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The speaker compliments the president on his shirt and mentions that Trump won. They ask the president what he plans to do to stop the war in Ukraine once he becomes the 47th president. The president responds by saying that he would start by calling two people: Putin and Zelensky. He would arrange a meeting and guarantee that he could work out a deal. The president mentions that he knows exactly what he would say to each person and that a deal would be made within 24 hours.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Vladimir Putin has theoretically and practically put forward a concept, stating readiness to engage in direct negotiations with Ukraine on May 15 in Istanbul, with Turkey as mediator, and without preconditions. This is presented as a successful negotiation model. Undermining it would only reinforce the idea that Ukraine, its western sponsors, and the United States are not serious about peace.

Сценарий предусматривает встречу украинского президента с Путиным "по принципу иду на вы", чтобы подвести итоги 1991 года и пересмотреть причины конфликта. Он заявляет о смене внешней и внутренней политики Украины — сохранить проектность, чтобы "Украина больше никогда не будет представлять угрозы для Российской Федерации со своей территории" и заложить преемственность политики при взаимных обязательствах: "для этого надо пересмотреть систему отношений" и "не допустить применения военной силы друг против друга". Он настаивает на прекращении войны через решение по четырём областям и Крыму: "Я отдаю четыре области и Крым. Не признаю их российскими. Отдаю на условиях ФРГ и ГДР." Вывод войск на границу, создание новой линии прикосновения "как у Кореи. 37-я параллель", и подписание мирного соглашения, если будет добрая воля, иначе продолжение войны. Затем символическое единство народов, совместный молебен "за погибших", и предложение возложить цветы российским солдатам с условием взаимности; у говорящего есть дед—"российский солдат". The scenario envisions the Ukrainian president meeting Putin "on the principle of I am coming to you" to review the 1991 era and reassess the causes of the conflict. He states a shift in Ukraine's foreign and domestic policy — to ensure "Ukraine will never again pose a threat to the Russian Federation from its territory" and to lay a succession of policy under mutual obligations: "to do this we must rethink the system of relations" and "prevent the use of military force against each other." He insists on ending the war through addressing four regions and Crimea: "I give up four regions and Crimea. I do not recognize them as Russian. I give them up on the conditions of the FRG and the GDR." Troop withdrawal to the border, creating a new contact line "like Korea’s 37th parallel", and signing a peace agreement if there is goodwill, otherwise continuation of the war. Then symbolic unity of peoples, a joint prayer "for the dead", and the proposal to lay flowers for Russian soldiers on the condition that the Russian side lays flowers too; the speaker notes his grandfather was a "Russian soldier".

Presidents Putin, Zelensky, and Biden should prioritize peace for Ukraine by agreeing to its neutrality. This means Ukraine would not join NATO or form military alliances with Russia, addressing security concerns for both the US and NATO, as well as Russia. By ensuring there are no Russian or NATO troops on each other's borders, the Ukrainian people can live in peace.

I am Russian! And you? Well, let me think! Okay. I'm with Ukraine. Honestly, Ukraine has always betrayed Russia. You can't understand them there. Ukraine with Russia! Then Russia! Ukraine! Let's go! Oh! Translation: I am Russian! And you? Well, let me think! Okay. I'm with Ukraine. Honestly, Ukraine has always betrayed Russia. You can't understand them there. Ukraine with Russia! Then Russia! Ukraine! Let's go! Oh!

«Я иду на вы.» Он призывает подвести итоги с 1991 года по Черноморский флот, ТУЗЛ и газовые войны, пересмотреть причинно-следственные связи. «Я полон решимости сменить направление внешней и внутренней политики Украины, то что я называю словом проектность украинскую.» Украина «больше никогда не будет представлять угрозы для Российской Федерации со своей территории» на взаимных условиях: «эти обязательства могут быть только взаимны... не допустить применения военной силы друг против друга»; «Кто угодно с кем угодно воюете, но только не русские, не украинцы и не белорусы.» «Вот эти 13 не должны быть.» Далее: «четыре области: Крым... и обеспечение прав русскоязычного населения и церкви.» «А отдаю четыре области... и Крым, и не признаю их российскими. Отдаю на условиях ФРГ и ГДР.» Мирный договор «должен быть» с признанием территории; иначе будет «мирное соглашение, не договор.» Вывод войск до границы «как у Кореи. 37 апреля.» Белорусь — фактор; символическое единство от Владимира Великого; совместный молебен; пресс-конференция: «нас пытались сделать врагами, я пришел положить конец этому.» Возложение цветов к российским солдатам по взаимной договоренности; иначе — со стороны говорящего, «у меня дед российский солдат». I go on the offensive. He calls to review since 1991 regarding problem areas: the Black Sea Fleet, Tuzla, and gas wars, and to reassess causes. «I am determined to change Ukraine’s external and internal policy, what I call the Ukrainian project.» Ukraine «will never again threaten the Russian Federation with its territory» on mutual terms: «these obligations can only be mutual... prevent the use of force against each other»; «Whoever fights with anyone, but not Russians, not Ukrainians, and not Belarusians.» «Those 13 must not be.» Then: «four regions: Crimea... and ensuring rights of the Russian-speaking population and the church.» «I give four regions... and Crimea, and I do not recognize them as Russian. I give on the terms of FRG and GDR.» A peace treaty «must have a clear legal form... recognition of territory.» Otherwise a «peace agreement, not a treaty.» Troops withdrawn to the border «like Korea. April 37.» Belarus as a factor; symbolic unity of peoples of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine from Vladimir the Great; joint prayer; press conference: «we were targeted as enemies, I came to end this.» Flowers to Russian soldiers by mutual accord; otherwise I will lay flowers from my side, «because my grandfather was a Russian soldier.»

I am ready to leave my post as president if it means peace for Ukraine. If it is absolutely necessary for me to leave for peace to occur, then I am willing to do so. I am also ready to exchange my position for NATO membership immediately, if those are the conditions required. I won't belabor the point any further.

We will now talk about the future of Ukraine with you, as it seems you are serious about it. Putin had asked the Americans in December 2021 for written confirmation on how to handle Ukraine, but President Biden refused to negotiate on this matter. There should have been an uproar on the German side, as a potential war would involve Germany in the issue.

Российская сторона настаивала на мирных инициативах, и стамбульские мирные инициативы были неплохим промежуточным документом. В НАТО Украина не могла вступить, но вопрос, примет ли НАТО. Сейчас Путин выставляет условие – никакого НАТО. Возможно, 200 тысяч человек были бы живы, и пол-Украины не было бы разрушено. Стоит ли подписать мирное соглашение в Стамбуле? Россияне были согласны на политическую дискуссию по Крыму, что было чуть ли не актом поражения России. Сумма уступок со стороны России была беспрецедентной, и такого уже не будет. Вопрос, надо было или не надо было фиксироваться тогда, будет тревожить современников и историков. **English Translation:** The Russian side insisted on peace initiatives, and the Istanbul peace initiatives were a good interim document. Ukraine could not join NATO, but the question is whether NATO would accept it. Now Putin sets a condition – no NATO. Perhaps 200,000 people would be alive, and half of Ukraine would not be destroyed. Was it worth signing a peace agreement in Istanbul? The Russians agreed to a political discussion on Crimea, which was almost an act of defeat for Russia. The amount of concessions from Russia was unprecedented, and this will never happen again. The question of whether or not it was necessary to fix it then will bother contemporaries and historians.

"Peace in Ukraine is possible now." "The war started eleven years ago when The United States backed a violent coup to overthrow the Ukrainian government of president Viktor Yanukovych." "Why did The United States want NATO enlargement? Because The United States wanted to dominate Russia." "It was based on autonomy for Eastern Ukraine, the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine." "The United States and Germany ignored the treaty." "Do not accept neutrality. Fight on." "The Ukraine war can end now based on neutrality of Ukraine. Just say it. Neutrality." "Diplomacy where Europe and Russia sit down and undertake collective security, recognizing that Russia does not want NATO or NATO troops on its border, and Russia recognizing that Europe does not want Russian troops in Ukraine."

Алексей Арестович заявляет, что патриот украинцев и русских народов не должны воевать. Он предлагает мир с Россией на условиях переговоров: «Я отдаю четыре области. И Крым.» и создание арбитражной системы, установление нейтрального статуса Украины. Он считает проектность Украины ключевым вопросом и говорит, что смена проекта необходима. Говоря о политике, он планирует баллотироваться, но только при условии радикальной смены курса; иначе «меня загонят FPV». Его отношение к Зеленскому претерпело резкую эволюцию: «посадите его пожизненно, если придёте к власти», затем он признал маргинализацию и сменил риторику. В Украине у него санкции; он «живу через YouTube». Он обвиняет внутренние элиты в коррупции и утверждает существование «сеток» из офиса президента, Порошенко и российской стороны. Он восхваляет Путина как «самого последовательного и рационального политика», предлагает встречи с Козаком и идею коллективного иска против Запада. Он говорит о нейтральности и символическом единстве Руси. Alexey Arrestovich states that patriots of Ukrainians and Russians should not fight. He proposes peace with Russia on negotiation terms: «I give four regions. And Crimea.» and the creation of an arbitration system, establishing a neutral status for Ukraine. He views Ukraine’s “project-ness” as key and says a change of project is necessary. Talking about politics, he plans to run, but only if there is a radical shift; otherwise «they will push me to FPV.» His stance toward Zelensky has undergone a sharp evolution: «lock him up for life if you come to power,» then he acknowledged marginalization and changed rhetoric. In Ukraine he faces sanctions; he «lives via YouTube.» He accuses domestic elites of corruption and asserts the existence of “nets” from the presidential office, Poroshenko, and the Russian side. He hails Putin as «the most coherent and rational politician,» proposes meetings with Kozak and the idea of a collective lawsuit against the West. He speaks of neutrality and symbolic unity of Rus'.

To restart talks, Zelensky needs to say he wants peace. He doesn't need to say negative things about me. He simply has to state, "I want to make peace. I don't want to fight this war any longer." His people are dying, and he needs to understand he doesn't hold the strong cards in this situation.

President Trump is likely the only person who can mediate peace between Ukraine and Russia because Putin respects and, in many ways, fears him. The speaker's discussions with Trump centered on the need for a ceasefire, suggesting April 20 as the date. If Putin, who is purportedly the only party not accepting a ceasefire, does not comply, the U.S. and Europe should impose colossal sanctions.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some action, so we could say we had to respond to set the stage for a military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert CIA action to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective is to get control of the oil. That's the number one priority, with an eye toward the risk of a renewed Iran conflict and the prospect of shutdown of the Persian Gulf, and the need to have an alternative supplier. Ukraine defeating Russia was the plan, and Russia’s military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: What’s your initial reaction to Venezuela? I talked to John Kuriaki who said to read naval movements to gauge what the military plans. The buildup on the coast of Venezuela is significant. They’ve got 14, 12 warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing or this is a Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the Central America branch, and the CIA’s analytical thrust was to provoke Noriega into taking action to justify a response and invasion. That happened in 1988. But that time there were US bases in Panama; Quarry Heights was full. Southern Command was there. Now Southern Command has moved to Miami, just near Southcom. Another issue: within the military, the concept of supported and supporting commands means the special operations command (SOCOM) would normally be the supporting commander, but here Southern Command would be subordinate to SOCOM, which is problematic because SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war. Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, and others are light infantry for raids, not mass warfare. So launching shells or sending ground forces won’t solve Venezuela; terrain is rugged and favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, body bags would likely exceed those from Iraq and Afghanistan. Venezuelans will fight, and insurgents from Brazil and Colombia could join. Decapitation strikes against Maduro could provoke an insurgency that the US would struggle to pacify. Mario: Could we see a decapitation strike like Israel against Hezbollah and Iran? Larry: Decapitating Maduro would still leave loyalists and other actors with weapons; an insurgency could erupt, and the US would be unable to pacify it. The real objective here is unclear. The State Department’s INL/INSCR programs have long documented Venezuela as a transit point for drugs; Trump claimed fentanyl is the issue, but most cocaine also goes to Europe. The 2018 Trump era mentioned the Trendy Aragua as a pretext to justify covert actions; I believe Trump signed a finding authorizing a CIA operation to remove Maduro, leading to Guaidó, but that failed. The broader agenda appears to be regaining oil influence and countering Russia, China, and Iran’s influence in Venezuela. Mario: Elaborate the agenda and strategy behind these strikes on boats out of Venezuela and Trump’s public acknowledgement of a CIA covert operation. What’s the strategy and intention? Larry: The objective is to restore oil control in Venezuela and reduce adversary influence. Maduro once aligned with the CIA, and Chavez/Maduro have maintained cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing. The US aims to curtail BRICS and reduce Venezuelan ties to Russia, China, and Iran, potentially moving Venezuela away from the dollar-based system. The theory that this is a message to Putin circulates, but if that were the aim, it’s a poor strategy given the broader geopolitical dynamics in Syria, Iran, and the Palestinian-Israeli arena. The US previously overpromised in the Red Sea and failed to secure freedom of navigation, signaling limited military capacity for large-scale campaigns. The objective of any Venezuela action must be concrete, otherwise it risks entanglement in an insurgency. Mario: Turning to general foreign policy under Trump. What about the national security strategy? Europe’s criticisms, and Trump’s approach to Ukraine—Witkoff and Kushner meeting Putin? Larry: The 2025 national security strategy signals change, but these documents are not blueprints; they’re guidelines. Europe is being asked to step up, while the US distances itself, arguing Europe’s resources and industrial capacity have diminished while Russia and China shift. Europe’s censorship and defense spending are under scrutiny. The US–UK intelligence relationship still lingers, but overall the West’s ability to project force is questioned. Russia and China’s relationship is deep and mutually reinforcing; the Rand Corporation’s earlier ideas that Ukraine would defeat Russia to force Moscow to join the West have not materialized. Ukraine’s fight has forced Russia to mobilize and shift front lines; casualty counts are contested, but Russia’s front has expanded with a larger force and higher attrition. Mario: What about Ukraine negotiations and Putin’s terms? Larry: Putin’s terms (as stated on 06/14/2024) are: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw forces from those territories before negotiations begin. An election must be held in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president, potentially replacing Zelenskyy, and Russia would then talk to Ukraine. Russia’s stance treats these territories as non-negotiable; freezing lines is not acceptable to Russia. If negotiations fail, Russia is likely to maintain control over large parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine, potentially extending into Kharkiv and Odessa. Western military support is insufficient in scale to match Russia’s production; Russia’s oil revenue remains a significant portion of GDP, and the global south is pivoting toward BRICS, with Modi’s meeting signaling stronger ties with Russia and China. The strategic trend is a shift away from Western dominance toward a multipolar order. Mario: Larry, appreciate your time. Larry: Pleasure as always, Mario.

I see the hatred for Putin, which makes a deal tough. I want to get this settled and align with Europe. I could be tougher, but that won't get a deal done. We had a president who talked tough, but Putin still invaded. Diplomacy is the path to peace. Putin occupied parts of Ukraine in 2014, and nobody stopped him. We signed ceasefire and gas contracts, but he broke them, killing our people and not exchanging prisoners. What kind of diplomacy are we talking about? It's disrespectful to litigate this here. You should be thanking me for trying to bring this to a conference.

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify and order the core claims and chronology of events. - Preserve the speaker’s key assertions and specific examples, including quoted phrases where appears in the transcript. - Highlight unique or surprising points (e.g., alleged coups, Minsk II interpretation). - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic content. - Avoid commentary on truthfulness; present claims as stated. - Translate only if needed (not needed here); keep the summary within 380–476 words. The speaker argues that the United States has repeatedly acted to redraw borders and topple governments without UN authorization, and that Western powers have treated international agreements as tools to serve their interests. He cites the Belgrade bombing for seventy-eight days as the first post-World War II European war that aimed to break Serbia, create Kosovo as an enclave, and install a NATO base in the Balkans, describing it as a NATO mission without UN authority. He lists additional interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, with the assertion that the Obama and Hillary Clinton era tasked the CIA to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, and that NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi. He also recounts Kyiv in February 2014, stating that the United States overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian forces, noting that this occurred after the EU had reached an agreement for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down by both sides. He emphasizes that the next day the opposition asserted disagreement, and the United States immediately backed the new government, ignoring the prior constitutional agreement. In 2015, he contends the Russians did not seek Donbas restoration but peace through negotiations. Minsk II, a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty, was signed by the Ukrainian government and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. He states that it was laughed at inside the US government, despite the UN endorsement. He cites Angela Merkel’s later remark in a desight-era interview after the 2022 escalation, claiming she said Minsk II was “a holding pattern to give Ukraine time to build its strength.” He counters that Minsk II was a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty meant to end the war. He asserts familiarity with the United States government and urges distrust, arguing that both sides should sit down publicly and present their terms “in front of the whole world” for judgment. He calls for clear terms: “We’re not going to overthrow governments anymore,” and asks the United States to say “We accept this agreement,” and Russia to say “We’re not stepping one foot farther than whatever the boundary is actually reached,” with NATO not enlarging. He envisions putting the terms on paper for the world to see, asserting that “once in a while, treaties actually hold.”

Speaker 0: He asks about comparisons to World War II and what Hitler did in Czechoslovakia. Initially, he takes some territory. He appeased Putin the same way they appeased Hitler. But then, especially if he takes the defensive line in Donbas, which Ukraine still holds at the moment, it puts Putin in a better position to continue invading more and more territory out of Ukraine over the next ten, fifteen years rather than trying to achieve it all in the next few months or next couple of years? Speaker 1: It’s wildly insulting to compare Putin to Hitler for obvious reasons. But regarding territory, for seven years before Russia invaded, Russia was on board with the Minsk Accords, brokered in February 2015. The Minsk Accords would have left all of Ukraine intact; Ukraine would have kept the Donbas. All Ukraine had to do was pass some laws in its parliament enshrining autonomous rights for the ethnic Russian regions of the Donbas, letting them speak the Russian language, letting them select their own judges, letting them have trade with Russia if they wanted to. And yes, that Minsk accord, if it had been implemented, would have kept Ukraine out of NATO. So this idea that Russia’s bent on conquest not only in Ukraine but everywhere is totally undermined by the available evidence. Russia was fine with even the Donbas staying in Ukraine as long as the cultural rights of Ukrainians of ethnic Russians in the Donbas were respected and if Ukraine stayed out of NATO. And if you want to say that that’s imperialist for Russia to demand the Ukraine side of NATO, would we ever accept Canada or Mexico being in a hostile military alliance led by Russia and China? Of course not. And by the way, Ukraine not being in NATO was, for a long time, the majority public position inside of Ukraine, if you look at polls, and it was enshrined in Ukraine’s declaration of state sovereignty, which said that Ukraine will be a permanently neutral state. So these were not radical demands by Putin at all. It was just ultraradicals in Ukraine—the ultranationalists, like groups like the Azov battalion, Right Sector, Vubota—which refused to accept the compromise of Minsk. You read the memoir of Angela Merkel; they all say the same thing. It was a hostility inside of Ukraine that prevented Minsk from being implemented. And had Minsk been implemented, I think you would have avoided this war. So in short, the idea that Putin has territorial designs in Ukraine is undermined by the available evidence, which then shows how completely idiotic it is to believe he has territorial designs beyond Ukraine as well.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

Russia occupied parts of Ukraine, including Crimea, starting in 2014. During the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, no one stopped him as people died on the contact line. In 2019, I signed a ceasefire deal with Macron, Merkel, and him, but he broke it, killing people and not exchanging prisoners. We need diplomacy to end the destruction of Ukraine. We have problems during the war, like everyone else. We are staying strong and thankful for the support, but we are not winning. You have given us billions of dollars in military equipment. I have said thank you many times to the American people. We want to stop the war, but we want a ceasefire with guarantees. Ask our people about a ceasefire. Obama gave us sheets, but Trump gave us javelins. Without your support, we have no cards.

The Ukrainian side needs to take real action if they want progress. They should start by revoking the red card given to the Ukrainian president for negotiating. We hear that they are ready for some kind of peace talks, but it's interesting how the responsible individuals who were recently talking about defeating Russia on the battlefield are now changing their tune. They are now saying that these problems should be resolved through peaceful negotiations, which is a positive transformation. However, just talking about it won't be enough. Concrete steps need to be taken if there is a genuine desire to make a deal.

What Trump wants is a ceasefire. That's it. He wants a ceasefire. And if Putin can get convince him that the quickest route to a ceasefire is for Ukraine to leave mother Russia and say no to NATO, that's it. That's all that has to happen for a ceasefire. And what Putin is going to say is it won't matter in a month. In a month, we're going to own it all. If you want your ceasefire now, tell Ukraine to leave. If the Ukraine won't leave, we'll make them leave. There's nothing you can do to stop us. We're not afraid of your sanctions. We're not afraid of any of your threats. This is going to happen. We can either happen have it happen in a way that gets you the ceasefire you want, or it's just gonna happen. And I think Trump understands it.

Speaker: Russia will never accept a freeze. This is just a White House fantasy, a wet dream. It's this Wall Street Journal. Everybody else repeats it. Russia has made it clear, 100% clear, that there will be no freeze, that for this war to end, Ukraine must leave all of Russian territory. And from the Russian perspective, that's total totality of Kherson, so the totality of Zaporizhzhia, the totality of Donetsk, and the totality of Lugansk. No if, ands, or buts. And let's just make this even more clear to your American audience, or your western audience. You know, in The United States, I'm somebody who took an oath to uphold and defend the constitution of The United States Of America. That's it. That's all America's about. We're a constitutional republic, and if you remove the constitution, we're nothing. We don't exist as The United States. So we take the constitution seriously. Why can't we respect the fact that the Russians take their constitution seriously? And because they were constitutionally viable from the Russian perspective, referendum in Kyrgyzstan, Zaporizhzhia, Lugansk, and Donetsk in September 2022, Russia absorbed these territories into the Russian land. It's part of Russia. Vladimir Putin cannot cannot, is incapable of giving up Russian territory as part of any deal. Constitutionally, it can't be done. He's not a dictator. You know? He is the president. He is bound by the constitution. So I don't know why people continue to repeat this absolute direct, this absolute nonsense. Russia will never give up its territory ever in a million years. It will never happen.

I'm aligned with the US and the world, and I want to end this conflict. It's hard to make a deal with so much hatred. I could be tough, but that won't get us anywhere. For four years, tough talk didn't stop Putin. Diplomacy is the path to peace. Others didn't stop Putin from occupying parts of Ukraine since 2014. We signed ceasefire and gas contracts, but he broke them, killing people and not exchanging prisoners. I am trying to end the destruction of your country. Everyone has problems during war, even you. You've allowed yourself to be in a bad position. You're gambling with lives and World War III, and that's disrespectful to the US. You haven't said thank you, and campaigned against us. Your country is in trouble and not winning. If we are out, you will be fighting on your own.

Спикер представляет гипотетический сценарий: стать президентом Украины и ехать в Москву «на вы» — не поклон, а принцип. Он предлагает пересмотреть причины конфликта с 1991 года: раздел Черноморского флота, ТУЗЛы, газовые войны, и выработать причинно-следственные выводы. Он намерен радикально сменить внешнюю и внутреннюю политику, чтобы «Украина больше никогда не будет... представлять угрозы для Российской Федерации» на время каденции, с взаимными обязательствами и арбитражом отношений. Он настаивает, чтобы «никто... но только не русские, не украинцы, не белорусы» не убивал друг друга, подчеркивая символическое единство народов. Конкретика: «отдаю четыре области и Крым. И не признаю их российскими. Отдаю на условиях ФРГ и ГДР», вывожу войска к границе и подписываю мирное соглашение, но без полного признания территории. Беларусь — ключевой фактор. Предлагает совместный молебен за погибших и возложение цветов российским солдатам с обеих сторон. Speaker presents a hypothetical scenario: becoming Ukraine's president and going to Moscow “on the offensive” — not a bow, but a principle. He proposes revisiting the causes of the conflict since 1991: the division of the Black Sea Fleet, TUZLs, gas wars, and drawing causal-consequential conclusions. He intends a radical shift in Ukraine's foreign and domestic policy to ensure “Ukraine will never again threaten the Russian Federation” during his term, with mutual obligations and an arbitration-based framework. He insists that “nobody... but only Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians” should not kill each other, stressing symbolic unity of peoples. Specifics: “I give four oblasts and Crimea. And I do not recognize them as Russian. I give them on the terms of FRG and GDR,” withdraws troops to the border and signs a peace agreement, but without full territorial recognition. Belarus is a key factor. Proposes a joint prayer for the dead and laying flowers for Russian soldiers from both sides.