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Reports of explosions in Iran began about an hour after the discussion started, with Iranian media citing strikes in Shabahar, Bandar Abbas, Qanarak, Ahvaz, and Bashir—locations reported struck in the previous two rounds. Early speculation treated the events as “wave three” of American strikes against Iran. An Axios report said the US was not striking Iran, shifting speculation toward Israel. The speakers said that if it were Israel, evidence like cruise missiles and reports of Israeli fighter jets would usually appear, but Israeli media also said it was not Israel. That left speculation about Gulf actors, with Bahrain and Kuwait seen as the remaining possibilities after noting Saudi was reportedly attacked and the UAE was not. The speakers described a further turn: in the minutes before they discussed it, Iranian media began denying that the reported explosions across those cities were true, creating confusion about whether the Gulf attacked or whether air defenses were active. One speaker said there were no reports of ship missiles launching from Iran, while another said air defenses were active and that Iranian media “jumped to conclusions” because everyone was on edge. They acknowledged they lacked conclusive information and were relying on scattered reports. They asked whether it would be surprising if a Gulf country participated in an attack on Iran, with the response emphasizing that such participation would be very surprising, and expressing that it made little sense for tiny states like Bahrain or Kuwait to initiate action that could invite retaliation. The speakers also contrasted this with Qatar, which they said had not been struck by Iran (except for what was described as a single warning shot yesterday). A new Iranian-media claim (IRNA, citing a deputy political and security governor) reported that an Iranian military headquarters on the outskirts of Bashir was hit by a “projectile from the American Zionist enemy,” with no casualties. The speakers discussed the uncertainty of the term “projectile” and offered a war anecdote about a mistaken assumption that friendly equipment effects (chaff) meant soldiers were being attacked. They concluded that early battlefield reports are often wrong and that multiple parties involved (Saudi/UAE, Iran, the US, Israel, the Houthis) make interpretation especially confusing. Switching to a different subject, they discussed a US truck strike on the Akkala Khan Railway Bridge in Golestan (near the Turkmenistan border), describing it as a node connecting China’s Xi’an to Tehran along Belt and Road routes running through Iran. One speaker suggested it appeared to be a warning shot and tied it to broader Belt and Road significance in Eurasia, arguing it was meant to signal to Iran and potentially to China that Washington could isolate Iran. The other speaker connected it to historical precedent, including the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway and British concerns before World War I, and relayed speculation that the strike signaled threats to US hegemony and might also relate to possible delivery of air defense batteries via the railway. On escalation over the prior 48 hours, one speaker said Iran attacked three ships passing the Omani side, after which the US “went ballistic.” They cited claims that the US attacked 14 times as much as in previous retaliation cycles and framed two schools of thought: the ceasefire/MOUs being dead and war continuing, or a long power struggle to control the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran purportedly maintaining control rather than escalating broadly. Another speaker said Iran appeared to be on a full war footing and argued that the US was not mobilized similarly, noting a US Navy admission of having more missile launchers/tubes than available missiles. They said the US lacks a coherent military-political strategy and asked what the objective is if regime change is not the goal, while asserting that Israel’s objective is the destruction of Iran. They also discussed economic and political constraints, including oil, inflation, strategic petroleum reserve replenishment, interest rates, and the bond market. One speaker said Iranian armed forces entered the highest state of alert and moved to wartime conditions, including reports of special forces moving to Iraqi Kurdistan to worry about infiltration. Another claimed that tanker trackers showed Tehran shipped out 10 million barrels of crude oil and fuel overnight in preparation for possible blockade or continued war. The speakers cited Axios reporting that the White House braced for a weeks-long fight with Iran. They considered whether the US was using a “carrot and stick” approach—unfreezing assets and easing sanctions in exchange for Iran not charging tolls in the Strait of Hormuz—while Iran refused to yield. The discussion then expanded to Turkey and Israel. They said Trump and Netanyahu coordinated closely on regional issues, and that Netanyahu raised Erdogan’s “increasingly hostile rhetoric” toward Israel and the importance of Israeli security zones. They recounted Israeli Finance Minister Smotrich’s statements that Israel must prepare for every scenario involving military action against Turkey and that Erdogan is a significant threat to Israel. They also said Trump praised Erdogan and considered approving F-35 sales to Turkey despite Netanyahu’s opposition. One speaker suggested this was effectively a bribe aimed at keeping Turkey on the sidelines and claimed Erdogan would later face pressures to act. The other speaker described a worrying theory that Trump might condition F-35s on Erdogan convincing Syria’s al-Shara to fight Hezbollah in Lebanon, though they said this idea seemed unlikely and that Syria’s situation would make such an action difficult. Finally, they discussed the broader pattern of US commitments and great-power decline, arguing financial/economic pressures would ultimately limit escalation. They also debated US policy toward Ukraine, describing Trump’s support for deeper strikes into Russia and licensing Patriot missiles to Ukraine, while arguing the timelines and Russian retaliation could undermine the effect. The conversation concluded with reflections comparing US and Russian/Chinese diplomatic behavior as professional and interest-focused, then ended with thanks and farewell.

Mario and Glenn discuss the evolving Iran–U.S. confrontation after Trump’s speech and recent military actions. They explore whether Trump is seeking an off-ramp and how Iran might respond, focusing on strategic leverage around the Strait of Hormuz, escalation dynamics, and regional implications. - Trump’s posture and off-ramp: Mario notes Trump’s speech yesterday seemed like a threat if Iran doesn’t grant an off-ramp, with comments suggesting further precision attacks if peace isn’t achieved quickly. Glenn agrees Trump is signaling for an off-ramp but warns the President lacks obvious military targets to push Iran toward surrender. Both acknowledge Trump’s dual tendency to escalate while also hinting at ending the conflict. - Strait of Hormuz as leverage: The discussion emphasizes that Iran’s ability to control, or at least influence, the Hormuz strait is a key factor in determining the war’s outcome. If Iran maintains dominance over Hormuz, they can set transit conditions, demand concessions, or push for non-dollar trade. The speakers agree that Iran can “hold on to the Strait of Hormuz” to prevent a clean U.S. victory, making it a central bargaining chip. - Historical lens on victory and war termination: Glenn argues that raw military power often doesn’t translate into lasting political victory, citing Vietnam and the Iraq war as examples, and notes Iran views the conflict as existential for legitimate reasons. Trump’s stated goal of “destroying everything of infrastructure and energy” would raise global energy prices and provoke Iranian retaliation against Gulf states, complicating U.S. aims. - Possible outcomes and shifts in posture: They consider multiple scenarios: - If Trump off-ramps, Iran might reciprocate, potentially halting strikes on U.S. bases and negotiating terms around Hormuz. - If the U.S. presses ahead or escalates, Iran could intensify attacks on Gulf states or even Israel, leading to broader regional destabilization. - A mutually acceptable security framework may require the U.S. to reduce its Middle East footprint while Gulf states participate in a collective security arrangement over Hormuz. - Israel’s veto power and potential U.S. decisions: Israel’s security considerations complicate any exit, but the U.S. might act unilaterally if core national security interests are threatened. - Ground troops and regional dynamics: Both acknowledge the ambiguity around ground deployments; Trump’s denial of ground troops conflicts with the impulse to escalate, creating a paradox that makes miscalculations likely. The possibility of renewed ground involvement remains uncertain, with skepticism about sustaining a ground campaign given logistics and supply constraints. - Regional actors and diplomacy: They discuss whether a broader regional rapprochement is possible. Iran’s willingness to negotiate could depend on assurances about its security and status quo changes in the Gulf. Tasnim News reports Iran and Oman are developing a joint maritime protocol for Hormuz in the post-war period, with Iran planning a toll-based framework for tanker traffic, signaling monetization and control even as Hormuz reopens for the world. - NATO, U.S. defense spending, and leadership changes: The conversation touches on geopolitics beyond Iran, noting a forthcoming $1.5 trillion defense budget and a leadership shift at the U.S. Army, with secretary of war P. Hexath ordering the Army chief of staff to retire, signaling a potential reorientation of U.S. military strategy. - Israel–Iran–Gulf triangle: They consider how Iran’s actions could affect Israel and Gulf states, noting that Iran’s retaliation could prompt U.S. or Israeli responses, while Gulf states struggle with the economic and security repercussions of sustained conflict. - Timing and next steps: Mario predicts the war could end soon, driven by off-ramps and Iranian willingness to negotiate, whereas Glenn cautions that the conflict will likely continue given the deep-seated security demands and the strategic importance of Hormuz. Both acknowledge daily developments could shift trajectories, and express cautious optimism that some form of resolution may emerge, though the exact terms remain uncertain. - Final reflections: The discussion closes with reflections on how fragile the current balance is, the possibility of a peace-through-strength stance, and the high stakes for global energy markets, regional stability, and the international order. Mario thanks Glenn for the dialogue, and they sign off.

The discussion centers on an “escalation trap” involving multiple fronts of escalation—direct and proxy—between the United States, Israel, Iran-backed groups, and Gulf-backed militias. Mario highlights escalations on the Lebanese, Syrian, and Iraqi fronts, with particular concern about the Yemeni front: in recent days, Saudi- and Emirati-backed militias have been building up and amassing, possibly for a renewed offensive against the Houthis. Mario links these developments to the Red Sea and choke points. He argues the Yemeni theatre matters because the Red Sea is increasingly important as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz if conflict resumes. For those alternatives to work, he says Iran’s “stranglehold” over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—through the Houthis—must be removed. He describes the possibility that clashes between Iran, the U.S., and Israel could temporarily shift into proxy fronts across multiple regions. David/“Professor Pape” modeling and incentives are emphasized by the second speaker. He agrees that Iraq’s recent crackdown on militias may be connected to Syria, Hezbollah, and pressure on militia behavior. He then expands the “big picture” to a sphere-of-influence competition over “the four corners of the MOU,” arguing there is a fundamental disagreement about regional power: the United States wants to remain preeminent; Israel wants to undermine the MOU; and Iran wants to stick with the MOU’s “four corners” as a roadmap to regional power. He frames Iran’s actions as consolidation rather than starting from scratch, noting proxies and relationships that predate the current crisis. He describes Iran’s IRGC messaging about an “access resistance belt” stretching from Lebanon through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea/Yemen and circling back toward the Gulf, which he says would encircle Iraq as well. He argues this sphere of influence is tied to Hormuz and the pathways to bypass it, connecting Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. A key focus becomes Hormuz arrangements in the context of an escalation around MOU Article 5. The second speaker explains that Iran is attempting to maintain Iran’s lead partner role (“Iran is going to be in charge of the arrangements with Oman”) and enforce Article 5’s threshold by exercising coercive leverage to prevent the U.S. from using “salami slicing” to whittle down the threshold. He describes the timing of fees as starting “after 60 days,” referencing an approaching “day 61,” and says Iran is coercively constraining shipping to force acceptance of fees. He cites an expected fee structure described as “something like $2 million a tanker,” equating to large daily and annual amounts, and he says Iran’s aim is to secure those fees and block exits. The discussion also covers the Strait of Hormuz clashes. The second speaker explains that Iran seeks to assert control by striking ships going on the Oman side, while the U.S. responds to make that unacceptable; clashes continue with another escalation after attempted talks. Qatar talks are mentioned, along with a report that Oman, Iran, and Oman have a plan to charge a fee and manage the Strait together, which the U.S. does not like. Regarding Qatar/Doha outcomes, he expects either little or temporary results and argues ceasefires are defunct in practical terms, with pauses between violence rather than linear outcomes. He attributes part of public messaging dynamics to market timing and political incentives to “lash back,” while insisting Iran’s coercive strategy follows realism-based incentives and periodic enforcement rather than continuous daily strikes. When asked what surprised him most, he says the stage-by-stage modeling has matched real events closely, outlining prior stages: bombing Fordow, then a feared move toward regime-change bombing out of nuclear material paranoia, leading to further lashing back and escalation or acceptance of Iran as a fourth center of power. He predicts the current “middle game” could last through at least January, while also noting U.S. posture changes—despite earlier expectations of pullbacks—are consistent with his modeled logic. On the likelihood of resumption of full conflict after midterms, he says a major war is plausible, citing two drivers: fuel/price impacts creating anger domestically and momentum for political narratives blaming Iran; and concern about potential Iranian nuclear weapons testing following regime-change-style pressures. He also discusses strategic ambiguity about keeping U.S. Marines and argues the forces could serve as backup in case of Iranian testing. The second speaker also addresses Israel as a “wild card” and describes internal Israeli pressures: public trauma after October 7, political direction toward full-bore action against Lebanon, and a strategic logic that Hezbollah-style drone threats could extend to Israeli trade corridors, particularly ports like Haifa. He describes Israel’s trade dependence as a strategic constraint that could make Hezbollah’s threat more severe in practice. In conclusion, he expects Iran to enforce the “four corners” of the MOU, likely initiating force in the coming weeks to do so, while the U.S. grows more inclined to respond more forcefully, increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia. He points to reported Pakistani troop and jet details in Saudi Arabia as a sign Gulf states may seek alternative approaches with Iran beyond retaliatory bombing. He emphasizes that Doha talks may occur but won’t predict the immediate reality, which he says will be driven by actions and security incentives rather than negotiations alone.

The speaker says the war with Iran is “back on” after renewed bombings. They claim the sequence began when the U.S. was trying to guide tankers and ships through the southern portion of the Strait of Hormuz, an area Iran “doesn’t want ships to use” near the Omani shoreline. The speaker states Iran has asserted control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and has granted safe passage through a “Northern Channel” closer to the Iranian border. They say this relates to Iran’s territorial waters out to about 11 nautical miles from shore, and that the U.S. preferred not to use the northern route because it would require paying fees to Iran. The speaker claims that as three to five tankers sailed through the southern portion, the IRGC warned them to turn around and stop, but they did not, and the ships were “struck by drones,” with some “set on fire” and “kinetically attacked.” The speaker then says the United States bombed Iran in response, citing CENTCOM, which they state reported striking 80 targets. They say CENTCOM stated U.S. forces struck Iranian air defense systems and coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, and small boats. The speaker questions the presence of small boats, referencing a claim that Iran’s Navy had already been destroyed. Next, the speaker says Iran has begun retaliatory strikes against U.S. forces, firing anti-ship cruise missiles and drones at U.S. Navy warships in the Sea of Oman. The speaker adds that Iran is asserting it will “assert control over the Strait of Hormuz.” They cite Professor Robert Pape (University of Chicago) saying: “trump is playing with nationalist fire by striking civilian targets in iran with millions demanding revenge at the supreme leader's funeral,” and also: “Trump just handed the regime a clear trigger for major retaliation. The entire world economy is now at risk.” The speaker also references political commentary from Marjorie Taylor Greene about “bombing Iran during the ceasefire” and says the war is “not a war.” They further mention Pete Hegseth (as referenced by the speaker), and that Marco Rubio is described as saying the U.S. would not allow Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz or charge a toll. The speaker turns to energy markets, stating that oil is spiking again and that a supply shock they have warned about will “kick in in a very harsh manner,” leading to “motor oil shortages,” “diesel shortages,” and higher prices for gasoline, diesel, and “jet fuel” by less than one month, accelerating into September and October. They link the worsening energy situation to escalation in conflicts and to attacks on infrastructure, claiming Ukrainian drone attacks hit multiple Russian oil tankers. They also claim that oil refining and refined product output are suffering “both out of Russia and also out of… the Middle East,” and that this is “engineered” to create a global energy crisis. They say the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since the 1980s. They also claim the U.S. revoked a sanctions waiver/license that allowed Iran to sell oil through roughly the end of August, stating: “the MOU is dead,” and that Iran’s oil will not contribute to Western supply because sanctions are back on. The speaker predicts additional choke-point escalation, asserting “closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait” could come next. They also mention Iran ballistic missiles striking U.S. military bases in Bahrain “apparently,” and conclude that fuel costs, food prices, fertilizer impacts, and supply-chain problems will intensify. They say fertilizer shortages for the fall planting season will lead to “increased famine in 2027,” and that “many items” could become unaffordable in the U.S. Finally, they predict U.S. economic and geopolitical consequences, including spillover into U.S. treasury markets if Japan sells treasuries to buy oil or gas, and they claim this could lead to a U.S. invasion of Iran. They state the IRGC says the U.S. will not be allowed to interfere in the Strait of Hormuz and argue that Iran will hold control until the West cannot handle energy “strangulation.”

The discussion centers on the scope and pattern of U.S.-led attacks during the day and how Iran may retaliate and sustain pressure. Speaker 0 says he is not tracking events “blow by blow” but indicates strikes were directed toward targets along the coastline rather than a nuclear power facility, and that Bashir was hit. Speaker 1 adds that the attacks struck the coastline with more significance than yesterday and references Axios reporting that a railway near the Turkmenistan border—connected to China’s Belt and Road—was struck. Speaker 1 says the initial impression was sabotage, but then reported that the U.S. struck it, which surprised Speaker 1. Speaker 0 frames the attacks as “finishing the job,” arguing the president is targeting Iran’s entire energy profile—production and, crucially, transportation. Speaker 0 specifically says the strikes are aimed at collapsing Iran’s ability not only to produce energy but to move it, citing Karg and saying additional attacks against Karg are likely. The Belt and Road Railway is described as keeping Iran’s energy production viable during the war by enabling shipment out, and Speaker 0 says the goal is to remove that capability. Speaker 0 then states: “Now Iran is retaliating.” Speaker 1 discusses reported air-defense and early-warning activity in Gulf locations: air defenses in Kuwait and Bahrain, and early warning alerts reportedly sent in Qatar, followed by “all clear.” Speaker 1 notes speculation that the UAE might be targeted but says there were no alerts or reports of anything in the UAE, and that explosions were heard in Kuwait and Bahrain. Speaker 0 says Qatar is “on the menu,” but not yet confirmed as a strike target. The speakers outline the U.S. target set as consistent with prior strikes since a ceasefire: targets from Bashir “all the way” down to Shabahar, Iran’s main port linking to the sea, and Abu Musa. Speaker 0 adds that beyond degrading Iran’s ability to control the Strait of Homs/coastline, the attacks also degrade Iran’s ability to defend the strait, and he worries this could be a prelude to attempts at landing. He emphasizes that the U.S. is methodically hitting what it can see, while “a boatload of stuff” cannot be seen, and he asks how Iran will retaliate both immediately and long-term, including what weapons and quantities Iran still holds in reserve. A major theme is whether the escalation pattern will broaden to additional Gulf countries. Speaker 1 asks why Iran is not responding “in kind” every time the U.S. escalates. Speaker 0 argues Iran does not have to escalate further because time is an advantage for Iran and a disadvantage for the U.S., describing the U.S. as operating on a countdown tied to oil reserves. Speaker 0 also argues Trump’s “escalate to de-escalate” approach is unstable: “a pause is not a de-escalation,” and he says the situation is continuing rather than genuinely de-escalating. The exchange turns to prior actions involving “Project Freedom.” Speaker 1 claims Trump has previously de-escalated when Iran retaliated (including the Fujairah response), while Speaker 0 disputes that those were true de-escalations, attributing outcomes to external constraints such as Saudi refusal to allow use of bases and the resulting “gap.” Speaker 0 characterizes the overall U.S. approach as being “dictated to by events” rather than controlled. Speaker 1 and Speaker 0 discuss the operational picture regarding shipping. Speaker 1 says the Strait is not closed, with discussion around “30, 40” ships and claims that Iranian-side waters are still open enough for ships to pass using Iranian traffic separation. Speaker 0 responds that the dispute is tied to Iran’s traffic separation scheme and claims U.S. efforts aim to prevent use of that scheme. Towards the end, Speaker 1 says there are multiple waves of explosions ongoing from Iran, with many interceptions and likely impacts expected near the Fifth Fleet headquarters. Speaker 0 shifts to a broader strategic argument: the Iranians allegedly do not need to do much beyond sustaining blockade-like conditions, because forcing the strait’s flow below pre-war levels is what matters. Speaker 0 argues Iran is playing an economic/survival game and that the regime’s metric is to remain in power, even while sustaining damage. Speaker 1 suggests Iran should retaliate more aggressively, but Speaker 1 and Speaker 0 both emphasize that symbolic strikes may not deter U.S. defense efforts. The speakers repeatedly suggest the key question is whether Iran believes a “red line” has been crossed, especially if the U.S. strikes Iranian energy infrastructure and transportation routes like the railway. Speaker 0 says Qatar is still “technically” on the menu but has not been struck yet, which he interprets as evidence Iran does not yet view current actions as crossing that red line. They conclude with continued concern about escalation and uncertainty about any practical off-ramp, while noting the attacks are continuing with patterns that resemble prior targeting rather than ending the memorandum.

Iranian missile and drone attacks continue in real time, with alerts reported in Kuwait and Bahrain and interceptions seen over Oman and other areas. The discussion notes that multiple targets appear to be involved, mentioning Kuwait and Bahrain, and that Jordan was struck first about ten minutes earlier. Interceptions are described from Lebanese skies against missiles heading toward Jordan, framed as Lebanon being “stuck in the middle” of missile traffic and interception. On the comparison of today’s strikes with yesterday, the analysis says the pattern mirrors prior activity: targets are described as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, with the MSA in Jordan identified as an interesting development. The speakers discuss that earlier US officials denied significant damage from yesterday’s events, and that today’s strikes appear geographically more expansive than yesterday, including areas near Iran’s capital—specifically Qaraj and other locations up north. Geographically, the strikes are said to include concentrated activity around the Strait of Hormuz and additional targeting near the capital, suggesting a broader scope than confinement to the strait region seen earlier. The discussion also links the northern strikes to possible “message” effects—warning/pressure tied to energy infrastructure near the capital—and compares US behavior to Israeli strikes that targeted similar areas. A major theme is why certain Gulf states are not being struck as directly, with suggested explanations including diplomatic concerns within the GCC and the risk of inviting retaliation. The speakers argue that Iran’s selection of targets like Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan—described as militarily capable but not large enough to drive major retaliation—could reflect deterrence and escalation management. They also say the UAE and Saudi airspace have been used extensively, and that these states appear less likely to be targeted in this phase. The conversation then shifts to US and allied air operations. Tankers and aircraft are discussed via flight tracking, including a refueling tanker near the Strait of Hormuz and other transport aircraft. The speakers interpret these overflights as supporting ongoing military operations, potentially reconnaissance, drone interception, or preparation for further waves. They highlight that airspace access appears to show integration among Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the US, and that Saudi airspace has not been shut down during this period. The discussion addresses whether radar/flight tracking could be affected by GPS spoofing or data gaps, and asks why the aircraft’s track and transponder behavior changes, including whether it might indicate activity near the Strait of Hormuz or possible operations closer to Iran. Tanker positioning is described as consistent with earlier “waves” and as potentially enabling aircraft to operate inside or near Iran. On escalation, the speakers describe concern that the pattern could become a “new normal” and resemble past high-intensity cycles, even while claiming today’s strikes are not yet targeting oil, power plants, or other major energy infrastructure (based on what is known in the moment). They debate objectives including pressure toward negotiations, symbolic messaging, and deterrence dynamics. They also argue that Iran’s ability to exert pressure on the US via the Strait of Hormuz is the key leverage and that further escalation could involve broader regional disruption (e.g., energy infrastructure or sea-lane closure). Additional real-time developments are mentioned: an explosion is reported in Bahrain near the US fleet base (Manama) and smoke/explosion imagery near a Jordanian base area is referenced. Kuwait Civil Aviation Authority is said to have announced temporary closure of Kuwaiti airspace due to Iranian attacks, and Kuwait’s army general staff is said to announce air-defense interceptions of hostile aerial targets per operational procedures. The speakers also note ongoing Iranian ballistic missile launches from Isfahan, with uncertainty about which country they are targeting as explosions continue. Later, the conversation turns to reports that Kuwait City is affected by Shahed drones, alongside commentary comparing drone intercept scenarios to major symbolic locations. They conclude that the conflict is likely to continue and expect similar cycles “tomorrow,” while acknowledging that additional strikes could come as alerts persist across the mentioned countries.

Iran struck three vessels in the last 24 hours—one Qatari, one Saudi, and one vessel of unknown ownership—while they were transiting via the Omani side through the Strait of Hormuz amid a power struggle between Iran and the United States over control of the waterway. The US wants it kept open like before February 28th, while Iran wants to control it and eventually charge a fee; this was expected to be the main sticking point in the memorandum of misunderstanding (MOU). The initial US response described was the revocation of a sanctions waiver placed about a week earlier covering Iranian oil sales and petrochemical sales and related services. A few hours later, the biggest US strikes on Iran since the ceasefire were described as hitting Bandar Abbas, Sirik, and Kashem, in multiple waves, followed by power outages reported in Kuwait and Bahrain. Axios was cited as reporting that US officials told Axios the response is a direct result of acts of international terrorism perpetrated by Iran on innocent ships transiting the Straits. CNN was cited as reporting that Iranian officials said the attack was not meant to be proportionate, but meant to be punishment. The Iranian president was described as having arrived in Iranian airspace after traveling from Iraq. A separate thread described the timing and authorization of US strikes: it was reported that Trump approved the strike plan against Iran and gave the final order on Tuesday while attending the NATO summit, after a meeting in Ankara with Hexeth, Rubio, Scott Besant, Dan Cain, the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, and other senior officials. A US official was cited as saying it remains unclear how long the strikes will continue. Across the discussion, the Strait of Hormuz was framed as the central issue that would not be resolved through consensus between Washington and Tehran, with expectations of continued cycles of violence rather than a lasting peace deal. The recurring use of the Oman route was described as being under pressure from the Americans to avoid further escalation, while Saudi and Qatari positions were described as becoming increasingly awkward as they balance wanting the crisis to end quickly with aligning with Washington. One speaker argued that the strikes could be interpreted as preparing the battle space for a potential amphibious landing by targeting areas related to Iran’s ability to control the Strait of Hormuz. The possibility of further actions—mines, sinking ships, and other ways to disrupt control of the Strait—was discussed, alongside claims that the Iranians believe they can survive economic calamity by keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed better than the Americans can. Another thread emphasized the role of the funeral processions and crowd emotions after the Iranian leadership’s death, describing large crowds chanting revenge as part of why negotiations and rational restraint might fail. At the same time, the counterpoint raised was that Iran faces massive inflation, currency collapse, and unemployment, and that the government prioritizes stabilizing the population and economy; still, revenge remained a major motivational force among many voices. The conversation also linked Iran’s actions to regional dynamics and to broader theaters, including Lebanon and Ukraine. Israeli strikes in Lebanon were described as potentially being part of a pattern connected to the US strikes on Iran, and Lebanon was characterized as inextricably linked to Iran through Hezbollah. Operational constraints and resource depletion were highlighted repeatedly: the defense industrial base was described as struggling to replenish what has been spent, and there were concerns about dwindling strategic petroleum reserve levels and the global price effects of damaging oil refineries. The strategic reserve discussion included claims about usable barrels remaining and accelerating depletion. Retaliation options were reviewed: it was suggested Iran could strike US bases (symbolically), strike Israel (though framed as less logical if Israel is not striking), or keep the Strait almost closed and carry out symbolic strikes. Closing the Strait was described as likely because it would produce immediate systemic shock through insurance and shipping market reactions, potentially restarting earlier pressure dynamics. There was also discussion that sinking a ship or more kinetic attacks would be escalatory. As additional reports emerged, the transcript noted explosions reported around Kashem and Cog (with Cog described as especially concerning). The discussion then turned to reports that Iran launched multiple anti-ship ballistic missile and anti-access area denial threats toward US Navy ships in the Persian Gulf, with saturation dynamics described as drones going first to drain defenses. The speakers discussed uncertainty about whether ships were hit and the likelihood of information gaps depending on what imagery and monitoring are available. The transcript ended with continued monitoring: it stated that Iran had struck three ships via the Strait route, that US strikes on Iran had continued for hours with peak effects early on, and that Iran’s retaliation began with at least two missiles and drones targeting US Navy forces, with no additional confirmed information at the time of the final updates.

Russia claims US intelligence is secretly moving ISIS terrorists from prisons in Syria into Iraq to prepare an attack on Iran. The report Russia cites says Western spy agencies plan to use Syrian militants as a proxy force against Iran, framing this as part of a broader effort to manipulate militant groups. Colonel Douglas McGregor says this kind of tactic has “been going on forever” in the region, pointing to past US and allied support for groups designated as terrorist organizations and to similar historical patterns of arming proxy forces. He argues Iran is “eminently well-equipped” to deal with such threats, including recalling an earlier incident in which a Turkish-backed group of Azari Turks and Kurds was stopped after warnings reached Iranian authorities. He says the larger effect is to reinforce Tehran’s belief that any agreement with the US is worthless because the US cannot be trusted. The discussion also centers on an alleged “final draft” of a US-Iran peace memorandum obtained by Al Arabiya. The transcript describes it as a “laundry list” of US demands that Iran likely will not accept, including: reopening the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation without fees or tolls; slowly removing sanctions on Iranian oil in phases over many years; ending Iranian military operations, including assisting Lebanon; and stopping Israeli bombing of southern Lebanon, with an asserted Israeli component in expected outcomes. McGregor says such elements are difficult to keep concealed and argues they reduce the likelihood of a lasting agreement. A key dispute involves Strait of Hormuz control and sanctions. The transcript states President Trump said the strait would be open to everyone, not controlled by any country under any Iran deal, and that there would be no discussions about easing sanctions. Iran is also said to have stated it would strike back after recent attacks over the weekend, with McGregor arguing there is no coherent strategy apparent and that policy changes occur “tweet to tweet.” He criticizes the claim that Iran would not control the strait by describing prior international arrangements (the Montreux Convention) as a reason to expect a Turkish framework and “de facto” Iranian control due to Iran’s coastline and incentives to keep shipping and trade flowing. McGregor identifies two major obstacles: Israel’s influence over US decisions via Netanyahu’s demands to Iran, and Trump’s personal political constraints about escaping a failed approach without appearing weak. He also claims that withholding or reducing protection and exerting political pressure would keep US actions aligned with those demands. The transcript shifts to economic concerns, linking the Iran crisis to potential financial instability. McGregor cites inflation rising from 3.2% to 3.8% and suggests possible acceleration to 6%, arguing that raising interest rates to match inflation could collapse the financial system. He also says Trump sold about 17.8 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to keep prices below $110 per barrel, warning the reserve could be exhausted by late July or early August, especially if sales occur below market price. He predicts wider economic harm, including a potential 36% reduction in global economic size, and compares current conditions to the Great Depression. He argues wealth and spending concentration make collapse-driven social change likely, describing the US as on an “unsustainable” path with debt and market distortions such as long-term mortgages and market manipulation benefiting the wealthy. He concludes that Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran accelerates the process and that a reckoning will eventually occur, though he does not specify timing.

Speaker 0 argues that control over the strait is more powerful than any nuclear weapon, noting that control is clearly in Iran’s hands, with additional mining of the southern portion forcing ships to sail right next to Iran’s total control. They criticize MAGA/Trump supporters for claiming Iran must open it immediately, saying, “you can say all the words you want, but Iran still controls the strait. And that means they control the backbone of the energy of planet earth, period.” Speaker 1 responds that Trump is desperate for a solution because the situation is humiliating the United States. They recount the U.S. posture since the Carter era, referencing the Carter Doctrine: to secure the energy-producing region in exchange for security guarantees, ensuring the Strait of Hormuz remains open. They remind that in 1987, during Operation Earnest Will, the U.S. Navy reflagged the Kuwaiti tanker fleet and escorted it through the Strait of Hormuz to protect it from Iraq and Iran. They say the Iranians watched and learned, and have since developed the capabilities to shut the strait down, and that the U.S. cannot keep it open—our navy, air force, and lack of sufficient ground power can’t do it. Therefore, Iran “own this. It is theirs, and they have declared it is ours.” Speaker 1 warns that if Iran continues to shut the strait, it will cause permanent damage, including permanent economic damage globally, with Europe facing an energy crisis it won’t recover from and Asia facing serious economic harm, including China. They note that China has intervened and pressured Iran to come to the table because a significant portion of China’s energy comes from the Middle East and from countries unable to ship oil due to the closure. They conclude that China told the Iranians they must sit down and talk with the Americans, and that Iran didn’t want to come to the table because they are “winning this war,” asserting, “they’re like, keep bombing us. We don’t care. You’re not destroying us. You’re not breaking our will. We’re destroying you. We’re humiliating you.” The Iranians, according to Speaker 1, were told by the Chinese to flow oil again and to begin talks, prompting Iran to sit down with the Americans.

The conversation centers on an ongoing international crisis involving Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. actions, and the war dynamics around shipping, along with a separate Lebanon agreement and the risk of civil conflict. Malcolm (Speaker 0) frames the situation as an ongoing “loop tape of stupid” and argues that, despite an international crisis appearing to be sliding downward, Iran will enforce navigation arrangements—including the Iranian traffic separation scheme—and may use violence to ensure compliance. He describes how, after Iran and Oman issued their own communique on managing the Strait of Hormuz, Oman said ships would pay a toll going in and out, while Iran made clear it would enforce related arrangements with violence. Malcolm also contrasts U.S. strikes with Iran’s response, claiming U.S. attacks kill people and that Iran is likely to respond when it perceives violations. A dispute arises over an IRGC statement: it is said that an IRGC statement reportedly circulated was not official and was later retracted, though a different statement attributed to Ibrahim Aziz of the National Security Commission is described as accurate. The attributed Aziz statement warns Gulf Cooperation Council heads not to gamble on an American scenario, claims U.S. military bases became sources of threat, and lists missile power, drone capabilities, and management of the Strait of Hormuz as “serious red lines.” It asserts distancing from America is the only way to ensure regional security, claims Iran has met national objectives, and says the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed until Donald Trump pays up, with Gulf states decoupling from the United States. The statement also references Iran retaining ballistic missiles and nuclear materials and rebuilding military capacity with “$300 billion,” along with claims about Gulf-state defense being on their own rather than the U.S. Later, Malcolm and Nikki (Speaker 1) discuss the ceasefire and the MOU/related arrangements. Nikki highlights a view shared by J.D. Vance: Iran signed a ceasefire agreement, the U.S. has intended to honor it, and Clause 5 involves attempting to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Nikki says attacks occurred: drones and two missiles were fired at ships going through the Strait of Hormuz. Malcolm agrees that Iran breached a clause while also emphasizing that, in his description of IRGC mindset, commanders may disregard the MOU and seek “their licks in.” He describes U.S. strike patterns as aimed at continuously degrading Iran’s ability to act further, rather than tit-for-tat. Shipping tracking and tactical effects become a focal point. Malcolm says 70 ships got out yesterday and 40 today, but that traffic through the “old” traffic separation scheme is not happening and larger crude carriers mostly use the Iranian scheme to avoid risk. He argues that if attacks persist, the Strait of Hormuz could remain closed for three or four more days and that oil and certain cargo types face severe disruption. Nikki adds that U.S. attacks since the ceasefire targeted radar installations along the coastline, including radar storage and missile/drone storage, with reference to U.S. officials stating aircraft attacked multiple Iranian targets. Malcolm then points to the “Sirik” underground tunnel complex, describing it as a storage and concealment site for boats and assets, and argues that strikes may hit entrances/exits or facilities to remind personnel the site is known. He claims U.S. strikes may have been partly performative but also real, and he emphasizes that ships have not been sunk according to his description. The conversation shifts to Lebanon. Nikki says a deal between the United States, Israel, and Lebanon has been signed with a 14-point framework that includes phased Israeli withdrawal, Lebanese armed forces gradually assuming security, disarmament of Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups, a U.S.-backed coordination and verification mechanism, reconstruction and humanitarian support, preventing funds from reaching armed groups, negotiations for comprehensive peace and security, and U.S. acknowledgement at the end. Malcolm reacts by calling the deal “awesome” before arguing it is unenforceable and a fantasy drafted by Washington and Israel, claiming Hezbollah cannot be disarmed and that the Lebanese army cannot fight Hezbollah effectively without external support. Nikki adds that Hezbollah is protesting and that reports circulate about gunfire. Finally, the discussion returns to possible escalation between Iran and the United States. Nikki reports claims that the IRGC Navy targeted U.S. military positions in response to alleged American aggression and violation of ceasefire commitments, while also stating there are “no indications” of attacks on American military positions according to her account. Malcolm suggests prior Iranian communications have sometimes telegraphed attacks, and he discusses the possibility that any missile activity might target specific U.S. sites such as Camp Buell or Ali al-Salam Air Base in Kuwait, with speculation about limited scope rather than Gulf-wide action. The segment ends with anticipation of further updates and a planned continuation about Iran’s retaliation and Lebanon’s civil-war risks.

The speakers say Iran is conducting a war of attrition using an asymmetric strategy against the United States. They argue Iran knows it cannot militarily confront the United States directly, so it focuses on holding and “choking” the Strait of Hormuz to harm the world economy. They claim that the longer the United States continues this approach, it affects both the world economy and the U.S. economy, and that Iran is trying to “teach Trump a lesson” about what will happen to him because he is “being so opposite.” They further state that Trump has not lived up to one of the terms of the 14-point agreement he signed on the MOU, specifically pointing to point one: getting Lebanese and Israel out of Lebanon. In response, one speaker characterizes Trump as “the king of the re-contract,” arguing that after an agreement is signed, it is quickly renegotiated—“a week later”—when one party asks for a new agreement.

Joe Kent, former director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, explains why he resigned over the war against Iran, arguing Iran posed no imminent threat and that the war was driven by Israeli influence and a regime-change agenda. Key points: - Imminent threat and escalation: In his view, Iran was not on the cusp of attacking the U.S. during Trump’s second term. Iran followed a calculated escalation ladder, stopping proxies during Operation Midnight Hammer and returning to negotiation afterward. After the attack on nuclear sites, Iran retaliated in kind, then returned to talks, indicating a calibrated approach rather than irrational behavior. The “imminent threat” cited by some officials was viewed as primarily tied to Israeli actions against Iran, not Iranian intent to attack the U.S. directly. - Regime-change as miscalculation: Kent contends that regime-change aims in Iran—similar to Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya—are flawed. He believes attempts to remove the Iranian regime strengthen it instead, and he personally did not want another costly war in the Middle East. - Israeli influence and the policymaking process: He describes a multilayered Israeli influence network—strong PAC presence, intelligence sharing, and media/think-tank leveraging—that shapes U.S. policy. Israelis push for no enrichment and regime-change outcomes, using media echo chambers and direct access to U.S. decision-makers to steer policy in a direction that aligns with their goals, sometimes at odds with longer-term U.S. interests or what Trump might publicly advocate. - Intelligence versus policy sales: He notes that intelligence briefings can inform or sell a policy. Israeli influence can bypass traditional channels, presenting threats in emotionally resonant terms (e.g., fear of Ayatollahs obtaining a bomb) to push for aggressive stances. This has contributed to a cycle of escalation and military action. - Negotiation space and red lines: The administration’s narrowing of red lines around enrichment (from broader nuclear nonproliferation to zero enrichment) limited potential deal space. The Iranians did show willingness to negotiate on enrichment levels, monitoring, and proxies, but the Israelis and policy ecosystem continually sought broader prohibitions, complicating any potential agreement. - The Iran-Israel dynamic: The Israeli objective appears oriented toward regime change or a state of chaos preventing Iran from leveraging its regional power. Kent argues the U.S. has enabled Israel by subsidizing its defense and offense, creating pressure that constrains U.S. policy and international leverage. - Strategic and regional assessment: The Gulf, Straits of Hormuz, and regional energy security are central. He argues that the U.S. cannot easily open Hormuz militarily in the long term and that any durable arrangement would require restraining Israel, easing sanctions relief for Iran, and returning to a sustainable regional security framework. - Iran’s current strategy: Iran has managed to deter substantial American escalation by threatening to disrupt energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz and by leveraging proxies and regional influence. The leadership has shown discipline in controlling proxies and presenting a credible threat that optimizes Iran’s strategic position. - Great power dynamics: China is seen as a major beneficiary of the current cycle, gaining leverage as global energy transactions shift away from the dollar and as U.S. attention diverts to the Middle East. Russia’s posture is also affected; sanctions and energy markets interact with Iran’s actions, while Russia and China could exploit the distraction and reframe influence in their favor. - Syria and broader war lessons: Kent emphasizes that regime-change in Syria contributed to instability, with various factions and external powers (Turkey, Israel, HTS, Al Qaeda offshoots) complicating the landscape. He remains skeptical about the future stability of Syria, warning that competing external interests could lead to further conflict. - Prospects for de-escalation: A path to de-escalation would require restraining Israel’s offensive actions, offering some sanctions relief to Iran, and engaging in constructive regional diplomacy to reopen Hormuz. He suggests a sustainable deal would avoid large U.S. troop commitments and focus on practical counterterrorism cooperation, stable oil flow, and avoiding regime-change rhetoric. Overall, Kent argues that the Iran war was driven by a dominant Israeli influence, a flawed regime-change impulse, and a diplomacy dynamic that prioritized aggressive measures over practical, balanced engagement. He advocates restraining Israel, pursuing a pragmatic, limited set of objectives with Iran, and reframing U.S. regional strategy to reduce perpetual conflict in the Middle East. He also warns that without de-escalation, the conflict risks drawing the U.S. into a prolonged and costly cycle with broad regional and global repercussions.

The discussion begins with sports and the U.S. hosting the World Cup. Ian describes the experience in cities like Seattle, Dallas, Philadelphia, and New Jersey as “fantastic,” and says the American team has shown heart, energy, strong offense, and deeper-than-expected success. Ian then focuses on a “controversial red card call” involving the U.S. team. He says Trump inserted himself by calling FIFA’s president, demanding the red card be overturned, and that FIFA suspended the red card for a year. Ian says no one on the American team asked Trump to do this and argues it makes the U.S. look like it received “special dispensation,” undermining the value of the event and putting an “asterisk” on the outcome. He also says the controversy became what fans talk about instead of the players and game, and links this to a possible motivation for Belgium to play harder. He expresses regret that Trump “had to be in the news.” When asked whether Americans praise or criticize Trump for the overstep, Ian says there is a small “pocket” of Americans who support Trump for everything, but most Americans are more “sensible” and not focused on politics. He says many Americans dislike interference by an American president in sports, and emphasizes a preference for fair play and underdog narratives. He also argues that Israel is increasingly treated like a Goliath rather than David, and ties that to how Americans view fair play—though he frames this as part of a broader discussion. The conversation shifts to Rahm Emanuel’s speech in Tel Aviv. Ian says he has not heard the speech but received a copy, calling it a “barn burner.” He says Emanuel describes Israel as having moved from a technological and economic power to a “territorial pariah,” losing young Americans and leaders globally due to unacceptable actions in the West Bank, Gaza, and elsewhere. Ian says Emanuel condemns Hamas’s Oct. 7 terrorism, but also argues that supporting Israel “no matter what they do” undermines Israel’s position. Ian describes Emanuel as a centrist Democrat among strong pro-Israel, pro-Zionist figures, and says the speech provides cover for Democrats seeking office in 2028 to be more critical. He also claims Tucker Carlson has become increasingly hostile toward Israel and says Trump’s relationship with Erdogan contrasts with criticism of some European leaders. Trump’s visit to Ankara becomes the next topic. Ian explains that “CATSA sanctions” were imposed in 2020 after Turkey engaged with Russia purchases of advanced weaponry, and that the U.S. would not provide similarly advanced interoperable weaponry because Russia could gain information. He says Trump unilaterally undid those sanctions, with the stated approach that the U.S. will not sanction friends and will instead use tariffs, framing Turkey as a friend. Ian says Trump praises Erdogan personally and contrasts that with how Trump criticized democratic European leaders. Ian discusses the F-35s possibility, saying it would require Congressional approval and that he does not see support. He lists opposition factors in Congress, including an Armenian lobby, a human rights lobby, and issues related to Fethullah Gülen and political donations. He also cites Greek lobby influence, and he says Bibi is dramatically opposed as well. He concludes these factors create “solid reasons” to expect Turkey would face problems in getting advanced technology approved. Netanyahu’s comments are also raised. Ian says many Americans would agree with Netanyahu’s portrayal of Turkey as aggressive and disruptive, but he also notes that increasingly large numbers of Americans, especially young Americans, describe Netanyahu similarly. He says Trump would not agree with Netanyahu’s claims about Turkey. Asked what might come from Netanyahu and Trump’s meeting, Ian says despite lack of trust, both have shared interests: intelligence coordination on Iran, interoperability, and coordination benefits. He says the Abraham Accords and integration of advanced AI defense companies into U.S. and Israeli defense systems are reasons these ties would not “go away.” He adds that by October Netanyahu “may be out of power,” suggesting a scenario where he could be removed or face major coalition difficulties, and says Trump may prefer Netanyahu lose because Netanyahu wants to keep fighting Hezbollah, remain in southern Lebanon, and continue a conflict with Iran—something Trump does not want. Ian says he is most interested in whether Trump says anything about the October elections, including reiterating calls for Netanyahu to be pardoned for alleged crimes and potential sentences. The conversation returns to Israeli politics. Ian references Ben Gvir’s role and says 20–30% of Israelis have a favorable view of him. He compares that to Hamas, saying he expects Palestinians in Gaza still have more than 20% favorable views of Hamas despite two years of war and devastation. Ian argues both sides commit war crimes and holds both leaderships as beyond basic humanity. He also discusses candidates mentioned by the host, including Ben Nesli Bennett and Benny Gantz/Eisencoat (Eisenkot), describing Eisencoat as more pragmatic, wanting to exit Lebanon and stop stretching Israel thin. On the region and shipping, the discussion turns to attacks on ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Ian says Iran’s demand is continued control over the strait and financial profit from it, with negotiations involving Gulf states and reduced oil leverage due to pricing changes and OPEC dynamics. He says the U.S. still has military leverage in the region, and the attacks are framed as contained and consistent with a ceasefire environment. He suggests the U.S. could respond kinetically within 24 hours with targeted shots at sites near the strait, but says there is no proximate risk that war restarts. Ukraine is discussed next. Ian says Zelensky appears more confident and argues Zelensky is taking an approach with Trump by backing a “winner,” emphasizing that Ukraine is killing more Russians than Ukrainians are being killed, damaging the Russian economy, and making limited territorial gains without U.S. taxpayer dollars being spent. Ian says he expects progress in the Trump-Zelensky meeting in Ankara, including missile defense joint work and potentially faster U.S. actions such as providing interceptors previously funded by Europeans. He says closer alignment with European allies is promising but fears it will not resolve the four-year war. Ian argues the biggest danger is that Putin, facing mounting strain and with no checks and balances like Trump, might escalate if his situation worsens or if his population turns against him. He mentions Russian attacks and operations near NATO, including fiber optic lines in the Baltic Sea, drone incursions into Romania and Poland, and other hostile actions. He says confidence about nuclear or extreme escalation is lower than months ago, and raises scenarios about near-misses and worse outcomes. He does not support stopping aid to Ukraine; instead, he calls for outreach to Russia to pressure it to accept reality, suggesting Trump should work the angle with Xi Jinping because Xi has more influence over Putin. The transcript ends with a brief sports update: Egypt leads Argentina 2–1 after a cancelled goal for Egypt, followed by another Egypt goal and an Argentina goal, with about ten minutes left. Ian expresses excitement about underdogs and notes he watched the U.S. loss to Belgium, describing the match and Trump intervention as “depressing” and difficult to watch, despite U.S. efforts.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

Debate focused on ongoing uncertainty around Iran, the status of any ceasefire, and the MOU’s ability to withstand clashes. One speaker said the situation is less about Israel than about Trump “dragging himself into war,” arguing the MOU was designed to fail because Trump negotiated a “pause to the war, it’s not peace.” They pointed to contradictions between MOU language and subsequent actions in Lebanon, and described how Iran’s leverage centers on control of the Strait of Hormuz to limit global shipping and impact the economy. The speaker said the MOU’s text assigns responsibility to Iran to set up a mechanism, yet the U.S. chose to send ships through the Omani-controlled part of the strait, leading Iran to fire at those ships to assert control. They then said Trump used the attack as an excuse to declare the ceasefire over, reimposing sanctions on Iranian oil exports and threatening additional strikes on Iranian infrastructure. The conversation also addressed who bombed Iran the previous day. One participant suggested Bahrain and Kuwait, while noting the information is publicly available but unclear and reportedly kept discreet; they also floated the possibility of involvement by the Americas. Turning to Syria and Hezbollah, the discussion asked whether Trump might move against Hezbollah and whether Trump, Erdogan, and F-35s are connected. The speaker argued that, even if Al-Sharaa is in power partly due to Israel, Al-Sharaa has reasons not to help against Hezbollah, including Israel’s prior bombing and destruction of Syria’s military assets. They also described an alleged humiliation involving Trump bragging at a NATO summit in Turkey, including references to recognizing Israel’s theft of the Golan, which the speaker said is personally humiliating for Al-Sharaa given Al-Sharaa’s name and origins. The debate shifted to terminology such as “terrorist” and “terrorist groups,” with one speaker referencing a historical State Department document that described Syria cooperating with the U.S. against Al-Qaeda while a “problem” was that Assad did not take action against Hezbollah and Palestinian groups fighting Israeli occupation. They connected regime change spending to installing a former Al-Qaeda leader. Regarding the MOU, one participant argued it may not be dead and that the current situation could be “bickering” over a key clause related to Iran not controlling the Strait of Hormuz versus American efforts to extract a concession. They said escalation risks exist, but argued the U.S. and Trump cannot afford a full-blown war. The other speaker outlined three options: full-blown war (unlikely), a U.S.-Iran peace deal (not seen as likely under Trump), or Trump walking away—requiring an eventual concession related to Hormuz. They added that each week brings flare-ups and threats to civilian infrastructure, while Iran’s missile capacity could target Gulf state infrastructure. A CNN report was cited claiming satellite images show Iran rebuilding the Talekhan II nuclear site in Parchin, with the roof’s holes allegedly fixed after being previously covered with sand by Iranian military engineers. The speaker tied this to the MOU’s nuclear language, quoting: “Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program,” and described the clause as vague. Finally, the discussion covered the NATO summit in Ankara and whether Trump’s closeness to Erdogan relates to F-35 approvals amid Israel-Turkey tensions. One speaker argued Israel needs enemies, suggested Israeli political rhetoric may be bluster, and said if Trump wants F-35 sales to Turkey, Israel would not be able to block it. The conversation ended with Lebanon, where one speaker said Lebanon is “pretty screwed” and linked the outcome to occupation and land theft policies, arguing Hezbollah’s support in Lebanon will persist because it has a sizable parliamentary bloc and a strong base of support, despite the population paying a huge cost.

The conversation centers on fast-moving developments involving Iran, the Strait of Hormuz/Homs, U.S. military posture in the region, and competing reports about talks and potential strikes. According to Axios and CBS, a U.S. official said Iranians reached out to the administration after two days of skirmishes earlier in the week to seek further talks to resolve the dispute. The Iranians allegedly returned to negotiations saying, “we screwed up” and “let’s keep talking.” Axios also reported that a second U.S. official warned of harsh consequences if Iran refuses to commit to cease firing on commercial vessels in the Strait of Homs. The discussion then shifts to satellite/force posture claims. The number of U.S. Air Force aircraft parked at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia reportedly fell to its lowest level since the buildup began in early February. The last three AWACS left early this week, leaving a single E-11 and nine tankers, and mediators/analysts argue this suggests critical assets have left the theater while the conversation includes the idea that assets may be brought back if strikes are expected. Israel’s military posture is also referenced. At an Israeli Air Force pilots graduation ceremony, IDF Chief of Staff Ayal Zamir reportedly said “major operations” are expected against Iran, that the air force remained on standby for a major operation on June 8, and that the alert remains high, adding that if they need to return, they will return with even greater force. On negotiations, competing claims are highlighted. Iranian Fars News reportedly denied that a new Iran–U.S. round in Islamabad next week is happening, saying preparations have not been finalized and technical discussions are false and baseless, and that developments will be announced only through official Iranian channels. Axios is cited saying the next round of talks is expected in Switzerland. CNN claims intensive diplomacy is underway behind the scenes, with the U.S. prioritizing negotiations over further military action and adopting a “striking and then pausing” approach to avoid escalation. Reuters is cited saying Qatari negotiators are in Iran to de-escalate and create conditions for talks focused on implementing the MOU and stopping clashes in Hormuz. Shipping and activity levels are treated as signals. The Strait of Homs reportedly saw only 22 verifying transits logged on Thursday (according to Kepler), far below recent weeks and pre-war daily averages. Some ships are said to have switched off transponders, implying tracking data may undercount real activity. A Chinese heavy load carrier reportedly transited. The U.S. demand side is also detailed. An Axios summary says U.S. officials are demanding that Iran, on Saturday, issue a public statement acknowledging the Strait is open and committing to stop firing on commercial ships—while also explicitly or implicitly acknowledging errors related to recent attacks. The discussion describes additional demands including that every channel on the strait will be open and “toll-free,” plus expectations of an apology. One key claim is that no strikes occurred that day. There is emphasis on “not many ships” transiting, and multiple mediators supposedly trying to restart talks. The transcript also covers alleged assassination-plot reporting. CNN says U.S. intelligence detected reporting of a possible Iranian plot to assassinate Trump, while stating the Israeli warning remains unclear and has not been independently verified. A Barak Ravid report is cited as saying Israeli intelligence did not share a specific organized detailed plan, describing Iranian figures discussing the matter without a concrete plan. The New York Post is cited as saying Trump left instructions for “a devastating response” if Iran assassinated him. The discussion includes an argument about U.S. constitutional/legal effect if the president is incapacitated. A story from the Wall Street Journal is cited about Trump returning from Turkey and changing aircraft (older Air Force One and later switching back to a newer Qatari-donated aircraft), tied to U.S. officials receiving Israeli intelligence about an elevated-risk mission lacking certain defensive capabilities. The transcript notes uncertainty about timing and stresses the reports’ emphasis on threat information and aircraft defensive differences. For Israel and Lebanon/Southern Lebanon, the transcript claims the U.S. asked Israel to refrain from sensitive military operations in southern Lebanon, and that Israel froze sensitive IDF operations while strikes continued at a lower level. The Financial Times is cited as saying a U.S. team was sent to Beirut to ensure a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, alongside references to Israel’s mixed messaging and shifting operational posture. Turkey/Syria/Lebanon becomes another thread. Israel’s Energy Minister Eli Cohen is quoted saying Turkey must not establish itself militarily in Syria, with a cabinet statement that if Turkey establishes bases in Syria, Israel will establish bases there as well. Turkish influence and related plans (including pipeline discussions involving Syria and a pipeline proposal between Israel and Cyprus mentioned as “plan” rather than concrete construction) are referenced. The transcript also discusses reports about Turkey seeking Russian S-400 air defenses and how that interacts with potential U.S. F-35 access, including a stated U.S. rationale about preventing compromise of F-35 stealth via S-400 data. On Ukraine, Zeluzhny is discussed. The transcript cites his Telegraph opinion piece warning against a Western narrative that Russia has effectively lost, describing the war as attritional and saying victory depends on which side can sustain economic, military, and psychological burdens longer with consistent international support. Reuters is then cited as saying Putin is rejecting calls for peace with Ukraine despite Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and ports, with sources describing increased resolve to continue the war and references to Donbas. The transcript concludes with a broad recap of its central “Strait of Hormuz” framing: carrot-and-stick sanctions/lifting dynamics, mediator pressure for de-escalation, and continued attention to whether attacks resume. It notes “no strikes today,” but emphasizes ongoing risk of escalation and continuing uncertainty about whether Iran will stop charging a fee in the Strait of Hormuz or accept terms in return. The speakers also mention threats discussed in the context of major escalations and hope for “cooler heads prevail” and a pause in escalation.

Glenn welcomes Seyyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, to discuss the fast-escalating conflict involving Israel, Iran, Lebanon, and the region. Marandi says that while in Tehran—busy interviewing Ph.D. candidates—he did not hear airstrikes, though he understands several missile strikes occurred. Marandi frames the situation as unfavorable for the “Americans” and says Iranian missile strikes have been effective. He describes Iran’s retaliation as occurring after Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Israel’s subsequent attacks on Iran, and claims Iran fired “five waves of missiles” and then large numbers afterward, with the total approaching “a hundred.” He also says Trump posted on Truth Social calling for action “to end this immediately,” while Marandi argues the United States had no intention of bringing about a ceasefire in Lebanon. Marandi contends that Lebanese leadership—including the president and prime minister—concluded negotiations against Lebanese law and received “death” in return, citing an Israeli bombing of a Lebanese military convoy soon after a CNN interview by Lebanon’s president attacking Iran. He adds that Lebanese authorities allegedly prevent refugees from moving within Lebanon, “corner” Shia-majority refugees, and try to make the situation sectarian, with Western NGOs and embassies encouraging restrictions in neighborhoods. He further alleges that proxies in Syria and Lebanon are working with Israel to keep borders closed and block assistance coming from Iran or Iraq, while claiming people nevertheless gather aid in Iran and Iraq that cannot be sent into Lebanon. He argues Iran and Hezbollah have continued striking effectively even during escalation, and suggests Iranian actions are tied to preventing Israeli plans to level areas of Beirut, describing a shift in Iran’s deterrence posture. Marandi says Iran warned that if Israel bombed Beirut, Iran would strike the Israeli regime, and that Israel refrained from striking Beirut for several days before resuming after the Pakistani interior minister delivered a message (Pakistan as mediator). He says the pattern mirrors earlier instances where U.S. attacks were met by larger Iranian counterstrikes. Discussing U.S. strategy, Marandi says the U.S. and allies appear to seek “low intensity” escalation to weaken and intimidate Iran while avoiding a “hot war,” but he claims Iran’s responses have instead sent signals that Iran is prepared to restart a more explosive war. He highlights that Iran has allegedly shut down the Strait of Hormuz and that, following Yemen’s announced disruption of Israel’s Red Sea access, Marandi says escalation stakes increase further. When asked about potential negotiations, Marandi says what matters to Iran is not Trump’s statements but what his regime does. He lists Iran’s stated terms: end to the war in Lebanon, regime retreat, end to the slaughter in Gaza, lifting siege, waiving sanctions on Iran’s oil/energy exports for the duration, and returning “stolen assets.” He argues Iran will not provide concessions that go beyond those conditions. On U.S.-Israel relations, Marandi addresses Axios reporting about differences between Trump and Netanyahu and says the publication itself matters because it portrays Netanyahu as despised and “crazy,” which he says damaged Netanyahu politically in Israel and also in the United States. He suggests a possible objective of weakening Netanyahu and emphasizes that Trump’s public disavowal (“I told him not to attack”) is undermining. Marandi then turns to what Iran may do next as escalation rises. He says Iran has changed the “rules of the game” by signaling that strikes on Lebanon trigger retaliation. He claims Iran will retaliate not only for attacks on itself but for attacks on Lebanon and, in further statements, for attacks on petrochemical and Persian Gulf energy-related installations affiliated with the United States or Israel. He asserts Iran threatens to strike Persian Gulf infrastructure and “the Americans too,” and says this extends Iran’s deterrence beyond Israel. He also says Hezbollah’s drones and ambush-style strikes harm the regime, while Iran’s deterrence against touching Beirut hampers offensive capability. Marandi concludes that he does not foresee a favorable outcome for the United States or Israel, and says the global economy remains close to a worsening point as the conflict intensifies. As a “footnote,” he says Iran carried out an operation on the Pakistan border against Wahhabi/Salafi militants, killing some and capturing others, portraying multiple extremist groups as attacking the same enemies rather than Israel.

Dimitri Lascares, a lawyer turned journalist, describes his reporting trips in Lebanon and the surrounding region, including repeated visits to southern areas. He says that while he has been physically present in Beirut over the past five days, he has not witnessed an attack there, adding that the only attack he is aware of during his presence was an Israeli strike in Dakhia, a southern Beirut suburb, which killed numerous civilians. He describes multiple incidents in the south and Bekaa Valley, including airstrikes that he says had no conceivable military justification because they occurred in evacuated villages with no military activity observed, and attacks that he says targeted areas near Jabal Amel Hospital in Sur by destroying the hospital parking lot, putting parts of the hospital out of action, and causing civilian casualties. Overall, he characterizes what he has seen outside Beirut as a campaign of terror in the south, while saying Israel has shown “uncharacteristic restraint” in Beirut, which he attributes to threats of Iranian retaliation. Lascares argues that Iranian deterrence is being extended to Lebanon, including through Iran striking Israel despite Israel not directly hitting Iran, framing Lebanon as part of a ceasefire and retaliating on Lebanon’s behalf. He then discusses Lebanon’s political complexity, saying the Lebanese government is engaged in talks and a ceasefire with Israel while Hezbollah is the group fighting. On Hezbollah’s role, he describes Hezbollah as a resistance movement formed in response to Israeli occupation and aggression, stating it has remained fundamentally a resistance movement and that it has not occupied land recognized as Israel under international law. He claims Hezbollah is restrained and says it has significant support among the Lebanese population, with overwhelming Shia support and also meaningful Sunni and Christian support, though less than among Shias. He criticizes what he says are ceasefire terms that, according to him, include disarmament of Hezbollah without disarmament of Israel and do not require Israeli troop withdrawal or stopping destruction of civilian infrastructure in temporarily occupied areas. He links this to a broader argument that any call to disarm resistance groups should begin with disarming Israel, including weapons of mass destruction, and he notes Israel is the only state in the region not in the NNPT. On the sustainability of Israel’s campaign, Lascares says he follows resistance commentary and that Hezbollah’s documentation of attacks includes regular video reports and daily accounts of military operations. He claims these reports—he says some corroborated by Israeli media—describe Hezbollah disabling more than twenty-five Israeli Iron Dome launchers, destroying hundreds of armored vehicles (mostly Merkava tanks), and inflicting severe casualties including senior commanders and elite brigades. He says Israeli leadership has discussed potential collapse and that he cites claims of large numbers of reservists refusing duty, alongside what he describes as PTSD and a suicide crisis, arguing the Israeli force was not built for wars of attrition and is conducting a multi-front war beyond its intended scope. Asked about Western support and media coverage, Lascares says Western elites show less concern for Lebanon’s destruction than the humanitarian narrative, while he asserts public polling shows Israel is deeply disliked across many Western countries and that negative sentiment is growing. He argues the disparity between what “the people want” and what media and political elites want is increasing and could lead to a political legitimacy crisis and instability in the West. Discussing Israel, the United States, and Iran, Lascares rejects a narrative of US-Israeli tension, arguing instead that the US uses Israel as a proxy to impose hegemony over a region he describes as strategically valuable, continuing to arm and support Israel while portraying restraint rhetorically. He says Israel and the US have aligned incentives: he claims US public opposition to a war on Iran and Israeli public support for it fit a posture strategy, with Trump portrayed as restraining Netanyahu while Netanyahu is portrayed as determined to continue the war. Regarding Iranian strategy, Lascares says Iran initially pursued commensurate retaliation but shifted to disproportionate retaliation after commensurate approaches did not work. He describes Iran striking multiple US military bases in the Persian Gulf, then intensifying attacks on Israel with wave after wave of missiles and drones. He says the IDF Defense Minister Katz has reiterated that if Hezbollah attacks Israel, Israel will attack Beirut, and he argues this escalation logic would be untenable because it would leave Israel free to attack the rest of Lebanon and continue destroying infrastructure. Lascares says Iran’s toll arrangement for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is difficult to assess externally due to Iran’s secrecy, but he says his discussions with Iranian officials and experts indicate some kind of fee is being extracted from ships transiting with Iranian consent. He argues there is “absolutely no military solution” to the toll problem, saying Iran can increase the risk of catastrophic damage without blocking shipping by using drones, ship-to-ship or land-to-ship missiles, mines, or fast attack boats. He frames the Strait of Hormuz as leverage and “their nuclear weapon,” and says the United States will eventually have to “pay the piper,” implying control would have to be ceded to Iran. On a potential diplomatic settlement, Lascares states that he sees “zero” hope of Iran giving up its nuclear program, and says Iran would accept JCPOA-type enrichment limits only with full sanctions relief and unfreezing of assets, while he says Iran would not hand over 60% enriched uranium to the US. He says Iran may be willing to dilute enrichment to about 20% for research purposes, but that any arrangement would require lifting sanctions and unfreezing assets. He argues US and Israeli concerns include the risk that sanctions relief would allow Iran to become the most powerful state in the region, and he expects escalation to continue with “catastrophic consequences for the global economy.” In closing, he says his on-the-ground experience in Iran contradicts foreign portrayals of Iranian leadership and people as extremely aggressive, irrational, or fanatical. He says he found Iranian people to be peace-loving, prepared to be reasonable and compromising, and expecting to be treated with respect as a sovereign nation. He promotes his own work by directing viewers to his YouTube channel, “Reason to Resist,” and to his X account under the handle @dimitri_laskaris.

The discussion centers on escalation between the United States and Iran after the U.S. lifted a sanctions waiver tied to the MOU on Iranian oil and petrochemicals, and after earlier talk suggested the strikes might end. Despite Iran not striking ships in the Strait of Hormuz on the day in question, the U.S. launched strikes on Iran again at multiple coastal locations, described as similar to targets previously hit, including Bushir, Bandar Kangan, Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lenge, Abu Musa Island, Kashim and Kashim Island, Sirik, Jask, Konarak, and Shabahar. The targets were said to include radar sites, missile launcher positions for anti-ship missiles, and small attack boats. Trump’s remarks were highlighted as framing the MOU as dead, while CNN reported the ceasefire had at least temporarily ceased, with U.S. officials warning the situation remained highly fluid and additional strikes were possible. Attention then shifted to whether Iran would retaliate and how it might do so. One recurring theme was that U.S. actions were violating the MOU, while Iranian enforcement of Strait of Hormuz routes was said to be in harmony with it. The debate also included a view that Iran’s biggest leverage is the Strait of Hormuz and that continuing to control traffic there could inflict more pain than attacking U.S. bases. Another counterpoint emphasized that Iran would want to both hit U.S. capabilities and maintain Strait of Hormuz pressure. Military buildup and movement were discussed using satellite imagery and reporting: U.S. Air Force aerial refueling tankers reportedly redeployed from Ben Gurion, including to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, with references to around 47 tankers stationed at airports as of the prior day and a total of 32 departing Ben Gurion in the cited time window. The argument was that these aircraft could facilitate attacks on Iran. Additional notes included U.S. warships patrolling across the Middle East per CENTCOM and reports about aircraft movements toward Turkish airspace and potential fueling for strikes. The conversation covered disputed interpretations of what counts as retaliation and how far escalation should go. On the Iranian side, the statements discussed included that retaliatory behavior would continue and that the Strait of Hormuz was not closed. The Iranian officials’ messaging included major MOU violations by the U.S., threats of further strikes, reinstated oil sanctions, and attacks on southern Iran, alongside claims that the “era of bullying and extortion is over.” The participants also discussed Khomeini’s funeral attendance claims from Iranian sources and timing questions about burial and processions. Trump’s comments were extensively quoted as describing repeated, escalating strike logic tied to attacks on ships, including claims about hitting Iran “very hard,” a 20-to-1 ratio, and statements that the U.S. might strike without a deal. The transcript also references threats about destroying bridges, power generation, and desalination plants, and speculation about seizing the Iranian island of Kharg. At the same time, it cited Trump saying he did not think a wider war in Iran would restart and that any actions would happen “very fast” rather than long term. Another segment focused on oil market implications. The discussion linked crack spreads and futures to costs and shortages, including claims that refined product prices were rising quickly relative to spot indicators. It described an argument that refineries face much higher costs for oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, with “crack spreads” spiking alongside futures. The participants debated explanations including demand destruction and oversupply from prior purchasing ahead of the war. They also discussed the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve refilling, contrasting “sweet crude” versus “sour crude,” and argued about U.S. refinery capabilities for converting sour crude into diesel and aviation fuel. Iranian military actions and U.S. counter-strikes were described as including anti-ship missiles and drones targeting U.S. facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, along with claims of drone shootdowns. OSINT-style references were made to U.S. strikes targeting communications towers at an IRGC Navy base in Sirik for a third time, a site north of Bandar Abbas Airport described as having been an S-200 SAM and surveillance radar location, and fire detected at coordinates inside Bandar Abbas fishing port. Trump’s treatment of the “111 missiles” claim was also discussed. In parallel, regional diplomatic and political developments were mentioned: a meeting between Trump and Al-Shara was said to include talk of unifying Syria and removing Syria from the state-sponsored terrorism list, with reports that removal had been actioned or requested. Al-Shara’s alleged commitments regarding Hezbollah were framed as a key indicator for future regional outcomes. Additional mention included Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warning regional countries not to allow their territory to be used for U.S. strikes on Iran, and Oman condemning attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait without naming Iran. Overall, the discussion concludes with repeated emphasis that the pattern is back-and-forth without a formal peace deal, uncertainty about how far retaliation will go, and a belief that the biggest risk is miscalculation leading to disproportionate escalation. The transcript also states that if Iran’s retaliation begins, it would most likely target Bahrain and Kuwait, while noting other possible targets such as the Emirates.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

The conversation covers a wide, interwoven set of points about Iran, the Gulf, and international power dynamics, centering on how Iran’s posture and regional actions are shaping the future balance of power. - Strait of Hormuz and ownership: The speakers discuss whether Iran believes the Strait of Hormuz permanently belongs to Iran. There is mention of a deputy parliamentary speaker saying “the Strait Of Hormuz belongs forever to the great nation of Iran,” and the implications of Iran’s rhetoric for sanctions, cables, and fees. The dialogue notes that this rhetoric risks pushing Trump toward continued conflict and highlights a distinction between legal territorial claims and the practical control Iran seeks to exercise. - Leverage, sanctions, and war aims: Speaker 1 argues Iran faces immense pressure and has suffered enormous casualties and damage, and would use all leverage to prevent a US victory. The frame presented is that Trump cannot easily compensate Iran for its losses, and that Iran’s leadership seeks to deter further US action, potentially by threatening critical regional chokepoints and economic channels. - UAE, Israel, and regional bases: The discussion addresses UAE’s normalization and hosting Israeli assets, with Speaker 1 insisting that if a country starts an illegal war, “you get to hit these assets.” They note Israeli presence in the UAE before the war and Israeli bases in the region, arguing that alliance and bases do not equal occupation, and acknowledging the UAE’s sovereign choices amid a complex security environment. - Iranian strategy and volume of attacks: The participants discuss why Iran used hundreds of drones and missiles against the UAE and other targets, suggesting the aim was to overcome air defenses and to send a signal given the breadth of anti-missile systems in the region. There is acknowledgment that while such strikes cause damage, they occur within a context of a broader blockade and ongoing hostilities, including the broader war dynamics in Lebanon, Gaza, and beyond. - Fujairah and other theaters: The discussion turns to the Fujairah incident (and a similar strike in Qatari waters) and whether Iran officially claimed responsibility. Speaker 1 notes that Iran did not accept responsibility due to ceasefire constraints, invoking terminology from Persian/Arabic to describe such “shots that come out of the blue.” There is speculation about other potential targets along alternative routes to bypass Hormuz, including Fujairah and Yanbu, to deter or disrupt overflow routes. - Regional outlook and strategic lists: The speakers speculate that Iran may maintain a prioritized list of targets among those responsible for significant damage to Iran (including Fujairah and Saudi pipeline routes) and that it could pursue other routes as part of a broader strategy to constrain Hormuz and diversify its leverage. - Ideology vs national interest in Iran: A major thread concerns whether Iran’s Islamic-republic ideology should or will give way to more pragmatic, interests-based diplomacy (such as re-entering or renegotiating the nuclear deal, minimizing sanctions, and engaging with the US while criticizing its allies). Speaker 0 argues the ideology often appears to guide policy, while Speaker 1 contends that Iran’s ideology is an enduring element of its foreign policy, shaping its support for Palestinians, Lebanese groups, and other allies, and that this ideological frame is not easily separated from national interests. - JCPOA and US policy: The dialogue references missed opportunities to return to the 2015 JCPOA framework, highlighting Robert Malley’s position that a revised, longer, stronger agreement could have been pursued after 2015, and noting that the withdrawal under Trump and subsequent sanctions contributed to the current crisis. There is critique of US internal politics and alleged influence from various actors, including assertions about the role of the “Epstein class” and other external pressures. - Post-ceasefire expectations: Looking ahead, Speaker 1 anticipates Iran becoming more aggressive in advancing its interests after any ceasefire, while Speaker 0 probes how Iran’s approach might shift if diplomacy were more effective, and whether a more calibrated policy toward the US and Israel could ease sanctions and improve conditions for ordinary Iranians. - Concluding note: The dialogue closes with mutual reflections on the enduring competition between ideology and national interests, regional power dynamics, and the potential trajectories for Iran and its neighbors in a post-ceasefire or negotiated settlement environment.

Speaker 0 contends that the world economy is severely damaged and worsening, blaming Israel’s influence, Trump’s policies, and BlackRock. They say Trump reversed the downturn but that his current behavior worsens the situation, describing him as a degenerate gambler who keeps betting with the people’s money. They warn that the global economy is being sunk by these decisions and that any recovery would be unlikely if he does not shut down the current course. Speaker 1 argues a simple plan: Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon and they won’t have one. They claim the president didn’t want to go that far, but there is no pressure from elsewhere. They assert victory will come, stating that militarily they have already achieved a complete victory in theory, with Iran’s navy effectively nullified and ships sunk by the U.S. They emphasize Iran’s strategy hinges on closing the Strait of Hormuz, not their blue-water navy. They note Iran has now made larger financial demands—a claim of $500,000,000,000 in reparations—describing these as part of a broader disaster. They accuse globalists and BlackRock of engineering the war to derail the Trump recovery, leading to inflation, fertilizer shortages, and a planetary downturn. They say there is no way to reverse this and warn that threats of further strikes against Iran could worsen the situation. They also accuse media and political figures of misrepresenting the war’s trajectory, and criticize those who supported the war for claiming to have been right. They suggest the debt situation is dire, with the national debt approaching or exceeding GDP in service, calling this a banana republic scenario. They describe a coming period of permanent austerity and a “great reset” via a central bank digital currency system, and contrast this with the supposed prior plan that could have rebuilt the economy. Speaker 2 adds that the United States holds all the cards if escalation occurs, but the goal is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and restore open access without mines in the water or tolls. They emphasize the aim to return to the previous open state of the strait. Throughout, Speaker 0 revisits earlier warnings about the start of the war, insisting Schmoyle (Schmoy/ Schmoyle) had warned this would derail the global recovery. They recall personal discussions with Tucker Carlson about Trump’s assessment of the war’s consequences, noting that Trump claimed “everything I do always turns out okay,” even as the analyst contends the consequences have been severe. They reiterate that the “globalist trap” and the Iran war were designed to undermine the U.S. and world economy, with the goal of bringing about a prolonged austerity and a global cashless system. They describe demonstrably worsening indicators—stocks, oil, and rates rising; inflation accelerating; fertilizer shortages; and a deepening recession—arguing these dynamics confirm the planned malaise. They reference headlines about inflation, the Iran confrontation, and potential sleeper cells, and they criticize the left, Democrats, neocons, and “MAGA knob polishers” for supporting the war. They reiterate that the globalists’ objective is to derail the U.S. and Western economies and to push toward a controlled, austerity-driven global order, while claiming the administration’s responses are failing to reverse the trend.

The discussion centers on the prospect of a renewed full-scale war in the Middle East, the motivations behind it, and the strategic implications for the United States, Israel, Iran, and regional partners. - Probability of renewed conflict: Speaker 1 argues that the chances of another US-Israeli assault are high and could be imminent. The war’s continuation is described as driven by Zionist policy, not by US national interests, and there is belief that “the forces surrounding Trump” are not rational. The capacity and readiness for a major operation are described as significant, with US equipment and ground-force preparations in Kuwait, the Emirates, and Bahrain, plus jets in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. - Iran’s stance and Hormuz: The conversation asserts that Iran did not intend to take control of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, that move came as a response to the war and hostile actions in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s side contends that the Strait should not be used as a foothold to wage war against Iran, and that its demand for secure passage is tied to preventing further attacks on Iranian infrastructure. The claim is that Netanyahu pushed for occupying the region and that the war’s origins relate to Zionism. - Netanyahu and policy: The speakers attribute the onset of the war to Netanyahu’s actions, arguing that his approach forced escalation and that the US reoriented its strategy in line with Netanyahu’s goals. The claim is made that the real policy of the US and Europe supports a scenario in which Israel could dominate the region, with the two-state solution presented as a long-standing facade. - Trump’s stance and rhetoric: The dialogue notes fluctuations in Trump’s rhetoric, including posts that reference military action against Iran. It is suggested that Trump wants to withdraw but is constrained by the gap between Iranian demands and what the US is willing to concede. There is a sense that Iran is not satisfied with limited concessions and that Tehran seeks broader sanctions relief plus a permanent adjustment to the Hormuz situation. - Negotiations and concessions: The speakers discuss the negotiations’ sticking points, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. There is a view that Iran should retain control over the Strait of Hormuz permanently, rejecting any plan to relinquish control or limit enrichment in a way that would be perceived as a concession to Trump or the West. The suggestion is that while limits could be easy to manage through the IAEA, the control of Hormuz must not be offered as a temporary concession. - UAE and Gulf dynamics: The UAE is described as strategically vulnerable and heavily aligned with the US and Israel, creating a target profile for Iran. Iran’s attacks are framed not as personal but as strategic, aiming to impact the global economy by targeting the UAE as a hub. The UAE’s role in regional politics is portrayed as aggressive in its push toward conflict, although the possibility of reconciliation with Iran is acknowledged. - Alaster Crook and decision-making: An anecdote about Alastair Crook is used to illustrate a point about Western decision-making, suggesting that rational analysis often does not drive policy; emotional factors and perceptions influence choices in Washington and European capitals. - Human costs and damage: The discussion references the human and infrastructural toll, including the destruction seen in Gaza and Lebanon, and alleges the US and Israeli campaigns have caused widespread harm, including to schools and civilians. The speakers assert that the war has inflicted severe economic and humanitarian costs and warn of deeper global recession or depression if conflict deepens. - Specific incident and online safety concerns: The host reveals that Speaker 1 has a bounty on his head, stemming from a Twitter account fundraising for kidnapping him; the account was initially not removed, drawing attention to online threats associated with the conflict. - Nuclear diplomacy and a potential deal: When considering a hypothetical deal, Speaker 1 asserts that Hormuz control must be permanent and rejects a proposal for temporary limits or enrichment concessions in exchange for sanctions relief or assets unfrozen. He emphasizes that Iran believes its nuclear program is a sovereign right and should be handled through international mechanisms like the IAEA rather than through punitive terms tied to Hormuz control. He also reiterates that the nuclear issue has long been used as a pretext for broader policy aims. - Final takeaway: The conversation closes with a sense of caution about the likelihood of avoiding a renewed war, a recognition of the high stakes involved, and an insistence that Hormuz control be non-negotiable for Iran, while acknowledging the potential for reconciliation if Gulf states reevaluate alignment with Israel and the US.