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Michael Hudson discusses how the Iran war is accelerating a global economic crisis and signaling a struggle over what the world economic order will look like after the current system breaks down. He emphasizes that energy markets are central to the ripple effects, since disruptions affect fertilizer and agricultural inputs, pharmaceuticals, helium for hospital and tech uses, and highly refined fuels for transportation. In India, fertilizer prices are rising; in the U.S., farmers face constraints from higher input costs and the need to borrow to plant, risking profits as crop prices may not compensate the costs. He notes that crop traders may profit more than farmers, and that the wider impact cascades into electronics and manufacturing through electricity-intensive processes like aluminum refining. The broader point is that energy is the linchpin of the economy; a disruption in energy flows threatens production across sectors, raising unemployment and undermining manufacturing. Hudson argues that the Iran threat, and the possibility that the United States and Israel would destroy Iran’s refining capacity and electricity, would provoke a depression larger than the 1930s because the physical flow of goods would be constrained beyond what debt relief or wartime Keynesianism can fix. To avoid this, he says, the world must restructure how trade, payments, and international reserves work, which would require reform—or replacement—of the United Nations, since U.S. veto power and international-law violations hinder cooperation and the transition away from fossil fuels toward atomic, solar, or wind energy. He characterizes the current dynamic as an economic mutually assured destruction: Iran resists being crushed by U.S. and Israeli aggression, while the U.S. seeks to maintain dominance by weaponizing energy and finance. He attributes extreme risk to the U.S. political leadership, describing the internal White House tensions and the possibility of a nuclear impulse as driven by political personalities who would gamble with civilization rather than accept a loss of dominance. Hudson then contrasts Iran’s position with the U.S. and its allies, noting that U.S. military capability is constrained: the United States has burned through missiles and bombers and cannot easily invade Iran on land. Iran, despite punitive actions against its navy and air force, retains a resilient defense and decoupled administrative networks, and it wields moral authority by opposing what it sees as American-dominated, one-sided control of oil, food, and the dollar. He argues that other countries confront a choice: align with a more independent, multipolar order or accept continued pressure from the United States to surrender sovereignty or face economic isolation. He critiques the Western use of the term liberalism as misapplied, arguing that the term in contemporary discourse often denotes neoliberals who favor deregulation and reduced government, whereas, historically, public control of essential services and strategic sectors—transportation, banking, health care, education—guided growth. He compares China favorably for keeping banking under public direction and maintaining state-led credit for productive investment, arguing that Western economies have shifted toward financialization and rent-seeking, fueling inequality and instability. He posits that open, liberal trade and investment are not genuinely open under U.S. dominance, since the dollar’s supremacy and centralized control enable coercive extraction. In closing, Hudson emphasizes that the real question is what economy and political system will replace the current liberal order, with attention to why China’s model—combining public banking, subsidized infrastructure, and state-led development—has produced higher productivity and living standards. He calls for a realistic redefinition of democracy and economic policy to prevent further polarization and decline, and for an international framework that supports productive investment and equitable growth rather than financial extractivism.

Glenn welcomes back Professor Michael Hudson to discuss the direction of civilization and how to assess civilizational decline through economic lenses. Hudson says he won’t remake his previous work The Destiny of Finance but will offer a sequel that revisits classical political economy and why it framed industrial capitalism. He emphasizes a distinction between the decline of an economy and the decline of an entire civilization. He describes a civilizational conflict between finance-led rentier capitalism in the West and the industrial capitalism with Chinese characteristics, noting that the latter mirrors early British, American, and German forms in its own way. The takeaway of industrial capitalism, he says, was to free the economy from feudal legacies—most notably hereditary landlord power—and to reduce three central rent-seeking blocks: landlords, monopolists, and bankers. Hudson recounts Ricardo’s 1817 warning that Britain’s industrial takeoff depended on cheap labor and the cost of subsistence, which was tied to food prices under the corn laws. Tariffs on food imports kept wages high, hindering investment by keeping costs high for employers. The landlords sought to protect rents; the fight for free trade (1815–1846) aimed to overcome landlord power and move toward a rent-reducing, production-focused economy. Ricardo’s labor theory of value held that value is produced by labor, but prices reflected rent and not true value; excess of price over value constituted economic rent, an unearned income. John Stuart Mill described rent as income earned in sleep. Classical economists saw economies as divided into a production sector and a rentier sector—where rent and credit relations acted as an overhead on the productive economy. The industrial project, they argued, was to align prices with real costs and minimize rents. Hudson argues that modern economies have shifted from industrial capitalism to finance capitalism, where rentier interests—banking, land rents, real estate, monopolies—back the financial sector and monopolies. Real estate endures as a transfer of wealth via debt-financed housing and commercial property; mortgage interest and fees become a form of rent. GDP growth increasingly reflects economic overhead and financial profits rather than productive output. The classical economists were opposed by late 19th-century rent-seeking forces: in the U.S., John Bates Clark; in Europe, Austrian School and utilitarian economists; all arguing against government intervention. Neoliberal reforms from Thatcher and Reagan onward privatized public infrastructure, supposedly increasing efficiency, but Hudson contends this raised costs (energy, water, rail) and deepened rentier power. Hudson contrasts the West’s rentier model with China and Russia, which pursue mixed economies with substantial public subsidies and government credit to support industry, wind energy, and infrastructure. He argues that China treats money as a public utility and uses credit to finance real construction rather than corporate takeovers, enabling broader growth. He asserts that Europe’s elites have pushed privatization and energy dependence on the United States, undermining European industry and security. He claims the U.S. uses NATO to constrain Europe and allies with sanctions and energy dependence, while Russia and China diversify from Western finance and technology to strengthen their own systems. The discussion then turns to ancient precedents: debt cancellation and land redistribution in Hammurabi’s Babylon, Egypt, and Judea’s Levitical laws, as examples of civilizations resetting rent and debt to maintain public legitimacy. Hudson argues that civilizations tend to polarize as wealth concentrates, and debt cancellation was a recurring tool to prevent oligarchic domination. He links this to modern-day neoliberalism, which denies rent and unearned income, presenting rentier gains as productive growth. He concludes that China’s approach—public-directed money and credit, mixed with private enterprise—reflects the civilization he believes resilient, whereas Western neoliberalism allows rentier control to dominate policy. Glenn thanks Hudson for the thorough, provocative explanation and notes the value of understanding rent seeking. Hudson highlights his works on rent, including an audiobook version of Super Imperialism, and contends that economics today often uses a deceptive vocabulary that obscures rentier dynamics. Glenn concludes, praising the discussion and noting links to Hudson’s books and website.

There are many smart, hardworking people in China, with impressive architecture like train stations and high-speed rail. The buildings in Shanghai and Beijing, as well as the terracotta warriors in Xi'an, are more impressive than in the US.

Warwick Powell says the Iran war is affecting East Asia in longer-term, structural ways. The immediate impact is through reduced oil and liquid fuel flows, which exposes Southeast Asian economies and Australia because they depend on Middle East crude and on fuels refined from it. He notes countries have adjusted by reaching out to other suppliers: Russia and Indonesia (Malaysia has done so), and Japan has sought to secure its position with the Sakhalin II project. He adds that Russian “European Urals” oil is chemically similar to Middle East oil and suits diesel manufacturing, while Singapore has refused Russian oil and therefore had to find other workarounds. He also highlights pressure on fertilizers and petrochemicals, with Japanese naphtha-market constraints already affecting related industries and pushing some firms to seek alternative supply options in China. Powell argues energy shocks do not end abruptly and that the downstream implications are likely to be manifold. He cites a consumer-level shift toward electrified transportation, especially Chinese EVs exported into Southeast Asia and Australia, which he says has increased dramatically over the last hundred days. He also says countries are increasing interest in energy technologies that support “energy sovereignty,” with Chinese clean-energy technologies positioned as central. He further emphasizes a defense and security dimension: the United States’ global power-projection base network is no longer defendable. He connects damaged or destroyed Persian Gulf bases with American pullbacks and says this has created shockwaves across Southeast Asia and Eastern North Asia. Powell argues Asia’s U.S. deterrence posture has relied on American bases across the First Island Chain (from Japan to the Philippines), so if those bases become unsustainable, the regional security architecture is forced to change while China expands its military posture over decades of modernization. Glenn links this to a broader post–Cold War U.S. hegemonic strategy and argues that in a multipolar world the U.S. cannot be everywhere. Powell responds by describing the effects of U.S. weapons and attention being diverted across multiple theaters, which he says reflects a failure to prioritize and contributes to European and Gulf states feeling betrayed or exposed, especially those portrayed as frontline states. He says that in East Asia, frontline states risk becoming targets for America’s adversaries while the U.S. cannot protect them as intended. Powell outlines differing regional responses. He says Japan has been remilitarizing for about a decade for domestic political reasons and for concerns about the U.S. security “blanket,” with similar pressures in South Korea, including public distrust about the American nuclear umbrella and growing demands for nuclearization. He also says this aligns with an American strategy of outsourcing funding, material responsibility, and frontline risk to allied states. He adds that U.S. basing in Japan and South Korea still helps keep them under U.S. influence, while he describes Philippine efforts to move closer to Washington and the economic pressures that have accompanied it. Powell claims oil-flow disruptions have caused significant economic problems in the Philippines, and that the Philippines reached out to China for support in fuel supply; he says Marcos indicated in late March that the Philippines was interested in re-engaging Beijing on joint exploration and development in the South China Sea. He notes public opposition building in multiple countries, including Australia’s renewed AUKUS debate at the Shangri-La Dialogues. Powell describes a public inquiry into AUKUS initiated by former federal labor minister Peter Garrett, arguing Parliament has not investigated the merits, handling, or process. He presents Pete Hegseth’s Shangri-La keynote as a “capstone” point, saying Hegseth described the U.S. role in Asia as ensuring no single power becomes a regional hegemon, and Powell contrasts this with the U.S. insistence in Powell’s memory that it was the sole hegemon in Asia. Powell then turns to whether Japan’s rearmament increases autonomy or becomes an instrument for U.S. frontline strategy. He says the outcome is double-edged, tied to whether U.S. bases remain defensible given shortages and Chinese capabilities, and he references U.S. force shifts such as relocating some forces away from Okinawa. He argues U.S. capability limitations suggest bases and stored airplanes might not last through the first week of serious conflict, and he says Japan will continue rearming, but autonomy depends on U.S. ability to keep Japan “under control.” He says Southeast Asia has lingering memories of Japanese militarization in the 1930s and 1940s and that this could make Asia tense. Powell also claims the Chinese economy’s scale limits the feasibility of balancing China militarily, stating he sees the real issue as how to live with China as the major power. On China’s ability to withstand attempts to disrupt its energy, Powell says China’s energy structure is less dependent on oil than 25 years ago, citing a diesel peak about two years ago and declining diesel consumption, plus a two-decade diversification through electrification, storage, renewables, and major expansion of coal and nuclear generation. He adds terrestrial transport across Eurasia improved, with Russia and Central Asia supplying oil and gas to China in ways that are harder to interdict than maritime choke points. He also says global energy markets are more fragmented than U.S. “energy monopoly” assumptions imply, and he argues that alternatives and new technologies make containment via energy choke points increasingly hard to execute. He concludes China should be “reasonably unscathed,” citing preparedness, growing global demand for Chinese clean-energy technologies, increased Chinese foreign direct investment, and deeper integration with Southeast Asia—especially through energy, commodities, finished products, and payment-system expansion that reduces reliance on American infrastructure and institutions like the dollar and SWIFT. When asked about India, Powell says India’s non-alignment tradition means it can appear to “waiver,” but that India faces challenges tied to economic development and elite relationships with the U.S., along with anxieties and unavoidable realities due to the land border and tensions with China. He says India’s key long-term problem is becoming a more autonomous economic actor with less exposure to U.S.-linked risk, including fertilizer and energy access problems and domestic infrastructure and industrialization gaps. He calls for a more cordial India-China relationship and says leadership is needed to transcend anxieties toward China. He also argues against bloc politics and describes the ASEAN-led approach as quietly successful in keeping a diverse region cohesive around economic development and prosperity, including RCEP and related expansions. He highlights payments infrastructure that can settle trade in national currencies and argues ASEAN—especially Indonesia—could be pivotal in maintaining a multipolar, “indivisible security” region. Powell says the Shanghai Cooperation Organization offers an institutional model that could be extended toward North Asia and Southeast Asia to support multipolar security, counter bloc politics, and reduce the risk of miscalculation and conflict. Powell closes by saying Asia-Pacific security could also benefit from engaging Russia, since Russia is a Pacific power, and he frames block politics as a path to suspicion, arms races, and eventual conflict. He ends by suggesting further discussion on Indonesia next time and directs readers to his Substack (warwickpaul.substack.com) and his book *Thermo Economics in the Time of Monsters*.

Sean Rein, author and founder/managing director of the China Market Research Group, discusses China’s current dynamics, opportunities, and global context with Glenn. Rein argues that China in 2026 is fundamentally different from China in 2016, with real estate, consumer confidence, and demographics as central challenges, but also with strong opportunities driven by indigenous innovation and a rapid reorientation toward self-reliance. On current challenges, Rein highlights real estate weakness as the primary concern: housing prices in top cities have fallen 30–40%, with slower property turnover and anemic transaction volumes. He distinguishes China’s situation from a US-style financial crisis, noting most homeowners have substantial mortgage equity (50–100% down) so there is no systemic panic selling. The result is stagnation rather than collapse, with consumer anxiety suppressing spending and delaying entrepreneurship. This consumer reticence, compounded by a large household savings stock (~$20 trillion) and a shrinking willingness to spend, threatens longer-term demographic goals (lower birth rates, delayed or avoided marriage) and complicates future growth. On opportunities, Rein emphasizes China’s shift toward indigenous innovation and self-reliance, a pivot that began under the Trump era’s sanctions regime and has intensified since. He argues that Chinese companies are now prioritizing technology—AI, semiconductors, NEVs, and broader green tech—alongside agriculture and food supply diversification (beef, soybeans, blueberries) to reduce exposure to Western import controls. He notes that Western observers often misread China’s trajectory due to outdated information from observers who left China years ago. He cites strong performance in Chinese equities (second-best global performance after Korea, up ~30% in a recent period) and asserts that Chinese tech firms (e.g., Alibaba, Baidu) are rapidly advancing, challenging passive stereotypes of China as merely a copycat. Rein also contends that China’s universities and talent pools are rising in global rankings, and that China’s approach to innovation now blends capital, government support, engineering talent, and an ecosystem that can outpace Western models that rely more on venture capital dynamics. On geopolitics and global leadership, Rein argues China is a natural partner with the United States, more so than with Russia, and that Western framing of China as an adversary is outdated. He contends that China’s strategy includes self-reliance in critical tech and a diversified supply chain—reducing vulnerability to sanction regimes by building internal capabilities and alternate sources. In energy and resources, China remains dependent on imports for oil (notably Iran as a major supplier) and is actively expanding renewables (wind, solar) and nuclear power, while securing strategic reserves to stabilize prices. He notes Europe as a potential beneficiary if it pursues reciprocity and deeper integration with Chinese markets, suggesting joint ventures and non-tariff barriers to ensure fair access for European firms, and criticizing European policymakers for hampering Chinese investment and technology transfer. On the US-China trade war, Rein calls tariffs a total failure overall, citing sectoral shifts in sourcing (China-plus-one strategies) but noting that costs often remain lower with Chinese imports due to tariff carve-outs and exceptions. He emphasizes that global supply chains have adapted to diversify away from single sources (China, the US, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, Vietnam), but asserts China still holds disproportionate leverage in critical areas like rare earths, refining, and certain energy and mineral markets. He argues that America’s coercive tools have backfired in many respects, and that Europe’s leverage lies in pragmatic, reciprocal relationships with both powers. Near-term outlook, Rein expects China to continue focusing on raising the quality of life for the large middle and lower-middle class, expanding access to health care and education, and creating a moderately prosperous society. He suggests that true wealth creation in China will come from within the middle 80–90% of the population, while a comparatively smaller elite may see gains in education and health services. He also notes that for individuals seeking the most dramatic financial upside, the United States (e.g., Austin, Silicon Valley) remains a more fertile landscape. As for his personal work, Rein promotes his book, The Finding the Opportunities in China and the New World Order, and mentions active presence on Twitter and LinkedIn, with possible future podcasting.

In this video, Ben Norton discusses various aspects of China's development and its pursuit of sovereignty. He highlights China's remarkable economic growth and development, emphasizing its focus on technological, economic, and food sovereignty. Norton explains how China has reduced its dependence on Western corporations by developing its own social media platforms, payment systems, maps, and hardware. He also acknowledges China's efforts to transition to renewable energy and strengthen food production. Despite challenges such as debt and inequality, Norton argues that the Chinese government is actively working to address these issues. He further contrasts China's approach to combat inequality and promote common prosperity with Western governments that are controlled by wealthy oligarchs and corporations. Norton also mentions China's interest in international trade while facing challenges in transitioning its economy towards internal consumption. Overall, he highlights China's pursuit of sovereignty and its impact on various aspects of its development.

A young Chinese influencer on TikTok who speaks English posted a minute-and-a-half clip directed at Americans. The clip argues that “they rub you blind, and you thank them for it,” calling it a tragedy and a scam, and says Americans “don’t need a tariff” but “need a revolution.” It claims Americans’ garment and auto industries shipped jobs to China “not for diplomacy, not for peace,” but to exploit cheap labor. It says this hollowed out the middle class, crashed the working class, and pressured people to be proud while their future was sold “for profit.” It contrasts China’s outcomes with the United States: it states China made money but used it to build roads, lift millions out of poverty, fund healthcare, and raise living standards, adding that “we reinvest in our people,” including the influencer’s own family benefiting. It then asserts that Americans’ “oligarchs” bought yachts, private jets, mansions with golf course driveways, manipulated markets, dodged taxes, and poured billions into endless wars. The clip contrasts this with Americans facing “stagnant wages, crippling healthcare costs, cheap dopamine, debt,” and “flaked away public money in China while they pick your pocket.” The clip concludes that for forty years both China and the United States benefited from trade and manufacturing, but only one side used that wealth to build. It states, “This isn’t China’s fault. This is yours. You let this happen,” blaming Americans for accepting lies and then letting those responsible blame China for the resulting problems. It calls for Americans to “wake up” and “take your country back,” repeating that a revolution is needed. In the discussion afterward, the host notes a correction: “we haven’t spent billions on useless wars, we’ve spent trillions on useless wars.” Professor Mearsheimer responds that if the influencer were a student in his class giving that statement, he would “basically agree,” saying the influencer is correct. He adds that the message is in large part something Trump made as a candidate before the 2016, 2020, and 2024 elections, and that it helped get him elected in two of those three cases. He concludes that many people in the country feel exactly the way the Chinese gentleman feels about what has happened.

The Chinese government is investing heavily in critical technologies, including nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles, surprising US intelligence. China's state-backed system supports everything from rocket launch systems to AI, with massive R&D spending that allows for numerous failures without financial repercussions. The speaker suggests the US should shift its funding approach, arguing against small business innovation research grants (SBIRs). Venture capital is now interested in high-risk ventures, offering better incentive alignment. The speaker believes the US competitive ecosystem is more efficient than China's massive spending approach. By funding the right companies with true technology and capable founders, large companies will emerge that solve real problems for the Department of Defense.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the implications of the Trump–Xi meeting in Beijing for the US economy, the global economy, and the political economy underlying the encounter. Wolff frames it as part of a broader transition in human history: the decline of American “empire” dominance that has existed since at least World War II, and the rise of China. He argues the US is pulled downward by the end of its dominance and that China has outperformed the West in economic growth over the past thirty to forty years, citing China’s GDP growth about three times the US average (about two to two and a half percent annually for the US). Wolff claims Trump and Xi’s meeting reveals asymmetrical timing. He says one side wants free trade, multilateralism, and open cooperation, while the other side tries to “smash the Chinese down every chance they get,” without success. He also argues China’s approach is distinct: a developmental hybrid combining roughly half of the economy as private capitalist enterprises and the other half as state-owned and state-operated enterprises, all managed by a powerful government supervised by the Communist Party of China. Wolff presents this as “sui generis,” neither the US/Western model nor the Soviet model. He describes a decades-long contest among “private capitalism,” “state capitalism” (including the Soviet system), and China’s hybrid system, saying the Soviet socialism collapsed, leaving Scandinavian/Western European socialism and a Chinese form of socialism. Wolff asserts China “won” at least at this point because China achieved rapid development from extreme poverty to a highly developed standard of living and strong economic dynamism, in spite of receiving little direct external development help compared with other countries. He says China supervised and regulated the process even as private capitalists played an important role in later decades. Wolff then argues the strategic logic of the meeting centers on avoiding war. He says China benefits from time on its side and wants to avoid “rocking the boat,” while the US leadership seeks freedom to resuscitate an imperial order and expects Chinese cooperation. He presents Iran as a “microcosm” of this clash: US aims include removing the Iranian regime, replacing it with a US client, and subdividing Iran, while Wolff says China wants Iran left in place so it can manage the Strait of Hormuz as before and remain aligned with Russia and China. He states China is not driven by oil urgency, citing large Chinese oil reserves, and says the US project fails and has cascading consequences. Wolff extends the argument to propose that the US attempts to revive dominance through energy control (he mentions attacks related to Russia’s energy, Venezuela, Iran, and other oil-related efforts) reflect “empire fantasy.” He argues these actions reveal a broader phenomenon: a decline in US control rather than an ability to impose outcomes. He adds that American public opinion is largely opposed to war, noting that unlike earlier conflicts where patriotic support faded over time with costs and casualties, he says there is already no appetite now, and that domestic economic concerns matter more than grandiose foreign projects. He also references the controversy around a White House “ballroom” as an example of political symbolism amid economic priorities. In response, Glenn asks about how shifting power should change ideological assumptions about development and about what each side wants from the other. Wolff says China’s position is to resolve problems and prevent explosive issues, potentially including disputes such as Taiwan, while the US cannot hear or accept China’s appeal to avoid warfare and instead wants room to restore the empire. He concludes that major issues are at stake even if reported discussion points seem limited, and he expects further efforts by a “declining empire” to preserve its sense of remaining time.

The speaker discusses the challenges faced by the younger generation in the US due to economic crises, lack of political representation, and declining living standards. They contrast the US system with China's socialist model, emphasizing China's progress in green technologies. The speaker criticizes the US media bias, political corruption, and lack of real democracy. They highlight China's peaceful development, integration of Marxism with its culture, and historical tradition of fighting for rights. The speaker suggests that other countries can learn from China's approach.

Speaker 0 argues that the United States has underestimated China's power across infrastructure, technology, and strategic planning. He notes the quality of Chinese infrastructure, citing high-speed trains that connect Beijing to Shanghai in four and a half hours over about 1,000 kilometers, comparing that favorably to Amtrak in the United States. Infrastructure strength is identified as a core strength, followed by China’s scientific and technological capacity, which he calls “the coin of the realm in our decade, in the next few decades.” He asks which society will turn out more scientists and engineers, presenting data to illustrate China’s lead: 34% of first-year Chinese university students study engineering or a STEM field, compared with 5.6% in the United States, noting China’s larger population. He references Harvard, where he teaches, observing that at graduation, chemistry, biology, and physics majors are largely Asian Americans, or more specifically Asians or citizens of Asian ethnicity, indicating a STEM-dominated profile among graduates. The speaker then points to the Trump administration’s gathering of tech titans at the White House, noting that a tremendous number of those tech leaders are Indian Americans and Chinese Americans, implying China’s tech influence extends into American leadership and industry. Addressing national security, he contends that the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) and China's overall power have been underestimated. He argues that the Communist Party of China (CPC) is strategic and unencumbered by free press constraints, allowing it to make long-term bets over decades (ten, twenty, thirty years) without the friction of media opposition. A specific strategic pattern is highlighted: for thirty-five consecutive years, the Chinese foreign minister’s first trip of the year has been to Africa in January to signal Africa as a priority. He contrasts this with U.S. presidents: President Trump did not visit Africa in his first term, while President Biden visited Angola for two or three days toward the end of his term. The speaker uses these examples to illustrate China’s consistent, long-term, strategic focus on Africa and broader global influence. Overall, he concludes that China’s technology, military, and economic power are stronger than commonly perceived, and that the United States must recognize this and adjust accordingly, as he asserts that underestimation is no longer viable.

We have underestimated Chinese power in the world. The trains are fabulous: Beijing to Shanghai in four and a half hours, roughly a thousand kilometers, unlike Amtrak’s typical long-haul experiences. The infrastructure strength is one key advantage. A second is their scientific and technological capacity, which is crucial for the coming decades. The question is: which society will turn out more scientists and engineers? A data point: 34% of first-year students in Chinese universities study engineering or a STEM field, while the United States is at 5.6%. And they are a much bigger country. At Harvard graduation, when we ask our graduate students to stand up as a class, chemistry majors, biology majors, physics majors largely consist of Asian Americans, or Americans of Asian ethnicity, or Chinese American citizens. Last week, when President Trump gathered all the tech titans of the United States in the White House, a tremendous number of those tech titans are Indian Americans and Chinese Americans. We’re not competing when it really matters for the future, and that’s on technology. The PLA, some have said, well, it hasn’t fought since 1978. What is it worth? I’ve seen the PLA and I think we’ve underestimated their military strength and their technology strength. And one other thing: the Communist Party of China is strategic, and they don’t have to worry about what the press says. That can be a good thing to have the press challenging the government, but they have nobody opposing them, so they can make big bets over ten, twenty, thirty years. Mary and I were mentioning one of them. For thirty-five consecutive years, the Chinese foreign minister, whoever that person is, has made his first trip of the year in January to Africa to show the Africans you are our priority. I think President Trump never went to Africa in his first term. President Biden went once to Angola for two or three days at the end of his term, just before he resigned. They’re strategic, and we’re not competing on that level. So, actually, I think the Chinese in technology, military, and economics are stronger than we think they are, and we’ve underestimated them, and we can’t do that any longer.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the future of the West, NATO, Europe, and the international economic system. - The central dynamic, according to Wolff, is the rise of China and the West’s unpreparedness. He argues that the West, after a long era of Cold War dominance, is encountering a China that grows two to three times faster than the United States, with no sign of slowing. China’s ascent has transformed global power relations and exposed that prior strategies to stop or slow China have failed. - The United States, having defeated various historical rivals, pursued a unipolar, neoliberal globalization project after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of that era left the U.S. with a sense of “manifest destiny” to shape the world order. But now time is on China’s side, and the short-term fix for the U.S. is to extract value from its allies rather than invest in long-run geopolitics. Wolff contends the U.S. is engaging in a transactional, extractive approach toward Europe and other partners, pressuring them to concede significant economic and strategic concessions. - Europe is seen by Wolff as increasingly subordinated to U.S. interests, with its leadership willing to accept terrible trade terms and militarization demands to maintain alignment with Washington. He cites the possibility of Europe accepting LNG imports and investments to the U.S. economy at the expense of its own social welfare, suggesting that Europe’s social protections could be jeopardized by this “divorce settlement” with the United States. - Russia’s role is reinterpreted: while U.S. and European actors have pursued expanding NATO and a Western-led security architecture, Russia’s move toward Greater Eurasia and its pivot to the East, particularly under Putin, complicates Western plans. Wolff argues that the West’s emphasis on demonizing Russia as the unifying threat ignores the broader strategic competition with China and risks pushing Europe toward greater autonomy or alignment with Russia and China. - The rise of BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are framed as major competitive challenges to Western economic primacy. The West’s failure to integrate and adapt to these shifts is seen as a strategic misstep, especially given Russia’s earlier openness to a pan-European security framework that was rejected in favor of a U.S.-led order. - Within the United States, there is a debate about the proper response to these shifts. One faction desires aggressive actions, including potential wars (e.g., Iran) to deter adversaries, while another emphasizes the dangers of escalation in a nuclear age. Wolff notes that Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of muscular interventions, and he points to domestic economic discontent—rising inequality, labor unrest, and a growing desire for systemic change—as factors that could press the United States to rethink its approach to global leadership. - Economically, Wolff challenges the dichotomy of public versus private dominance. He highlights China’s pragmatic hybrid model—roughly 50/50 private and state enterprise, with openness to foreign participation yet strong state direction. He argues that the fixation on choosing between private-market and public-control models is misguided and that outcomes matter more than orthodox ideological labels. - Looking ahead, Wolff is optimistic that Western economies could reframe development by learning from China’s approach, embracing a more integrated strategy that blends public and private efforts, and reducing ideological rigidity. He suggests Europe could reposition itself by deepening ties with China and leveraging its own market size to negotiate from a position of strength, potentially even joining or aligning with BRICS in some form. - For Europe, a potential path to resilience would involve shifting away from a mindset of subordination to the United States, pursuing energy diversification (including engaging with Russia for cheaper energy), and forming broader partnerships with China to balance relations with the United States and Russia. This would require political renewal in Europe and a willingness to depart from a “World War II–reboot” mentality toward a more pragmatic, multipolar strategy. - In closing, Wolff stresses that the West’s current trajectory is not inevitable. He envisions a Europe capable of redefining its alliances, reconsidering economic models, and seeking a more autonomous, multipolar future that reduces dependency on U.S. leadership. He ends with a provocative suggestion: Europe might consider a realignment toward Russia and China as a way to reshape global power balances, rather than defaulting to a perpetual U.S.-led order.

Speaker 0 introduces a myth that Trump waging war against Iran would close the Strait in a way that hurts China first, making Trump victorious, and asks for an answer to that perception. Speaker 1 argues that the perception isn't accurate, noting China has been building energy security for over twenty years. They travel to China frequently and see zero signs of energy scarcity; if there were any potential energy squeeze, it would be visible among the people and on social media, but it isn’t. He explains China’s energy composition is stable, and that even if Middle Eastern energy supplies were disrupted, China’s situation remains manageable. He states that China actually produces 30% of the crude oil it consumes domestically, so it does not import all its energy. Speaker 0 adds that people are often surprised by how much solar, wind, and hydropower China has, mentioning a special report noting that the aggregate annual terawatt-hours of output of China’s power grid is more than double the United States, and that this is growing rapidly. Speaker 1 confirms the rapid growth and attributes part of China’s diversification to the influence of Western financial practices, saying, “thanks to the Western banking cartel because they have been suppressing the price of silver to ridiculous low prices.” He claims China imports all the silver to manufacture solar panels, implying that by maintaining low silver prices, Western bankers have inadvertently helped China with energy diversification.

China’s accelerated AI progress is attributed to several factors. First, China leads the world in STEM graduates, producing far more STEM graduates annually than other countries. Second, the Chinese government’s long-term planning is emphasized, including “fourteenth consecutive five year plan,” where each five-year cycle sets national priorities and goals for the country. A prior example of this planning is described: the last five-year plan included increasing citizens’ life expectancy by one year. To pursue this, China focused on improving air quality through systematic steps such as changing factory practices, shifting electricity sources, and cleaning up urban air. The transcript contrasts earlier pollution levels—describing severe visibility issues in Shanghai—with later changes after the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010. It also states that the auto industry shifted from gas vehicles to electric vehicles, claiming that China is “60% electric vehicles,” which improved air quality and street conditions in major cities like Shanghai and Beijing. For the current next five-year plan, the transcript says AI is the top priority, with heavy investment. A strategic advantage is described as China’s access to tremendous amounts of data. The transcript links this to training large language models, saying more people inputting creates more data and allows faster development and more advanced AI. It also points to TikTok as an example, stating TikTok rose quickly because China had more pieces of content feeding the recommendation algorithm, resulting in a more curated, superior algorithm. The transcript claims this contributed to TikTok becoming more popular in the United States than Facebook or Instagram, especially among people under 30. The transcript further contrasts approaches between China and the United States. It says the United States emphasizes monetizing and maximizing profitability, while China developed “Deepseek,” described as completely open source, open to anyone, and developed for “a few million dollars.” It contrasts this with OpenAI, described as charging monthly fees for access and involving investments totaling “hundreds of billions of dollars.” It also claims Sam Altman indicated the model may become so important for the American economy that it might require a government bailout, and that the U.S. government should bail out OpenAI. The overall takeaway is that the transcript presents China as pushing innovation in AI and other industries, including “write videos.”

The speaker discusses who will lead the fourth industrial revolution and mentions the technological advancements made by China. They differentiate between state capitalism and shareholder capitalism, stating that state capitalism has short-term advantages due to its ability to mobilize resources. However, they believe that the future lies in a combination of stakeholder capitalism and social responsibility.

Professor Wang Wen discusses China’s de Americanization as a strategic response to shifts in global power and U.S. policy, not as an outright anti-American project. He outlines six fields of de Americanization that have evolved over seven to eight years: de Americanization of trade, de Americanization of finance, de Americanization of security, demarization of IT knowledge, demarization of high-tech, and demarization of education. He argues the strategy was not China’s initiative but was forced by the United States. Key motivations and timeline - Since China’s reform and opening, China sought a friendly relationship with the U.S., inviting American investment, expanding trade, and learning from American management and financial markets. By 2002–2016, about 20% of China’s trade depended on the United States. The U.S. containment policy, including the Trump administration’s trade war, Huawei actions, and sanctions on Chinese firms, prompted China to respond with countermeasures and adjustments. - A 2022 New York Times piece, cited by Wang, notes that Chinese people have awakened about U.S. hypocrisy and the dangers of relying on the United States. He even states that Trump’s actions educated Chinese perspectives on necessary countermeasures to defend core interests, framing de Americanization as a protective response rather than hostility. Global and economic consequences - Diversification of trade: since the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, China has deepened cooperation with the Global South. Trade with Russia, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has grown faster than with the United States. Five years ago, China–Russia trade was just over $100 billion; now it’s around $250 billion and could exceed $300 billion in five years. China–Latin America trade has surpassed $500 billion and may overtake the China–U.S. trade in the next five years. The U.S.–China trade volume is around $500 billion this year. - The result is a more balanced and secure global trade structure, with the U.S. remaining important but declining in China’s overall trade landscape. China views its “international price revolution” as raising the quality and affordability of goods for the Global South, such as EVs and solar energy products, enabling developing countries to access better products at similar prices. - The U.S. trade war is seen as less successful from China’s perspective because America’s share of China’s trade has fallen from about 20% to roughly 9%. Financial and monetary dimensions - In finance, China has faced over 2,000 U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms in the past seven years, which has spurred dedollarization and efforts to reform international payment systems. Wang argues that dollar hegemony harms the global system and predicts dedollarization and RMB internationalization will expand, with the dollar’s dominance continuing to wane by 2035 as more countries reduce dependence on U.S. currency. Technological rivalry - China’s rise as a technology power is framed as a normal, market-based competition. The U.S. should not weaponize financial or policy instruments to curb China’s development, nor should it fear fair competition. He notes that many foundational technologies (papermaking, the compass, gunpowder) originated in China, and today China builds on existing technologies, including AI and high-speed rail, while denying accusations of coercive theft. - The future of tech competition could benefit humanity if managed rationally, with multiple centers of innovation rather than a single hegemon. The U.S. concern about losing its lead is framed as a driver of misallocations and “malinvestments” in AI funding. Education and culture - Education is a key battleground in de Americanization. China aims to shift from dependence on U.S.-dominated knowledge systems to a normal, China-centered educational ecosystem with autonomous textbooks and disciplinary systems. Many Chinese students studied abroad, especially in the U.S., but a growing number now stay home or return after training. Wang highlights that more than 30% of Silicon Valley AI scientists hold undergraduate degrees from China, illustrating the reverse brain drain benefiting China. - The aim is not decoupling but a normal relationship with the U.S.—one in which China maintains its own knowledge system while continuing constructive cooperation where appropriate. Concluding metaphor - Wang uses the “normal neighbors” metaphor: the U.S. and China should avoid military conflict and embrace a functional, non-dependence-oriented, neighborly relationship rather than an unbalanced marriage, recognizing that diversification and multipolarity can strengthen global resilience. He also warns against color revolutions and NGO-driven civil-society manipulation, advocating for a Japan-like, balanced approach to democracy and civil society that respects national contexts.