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Charles (Speaker 0) and Mario (Speaker 1) discuss a wide range of intelligence topics, personal history, and contemporary covert operations, emphasizing experiences from the CIA and reflections on global security dynamics. Charles begins by outlining his background: growing up on a farm in Ohio, enlisting in the Navy as a law enforcement specialist at 17, studying East Asian languages and Mandarin, and eventually learning Persian. He joined the CIA in July 2001 as an operations officer, spending most of his career in the Middle East with stints in Europe and Asia, and leaving the CIA in 2019. Afterward, he worked at Tesla to set up an insider threat program and manage global information security investigations. He notes extensive experience with China, Russia, Israel, France, and South Korea, and emphasizes the prevalence of intellectual property theft and proprietary-systems concerns in the private sector, including the role of motivated individuals and cross-border actors seeking to commercialize advanced technology. The conversation turns to leadership targeting and decapitation concepts. Charles references how the Iraq War began with an attempted decapitation strike at Saddam, asking whether removing a center of gravity leadership could end a conflict decisively and whether that would be humane. He discusses Iran as a persistent factor across the region, arguing that Iran’s meddling contributed to problems in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and that without Iranian involvement, upheaval might be less intense, though turmoil remains possible. Mario expresses fascination with intelligence capabilities, particularly related to Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Maduro, and asks about Charles’s CIA background and roles. Charles explains that his work involved recruiting individuals with access to foreign governments to commit espionage and provide secret information—“human operations.” He emphasizes the dramatic realism of espionage as two people engaging in a life-changing conversation, rather than high-action TV tropes. They discuss border crossings and the reality of intelligence work. Charles notes that the hardest border crossings were often returning to the United States, when travel appearances didn’t match and documents or identities could be scrutinized. He stresses the difference between romanticized espionage and the real tension of crossing borders with non-legitimate materials, relying on confidence, charisma, and interaction under stress. On private-sector and national-security crossover, Charles highlights the complexity of cyber threats and corporate espionage. He describes a Tesla case involving a Russian criminal organization attempting to install malware, with FBI involvement and the arrest of a Russian national. He explains that in cyber threats, the distinction between government-sponsored and private actors is often blurred, with organized crime sometimes acting as proxies for larger state agendas. He notes that entrepreneurial actors seek to accelerate development by acquiring others’ material, not building entire systems from scratch. He also comments on the blurry boundary between nation-states and private actors in tech espionage and the difficulty of attributing responsibility. The Mossad’s capabilities are analyzed in depth. Charles argues Mossad excels by focusing on high-impact targets within a narrow geopolitical scope (Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq) and by strong locational intelligence—understanding where leaders live, work, and their access points. He emphasizes Mossad’s willingness to act decisively, using surrogates and superior technology for surveillance. He mentions the head of Mossad and a quote from his book about ubiquitous surveillance through devices like phones and watches. He notes the “pager operation” against Hezbollah as a case study in supply-chain manipulation and the use of compromised intermediaries, and he cautions that modern operations involve cyber manipulation and near-constant information-flow considerations. Both discuss real-world operations, including the 2010 Dubai operation targeting a Hamas logistics figure, and general lessons about operational security, noting that some details cannot be disclosed publicly. They reflect on the “gentleman’s rules of the game,” acknowledging that lethal operations and leadership-targeting can be controversial and legally complex; they discuss how different regimes and leaders are perceived and targeted. The Maduro operation is revisited. Charles describes gathering information through satellites, drones (including covert, stealth, and micro-drones), and human intelligence; he stresses determining a target’s pattern of life, where a leader lives, sleeps, moves, whom they meet, and what they eat. He notes that insider sources and the right informants are critical, and he discusses the balance between opportunities created by regime instability and the risk of compromised sources. He emphasizes that in times of turmoil, there is opportunistic recruitment, as some individuals see few options other than cooperating with outside powers. Privacy is a recurring theme. Charles asserts that privacy is not dead but requires effort to protect. He compares privacy to fitness, arguing that modern technologies make it easy to be public, but steps can be taken to reduce attack surfaces, including privacy consulting, careful metadata handling, and secure, layered security (physical security and cyber measures). He uses anecdotes about Strava revealing location data and a submarine commander whose Strava activity was linked to his demise, illustrating how personal data can reveal sensitive information. Towards the end, Mario and Charles discuss strategic ambiguity and unpredictability in political leadership, including Trump’s posture and international signaling. They touch on the potential paths for Iran if regime change occurs, debating the likelihood and consequences of upheaval, the role of Western policy, and how regional dynamics might shift if the mullahs and IRGC structures are altered. The conversation ends with mutual appreciation for the complexity of global security issues and the rapid pace of geopolitical change.

Israeli spies were detained after being caught recording the 9/11 attacks. They later admitted on television that it was their job to document the event. They were then questioned again, this time about their alleged membership in Masai. They explained that they come from a country that faces daily terror attacks and their purpose was to document the event.

The Mossad is very small. We're talking about an organization that has about 1,200 people, including secretaries and dry. To run a station in London you need doctors. You need drivers. You need cars. You need apartments. You need people who buy food, who sell food. You need people who vacate you tickets. So you open a station in London with five guys. Five. Sorry. That's the most sign for five. These five guys are the actual case officers. Then what you do is you get people to come from Israel, and they scout the country. They come up with a lot of names of the Jewish community in London. 70% turned them down, but nobody will ever turn them in. Before you know it, you've got 300, 400 people in London who are supporting the station. A banker opens the bank, and he takes it up because he knows two days from now, the money's gonna be back. You open a summer camp in Israel, and you fly people in, and you start teaching them that there’s a lot of antisemitism out there, and you have to protect yourself because everybody's an antisemite. There is no such thing as dual loyalty. This is a myth. Either you're loyal to your country or you're not. Never will Israel agree to have an Israeli support The US the way they expect people in the Jewish community to support Israel. There are more people in Israeli jail for supporting or helping US intelligence than you have Israelis in American jail. Now you have the same power that I was just telling you about in Tel Aviv, in San Francisco. Your people don't have that kind of power. This is a separate department that handles your work as a backup. That's called the soft cushion that you fall back on. San Francisco. Fine. We'll write you down that you're going to San Francisco. We have this cop and this cop and this cop and this cop, and we'll call this guy and this guy and this guy, and we'll get you out of there. Don't worry. Go do your thing.

The discussion connects multiple individuals and organizations to alleged covert intelligence activity and influence over major events. It begins by referencing Robert F. Kennedy’s campaign and Teddy Kennedy’s chief counsel, then claims that attorney Jeffrey Blattner (executive chairman of HIAS) told Ted Kennedy not to run against incumbent Linda B. Johnson, after which Robert Kennedy ran anyway. The transcript then links Jules Kroll to Robert Kennedy’s campaign team and asserts that Jules Kroll is IDF unit 82,300 while Jeffrey Blattner is Mossad. It claims that in 1972 Jules Kroll and his wife Lynn Korda Kroll began a private intelligence operation called J. Kroll and Associates, which later became Kroll Incorporated and grew into a major private intelligence and investigative firm. The speaker says Kroll and K2 Intelligence are related “distinction without a difference,” and that Kroll worked for clients including the Vatican and Bernie Madoff, as well as being used in cases such as Harvey Weinstein investigations. The transcript also claims that the firm’s Tel Aviv spinoff later had a chief technology officer who was an IDF sergeant in unit 82,300, described as an Israeli signals intelligence equivalent to the NSA. The “plot” relevance is tied to the speaker’s claim that Kroll’s wife had a role in UJA Federation (United Jewish Appeal), and it expands into UJA Federation’s alleged connections to broader power networks. It identifies Larry Silverstein as former chairman of UJA Federation (1994–1997), describes him as connected to “old money” Jewish families and Mossad-related figures, and brings in Brian Michael Jenkins (described as deputy chairman of Kroll) and L. Paul Bremer. The transcript claims French intelligence suspected Jenkins and Bremer of promoting threat prevention strategies and then causing attacks when organizations didn’t adopt them. It further states that the New York Port Authority hired Kroll in 1993 to conduct a terrorism vulnerability threat analysis for the World Trade Center Plaza and that the report included a line item suggesting (it said) it was unlikely but possible that the towers could be vulnerable to being hit by jet airliners. The transcript then asserts the Port Authority hired Kroll to run security for the World Trade Center Plaza immediately after Jenkins’ report, and links that year to Larry Silverstein becoming president of UJA Federation. A Mossad whistleblower is introduced: Victor Ostrovsky. The transcript says Ostrovsky, after serving in the Israeli Defense Force beginning at age 14 and becoming a Mossad agent for fourteen months, became a “burn notice”/whistleblower and wrote two books: *By Way of Deception* and *The Other Side of Deception*. It claims the books’ content was managed to avoid “mass scale antisemitism,” and lists ADL (Jonathan Greenblatt), APAC, and UJA as entities said to be arms of Mossad, citing social media training claims and appointment/training activities mentioned in the transcript. The transcript then moves to post–September 11 financial and structural changes, asserting that Solomon Smith Barney (described as the largest tenant of World Trade Center Building 7) was “crashed” and consolidated, and it claims $2.3 trillion referenced by Donald Rumsfeld was consolidated among Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, BlackRock, Blackstone, Apollo, and a little to Goldman Sachs. It states there were 3,800 Jews who worked in both towers and claims only four Jewish deaths were reported on 09/11, including Daniel Lewin (cofounder of Akamai) described as reportedly the first 9/11 casualty and said to be IDF. Additional claims focus on corporate ownership: the transcript asks who is the largest shareholder of BlackRock and asserts Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley ownership (with Merrill Lynch said to own 45%), and it links BlackRock’s founding to Steven Schwarzman of Blackstone, and Rob Capito as UJA Federation. It further asserts connections among Blackstone, BlackRock, Apollo Global Management, Larry Silverstein, and James Tisch, alongside Mark Rich (born Marcel Reich), and describes Mark Rich as having brokered deals involving Iran, Israel, and the Ayatollah through Mossad agents that allegedly reduced oil costs despite US sanctions. It then identifies Michael Chertoff as “second generation Mossad” and claims he coauthored the Patriot Act with provisions to protect Israel from future investigation, later appointing him as secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and later chairman of BAE Systems. The transcript claims Rumsfeld later chaired a pharmaceutical company (Eli Lilly) and sat on boards connected to Investor AB. The discussion culminates in claims about COVID-19: it introduces Alvin Krongard, alleging he controls conservative media, helped plan and cover up COVID, and made trades before September 11 and before related outcomes. It asserts that BlackRock’s Aladdin (and similar tools “In-Q-Tel” and “Lab 72/Lab 41”) was used to model pandemic impacts, and claims Avril Haines (described as working directly for Tony Blinken) was sent to “Event 201” to seize control of the global financial system. Finally, it asserts COVID was “calibrated” to affect certain populations through ACE2 receptor polymorphisms, and it connects Sergei Brin and 23andMe to access to patient DNA data used for calibration. The transcript ends mid-sentence as it continues discussing these claims.

Israel's entire military plan was leaked, including highly confidential information about how they're going to fight, where they're going to fight, and where they're going to go. The leak was possibly from the defense department or somebody. Authorities have no idea who did it. The speaker suggests that whoever leaked the information is the enemy, possibly the enemy from within.

We have an incredible array of possibilities of creating foreign companies that have no weight being traced back to Israel. Shell companies over shell companies who affect the supply chain to our favor. We create a pretend world. We are a global production company. We write the screenplay. We're the directors. We're the producers. We're the main actors. The world is our stage. This is Mossad's old office. Its motto from Proverbs twenty four six says in so many words, wage war through deception and trickery, kinda like the CIA smoke and mirrors, which is what this operation was all about.

"Israelis are not like anybody else. They killed a guy in a hotel room in Dubai, and then after they killed him, they were somehow able to lock the door from the inside of the hotel room. There's an underground" "My experience is universally negative. Universally negative. I've never had a positive encounter with Mossad." "The thing is, you know, the Israelis this was covered in the Washington Post, just a couple days after the twelve day war started." "And what the Israelis did is that they have a lot of Farsi speaking Jews in Israel. These are Iranians who are Jewish and who emigrated to Israel, and a lot of them work from Mossad and Shin Bet."

Discussion centers on subversion and thwarting plots against the state of Israel and, publicly, what they call the Mossad. It was hard to answer because 'you can't pick up the phone book.' 'There's no, Langley in, in Israel'—so they couldn't simply look up 'CIA or Mossad.' They asked, 'What shall we call it in English?' 'Mossad is institute,' but they wondered, 'when they write a letter to their friends in the CIA or the British intelligence, what do they call themselves?' It took a while, 'a matter of asking the prime minister's spokesman,' since officially 'the Mossad is under the prime minister's office.' He 'sort of wondered why you wanna know and all that,' so they explained, and he came up with 'the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service.' 'If it were to have initials, it would be ISIS. Just simple words like that.'

Mario: Daniel, after decades of diplomacy, the Middle East is now at war. Early on you suggested Hormuz and economic leverage; as the conflict evolved, US ground invasion talk, targeted Iranian leadership, and new developments—like JD Vance’s reaction to US intel and Israel striking energy infrastructure in Iran—have shaped concerns that Israel wields outsized influence. Broad question: how did we get here and why? Daniel: There’s a long history of American and Israeli influence in play. There is American agency and a geopolitical logic tying chokepoints like Hormuz to broader aims, such as reasserting US primacy vis-à-vis China. But this doesn’t fully explain how the last 10 yards into war were crossed. Netanyahu’s long effort to shape a strategic environment culminated when he found a president open to using American power in the region. Israel’s strategy appears to be to assert greater regional dominion by leveraging US military power and creating dependencies with Gulf states. Netanyahu reportedly offered the president an actionable plan, including on-the-ground assets, to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spark a broader upheaval, which helped push the White House toward a twelve-day war in June. Israel also presented a narrative of rapid US escalation to secure its aims, while the American interagency process—though deteriorated in recent years—had to interpret unusually aggressive, yet selective, Israeli intelligence and objectives. The result is a complex dynamic where US rhetoric and decisions are deeply entangled with Israeli designs for regional hegemony, an outcome that was not broadly anticipated by many regional partners. Mario: If the US administration had not fully understood Israel’s project, how did this come to pass? And how does Mossad factor in? Daniel: Israel has tremendous access to influence over an American administration through lobbying, media echo chambers, and political finance, which Netanyahu exploited to drive a course toward major confrontation with Iran. Before Trump’s term, Netanyahu was nervous about a president who could pivot against allies; he devised a strategy that culminated in Operation Midnight Hammer and subsequent US-Israeli collaboration, reinforced by the possibility of rapid decapitation of Iran’s leadership. There are reports (and debates) about Mossad presenting on-the-ground assets and the possibility of instigating a street revolution in Iran, which may not have been fully believed by Washington but was persuasive enough to shape policy. The question remains how much of Israeli intelligence makes it to Trump and his inner circle, especially given concerns about cognitive ability and decision-making in the White House at that time. Netanyahu’s aim, according to Daniel, was not simply to topple Iran but to maximize Israel’s regional leverage by using American power while reducing other regional peers’ influence. Mario: What about Gulf states and broader regional realignments? How did the Gulf respond, and what does this mean for their security calculus? Daniel: The Gulf states face a stark dilemma. They fear Iran's retaliatory capabilities but also distrust America’s consistency and question whether US support will be cost-effective. Iran’s strikes into the Gulf have forced Gulf capitals to reassess their reliance on US protection and Israel’s influence, particularly given Israel’s aggressive posture and expanded regional footprint—Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—with potential implications for the Gulf’s own security and economic interests. Some Gulf actors worry about over-dependence on American security assurances while Israel intensifies operational reach. The GCC’s calculus is shifting: they confront a choice between continuing alignment with the US-Israel bloc or seeking more independent security arrangements. The possibility of a broader Gulf-Israel axis, or at least closer coordination, is tempered by concerns over long-term regional stability, public opinion, and the risk of escalation. Mario: How has this affected perceptions of Iran, Israel, and the broader regional order? Has the Gulf’s stance shifted? Daniel: The region’s balance has been unsettled. Iran’s actions have damaged Gulf trust in its neighbors’ security guarantees, while Israel’s aggressive posture and reliance on US power have complicated Gulf states’ calculations. Turkey’s role is pivotal as it balances concerns about Iran and Israel, while also watching how the region realigns. The possibility of a future where Iran’s power is weakened is weighed against the risk of destabilization and long-term security costs. Negotiations between the US, Iran, and regional actors—stoked by Turkish diplomacy and shifting Gulf positions—are ongoing, with Turkey signaling that diplomacy remains important, even as Gulf states reassess their security dependencies. Mario: What about Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the potential for broader spillover? Daniel: Lebanon faces severe consequences: displacement, civilian harm, and a domestic political paralysis that complicates relations with Israel. Hezbollah remains a factor, with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and the South. Israel’s goal of establishing security-control in Lebanon risks reigniting long-standing conflicts, while Lebanon’s government seeks a balance that could prevent further escalation, if possible. The broader picture is that Israel’s approach—driven by a perceived need to neutralize Iran and all potential threats—could provoke wider regional blowback, complicating already fragile domestic politics across the Levant. Mario: Final thoughts as the war unfolds? Daniel: Israel’s strategic ambitions appear to extend beyond countering Iran to shaping a broader order in which it remains the dominant regional power, aided by US military leverage. Gulf states face a difficult reorientation, reassessing longstanding alliances in light of perceptions of US reliability. The coming months will reveal whether regional actors can recalibrate toward diplomatic resolutions or wind up in a deeper, more protracted conflict. The question remains whether a political path could replace military escalation, and whether external powers can deter further aggression and stabilize the region without allowing a broader conflagration.

The speaker discusses trying to uncover what the Mossad is called when dealing with other intelligence agencies. After asking the prime minister's spokesman, it was revealed that they refer to themselves as the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service, or ISIS for short. This name is used when communicating with agencies like the CIA or British intelligence.

The speaker discusses subversion and how to identify what they call the Mossad publicly. You can't pick up the phone book—"There's no, Langley in, in Israel that you can look up, you know, CIA or, in our case, the Mossad." They asked, "what shall we call it in English?" "Mossad is institute" translates the Hebrew words. When they write to friends in the CIA or British intelligence, "what do they call themselves?" It took a while. It was a matter of asking the prime minister spokesman, the best you could do because officially, the Mossad is under the prime minister's office. And I think he sort of wondered why he wanna know and all that, so we explained. He came up with "the Israeli secret intelligence Service." "If it were to have initials, it would be ISIS." "Just simple words like that." "Interestingly enough, kind of a British model."

Mossad agents are not permitted in CIA headquarters because every time they would come, they would give us gifts, and the gifts always had listening devices embedded in them. And we're like, you guys have to stop doing this. They're like, oh, we brought you a seal of the CIA. You should hang it in the director's office. It's all full of listening devices. So we're like, you guys can't come here anymore. So we had to rent a safe house, and we meet with the Israelis in this safe house. The Israelis are not our friends, period.

Subversion involves foiling plots against Israel, including political ones. A question arose about what to call the Mossad in English. Unlike the CIA, there’s no straightforward way to look it up. The term "Mossad" translates to "institute," but when communicating with agencies like the CIA or British intelligence, what do they refer to themselves as? After some inquiry, the prime minister's spokesman revealed that they call it the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service, which could be abbreviated as ISIS. This naming follows a model similar to that of British intelligence.

Discussion centers on how to publicly refer to Mossad. There’s no directory like Langley in Israel, and the question arises: what do they call it in English? Mossad is institute. When they write to friends in the CIA or British intelligence, what do they call themselves? It took a while; it was a matter of asking the prime minister spokesman. Officially, the Mossad is under the prime minister's office, and he wondered why they wanted to know, so we explained. He came up with the Israeli secret intelligence Service. I mean, if it were to have initials, it would be ISIS. Just simple words like that. Interestingly enough, kind of a British model.

The transcript references Mossad whistleblower Victor Ostrovsky, who started in the Israeli Defense Force at age 14, spent twenty years with the Mossad, and became a burn notice whistleblower who wrote two books: “hear the truth now. First one by way of deception” (described as respected from Israel to the rest of the world) and “the other side of this option, the rest of the world's perspective, but they left out.” It claims Mossad is “the most ruthless, aversive intelligence apparatus in the world. No close second, not even the CIA.” It states the second book covers how Mossad affected global governments, geopolitics, legislation, and policy on a global scale. It also asserts claims about influence over elections, saying “Candidates. One Israeli intelligence telling you they control your election.” It alleges the ADL trains every FBI agent at Quantico. The text mentions “NBC Halakaz Museum” and states that “Israeli intelligence [is] controlling the federal law enforcement.” It connects financial figures to conspiracy claims: “Apollo Global Management, chairman of UGA Federation Mark Rowen, Leon Black, long time Epstein, associate Josh Harris,” alleged to be behind the COVID murders while “assuming control of the financial markets.” It claims COVID was a replay of 9/11, stating that “Nothing discriminate planes into buildings, but this time more specific with who they targeted, white Europeans.” The speaker then repeats phrases like “They lift it up” and emphasizes urgency: “Wake up. Wake up. See the guns, they're moving. You need to understand the urgency and what time it really is.”

Speaker 0: Agreed with an Israeli request to stop the distribution of a book that contains some pretty damning information about the Israeli secret service, the Mossad, if it is true. Speaker 1: The most sensational claim in the book involves this bloody day, the Beirut Marine Barracks bombing. The book says Israeli agents kept vital information from US Marines that might have saved the lives of 241 Americans killed here. Israeli government sources deny this account. But according to the book, an Israeli informant saw a Mercedes truck being fitted with secret panels for explosives. Israeli troops were told to be on the lookout for the truck. But the book says the Israelis intentionally gave the Americans only a vague warning, not mentioning the kind or size of vehicle. The book says Israeli intelligence was willing to let the terrorists succeed to protect their sources and out of contempt for US intelligence. It says agents withheld information on US hostages for similar reasons. In Toronto today, the author was under a court ordered gag not to discuss the book or the case. Speaker 2: You see, there's two restrictions. There's one restriction that I can't talk about what I learned or have done in the Mossad, and the other restriction is I cannot talk about anything that's in the book. Speaker 1: Israeli officials confirm that Viktor Ostrovsky worked for the Mossad in the nineteen eighties. Alarmed by the contents of the book, they got it temporarily blocked in Canada and The United States. Speaker 3: It's a position of the Israeli government that the information contained in the book could very well lead to the identification of employees of the Mossad and could jeopardize their lives. Speaker 1: But the book's introduction says it does not name active agents and gives only initials. It does say that more than two dozen senior Israeli agents routinely gather intelligence in The United States. Late today, the book was put out for sale in New York after the court lifted its restraining order. The publishers claimed victory, but the Israeli embassy said it will still pursue its action against the author. John Martin, ABC News, Washington.

"The Mossad is very small. We're talking about an organization that has about 1,200 people, including secretaries and dry." "Five guys are the actual case officers." "Cannot have a station in Damascus because they have no embassies there." "70% turned them down, but nobody will ever turn them in." "You need a car, you need a safe house, you need a doctor, you need tickets, you need transportation, you need $300,000 in an hour, 12:00 at night." "There are more people in Israeli jail for supporting or helping US intelligence than you have Israelis in American jail." "There is no such thing as dual loyalty. This is a myth." "A separate department that handles your work as a backup... the soft cushion that you fall back on." "Your people don't have that kind of power."

The speaker explored why someone was so protected, initially considering possibilities like working for the Israelis or Mossad. They now believe US involvement was primary, stating that working for Israel wouldn't provide such protection, referencing Jonathan Pollard's jail time. The speaker suggests that if it was an intelligence operation, the key question is which part of the US intelligence system the individual was working for.

The speaker lays out a narrative in which Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, is intricately connected to the CIA and to a longtime insider, James Angleton. The claim is that Mossad and Angleton formed an alliance “forever,” with Angleton described as “the mole” who was aligned with Mossad. In 1960, Angleton was the head of the CIA’s Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, and he is depicted as the person who was always searching for a Russian mole. The speaker asserts that Angleton was effectively the Russian mole because of his close friendship with Mossad, to the extent that he would share information with Mossad and Mossad would not relay it to Russia. The narrative then moves to 1963, referencing David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli prime minister, arguing that Israel decided to kill John F. Kennedy. The speaker quotes Ben-Gurion as saying that Kennedy’s threats of inspections of “demonic” (interpreted as a mispronunciation or coded term for dangerous issues) were unacceptable, and that Ben-Gurion said, “It’s none of his frigging business. I don’t wanna hear anymore from Kennedy. You kill him.” According to the speaker, Ben-Gurion issued this order to Mossad and then resigned so he could not be held responsible for it. The implication is that Mossad then went to Angleton, implying that the Kennedy assassination was not a CIA job, but was “greased by the CIA” because Angleton had his connections at Mossad. From there, the speaker claims that Corsican sharpshooters were hired by Mossad for the Kennedy assassination as part of a larger operation at Dealey Plaza, including the escape. The speaker asserts that public suspicion has misattributed the blame to the mob, Lyndon Johnson, or Castro, but maintains that it was Israel that carried it out. The stated motive is tied to Israel’s desire to avoid further inspections related to their nuclear program. The speaker claims this is connected to Israel’s nuclear and biological capabilities and asserts that plutonium was stolen from the United States to support their program. In summary, the speaker contends that the Kennedy assassination was orchestrated not by the CIA alone, but through a coordinated effort involving Mossad, James Angleton, and David Ben-Gurion, with Israel acting to prevent scrutiny of its nuclear activities by eliminating Kennedy, aided by Corsican shooters and a CIA-Mossad alliance.

The discussion revolves around the Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, and how it identifies itself in English. After inquiries, it was clarified that they refer to themselves as the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service (ISIS). The conversation then shifts to the historical context of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, highlighting that the fighters being faced today were once supported by the U.S. during the Cold War to counter the Soviet Union. This strategy, backed by President Reagan and Congress, involved recruiting Mujahideen with the help of the Pakistani military, which ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union's collapse. The dialogue also touches on the controversial claim that Hillary Clinton and Obama played roles in the creation of ISIS, while emphasizing the importance of American influence in these geopolitical matters.

Clayton discusses with Kevin Ship, a former CIA officer and author of Twilight of the Shadow Government, how false flags allegedly unfold and why they persist in public discourse. Key points: - False flags are planned for months in advance. Kevin suggests that covert operations typically identify a single boogeyman to avoid implying a broader conspiracy, arguing that a lone perpetrator allows authorities to claim “we got him” and deny wider conspiracy. - The pattern cited includes one individual who previously showed no criminal tendencies, who then commits a violent act, followed by quick attribution to a designated boogeyman, with the implication that the operation is over and left without further inquiry. - Specific incidents discussed include the Bondi Beach attack in Australia, with references to Mossad’s involvement and claims that Iran is behind the attack to push for war with Iran. The exchange questions the Australian government’s role and the relevance of Mossad’s presence in investigating the incident. - The conversation links these operations to broader intelligence ecosystem dynamics, noting a close collaboration and “frenemies” relationship between the CIA and Mossad. They describe Mossad as having a pervasive role in Middle East intelligence and describe a history of interactions where Mossad and the CIA share high-level information and sometimes operate in tandem, though at times Mossad may target the CIA as well. - The discussion points to prior examples of disinformation, such as the 9/11 events, where perceptions of evidence (e.g., a passport found near the World Trade Center) are presented as straightforward proof, while being described as an example of ineffective or misused disinformation to shape public belief. - In addressing media influence, Kevin references the CIA’s media liaison office and programs designed to influence how news is presented in the United States. He contends that “Mockingbird”-like media consolidation and complicit outlets help propagate these narratives, especially to audiences that rely primarily on television news. - The conversation notes a perceived pattern of actors or individuals appearing at multiple, unrelated events (e.g., a person claiming responsibility or being present at various incidents) as part of the alleged orchestration of false flag narratives. - They discuss the effectiveness of false flags: despite growing scrutiny and critical reporting, they argue that false flags continue to influence public perception, aided by psychological studies within intelligence communities and the reliance of many viewers on mainstream media for information. - Kevin reiterates his belief that the shadow government—particularly the CIA’s control of elected government and media propaganda programs—remains powerful, with ongoing operations designed to manipulate thinking and push narratives that serve certain geopolitical aims. He emphasizes that false flags are a recurring tactic and predict more of them in the future. - The conversation closes with Kevin urging readers to consider his book Twilight of the Shadow Government and to engage with his perspective on the CIA’s influence over media, politics, and public belief.

The speaker states they did not trust Israelis, "not as far as I could throw them," and that the CIA doesn't allow Israelis into headquarters because they would bring gifts containing listening devices. According to the speaker, 100% of the gifts from Israelis had bugs in them, even at a safe house in Virginia. The speaker claims that 100% of their colleagues didn't trust Mossad. In contrast, the speaker trusted the British the most because their national interests are closely aligned.

"The Mossad is very small. We're talking about an organization that has about 1,200 people, including secretaries and dry" "In order to have a station in London, what do you need? You need doctors. You need drivers. You need cars. You need apartments." "So you open a station in London with five guys. Five. Sorry. That's the most sign for five. These five guys are the actual case officers." "70% turned them down, but nobody will ever turn them in." "There are more people in Israeli jail for supporting or helping US intelligence than you have Israelis in American jail." "Now you have the same power that I was just telling you about in Tel Aviv, in San Francisco. Your people don't have that kind of power."

Speaker 0 discusses working with the Israelis, describing them as “very American” and noting that they could get into shouting matches during meetings over whose idea was best, followed by casual lunch and reconciliation. He emphasizes that Israel is a good ally that the U.S. needs to protect and support, and he asserts that CIA and Al Qaeda had worked closely together in Iraq and in Syria, and that there are times when covert action allowed meetings with the “quote unquote, enemies” to try to bring things down as CIA officers. Speaker 1 adds that most of the world has a problem with Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh, but there is less of a problem because the CIA worked with ISIS/Daesh and Al Qaeda. He suggests that if the CIA worked with them, it would be better to understand what they were doing, and if the plan is for the U.S. to work with them on a security agreement, which has been done with enemies before, then this has been done in concert with diplomats and other countries involved. He indicates he wouldn’t be surprised if that was happening and would call it possibly hopeful. Speaker 0 continues by noting that newspapers in the United States once celebrated Qasem Soleimani as a fighter with American troops against ISIS and Al Qaeda. He states that Soleimani “was, and now it's switched,” implying a shift in perception or policy. The overarching theme is the idea of collaboration or coordination with hostile or extremist groups in pursuit of broader strategic objectives, including countering Iran, and the possibility that such collaborations could be framed as necessary or hopeful within a complex web of alliances and covert actions. Speaker 0 ends by reiterating the shift in stance: “Now we have to go to al ISIS and Al Qaeda to go back against Iran.” This underscores a cyclical or ironic pivot in U.S. strategy, moving from partnering with certain adversaries against common threats to reengaging those same groups to counter another adversary. The dialogue presents a candid view of realpolitik, suggesting that relationships with seemingly incompatible actors and shifts in alliances occur as part of broader geopolitical objectives, with collaboration sometimes described as acceptable when it serves strategic goals, and public narratives sometimes contrasting with behind-the-scenes actions.

Speaker 1 acknowledges that Mossad likely doesn't share all intelligence with the U.S., just as the U.S. doesn't share everything with them, but emphasizes it's a close alliance. Speaker 1 assumes all allies, including Israel, spy on the U.S., and attributes this to people acting in their rational self-interest. When asked if it's in America's interest for Israel to spy on the U.S., including on the president, Speaker 1 states it's in America's interest to be closely allied with Israel because the U.S. gets huge benefits from it. While acknowledging the spying takes place, Speaker 1 does not express disapproval, but rather focuses on the benefits of the alliance.