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Speaker 1 argues that Cuba should make a deal and asks what that deal would entail and what Cuba should do. He describes Cuba as currently a failed nation, noting that they “don’t even have jet fuel to get for airplanes to take off” and that they are “plugging up their runway.” He says that the United States is talking to Cuba and to Marco Rubio, and asserts that Cuba should absolutely make a deal because it is a humanitarian threat. He emphasizes that many Cuban Americans will be very happy when they can return to greet their relatives and do things that they should have been allowed to do for a long time. He states his interest in the people who were “treated so badly by Castro and the Cuban authorities” and notes that they “have been treated horribly,” adding that they will see how it all turns out as “Cuba and us, we are talking.” Speaker 0 asks whether that would be a good deal. Speaker 1 responds by outlining the current situation: there is an embargo, there is no oil, there is no money, and there is “no anything.” He then asks rhetorically whether, if a deal isn’t made, the United States would consider an operation like the one in Venezuela. He says he doesn’t want to answer that, suggesting it would not be a very tough operation if he did answer, but states he does not think such an operation will be necessary. He concludes with “Mister president.”

A Cuban family from the Fanhul group, who have not been back to Cuba for about fifty years, recently spoke with me. They want to visit Cuba again, and they’re not alone—many Cubans have said they would love to go back. The family largely comes from Cuba, and they’re curious about what might happen if they return. I discussed Cuba’s appeal in terms of tourism and climate. Cuba is, in its own way, a beautiful island with great weather, and they’re not in a hurricane zone, which is a nice change. They noted they wouldn’t be asking us for money for hurricanes every week. I think Cuba’s situation is changing; I’ve heard my entire life about the United States and Cuba, and when will the United States do it. I do believe I’ll be the honor of having the honor of taking Cuba. That’d be a good honor. Taking Cuba, in some form. Taking Cuba. I mean, whether I free it or take it, I think I could do anything I want with it, to tell the truth. They described Cuba’s current condition as weakened. They said Cuba has been a violent country under its leaders, with Fidel Castro being a very violent leader and his brother also a very violent leader. That’s how they governed. Despite these views, a lot of people would like to go back.

- Speaker 0 asks for the first reaction to the news and whether it was clearly a special operations effort to capture Maduro or a larger military operation. Speaker 1 says it quickly became obvious it was a special operations mission, citing the ships and platforms ideal for this, and the ability to fly helicopters into Venezuela as supporting evidence. - On how the operation penetrated Caracas and Maduro’s defenses: Speaker 1 says cyber operations were used to turn off power and to blind the air defense by making tracking and identification difficult, in addition to traditional jamming and excellent on-the-ground intelligence built up over weeks. He also suggests internal help within the Venezuelan regime was likely. - On the possibility of an inside asset and the defensive protections: Speaker 0 notes Cuban intelligence and Venezuelan National Guard protection for Maduro and asks how insiders could have enabled the operation. Speaker 1 says insiders could have assisted, and acknowledges the intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts was very strong. He cautions the president’s administration should not publicly reveal inside help, as that could cause paranoia within the command structure. - On the operation’s execution and its comparison to past regime-change operations: Speaker 1 emphasizes training and technology, noting the unit would include special operations aviation, Delta, and other components; argues this is a joint operation involving army, navy, air force, marines, cyber, and space-based platforms, requiring extensive rehearsals over weeks. He references Noriega’s capture as a point of comparison, but notes Maduro is on a different level. - On the electricity outage in Caracas: Speaker 0 asks if it was a cyber disruption or a kinetic strike. Speaker 1 responds that a cyber disruption to power is more likely than a kinetic strike, given the context. - On Venezuela’s air defense systems (S-300s, BUKs) and the $6 billion investment: Speaker 0 questions whether it’s fair to criticize these systems given the operation. Speaker 1 acknowledges they are sophisticated and capable but not sure of their maintenance and training levels. He notes the United States had telegraphed expectations for weeks and suggests negligence or incompetence in air-defense command and control if surprised. - On possible inside help and seniority of the asset: Speaker 0 asks who within the regime might have cooperated with the CIA. Speaker 1 is reluctant to speculate beyond confirming there was very good intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts. He finds it unlikely that the vice president would have been an internal asset, though he concedes nothing is impossible, given a mix of factions in the regime and third-party interference. - On geopolitical repercussions and messaging to China, Iran, and Russia: Speaker 0 points to the timing with a Chinese delegation in Caracas and asks what message this sends to China and whether the date had symbolic resonance with other events. Speaker 1 says the date was probably driven by weather and other operations rather than a deliberate China signal; he suggests China would reassess oil dependencies and potential leverage now that Maduro is captured. He predicts the next target could be Cuba and discusses logistical challenges, such as Cuba’s island geography and Guantanamo Bay. - On US strategy in the Western Hemisphere and potential targets: Speaker 1 opines that Cuba is a plausible next target and explains why, including electoral considerations in Florida. He notes that a Cuba operation would be more difficult than Venezuela due to geography but could be motivated by domestic political calculation and the Monroe Doctrine as a signal. - On China, Russia, and Iran in the wake of Maduro’s capture: Speaker 1 argues the US demonstrates strong capabilities, and China would need to reassess oil supply and leverage; Russia’s and Iran’s interests could be pressured as the US asserts influence in the region. He mentions that the US might not directly engage in large-scale intervention in Iran but warns against overreach due to domestic political constraints. - On the broader pattern and future: Speaker 1 cautions about the risk of hubris and notes domestic political constraints and upcoming congressional pressures that could shape how far the administration pursues this strategy beyond Venezuela. He stresses the importance of not overestimating the ability to sustain similar moves without a plan for the post-Maduro environment.

Dr. Paul and the other speaker discuss a sequence of public claims and shifts regarding Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, and the Cartel de los Soles. They begin by recalling a $50,000,000 bounty on President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, arguing that Maduro is the head of a narco-terrorist drug cartel called Cartel de los Soles. They note that Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio stated in November that the State Department intends to designate Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization headed by the illegitimate Nicolas Maduro, asserting that the group has corrupted Venezuela’s institutions and is responsible for terrorist violence conducted with other designated foreign terrorist organizations, as well as for trafficking drugs into the U.S. and Europe. The speakers claim that for weeks Americans were exposed to a narrative portraying foreign narco-terrorist cartels running the country and that this narrative influenced public opinion, making some believe it might be acceptable to take drastic actions, including attacking boats, on the premise that “they’re all terrorists.” They then point to a development that “dropped yesterday,” presenting a clip that, once Maduro was “in their grasp,” the Justice Department allegedly dropped the claim that Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles is an actual group. They assert that after months of hype intended to drum up support for invading Venezuela, the claim was retracted, with the implication that the government figures had misrepresented the situation. The speakers compare this sequence to the Iraq WMD narrative, asserting that officials “swore up and down for years” about WMDs, and when the invasion occurred they were shown joking about the existence of WMDs. They recall President George W. Bush joking about WMDs at a White House Correspondents’ Dinner, looking under the couch and the coffee table, asking “Where’s those WMDs?” They conclude by likening the Cartel de los Soles to the WMDs of their operation, arguing that the construct is already completely falling apart. The overarching claim is that the Cartel de los Soles was used as a justification for aggressive action, and that the narrative surrounding the cartel has been exposed as unreliable or false.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the January 3 operation in Venezuela, the speakers explore initial reactions, possible motives, and the broader geopolitical implications. - Initial reaction and early concerns: The exchange begins with the worry that the events marked the start of a full amphibious assault or a new war. Speaker 1 recalls staying up late and being shocked by the “sheer gangsterism” of Maduro’s kidnapping, noting that Maduro was flown out of the country with little resistance. He models several theories around how such an operation could occur with minimal opposition and suggests the possibility of a negotiated exit that would keep the Chavista structure in place through a successor like Delsy Rodriguez. - The “deal” theory and who might be involved: Speaker 1 explains a theory that Donald Trump and Marco Rubio wanted a negotiated exit for Maduro that would allow the Pesuv (Chavista) structure to remain and enable the installation of a figure like Delsy Rodriguez to work within Chavismo to secure resource contracts for Trump’s allies. He cites sources close to negotiations and references coverage in the New York Times supporting elements of this narrative. He also notes Trump’s public dismissal of Maria Carina Machado as lacking support to rule, a point he says he predicted on a livestream. - The military stand-down hypothesis: The conversation delves into why no strikes targeted the helicopters, positing a stand-down order. Speaker 0 asks who would authorize such a stand-down and cites Ian Bremmer’s assessment as a possibility but unlikely due to the risk. Speaker 1 acknowledges the plausibility of many theories, including the idea that a stand-down could spare the country from greater U.S. violence, reminiscent of past operations in Baghdad or Raqqa, and emphasizes that the question of who issued any stand-down order remains unresolved. He mentions Delsy Rodriguez’s potential self-protection concerns and notes Diosdado Cabello’s visible signaling alongside military figures after Maduro’s abduction. - Delsy Rodriguez and potential motivations: The interlocutors discuss Rodriguez’s political stature, her management of Venezuela’s COVID response, and the perception she could pose a more direct challenge to U.S. interests due to her economic stabilization efforts and heavy ties to China. Speaker 1 underscores that Rodriguez stabilized the economy and was central to a revival that included substantial China-driven oil exports, a point supported by a New York Times profile. He clarifies that he did not speculate Rodriguez was the U.S. mole but stresses she would be asked by interviewers about such questions. - Maduro’s leadership and the economic crisis: The participants debate Maduro’s competence, acknowledging corruption and structural issues within a petro-state framework but arguing that the decline in living standards and oil production has deep roots, including U.S. sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Speaker 1 contends that while Maduro was not a “stupid” leader, Chavez-era and post-Chavez mismanagement, together with U.S. financial sanctions and regime-change tactics, contributed to Venezuela’s economic collapse. He insists the regime’s persistence does not hinge on one leader and cautions against simplistic characterizations of Maduro or Chavez as solely responsible for ruin. - Economic dynamics and sanctions: The discussion emphasizes that Venezuela’s economic trajectory has been shaped by sanctions and counter-sanctions, with Speaker 1 asserting that U.S. maximum-pressure campaigns and the theft of assets (including Sitco and gold reserves) severely impacted the economy. He argues the sanctions constitute financial terrorism and compares U.S. policy to broader imperial dynamics centered on dollar dominance and oil leverage. - Regime change prospects and future leadership: The speakers speculate about possible future leadership within the Pesuv or an alternative power structure, including the potential grooming of a candidate from within the regime or the return of Maria Carina Machado if conditions align. They note that a political shift would require military backing, and they discuss whether an eventual election could be staged or delayed to a more favorable time for U.S. interests. They emphasize that, absent military support, it would be difficult for any non-Maduro leadership to emerge. - China, Russia, and global signaling: The conversation covers the Chinese envoy’s presence in Caracas before the operation and the broader implications for China’s role in Venezuela. Speaker 1 argues the operation sent a global message to rivals (China, Russia, Iran) that the U.S. can seize leadership and resources, while also suggesting that China could be leveraged to avoid deeper conflict by permitting continued oil exports. The dialogue also touches on potential retaliatory moves by Russia or China and the broader geopolitical chessboard, including implications for Greenland and other strategic theaters. - Legal proceedings and comparisons to other regime changes: Maduro’s indictment in the Southern District of New York is discussed, with reflections on its weaknesses and how it compares to similar prosecutions (e.g., Juan Orlando Hernandez). The discussion concludes with a sense that Venezuela will likely face a prolonged, complex confrontation, with lingering questions about who will govern next and under what terms.

Speaker 0 outlines a discussion on global threats and resources. The audience quickly names Russia as the major threat, with China and North Korea also suggested; Venezuela is mentioned by one participant as well. The speaker then pivots to a question about natural resources: which place has the largest oil deposit on the planet, more than Saudi Arabia or Iran? The answer highlighted is Venezuela, noted as arguably the single greatest source of oil and minerals on the planet. The focus shifts to Venezuela’s leadership: President Nicholas Reyes, who rose to power on nationalist pride and, in six years, has crippled the national economy by half and raised the poverty rate by almost 400%. Reyes is up for reelection. His opponent is Gloria Bonaldi, described as a history professor turned activist, running on a social justice platform. The speaker adds a claim about predictions for Venezuela’s future, stating that as of today the chances of total economic collapse are 87%. Media framing is contrasted: on the news, Venezuela would be called a crisis, but on the world stage it would be called a failed state. The speaker notes other examples of failed states in recent history—Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. A further point is made that Venezuela is the only one of these places within a thirty-minute range from the US of “next gen nuclear missiles.” The claim continues that you will not hear about any of this on the news because the biggest players on the world stage do not want you to; unstable governments are seen, in their view, as opportunities. The closing assertion is that Russia and China can never be the most major threat until countries like Venezuela leave the door open to the United States’ backyard.

Speaker 0 emphasizes that the MAGA base is not at risk of being lost because they want to win, want the country protected, and want strength to prevent hostile nations from having nuclear weapons, as well as support for certain allies like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. They state MAGA wants strength and victory, and that there has been success. They reference going into Venezuela, noting they campaigned on “peace with strength,” adding, “you wouldn't have to I said you'll never have to use it.” They then joke, “but some and Cuba's next, by the way. But pretend I didn't say that, please. Pretend I didn't say that. Please.” They conclude with a plea to the media to disregard that statement, and reiterate “Cuba's next.”

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss Venezuela policy and leadership. Speaker 0 asks if "secretary Hagsef and Rubio are going to be running Venezuela" and whether US military troops will be sent in. Speaker 1 responds that they are "working with the people of Venezuela to make sure that we have Venezuela" and questions who would take over if the US left, noting there is "a vice president who's been appointed by Maduro" who "was sworn as president just a little while ago." She had a long conversation with Marco and said, "we'll do whatever you need," though she "really doesn't have a choice." Speaker 1 asserts they will "have this done right" and "not gonna just do this with Maduro then leave like everybody else" or let it "go to hell." If the US left, it would have "zero chance of ever coming back." They will "run it properly," with "the greatest oil companies in the world" investing "billions and billions of dollars" and using that money "in Venezuela." The biggest beneficiary, per Speaker 1, will be "the people of Venice."

The speaker asks, why are we doing this and why are we so opposed to Nicolas Maduro. On the street, most people would say they don’t know who Nicolas Maduro is. But in places like South Florida, where people recognize Maduro and can identify Venezuela on a map, the typical answer shifts: because he’s a communist or a socialist. The speaker asserts that this is true: Nicolas Maduro and his government are very left wing on economics. The speaker notes an interesting distinction: this left-wing stance is economic, not social. In Venezuela, gay marriage is banned, abortion is banned, and sex changes for transgender individuals are banned. The speaker describes Venezuela as one of the very few countries in the entire hemisphere with those social policies, emphasizing that these policies are conservative socially. The speaker adds that Venezuela is one of the very few nations in the region with those social policies, specifying that it is on social policy, not defending the regime. The speaker mentions that only El Salvador comes close in conservatism, though El Salvador is much smaller. Additionally, the speaker brings up a political point: the US-backed opposition leader who would take Maduro’s place, if Maduro were removed, is described as eager to implement gay marriage in Venezuela. This is presented as a counterpoint to the idea that the opposition is globally liberal or that the regime is uniquely opposed to liberal social policies. The speaker references the notion of a “global homo” project and implies that the reality is different from that belief, labeling the project as not crazy after all. The overall argument ties Maduro’s economic leftism to social policy conservatism, and contrasts Venezuelan social policy with potential shifts under the opposition, while noting public recognition differences about Maduro.

Speaker 0 argues that despite claims that the United States kidnapped Maduro in Venezuela to seize oil resources, the true motive was to counter China. China, according to the speaker, has tools and weapons that could destabilize the U.S. dollar, which would impact civil markets. At the start of the year, China announced it would restrict exports of its silver, and since China dominates the silver market, this caused the price of silver to surge. The speaker asserts that if the United States embargoed China's oil, China could dump its U.S. Treasuries and cause financial havoc, potentially destroying both nations. A central metaphor is presented: a ladder over an abyss, with both China and the United States attempting to climb it together. The United States supposedly insists on remaining higher than China; if the U.S. goes too far and falls behind, the latter destabilizes and both fall into the abyss. Conversely, if China overtakes and climbs too far, they both fall. The speaker contends that the American financial industry currently lacks the capacity to self-correct, and a market collapse could pull the entire economy down. Another major problem cited is over-financialization. Regarding silver, the speaker asserts that China needs silver, but in the United States it is used for speculation, describing silver as “really just paper silver.” They claim that some companies, such as JPMorgan, are significantly overleveraged—“300 to one”—so every ounce of silver they hold is promised 300 on paper. The speaker then shifts to a geopolitical forecast: “This war will be settled in Odessa.” NATO, they claim, will commit to defending Odessa; Russia will encircle and blockade, and NATO will be unable to hold on. Europeans would be forced to be conscripted to fight in Odessa, would refuse, and civil war would ensue across Europe. The timeframe is given as five to ten years, with a note that it would be a slow death for Europe, and that some aspects are expected to unfold “this year.”

The speaker stated, “How about we’re buying oil from Venezuela? When I left, Venezuela was ready to collapse. We would have taken it over. We would have gotten all that oil. It would have been right next door.” The claim centers on the idea that external action could have enabled acquiring Venezuelan oil by seizing control as the country was described as near collapse.

Speaker 0 conveys a policy stance: 'When I came in, the first thing I said is any BRICS state that even mentions the destruction of the dollar will be charged a 150% tariff, and we don't want your goods. We don't wanna partake. And' The central assertion is that any BRICS state mentioning the destruction of the dollar would incur a 150% tariff, with the speaker stating they do not want the goods or participation from those states. The transcript ends with an unfinished conjunction, 'And', suggesting the thought continued beyond the excerpt. The excerpt provided ends abruptly, with 'And' indicating continuation.

The speaker argues that Venezuela has already been invaded, naming Russian agents, Iranian agents, and terrorist groups such as Hizbola and Hamas operating freely in alignment with the regime. They also point to the Colombian guerrilla and drug cartels as factors that have taken over 60% of the population, not only in drug trafficking but also in human trafficking and networks of prostitution. This, the speaker says, has transformed Venezuela into the criminal hub of The Americas. The regime’s sustainability, according to the speaker, relies on a powerful and heavily funded repression system. The speaker asks where this funding comes from, answering with multiple illicit streams: drug trafficking, the black market of oil, arms trafficking, and human trafficking. They assert that these flows must be cut, arguing that once repression is weakened, “it's over” because violence and terror are all the regime has left. The speaker urges the international community to cut these sources of funding and support. They claim that the other regimes that back Maduro and the criminal structure are active and have turned Venezuela into a safe haven for their operations, extending their influence into the rest of Latin America.

Look at those streets, it's like a war zone, a dead city. This is Havana, or what's left of it. There's no prosperity, no path, no future. People are living like zombies, surviving rather than truly living. It's sad to see a nation drowning in hunger and need. This is what Fidel Castro wanted for Latin America, what they want for Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico. This is communism, folks. Don't let it reach your country.

The conversation centers on Venezuela and regional concerns. Speaker 0 notes that there were voices suggesting Venezuela isn’t so bad and that Latin America isn’t either, but they remain unconvinced. They ask Abe for good reasons not to be convinced. Abe responds that there are good reasons: Venezuela is getting worse, little by little, as long as oil money continues to flow. Speaker 0 then relays information from experts: Venezuela, apart from Iran, is the only government that propagates anti-Semitism around the world. The claim is that it’s already formalized, first within the country and then outside. The discussion moves to what actions might be taken. Speaker 0 asks whether there is any pressing effort underway. They say they’ve talked to Jesse Jackson, noting the relationship, but it’s not for Kenra; there are other plans, which will be discussed in a moment.

Speaker 0 claims that everything happening in Canada now is what happened in Venezuela twenty years ago, step by step, calling it a script from communism. They say that every immigrant from Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia can tell you that this is messed up 100%.

The speaker says the United States is becoming like Venezuela. At a local HEB in San Antonio, Texas, the speaker observed a majority of people who appeared to be Venezuelan. They were speaking a Spanish dialect different from Mexican Spanish and wearing jerseys with "Venezuela" on them. The speaker observed them taking up all the aisles, not moving for others, and loading up on beer. The speaker feels big changes are coming to the United States.

Speaker 0: Have you considered talking to the president of Colombia who you called a drop leader? Speaker 1: No. I haven't really thought too much about him. He's been fairly hostile to The United States, and I haven't given him a lot of thought. He's he's gonna have himself some big problems if he doesn't wise up. Speaker 2: Did you say Colombia is producing a lot of drugs. Have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into The United States. So he better wise up or he'll be next. He'll be next too. I hope he's listening. Speaker 0: So was this operation a message that you're sending to Mexico, to Claudia Scheinbaum, president there? Speaker 2: Well, it wasn't meant to be. We're very friendly with her. She's a good woman, but the cartels are running Mexico. She's not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico. We could be politically correct and be nice and say, oh, yes. Is no. No. She's very, you know, she's very frightened of the cartels that are running Mexico. And I've asked her numerous times, would you like us to take out the cartels? No. No. No, mister president. No. No, no, please. So we have to do something because we lost the real number is 300,000 people, in my opinion. You know, they like to say a 100,000. A 100,000 is a lot of people, but the real number is 300,000 people. And we lost it to drugs, and they come in through the southern border, mostly the southern border. A lot plenty come in through Canada too, by the way, in case you don't know. But but they come in through the southern border, and something's gonna have to be done with Mexico. Cuban government, the Trump administration's next target, mister secretary, very quickly. Speaker 3: Well, the Cuban government is a is a huge problem. Yeah. The the the the Cuban government is a huge problem for Speaker 2: some So is that a yes? Speaker 3: Cuba. But I don't think people fully appreciate. I think they're in a lot of trouble. Yes. I'm not gonna talk talk to you about what our future steps are gonna be and our policies are gonna be right now in this regard, but I don't think it's any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro. His entire, like, internal security force, his internal security opera apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. One of the untold stories here is how, in essence, you talk about colonization because I think you said Dulce Rodriguez mentioned that, the ones who have sort of colonized, at least inside the regime, are Cubans. It was Cubans that guarded Maduro. He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards. In terms of their internal intelligence, who spies on who inside to make sure there are no traitors, those are all Cubans. Speaker 0: He felt very strongly. We we needed for nationals. We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We had some we have so many sites for minerals and oil and everything. We have more oil than any other country in the world. We need Greenland for national security.

Speaker 0 states that Colombia is very sick, run by a sick man who likes making cocaine and selling it to The United States. He says the man "is not gonna be doing it very long" and repeats that "he's not gonna be doing it very long," noting that "he has cocaine mills and cocaine factories." The speaker asserts it "will be an operation by The US" and concludes, "It sounds good to me."