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Gilbert Doktorov is asked how the Iran war is reshaping dynamics in the East, especially for Russia and China, and what the broader implications are for global order. - On Russia’s stance and reaction: Doktorov notes a gap between the Kremlin’s official positions and what “chattering classes” discuss. He observes astonishingly limited reaction from President Putin and his close foreign-policy circle to dramatic developments that could redefine regional and global orders. He contrasts Putin’s cautious, “slow-war” approach with sharper criticisms from other Russian voices (e.g., Salaviyev and Alexander Dugin) who urge moving beyond a gradual strategy. There is a sense within some Russian circles that a more assertive stance may be required, yet official channels show restraint. - On Iran’s strategic position and alliances: He points out that Iran has withstood intense pressure and maintained the ability to threaten Gulf energy infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz, thereby sustaining global leverage despite severe attacks. Iran has managed to survive and press the global energy market, calling into question how meaningful Iran’s inclusion in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is in practice. He notes scant evidence of meaningful Russian or Chinese military or intelligence support to Iran in public accounts, and cites Israeli claims of Russian arms shipments being denied by Moscow. - On the West’s behavior and international law: The discussion highlights what is described as the United States’ “might makes right” posture and the dismissiveness toward traditional international-law norms, including UN Charter commitments. The panelists contrast American rhetoric about legality with its real-world actions, and discuss how Russia’s and China’s responses have been cautious or critical rather than conciliatory or confrontational. - On potential military cooperation and bloc dynamics: The conversation explores whether a deeper Russia-China-North Korea alignment could emerge in reaction to US and Israeli actions against Iran. Doktorov mentions that North Korea is viewed as a, “will and determination to act,” supplying munitions such as underwater drones and missiles to Iran, whereas Russia and China are characterized as more talk than action. He argues Moscow benefits from maintaining broad, non-aligned diplomacy, but acknowledges a shift in Russian thinking after recent events toward more decisive posture. - On Europe and the US-European split: The panel discusses the European Union’s fragility and its leaders’ inconsistent responses to the Iran crisis and to US pressure. They consider European solidarity rhetoric as a cover for avoiding hard choices, with examples including Belgian leadership suggesting normalization with Russia post-conflict. The discussion reflects concern that EU leaders may be forced to confront realignments as Gulf energy supplies and US LNG leverage reshape Europe’s energy security and political calculus. - On diplomacy and pathways forward: The speakers debate the prospects for diplomacy, including possible three-way or broader security arrangements, and whether Alaska or other meeting points could offer reprieve. They note a public split within Moscow’s foreign-policy establishment about how to proceed, with internal figures pushing for diplomacy and others advocating a stronger balance of power. There is explicit skepticism about the utility of negotiations with Donald Trump and the idea that the war could end on the battlefield rather than through diplomacy. - On the Ukraine war’s interconnection: The discussion emphasizes that the Iran crisis has global ramifications that feed back into Ukraine, noting that Russia’s current posture and Western responses influence the Ukraine conflict. Doktorov highlights that the depletion of US air defenses observed in the Israel-Iran context affects Ukraine, underscoring the interrelatedness of the two wars and their combined impact on global power dynamics. - Final takeaway: The dialogue reiterates that the Iran war has a global dimension with the two wars being intimately connected; the Iran conflict reshapes alliances, energy security, and strategic calculations across Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, while signaling a potential reconfiguration of Western alliances and multipolar governance.

Mario and Professor discuss the current MOU tied to Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and related negotiations. Professor says Iran is “in the driver’s seat,” that the deal starts “terrifically” for Iran, and that it will “get better over time.” He argues the most important information comes from shippers who want Iran to clearly guarantee their security “by Iran,” not by the United States, UAE, or other Gulf states. He says Iran’s stated demands include $12 billion up front, another $12 billion at the end of the 60 days, and ongoing weekly oil-sale revenue of about a “billion dollars a week,” which he frames as leverage used to “squeeze” Donald Trump during the 60-day window. Professor’s central claim is that oil inventory drawdowns create a timeline advantage for Iran. He says oil shipments to refineries take roughly 30 to 60 days, so during the 60-day window consumers must keep drawing down inventories because “there will be no new oil coming” to them. He predicts Iran’s leverage will grow by the end of 60 days because the world’s buffers will be gone, and oil inventory experts indicate inventories cannot be refilled until next year. He adds that this produces a repeating cycle: if Iran cuts off again, it would be “much worse” for the market, giving Iran additional leverage to demand more, including linked pressure regarding Lebanon and Hezbollah. He also argues that Iran is using the negotiation as a power-maximization tool to reach regional dominance, noting that since March/April Iran has allegedly “taken Hormuz” and then worked to shift Gulf-state alignment through negotiations with Russia, China, Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, and apparently the UAE. He says the Abraham Accords have “gone poof” and frames the shift as “power” and “relative power,” building a sphere of influence while reducing the strategic value of American presence. He expects more regional arrangements “without the U.S.” over the next six months, potentially including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Regarding U.S. and Israeli reactions, Professor says Israel is the “biggest loser” in a flipped power landscape where Iran becomes the rising power. He argues Israel opened a “second front into Lebanon,” making Israel and the United States more overstretched as Iran’s leverage increases. He says the key question is which Iranian demands matter most: cutting off U.S. military aid to Israel, withdrawing U.S. combat forces from the Persian Gulf, or both. He suggests Israel could respond by “lashing out” if it feels cornered, including possible targeting of Iranian leaders involved in negotiations. Mario asks whether Trump making clear the U.S. would not support Israel in a war would still allow Israel to start one. Professor says “words won’t be enough,” citing internal political pressures on Netanyahu ahead of reelection and the need to appear successful at defending Israel against Iran and Hezbollah. He argues Iran’s leverage trajectory could continue growing and that he expects a period of increased pressure through at least January. On U.S. intelligence, Professor references reporting that CIA Director John Ratcliffe told Trump that U.S. intelligence raised serious doubts about Iran’s willingness to make nuclear concessions, including that Iranian officials discussed the deal inconsistently with what they told American negotiators. He also references Israeli media reporting about Trump potentially allowing opposition figures to be sidelined. In discussing the MOU’s clauses, Professor says ambiguities in the MOU and supposed Israel withdrawal plan (described as non-direct and vague) would tend to advantage Iran across the 60-day window. He frames Iran’s leverage as rising if agreed withdrawal plans do not materialize, with Iran using the resulting circumstances as justification to close the Strait again. He also emphasizes Iran’s strategy of shifting blame—“passing the buck”—so that increased pressure is attributed to America or Israel rather than Iran. Mario and Professor end by noting they will wait for the MOU to be released and then review clauses for political ramifications, while Professor bases his outlook on Iran statements plus the oil inventory drawdown mechanics structured into the 60-day timeframe.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Brandon and Kieran Andrew discuss the mounting regional dynamics as the Iran war drags into its fourth week. They agree on the possibility of serious unrest in at least one or two Arab countries in the coming years, though they caution not to overstate things. They note that the Gulf states lack a strong social contract, so economic volatility and external shocks could push instability, even if regimes recalibrate and survive. Kieran argues the perception in the region is that Iran has punched above its weight, pursuing a strategy of absorbing losses while raising costs for opponents, especially the US and Israel. Across the region, people are furious with the disruption and violence, privately blaming Israel and the United States for attacking Iran, even if publicly they maintain official narratives. Sovereignty violations against Iran are seen as justification for Iranian retaliation, with regimes prioritizing survival and counterattack. They touch on Bahrain as a case study: civil and political fragility, with Shiite civilians allegedly assisting Iranian targeting, and the Bahrain monarch’s status complicating regional dynamics. This feeds into the broader idea that a new Arab Spring is plausible in the Gulf as governments face popular pressures and a deteriorating social contract. Brandon reflects on the American role, noting the US prioritized defending Israeli targets over its own bases in the region, which erodes trust among Arab states. This feeds a fear that American retreat could materialize, altering long-standing regional alignments and making it harder to maintain bases or security commitments. The conversation shifts to the US-Israel relationship. They discuss the “wolf’s milk of nationalism” and how many Israelis are conditioned to view themselves as besieged and exceptional, which shapes policy and public opinion. They critique a top Israeli official’s stance that the Strait of Hormuz is not Israel’s concern, calling it insane and arguing that open sea lanes affect everyone. They contrast Israel’s unified national narrative with the region’s broader interests, suggesting that the Israeli leadership often acts in ways that may be unsustainable in the long run. They discuss the economics of the conflict. The IEA highlighted that oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 produced a combined loss of about 10 million barrels per day; in this war, about 11 million barrels per day have been lost on average. Gas losses are also significant, with 2022 spikes reversing and accelerating inflation. They warn about broader macro effects: rising inflation (Goldman Sachs predicting 4.5% in the US), higher interest rates, stock market risks, and potential AI-related energy and helium shortages that could undermine tech-driven growth. They emphasize that this energy shock could feed a broader recession in the West. They debate possible endgames. Scenario one: Trump constructs a narrative that the US won, reaching a face-saving deal with Iran to “cover up” a catastrophic outcome; Iran then consolidates a more entrenched, economically weakened regime, and the US must manage the fallout with bases and allies. Scenario two: deployment of US troops leads to a quagmire, with escalating casualties and a draw-out conflict that could push toward nuclear risk. Scenario three: arguably not distinct, but a continued escalation toward wider conflict, potentially drawing in adversaries or increasing regional volatility. They see scenario two as more likely, driven by Israeli pressure and ongoing US engagement, possibly culminating in escalation to nuclear threats. They consider Russia and China’s roles. Russia is viewed as aligned with China; China is playing a cautious, calculating game, avoiding direct involvement while expanding its influence through trade and joint exercises with client states. They argue China’s approach could accelerate American decline and shift influence toward Beijing’s orbit over the next 15–30 years, with Pacific allies and others gravitating toward China for stability and economic ties, even if not openly allied. Iran remains central. They discuss Iran’s resilience: even if economic conditions deteriorate, the regime could deepen its internal consolidation and broaden its persistence through institutions and praetorian guard support. If nukes were used or if retaliation escalates, the regime’s survivability would hinge on its decentralized structure and potential for hardline consolidation. Brandon asks about the possible brain drain and long-term sustainability of Israel if the conflict endures. Kieran warns that even if Israel survives militarily, it faces a Pyrrhic victory with existential threats from within, including demographic shifts, brain drain, and an economy sustained by a war footing and American aid, which may not be sustainable in the long run. Brain drain and domestic social fractures could undermine Israel’s stability and economic vitality, especially once the immediate military crisis subsides. Towards the end, they acknowledge that the war’s trajectory will likely redefine US influence, the Gulf’s political landscape, and Israel’s future. They conclude with mutual acknowledgment of the complexities, agreeing that the situation is poised to reshape regional and global power dynamics for years to come, and that the path forward remains uncertain and dangerous. They sign off with plans to reconnect, noting Kieran’s Navarra Live and other media appearances.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss how the Iran war is shaping Russia’s strategic thinking, deterrence, diplomacy, and domestic political psychology. - The central impact in Russia is not economic bets on oil or gas, or European gas demand, but a shift in elite psychology in Moscow. Russians feel they have been jolted by a disaster scenario for their country, prompting a re-evaluation of strategy and leadership. This has driven a more acute public scrutiny of Putin and the feasibility of gradual, negotiated restraint versus decisive action. - A key theme is the perceived weakness or inconsistency of Western deterrence. Russians note that Trump's actions against Iran showed that American leadership can be unpredictable and capable of abrupt, decisive moves that undermine Russia’s sense of security. This has contributed to a loss of confidence in the long-standing belief that restraint and negotiation would preserve deterrence. - The discussion emphasizes a perceived “electric shock” in the Russian political class: doubts about the wisdom of a slow, nuanced approach, and concern that Washington might carry out decapitation-like or otherwise aggressive actions if Moscow does not appear capable of credible deterrence. The panel cites examples such as past American strikes and drone activity that highlighted vulnerabilities in Russia’s security posture and raised existential anxieties about Russia’s own durability. - Some interviewers and analysts describe a growing perception that Russia’s deterrence has been eroded by Western escalation, with NATO posture and Ukrainian military support intensifying pressure. There is fear that restraint by Moscow is interpreted as weakness, pushing Russia toward recalibrating its own posture to reassert deterrence, potentially through more aggressive or rapid actions. - The conversation notes internal Russian media dynamics and the shifting stance of influential figures. Salovyev’s and Lavrov’s recent critiques of negotiation, the discussion of Sergei Dabkov’s “spirit of Anchorage” remark, and other domestic debates reflect a broader realignment away from pacific, slow negotiations toward a more hardline posture. Alexander Dugin’s criticisms are mentioned as a sign of growing dissent about the current course. - The broader strategic environment includes concerns about Russia’s relations with China. Russian observers are disappointed that China’s support for Iran did not translate into the expected practical backing; Chinese aid and the efficacy of Chinese weapons are questioned after the Iran-Israel conflict began. This has undermined Russian confidence in China as a reliable partner in countering U.S. pressure. - The discussion highlights the possibility that Iran’s use of economic and political warfare—such as threatening Hormuz and impacting Gulf economies—could have major global consequences, increasing Europe’s energy insecurity and persisting higher prices, which could influence Western political dynamics and, in turn, Russia’s calculations. - There is speculation about whether Russia might seek to draw in Iran more deeply or exploit broader regional escalations. The interview notes that the Russians never concluded a mutual defense pact with Iran, viewing Iran’s reluctance as a factor that complicates Russian confidence in Tehran’s reliability. The possibility of Russia assisting Iran more robustly remains uncertain and is framed as a sensitive strategic option. - The interlocutors stress that the situation is developing into a high-stakes, all-or-nothing dynamic for major powers. Putin’s future decisions, Trump’s political fate, and the Western willingness to escalate further all feed into a fragile balance. The experts warn that escalating to large-scale action becomes a dangerous and destabilizing path for Russia, the United States, Iran, and regional players. - In closing, both speakers acknowledge the difficult, precarious trajectory ahead. The analyst emphasizes that if Russia does not bolster its deterrence and adapt its strategy, the domestic and international consequences could be severe; the host notes the dangerous incentives created by an all-or-nothing strategic environment and the potential for rapid, unintended escalations.

In this conversation, the speakers discuss a high-profile operation centered on Maduro’s kidnapping, its implications, and broader geopolitical consequences. - The operation to capture Maduro is described as not a regime change but an action intended to “hold off Maduro, get US control of the oil, and get China and Russia and Iran out.” A senior Venezuelan security official is identified as a full cooperator with the United States, allowing US forces to enter “the front door” with minimal resistance and no return fire. The plan reportedly involved a coordinated assault with Venezuelan forces, and while several air defenses were destroyed or not activated, most were not deployed due to a stand-down order. The operation did not replace the Venezuelan government; Maduro remained in power, at least for the moment. - For context on the execution, Speaker 1, who has experience scripting Delta Force and SEAL Team Six exercises, notes the mission took place in full moonlight (unusual for planned clandestine night operations). He claims the Venezuelan air defenses were substantial but largely avoided activation because of the stand-down order, enabling a seamless entry for US forces. He compares this to a counterterrorism exercise in the US years earlier—staged surveillance and pre-positioned access that eliminated obstacles in advance. - Casualties and aftermath are uncertain. There are conflicting reports on casualties among Cubans and Venezuelans, with no clear names or numbers yet confirmed. The operation involved collaboration with Venezuelan forces and did not topple the Maduro regime. - On the motive and internal dynamics, Speaker 1 suggests multiple potential actors within Maduro’s circle could have incentives to cooperate with the US, possibly including financial or visa-based incentives. The possibility of infiltrators within intelligence, military, or police is raised. The role of a specific senior official who allegedly ordered a stand-down is mentioned, though not named. - Questions about the rocket attack on a US chopper are raised, with speculation that it might have been a lone actor or a malfunction rather than a deliberate act by a large organized force. - The discussion turns to the interim president Delcy Rodríguez. While theories exist that she cooperated with the US, Speaker 1 says that the theory of her involvement is likely a cover story designed to divert attention from those actually involved. - The broader geopolitical frame emphasizes that this is not about regime change in Venezuela, but about oil access and limiting adversaries. The conversation suggests a recurring US strategy: remove Maduro, gain oil leverage, and push rivals like China, Russia, and Iran out of influence. The hypothesis includes using economic and political pressure and, if necessary, military options, while acknowledging the risk of drawing wider regional opposition and potential escalation. - The discussion then broadens to the US role in the multipolar order. The speakers debate whether the world is tilting toward a multipolar system or a reinforced US unipolar order. They agree that the reality is mixed: Russia and China are building a new international order with India and Brazil, while US actions—such as threats against Venezuela, arms packages to Taiwan, and support for Ukraine—signal both erosion of hegemony and attempts to sustain influence. - The Monroe Doctrine is critiqued. The speakers contend that the so-called Dunro Doctrine (a term they use to describe perceived US interference) misreads the historical framework. They argue that the Monroe Doctrine was never a proclamation of exclusive US dominance in the Western Hemisphere; instead, the US has historically faced resistance as other powers gain influence. - Iran and the Middle East are discussed at length. The twelve-day war (in reference to Iran’s confrontation with Israel) is described as not severely weakening Iran militarily, though it has economic and political strains. Iran’s allies (Russia, China) have become more engaged since sanctions relief began in September, and Iran has pursued stronger economic ties with both Russia and China, including a potential North–South Corridor. Iran reportedly rejected a mutual defense treaty with Russia initially but later pursued stronger cooperation after the conflict. Iran’s leadership is described as consolidating power and preparing for potential future conflicts, while the protests inside Iran are depicted as largely manufactured or at least amplified by Western intelligence networks, though there is genuine internal discontent over currency and economic conditions. - The panelists debate whether the US could or would attempt another targeted strike on Iranian leadership. They argue that the US would face greater risk and likely casualties if attempting a similar operation without a compatible insider network, making a repeat Maduro-like capture unlikely. - Final reflections acknowledge that the US’s global influence is eroding, but the US remains deeply involved in global affairs. The discussion ends with a cautionary stance toward US hegemonic assumptions and recognition of a rising multipolar framework in which China, Russia, and allied states exert greater influence in Latin America, the Middle East, and beyond.

Mario: Daniel, after decades of diplomacy, the Middle East is now at war. Early on you suggested Hormuz and economic leverage; as the conflict evolved, US ground invasion talk, targeted Iranian leadership, and new developments—like JD Vance’s reaction to US intel and Israel striking energy infrastructure in Iran—have shaped concerns that Israel wields outsized influence. Broad question: how did we get here and why? Daniel: There’s a long history of American and Israeli influence in play. There is American agency and a geopolitical logic tying chokepoints like Hormuz to broader aims, such as reasserting US primacy vis-à-vis China. But this doesn’t fully explain how the last 10 yards into war were crossed. Netanyahu’s long effort to shape a strategic environment culminated when he found a president open to using American power in the region. Israel’s strategy appears to be to assert greater regional dominion by leveraging US military power and creating dependencies with Gulf states. Netanyahu reportedly offered the president an actionable plan, including on-the-ground assets, to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spark a broader upheaval, which helped push the White House toward a twelve-day war in June. Israel also presented a narrative of rapid US escalation to secure its aims, while the American interagency process—though deteriorated in recent years—had to interpret unusually aggressive, yet selective, Israeli intelligence and objectives. The result is a complex dynamic where US rhetoric and decisions are deeply entangled with Israeli designs for regional hegemony, an outcome that was not broadly anticipated by many regional partners. Mario: If the US administration had not fully understood Israel’s project, how did this come to pass? And how does Mossad factor in? Daniel: Israel has tremendous access to influence over an American administration through lobbying, media echo chambers, and political finance, which Netanyahu exploited to drive a course toward major confrontation with Iran. Before Trump’s term, Netanyahu was nervous about a president who could pivot against allies; he devised a strategy that culminated in Operation Midnight Hammer and subsequent US-Israeli collaboration, reinforced by the possibility of rapid decapitation of Iran’s leadership. There are reports (and debates) about Mossad presenting on-the-ground assets and the possibility of instigating a street revolution in Iran, which may not have been fully believed by Washington but was persuasive enough to shape policy. The question remains how much of Israeli intelligence makes it to Trump and his inner circle, especially given concerns about cognitive ability and decision-making in the White House at that time. Netanyahu’s aim, according to Daniel, was not simply to topple Iran but to maximize Israel’s regional leverage by using American power while reducing other regional peers’ influence. Mario: What about Gulf states and broader regional realignments? How did the Gulf respond, and what does this mean for their security calculus? Daniel: The Gulf states face a stark dilemma. They fear Iran's retaliatory capabilities but also distrust America’s consistency and question whether US support will be cost-effective. Iran’s strikes into the Gulf have forced Gulf capitals to reassess their reliance on US protection and Israel’s influence, particularly given Israel’s aggressive posture and expanded regional footprint—Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—with potential implications for the Gulf’s own security and economic interests. Some Gulf actors worry about over-dependence on American security assurances while Israel intensifies operational reach. The GCC’s calculus is shifting: they confront a choice between continuing alignment with the US-Israel bloc or seeking more independent security arrangements. The possibility of a broader Gulf-Israel axis, or at least closer coordination, is tempered by concerns over long-term regional stability, public opinion, and the risk of escalation. Mario: How has this affected perceptions of Iran, Israel, and the broader regional order? Has the Gulf’s stance shifted? Daniel: The region’s balance has been unsettled. Iran’s actions have damaged Gulf trust in its neighbors’ security guarantees, while Israel’s aggressive posture and reliance on US power have complicated Gulf states’ calculations. Turkey’s role is pivotal as it balances concerns about Iran and Israel, while also watching how the region realigns. The possibility of a future where Iran’s power is weakened is weighed against the risk of destabilization and long-term security costs. Negotiations between the US, Iran, and regional actors—stoked by Turkish diplomacy and shifting Gulf positions—are ongoing, with Turkey signaling that diplomacy remains important, even as Gulf states reassess their security dependencies. Mario: What about Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the potential for broader spillover? Daniel: Lebanon faces severe consequences: displacement, civilian harm, and a domestic political paralysis that complicates relations with Israel. Hezbollah remains a factor, with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and the South. Israel’s goal of establishing security-control in Lebanon risks reigniting long-standing conflicts, while Lebanon’s government seeks a balance that could prevent further escalation, if possible. The broader picture is that Israel’s approach—driven by a perceived need to neutralize Iran and all potential threats—could provoke wider regional blowback, complicating already fragile domestic politics across the Levant. Mario: Final thoughts as the war unfolds? Daniel: Israel’s strategic ambitions appear to extend beyond countering Iran to shaping a broader order in which it remains the dominant regional power, aided by US military leverage. Gulf states face a difficult reorientation, reassessing longstanding alliances in light of perceptions of US reliability. The coming months will reveal whether regional actors can recalibrate toward diplomatic resolutions or wind up in a deeper, more protracted conflict. The question remains whether a political path could replace military escalation, and whether external powers can deter further aggression and stabilize the region without allowing a broader conflagration.

The discussion centers on how Donald Trump is said to have “transformed” from describing himself as being under blackmail or duress to portraying himself as someone who can control Netanyahu and Israel—framed as a rationalizing process meant to avoid cognitive dissonance. The speaker argues that, if a person is pressured into actions, the mind may later reframe the situation so the person believes they “chose this” rather than being forced, ultimately convincing themselves that they are in control. This is illustrated through historical examples and analogies, including claims that Stockholm-syndrome-like processes occur when captives are compelled to adapt psychologically and socially to survive. To support the explanation, the speaker cites Texas frontier accounts and rereads Herman Lehman’s *Nine Years Among the Indians, 1870 to 1879*, describing cases in which boys captured by Comanches and Apaches could be brought over into the captors’ mindset over time. The speaker also references *Indian Depredations in Texas* (1889) and films such as *The Searchers* (including the story of a kidnapped girl who does not want to return), as well as Burt Lancaster’s *Ulzanas Raid*. The core claim is that these captives underwent prolonged hardship and social pressure—adaptation through survival, conditioning, and eventual identity change—so that the captive’s mind becomes “in their mind” part of the group. The speaker then ties the framework to contemporary politics by returning to remarks attributed to Trump about Israel and Netanyahu. The speaker says that earlier, Rubio and Trump supposedly said they conducted an attack (after February 28) because Israel said it would attack Israel, but that later Trump’s mindset shifts to believing Netanyahu will do whatever he says and that Trump may even joke about becoming “the next prime minister of Israel.” The speaker adds that Trump reportedly dismisses unfavorable polls as “fake news” and cites a poll Trump mentioned claiming extremely high Israeli favorability, arguing that such favorability does not translate to broad global acceptance. A large portion shifts to a geopolitical and energy argument focused on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and the global economy. The speaker claims that U.S.-linked actions have increasingly been associated with heightened risk, noting U.S.-provided munitions and support and asserting that extending Israel’s range with refuelers helps Israel “leapfrog” beyond Israel’s defensive perimeter. The speaker argues that assassination tactics and “sneak attack” approaches undermine negotiation, using historical comparisons (including Pearl Harbor) to argue that starting or escalating conflict produces long-term distrust and consequences. The speaker argues that the conflict is not sustainable as a prolonged “stalemate” because world fuel levels are declining and the global system is described as being “just in time,” with tankers serving as moving inventory. The speaker proposes a “tank bottom” concept—when reserve fuel buffers abroad become so depleted that supply chains and infrastructure cannot handle remaining fractions—leading to global cascading effects. They claim that even if ships head to the U.S. to refuel, it inflates U.S. prices, damages perceptions of the U.S. internationally, and does not solve the global shortfall. From there, the speaker forecasts knock-on impacts: acute energy problems followed by food crisis conditions, and they link agriculture outcomes to fertilizer, diesel, irrigation, and supply constraints. They also argue that psychological and social preparedness matters—asserting that Americans may collapse faster due to expectations of constant electricity, water, and supermarket access, while people with lived hardship may adapt more readily. The transcript also includes an extended interlude promoting and discussing products and fundraising tied to the show, including supplements, iodine products, wallets, and an RFID/Faraday-shield theme. It describes sales, pricing, and claims about how shielding protects against card scanning and data theft.

Mario asks Larry for his analysis of the likelihood of a US attack on Iran. Larry says he thinks it will happen, probably by March or sooner, and that the operation would be a cooperative intelligence effort involving the CIA, Mossad, and Britain’s MI6. He claims the Iranian regime is fighting for survival and that the December 28 currency crash was a consequence of actions initiated by US intelligence, describing it as deliberate, and comparing it to George Soros crashing the British pound to argue that unified intelligence communities could destabilize an economically weaker country. He says the protests were legitimate anger at economic mismanagement by the Pazheshkin government, not a call to overthrow the Islamic Republic, and asserts Iran’s leadership began responding immediately by removing the central banker. Mario notes a regional military buildup: USS Abraham Lincoln, F-15s, Pegasus, Stratotankers, Globemaster, and other assets moving toward the region, with Iran warning the US not to strike. He asks for analysis of the likelihood of a US strike. Larry reiterates his view that such an attack is likely by March or sooner and argues the initial plan was long in the works, a joint intelligence operation, and not a reaction to protests. He asserts the urgency was to crash Iran’s economy to incite protests and weaken the regime, and emphasizes that the cyber- and information-dominance aspect was anticipated, with Starlink terminals smuggled into Iran prior to December 28. He claims Netanyahu’s appearance at Mar-a-Lago on December 29 and discussions between Trump and Netanyahu shaped the military plan, with dissident groups acting to inflame the situation using a Maidan-like playbook of snipers and protests. Larry describes Iran’s internet shutdown on January 8-9 as a turning point that reduced protest organization and led millions to demonstrate in support of Khamenei, arguing the US briefing to Trump could not guarantee a decisive strike and therefore the operation was postponed. He says Iran now has Russia and China backing more robustly, with Russian technicians and air defenses on the ground, and China providing air defense and assisting with Starlink interdiction. He adds that Iran could shut the Strait of Hormuz if attacked, highlighting its economic stakes and the potential global impact on oil supply. Mario asks about casualty numbers from the crackdown and how credible Western reports are. Larry argues much of Western reporting has been driven by intelligence sources and cites a historical example: collaboration with the MEK starting in 2004 and into 2009, suggesting much of the western narrative around Iranian protests is propaganda. He references conversations with Iranian dissidents and an engineering professor in Brazil who argued the West’s portrayal of mass deaths does not match what he observed. He notes Mossad assets on the ground and suggests the CIA has acknowledged this in some form, and contends sanctions, while damaging to ordinary Iranians, are part of a broader US strategy. The discussion shifts to Iran’s potential internal dynamics and regional relations. Mario asks whether sanctions might eventually lead to a more conciliatory Iran, pointing to improved ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Larry counters that the sanctions strategy has previously failed to deliver lasting regime change, drawing parallels to Syria’s experience and suggesting BRICS ties, including with Russia and China, would help Iran economically. He argues Iran has no desire to pro-actively attack other countries, but is prepared to respond to aggression, including potential strikes on US bases or Israel if provoked, and warns that an Israeli nuclear response could escalate the conflict. The conversation explores the idea of regime change versus coercive diplomacy. Larry notes the difficulty of removing Iran’s leadership given the IRGC’s power and the possibility that any strike could lead to broader chaos, including potential desertion or reconfiguration of alliances in the region. He mentions Reza Pahlavi as a potential opposition figure but asserts regime change remains unlikely. He discusses the role of Netanyahu, Trump, and Zionist lobbying in policy decisions, and emphasizes the broader historical pattern of US interventionism, citing past coups and regime changes in various countries. Towards Greenland, Mario references Trump’s post about a framework for the Arctic deal and a halt to tariffs, questioning the motive behind Greenland-related strategies. Larry dismisses Greenland as a distraction, noting Russia’s existing Arctic advantages and suggesting economic interests or donor benefits may be at play rather than strategic necessity. The two discuss air defense capabilities and the challenges of the US’s missile defense, contrasting Patriot systems with hypersonic threats and arguing that America’s military hardware has not kept pace with evolving threats. They contemplate the broader implications for Ukraine, Russia, and the possibility of a peace settlement, with Larry predicting a settlement favorable to Russia, including potential annexation votes in several Ukrainian oblasts. The interview ends with reflections on media manipulation, the value of independent voices, and the enduring question of Iran’s future, with Mario and Larry agreeing they hope the discussion remains speculative rather than prescriptive of imminent conflict.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the potential for a regional war surrounding Iran and the Gulf, examining miscalculations, pathways to escalation, and the interests and responses of regional and global powers. Key points: - The likelihood of a regional war is increasing. Compared to Ukraine, miscalculations today could lead to broader conflict, with concerns about missed opportunities for peace and the involvement of NATO contributing to a harsh trajectory. - Several escalation pathways exist. If Gulf states push back against Iran, Bahrain could become a flashpoint, and Israel or other actors could attempt to destabilize Gulf states by targeting energy facilities, finance hubs, and expatriate communities to provoke economic and social crisis. - Iran’s capacity and alliances matter. Iran alone cannot sustain attacks on multiple Gulf states, especially if Kurdish movements pressure the regime. While there are allegations of Russian and Chinese intelligence backing, there is debate about direct military backing. Escalation could occur if allied powers or regional actors become involved. - The potential for a power grab in Iran. If Iran descends into civil chaos, multiple neighboring countries with competing interests (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, and other regional players) could intervene to protect their concerns about ethnic groups or separatist movements. A significant fear is that control of the Strait of Hormuz could shift to different actors, creating a strategic chokepoint crisis. - Turkey’s role is complex. Turkey, a major NATO ally with a large Kurdish minority, could be wary of consequences from Kurdish empowerment in Iran. Although Turkey might benefit from stability, it has security concerns about Kurdish autonomy and potential spillovers into Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Turkey’s stance may deter wholehearted support for Iranian destabilization, given its own security dependencies. - The impact of Kurdish dynamics. U.S.-backed Kurdish groups in Syria and broader Kurdish populations across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria raise concerns about cross-border spillovers and regional realignments. Historical U.S. involvement with Kurdish groups is cited as a factor that could provoke Turkish concern and complicate alliances. - The broader strategic environment. The Gulf states’ vulnerability is tied to energy exports, real estate, and financial networks, including the expulsion of expatriates under crisis. The possibility of striking energy infrastructure could trigger cascading economic and political crises across the region. - Deterrence and misperception. Iran has been viewed as a deterrent to Israeli actions; its potential degradation or destruction is contrasted with the risk that a diminished Iran could still present a long-term challenge through drone warfare and asymmetric means. Drone capabilities are noted as being cheaper to produce and harder to intercept than some missiles. - Comparisons to Ukraine and uncertainty about outcomes. While some suggest Iran could be defeated without ground troops, there is no consensus. Ukraine’s resilience is highlighted as an example that large states can endure prolonged resistance, and Iran’s larger population and geography complicate straightforward assumptions about quick outcomes. - Acknowledgment of evolving realities. The discussion emphasizes that current events have altered regional norms and expectations, with Gulf nations experiencing a changed security landscape, including the potential for broader conflict and a greater likelihood of arms competition among regional actors.

Alastair Crook discusses with the host the evolving US strategy toward Iran, the credibility of Iran’s deterrence, the role of Israel and Gulf states, and what is known about Iran’s domestic unrest. - Trump’s strategy toward Iran has shifted. Initially, he sought a big, quick victory with minimal entanglement, including a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June and assistance from Israel to identify a gap to exploit. Crook says Trump hoped for a toppling of the Iranian leadership via a “Maduro-style” operation that could be quickly achieved with outside support. Over time, outcomes did not align with those hopes, and the plan became far more complicated. - The naval armada near Iran was intended as a pressure point but, from the Pentagon’s view, is more of a liability. The armada is loaded with Tomahawk missiles rather than air defense missiles; estimates suggest 300-350 Tomahawks among two destroyers and one carrier. Iran has countermeasures: anti-ship missiles along the coast, submarines (including mini-submarines) with anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Drones threaten the fleet, and the air defense burden would be high if a drone swarm attacked. Hormuz could be shut by Iran in the event of war, a long-term strategic lever that Iran has signaled. - Iran’s deterrence has matured: any attack by Israel or the US could trigger full-scale war and Hormuz closure. Symbolic exchanges were proposed by intermediaries (an empty IRGC building and an attack on a US base), but Iran rejected such symbolic moves, insisting on a broader, sustained response if attacked. - Israel’s posture and constraints: Israel has told the US it does not view the nuclear issue as the sole determinant, but instead urges action to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile system and deter future threats. Netanyahu, meeting with Whitlock, indicated opposition to any nuclear deal if the US does not secure certain Israeli demands, warning that without Israeli endorsement, a US deal would fail. Israel insists on conditions that make a broader deal nonviable for the US. - The Arabs’ restraint: Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do not want direct involvement in an attack on Iran, including airspace use or refueling. Several factors influence their position: fear of Iranian retaliation, concerns about broader regional instability, and shifts in regional alignments. Saudi Arabia has grown more anti-Israel, viewing Israel as destabilizing and expressing concerns about the region’s security order. There is also a fear that a major war could trigger an Arab Spring-like upheaval in Gulf monarchies. - Iran’s internal unrest: The insurrection in Iran involved trained insurgents (MEK operatives trained by the Americans in Armenia and Kurds trained in Northeastern Syria) and some Baluch participants. Corridors through Turkey and Kurdish groups facilitated their entry into Kermanshah Province. The strategy aimed at creating chaos to provoke a Western intervention, with reports that attackers were paid (roughly $5-$10) to inflame violence, burn buildings, attack ambulances, and kill. The Iranian government reports nearly 3,000 killed during the protests, with about 150 more unidentified; the majority of casualties were security forces due to exchange of fire. The narrative contrasts with outside accounts, noting the opposition did not lead to defections from key state institutions, and Israeli intelligence assessment reportedly concluded the unrest did not threaten the regime’s collapse. - Regional and great-power dynamics: Russia and China have signaled opposition to letting Iran be pressured by the United States, with discussions in Russia about offering a nuclear umbrella or naval support for Iran, though official policies are unclear.Originally planned joint exercises near Hormuz were paused; there are ongoing considerations of Chinese/Russian involvement that would complicate US options. A Chinese-Russian naval presence near Iran could limit US maneuvering. A recent drone shot down by the USS Lincoln reflects continued attempts at signaling and potential negotiation. - Overall assessment: Trump faces a dilemma between projecting strength and avoiding a costly escalation, with Israeli opposition complicating any potential US move. The US cannot easily sustain pressure without risking market turmoil and broad regional and great-power entanglements. The likely trajectory involves continued “negotiations about negotiations” rather than immediate, decisive action, while Iran’s deterrence and regional recalibrations constrain what any use of force might achieve.

Alistair Crook and Alistair Crook discuss two linked crises: Iran and the US/Israel framework for a ceasefire, and a Europe-coordinated escalation against Russia after a major strike on Moscow. Crook begins with Iran, referencing a memorandum of understanding that has allegedly already been signed but remains shrouded in secrecy. He asks whether the Americans will uphold it, how it will reshape the region, and how it affects US-Israeli dynamics. Crook notes that Netanyahu appears weaker and raises the possibility that his replacement could be more hawkish, questioning whether Arab-party support for Netanyahu has shifted. He suggests that regardless of whether the framework is implemented, it will have a major impact across the US, Israel, and the wider region. Alistair Crook responds that the arrangement is a “framework” rather than a treaty or ceasefire: it is the “easiest part,” while the hardest element is constructing a protective zone and managing disruption. He describes visible elements already approaching within this “framework.” He then breaks down three areas Crook raised. First, he says the agreement is controversial in the United States and also controversial in Iran. He describes tension rooted in Iran’s experience with the JCPOA not being upheld and Iran remaining constrained. He cites a statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, saying the Supreme Leader opposed the framework but was persuaded by Tazashian and Kaleva that there would be no backsliding on the framework terms or Iranian interests, which predominantly center on Hormuz. He frames Hormuz as a pivot for Iran’s potential shift into a new geopolitical context. He adds that the Supreme Leader is putting on notice both Iran’s reformist wing and a skeptical public that Iran will not allow precedents that expand the meaning of the framework until it is emptied of its purpose. Second, he highlights Lebanon as crucial. He says Iran has changed its position because it previously did not intervene directly against Israel in the axis-of-resistance way until the last period. He describes this as the first time Iran threatened heavy missile strikes on northern Israel if Israel flattened Beirut’s Dahir, arguing that this threatened the border-to-Galilee “path.” He says Trump then intervened and the attacks were stopped, but now the “thing” is being tested again. He links this to a breach question: he says Iran refuses to attend negotiating sessions and that Lebanon would be seen as a breach of the ceasefire from Iran’s perspective. Third, he turns to Israel and US politics. He claims Israeli press coverage reflects “real turmoil,” portraying the situation as a huge defeat for the “victory narrative” involving American support to destroy Iran, destroy Hezbollah, and annex parts of Lebanon with proxy permission. He describes an incident near Bofor Castle where Hezbollah attacked with an anti-tank missile, resulting in four soldiers dead, including the commander of the 82nd Brigade. He says figures and polling pressure are intensifying for Netanyahu, arguing that if Netanyahu does nothing militarily in Lebanon, his election will be lost and that there is “wall-to-wall consensus” for action. He adds that Trump’s language is shocking to Israelis: he reports Trump criticized Israel’s handling in Beirut and implied that an ex-ISIS leader could manage Lebanon more “sophisticatedly,” describing it as an unparalleled slap. He says Israelis interpret this as a Middle East that has changed: they believe there is no way to destroy Iran without the United States, and therefore that regime change is not achievable. He characterizes the result as a psychological defeat for the “Gratial Israel” concept and an acceptance that the US may impose penalties on Israel if it retaliates or breaches the framework, particularly in ways that could undermine Trump’s achievement of opening Hormuz. He argues that the framework triggered a US shift, driven by Hormuz and an “economic cliff,” saying Trump said the US was “four weeks away from running out of oil,” with figures describing US strategic reserve levels down to about 20 million barrels. He describes the ensuing US domestic battle between pro-Israel Zionist groups and Trump supporters insisting on “America first.” He counters a simple prediction of Republican losses by suggesting the midterms are rotational, with about 20 Republican seats in contention, and that loyalty to Trump’s personality could reduce defection. He also suggests that if Netanyahu attacks Lebanon, the shift could frame it as “slapping America in the face,” potentially rebounding politically for Trump among some voters. Crook then shifts topics to Russia, focusing on what he presents as an unprecedented Western escalation: a massive strike on Moscow, with NATO footprints being “advertised almost.” He asks how such escalation could be controlled and prevent nuclear escalation. He also complains that Western participation is now openly visible despite earlier efforts to conceal or downplay it. Alistair Crook says the strike involved many drones and missiles into a refinery area in Moscow and was intended to put Russians “on edge.” He links it to coordination around EU and allied meetings, stating that Macron and Merz met in London beforehand and brought Zelensky to stage European ultimatums. He says the point was to change the narrative, with Europe trying to present that Ukraine is not on the back foot and to push for more defense resources. He describes Europe’s aim as a ceasefire framework and UK/France and other participation in peacekeeping, with Ukraine eventually aligned with Europe, and bringing America back into the process via stage-managed messaging. He argues that Europe is escalating toward a war with Russia but lacks practical clarity on what such a war would look like, questioning whether it would be conventional, asymmetrical, air, or nuclear. He recounts arguments by Russian figures at the St. Petersburg Conference about stopping the “ratchet” of escalation and says the debate is growing over more procurement, missiles, drones, and co-production—reassembling shipped systems in Ukraine for use against Russia. He says Europe’s assumption that Russia would capitulate is a misunderstanding of Russia’s consciousness and history with Europe, similar to what he earlier described as a misunderstanding of Iran. He concludes that the strategy is dangerous because there is no clear escalation control if Russia perceives the threat, and he links this to Russia’s history of restraint before retaliation. The discussion ends with Crook urging readers to consult Alistair Crook’s Substack, and Crook thanking him for his insights.

Zhang Shueqin is discussed as a predictor known for predicting Trump’s reelection, Vance as VP pick, and a US–Iran war. The conversation centers on why he predicted a US attack on Iran and how it might unfold. Key reasoning about Iran war - The strongest evidence, according to Zhang, is the January 2020 US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who led Iranian proxies. He argues that killing an Iranian envoy to the region amounted to a declaration of war, and that if Trump had won reelection in 2020, he would have most certainly declared war on Iran. - In the war’s first month, the US focus was decapitation of Iranian leadership, aiming to force surrender and regime change. Iran proved resilient and creative, leading the US to shift to a phase of attrition, attempting to cripple Iran’s war-financing capacity and oil exports to China, and to control Hormuz. This included a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. - The war is expected to be slow and world-news-muted, with efforts to pressure Iran economically and diplomatically to force a settlement. There is no off-ramp seen for the US because consequences are vast for regional players. Actors and interests in the region - Regional players: UAE, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait, viewed as wanting Iran defeated and the war prolonged. Iran’s leadership wants relief from sanctions and to retain Hormuz as leverage. - The United States: aims to sustain the petrodollar system; fears that if Gulf states decouple from the dollar or shift currencies, the American economy could suffer. The US would prefer to press sanctions and blockade to compel cooperation and debt-financing from global actors. - Israel: sees the conflict as an opportunity for its Greater Israel project, hoping regional chaos would redraw borders after the conflict. - China: wants an end to the conflict to protect global trade and its energy interests, and to preserve balance in its relations with Iran, the GCC, and other players. China’s leverage includes pressure on Iran and economic guarantees that encourage a ceasefire, while seeking to minimize direct conflict with GCC states. - Russia and others: Russia is discussed as arming and supporting Iran in a broader economic/military contest with the US; geopolitics involve maritime skirmishes and energy strikes in a wider economic war. World War III framework and economic warfare - Zhang argues we are already in World War III, but the war is economic and strategic rather than traditional kinetic warfare. The main combatants are the US and Russia in the maritime and energy sphere, with China central to US debt-financing and global trade stability. - Economic warfare includes targeting oil refineries, shipping lanes, and export capabilities; the purpose is to force political settlements and shift global economic order. - The US strategy is described as creating global chaos while maintaining North American focus, exporting conflict to Europe and East Asia to defend empire interests, and using debt and weapons sales to manage global markets. China, the US, and future diplomacy - A Trump visit to Beijing is framed as potentially signaling a rapprochement, followed by cooperation in three areas: trade (China buying more Western Hemisphere LNG and resources), Taiwan status (reaffirming one China policy), and AI collaboration. The larger aim is described as turning China into an economic vassal to the US empire. - Europe is described as already largely vassalized by US policy, with the war in Ukraine illustrating this subordination; popular discontent is rising (e.g., in Germany with the AfD), but European leadership remains aligned with Washington’s agenda. Iranian and European responses - Iran, facing economic pressures and geopolitical isolation, initially led the war, but China’s mediation and pressure contributed to a ceasefire. There is a rift between Iran’s political leadership and its military leadership over how to proceed with the war. - Europeans could escalate involvement in a broader conflict, but the US strategy appears to rely on Europe fighting longer against Russia while the US profits through arms sales and financial mechanisms. European leadership, according to the discussion, remains cautious and influenced by external powers. Israel’s position and the broader arc - Israel is depicted as pursuing a death-cult, eschatological strategy that could unify Jews globally but increase regional instability. The greater aim is for Israel to benefit from regional chaos, while risking broader conflict. Future trajectories and civilizational decline - The discussion suggests that, in the short term, the US may appear to win economically, especially through debt-financed global demand for US energy and weapons, but in the mid- to long-term, imperial decline could lead to civil conflict within the US, driven by factional struggles between Wall Street financiers and tech oligarchs backing AI surveillance/state power. - The potential for a third Trump term is linked to deeper internal conflicts and the acceleration of violence or civil unrest, with religion offered by some as a potential stabilizing force in American society. - Three symptoms of imperial decline are privatization, financialization, and individualization; yet the speaker believes a Christian-nationalist revival could renew the republic. Closing stance - Across the discussion, the US empire is portrayed as pursuing an expansive, conflict-driven strategy to sustain power, while global players seek various economic and strategic outcomes. The overall forecast emphasizes ongoing, multi-front tensions with no easy peace, and a complex interplay among US, European, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Chinese interests.

Alastair Crook discusses the growing talk of a possible war with Iran and how current developments resemble a broader “model” drawn from other recent U.S. military ventures, notably in Venezuela and Syria. He notes a palpable sense in the United States after a controversial press conference by Trump and in comments from the secretary of state that Cuba, Colombia, and Mexico are among the countries potentially targeted, with Venezuela’s fate also in play. He argues that the situation in Venezuela is following a pattern similar to Syria: Gulf states pressured Assad to cut links with Iran and Hezbollah while Russia and Turkey backed him, leading to a management-style “buyout” of control. In Venezuela, Maduro was removed and Beltrie Rodriguez has become acting president, with Rodriguez connected to Doha and the Qatari business and oil sectors. Crook suggests that the arrangement mirrors a “CEO replacement” or management buyout of a state, with U.S. and regional interests reconfiguring leadership, security, and oil ownership. He points to the involvement of Cuban security forces and notes rival power centers such as Cabello (a former head of security/intelligence) returning from Cuba, indicating ongoing instability and potential spillover into Colombia and Mexico. On Israel, Crook describes a crisis connected to Netanyahu’s legal jeopardy, corruption trials, and a broader domestic fight over accountability and governance. He highlights allegations of treachery within Netanyahu’s close circle related to Qatar and Doaa (Doha) influence, including the Four Seasons hotel stays in the U.S. and questions over what Qatar sought in return. He says hardline elements in Israel—Israeli ministers and security leaders—are using these revelations to demand investigations and possible resignations, intensifying internal divisions. In parallel, he says Netanyahu is trying to present a war with Iran as a political solution to domestic crises. He references Israeli cabinet discussions and Netanyahu’s expectation that a U.S. green light for a strike on Iran might be forthcoming as a way to reset political momentum, particularly with the MAGA crowd in the U.S. and the Likud party seeking to maintain power. Crook emphasizes that Netanyahu’s calculus is tied to broader regional and transatlantic dynamics. In Israel, there is talk that Iran’s defense and missile systems are being upgraded to create a shield that would complicate any attack, shifting the emphasis from a nuclear focus to destroying missiles to retain a feasible option to strike Iran’s nuclear capabilities. He notes that in Iran, protests and currency pressures are framed by foreign influence, including claims of Al-Qaeda links, though he argues such claims are part of a broader propaganda effort. He also points to the currency collapse and external destabilization as signs of precursors to conflict, with murmurs in Hebrew press that a broader war against Hezbollah and disarmament might be pursued if a “green light” is extended by the United States. Crook concludes that war with Iran would likely be driven by a combination of strategic aims and political calculations: decapitation or disruption of Iran’s missile structure, potential regime-change dynamics, and internal U.S. and Israeli political pressures. He stresses that the war is not simply a military objective but also a crucible for the future of Israel, U.S. policy, and the MAGA movement, with eschatological and messianic narratives intersecting with realpolitik. He also cautions against assuming a purely rational strategic calculation, noting how ideological commitments and domestic political infighting could push leaders toward dramatic actions despite uncertain outcomes. Finally, he asserts that the relationship between America’s Israel policy and its domestic political landscape will shape the trajectory of any potential confrontation.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

In a discussion on the risk of a broader war with Iran and Russia, Alastair Crook discusses the current state of Iran-related negotiations and strategic calculations. He notes a lot of propaganda and confusion, and asserts there has been a substantive change, though it’s important to understand what that change is. He mentions there was never a proposal for Aradshi to meet with Kushner or Whitcroft in Islamabad; Trump called that a fantasy, stating there was no point to talks until Iran and its allies produced a plan of what they want. He recalls that Iran’s negotiating position was outlined in a ten-point plan given to the Americans for Islamabad talks, which Trump described as a realistic basis for discussion, and notes that the points have not changed. He reflects on the JCPOA, rereading it and considering what Iran would want to return to, suggesting the JCPOA feels like a “parole from prison” given the military bases, sanctions, UN resolutions, and IAEA inspections that would accompany a return. He describes Iran’s new investigation process principles as not discussing the nuclear issue until Iran has resolved questions about the war, the blockade of Hormuz, sanctions, and the seizure or refitting of tanker ships by US officials. Iran says it will discuss Hormuz and a potential discussion of CICEFAR later, and possibly military issues later; Khalibat tweeted that Trump claims “he has all the caste,” but Iran says “one is Hormuz” and Iran controls Hormuz while threatening to continue, and can also control the Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, and pipelines. He notes the American blockade is porous, with vessels passing through, and explains Iran’s ongoing oil earnings during the war—citing that four tankers recently earned nearly $1.8 billion, with Iran continuing to move tankers along the coast into territorial waters. He emphasizes Iran is not prepared to capitulate and suggests Iran is a civilizational, revolutionary state, not just a conventional nation-state. Crook then analyzes prospects for negotiated settlement. He argues there is no path to a simple solution, comparing the situation to Brexit, and identifies two major roadblocks. The first is Trump, whose approach to Iran is influenced by dislike of Obama and the desire to present a better JCPOA to outdo Obama; he asserts that a deal more favorable than Obama’s JCPOA would still face opposition from Netanyahu and Koali, and suggests Trump’s incentive would be to present a symbolic win like 430 kilograms of enriched uranium handed over as a trophy, which Iran is unlikely to do. He discusses Vance’s Islamabad discussions and wonders whether Trump would accept a deal that extends timelines and increases monitoring if it is not a “win” for Trump. The second barrier is Israel, where Netanyahu faces pressure over war outcomes against Iran and Hezbollah; Crook describes Israel’s shift toward a more messianic, apocalyptic stance, and cites Israeli defense minister Katz’s apocalyptic language. He argues restraint is unlikely in Israel and suggests Israel may push the United States to continue the war, though he questions whether this aligns with American interests. Crook contends that if a settlement with Trump is possible, it would still require addressing Israel, which may not cooperate. He notes European Union insistence that sanctions on Iran will not come off for values or regime change reasons, and positions this within a broader context of a multipolar world where Western actors struggle to adapt to new power dynamics. He reiterates that Iran’s objective is to break the paradigm of sanctions and Western control, including the dollar hegemony and the financialized world, and to resist the imperial structures backing those policies. He concludes by observing that the war is a broader contest that could threaten the American-led world order, and that the time is on the side of Iran in a material sense due to its revenue from oil and control of Hormuz, while Western economies face cost of living pressures and potential shortages.

Alastair Crook outlines a two-component Iranian retaliation that is unfolding in three stages. The first component, driven by Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, was expected to target American bases in the Persian Gulf and Gulf area rather than Gulf States themselves. Ali Larragyani has stressed that the attack is not on Gulf States but on American bases and CIA facilities that use Gulf States to pursue Iran’s conflict. The second element, aimed at Israel, focuses on degrading Israel’s early warning radar systems and AIGs that allow United States and Israel to monitor Iran. This involves striking major radar sites in Gulf States such as Qatar and other locations to hinder Israel’s ability to attack Iran. The second phase then employs older missiles and drones to exhaust Israeli air defenses, wearing them down so they can no longer intercept subsequent strikes. Observations of Israeli intercepts against incoming missiles, with many intercept attempts yet frequent misses, are cited as evidence of this wear-down strategy. In the Gulf, Iranian drones have begun to operate more freely over Dubai and other sites, indicating that Gulf air defenses are strained or exhausted. Iran may continue destroying American bases and evacuating certain installations, notably in Bahrain, where the Fifth Fleet facilities have suffered significant damage. In the Israel domain, after degrading radar and defense networks, Iran may transition to more modern, faster missiles. There is speculation about hypersonic missiles with higher speeds (potentially Mach 8–10) and multi-warhead configurations arriving in Iranian inventories, though Crook hedges that he is not a military expert. A longer-term objective of Iran, according to Crook, is to drive the United States out of the Middle East, with the broader aim of reconfiguring regional power dynamics and energy infrastructure—potentially shifting influence toward BRICS and reducing Western dominance over seaborne oil and gas routes. He notes signs that the United States is attempting to control chokepoints and detain or seize tankers linked to Russia, China, or sanctioned states, albeit with questionable legal justification. The economic and geopolitical costs are significant: gas prices for Europe have surged, oil prices are up, and markets are crashing. He suggests the Gulf States may never be the same, with security concerns driving some Western residents to relocate. The conflict is also prompting discussions among Gulf States about changing their relationships with Iran and potentially limiting future American or British military presence on Gulf bases, as illustrated by warnings to the British about the Cyprus and broader Gulf basing roles. On the American side, Crook argues that the U.S. strategy is not going as planned. He asserts the killing of the Iranian supreme leader (Khamenei) was a grave miscalculation that failed to trigger regime change and instead sparked widespread protests in Baghdad, Bahrain, and Iraq, potentially destabilizing Bahrain’s ruling Emir and provoking regional unrest. He emphasizes that the attack undermined U.S. credibility and highlighted the vulnerability of American interests, with protests and regional backlash challenging the U.S. narrative and complicating domestic political considerations, including potential ramifications for Trump’s political standing. Regarding the Israeli-American relationship, Crook suggests the clash and miscalculations are likely to affect U.S.–Israel ties. He argues that attempts at decapitation strikes and hopes for a Western-aligned Iran have not only failed but also intensified anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment in parts of the region, challenging the traditional “Israel-first” posture and implying significant implications for how the United States will engage with Israel in future policy, diplomacy, and security commitments. He also notes that even within the Democratic Party, there may be demand for a thorough rethink of U.S.–Israel relations. Crook concludes that Iran’s hard-to-predict responses, combined with U.S. miscalculations and regional blowback, signal broad and potentially lasting geopolitical shifts in West Asia, with the possibility of broader implications for Russia–Ukraine dynamics and global energy security. The discussion ends with an acknowledgment that an immediate diplomatic de-escalation seems unlikely unless substantial concessions—such as lifting sanctions, returning frozen Iranian assets, and a broader shift in U.S. policy—are offered.

Glenn and Chas Freeman discuss the rapidly evolving Iran-Israel-Gulf crisis sparked by Donald Trump’s 48-hour threat to “open the Strait of Hormuz” and destroy Iran’s energy infrastructure, and the apparent push-and-pull over whether talks are actually taking place. - Trump’s maneuvering: Freeman notes Trump appears to be trying to walk back the threat, arguing there were “two days of good productive discussions,” while Iranian Foreign Minister says there have been no talks. Freeman emphasizes that diplomacy remains indispensable, even as Trump’s posture leans toward coercive tactics. - The wider pattern: Freeman argues the region’s dynamics have driven Israel and Iran toward force, with diplomacy sidelined. He contends Washington’s challenge now is the price of energy (gas at the pump) and domestic political concerns rather than allied welfare. The Strait of Hormuz currently operates as a toll booth: many countries can pass if they have the license and pay. - Escalation and responses: There is a recurring cycle of Israeli and American escalation met by Iranian counter-escalation (e.g., Iranian missiles fired near Dimona in response to Natanz, and Iran listing targets including Ras Al Khair desalination plant in Saudi Arabia). Iran’s stated willingness to devastate Gulf desalination capacity signals a readiness to impose extreme costs. - International diplomacy and actors: Freeman highlights quiet diplomacy behind the scenes with China, India, Japan, Turkey, and behind-the-scenes talks by Italy and France with Iran. He notes European leaders’ unease and questions whether Europe will push more assertively, with Spain showing some potential for distancing from US and a possible NATO rethink. He argues the Atlantic alliance’s conceptual basis has eroded, risking a shift from a defensive to an offensive posture in Europe, and suggests the Gulf states may gradually distance from the United States while privately leveraging Israel’s tech and security advantages. - The Gulf Arab position: Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states remain publicly tied to the United States but fear becoming casualties in a miscalculated conflict. Freeman posits that long-term strategists in Saudi Arabia recognize the need to reduce threat through diplomacy with Iran and diversify defense dependencies (including growing Chinese weapons collaboration) as U.S. security guarantees wane. - The question of a negotiated settlement: Freeman suggests two ingredients for any settlement: a regional security architecture and a credible path for a phased American withdrawal from the Gulf. He cites Iran’s proposals (e.g., postwar regional management, toll-sharing for Hormuz) and Iran’s openness to multilateral diplomacy through bodies like the OIC, coupled with Gulf-Arab cooperation. He acknowledges Washington’s current lack of credible diplomacy and worries about whether negotiators on both sides can imagine a stable framework that preserves balance without American military primacy. - Iran’s strategic posture: Freeman argues Iran is not deterred by American or Israeli pressure and may pursue a broader missile and nuclear-capable capability build, particularly after leadership changes. He notes Iranian restraint has lessened since the late supreme leader’s era, and Iran continues missile and drone activity despite escalation. He also references possible false-flag concerns and Israel’s assassination campaigns against potential Iranian interlocutors as obstacles to diplomacy. - U.S. strategy and domestic politics: Freeman observes Trump’s incentives are mixed—gas prices at home influence his political prospects, and MAGA backers are increasingly unhappy with the war. He suggests Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” approach is counterproductive: power without purpose, and tactics without a coherent strategy. He implies a negotiated solution is preferable to ongoing low-intensity conflict, but notes it would require both sides to accept a recalibrated security arrangement rather than total capitulation. - Saudi perspective and future: Freeman notes Saudi Arabia’s desire to link more closely with the United States in the short term while also seeking greater strategic autonomy—building domestic military production and reducing sole dependence on U.S. security guarantees. He warns that public alignment with Israel in any confrontation is politically untenable for Gulf publics. - Outlook: Freeman closes by acknowledging the difficulty of predicting Trump’s behavior, the credibility issues around interlocutors like Stephen Witkoff, and the urgent need for diplomacy. He emphasizes the indispensability of diplomacy and suggests that a pathway toward a new regional security architecture, with reduced U.S. troop presence and coordinated Hormuz governance, would be a constructive turn if pursued by capable diplomats.