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The Global Engagement Center, supported by allies, exposes Russian disinformation campaigns worldwide. Collaborating with tech companies, we combat false stories. Our focus is on getting truth to Russia amid a ban on independent news.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss government disinformation offices and transparency concerns. - CISA’s office of mis, dis, and malinformation (MDM) operated as a DHS unit focused on domestic threat actors, with archive details at cisa.gov/mdm. The office existed for two years, from 2021 to 2023, before being shut down and renamed after the foundation published a series of reports. - The disinformation governance board was formed around April 2022. The CISOs countering foreign influence task force, originally aimed at stopping Russian influence and repurposed to “stop Trump in the twenty twenty election,” changed its name to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation and shifted focus from foreign influence to 80% domestic, 20% foreign, one month before the twenty twenty election. - Speaker 1 argues that the information environment problems are largely domestic, suggesting an 80/20 focus on foreign vs domestic issues should be flipped. - A June 2022 Holly Senate committee link is highlighted, leading to a 31-page PDF that, as of now, represents the sum total of internal documents related to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation. The speaker questions why there is more transparency about the DHS MIS office from a whistleblower three years ago than in ten months of current executive power. - The speaker calls for comprehensive publication of internal files: every email, text, and correspondence from DHS MIS personnel, to be placed in a WikiLeaks/JFK-style publicly accessible database for forensic reconstruction of DHS actions during those years, to name and shame responsible individuals and prevent repetition. - The video also references George Soros state department cables published by WikiLeaks (from 2010), noting extensive transparency about the Open Society Foundations’ relationship with the state department fifteen years ago, compared to today. The claim is that Open Society Foundations’ activities through the state department, USAID, and the CIA were weaponized to influence domestic politics while remaining secret, with zero disclosures to this day. - Speaker questions why cooperative agreements from USAID with Open Society Foundation, Omidyar Network, or Gates Foundation have never been made public, nor quarterly or annual milestone reports, network details, or the actual scope of funded activities. USAID grant descriptions on usaspending.gov are often opaque or misleading compared to the true activities funded. - The speaker urges transparency across DHS, USAID, the State Department, CIA, ODNI, and related entities, asking for open files and for accountability. They stress the need to open these records now to inform the public and prevent recurrence, especially as mid-term political considerations loom.

A USAID-funded organization, OCCRP, created key evidence that led to President Trump's impeachment. This same organization also participated in the Russiagate hoax. USAID has a broad strategy for information control that includes censorship and control of investigative journalism worldwide. Organizations that participated in violations of the First Amendment should face consequences. Weaponizing organizations like DHS, FBI, and CISA constitutes treasonous regime change activities redirected against the American people and our representatives.

Our current focus is on prebunking to prevent misinformation rather than debunking after the fact. Preemptively injecting people with weakened fake news can build cognitive antibodies against manipulation. This approach is likened to a psychological vaccine. The initiative involves partnerships with Cambridge University, the Department of Homeland Security, and Google's Jigsaw unit.

The Pentagon funded a psychological operations research group that began mapping COVID-19 skepticism and conspiracy theories in April 2020. Their analysis indicated that right-wing accounts were diminishing the mainstream conversation about the virus. This effort aimed to counter misinformation regarding COVID origins and involved targeting individuals questioning vaccine efficacy and lockdown policies. The project, known as the Virality Project, received funding from U.S. government sources, including a $3 million grant to Stanford and the University of Washington. Additionally, the Atlantic Council, which has ties to various U.S. intelligence agencies, received significant funding from the Pentagon and State Department. This initiative effectively aimed to protect the reputations of figures like Bill Gates and George Soros by mapping and censoring online discourse surrounding them.

George Soros's Open Society Foundations have been revealed to be actively trying to influence political processes in Europe and Russia through funding local advocacy groups, social media projects, and journalists. For example, they provided over $130,000 to EU Observer, which used professional news reporting to promote open society values during the European elections. Additionally, leaked documents show the organization's half a million dollar effort to find evidence of Russia's alleged influence in European politics, although they acknowledge the challenges of accusing Russia. Some critics argue that Soros aims to disrupt Europe and promote open borders, referring to his version of democracy as "Sorosocracy."

This is USAID's Strengthening Transparency and Accountability Through Investigative Reporting program for Europe and Eurasia. USAID funding is $20,000,000. They don't report on kittens being saved, but rather corruption. This is all built under capacity building, meaning pumping up the blob's assets. With this $20,000,000 investment, at least $4,500,000,000 in fines were levied against targets. The head of the OCCRP said it's now over $10,000,000,000, a 20000% return on investment because all these dollars were returned to government coffers. Additionally, there were 548 policy changes by the government or actions by civil society and the private sector. They proudly sponsored hit piece journalism to ruin people's lives and go after political targets in order to change the policies of foreign governments from the inside.

The speaker outlines a project to map US State Department involvement with George Soros, The Open Society Foundations, and related entities across many countries, noting that the WikiLeaks cables (Kissinger, Carter, and Cablegate) cover 1973–2010 but omit the 1980s and 1990s. The goal is to create a comprehensive picture of how US policy has aligned with “George Soros, The Open Society Foundation, The Open Society Institute, every open society spandrel in every country.” The speaker highlights that Strobe Talbott in 1995 said US foreign policy had to be synchronized with allied governments and with Soros, describing it as “like working with a friendly, allied, independent entity, if not a government,” and stating that Soros then became “the number one political downer.” The narrative begins with precedents before the Open Society Foundation’s creation in 1979. In 1973–1975, Soros references appear in cables before the Open Society Foundation started. The speaker then focuses on a troubling example from 1976 in Gabon, via a Kissinger cable titled Visit by Brown and Root Executives to Gabon. Brown and Root, later Halliburton, is connected to George Soros through Brown and Root’s executives and projects. The CIA’s reaction to a Ramparts article about Brown and Root is discussed, showing Herman Brown (founder of Brown and Root) and his son George Rufus Brown as covert associates with the CIA under project LP coin, with Herman Brown serving as president and director of Brown and Root and trustee of the Brown Foundation. The claim is that both Herman Brown and his son had covert security clearances and were involved with CIA projects from 1965–1967, including potential service on the board of a CIA creation in Thailand/Laos. Brown and Root is described as one of Soros’s top five holdings in the mid-2000s, implying a CIA-connected origin for the company. A note is given that in Gabon, Soros Associates (founded by Paul Soros, George Soros’s older brother) is involved in port projects. Paul Soros’s shipping and engineering influence is illustrated by a Washington Post obituary, and the speaker mentions a related anecdote from Bill Burns’s autobiography The Back Channel about embassy construction projects in Russia being prebugged, and the implication that Western engineering firms with ties to intelligence could have facilitated spying. Before Open Society Foundations existed, in June 1975 Bandar Abbas Port Project in Iran involved three senior Dravo Corporation executives, plus International Systems, Van Houten Associates, and Soros Associates. The embassy was instructed to assist American bidders to ensure Soros Associates’ bid, noting Soros Associates’ engineering focus and the aim to eliminate competing bids. The government of Iran’s consideration of the American group and the influence of Soros’s bid on Iran’s judgment are documented. In Gabon, 1975–1976, financing arrangements are described: a financing package for Soros’s contract including a down payment by the Gabonese governor, an Export-Import Bank direct loan, and a First National City Bank loan, with the U.S. embassy consulting to emphasize more favorable terms and to potentially extend financing into a larger package. The accounts emphasize multiple U.S. government roles: Commerce Department, State Department, Export-Import Bank, and embassies, colluding to support Soros financing and projects, with the claim that this occurred years before the Open Society Foundations were created and began collaborating with U.S. agencies. The speaker suggests a long-standing family involvement, with older brother Paul Soros already coordinating with the State Department to secure deals for Soros Associates before 1979. The Mongolia story is promised as a later highlight. The compilation is framed as a five-decade pattern of government support for Soros-related deals, starting in 1973 and continuing through the Cablegate era.

Many people overlook their options in dealing with misinformation on social media. Early detection is key to tracking and countering harmful narratives. Legal action can be taken against profit-driven disinformation networks. Fact-checking alone may not change beliefs, so building counter narratives is crucial. Our organization helps detect, assess, and mitigate the impact of misinformation to prevent future issues. The recent events at the US Capitol highlight the real-world consequences of online disinformation. Translation: It is important to detect and counter harmful narratives early to prevent misinformation from causing real-world harm. Legal action can be taken against profit-driven disinformation networks, and building counter narratives is essential. Our organization helps organizations address the impact of misinformation to prevent future issues. The recent events at the US Capitol show the consequences of online misinformation.

I spent years researching and watching lengthy videos to understand the influence of organizations like the Atlantic Council, which is heavily funded by U.S. government agencies, including the CIA and the Pentagon. This group trains journalists to identify and censor disinformation, particularly targeting populist narratives like those of Donald Trump and Brexit. They promote a framework called the "four D's" of disinformation: dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay. This framework allows them to label factually true information as disinformation if it undermines government narratives. The Atlantic Council's connections to high-ranking CIA officials and its role in shaping media narratives illustrate a troubling intersection of government and media, aiming to control public discourse and influence political outcomes.

Under USAID's independent media and media sustainability branches, half a billion dollars a year funds a network of over 4,000 media outlets, reaching 778,000,000 people and training 9,000 journalists. This includes training by organizations like the Atlantic Council, funded by USAID, the State Department, and the Pentagon. USAID funds both sides of the issue, including a $500,000,000 mercenary media operation. The CEO of Internews, which is funded by USAID, is advocating for a global advertising exclusion list to censor disinformation by targeting ad revenue. USAID also gave $68,000,000 to the World Economic Forum. USAID's internal documents show explicit political targeting of advertiser networks.

The threat of disinformation and foreign interference is growing. To combat this, we are introducing the European Democracy Shield. This initiative will identify and counter information manipulation, work with national agencies, detect foreign interference, enhance AI deepfake detection, and promote resilience.

Speaker 0 says he began in 2020 to combine the most successful coup fighters with experts who helped study or defeat autocracy internationally, visiting Hungary, Poland, Brazil, Czech Republic, and forming a plan over four years. "twice as many protests in 2025 as there were in 2021." Speaker 2 outlines Norm Eisen’s "democracy playbook" with seven pillars: "controlling elections, controlling the courts, fighting corruption, basically, painting Trump as an autocrat, reinforcing civic and media space," and pillar six: "controlling disinformation," noting that "states may find partners in allied regulators over social media such as the EU and Brazil." Eisen recruited people for his new blob shop from folks who overturned basically regimes that he called autocratic. "All these people get paid to fight autocracy abroad through the State Department, USAID, the US Institute of Peace, the Department of Defense, Civil Military." The playbook cites USAID "37 times," funding "media allies for the blob" and projects like "the corruption reporting project in Ukraine" and "a billion dollar USAID loan guarantee" to remove Victor Shokin. It also discusses "designating elections as critical infrastructure" and a "slush fund" to pay state secretaries, plus "strategic non cooperation."

This week, an initiative was launched with companies and nonprofits to improve research and understanding of how automated processes curate online experiences. This is important for understanding online mis- and disinformation, a challenge that leaders must address. While it's easy to dismiss disinformation, ignoring it poses a threat to valued norms. How can wars end if people believe their reasons are legal and noble? How can climate change be tackled if people don't believe it exists? How are human rights upheld when people are subject to hateful rhetoric? The goals of those who perpetuate disinformation are to cause chaos, reduce the ability to defend, disband communities, and collapse countries' collective strength. There is an opportunity to ensure these weapons of war do not become an established part of warfare. Despite facing many battles, there is cause for optimism because for every new weapon, there is a new tool to overcome it. We have the means; we just need the collective will.

The speaker works with the German Marshall Fund and a group that tracks Russian activities, aiming for transparency. Hamilton 68, also involving General Hayden, is a resource to monitor Russian trolls and bot armies. The goal is to provide public access to this information, enabling informed decision-making. The speaker jokingly comments on General Hayden's improved appearance. The website is Hamilton68.com.

I founded Aletheia Group in 2019 after working on a Senate campaign. We developed strategies to combat disinformation and influence operations. This issue is a national security concern, not just political. Aletheia Group consists of diverse experts aiming to tackle this challenge. My background in government consulting and policy helped shape my approach. Disinformation targets voter turnout and candidate choice. Governments, especially the US, have the resources to combat disinformation effectively. We need to shift our approach to disinformation and address it legislatively.

Disinformation is profitable, so we must trace the money. A significant portion of advertising revenue supports harmful content. We need to collaborate with the global advertising industry to redirect ad dollars. This involves creating exclusion and inclusion lists to prioritize funding for accurate and relevant news and information. We must challenge the global advertising industry worldwide to focus its resources on disseminating truthful and beneficial information.

The discussion centers on OCCRP (the Corruption Reporting Project), its funding, and how it operates as “mercenary media” for state interests, particularly the U.S. State Department and USAID. The speakers argue that OCCRP is not independent journalism but a State Department–funded operation that produces hit pieces to seize assets, indict officials, and press regime change across multiple countries. Key findings and claims discussed - OCCRP’s funding and control: The group is described as receiving substantial funding from the United States government through USAID and the State Department, with other sources including Open Society (Soros), Microsoft, and NED. A recurring claim is that half of OCCRP’s funding comes from the U.S. government, that USAID and the State Department actually control hiring and firing decisions of top personnel, and that a “cooperative agreement” structure channels editorial direction through government-approved annual work plans and key personnel (including the editor‑in‑chief or chief of party). - Financial returns and impact: It is claimed that USAID boasted in internal documents that paying $20 million to independent journalists yielded $4.5 billion in fines and assets seized, and that mercenary reporting led to 548 policy changes, 21 resignations or removals (including a president and a prime minister), 456 arrests or indictments, and roughly $10 billion in assets returned to government coffers across various countries (Central Europe, Eastern Partnership, Western Balkans, etc.). A related claim is that total spending over OCCRP’s history amounts to about $50 million, with returns rising from $4.5 billion in 2022 to about $10 billion by 2024. - Geographic scope and targets: The reporting funded or influenced by the State Department covered broad regions—Germany, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, and the Western Balkans—extending to the Eastern Partnership and beyond. The pieces are described as having led to investigations and asset seizures that targeted political enemies of state authorities. - The role of “mercenary media” and independence claims: The speakers repeatedly contrast the claimed editorial independence of OCCRP with the reality of donor influence. They describe OCCRP as “mercenary media for the state,” funded to generate narratives and political outcomes favorable to U.S. foreign policy. They challenge the notion of independent journalism by noting the requirement that key personnel and annual work plans be approved or vetoed by USAID, and that there are “strings attached” to cooperative agreements that go beyond simple gifts. - Editorial process and donor influence: The conversation scrutinizes how the annual work plan, subgrants, and editor-level appointments are subject to USAID oversight. It is noted that, even when OCCRP claims editorial independence, the top editors must navigate donor influence, and in practice, the content may be shaped to align with funders’ interests. The argument is that without donor influence, OCCRP would not exist or would not continue to receive large sums of money. - The rhetoric of independence: Several speakers underscore the paradox of insisting on “independent media” while acknowledging that funding, governance, and personnel decisions are shaped by U.S. government agencies, with additional support from Soros/Open Society and corporate donors like Microsoft. They juxtapose “independence” rhetoric with admissions of entanglement with government and intelligence entities, and their discussions touch on the historical context of U.S. public diplomacy, the U.S. Information Agency, and the evolution of state-driven media influence. - Historical funding trajectory and organizations: The first funds reportedly came from sources such as the United Nations Democracy Fund, with later support from INL (the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement) and a transition to USAID administration. The participants discuss the possibility that multiple U.S. government agencies (State Department, USAID, NED, INL) and private sponsors (Open Society, Microsoft) contribute to OCCRP’s budget, with the U.S. government described as the largest donor at various points, though not always claimed as the single dominating donor. - “Capacity building” and the machinery of influence: The conversation highlights “capacity building” as a common label for donor-driven expansion of media assets, civil society groups, and investigative journalism networks. They connect these efforts to broader U.S. democracy promotion programs and to the use of investigative reporting as a tool for law enforcement and political leverage—where journalists may gather information and feed it to prosecutors and foreign policy objectives. - Individual positions and disclosures: Several speakers identify named individuals (e.g., Drew Sullivan, Shannon McGuire) and discuss their roles, funding pathways, and concerns about editorial control. The dialogue reveals tensions between the journalists’ professional aims and the political-economic machinery enabling their work. Cumulative impression - The transcript presents a frontal, highly confrontational critique of OCCRP as a state-funded, state-influenced enterprise that positions itself as independent journalism while enabling significant political and legal actions abroad. The speakers claim conspicuously high returns on investment for government funding (billions of dollars in assets seized and numerous political changes) and describe the cooperative funding structure as funneling editorial output toward U.S. foreign policy objectives. They argue that independence is a veneer masking a structured, donor-driven process with formal approval channels for personnel and plans, and with direct implications for how narratives are shaped and which targets are pursued. They also connect OCCRP’s practices to broader historical patterns of U.S. public diplomacy, intelligence collaboration, and the global propaganda ecosystem.

Susan Spalding, a former senior advisor at the Centers For Strategic International Studies, believed that Russia not only interfered in the 2016 election but also aimed to undermine the American people's faith in the judicial system. She partnered with the CIA to hold a conference for justices across the country. The organization she worked for, the Centers For Strategic and International Studies, is a nonprofit funded by various governments and influential individuals such as George Soros and the Koch Brothers. The board of directors includes former government officials and influential figures from various industries. These individuals, with their own ideologies and policies, aim to control and exert power over the rest of society.

A major piece of legislation was quietly signed into law that allows the US government to combat foreign propaganda by creating its own. The Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act of 2016, sponsored by Senator Rob Portman, is designed to combat foreign propaganda from organizations such as RT, China's CCTV, or Iran's Press TV. There is currently no single US governmental agency charged with synchronizing strategies to counter foreign propaganda. This bipartisan bill will establish an interagency center at the State Department to coordinate counterpropaganda efforts. It also creates a grant program for NGOs, think tanks, and other experts engaged in counterpropaganda work. This law essentially funds U.S. propaganda. Three years ago, an amendment removed the ban on the US government creating propaganda and showing it to US citizens, a ban that had been in place since 1948.

Thank you to everyone for their work in the Science and Technology, Innovation Program. Nina Jankiewicz, the Wilson Center's disinformation fellow, discussed efforts in Brazil to combat disinformation. Social media platforms are taking action to remove false information, aligning with international standards. Setting common standards is crucial for effective regulation in combating disinformation globally.

The speaker works with the German Marshall Fund, which tracks Russian activities. The speaker directs the audience to hamilton68.com, a site created to monitor Russian trolls and bot armies. The goal is to provide the public with information to help them distinguish between legitimate speech and speech originating outside the country intended to create chaos. The speaker acknowledges the difficulty the country will face in discerning the origins and intent of different types of speech.

We were covering an article about 55,000 Democrat NGOs discovered to be contributing to campaigns, moving things around, and pushing propaganda. It was discovered through AI that to figure out where the money's coming from, you have to go through layers and layers, and it's all funneling down to one group or another. It's a giant propaganda machine, a giant regime change machine.

The Alliance for Securing Democracy is developing tools and strategies to counter attacks on the U.S. and its allies. They are tracking the toolkit Russia is using to undermine democracies. Their dashboard tracks Russian active measures and can be found at dashboard.securingdemocracy.org.

Disinformation is profitable, so we must trace the money. A significant portion of the funding for harmful content comes from the global advertising industry. We need to collaborate with this industry to redirect ad dollars. This can involve creating exclusion and inclusion lists to target funding towards accurate and reliable news and information. We must challenge the global advertising industry worldwide to prioritize funding for truthful and relevant content.