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Glenn welcomes back Professor Michael Hudson to discuss the direction of civilization and how to assess civilizational decline through economic lenses. Hudson says he won’t remake his previous work The Destiny of Finance but will offer a sequel that revisits classical political economy and why it framed industrial capitalism. He emphasizes a distinction between the decline of an economy and the decline of an entire civilization. He describes a civilizational conflict between finance-led rentier capitalism in the West and the industrial capitalism with Chinese characteristics, noting that the latter mirrors early British, American, and German forms in its own way. The takeaway of industrial capitalism, he says, was to free the economy from feudal legacies—most notably hereditary landlord power—and to reduce three central rent-seeking blocks: landlords, monopolists, and bankers. Hudson recounts Ricardo’s 1817 warning that Britain’s industrial takeoff depended on cheap labor and the cost of subsistence, which was tied to food prices under the corn laws. Tariffs on food imports kept wages high, hindering investment by keeping costs high for employers. The landlords sought to protect rents; the fight for free trade (1815–1846) aimed to overcome landlord power and move toward a rent-reducing, production-focused economy. Ricardo’s labor theory of value held that value is produced by labor, but prices reflected rent and not true value; excess of price over value constituted economic rent, an unearned income. John Stuart Mill described rent as income earned in sleep. Classical economists saw economies as divided into a production sector and a rentier sector—where rent and credit relations acted as an overhead on the productive economy. The industrial project, they argued, was to align prices with real costs and minimize rents. Hudson argues that modern economies have shifted from industrial capitalism to finance capitalism, where rentier interests—banking, land rents, real estate, monopolies—back the financial sector and monopolies. Real estate endures as a transfer of wealth via debt-financed housing and commercial property; mortgage interest and fees become a form of rent. GDP growth increasingly reflects economic overhead and financial profits rather than productive output. The classical economists were opposed by late 19th-century rent-seeking forces: in the U.S., John Bates Clark; in Europe, Austrian School and utilitarian economists; all arguing against government intervention. Neoliberal reforms from Thatcher and Reagan onward privatized public infrastructure, supposedly increasing efficiency, but Hudson contends this raised costs (energy, water, rail) and deepened rentier power. Hudson contrasts the West’s rentier model with China and Russia, which pursue mixed economies with substantial public subsidies and government credit to support industry, wind energy, and infrastructure. He argues that China treats money as a public utility and uses credit to finance real construction rather than corporate takeovers, enabling broader growth. He asserts that Europe’s elites have pushed privatization and energy dependence on the United States, undermining European industry and security. He claims the U.S. uses NATO to constrain Europe and allies with sanctions and energy dependence, while Russia and China diversify from Western finance and technology to strengthen their own systems. The discussion then turns to ancient precedents: debt cancellation and land redistribution in Hammurabi’s Babylon, Egypt, and Judea’s Levitical laws, as examples of civilizations resetting rent and debt to maintain public legitimacy. Hudson argues that civilizations tend to polarize as wealth concentrates, and debt cancellation was a recurring tool to prevent oligarchic domination. He links this to modern-day neoliberalism, which denies rent and unearned income, presenting rentier gains as productive growth. He concludes that China’s approach—public-directed money and credit, mixed with private enterprise—reflects the civilization he believes resilient, whereas Western neoliberalism allows rentier control to dominate policy. Glenn thanks Hudson for the thorough, provocative explanation and notes the value of understanding rent seeking. Hudson highlights his works on rent, including an audiobook version of Super Imperialism, and contends that economics today often uses a deceptive vocabulary that obscures rentier dynamics. Glenn concludes, praising the discussion and noting links to Hudson’s books and website.

There are many smart, hardworking people in China, with impressive architecture like train stations and high-speed rail. The buildings in Shanghai and Beijing, as well as the terracotta warriors in Xi'an, are more impressive than in the US.

Sean Rein, author and founder/managing director of the China Market Research Group, discusses China’s current dynamics, opportunities, and global context with Glenn. Rein argues that China in 2026 is fundamentally different from China in 2016, with real estate, consumer confidence, and demographics as central challenges, but also with strong opportunities driven by indigenous innovation and a rapid reorientation toward self-reliance. On current challenges, Rein highlights real estate weakness as the primary concern: housing prices in top cities have fallen 30–40%, with slower property turnover and anemic transaction volumes. He distinguishes China’s situation from a US-style financial crisis, noting most homeowners have substantial mortgage equity (50–100% down) so there is no systemic panic selling. The result is stagnation rather than collapse, with consumer anxiety suppressing spending and delaying entrepreneurship. This consumer reticence, compounded by a large household savings stock (~$20 trillion) and a shrinking willingness to spend, threatens longer-term demographic goals (lower birth rates, delayed or avoided marriage) and complicates future growth. On opportunities, Rein emphasizes China’s shift toward indigenous innovation and self-reliance, a pivot that began under the Trump era’s sanctions regime and has intensified since. He argues that Chinese companies are now prioritizing technology—AI, semiconductors, NEVs, and broader green tech—alongside agriculture and food supply diversification (beef, soybeans, blueberries) to reduce exposure to Western import controls. He notes that Western observers often misread China’s trajectory due to outdated information from observers who left China years ago. He cites strong performance in Chinese equities (second-best global performance after Korea, up ~30% in a recent period) and asserts that Chinese tech firms (e.g., Alibaba, Baidu) are rapidly advancing, challenging passive stereotypes of China as merely a copycat. Rein also contends that China’s universities and talent pools are rising in global rankings, and that China’s approach to innovation now blends capital, government support, engineering talent, and an ecosystem that can outpace Western models that rely more on venture capital dynamics. On geopolitics and global leadership, Rein argues China is a natural partner with the United States, more so than with Russia, and that Western framing of China as an adversary is outdated. He contends that China’s strategy includes self-reliance in critical tech and a diversified supply chain—reducing vulnerability to sanction regimes by building internal capabilities and alternate sources. In energy and resources, China remains dependent on imports for oil (notably Iran as a major supplier) and is actively expanding renewables (wind, solar) and nuclear power, while securing strategic reserves to stabilize prices. He notes Europe as a potential beneficiary if it pursues reciprocity and deeper integration with Chinese markets, suggesting joint ventures and non-tariff barriers to ensure fair access for European firms, and criticizing European policymakers for hampering Chinese investment and technology transfer. On the US-China trade war, Rein calls tariffs a total failure overall, citing sectoral shifts in sourcing (China-plus-one strategies) but noting that costs often remain lower with Chinese imports due to tariff carve-outs and exceptions. He emphasizes that global supply chains have adapted to diversify away from single sources (China, the US, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, Vietnam), but asserts China still holds disproportionate leverage in critical areas like rare earths, refining, and certain energy and mineral markets. He argues that America’s coercive tools have backfired in many respects, and that Europe’s leverage lies in pragmatic, reciprocal relationships with both powers. Near-term outlook, Rein expects China to continue focusing on raising the quality of life for the large middle and lower-middle class, expanding access to health care and education, and creating a moderately prosperous society. He suggests that true wealth creation in China will come from within the middle 80–90% of the population, while a comparatively smaller elite may see gains in education and health services. He also notes that for individuals seeking the most dramatic financial upside, the United States (e.g., Austin, Silicon Valley) remains a more fertile landscape. As for his personal work, Rein promotes his book, The Finding the Opportunities in China and the New World Order, and mentions active presence on Twitter and LinkedIn, with possible future podcasting.

In this video, Ben Norton discusses various aspects of China's development and its pursuit of sovereignty. He highlights China's remarkable economic growth and development, emphasizing its focus on technological, economic, and food sovereignty. Norton explains how China has reduced its dependence on Western corporations by developing its own social media platforms, payment systems, maps, and hardware. He also acknowledges China's efforts to transition to renewable energy and strengthen food production. Despite challenges such as debt and inequality, Norton argues that the Chinese government is actively working to address these issues. He further contrasts China's approach to combat inequality and promote common prosperity with Western governments that are controlled by wealthy oligarchs and corporations. Norton also mentions China's interest in international trade while facing challenges in transitioning its economy towards internal consumption. Overall, he highlights China's pursuit of sovereignty and its impact on various aspects of its development.

The Chinese government is investing heavily in critical technologies, including nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles, surprising US intelligence. China's state-backed system supports everything from rocket launch systems to AI, with massive R&D spending that allows for numerous failures without financial repercussions. The speaker suggests the US should shift its funding approach, arguing against small business innovation research grants (SBIRs). Venture capital is now interested in high-risk ventures, offering better incentive alignment. The speaker believes the US competitive ecosystem is more efficient than China's massive spending approach. By funding the right companies with true technology and capable founders, large companies will emerge that solve real problems for the Department of Defense.

China dominates global manufacturing with approximately 33% of the world's total output, surpassing the combined manufacturing of the United States, Europe, and Japan. Their manufacturing is cost-effective, and they integrate chips into their processes. China leads in the practical application of chips and robotics, connecting thought with automated systems. Different regions will lead in different sectors, creating global competition. This will lead to protectionist measures, as countries navigate these disparities; this is the reality of the global landscape.

Mario: Markets crash every time there's talk of a trade war between The US and China. The world is waiting to see what happens between China and Taiwan. Will China invade? What will The US do? Today I spoke with professor Yasheng Huang. He was born in China; his father and grandfather were in the CCP; he is now a professor in the US after Harvard. We discuss the real economic situation in China, how a trade war would look over the next two to three years, and whether China will invade Taiwan. Mario: How are you, professor? Yasheng Huang: The official rationale is that it is not an export ban. It is a form of export control in which those who use the rare earth process in China are required to submit applications for using the Chinese rare earth process. If fully implemented, this would send shock waves globally because every electronic production uses rare earths. The threshold is set so low that virtually everybody has to submit an application. Civilian usages are claimed to be okay, but defense-related usages will be scrutinized or prohibited. The definition of civilian vs. defense-related usage is unclear. The missiles the US is supplying Ukraine, air defense systems for Israel and other allies, and equipment for Taiwan all require rare earths and magnets, of which China supplies a large majority. Mario: What would be the impact on The US if China proceeds with these restrictions? Yasheng Huang: It would amount to a sudden stop in the production of equipment and devices globally because rare earths are used universally in electronic production, from phones to computers. It’s not a sharp division between civilian and defense uses; the impact would be broad and significant, not well targeted. Mario: The timeline includes US fentanyl tariffs, a Geneva truce, halting five-nanometer chip exports, and later allowing seven-nanometer chips with limitations. Then China announced the rare earth move. Why did China take this step, and what is the strategy behind it? Yasheng Huang: The timeline is broadly correct, with mid-September adding US docking and stocking fees on Chinese ships. The rare earth move is not targeted specifically at the US; it targets any user of Chinese-processed rare earths. It appears aimed at pressuring ahead of a potential Xi-Trump summit later this month in South Korea. It’s a high-pressure tactic that may overplay their hand, given weaknesses in US agriculture exports and farmer distress. The move likely seeks to leverage leverage ahead of the summit, but it is not well tailored as a bargaining chip. Mario: It seems China is fighting the US more than most other countries. Do you think they overplayed their hand? Yasheng Huang: The rare earth export control is not tailored to the US and could prompt others to build processing capacity elsewhere, reducing China’s long-term leverage. In the short run, China has substantial bargaining power, given the short-term constraints in the US economy, inflation, and supply chains, but long-term effects include diversification of processing capacity by others, including Japan and Europe. The situation resembles Apple diversifying production after zero-COVID controls, which reduces reliance on China over time, though it takes years. Mario: Let’s discuss the economy. Some say China’s economy is weak now, with debt rising and productivity declining, though growth remains around 5%. How do you assess China’s economic health? Yasheng Huang: There’s a distinction between growth and productivity. Past predictions of collapse were wrong, but today China experiences economic strains. The debt-to-GDP ratio has risen since 2008, and incremental capital to output required for each percent of growth has increased. Productivity numbers trend downward; there is a large amount of waste in the economy—unwanted goods sitting in warehouses, overbuilding in housing, and high logistical costs. The academic view emphasizes that aggregate total factor productivity is negative, meaning inefficiencies outweigh gains from new infrastructure and devices. The result is an economy that is growing, but less efficiently, with structural strains. Mario: The debate around democracy vs. autocracy comes up here. Could you comment on the Chinese model and the contrast with democracy? Yasheng Huang: There is a distinction between ideal democracy and how it is implemented. The US system has flaws—senate gerrymandering, the electoral college, and political money influence—but China’s autocracy is not the sole driver of growth. Historical comparisons show that once China opened up under Deng Xiaoping, growth accelerated, and regions with less central control grew faster. Autocracy alone does not guarantee growth; in fact, per-capita income growth was higher in some less centralized regions during earlier reform periods. In this sense, the correlation between openness and growth is nuanced. The Chinese economy has benefited from less autocratic periods, and the long-term sustainability depends on governance and openness rather than simply the political system. Mario: And Trump’s strategy toward China? Yasheng Huang: The Trump administration elevated the prestige and legitimacy of autocratic leaders globally, but long-term economic balancing depends on how others respond. Europe may move closer to China if China’s Ukraine policy shifts, and if China revises its stance on Ukraine. European leaders see Trump as transactional and pursue pragmatic deals to safeguard economic interests. The global balance depends on actions by China and other nations, not only on US policy. Trump’s approach has created a shifting geopolitical landscape that could influence future alignments. Mario: Professor, this has been an incredible conversation. Thank you for explaining the trade war dynamics, rare earth restrictions, and the US-China strategic posture. Yasheng Huang: I enjoyed talking with you, Mario.

The speaker discusses the challenges faced by the younger generation in the US due to economic crises, lack of political representation, and declining living standards. They contrast the US system with China's socialist model, emphasizing China's progress in green technologies. The speaker criticizes the US media bias, political corruption, and lack of real democracy. They highlight China's peaceful development, integration of Marxism with its culture, and historical tradition of fighting for rights. The speaker suggests that other countries can learn from China's approach.

The good news is that the underdeveloped countries can escape this trap. China, for example, is a paragon of this transformation. Before China, the Asian Tigers provided the playbook that is centered around manufacturing, FDI and exports. While the China model is hard for other countries to replicate, the fundamental secrets to development are not hard to understand. It's about holistic and incremental progress in a myriad of areas. Basic infrastructure such as electricity, roads, highways and railways, schools and colleges to create a skilled workforce, modernization to increase productivity, sound monetary and fiscal policies, as well as the rule of law and a stable political environment. And all these must be done in a sustainable way.

First speaker notes that China is a reascending power, not a rising one, pointing out that from 1500 to now China had the world’s largest GDP 70% of those years. He suggests that Confucian thinking underpins China’s view of reasserting long-standing dominance, and explains the blending of public-private partnerships and the role of organizations that backstop private companies in China. He describes China’s capital allocation as both rigid and flexible. The process starts with Xi Jinping and his close circle drafting priorities, including involvement in the five-year plan. The plan moves from a small central group to the Politburo, then to the provinces and finally to the prefectures. He explains it as a cascading set of venture capitalists operating against national priorities, with provinces and local actors rewarded for aligning capital and labor with those priorities. The result is an ecosystem where hundreds of venture capitalists coordinate human capital across regions to advance targeted goals, producing major companies such as BYD and Xiaomi. Second speaker adds that China maintains a five-year plans for every industry, detailing forecasts not just for catching up but for what is possible. This framework drives innovation across sectors, including nuclear power, and supports the notion that China is charting new avenues of development. He reiterates that the country is returning to a position it has long held rather than pursuing a status as the world’s largest economy, emphasizing a national-pride motivation amid different governance structures. Third speaker emphasizes the historical perspective, noting how remarkable it is that China held the world’s largest GDP 70% of the years since 1500. He reflects on how technological innovations, such as ship technology, have driven great empires, with China repeatedly on the heels of such shifts. He suggests that this may be China’s moment of resurgence across the board. The discussion also cites Lee Kuan Yew’s foresight, as highlighted by a work by Graham Allison and related quotes: China is not just another big player, but the biggest player in the history of the world, and China’s displacement of the world balance requires the world to find a new equilibrium. The dialogue ties this historic perspective to the idea that China’s current reemergence is both a continuation of a long pattern and a contemporary strategic effort guided by centralized planning and broad industry-wide five-year frameworks.

Speaker 0 argues that the United States has underestimated China's power across infrastructure, technology, and strategic planning. He notes the quality of Chinese infrastructure, citing high-speed trains that connect Beijing to Shanghai in four and a half hours over about 1,000 kilometers, comparing that favorably to Amtrak in the United States. Infrastructure strength is identified as a core strength, followed by China’s scientific and technological capacity, which he calls “the coin of the realm in our decade, in the next few decades.” He asks which society will turn out more scientists and engineers, presenting data to illustrate China’s lead: 34% of first-year Chinese university students study engineering or a STEM field, compared with 5.6% in the United States, noting China’s larger population. He references Harvard, where he teaches, observing that at graduation, chemistry, biology, and physics majors are largely Asian Americans, or more specifically Asians or citizens of Asian ethnicity, indicating a STEM-dominated profile among graduates. The speaker then points to the Trump administration’s gathering of tech titans at the White House, noting that a tremendous number of those tech leaders are Indian Americans and Chinese Americans, implying China’s tech influence extends into American leadership and industry. Addressing national security, he contends that the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) and China's overall power have been underestimated. He argues that the Communist Party of China (CPC) is strategic and unencumbered by free press constraints, allowing it to make long-term bets over decades (ten, twenty, thirty years) without the friction of media opposition. A specific strategic pattern is highlighted: for thirty-five consecutive years, the Chinese foreign minister’s first trip of the year has been to Africa in January to signal Africa as a priority. He contrasts this with U.S. presidents: President Trump did not visit Africa in his first term, while President Biden visited Angola for two or three days toward the end of his term. The speaker uses these examples to illustrate China’s consistent, long-term, strategic focus on Africa and broader global influence. Overall, he concludes that China’s technology, military, and economic power are stronger than commonly perceived, and that the United States must recognize this and adjust accordingly, as he asserts that underestimation is no longer viable.

We have underestimated Chinese power in the world. The trains are fabulous: Beijing to Shanghai in four and a half hours, roughly a thousand kilometers, unlike Amtrak’s typical long-haul experiences. The infrastructure strength is one key advantage. A second is their scientific and technological capacity, which is crucial for the coming decades. The question is: which society will turn out more scientists and engineers? A data point: 34% of first-year students in Chinese universities study engineering or a STEM field, while the United States is at 5.6%. And they are a much bigger country. At Harvard graduation, when we ask our graduate students to stand up as a class, chemistry majors, biology majors, physics majors largely consist of Asian Americans, or Americans of Asian ethnicity, or Chinese American citizens. Last week, when President Trump gathered all the tech titans of the United States in the White House, a tremendous number of those tech titans are Indian Americans and Chinese Americans. We’re not competing when it really matters for the future, and that’s on technology. The PLA, some have said, well, it hasn’t fought since 1978. What is it worth? I’ve seen the PLA and I think we’ve underestimated their military strength and their technology strength. And one other thing: the Communist Party of China is strategic, and they don’t have to worry about what the press says. That can be a good thing to have the press challenging the government, but they have nobody opposing them, so they can make big bets over ten, twenty, thirty years. Mary and I were mentioning one of them. For thirty-five consecutive years, the Chinese foreign minister, whoever that person is, has made his first trip of the year in January to Africa to show the Africans you are our priority. I think President Trump never went to Africa in his first term. President Biden went once to Angola for two or three days at the end of his term, just before he resigned. They’re strategic, and we’re not competing on that level. So, actually, I think the Chinese in technology, military, and economics are stronger than we think they are, and we’ve underestimated them, and we can’t do that any longer.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the future of the West, NATO, Europe, and the international economic system. - The central dynamic, according to Wolff, is the rise of China and the West’s unpreparedness. He argues that the West, after a long era of Cold War dominance, is encountering a China that grows two to three times faster than the United States, with no sign of slowing. China’s ascent has transformed global power relations and exposed that prior strategies to stop or slow China have failed. - The United States, having defeated various historical rivals, pursued a unipolar, neoliberal globalization project after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of that era left the U.S. with a sense of “manifest destiny” to shape the world order. But now time is on China’s side, and the short-term fix for the U.S. is to extract value from its allies rather than invest in long-run geopolitics. Wolff contends the U.S. is engaging in a transactional, extractive approach toward Europe and other partners, pressuring them to concede significant economic and strategic concessions. - Europe is seen by Wolff as increasingly subordinated to U.S. interests, with its leadership willing to accept terrible trade terms and militarization demands to maintain alignment with Washington. He cites the possibility of Europe accepting LNG imports and investments to the U.S. economy at the expense of its own social welfare, suggesting that Europe’s social protections could be jeopardized by this “divorce settlement” with the United States. - Russia’s role is reinterpreted: while U.S. and European actors have pursued expanding NATO and a Western-led security architecture, Russia’s move toward Greater Eurasia and its pivot to the East, particularly under Putin, complicates Western plans. Wolff argues that the West’s emphasis on demonizing Russia as the unifying threat ignores the broader strategic competition with China and risks pushing Europe toward greater autonomy or alignment with Russia and China. - The rise of BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are framed as major competitive challenges to Western economic primacy. The West’s failure to integrate and adapt to these shifts is seen as a strategic misstep, especially given Russia’s earlier openness to a pan-European security framework that was rejected in favor of a U.S.-led order. - Within the United States, there is a debate about the proper response to these shifts. One faction desires aggressive actions, including potential wars (e.g., Iran) to deter adversaries, while another emphasizes the dangers of escalation in a nuclear age. Wolff notes that Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of muscular interventions, and he points to domestic economic discontent—rising inequality, labor unrest, and a growing desire for systemic change—as factors that could press the United States to rethink its approach to global leadership. - Economically, Wolff challenges the dichotomy of public versus private dominance. He highlights China’s pragmatic hybrid model—roughly 50/50 private and state enterprise, with openness to foreign participation yet strong state direction. He argues that the fixation on choosing between private-market and public-control models is misguided and that outcomes matter more than orthodox ideological labels. - Looking ahead, Wolff is optimistic that Western economies could reframe development by learning from China’s approach, embracing a more integrated strategy that blends public and private efforts, and reducing ideological rigidity. He suggests Europe could reposition itself by deepening ties with China and leveraging its own market size to negotiate from a position of strength, potentially even joining or aligning with BRICS in some form. - For Europe, a potential path to resilience would involve shifting away from a mindset of subordination to the United States, pursuing energy diversification (including engaging with Russia for cheaper energy), and forming broader partnerships with China to balance relations with the United States and Russia. This would require political renewal in Europe and a willingness to depart from a “World War II–reboot” mentality toward a more pragmatic, multipolar strategy. - In closing, Wolff stresses that the West’s current trajectory is not inevitable. He envisions a Europe capable of redefining its alliances, reconsidering economic models, and seeking a more autonomous, multipolar future that reduces dependency on U.S. leadership. He ends with a provocative suggestion: Europe might consider a realignment toward Russia and China as a way to reshape global power balances, rather than defaulting to a perpetual U.S.-led order.

The speaker discusses who will lead the fourth industrial revolution and mentions the technological advancements made by China. They differentiate between state capitalism and shareholder capitalism, stating that state capitalism has short-term advantages due to its ability to mobilize resources. However, they believe that the future lies in a combination of stakeholder capitalism and social responsibility.

Professor Wang Wen discusses China’s de Americanization as a strategic response to shifts in global power and U.S. policy, not as an outright anti-American project. He outlines six fields of de Americanization that have evolved over seven to eight years: de Americanization of trade, de Americanization of finance, de Americanization of security, demarization of IT knowledge, demarization of high-tech, and demarization of education. He argues the strategy was not China’s initiative but was forced by the United States. Key motivations and timeline - Since China’s reform and opening, China sought a friendly relationship with the U.S., inviting American investment, expanding trade, and learning from American management and financial markets. By 2002–2016, about 20% of China’s trade depended on the United States. The U.S. containment policy, including the Trump administration’s trade war, Huawei actions, and sanctions on Chinese firms, prompted China to respond with countermeasures and adjustments. - A 2022 New York Times piece, cited by Wang, notes that Chinese people have awakened about U.S. hypocrisy and the dangers of relying on the United States. He even states that Trump’s actions educated Chinese perspectives on necessary countermeasures to defend core interests, framing de Americanization as a protective response rather than hostility. Global and economic consequences - Diversification of trade: since the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, China has deepened cooperation with the Global South. Trade with Russia, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has grown faster than with the United States. Five years ago, China–Russia trade was just over $100 billion; now it’s around $250 billion and could exceed $300 billion in five years. China–Latin America trade has surpassed $500 billion and may overtake the China–U.S. trade in the next five years. The U.S.–China trade volume is around $500 billion this year. - The result is a more balanced and secure global trade structure, with the U.S. remaining important but declining in China’s overall trade landscape. China views its “international price revolution” as raising the quality and affordability of goods for the Global South, such as EVs and solar energy products, enabling developing countries to access better products at similar prices. - The U.S. trade war is seen as less successful from China’s perspective because America’s share of China’s trade has fallen from about 20% to roughly 9%. Financial and monetary dimensions - In finance, China has faced over 2,000 U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms in the past seven years, which has spurred dedollarization and efforts to reform international payment systems. Wang argues that dollar hegemony harms the global system and predicts dedollarization and RMB internationalization will expand, with the dollar’s dominance continuing to wane by 2035 as more countries reduce dependence on U.S. currency. Technological rivalry - China’s rise as a technology power is framed as a normal, market-based competition. The U.S. should not weaponize financial or policy instruments to curb China’s development, nor should it fear fair competition. He notes that many foundational technologies (papermaking, the compass, gunpowder) originated in China, and today China builds on existing technologies, including AI and high-speed rail, while denying accusations of coercive theft. - The future of tech competition could benefit humanity if managed rationally, with multiple centers of innovation rather than a single hegemon. The U.S. concern about losing its lead is framed as a driver of misallocations and “malinvestments” in AI funding. Education and culture - Education is a key battleground in de Americanization. China aims to shift from dependence on U.S.-dominated knowledge systems to a normal, China-centered educational ecosystem with autonomous textbooks and disciplinary systems. Many Chinese students studied abroad, especially in the U.S., but a growing number now stay home or return after training. Wang highlights that more than 30% of Silicon Valley AI scientists hold undergraduate degrees from China, illustrating the reverse brain drain benefiting China. - The aim is not decoupling but a normal relationship with the U.S.—one in which China maintains its own knowledge system while continuing constructive cooperation where appropriate. Concluding metaphor - Wang uses the “normal neighbors” metaphor: the U.S. and China should avoid military conflict and embrace a functional, non-dependence-oriented, neighborly relationship rather than an unbalanced marriage, recognizing that diversification and multipolarity can strengthen global resilience. He also warns against color revolutions and NGO-driven civil-society manipulation, advocating for a Japan-like, balanced approach to democracy and civil society that respects national contexts.