures, currency issues, and imports shortages, driving people into the streets. - Marketed outcomes and media treatment: Bessent is accused of describing a “positive” outcome from destabilization, with mainstream media avoiding coverage of this stance. The claim is that weaponized finance is a tactic to destabilize Iran without conventional warfare. - Containment risk and nuclear considerations: Sachs warns that if the situation deteriorates, Iran could decide to dash for nuclear weapons, particularly if existential threats mount. He emphasizes that a broader regional war could involve many countries and risk nuclear escalation, making prevention imperative. He argues the UN Security Council should convene immediately to stop escalation. - Prospects for Europe and regional actors: He criticizes European leaders for not resisting aggression, noting skepticism about who would oppose U.S. aggression. He suggests some regional players (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Turkey) may not want a wider war, but questions whether they can prevent it given U.S. leadership and Israeli influence. - Final note: Sachs calls for a strong, principled international response to prevent an explosion in a highly volatile region, urging opposition to unilateral threats and actions.

In this discussion, Speaker 0 interviews Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector and US Marine Corps intelligence officer, about the implications of a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the broader geopolitics around Ukraine, Iran, and energy. - On the Trump-Putin call and diplomacy with the US: Ritter notes that Trump initiated the call, and Russia has kept a diplomatic channel open with the United States, despite tensions and distrust. Russia reportedly invited figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to continue diplomacy. He interprets Russia’s openness as a strategic move to maintain influence in decision-making, particularly with the US seeking Russian assistance on energy and conflict termination in Ukraine and Iran. - Russia’s behavior in response to Western strikes and its strategic calculus: Ritter argues Russia has deliberately avoided a rapid military overreaction to Western actions (e.g., UK strikes on Bryansk using Storm Shadow missiles and Flamingo systems) to prevent elevating Ukrainian nationalism or provoking a harsher Western stance. He suggests Russia can legally justify countermeasures against British facilities tied to Storm Shadow and Flamingo production, but chooses restraint to avoid elevating domestic political backlash and to exploit diplomatic openings. - Economic dimensions and sanctions: He contends Russia benefits from the lifting of oil sanctions, with Russia able to sell crude at much higher market prices, improving its budget and war finances without further escalation. This is framed as a strategic reward for keeping the diplomatic channel open and for not overreacting militarily. - The strategic objective in Ukraine and the West: Ritter states Russia aims to remove Ukrainian nationalism from Europe’s security equation and to establish Ukraine as a neutral party. He argues that Russian actions, including potential pressure on Ukraine and Western states, are designed to compel a settlement more favorable to Moscow, with less emphasis on Ukrainian terms. - The Iran context and US leverage: The conversation posits that Russia’s phone call with Trump could enable further discussions with Kushner and Witkoff on terms that reflect Russian objectives, given the US’s urgent need for Russian help on energy and geopolitical cover. Ritter suggests Moscow could pressure Iran to negotiate in a way that aligns with broader Russian goals and reduces US influence, including potentially linking Ukraine settlements to Iran’s termination or moderation. - Off-ramps and the Iranian war: In Iran, the sole off-ramp is one Iran accepts; the US and Israel no longer control the process. Ritter argues that US strategies (e.g., general Cain’s claims about missile successes) are misguided, with Iran reportedly evading decisive pressure and maintaining leverage. The path forward would involve Russia acting as mediator and engaging Iranian leadership more directly, while the US’s ability to impose a decisive settlement appears limited. - US military options and feasibility: Ritter points out the limits of US military options in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. He argues that large-scale ground involvement (e.g., 80,000 Marines to seize territories around Hormuz) is impractical given resource constraints, political risk, and logistical challenges. He criticizes the reliance on bombing campaigns with insufficient precision munitions and questions target selection and legality, highlighting a historical precedent where strategic air campaigns did not compel German surrender in World War II. - Broader geopolitical consequences and alliances: The discussion covers how a perceived US strategic defeat could reshape global alignments. Ritter foresees BRICS strengthening as the US loses credibility, with China advancing in Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Russia expanding influence in the Middle East. He suggests Iran could emerge as a regional power, while Israel’s nuclear program could come under renewed pressure. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, grounded in a strategic framework with Iran, provides Moscow with diplomatic legitimacy to lecture Gulf states. - Lavrov’s stance and Gulf politics: The speakers address Lavrov’s public admonition of Gulf states for pressuring Iran and seeking Western support, arguing this reflects Russia’s adherence to its diplomatic framework and a legally grounded position. Russia’s recent strategic framework with Iran underpins its legitimacy to influence Gulf behavior. - Closing assessment: Ritter emphasizes that the war’s trajectory is being driven by Iranian resilience and US strategic miscalculations. He maintains that Russia’s role as mediator and its leverage over energy markets position Moscow to shape outcomes, while the United States appears increasingly constrained, resource-drained, and vulnerable to strategic defeats on multiple fronts. The result could be a reordering of global alliances and regional power dynamics, with Russia and Iran gaining greater influence and the US recalibrating its priorities accordingly.

Ambassador Chas Freeman and Glenn discuss the volatile situation across West Asia and beyond, focusing on Iran, Israel, and how great-power and regional dynamics interact with the Ukrainian and Venezuelan crises. - Israel-Iran confrontation and objectives: Freeman argues that Israel is preparing to challenge Iran to expand its regional dominance beyond the Levant into West Asia. Netanyahu reportedly said that if Iran resumes its missile development program, that would justify an Israeli attack. Freeman notes Iran has never halted its missile development, describing Netanyahu’s pretext as transparent. He believes Iran is prepared to retaliate and that Israel is capable of unexpected moves, so vigilance is warranted. - Iran’s domestic situation and external leverage: The discussion highlights domestic distress in Iran driven by economic conditions, notably the sharp devaluation of the rial. The Pazeshkian government’s central-bank management changes are mentioned, as are low oil prices and broader economic pressures. Freeman emphasizes that protests, especially on economic affordability, are often leveraged by external actors (Israel and the United States) but also reflects genuine Iranian grievances. He argues the protests threaten the regime only as a demand for economic reform, not a signal of imminent regime collapse. - Regional realignments and external actors: There is a sense that Iranian protests could invite external manipulation, while Israel has long supported exiled Iranian groups capable of striking inside Iran. The June Israeli attack reportedly led Iranian security services to round up many people accused of Mossad engagement, suggesting Israel’s intelligence network inside Iran has been eroded. The discussion notes a shift in Gulf Arab openness toward Iran, with Oman’s foreign minister stating that Israel—not Iran—is the source of region instability, signaling a strategic realignment against Israel. Turkey’s position is ambiguous, and Russia and China are aiding Iran in reconstituting air defenses. Egypt and Iran appear to have mended ties, while Iran’s allied groups (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthi movements) are partially reconstituted but lack close-in capability to attack Israel directly; Hamas remains on the defensive in Gaza. - Prospects for a broader war and what success might look like: Freeman suggests Israeli objectives include fragmentation of Iran and continued pressure to undermine Iran’s governance, with possible support for exiled groups. He notes Iran’s missiles, including hypersonics, and its air defenses, and warns that a new Israeli attack could trigger broader regional involvement. He also discusses potential coalitions against Israel forming among Gulf states if conflict escalates, with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states balancing relations with Iran and the region. - Deterrence, diplomacy, and the collapse of international law norms: The conversation critiques deterrence as reliant on threats without diplomatic reassurance, pointing to a lack of meaningful dialogue with Iran and the West’s inconsistent commitment to international law. Freeman argues that the Trump administration repudiated a previously approved agreement with Iran, and he criticizes US actions in Venezuela, Cuba, and other places as undermining sovereignty and international norms. He asserts that the Zionist approach to security is seen by many as uncompromising and expansionist, eroding international law and the UN Charter, with Israel and the United States often shielding violations through impunity. The discussion touches on Europe’s perceived hollow rhetoric and the suppression of dissent on security matters, claiming that discussing security concerns or engaging in diplomacy is sometimes treated as legitimizing adversaries. - Global parallels and strategic indicators: The speakers compare the current dynamics in Europe and the Middle East with broader trends—escalatory language, the weaponization of language, and the suppression of dissent about US and Western policies. They discuss the governance implications of US actions, the role of international law, and the risks of miscalculation in Iran-Israel tensions. As indicators of looming conflict, they cite the movement of large American transport aircraft (C-5As) carrying weapons to Israel through Europe, potential naval movements to the Mediterranean or Arabian Sea, and possible deployments to Diego Garcia. - Conclusion: The conversation underscores the fragility of regional security, the potential for miscalculation in a highly militarized context, and the sense that diplomacy is deteriorating amid a pattern of external interference, deterring legitimate security concerns, and a broader decline in adherence to international law. Freeman closes by acknowledging the depressing but necessary clarity of facing these dynamics squarely.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the potential for a regional war surrounding Iran and the Gulf, examining miscalculations, pathways to escalation, and the interests and responses of regional and global powers. Key points: - The likelihood of a regional war is increasing. Compared to Ukraine, miscalculations today could lead to broader conflict, with concerns about missed opportunities for peace and the involvement of NATO contributing to a harsh trajectory. - Several escalation pathways exist. If Gulf states push back against Iran, Bahrain could become a flashpoint, and Israel or other actors could attempt to destabilize Gulf states by targeting energy facilities, finance hubs, and expatriate communities to provoke economic and social crisis. - Iran’s capacity and alliances matter. Iran alone cannot sustain attacks on multiple Gulf states, especially if Kurdish movements pressure the regime. While there are allegations of Russian and Chinese intelligence backing, there is debate about direct military backing. Escalation could occur if allied powers or regional actors become involved. - The potential for a power grab in Iran. If Iran descends into civil chaos, multiple neighboring countries with competing interests (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, and other regional players) could intervene to protect their concerns about ethnic groups or separatist movements. A significant fear is that control of the Strait of Hormuz could shift to different actors, creating a strategic chokepoint crisis. - Turkey’s role is complex. Turkey, a major NATO ally with a large Kurdish minority, could be wary of consequences from Kurdish empowerment in Iran. Although Turkey might benefit from stability, it has security concerns about Kurdish autonomy and potential spillovers into Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Turkey’s stance may deter wholehearted support for Iranian destabilization, given its own security dependencies. - The impact of Kurdish dynamics. U.S.-backed Kurdish groups in Syria and broader Kurdish populations across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria raise concerns about cross-border spillovers and regional realignments. Historical U.S. involvement with Kurdish groups is cited as a factor that could provoke Turkish concern and complicate alliances. - The broader strategic environment. The Gulf states’ vulnerability is tied to energy exports, real estate, and financial networks, including the expulsion of expatriates under crisis. The possibility of striking energy infrastructure could trigger cascading economic and political crises across the region. - Deterrence and misperception. Iran has been viewed as a deterrent to Israeli actions; its potential degradation or destruction is contrasted with the risk that a diminished Iran could still present a long-term challenge through drone warfare and asymmetric means. Drone capabilities are noted as being cheaper to produce and harder to intercept than some missiles. - Comparisons to Ukraine and uncertainty about outcomes. While some suggest Iran could be defeated without ground troops, there is no consensus. Ukraine’s resilience is highlighted as an example that large states can endure prolonged resistance, and Iran’s larger population and geography complicate straightforward assumptions about quick outcomes. - Acknowledgment of evolving realities. The discussion emphasizes that current events have altered regional norms and expectations, with Gulf nations experiencing a changed security landscape, including the potential for broader conflict and a greater likelihood of arms competition among regional actors.

Alastair Crook discusses with the host the evolving US strategy toward Iran, the credibility of Iran’s deterrence, the role of Israel and Gulf states, and what is known about Iran’s domestic unrest. - Trump’s strategy toward Iran has shifted. Initially, he sought a big, quick victory with minimal entanglement, including a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June and assistance from Israel to identify a gap to exploit. Crook says Trump hoped for a toppling of the Iranian leadership via a “Maduro-style” operation that could be quickly achieved with outside support. Over time, outcomes did not align with those hopes, and the plan became far more complicated. - The naval armada near Iran was intended as a pressure point but, from the Pentagon’s view, is more of a liability. The armada is loaded with Tomahawk missiles rather than air defense missiles; estimates suggest 300-350 Tomahawks among two destroyers and one carrier. Iran has countermeasures: anti-ship missiles along the coast, submarines (including mini-submarines) with anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Drones threaten the fleet, and the air defense burden would be high if a drone swarm attacked. Hormuz could be shut by Iran in the event of war, a long-term strategic lever that Iran has signaled. - Iran’s deterrence has matured: any attack by Israel or the US could trigger full-scale war and Hormuz closure. Symbolic exchanges were proposed by intermediaries (an empty IRGC building and an attack on a US base), but Iran rejected such symbolic moves, insisting on a broader, sustained response if attacked. - Israel’s posture and constraints: Israel has told the US it does not view the nuclear issue as the sole determinant, but instead urges action to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile system and deter future threats. Netanyahu, meeting with Whitlock, indicated opposition to any nuclear deal if the US does not secure certain Israeli demands, warning that without Israeli endorsement, a US deal would fail. Israel insists on conditions that make a broader deal nonviable for the US. - The Arabs’ restraint: Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do not want direct involvement in an attack on Iran, including airspace use or refueling. Several factors influence their position: fear of Iranian retaliation, concerns about broader regional instability, and shifts in regional alignments. Saudi Arabia has grown more anti-Israel, viewing Israel as destabilizing and expressing concerns about the region’s security order. There is also a fear that a major war could trigger an Arab Spring-like upheaval in Gulf monarchies. - Iran’s internal unrest: The insurrection in Iran involved trained insurgents (MEK operatives trained by the Americans in Armenia and Kurds trained in Northeastern Syria) and some Baluch participants. Corridors through Turkey and Kurdish groups facilitated their entry into Kermanshah Province. The strategy aimed at creating chaos to provoke a Western intervention, with reports that attackers were paid (roughly $5-$10) to inflame violence, burn buildings, attack ambulances, and kill. The Iranian government reports nearly 3,000 killed during the protests, with about 150 more unidentified; the majority of casualties were security forces due to exchange of fire. The narrative contrasts with outside accounts, noting the opposition did not lead to defections from key state institutions, and Israeli intelligence assessment reportedly concluded the unrest did not threaten the regime’s collapse. - Regional and great-power dynamics: Russia and China have signaled opposition to letting Iran be pressured by the United States, with discussions in Russia about offering a nuclear umbrella or naval support for Iran, though official policies are unclear.Originally planned joint exercises near Hormuz were paused; there are ongoing considerations of Chinese/Russian involvement that would complicate US options. A Chinese-Russian naval presence near Iran could limit US maneuvering. A recent drone shot down by the USS Lincoln reflects continued attempts at signaling and potential negotiation. - Overall assessment: Trump faces a dilemma between projecting strength and avoiding a costly escalation, with Israeli opposition complicating any potential US move. The US cannot easily sustain pressure without risking market turmoil and broad regional and great-power entanglements. The likely trajectory involves continued “negotiations about negotiations” rather than immediate, decisive action, while Iran’s deterrence and regional recalibrations constrain what any use of force might achieve.

Seyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, discusses the war launched against Iran, Iran’s aims, and the shifting regional dynamics. He argues that Western analyses over the years have been incorrect and that Iran’s objectives are clear: Iran will not accept a ceasefire until its demands are met, will no longer tolerate U.S. threats or Gulf regimes acting as bases against Iran, and will seek compensation from regional adversaries for destruction and slaughter attributed to the conflict. He asserts that Iran’s position and strength are growing, with widespread street support for the leader and resilience under missile and drone strikes against U.S. assets and Israel’s regime. Key points on Iran’s war aims and the conflict: - Iran’s demands: ceasefire is not an option; the war will continue until Iran’s demands are met. Iran will no longer accept a situation in which the United States can threaten it again, and will demand that Gulf regimes stop operating bases that threaten Iran. Yemen will demand and obtain full compensation for destruction. - Regional balance: Iran views the Palestinian and Lebanese causes as linked to regional resistance; Hezbollah, Yemen, Iraq, and other groups are actively undermining the regime’s regional military and political position. - Ground realities: Iran’s missiles and drones are striking U.S. assets across the Persian Gulf; Israel is being heavily targeted; resistance in Lebanon and Iraq is damaging the regime; Yemen is prepared to escalate its actions. The longer the war lasts, the more compensation Iran anticipates extracting from Gulf regimes. Escalation and tactics: - Civilian targets: Iran’s leadership says the United States has failed on the battlefield and is now targeting civilians and infrastructure, including attacks on fuel depots, desalination plants, and oil facilities, creating toxic rain and ecological harm in Iran. - Desalination and water security: destruction of desalination plants is described as a major risk to civilian water supply; Iranian civilians face environmental and health consequences from the attacks. - Economic impact and energy markets: Marandi contends that 20 million barrels of oil per day are missing from the market and that Western reserves could only offset two months; closing the Strait of Hormuz or sustained disruption could precipitate a global economic crisis and undermine the petrodollar system. - Strategic posture: Iran will respond with countermeasures, and if Gulf regimes push further against Iran, Tehran asserts it could take actions that would profoundly affect the region’s energy infrastructure and Western interests. International actors and alignment: - France and other Western allies: France has announced a defensive mission to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while Trump has made highly contradictory statements about ending the war or destroying Iran, illustrating perceived Western moral and strategic hostility. - China and Russia: Marandi notes closer alignment among Iran, China, and Russia, with China and Russia benefiting from opposing U.S. dominance in West Asia; Iran’s geography allows multiple overland routes for weapons and supplies, and Moscow and Beijing are seen as unlikely to allow a Western victory in the region. - Azerbaijan and Turkey: Azerbaijan’s response and Turkey’s involvement are discussed; Iran emphasizes it would respond decisively against Gulf and regional actors supporting Israel if pushed. Domestic and regional reactions: - Iranian public sentiment: there is strong public support for the leadership, with mobilization and resilience evident in Tehran and across the country despite missile and drone strikes. - Perceived Western narratives: Marandi argues that Western elites have remained morally and strategically bankrupt, using demonstrable inconsistency in statements and policy to justify continued escalation. Broader implications: - The war is reshaping regional power dynamics, with Iran asserting greater confidence and influence, and with China and Russia increasingly integrated with Iran against U.S. hegemony in West Asia. - The deteriorating situation could produce far-reaching consequences for global energy markets, security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, and the dollar-centered economic order, depending on how escalation and potential reciprocal actions unfold.

The discussion covers Iran, its regional threats, and potential US actions, along with broader geopolitical implications. - Iranian capabilities and external support: The on-hand capabilities are said to be far more lethal and the Iranian position stronger, with enormous recent investment by Iran, notably with Chinese and Russian involvement over the last six months. Russia is aiding integrated air defenses and China has reportedly provided missiles; the exact mix and ranges are not fully disclosed. The panelists expect Iranian air and missile defenses to work much better with Russian and Chinese assistance this time. - Protests in Iran and US strike calculations: The protests were described as legitimate initially, driven by economic distress, with two groups present: reform-minded and more conservative elements. The Mossad, with CIA and MI6, allegedly joined to provoke brutality by the regime, aiming to push it toward a brutal crackdown and to exploit the protests as a regime-change opportunity. It was claimed that 40,000 starlight terminals were smuggled in to orchestrate protests but were discovered and eliminated, marking the operation as a failure. Consequently, strikes were deemed impractical unless more firepower and longer duration were available, leading to a predicted extended air campaign rather than a quick strike. - Maduro kidnapping and Venezuela: The operation involved paying off those in the way and exploiting air defenses; one air-defense battery fired, hitting a helicopter but not bringing it down. The new president in Venezuela reportedly refuses to take instructions from Washington, raising questions about regime-change outcomes. There is speculation about continued income from oil captured and sold illegally, and about who will protect Venezuelan oil interests as drilling resumes, including potential mercenaries and maverick oil groups. The oil leadership reportedly lacks interest in going down there unless it is highly profitable. - Secret weapon discussions: The “discombobulator” and other secret weapons mentioned by Trump are described as exaggerated; the speaker notes there are weapons kept secret for dire circumstances but declines to elaborate beyond public knowledge, given high-level clearance. - Iran-focused air campaign planning: The US would rely on a prolonged air campaign, potentially comparable to the Kosovo campaign in 1999, avoiding nuclear weapons and using extensive air power with support from bases in Europe and the region. The Navy would be complemented by the Air Force with a long campaign, while the Navy would need replenishment and time to rearm. - Missile and weapon capabilities: Iran’s capabilities have evolved, aided by Chinese missiles (allegedly hundreds) and Russian support. The range of missiles questions whether they can reach Diego Garcia, with concerns about more capable missiles hitting US bases in the region. Russia’s supply of Reshnik missiles (hypersonic, multiple warheads) is viewed as unlikely; the focus is on Iranian missiles that can threaten ships and bases in the Middle East. - US force posture and diplomacy: The force buildup (aircraft, submarines, drones, THAAD, Patriot) signals a “play for time” strategy while pursuing negotiations, including enriched uranium discussions. There is debate about what agreement might be possible on enriched uranium and JCPOA-related issues; Iran reportedly rejects several Netanyahu/Trump demand points, including missile constraints as a non-starter. - Russia, China, and Turkey as wild cards: Russia would likely intervene militarily only if Iran’s regime faces collapse; China would likely use economic means and some political leverage. Turkey is seen as a wild card; it could join a regional confrontation and potentially align against Israel or the US, with NATO’s response viewed as uncertain and largely lacking a unified, decisive stance. - Nuclear arms and START: The May suspension of START is mentioned; Russia claims willingness to extend, while the US has not responded, raising concerns about unconstrained Russian nuclear activity if treaties lapse. - Ukraine and Taiwan implications: European nerves and NATO dynamics are evolving; the Europeans are portrayed as vacillating between opposing and challenging Trump-era policies, with NATO potentially facing existential questions. A strike on Iran could shift focus away from Ukraine and Taiwan, empowering adversaries, or strengthen deterrence depending on actions and diplomacy. The speaker suggests that, pragmatically, Taiwan poses a far more difficult strategic challenge and that escalation there would be highly unrewarding, potentially increasing China’s incentives to avoid direct conflict.

The discussion centers on the ongoing tensions with Iran, the potential for American military involvement, and the role of media and ideology in shaping public perception. The speakers express a critical view of how the situation is being managed and portrayed. Key points about the Iran situation: - President Trump publicly claimed “we’ve won the war against Iran,” but the panel notes Israel’s public interest in a broader outcome, specifically regime change in Iran, which would require boots on the ground rather than air strikes. - It is argued that air strikes alone cannot achieve regime change; the Israeli military, even with about 170,000 active-duty soldiers plus reservists, would need American boots on the ground to accomplish such aims against a larger Iranian army. - Senators, including Richard Blumenthal, warned about the risk to American lives in potentially deploying ground troops in Iran, citing a path toward American ground forces. - The new National Defense Authorization Act renewal could lead to an involuntary draft by year’s end, a concern raised by Dan McAdams of the Ron Paul Institute who argues it treats citizens as owned by the government. - There is tension between Trump’s public push for a quick end to conflict and Netanyahu’s government talking about a larger, more prolonged objective in the region, including a potential demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon akin to Gaza’s situation. - Iran’s new supreme leader Khomeini issued a televised statement threatening to shut the Strait of Hormuz until the United States begs and vowing vengeance for martyrs, signaling that the conflict could continue or escalate beyond initial claims of victory. - The panel highlights potential escalation, including the possibility of nuclear weapons discussion by Trump and concerns about who controls the war, given factions within Iran and differing US-Israeli goals. Tucker Carlson’s analysis and warnings: - Carlson is presented as having warned that a war with Iran would be hard due to Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal aimed at US bases and allies’ infrastructure, and that it would push Iran closer to China and Russia, potentially undermining the US. - Carlson emphasizes the lack of a clear, publicly articulated endgame or exit strategy for the war, arguing that diplomacy has deteriorated and that the US appears discredited in its ability to negotiate peace. - He discusses the governance of Israel and the idea that some Israeli leaders advocate for extreme measures, referencing “Amalek” language used by Netanyahu to describe enemies, which Carlson characterizes as dangerous and incompatible with Western civilization’s values. - Carlson argues that American interests and Israeli strategic aims diverge, and questions why Israel is the partner with decision-making authority in such a conflict. He notes the US’s reliance on Israel for intelligence (with Israel translating SIGINT) and suggests that Israel’s endgame may be to erode American influence in the region. - He also suggests the war is being used to advance a broader political and ideological project, including America’s pivot away from foreign entanglements; he asserts that certain power centers in the US and in media and defense circles benefit from perpetual conflict. - Carlson discusses the moral framework around targeting and civilian casualties, asserting that there is concern over the ethical implications of autonomous targeting and the potential for AI to play a role in warfare decisions. - He notes the possibility that AI involvement in targeting decisions exists in other conflicts, though in the Iran situation, he mentions that a human pressed play in the specific case of an attack (the school near an Iranian base), while coordinates may have come from other sources, possibly shared by Israel. - Carlson discusses media dynamics, describing mainstream outlets as “embedded” with the defense establishment and questioning why there isn’t a robust public discussion about the war’s endgame, exit ramps, or the true costs of war. Media, propaganda, and public discourse: - The panel critiques media coverage as lacking skepticism, with anchors and outlets seemingly aligned with the administration’s war narratives, raising concerns about “access journalism” and the absence of tough questions about goals, timelines, and consequences. - Carlson and participants discuss the use of propaganda—historically, Disney and the Treasury Department in World War II as examples—arguing that today’s propaganda around Iran relies on pop culture and entertainment to normalize or justify intervention without clear justification to the public. - They argue that contemporary media often fails to examine the ethics and consequences of war or to question the necessity and legitimacy of continuing conflict, suggesting a broader risk of technology-enabled control over public opinion and civil discourse. White House dynamics and internal debate: - The guests discuss the possibility of internal disagreement within the White House, noting that while some senior figures had reservations, external pressure, particularly from Netanyahu, may have pushed the administration toward action. - They touch on the strategic ambiguity surrounding US forces in the region, noting that while large-scale ground invasion is unlikely, special forces and other assets may be deployed, with civilian and military costs disproportionately affecting American families. - The conversation also explores concerns about civil liberties, surveillance, and the potential for centralized control of information and warfare technologies to influence domestic politics and social cohesion. Overall, the dialogue presents a multifaceted critique of the handling and propulsion of a potential Iran conflict, emphasizing the risk of escalatory dynamics, the clash of strategic goals between the US and Israel, concerns about democratic consent and media accountability, and the ethical implications of modern warfare technology.

The discussion centers on the alleged Iranian nuclear threat and the possibility of a U.S.-led or Israel-led military confrontation, with a mix of arguments about intelligence, strategy, and public appetite for war. - Recurrent warnings about Iran: The hosts note that for decades the U.S. government has warned Iran is on the brink of reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. They reference claims of “fresh intelligence” and “new evidence” of a renewed program, contrasting them with past warnings during the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. The tone suggests these claim cycles reappear with each new administration or set of negotiations. - Netanyahu and Iran timing: A compilation is shown of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stating over two decades that Iran has a nuclear program that could be imminent. One clip claims Iran could produce a weapon in a short time, with phrases like “weeks away,” “three to five years,” and even apocalyptic projections. The conversation then questions whether those warnings have come to fruition and whether media and public commentary have overstated the immediacy or impact of those claims. - Stuxnet and sanctions context: The moderator recalls that during the Bush era the U.S. launched Stuxnet against Iran’s centrifuges, and argues that Obama continued those efforts with sanctions; they portray sanctions as bipartisan pressure intended to justify claims about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. A guest mentions “demonic officials” and cites a book to underscore a harsh view of the two-term sanction era. - Diplomatic vs. military options: The panel describes the Biden administration sending negotiators to address the nuclear issue, while noting that “other options” exist. They discuss the tension between diplomacy and potential coercive measures, including the possibility of coalition or unilateral strikes. - Military balance and potential outcomes (Colonel Douglas MacGregor’s view): The guest emphasizes the complexity and risk of fighting Iran. He argues: - Iran is capable and not a “backward desert” opponent, with an arsenal including roughly 2,000 ballistic missiles and significant, varied air defenses. - Iranian forces could target U.S. bases and Israel, potentially inflicting substantial losses, though the duration and scale of any campaign are uncertain. - The aim would be to “disintegrate the state” and induce chaos rather than secure swift compliance; the scenario could produce high casualties among both sides, potentially thousands for Iran and substantial American losses, depending on scale and duration. - The long-term goal, he says, is to “make the region safe for Israel” and establish Israeli hegemony, noting the defensiveness and regional power dynamics in play, including rising concerns about Turkey as a threat. - Intelligence reliability and sources: A CIA veteran (John Kiriakou) challenges the immediacy and reliability of intelligence asserting that Iran reconstituted a nuclear program. He contends: - The Israelis and the U.S. have historically provided intelligence that may be biased toward aggressive action. - The CIA has produced intelligence estimates stating Iran did not have a nuclear weapons program; he questions whether boots-on-the-ground intelligence would confirm otherwise. - He emphasizes the risk that media outlets amplify “existential threat” narratives rooted in political calculations rather than verified evidence. - The domestic political-media dynamic: The discussion highlights perceived incentives for hawkish messaging from certain U.S. and Israeli actors, including prominent commentators who push the threat narrative. One commentator argues that the push for war serves particular political or financial interests, suggesting that public opinion in the U.S. is not aligned with an immediate military conflict. - Regional and alliance implications: The panel debates how a U.S.-led or Israeli-led strike would affect alliances, regional stability, and the global economy. They highlight: - The possibility that Iran could retaliate with volumes of missiles and unmanned systems, inflicting damage on Israel and regional targets. - The risk that a prolonged conflict could undermine NATO cohesion and Western diplomatic credibility in the Middle East and beyond. - Concerns about the effect on energy routes, particularly the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and broader economic ramifications. - Operational and logistical strains: They discuss the practical challenges of sustained conflict, including: - Navy and air defenses, the need for replenishment of carrier groups, and the strain on logistics and maintenance after extended deployments. - The impact of political missteps and controversial statements (such as comments linked to public pro-war stances) on alliances and military readiness. - Speculation on timing and signals: The guests speculate about when or whether a conflict might occur, noting that political leaders may face pressure “between now and March” or around certain holidays, while acknowledging uncertainty and the potential for last-minute changes. - Ending note: The conversation closes with a recognition that the set of actors—intelligence, defense officials, media, and political leaders—are collectively influencing public perception and policy directions. The speakers emphasize contrasting views on Iran’s threat, the legitimacy and consequences of potential war, and the stakes for the United States, Israel, and global stability.

The conversation centers on Iran, potential U.S. action, and the wider strategic spillovers across the Middle East and beyond. The speakers discuss what prompted a delay in striking Iran, the likelihood of a broader attack, and how regional and great-power dynamics might unfold. - On why a strike against Iran was postponed, the consensus from the guest is that Netanyahu asked for more time to prepare for defending against Iranian missiles and to enable a larger attack footprint. The guest also cites public statements by U.S. figures supporting a bigger operation: Lindsey Graham emphatically said last Friday that the delay was so we can go bigger; General Jack Keane stated that military operations would target political and military leaders and destroy their military infrastructure to take the regime out. The guest emphasizes that the most likely scenario is an expanded target set and greater combat power in the region to defend bases and improve the attack’s effectiveness, rather than a symbolic strike. - Regarding whether Russia or China would become involved, the guest doubts active involvement by either country, but suggests indirect support or intelligence help could occur. The logic is that direct involvement would be costly for these powers, though they might assist Iran indirectly. - On the readiness and capability of Iran, the guest argues Iran is now far more prepared than in the twelve-day war. They note that insiders were purged after the prior conflict, defenses were strengthened, and missile production likely accelerated since June, with production areas shielded from prior attacks. Iran’s ability to respond quickly and with significant damage is viewed as higher, and the guest warns that if Iran experiences an existential threat, it could abandon restraint and retaliate in a way that makes a broader war more likely. - The discussion covers U.S. bases in the region, where the guest concedes that the U.S. air defense is not at the level of Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling, THAAD, and other integrated systems. Some bases lack robust defense against ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats, and, while 30,000 U.S. troops remain in the area, the overall air-defense capability is described as insufficient to stop all Iranian missiles. - Would Iran strike Gulf nations directly to pressure them to push the U.S. to end the war? The guest says not likely, arguing that Iranian leadership has signaled a preference for good relations with Gulf states and that attacking Gulf bases or cities would create more enemies and complicate Iran’s strategic posture. - A decapitation strike targeting leadership is considered plausible by some but deemed risky. The guest notes Iran has continuity of government plans and could designate successors; even if leadership is removed, a power vacuum could ignite internal fighting. The possibility of an existential attack by Iran—coupled with a broader regional war—could be catastrophic and is something to avoid. - The discussion turns to Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and the broader spillover risk. The guest suggests that if Iran’s retaliation is strong and Hamas or Hezbollah see an opportunity, there could be escalations, including potential involvement by Turkey. However, Iran would likely avoid opening new fronts that would diffuse its capability to strike U.S. bases in the region. - The problem of Iran’s internal diversity is highlighted: Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmen, among others, complicate any post-regime-change scenario. The guest argues Iran could fragment, but emphasizes that a successful Western-backed regime change could still lead to civil strife rather than a stable replacement, warning of a “textbook failed regime change” akin to past Middle East interventions. - On NATO and Western unity, the guest asserts NATO is dead or in deep trouble, citing European leaders who doubt U.S. stability and reliability. He notes European politicians discuss building an autonomous European security architecture, implying growing European reluctance to rely on U.S. leadership for defense. - Greenland as a strategic issue: the guest argues there is no rational military need for Greenland for security, and that the notion of occupying or militarizing Greenland is driven more by Trump’s personal preferences than strategic necessity. He points out that even if Greenland were militarized, Russia and China would have little to gain, given logistical and strategic barriers. - Finally, the future trajectory: the guest predicts Iran will likely be pressed hard in a large strike but warns that the consequences could be severe, including regional destabilization, potential civil conflict inside Iran, and long-term strategic costs for the U.S. and its European partners. He suggests that as long as the U.S. overextends itself in multiple theaters (Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, Venezuela), global stability and the U.S. economic footing could be endangered. The guest closes by highlighting the uncertainty of Trump’s next moves, citing possible abrupt shifts and cognitive concerns that could influence decisions in unpredictable ways.

Chas Freeman and Glenn discuss the broader geopolitical implications of the ongoing war with Iran, focusing on perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States, and then turning to regional dynamics involving Israel, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and others. Freeman argues that China does not have a unified view on the Iran war. He notes that some in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are pleased to see the United States seemingly disarmed by its own stalemate and by depleting weapons stockpiles, including the pivot away from stationing intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific. Geopolitical thinkers fear the war destabilizes a central region for global commerce and energy, with the Hormuz Strait now effectively impassable. He asserts that Azerbaijan has become a primary route for Asia-to-Europe transit, while Iran’s control of the strait and safe passage for Chinese tankers complicate sanctions regimes. China, he says, is also recalibrating its economy toward renewables and away from fossil fuels due to the war’s effects. Freeman highlights how Asia-Pacific dynamics are affected: Japan is highly dependent on oil and gas imports and is stressed; Taiwan faces limits due to its own energy constraints; South Korea is economically hurt by the strait closure; Southeast Asia suffers from reduced petroleum exports; and the war pushes China closer to Russia, with Russia’s planned Siberia gas project gaining traction as a diversified supply route away from maritime routes. He also mentions Brazil and South Africa increasing military cooperation, noting potential Brazilian-Japanese collaborations and rising defense spending in Japan, with implications for US influence and global supply chains. Freeman then discusses Russia, noting Trump’s call with Putin and the possibility that Russia is seeking to influence or assist in ending the war with Iran. He asserts Iran seeks to deter or destroy Israel and to decolonize West Asia, including removing American forces from the Gulf. He emphasizes that Russia and China do not want Iran subjugated and abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning Iran, aiming to avoid offending Gulf Arabs while not endorsing the war. The war has drawn Iran closer to Russia, with Iranian drones and technology transfers now in Russian use, and Russia increasing influence in Iran as Gulf reconstruction becomes necessary. Freeman also points out that Iran has demanded reparations and sanctions relief, and that sanctions have deeply distressed the Iranian population. He argues that Russia benefits from higher oil and gas prices and European energy dependence on Russian supply, while the conflict complicates Western weapon stockpiles and European defense needs. He contends Putin benefits from divisions within the US and diminished American global leadership, while the war is not advantageous for the United States overall. Freeman emphasizes a broader moral and strategic dimension, criticizing what he sees as a departure from international law and ethical norms, including the suspension of targeting guidelines and collateral-damage assessments in certain operations. He cites concerns about human rights and humanitarian law, warning that the erosion of a universal moral order could have long-term consequences for Western diplomacy. He invokes historical and religious ethical frameworks (Kant, Grotius, and others) to argue for a return to principled conduct in war and postwar reconciliation. The conversation turns to Israel, with Freeman suggesting that Netanyahu’s long-standing aim to reshape Israel’s security and borders faces a difficult reckoning as Iran becomes a tangible military threat. Freeman contends that Israel’s plan for regime change in Iran is failing, and he questions what Plan B might be if Israel cannot secure its strategic goals. He warns that Israel could contemplate extreme options, including nuclear considerations, if it feels existentially threatened, while noting the potential for Israel’s positions to undermine American public support for Israel and complicate US domestic civil liberties and freedom of inquiry. Glenn and Freeman close by acknowledging that the situation has created a shifting web of alliances and rivalries, with European willingness to appease Trump waning and broader questions about coexistence in the Middle East. They stress the need for a more sustainable approach to regional security and a reconsideration of diplomatic norms to avoid escalating toward broader conflict.

Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi joins the program to discuss a fast-escalating confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, with warnings of a potential global crisis. He emphasizes, repeatedly, that Iran is retaliating rather than initiating, and that Western media has downplayed the start of hostilities. Key points and claims as presented: - Recent strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities and energy-related sites. Israel attacked the Bosher (Bushehr) and Natanz facilities; Iran reportedly retaliated against Dimona in Israel, with attacks occurring near the Israeli nuclear site rather than the plant itself. - Trump has issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to strike Iran’s energy fields if Iran does not capitulate. Iran’s military leadership warned that if the United States proceeds with threats, they would strike energy facilities and desalination plants across the Gulf states, with the claim that such actions could spell “the end of this state.” - Marandi asserts the war began earlier, with U.S.-Israel aggression about eight to nine months ago, and Iran has been retaliating in response to Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure. He cites Iran’s responses to the South Pars gas field strikes and subsequent retaliations against Qatari and Emirati energy facilities as signals that Tehran will respond to escalation. - He contends that Iran’s leadership believes escalation will place greater costs on the other side, given Iran’s access to assets across the Persian Gulf and the potential to destroy Western targets. He warns that a strike on Iran’s vital infrastructure could trigger a global economic catastrophe, with cascading consequences such as mass displacement and industrial collapse. - Marandi criticizes Western media, the UN Security Council, and regional regimes allied with the U.S. and Israel for condemning Iran’s retaliation while not addressing the Israeli-U.S. aggression. He describes Western media as “Epstein class controlled” and calls for deterrence that remains credible. - He argues Iran possesses escalation dominance: confronting greater Western military capabilities with more robust regional assets and allied groups (including the axis of resistance). He asserts that if the United States expands the conflict to attack Iranian territory or regional infrastructure, Iran would respond by destroying assets on the other side of the Persian Gulf, potentially leading to the fall of allied regimes. - The discussion touches on potential consequences if Iran escalates to the destruction of Gulf energy infrastructure or desalination plants: global energy shortages, food insecurity due to fertilizer and agricultural disruptions, and a broader collapse of the world economy. - The role of regional proxies and geopolitics is explored. Azerbaijan’s Aliyev regime, Iraqi factions, Yemeni resistance, and Gulf regimes are discussed as vulnerable to Iranian retaliation or as complicit in the broader conflict. Marandi suggests that any move by the U.S. to invade Iranian territory would provoke severe retaliation across multiple fronts, including in the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea. - The possibility of broader geopolitical chain reactions is considered: Europe’s energy dependence, Russia’s position, and potential shifts in North Africa and the Middle East. He states that Europe is losing influence, and Russia could gain strategic advantages as the conflict deepens. - The refugee and humanitarian dimension is acknowledged. Iran hosts many refugees, complicating regional dynamics if conflicts worsen. - On leadership and probability, Marandi casts Trump as unpredictable, with statements and threats oscillating; he predicts a grim trajectory unless deterrence is credibly maintained, and he suggests that even a withdrawal or ceasefire would not be straightforward, given the on-the-ground realities and Iran’s demands. - He concludes with a broad warning: a global catastrophe is possible if escalation continues, and while Iran seeks to deter and respond proportionally, the path to de-escalation remains uncertain, with the possibility that the world could be drawn into a larger—and potentially third-world-war—conflict. Overall, the conversation frames Iran as retaliatory and strategically calculating, asserting that escalation could become uncontrollable and produce widespread economic, political, and humanitarian devastation unless restraint and credible deterrence prevail.

Alastair Crook outlines a two-component Iranian retaliation that is unfolding in three stages. The first component, driven by Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, was expected to target American bases in the Persian Gulf and Gulf area rather than Gulf States themselves. Ali Larragyani has stressed that the attack is not on Gulf States but on American bases and CIA facilities that use Gulf States to pursue Iran’s conflict. The second element, aimed at Israel, focuses on degrading Israel’s early warning radar systems and AIGs that allow United States and Israel to monitor Iran. This involves striking major radar sites in Gulf States such as Qatar and other locations to hinder Israel’s ability to attack Iran. The second phase then employs older missiles and drones to exhaust Israeli air defenses, wearing them down so they can no longer intercept subsequent strikes. Observations of Israeli intercepts against incoming missiles, with many intercept attempts yet frequent misses, are cited as evidence of this wear-down strategy. In the Gulf, Iranian drones have begun to operate more freely over Dubai and other sites, indicating that Gulf air defenses are strained or exhausted. Iran may continue destroying American bases and evacuating certain installations, notably in Bahrain, where the Fifth Fleet facilities have suffered significant damage. In the Israel domain, after degrading radar and defense networks, Iran may transition to more modern, faster missiles. There is speculation about hypersonic missiles with higher speeds (potentially Mach 8–10) and multi-warhead configurations arriving in Iranian inventories, though Crook hedges that he is not a military expert. A longer-term objective of Iran, according to Crook, is to drive the United States out of the Middle East, with the broader aim of reconfiguring regional power dynamics and energy infrastructure—potentially shifting influence toward BRICS and reducing Western dominance over seaborne oil and gas routes. He notes signs that the United States is attempting to control chokepoints and detain or seize tankers linked to Russia, China, or sanctioned states, albeit with questionable legal justification. The economic and geopolitical costs are significant: gas prices for Europe have surged, oil prices are up, and markets are crashing. He suggests the Gulf States may never be the same, with security concerns driving some Western residents to relocate. The conflict is also prompting discussions among Gulf States about changing their relationships with Iran and potentially limiting future American or British military presence on Gulf bases, as illustrated by warnings to the British about the Cyprus and broader Gulf basing roles. On the American side, Crook argues that the U.S. strategy is not going as planned. He asserts the killing of the Iranian supreme leader (Khamenei) was a grave miscalculation that failed to trigger regime change and instead sparked widespread protests in Baghdad, Bahrain, and Iraq, potentially destabilizing Bahrain’s ruling Emir and provoking regional unrest. He emphasizes that the attack undermined U.S. credibility and highlighted the vulnerability of American interests, with protests and regional backlash challenging the U.S. narrative and complicating domestic political considerations, including potential ramifications for Trump’s political standing. Regarding the Israeli-American relationship, Crook suggests the clash and miscalculations are likely to affect U.S.–Israel ties. He argues that attempts at decapitation strikes and hopes for a Western-aligned Iran have not only failed but also intensified anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment in parts of the region, challenging the traditional “Israel-first” posture and implying significant implications for how the United States will engage with Israel in future policy, diplomacy, and security commitments. He also notes that even within the Democratic Party, there may be demand for a thorough rethink of U.S.–Israel relations. Crook concludes that Iran’s hard-to-predict responses, combined with U.S. miscalculations and regional blowback, signal broad and potentially lasting geopolitical shifts in West Asia, with the possibility of broader implications for Russia–Ukraine dynamics and global energy security. The discussion ends with an acknowledgment that an immediate diplomatic de-escalation seems unlikely unless substantial concessions—such as lifting sanctions, returning frozen Iranian assets, and a broader shift in U.S. policy—are offered.