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The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

China's strength lies in its medium- to long-term perspective. The G20 and Chinese leadership are ambitious.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

Yesterday, I addressed the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, emphasizing the importance of significantly reducing our country's accumulated net emissions by 2050 in the context of social and economic development. I also mentioned considering preferential treatment for foreign entities. It is crucial to highlight that Russia is genuinely interested in enhancing international cooperation.

The United States has the largest reserves of oil and gas in the world, and we may soon see significant growth in our country. For years, we have remained the same size, but that could change. Our focus will be on increased drilling, which is expected to lower prices and boost the economy.

Xu Qinhua, host of Dialogue at CGTN, joined Glenn to discuss Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing on 05/14/2026, including the atmosphere, objectives, and key issues shaping China–U.S. relations. Xu Qinhua said the day’s atmosphere was “very positive.” Trump was impressed by the welcoming ceremony, reviewing the ceremonial guards with Xi Jinping, visits to the Temple of Heaven, and a state banquet. The leaders spent the morning in discussions with their teams, then met at the Temple of Heaven in the afternoon. In the evening, they attended a state banquet hosted by the presidency. Xi Jinping’s speech emphasized that China–U.S. should be “partners rather than rivals,” while Trump’s warm response highlighted shared values between Chinese and Americans and referenced long engagement between the peoples over about 250 years. Trump cited early U.S. contact with China in 1784, including the arrival of a U.S. ship, Chinese terms for newcomers, Chinese workers helping link the Pacific and Atlantic through a continental railroad, the establishment of Tsinghua University, U.S.-China allied cooperation during World War II, and Confucius being respected in the U.S. Xu Qinhua said both sides agreed on a vision described as “strategic constructive… strategic stability” to guide the relationship for the next three years or even beyond. Glenn raised the broader concern that Trump’s administrations, and more broadly U.S. views that China is the main peer rival, often place China in the spotlight. He referenced Xi Jinping’s idea of overcoming the “Thucydides’ trap” and asked about prospects for easing the economic war shaped by trade, technology, and tariffs. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping meant overcoming the trap and setting a new model for major-power relationships. Xu described China and the U.S. as peers in terms of economy, high-tech development, innovation, and military capabilities, arguing that how they handle the relationship affects not only both countries but global stability. He said trade used to serve as a “ballast” stabilizer because of investment and exports, but the relationship is now again at a challenging time involving trade war, tech war, and tariffs. Xu said both sides were discussing the possibility of a “new model” of coexistence, emphasizing “cooperation” and limiting “zero sum” thinking. Glenn asked what specific issues must be resolved, including whether the focus is tariffs, chip export limitations, or China’s willingness to export rare earths, and noted U.S. interest in Chinese purchases of U.S. energy and agriculture. Xu Qinhua responded that they were discussing building a “border for trade” and a “board of investment” to institutionalize dialogues and communications to address individual issues regularly rather than in isolated cases. Xu said from China’s perspective the trade war has brought suffering to both sides; China’s exports continued to grow even as U.S. tariff efforts did not stop Chinese exports. Xu said the Chinese side was pragmatic about expanding trade in areas that are not sensitive, such as advanced chips, and that U.S. companies could be willing to sell items like oil, agriculture products (including soybeans and beef), and Boeing airplanes if trade targets fall outside high-tech and national-security sensitivities. He said China’s theme is cooperation-focused “strategic stability,” with limited competition, and communication across multiple areas including military and trade. Xu argued trade itself is mutually beneficial and that trade imbalance is not the real issue, tying underlying concerns to the U.S. role as the supplier of the major reserve currency. On energy security, Glenn described U.S. efforts to reduce exports from key energy exporters and replace them with U.S. supplies, including claims about Europe after Nord Stream and a push for U.S. centrality in energy infrastructure and sales. Xu Qinhua said China has concern about over-reliance on U.S. oil and LNG and forming reliance on the U.S. market amid negative U.S. media coverage and low trust. He said China has diversified exports to ASEAN, Southeast Asia, African countries, Latin America, and European markets, and diversified energy sources so reliance on a single source is usually not over 20%, with oil and gas coming from Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ghana, among others. Xu said China is rapidly developing renewable energy (EVs, solar panels, and wind turbines), investing in nuclear power plants under construction, and also has coal resources and technology to transform coal into gas so that coal can provide electricity in worst-case scenarios. He linked this to energy security being both about sufficient supply and access to energy resources globally. Glenn raised Taiwan as a central security issue and asked how central it was in talks and whether a reduced-tension common meeting point existed. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping raised Taiwan as expected in discussions with Trump, calling it the most important issue between China and the U.S. and warning that mishandling it could put the overall relationship in jeopardy. Xu said the Chinese side increased the volume and severity of its messaging, warning that Taiwan separatist activity threatens regional peace and stability; Xu said arms sales to Taiwan embolden secessionists and create security risks. Xu said the U.S. “one China” principle has been hollowed out, citing that while a 1982 communiqué foundation includes that the U.S. would reduce arms sales until zero, Xu claimed the U.S. has increased arms sales to Taiwan. Xu argued that if Washington truly cared about peace, it would make clear to separatists that it opposes Taiwan independence and support peaceful reunification efforts, which Xu said would remove a persistent irritant and allow cooperation on issues such as AI governance and crises including the Strait of Hormuz and Ukraine. Xu added that even with U.S. intervention, Taiwan purchases of arms would not match Mainland capabilities, and he said U.S. support for separatists would fail to slow China’s modernization. Glenn asked about Iran and the Strait of Hormuz as an issue discussed between Xi and Trump. Xu Qinhua said the leaders’ discussions covered the Iranian crisis. Xu said some U.S. media coverage claimed Trump should pressure China to pressure the Iranians, but Xu said the “wrong approach” would be pressure from Washington; Xu said Beijing has nothing to do with the crisis and that the crisis is tied to a war launched by Washington and the Israelis without UN authorization, without proper explanation, and without legitimacy. Xu said China and the U.S. share some common interest in opening the Strait of Hormuz because Gulf nations’ exports rely on it and because China purchases about 50–40% of its energy from the region. Xu said Washington would need to restrain demands, respect the fact that it launched the war and failed to achieve its goals, and accept reality, while the Chinese side would help seek a long-term deal and stable relationship between the U.S. and Iran. Xu said the U.S. side had not been seen as earnest or faithful in resolving the problem. When Glenn asked how this aligns with a common stance that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, Xu Qinhua said he did not see tensions upcoming between China and Iran. Xu said multiple oil tankers were navigating the Strait of Hormuz with limited disruption, and that about 90% of Iranian oil exports go to China, meaning there is no point for China to ask for tolls on tankers destined for China. Xu said if Iranian control or tolls occur, China would not oppose, especially if the U.S. refuses compromise, refuses to lift sanctions, and does not allow normal business with other countries. Xu described the key issue as how long the U.S. will tolerate inflationary pressure and how the U.S. continues its approach against what he characterized as an Iranian blockade against the U.S. blockade. In closing, Glenn asked whether the meeting would produce a “grand bargain” or only minor tweaks to resolve disputes. Xu Qinhua said the encounter was significant, not only between the leaders but also because top executives mingled and talked, which Xu said could increase understanding and opportunities for engagement that had been absent for nine years or longer. Xu said 2026 could be a milestone year for China–U.S. relations due to frequent future meeting opportunities: Trump’s invitation for Xi to visit the U.S. in late September, plus further opportunities on the sidelines of APEC in Shenzhen and the G20 summit in the U.S. Xu said they had found the “right approach” of constructive strategic stability with cooperation-focused limited competition, moving away from zero-sum mentality, which Xu said could benefit both sides and the world.

The speaker outlines a plan to boost total volume through Mongolia and several additional routes designed to expand the total volume. The quotes themselves specify large numerical targets and the intended effect of new connections. "We'll have a 50,000,000,000 from Mongolia." "Now we have 38." "And then we'll have a couple of additional routes all to expand the total volume." "And all in all, it will be over 100,000,000,000 cubic meters of" These claims describe contributions from Mongolia, a current figure, additional routes to expand the total volume, and an expected overall volume of over 100,000,000,000 cubic meters. The transcript ends mid-sentence with 'cubic meters of'.

We are ready to offer our American partners, including administrative and governmental structures, as well as companies, the opportunity for collaboration. We have significantly more resources of this kind than Ukraine. Russia is a leader in reserves of rare and rare earth metals, located in Murmansk, Kabardino-Balkaria, the Far East, and other regions. These are capital-intensive projects, and we would be happy to work with any foreign partners, including Americans. Regarding the development of new territories, we are also ready to involve foreign partners in our newly integrated historical territories, where there are also certain reserves. We are open to working with our partners, including American companies, in these areas as well.

A new round of breakthrough in oil and gas exploration has seen the government treat oil and gas as the core focus of the latest national exploration effort, with investment approaching 450 billion yuan. New large and medium oil and gas fields have been discovered in Tarim, Ordos, and Bohai Bay, totaling 22 fields, including 13 oil fields with annual production of more than one billion tons and 26 fields with gas reserves of more than 100 billion cubic meters. By 2025, national crude oil production is projected to reach 216 million tons, and natural gas production will exceed 260 billion cubic meters, marking nine consecutive years of production growth, each year increasing by more than 10 billion cubic meters. These increases are part of a broader strategy to ensure national energy security. The Ministry of Natural Resources notes that China has achieved a three-dimensional expansion into oil and gas exploration, including deep, deep-sea, and ultra-deep operations, becoming a new growth driver. Notably, China’s first 10,000-meter-deep onshore well, Ta Ke Yi Jing, was successfully drilled through the bottom layer, and oil was discovered at depths below 10,000 meters for the first time globally. In offshore development, the Shenhai No. 1 ultra-deepwater gas field has begun production, further advancing China’s capabilities in deep-sea oil and gas exploration and development, bringing China’s total marine oil and gas production to over 90 million tons. Speaker 1 emphasizes that the significance of oil and gas breakthroughs lies not only in increasing reserves and output, but more importantly in extending exploration to deeper and more challenging regions. This dramatically expands exploration and development space and strengthens energy security by firmly securing primary control over energy security in the country.

The discussion centers on India’s position in 2025 amid a shifting international order and U.S. efforts to recalibrate a multipolar world. - The year 2025 is characterized as eventful for India, with the country under pressure to choose a path in a world where power is more distributed. The conversation opens with a framing of the U.S. adjusting to multipolarity, the return of Trump, and various global tensions, noting that India’s role has received relatively less attention. - Speaker 1 reflects that 2025 was not a good year for India. At the start of the year, India expected to remain a fulcrum of U.S. policy to contain China and to shuttle between powers, maintaining a growing trade relationship with China while navigating U.S. pressures. The Trump presidency disrupted this balance. India perceived U.S. interference in its domestic politics, including alleged U.S. fingerprints in color revolutions in Bangladesh and Nepal, and a perception that U.S. entities like the National Endowment for Democracy were involved. The 50% trade tariff on India by the U.S. shocked New Delhi, and Trump’s public and private statements criticizing India complicated the relationship. - The discussion notes India’s sensitivity to becoming overly dependent on the U.S. for strategic protection against China, given Modi’s emphasis on Indian sovereignty and self-reliance. Modi’s perceived humility toward Trump, followed by a cooling of the relationship after Trump’s tariff threats, created a crisis of confidence in the U.S.-India alignment. Modi’s personal interactions with Trump—such as a cordial birthday exchange followed by threats of 100% tariffs on India—were seen as signaling mixed signals from Washington. - India’s options in 2025 include: (1) retrenchment and continuing to seek a balancing act between the U.S., China, and Russia; (2) charting an independent course by strengthening ties within BRICS and the Global South; or (3) aligning more with the U.S. with the hope of future U.S. policy shifts. The economic reality complicates choices: while India’s exports did reasonably well despite tariffs and some FDI, opening Indian dairy and agriculture to the U.S. market would threaten farmers’ livelihoods, potentially destabilizing an electorate sensitive to domestic issues. - There is a broader point about Washington’s approach: demand loyalty from regions and countries while using tariffs and pressure to shape alignment, and Trump’s approach is described as a fear-and-intimidation strategy toward the Global South. - On the China-India axis, the speakers discuss how China’s rise and India’s size create a power disparity that makes simple dominance difficult for either side. India’s strategy involves leveraging BRICS and other forums (including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) to expand multipolar governance and reduce dependence on a single power center. The interlocutors emphasize that BRICS operates by consensus and is not a vetoed UN-style body; thus, it offers a platform where major powers can cooperate without a single dominant voice. - The potential paths for India include growing within BRICS and the Global South, seeking mutual economic advantages, and developing a strategy that reduces vulnerability to U.S. coercion. One line of thought suggests using digital tools to help Indian small and medium-sized enterprises access global markets, and building coalitions using shared developmental and financial needs to negotiate better terms in global trade, similar to how an OPEC-like approach could coordinate commodity pricing for the Global South. - The conversation also touches on border and regional issues: a historical context where Russia resolved border tensions with China via settlements that altered the balance of power; the suggestion that India and China could adopt joint administrative arrangements for disputed border zones to reduce conflict risk and foster cooperation, though this requires careful handling to avoid loss of face for either side. - The role of China is described as patient and multipolar-friendly, seeking to buy more from India and to cultivate mutual trade, while recognizing India’s internal challenges, such as power reliability and structural issues like caste and crony capitalism, which affect India’s ability to produce and export higher-value goods. - The broader takeaway is a vision of a more integrated multipolar Eurasia, where India’s leadership within BRICS/SC0 and its ability to create innovative economic arrangements—such as “resource bourses” or shared supply chains—could alter the balance of power and reduce dependency on U.S. policy dynamics. There is an emphasis on avoiding a new Cold War by fostering dialogue and joint governance mechanisms that include China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and other Global South actors. - The speakers close with a cautious optimism: 2026 could be better if nations learn to push back against coercive power, redefine security around development and governance rather than force, and pursue multipolar institutions that preserve autonomy while enabling peaceful competition. The expectation is that seeds of hope exist within these analyses, even as the present year has been challenging.

The BRICS countries are implementing large scale initiatives in the area of nuclear energy and aviation, new materials and IT industry, robotics engineering, and artificial intelligence. Certainly, particular attention is being paid to strengthening connection within the BRICS block. Their mutual goods turnover of our countries has already exceeded 1,000,000,000,000 U. S. Dollars and continues to grow. All of that are elements of the global platform for growth. They are founded on the key principles of BRICS, that is primarily consensus, parity, accounting for the interest of one another. Russia welcomes all of its partners to make their contribution to shaping new global growth model.

Europeans were buying more Russian oil and gas than they were giving in aid to Ukraine, essentially funding both sides of the war. Germany will become totally dependent on Russian energy if it does not immediately change course. It's very sad that Germany makes massive oil and gas deals with Russia, paying billions of dollars a year to them. Many countries make pipeline deals with Russia, paying billions into their coffers while we're supposed to protect them against Russia. The former chancellor of Germany even heads the pipeline company supplying the gas. Germany will have almost 70% of their country controlled by Russia with natural gas. Germany is a captive of Russia because they get so much of their energy from them. They got rid of their coal plants and nuclear. NATO needs to address this.

US leaders, according to the discussion, have pushed Russia and China closer by trying to prevent a stronger alliance outside the Western Hemisphere. President Vladimir Putin met with President Xi Jinping, and the two signed a record number of agreements covering energy, finance, AI, transportation, manufacturing, and military coordination. Key developments highlighted include new pipeline infrastructure permanently directing Russian energy toward China and growing efforts to bypass the US dollar in global trade. The discussion links these moves to Western pressures such as high energy prices, deindustrialization, debt, stagnant growth, and economic fallout from years of proxy wars and sanctions policy, framing the Russia-China trade corridor as on track to become a strategically important global route. The speakers contrast the Putin-Xi agreements with President Trump’s recent trip to China, describing one set of deals as historic and growth-based and the other as diplomatic and transactional. They portray Trump-era US-China deals as tariff pauses, trade concessions, agricultural purchases, and efforts to stabilize and correct issues created, while portraying Putin-Xi agreements as going beyond commerce—building long-term energy infrastructure and alternative financial systems outside the US dollar, effectively aiming at a parallel economic order rather than managing trade tensions. Former State Department diplomat Jim Jatris says US foreign policy has driven the two powers into a historic alliance, and he argues that the real question is whether Russia and China still see themselves as invested in the dollar-denominated system as it stands. He points to the joint statement’s “hoping” for a future multipolar order with the US stepping down from ambitions for global unipolar power, adding that they may not yet know whether the US can be persuaded to do so. When asked about the nature of the Russia-China partnership and whether the US could do something similar, Jatris responds that US diplomacy often arrives with minimal substance, while he claims Americans are not offering the kind of comprehensive, sustained partnership described. On the US dollar, Jatris says the agreements involve multipolar cooperation and end-around arrangements to settle transactions in yuan and ruble outside the US petrodollar system, describing this as potentially the “final nail in a coffin” for the dollar and noting that earlier predictions of replacement currencies have not yet come to pass. He argues both Russia and China also have corrupt interests and that short-term deals could benefit individuals rather than national interests. Asked about Iran, Jatris calls it the “big question,” arguing that Russia, China, and Iran are loath to admit that the United States is not “agreement capable,” citing a hypothetical example involving sanctions relief and control of the Straits of Hormuz. He says Russia and China may instead view the situation as an opportunity to weaken the US “empire,” offering an off ramp for Trump that could result in a “Minsk type deception.” On military cooperation, Jatris says China is interested in technical knowledge gained by Russia in Ukraine, describing joint training missions as Russians training Chinese on lessons from drone warfare and related experience. He frames Russia as the stronger military power with a larger nuclear arsenal and notes direct experience in a paradigm-changing war only Russia and Ukraine have. Regarding Europe and the prospect of a western war against Russia, Jatris argues Europe is the main problem, asserting Washington is trying to offload burdens to Europeans. He describes low willingness among Europeans to fight, ties it to constraints including cheap Russian energy’s role in industry, and argues Europeans are making noise but are not positioned to fight materially, spiritually, morally. He suggests Russia may be overestimating that European problem and makes the case that Russia should finish the Ukraine war sooner rather than later. On Putin’s political prospects and Russian appetite for continued conflict, Jatris says he sees not an inability to win but a deliberate decision shaped by classic statecraft: forcing the enemy to agree to terms. He cites Putin’s June 2024 terms—four oblasts, Crimea agreements including no NATO neutrality, denazification, and demilitarization—and argues that even if the West agreed, those terms would not be honorably enforceable without Russian control of Kyiv. He also contends that Russian questioning of treaty guarantees and the possibility of denazification/demilitarization lacks a workable answer. The conversation also includes claims of frustration in Russia over the war being prolonged, references to large numbers of dead including non-Ukrainians serving as mercenaries, and the view that money continues to flow into the conflict.

First speaker notes that China is a reascending power, not a rising one, pointing out that from 1500 to now China had the world’s largest GDP 70% of those years. He suggests that Confucian thinking underpins China’s view of reasserting long-standing dominance, and explains the blending of public-private partnerships and the role of organizations that backstop private companies in China. He describes China’s capital allocation as both rigid and flexible. The process starts with Xi Jinping and his close circle drafting priorities, including involvement in the five-year plan. The plan moves from a small central group to the Politburo, then to the provinces and finally to the prefectures. He explains it as a cascading set of venture capitalists operating against national priorities, with provinces and local actors rewarded for aligning capital and labor with those priorities. The result is an ecosystem where hundreds of venture capitalists coordinate human capital across regions to advance targeted goals, producing major companies such as BYD and Xiaomi. Second speaker adds that China maintains a five-year plans for every industry, detailing forecasts not just for catching up but for what is possible. This framework drives innovation across sectors, including nuclear power, and supports the notion that China is charting new avenues of development. He reiterates that the country is returning to a position it has long held rather than pursuing a status as the world’s largest economy, emphasizing a national-pride motivation amid different governance structures. Third speaker emphasizes the historical perspective, noting how remarkable it is that China held the world’s largest GDP 70% of the years since 1500. He reflects on how technological innovations, such as ship technology, have driven great empires, with China repeatedly on the heels of such shifts. He suggests that this may be China’s moment of resurgence across the board. The discussion also cites Lee Kuan Yew’s foresight, as highlighted by a work by Graham Allison and related quotes: China is not just another big player, but the biggest player in the history of the world, and China’s displacement of the world balance requires the world to find a new equilibrium. The dialogue ties this historic perspective to the idea that China’s current reemergence is both a continuation of a long pattern and a contemporary strategic effort guided by centralized planning and broad industry-wide five-year frameworks.

We would be ready to offer our American partners, including administrative, governmental structures, and companies, to work together. We have far more resources of this kind than Ukraine. Russia is a leader in reserves of these rare and rare earth metals, located in the north in Murmansk, in the Caucasus in Kabardino-Balkaria, in the Far East, in the Irkutsk region, in Yakutia, and in Tyva. These are capital-intensive investment projects. We would be happy to work with any foreign partners, including American ones, and on new territories as well. We are ready to involve foreign partners in our newly acquired historical territories, which have been returned to the Russian Federation, as there are certain reserves there too. We are ready to collaborate with our partners, including American ones.

China’s president Xi Jinping has explicitly called for the renminbi (yuan) to attain global reserve currency status, stating that China must build a powerful currency that can be widely used in international trade, investment, and foreign exchange markets and that can be held by central banks as a reserve asset. This is a clear, definitive statement of intent that signals Beijing’s aim for the yuan to play a central role in the global monetary system and to reduce reliance on the US dollar. Beijing surfaced this message with intentional timing. The remarks, originally delivered in 2024 to senior Communist Party and financial officials, were only recently made public. Xi’s reserve currency ambitions and plans were published in Qiushi, the party’s most authoritative policy journal. The timing matters because the remarks appear as the US dollar faces pressure, global monetary uncertainty rises, and central banks worldwide reassess their exposure to the dollar. Trade tensions, the growth of sanctions, and rising political risk have contributed to this reevaluation, and China has moved from quietly expanding yuan usage for trade to explicitly naming its ultimate goal. Xi outlined the institutional foundations he believes are required to support reserve status: a powerful central bank with effective monetary control, globally competitive financial institutions, and international financial centers such as Shanghai and Shenzhen capable of attracting global capital and influencing global pricing. As for where things stand today, IMF data shows the yuan still has a long way to go. It currently makes up less than 2% of global foreign exchange reserves. The dollar still dominates with well over 57%, though it has declined from about 71% in 2000, and the euro is roughly 20%. China still has capital controls, and the currency is not fully convertible. Why would central banks want another fiat currency in their reserves? The attraction of the dollar and the euro lies in the backing of the United States and the institutional credibility behind them. The yuan’s appeal, according to the discussion, is that it is becoming a fiat currency with implicit gold backing. China’s officially reported gold holdings have risen to roughly 2,300 tons, per the World Gold Council, with steady year-after-year purchases, including at least fourteen consecutive months of net purchases through 2025. However, many analysts believe China holds more, with estimates based on trade flows, import data, and disclosure gaps suggesting true holdings closer to 3,005 tons, and some higher-end estimates proposing up to 10,000 tons or more. This gold accumulation serves as a hard asset anchor in an era where trust in fiat currencies is perceived to be weakening. China may be gearing up to offer an alternative linked to gold. It may not be ready to displace the dollar tomorrow, but it is clearly moving toward challenging King Dollar’s throne.

Afshun Rutansi speaks with Professor Zhang Weiwei, director of the China Institute at Fudan University, who has translated for Chinese paramount leaders including Deng Xiaoping. Rutansi frames the discussion around Trump’s visit to China amid the Israel-Iran war context and events including officials meeting in Delhi and a reported Saudi initiative for a West Asian aggression pact with Iran ahead of Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s scheduled meeting in Beijing. Rutansi asks whether Chinese officials understand that Xi Jinping is meeting a U.S. president responsible for attacking one of China’s key energy trading partners. Zhang says many Chinese prefer Trump over Harris for being “slightly more honest,” and contrasts Trump’s “decent respect” for big powers such as Russia and China with perceived hypocrisy from Biden and Harris. He argues that China should manage damage through dialogue given U.S.-China as the two largest economies and military powers. Rutansi raises historical memory, arguing that the U.S. deliberately prevented China from buying grain during Mao’s famine and imposed a naval blockade of food. Zhang responds that, during the Cold War, although no “hot wars” occurred between the U.S. and Soviet Union, China faced the Korean War and the Vietnam War as direct military confrontation with the U.S., and that China remembers the U.S. drawing lessons from those conflicts and that China would fight back if “red lines” were crossed. On claims that Trump is “destroying China while smiling” and attacking China’s energy supplies, Zhang says operations tied to Venezuela and Iran are aimed at controlling oil China needs. He says Venezuela represents less than 3% of China’s total oil imports, so it “will not affect” China’s oil supply, while the Iran situation is “more serious” and is treated as a mistake from which China can benefit due to long-term energy planning pursued for about two decades. Zhang says China’s energy dependency on foreign supply is at maximum 15%, and outlines China’s current energy mix: about 52% from coal described as “processed green coal,” 20% from renewables, and the rest from traditional oil and gas, with roughly 70% of those fuels from foreign sources. He lists diversified oil supply routes including lines from Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar, and highlights a railway connection between China and Iran as “hugely important for Iran.” Rutansi asks whether this railway was bombed as part of a U.S.-Israeli campaign; Zhang says the U.S. “really dare[s]” not to damage it overall and that on the whole it is still moving. Zhang links U.S. efforts to containment with previous trade and tech wars starting in 2018, saying they “failed completely,” and cites an ASPI report comparing critical high-tech technologies where he claims China beats the U.S. in 57 of 64. He argues China’s position is that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open and places responsibility for the crisis’s consequences on U.S. and Israeli military action, while also saying China has “strategic partner” relations with Iran and Gulf states and hopes for reconciliation between Iran and the Gulf States. In part two, Rutansi asks why China was not hosting or acting as intermediary in negotiations and whether China spoke through Pakistan. Zhang says China prefers “behind the scene, low key” approaches. Rutansi then addresses claims that China could use rare earths as leverage and asks why China exports rare earths to the U.S. Zhang says China has exercised stricter control over rare earth exports to the U.S. since the previous year, stating that for a one-year period there would be no rare earths for military purposes, and that China can exercise this control during negotiations. Rutansi asks whether China will reduce exposure to U.S. treasury markets; Zhang says China-U.S. trade relations are normal overall, but that Trump’s trade war led to a sharp drop, and describes China’s “socialist market economy” as driven by private and public enterprises. He rejects “moralistic perspective” as the main lens, stating that China follows international law and Chinese law, condemns aggression, and applies sanctions through the United Nations if necessary. Rutansi criticizes propaganda narratives and asks about the U.N. General Assembly president Annalina Beerbok calling Xi Jinping a dictator, asking whether that makes things difficult for China and the U.N. Zhang argues the issue lies in EU politics and what he calls low caliber of EU, U.S., and NATO leadership, and says he predicted that without political reform, worse leaders would be elected. On whether working classes in NATO countries will see through propaganda that China is the enemy, Zhang says opinion surveys show China’s impression improving gradually in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and in the West, especially among young people, attributing this in part to widespread use of Chinese hardware and software. He also explains that American and other foreign companies invested in China because of profits, and says the trade war and tech war drove high-tech firms to consolidate business interests in China; he mentions Apple, Tesla, Microsoft, and says Boeing has not been purchased in nine years while Boeing’s CEO is now in China.

Speaker 0 introduces a myth that Trump waging war against Iran would close the Strait in a way that hurts China first, making Trump victorious, and asks for an answer to that perception. Speaker 1 argues that the perception isn't accurate, noting China has been building energy security for over twenty years. They travel to China frequently and see zero signs of energy scarcity; if there were any potential energy squeeze, it would be visible among the people and on social media, but it isn’t. He explains China’s energy composition is stable, and that even if Middle Eastern energy supplies were disrupted, China’s situation remains manageable. He states that China actually produces 30% of the crude oil it consumes domestically, so it does not import all its energy. Speaker 0 adds that people are often surprised by how much solar, wind, and hydropower China has, mentioning a special report noting that the aggregate annual terawatt-hours of output of China’s power grid is more than double the United States, and that this is growing rapidly. Speaker 1 confirms the rapid growth and attributes part of China’s diversification to the influence of Western financial practices, saying, “thanks to the Western banking cartel because they have been suppressing the price of silver to ridiculous low prices.” He claims China imports all the silver to manufacture solar panels, implying that by maintaining low silver prices, Western bankers have inadvertently helped China with energy diversification.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.

The speaker discusses a three-year plan involving the purchase of 250 units per year. The speaker states that too much Russian LNG is entering the European Union through the back door, along with some Russian gas and oil. The goal is to eliminate Russian fossil fuels entirely from the European Union. Purchasing more affordable and better LNG from the United States is welcomed. The estimation is approximately 250 units per year over three years.

Speaker 1 argues that the outcome mentioned in the headline is already baked in due to the lack of energy and fertilizer coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. He notes we are in week nine of the conflict, and there doesn’t appear to be a solution in sight. If the conflict lasts a few more months, it becomes catastrophic on a global scale. The countries most impacted will not be the United States but nations that already have tens of millions on the edge of famine, including Sudan and Yemen. Egypt is close to that category, and India and Bangladesh will also have a lot of difficulty. He explains that Bangladesh has its own nitrogen production plants but relies on imported natural gas to produce nitrogen. Two of Qatar Energy’s 14 natural gas trains, which are production pipelines, are out of commission for three to five years, taking 17% of Qatar Energy’s gas offline. The Haber-Bosch chemical process, which turns gas into ammonia and then into urea and other nitrogenous fertilizers, underpins this. Therefore, the world is already going to face starvation of millions in 2027, and that number could grow to tens of millions or even hundreds of millions if the Strait of Hormuz is not open soon. Speaker 0 asks for a global explanation of how the food system works and why countries depend on inputs from abroad. Speaker 1 responds that about 8,000,000,000 people globally, or roughly 4,000,000,000 or more, live today because of the Haber-Bosch process that turns hydrocarbons into ammonia and then nitrogenous fertilizers. If the supply chain is lost, and while not all natural gas comes from the Strait of Hormuz, a large amount—25% or more—comes from there for fertilizer production. The destruction of Nord Stream pipelines affected BASF (BASF is a German company) which produced nitrogenous fertilizers from Russian gas, and that cut off years ago. China and Russia have now halted all exports of fertilizers, including to India, which asked China for emergency fertilizer and was told that China needs it for its own populations. The bottom line is that not only is the natural gas feedstock being cut off that would normally feed 4,000,000,000 of the 8,000,000,000 on the planet, but countries are becoming more nationalized with their supplies, leaving vulnerable countries like Bangladesh, Thailand, and India hanging in the wind.

On December 9, 2022, Xi Jinping reportedly stated during a state visit to Riyadh that Palestine should be addressed as a state with 1967 borders and a capital in Jerusalem, a claim not covered by Western media but reported in Middle East press. In the afternoon, he invited the six Gulf Cooperation Council states to trade oil and gas in Shanghai for yuan, signaling the end of the Bretton Woods system. The speaker published a commentary on their website asserting that Bretton Woods ended that day, a claim they felt Western media ignored, leading them to develop multicurrency mercantilism as a handbook for understanding future developments. The alternative to the dollar, according to the speaker, is the dollar plus all other currencies and commodities. The ruble, yuan, rand, UAE dirham, Malaysian ringgit, or any currency that two parties to a transaction accept, along with gold, oil, and recently silver and other commodities, can serve as stores of value or economic inputs. The transition to alternatives could be stable unless there is wider war. Historically, transitions from a hegemonic currency to a rival currency have been accompanied by world wars. The dollar replaced sterling after World War I and established dominance after World War II. The central question is whether a new hegemon will emerge and how the United States’ willingness to use violence to preserve hegemony will fare given its growing economic dependence on China and vulnerability. China is not forcing use of the yuan; it invites use, but participants are not obligated. Globalization, the speaker argues, accelerates as more than 40% of the global economy under sanctions (e.g., Iran, Russia) gains optionality to use other currencies, re-integrating with global trade. Russia is engaging in substantial trade with India and China, selling oil and gas, while Iran trades with China as its main oil buyer. Venezuela, previously a major oil supplier to China, faced sanctions; the speaker notes it was invaded yesterday, implying altered trade dynamics. The “Angel Paradox,” named after Norman Angell, posits that sanctions harm the sanctioner more than the sanctioned when interdependent economies go to war; this paradox has been reinforced, particularly with Russia, which has become more sovereign and less dependent on Europe after 19 rounds of sanctions, emerging stronger and contributing to Russia becoming the world’s fourth-largest economy, with the ruble performing well in 2025. Europe, the speaker contends, has weakened due to energy costs, and 19 rounds of sanctions have diminished its growth and industrial capacity. The concept of resiliency, stability, and inflation is highlighted: trading in one’s own currency with partner currencies yields more predictable flows, reduces volatility, and may lower inflation while enabling steadier long-run growth. The speaker notes that more countries have moved to local currency trade since 2022, illustrating the ongoing shift away from hegemonic currencies. Speaker 1 adds that Russia did not anticipate SWIFT exclusion and responded by mandating ruble payments for oil and gas, accelerating the development and globalization of Russia’s own payment system, MIRS, akin to SIPs, and praising Central Bank Governor Elvira Nebolmina for stabilizing the transition.

Russia is rich in natural resources, like grain, oil, aluminum, and fertilizers, making it a key player in the global economy. Some see breaking up Russia as a way to profit immensely. After the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, NATO should have disbanded since its purpose was to counter the Soviet Union. Instead, NATO persisted, needing a new enemy to justify its existence. Russia sought to join the West, even meeting with Gazprom's leader.

Speaker 0 questions whether the “woke era” is a failed experiment and references ESG and DEI as part of that push, noting a shift toward talking in practical terms about what can be done. Speaker 1 reflects on the pendulum of society, noting that BlackRock manages money for a wide range of investors. He says, today, renewables are less talked about, but many investors worldwide are investing in renewables, emphasizing solar and related technologies. He mentions working with Occidental Petroleum to build carbon capture factories in Texas. He states that the pendulum five years ago was too far and that he is personally more pragmatic. He asks whether BlackRock pushed some companies a little left of center, clarifying that it was never their intention because their job is to be a fiduciary to everyone who gives them money. He explains their responsibility: if an investor wants to invest 100% in hydrocarbons in Texas, they will invest the full amount in Texas; if another state fund wants them to invest in all green energy, they will do that because it’s their money. Speaker 1 emphasizes that today, due to AI and the overwhelming need for power and electricity, energy strategy cannot be one-dimensional. It cannot be solely hydrocarbon. He notes that China is rapidly building more nuclear than any other country, has the largest solar fields, yet remains the biggest importer of gas and oil. He concludes that, more importantly today, society has moved into a better position of having more pragmatism, and what Speaker 1 is expressing echoes what their clients are saying.

Professor Wang Wen discusses China’s de Americanization as a strategic response to shifts in global power and U.S. policy, not as an outright anti-American project. He outlines six fields of de Americanization that have evolved over seven to eight years: de Americanization of trade, de Americanization of finance, de Americanization of security, demarization of IT knowledge, demarization of high-tech, and demarization of education. He argues the strategy was not China’s initiative but was forced by the United States. Key motivations and timeline - Since China’s reform and opening, China sought a friendly relationship with the U.S., inviting American investment, expanding trade, and learning from American management and financial markets. By 2002–2016, about 20% of China’s trade depended on the United States. The U.S. containment policy, including the Trump administration’s trade war, Huawei actions, and sanctions on Chinese firms, prompted China to respond with countermeasures and adjustments. - A 2022 New York Times piece, cited by Wang, notes that Chinese people have awakened about U.S. hypocrisy and the dangers of relying on the United States. He even states that Trump’s actions educated Chinese perspectives on necessary countermeasures to defend core interests, framing de Americanization as a protective response rather than hostility. Global and economic consequences - Diversification of trade: since the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, China has deepened cooperation with the Global South. Trade with Russia, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has grown faster than with the United States. Five years ago, China–Russia trade was just over $100 billion; now it’s around $250 billion and could exceed $300 billion in five years. China–Latin America trade has surpassed $500 billion and may overtake the China–U.S. trade in the next five years. The U.S.–China trade volume is around $500 billion this year. - The result is a more balanced and secure global trade structure, with the U.S. remaining important but declining in China’s overall trade landscape. China views its “international price revolution” as raising the quality and affordability of goods for the Global South, such as EVs and solar energy products, enabling developing countries to access better products at similar prices. - The U.S. trade war is seen as less successful from China’s perspective because America’s share of China’s trade has fallen from about 20% to roughly 9%. Financial and monetary dimensions - In finance, China has faced over 2,000 U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms in the past seven years, which has spurred dedollarization and efforts to reform international payment systems. Wang argues that dollar hegemony harms the global system and predicts dedollarization and RMB internationalization will expand, with the dollar’s dominance continuing to wane by 2035 as more countries reduce dependence on U.S. currency. Technological rivalry - China’s rise as a technology power is framed as a normal, market-based competition. The U.S. should not weaponize financial or policy instruments to curb China’s development, nor should it fear fair competition. He notes that many foundational technologies (papermaking, the compass, gunpowder) originated in China, and today China builds on existing technologies, including AI and high-speed rail, while denying accusations of coercive theft. - The future of tech competition could benefit humanity if managed rationally, with multiple centers of innovation rather than a single hegemon. The U.S. concern about losing its lead is framed as a driver of misallocations and “malinvestments” in AI funding. Education and culture - Education is a key battleground in de Americanization. China aims to shift from dependence on U.S.-dominated knowledge systems to a normal, China-centered educational ecosystem with autonomous textbooks and disciplinary systems. Many Chinese students studied abroad, especially in the U.S., but a growing number now stay home or return after training. Wang highlights that more than 30% of Silicon Valley AI scientists hold undergraduate degrees from China, illustrating the reverse brain drain benefiting China. - The aim is not decoupling but a normal relationship with the U.S.—one in which China maintains its own knowledge system while continuing constructive cooperation where appropriate. Concluding metaphor - Wang uses the “normal neighbors” metaphor: the U.S. and China should avoid military conflict and embrace a functional, non-dependence-oriented, neighborly relationship rather than an unbalanced marriage, recognizing that diversification and multipolarity can strengthen global resilience. He also warns against color revolutions and NGO-driven civil-society manipulation, advocating for a Japan-like, balanced approach to democracy and civil society that respects national contexts.