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We're at a point now where the Russian military has all of the advantages. They have mastered drone warfare. And I bring that up because that's the way the fighting's done now. The day of, you know, mass tank attacks and all this is over. You put a thousand tanks online and move them towards a drone equipped enemy, and you'll have a thousand smoking hulks. You can't do mass infantry attacks. You have to break your teams up into smaller teams. You have to break the battlefield up into smaller chunks. There's nothing that can be done. Nothing can be done to stop this. The advantage is 100% Russia, and we're looking at the Ukrainians on the verge of total collapse. This is why you're seeing 10 kilometers in a day here. Unpressured because the Ukrainians have nothing to plug the hole.

Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer from Donbas, returns to discuss the escalation of NATO-Russia proxy warfare, the role of drones, and potential strategic escalations. The conversation centers on how Europe is contributing to deep strikes in Russia, especially against energy installations, and the resulting danger of a broader conflict. Key points and claims, as presented: - Drones and deep strikes: The EU, through its defense alignment, aims to overwhelm Russian air defenses and threaten strategic assets, including nuclear-capable targets, by using long-range drones. The objective is to degrade Russian defensive systems and the production rate of missiles, potentially opening the path to strikes on radars, early warning systems, strategic assets like bombers, and even nuclear submarines in port. - Nuclear war risk: The interviewee asserts that by mid-to-late summer there could be a zone of possible nuclear war if ground warfare arises or escalates due to Western actions. He notes that Russia’s anti-aircraft and early warning capabilities are limited to manageable scopes, with occasional corridors allowing strikes in, and that Europe’s current strategy could push the conflict toward a nuclear dimension. - Deterrence and first strikes: The discussion contrasts U.S. first-strike doctrine with other nations’ second-strike assurances. The speaker argues that in a blinded Russia, the logic for targeted first strikes becomes stronger for the other side, while lamenting that Europe’s leadership might be pushing toward a nuclear exchange. He cites studies suggesting that as few as 47 key targets could collapse the U.S. in a nuclear context, highlighting the fragility of a high-tech economy under nuclear disruption. - European psyche and policy: There is criticism of what the speaker describes as a mass psychosis in Europe, where warnings about striking Russia’s early radar or deterrent systems are dismissed in favor of defending Ukraine. The rhetoric suggests deep political and media reinforcement of pro-Ukraine narratives, with limited space for risk discussion about nuclear consequences. - Energy installations and economy: While drone strikes have targeted oil facilities, the speaker notes that most damage has been to storage facilities rather than critical infrastructure like pipelines or refineries. Refineries are large, and damage to some vessels can take longer to repair. Russia’s production has not been significantly reduced, but the attacks are accelerating a shift of energy facilities eastward toward Asia, while Europe faces higher oil prices on the spot market and potential disruptions to gas routes like TurkStream and Caspian Pipeline Authority, with broader economic impact on Southeastern Europe and Turkey. - Russia’s response and drone modernization: The Russian military has reorganized its drone capabilities, forming dedicated drone battalions and establishing new schools to standardize and professionalize drone operations. The move encompasses reconnaissance, kamikaze, bombing, and supply drones, with adjustments after initial disorganization. Ukrainians reportedly helped inspire and provide drone countermeasures, and Russia’s modernization integrates drones with air defenses. - Zelensky and Victory Day threat: The possibility of Zelensky threatening to strike Moscow’s Victory Day parade is discussed. The guest suggests Zelensky would want to be at the head of such a move, while acknowledging the uncertainty of who controls decisions in Kyiv and the level of Western involvement. The parade’s downscaled format is noted, but the broader question remains whether such a strike could occur. The guest asserts that Russian deterrence may have been eroded, and Western actors might not take credible deterrence seriously until an incident occurs. - Africa and Mali: Russia’s activities in Africa, especially Mali, are described as significant. Mali’s leadership under Asimi Goata is navigating between Western and Russian influence. Russian forces, including elements from the former Wagner group now under the Russian defense ministry, are described as rebuilding Mali’s military and supporting a campaign by jihadist groups. The situation includes rapid, mobile “flying columns” that can cause chaos but lack staying power against organized defenses. Russian drones and aviation (including ME-20 aircraft) are reportedly effective, and Mali is moving toward energy and resource development, including three nuclear power plants proposed by Russia to Elektrify the country. France’s position is framed as colonial, with Mali’s uranium, gold, and other resources creating strategic interest. Burkina Faso’s involvement and regional dynamics involving Niger are cited as part of a broader, expanding conflict network across Africa. - Global frontlines and war risk: The guest argues that multiple frontlines are forming—Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, and Western Africa—and that they could merge into a single broader conflict if not stopped. He asserts that the West is driving this escalation, and he characterizes Western public sentiment as often indifferent to Ukrainian casualties, focusing instead on political or financial gains from the conflict. - Frontline realities: On the ground, Ukraine has tactical successes but limited staying power due to heavy casualties and supply problems. Russian forces are reportedly stronger in Donbas, Kherson, and Sumy, while Ukrainian forces face difficult conditions, including open fields and heavy artillery advantages for the Russians. Drone warfare has prompted reorganized Russian drone corps, with improved training and standardized units. The discussion ends with a warning that the conflict has global implications, with fronts expanding and risks of a broader, possibly world-scale war if not curtailed. The interviewee emphasizes that the West’s actions are fueling escalation and that African theaters, particularly Mali, are becoming an integral part of the wider confrontation.

The discussion questions what NATO will contribute, especially in terms of deploying French soldiers to Ukraine, and then pivots to the broader military capacity of Europe. The speaker asserts that only a handful of militaries today can fight large-scale ground combat, and in Europe that group consists of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. There is no European army today capable of large-scale ground combat. The speaker notes that Germany claims it will build the largest ground army in Europe, but cites a recent poll showing that only 16% of German men would be willing to fight and die for their country if Germany were invaded, and speculates about the willingness to fight if Germany were to take the fight abroad to invade somebody else. Regarding Britain, the speaker describes the entire British military as something that could be placed in a large soccer stadium, with 30,000 unsold seats, implying a perceived weakness or limited capability. The overarching point is that Europe is “a lot of huffing and puffing, but they can't blow the house down.”

Speaker 0 says that Russia's strategy is to collapse morale within Ukraine and the will to fight. We've been in discussions with them about defensive weapons to be able to protect their grid, and ongoing technical conversations about the specific equipment they need, but ultimately, if that equipment is ultimately destroyed a week later after it's installed, that remains a problem, and that's been the history the last two or three years.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

We need to do more for Ukraine than just provide supplies. While sending aid is essential, we must engage in a broader strategic campaign to effectively combat the war. It's important to understand Russia's objectives, which include degrading Ukraine's military capabilities through various means. By analyzing these tactics, we can better identify countermeasures, articulate our needs, and communicate shortfalls to the international community.

The discussion focused on multiple current geopolitical developments: Iran’s ongoing funeral proceedings for Ali Khamenei, Iran–Israel tensions around ceasefire negotiations, and the risks of escalation involving Russia, NATO, and Ukraine. Regarding Iran, the conversation cited a New York Times report that the United States was worried Israel might kill Arachi and Ghalibaf. The claim was that the Americans warned Iran through Pakistan and Qatar—via negotiations mediated by Pakistan—that Israel may assassinate them. The report also alleged that Ghalibaf’s plane, while returning from negotiations, made an emergency landing in the north after Israeli fighter jets were spotted in Iraqi airspace near or entering Iranian airspace, after which the plane drove to Tehran. Netanyahu’s press office denied the claim. The funeral context was described as a multi-day event underway, with world leaders including Medvedev in Iran. The question raised was whether Israel might assassinate Mustafa Khamenei (or other Iranian leaders) during the funeral. The response suggested it would be “too much” due to the large international delegation and the reputational and collateral-damage concerns such an assassination would create, while also arguing the news indicates Israel “becoming more reckless” if the claims were true. The discussion also touched on the idea that international warnings and mediation could be either real or “political theater,” but either way could damage U.S.–Israel relations by suggesting Israel is “extremely reckless” and that Americans felt the need to warn Iran about potential Israeli intent. On negotiations, the conversation shifted to the Strait of Hormuz. It noted that Europeans accepted Iran would charge a fee, with a Bloomberg report saying they want standardization and not pay more than countries like China or Russia. The U.S. was described as still trying to convince Iran not to charge a fee, offering unfreezing of $6 billion in exchange for Iran not charging a fee; Iran rejected the offer. The response argued Iran would interpret the situation as establishing new “realities on the ground,” and would position the charge as a fee tied to assistance and other concerns rather than a simple toll. It also argued that trust issues make the U.S. asset-unfreezing proposal “absurd,” and that renegotiation and sanctions returning would lead Iran to avoid trading control of the strait for “empty promises.” Broader regional tensions were listed: Lebanon on edge with Hezbollah; the Lebanese government seeking to disarm Hezbollah; mobilizations in Yemen involving Saudi-supported factions and Iran-aligned Houthis; and a crackdown in Iraq on figures close to Iran aligned with anti-corruption efforts. The discussion concluded the outlook was not good and that both sides would try to do something with the MOU rather than implementing it fully as outlined. The conversation then moved to Ukraine and Russia. It cited a Telegraph report claiming U.S. intelligence warned Poland that Russia may prepare a limited provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO resolve, including missile/drone strikes on critical infrastructure, cyber/hybrid attacks, or a small cross-border incursion from Kaliningrad or Belarus disguised as accidental GPS failure or a rescue mission, followed by leverage via withdrawal and demands to end Western aid to Ukraine. The response expressed skepticism due to elaborateness and the vulnerability of Kaliningrad, but acknowledged the possibility that Russia could strike a European country given prior arguments that weapons sent to fight Russia are legitimate targets and the European build-up. It also argued that Article 5 does not automatically force all NATO countries to go to war and that each country can decide its response, while warning escalation—including the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons—could be difficult to control if NATO becomes directly involved. Additional updates were discussed: Bloomberg said Prime Minister Tusk urged Poland to be cautious with further aid for Ukraine at an upcoming NATO summit; Medvedev commented that Finland lifted its ban on hosting nuclear weapons; and the Lithuanian president initiated a constitutional amendment to remove restrictions on nuclear weapon deployment to participate in NATO’s collective nuclear deterrence. The response connected these changes to perceptions of increased targeting risk and the idea that expanded deterrence can increase danger rather than reduce it, describing Finland as becoming a frontline close to St. Petersburg and arguing European “reassurance” had become politically impossible. Finally, the discussion summarized the Ukraine war. It claimed Ukrainians were “going from bad to worse,” contested claims that Ukraine is retaking territory and that Russians are taking larger casualties, and emphasized exchange ratios and map changes as evidence. It described specific battlefield concerns: increased exposure around Zaporizhzhia, Russian pressure and vulnerability near Orekhova, Russian advances threatening supply lines, and the fall of Konstantinovka and Krasny Liman in the north that would enable a pincer affecting Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. It also highlighted Russia’s talk of needing a bigger buffer zone and potential territorial aims beyond Donbas, including references to Novorossiya. The response added that Russia’s attacks behind the front include energy infrastructure and fuel logistics, targeting gas stations and transportation routes in order to disrupt Ukraine’s logistics, while arguing Ukraine has not yet collapsed but could unravel quickly once it begins. The segment ended with thanks and a brief aside about a parrot in the office.

The speaker discusses the counter offensive in Ukraine and the challenges they are facing. The lack of close air support is hindering their progress against the Russian fortifications. The speaker believes that without this support, a stalemate is likely. They also mention that the West has contributed to the problem by not providing the necessary equipment to Ukraine. The speaker suggests that negotiations or an armistice may be necessary to find a way out of the destructive war.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the Ukraine war and related strategic developments, Colonel and the host cover several key topics, facts, and analyses. Skyfall/Burevznik nuclear-powered cruise missile - The Skyfall (Burevznik) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. A test five years ago ended with five deaths and an explosion; a newer test reportedly flew 14 hours and 15,000 miles. Its characteristics include very long range, low-altitude flight to hug terrain, and high maneuverability, making detection and interception challenging. - The U.S. perspective is that it is not a silver bullet, but it represents an advanced capability: maneuvering over great distances, flying subsonically at very low altitude (within about 20 meters of the ground), and potentially approaching from unexpected directions. - Russia claims it cannot be shot down; the guest cautions that nothing is invulnerable until proven operational, but the missile adds a troubling dimension to deterrence and arms competition. - The broader significance is that it accentuates concern about nuclear weapons and underscores the desirability of nuclear arms reduction talks before START’s expiration. Nuclear arms talks and China’s potential role - The guest indicates Russia is pushing for nuclear arms reduction talks before START expires (February). China is conceptually willing to join, according to some Russian sources, but no authoritative statements from China are cited. Any willingness would depend on Western engagement to explore meaningful participation. Poseidon and other advanced weapons - Poseidon is described as a Russian nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (a "massive unmanned torpedo drone") intended as a strategic deterrent. Its exact status is uncertain; reports and videos circulate, but it remains largely experimental. - The discussion notes general concerns about U.S. safety from advanced weapons such as Poseidon and other long-range strike capabilities. Encirclement near Donbas: Pokrovsk and Kupiansk - Grasimov claimed 49 Ukrainian battalions are involved in Donbas, with about 31 allegedly encircled near Pokrovsk (for roughly 5,000 troops). Ukraine says supply lines are not cut and that encirclement is not complete. - The analysts explain that Russia has achieved notable progress in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk areas. Ukraine has mounted limited counterattacks in the north near Pokrovsk to disrupt a potential northern encirclement pivot at Rodinsky, but sustained pressure is difficult due to Ukraine’s manpower and logistics constraints. - The northern shoulder near Rodinsky is a focal point: if Russians move beyond Rodinsky, encirclement risk increases. Ukraine’s ability to keep tens of thousands of troops supplied and to hold the city is limited; Russia’s reserves enable more methodical advances. - The overarching view: Ukraine can slow Russian advances but cannot realistically stop or reverse the broader trajectory due to manpower, equipment, and ammunition imbalances. Russia’s advantage in resources makes a prolonged war of attrition unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower, equipment, and ammunition - The central constraint for Ukraine is manpower. Even with missiles, drones, and air defense, without sufficient infantry to hold and seize territory and to provide reserves, Ukraine cannot win. - Russia’s industrial capacity and reserves enable it to sustain campaigns, whereas Ukraine’s supply and manpower constraints limit sustained operations. - The discussion notes Western missiles (Storm Shadow, Flamingo) and the pace of Tomahawk deliveries, with the implication that gaps in long-range standoff capability affect Ukraine’s offensive and defensive options. Mercenaries and potential foreign troop contributions - Reports of North Korean troops aiding Pokrovsk are discussed. The guest sees little likelihood of other countries sending troops, given the risk of provoking Russia. Mercenary recruitment by other countries is mentioned as a potential but unverified factor. Western sanctions and energy dynamics - The significant development of American sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (two-thirds of Russia’s oil exports, roughly 4.4 million barrels per day) is analyzed. China’s state-owned majors and India are reducing seaborne imports but still engaging via pipelines or other mechanisms; the long-term impact on Russia’s revenue is likely substantial but may be offset through workarounds. - The guest emphasizes that history shows Russia tends to absorb economic pain and adapt, making it unlikely that sanctions alone will force strategic changes in Russia’s posture. Global Thunder and other security signals - The Global Thunder nuclear command exercise is mentioned, but the guest signals incomplete knowledge of this particular exercise’s details. Other security signals include drone activity near the Kremlin and assertions about Russia’s broader strategic planning, including potential NATO-related concerns and the Arctic buildup. NATO, European militaries, and relative capabilities - The discussion contrasts Europe’s growing modernization and ambition with actual combat experience. Europe’s strategic parity with Russia is viewed as plausible at a high level, but conventional capabilities lag Russia’s real-time battlefield experience and industrial scale. - The guest warns that perception of inevitable war between NATO and Russia could create self-fulfilling dynamics, urging cautious interpretation of escalatory signaling on both sides. Trump’s negotiation tactics and Ukraine peace prospects - The host questions Trump’s peace negotiation tactics: threats of Tomahawk missiles, meetings with Putin, and attempts to tailor a peace deal offering to freeze lines or concede Donbas. The guest describes Trump’s approach as transactional and inconsistent, with fluctuating positions that depend on the perceived personal and political gains. - The guest argues that Russia’s position has remained consistent since 2014-2022, centering on existential-security demands and denazification logic, including ensuring rights and language protections for ethnic Russians within the contested territories. A lasting peace would require a win-win vision that both sides can accept; transactional bargaining alone is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. Venezuela and broader geopolitics - The discussion notes a Wagda-linked cargo flight to Venezuela amid sanctions evasion talk, with implications of mercenaries or military parts and a broader strategic alignment with Russia. The host and guest agree that U.S. regime-change impulses in Venezuela complicate international norms, risk escalation, and could inadvertently shift attention away from Ukraine. Overall, the conversation traces the evolving military balance in Ukraine, the emergence of new weapons systems and strategic deterrence concerns, the limits of Western capabilities and sanctions, and the complex interplay of diplomacy, negotiation tactics, and geopolitical aims shaping the conflict and potential resolutions.

The speaker describes the Ukrainian Armed Forces' training and motivation as layered. They have analyzed about a thousand enemy units over three years, including brigades like the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which has been reorganized multiple times after suffering losses. The speaker claims that 15-20% of Ukrainian forces are ideologically committed, while about half are fresh conscripts. They state that those mobilized are sent into combat, and prisoners report no way to avoid conscription, with refusal leading to imprisonment and assignment to assault units. One prisoner claimed he was working in a factory two weeks prior, received two weeks of training in Germany, and was then sent to the front. The speaker asserts that 10-15% of ideologically driven nationalists control armed groups and have no option to surrender, while the other 75% of Ukrainian citizens are hostages.

"This is a NATO army that's manned by Ukrainians and by foreign mercenaries." "There’s a large number of them apparently participating in this current offensive." "So they're an active participant in this conflict, and I don't think you'd have them in these numbers if there wasn't a green light given to them by their respective governments." "There's been an internationalization of this fight." "The army that's fighting Russia right now in Ukraine is no longer a Ukrainian army." "it's a NATO army... supported by NATO intelligence, by NATO communications, by NATO command staffs, by NATO logistics." "the international legion has always been in in this fight."

Stanislav Kravtynik says he has returned to Donbass while living in Moscow. He describes trips to areas near Zaporozhye and Kherson, saying Ukrainians use drones at night to drop mines along roads, while civilian trucking and civilian cars make up most of the traffic being hit. He claims the pattern is designed to terrorize civilians, including targeting fuel trucks but mainly civilian transport. When asked about Russia’s escalation, Kravtynik argues that the Kremlin mood is “extremely militant,” saying Kiev and some European cities should be “a crater.” He asserts that daily civilian killings by Ukrainians are “nothing new” and claims Ukrainian drone warfare is “gamified”: Ukrainian drone operators receive points for destroying military equipment and personnel, and if no suitable targets are available they move down categories to civilian engineering, telecommunications, civilian trucking, civilian cars, and then civilians. He also claims most drones do not achieve kills, estimating only 15–20% produce results, with many drones shot down, stopped, or lost. He says targeting specific civilian locations includes reconning a school in Starobiesc with recon drones before attacks. He connects Russia’s restraint to changes in the escalation environment, referencing a dormitory incident in Lugansk and saying Russian conventional actions are used to “get the message across” rather than via nuclear escalation. Kravtynik criticizes targeting decisions that focus on “decision-making centers,” saying the military is a “tool” and that leadership replacement dynamics mean new officials would assume control. He also claims Ukrainian leadership is sustained by corruption and incentives tied to continuing the war, stating that as personnel are killed or “liquidated,” the remaining leadership would collapse. He argues it is unnecessary to target specific figures directly, since removing enough of the leadership apparatus would create broader collapse. Kravtynik says NATO countries are not neutral once they allow airspace or ground space for attacks or do not shoot down drones passing through their territory. He lists Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, and claims Latvia has enabled launching platforms for Ukrainian drones. He argues NATO bases should be made examples and suggests attacks on life-critical infrastructure in European cities as part of this approach. Turning to front-line developments, Kravtynik focuses on multiple sectors. In western Zaporizhzhia, he says Ukrainians have launched three counteroffensives, with earlier efforts around Gulyai Polia stopped quickly and an eastern push now encircled, with bridges blown and a pocket surrounded. He says Ukrainians break through faster because they do not “give a damn about losses,” using “suicide infantry” and storm infantry differently: younger, healthier personnel are assigned to storm infantry with training and equipment, while others become “suicide” assault waves or are used to hold sectors storm infantry cannot. He describes Kharkiv as an example, claiming attackers were sent across “two kilometers of open fields” with artillery killing the waves and that storm infantry could not be used effectively until targets were softened. He claims western Zaporizhzhia is at most a spoiling attack to delay a Russian offensive. He then discusses Ariokhov, describing movement from multiple directions, drone control over supply routes, and Russian forces closing rapidly toward Ariokhov, asserting Ukrainian defenses have collapsed. He describes Donetsk Republic as quieter, with concentrated fighting around Kostiantynivka, claiming roughly “70% in Russian hands,” a pocket of Ukrainians surrounded, and bridges blown so northern ridges cannot support each other. He claims Krasnystawka is near collapse and that Russian forces are within kilometers of Kramatorsk from the east. For the north (toward Slaviansk and Kupiansk), he describes siege dynamics around Krasnaya Mlyn, constant probing to wear out defenders, and says Ukrainians are running out of food and ammo. He also discusses logistics and a pocket up to the Serebrianka River, asserting Russian forces are cutting logistics lines and planning an offensive that could cut off a portion of Kharkiv Oblast. Regarding areas farther north and Belarus, Kravtynik claims Ukrainian drone activity over Belarus has been extensive and that Belarus would bear a cost-benefit if entering the war. He addresses reports that Zelensky has identified “500 targets” in Belarus and says the prospect of Belarus entering the fight would be escalation. He argues that European involvement is central to the survival strategy of the Zelensky regime and claims European leadership and populations are being pushed toward war while elites plan to exit when conditions become dangerous. Kravtynik concludes with a discussion of decision-making matrices, claiming staff systems weight options so that leadership believes it has choices while an intended course of action is selected. He says European leadership is influenced by “propaganda” and special interests, invoking examples such as BlackRock, and argues that even if some leaders slow the process, the EU continues moving toward war.

Russia is holding on due to its size and army. Putin is waging the war in Ukraine as a special military operation to avoid overheating Russian society, keeping it at a minimal background level. They are not fighting at full capacity; a real war with 2,000,000 drafted and 40% of the budget would have ended Ukraine in three months. Russia is satisfied with the war as a process because international isolation has ended. They have many friends, the ruble is strong, stores are full, and travel is open. Despite setbacks like Kharkov, Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kherson, and the Prigashin revolt, they continue to fight with fewer troops. The speaker questions why Russia is fighting with 650,000 against a million Ukrainian troops, contrary to textbook ratios. They ask what system they live in and what they are fighting for, given that people are hiding from mobilization instead of fighting for the motherland.

The speaker asserts that the Russian army of 2022 differs greatly from the present army due to combat experience. They claim that the experience gained across all units during the special military operation distinguishes the Russian army from all others, and any other army would suffer huge damage trying to gain that experience. The speaker believes that currently, Russia has the strongest, most professional army globally. They state that aside from the Russian and Ukrainian armies, no other army truly knows how to fight, because until an army engages in real war, combat challenges remain hidden. The speaker says that Russia has processed all of this over the past three years and is advancing technologically.

The speaker believes no factors will help the Ukrainian Armed Forces succeed in the long term. After three years, the speaker is convinced that Ukraine cannot stop them, and success depends entirely on their actions. Ukraine can only delay and slow them down, even with thousands of drones. The speaker claims their assault troops will eventually take any fortified position. They cite the Avdivka fortified area in Donetsk People's Republic as an example of a formidable fortification that they captured, despite its heavy concrete reinforcement that rendered even the Sonsepioc heavy flamethrower system ineffective. They also claim to have taken Sooja. The speaker concludes that Ukraine will not achieve success in the special military operation zone, regardless of circumstances.

Russia is holding on due to its size and army of a million. An army of 700,000 advancing on a million is slow. Putin wages war as a special military operation to avoid overheating Russian society, keeping it minimal. Russia spends 5-7% of its budget, a background mode of war with volunteers, not mobilization, while Ukraine is collapsing. If Russia drafted 2,000,000, strained the budget by 40%, Ukraine would be over in three months. They're not really fighting because they don't call up 1.5 million men. There is no real war because Medinsky feels sorry for everyone. They attack with fewer than Ukraine defends. War is a threefold superiority in breakthrough areas, 12-15 times concentration of forces, destruction to operational depth. They could create a threefold superiority of manpower and Putin may carry out another mobilization.

If the Ukrainian military doesn't stop the Russian invasion, it won't be long before our NATO forces have to fight the Russian army crossing the border.

Speaker 0 argues that many narratives about the Russia–Ukraine war lack internal logic. They say that claims Ukraine is “winning” are supported by evidence such as Russians taking massive casualties and Ukrainians recapturing territory. However, they point to reported exchanges of dead soldiers (including reparation of remains and prisoner-related dead exchanges) where the ratio is often described as around 1 to 20 or even 1 to 40, which they say implies far more dead Ukrainian soldiers than Russian soldiers and “doesn't really make any sense.” They also argue that if casualties were higher overall, the ratios would be reversed. Speaker 0 adds that advocates using these claims “get away with it.” Speaker 1 responds by focusing on casualty figures. They reference a New York Times piece that presented relative casualty numbers—killed in action plus wounded—and also separate killed-in-action counts for both sides. Speaker 1 says the New York Times article was based on a CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) study in Washington, D.C., which estimated roughly 450,000 Russians dead and between 125,000 and 150,000 Ukrainians dead. Speaker 1 uses the Ukrainians’ high-end figure of 150,000 against 450,000 for Russians, producing a “three to one ratio” (three Russians dead for every Ukrainian), and says this cannot be the case. They argue that the main battlefield killer is artillery and that estimates suggest Russians held an advantage in artillery throughout most of the war, ranging from 5 to 1 to 7 to 1 or 10 to 1. They also point to Russian smart bomb inventories as a reason Russians have been able to strike Ukrainian forces more heavily, while saying Ukrainians have virtually no smart bombs deployed against Russians. Speaker 1 further disputes the idea that differences in casualty totals can be explained by posture. They say Ukrainians have been on the offensive for much of the war, citing the Kursk offensive and a June 4, 2023 offensive described as aiming for a blitzkrieg that would reach the Sea of Azov and cut Russian front lines in half. Speaker 1 also cites major Ukrainian offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv in 2022 after noting Russian defeats. They argue that because Ukrainians have frequently conducted offensive operations—and because offense generally produces higher casualties than defense—those numbers do not align with how casualties should look. Speaker 1 says they expect that Ukrainians likely lost around a million men killed in action rather than 150,000, and that the lower figure is “ludicrous.” They add that these casualty narratives are reported and then used by various people to decide what should be done “moving forward,” including arguments for escalating support to “clobber the Russians” and end them as a great power. Speaker 1 concludes by saying elites have told themselves a story they believe and continue “march[ing] forward based on these false narratives.”

The speaker suggests that it may be unrealistic to expect Ukraine to drive out all Russian forces from their country. They propose that the United States should have direct conversations with Ukraine and focus on holding onto their current territory through diplomacy and sanctions. The speaker believes that lowering our goals and focusing on rebuilding support for Ukraine is a more realistic option. The situation in Ukraine has reached a new stage, with Russia now in a defensive posture. The Russians have built defensive lines, making it difficult for Ukraine to make significant progress. The Ukrainians have only taken back a small percentage of the land that Russia took. The speaker does not believe that Russia has achieved victory.

They are using strategic resources to break the defense line, move forward, and settle in the territory, but they have not reached any results. Their losses are very high, more than one to ten compared to Russian army losses. They have lost 186 tanks and 417 armed vehicles. There are no successes in any areas.

The brigade was left with only 20% of its members, not allowed to take them. People are being grabbed off the streets, farmers are taken and thrown to the front lines. There's no gear, no ammunition, no weapons. My will was broken. My comrades and I believe that if we had gone from Rusnea to Kyiv, all of this would have ended long ago.

President Zelensky urged Western supporters of Ukraine to join the fight against the Russian army due to Ukraine's disadvantage in population size. He called for assistance in the form of arms and manpower, emphasizing the importance of continuously sending soldiers to the front lines. However, despite repeated pleas, only a few individuals from the West chose to participate in the war effort. The majority opted not to get involved, potentially hindering the Ukrainian military and US war policy in Ukraine.

If Ukraine's military doesn't halt the Russian invasion, it won't be long before our NATO forces have to fight on the border.

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

Mario and the Colonel discuss the latest developments in the Ukraine-Russia conflict and their implications for peace negotiations and the battlefield. - The hosts walk through conflicting claims about an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on Putin’s residence, timed with Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump. Ukraine denied the claims; Russia asserted the opposite; a CIA report then said the drones targeted a Russian military base in the region and that this wasn’t the first time such a base had been targeted. The Colonel notes that all sides may be using disinformation, and no one can say with authority what happened. He emphasizes that what matters is how each side uses the information to bolster its position and public support, including Lavrov’s stated threat of retaliation. He argues the military reality on the ground continues to be unfavorable for Ukraine, and that Russia will use any incident to justify gains or concessions on its terms. - On negotiations, the 90–95% of an agreement reportedly already accepted is contrasted with two sticking points: security guarantees and territory. Zelenskyy is said to be nearing some form of security guarantee solution, but Donbas territorial concessions remain unresolved. The Colonel suggests evaluating who benefits from the alleged incident; if true, it could be used to sabotage peace talks. He notes competing narratives: Ukraine seeks to portray Russia as untrustworthy, while Russia portrays Ukraine as the aggressor and untrustworthy, both using the incident to justify their positions. He questions whether any side actually benefits, proposing that Russia might use the event domestically to rally support and push negotiations toward its terms. - The discussion moves to strategic weapons and timing. They note the Arashnik missiles in Belarus, described as nuclear-capable, with high speed and multiple warheads. The Colonel says Russia has signaled willingness to escalate but would likely reserve Arashniks for decisive moments or major escalations, possibly a clash with NATO, rather than using them routinely. He cites Putin’s statements about negotiating or taking actions by force and explains that Russia’s leadership appears to have reached a point where battlefield gains could be prioritized if diplomacy stalls. - On Ukraine’s ability to advance, the Colonel argues that Russia prioritizes territorial gains but is not constrained by time, with large manpower advantages and sustained firepower. He asserts Russia’s advance has accelerated over 2024–2025 and could continue, potentially enabling breakthroughs even if the Donbas remains a long-term objective. He contrasts this with potential Ukrainian vulnerabilities, including troop losses, desertions, and mobilization limits, suggesting Ukraine could face a collapse in the front line by spring or summer, though there is uncertainty about exact outcomes. - Regarding Ukraine’s effort to disrupt Russia’s economy by targeting the Black Sea fleet and shipping, the Colonel is skeptical that such actions would decisively affect Russia, given Russia’s diversification away from sea-based revenues and Ukraine’s parallel economic strains, including power shortages and refineries. He emphasizes that neither side’s economic measures have produced a decisive effect, and that Russia has prepared countermeasures. - Trump’s post claiming that “Putin’s attack bluster” shows Russia stands in the way of peace is discussed. The Colonel says Trump is echoing Western lines and that such rhetoric will not by itself alter the course of negotiations; an eventual settlement requires both sides to agree on terms, not slogans. - On possible Russian retaliation, the Colonel suggests targeted responses within Kyiv’s power sector or leadership and possibly infrastructure, but he cautions against predicting escalation, noting Russia’s risk-averse tendencies and potential to strike second- and third-tier Ukrainian leaders or critical infrastructure if deemed necessary for domestic purposes. - Looking ahead twelve months, the Colonel predicts continued war, potential major battlefield moves with accelerating territorial changes, and the possibility of a breakthrough or a sharp escalation. He warns that a purely defensive posture will not win and that the pace of Russian advances could lead to significant shifts by late 2026, with Donbas negotiations remaining unsettled. He concludes that the conflict is likely to continue, with hybrid warfare and broader Western responses shaping developments.