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In this video, the speaker discusses the importance of securing election systems. They highlight the risk of connecting these systems to the internet, as it can make them vulnerable to hacking. The speaker suggests that using paper ballots might be a smarter option, as they cannot be hacked like computer systems. By having something tangible to hold on to, like a piece of paper, we can ensure the integrity of the election process.

A senate report revealed that voting machines are aging and vulnerable to exploitation. A hacker demonstrated how easy it is to gain full admin access to a model used in 18 states. Professor Ed Felton documented how unattended voting machines can be manipulated by anyone. Additionally, some machines that claim not to be connected to the internet actually are, while others use cards programmed on internet-connected computers. In summary, all voting machines can be tampered with in some way. As an axe murderer once said, "pretty much everything is hackable."

Concerns about election integrity are valid. Historically, Democrats have questioned election outcomes, such as in 2001 and 2004, without facing accusations of unpatriotism. It's essential to focus on the safeguards in place to prevent election tampering rather than getting angry at those who raise concerns. We have the technology to ensure accuracy, as seen with ATM machines and other systems that function reliably. To enhance election security, we should implement measures like paper ballots for verification. The conversation should center on improving the electoral process rather than debating whether specific elections were hacked.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

The speaker states they are investigating dangerous and negative consequences with the "best of the best." They claim electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and open to exploitation, allowing manipulation of vote results. This vulnerability purportedly reinforces the need for paper ballots nationwide, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

Voting machines in the U.S. are highly vulnerable to hacking, with researchers demonstrating that even those with limited skills can breach them quickly. Many machines are outdated, using unsupported software, and some states lack adequate paper trails for verification. Remote access software on machines increases risks, and several states have been hacked without detection. The use of cellular modems for transmitting results further exposes systems to cyber threats. Election management systems, often connected to the internet, can be compromised, allowing attackers to manipulate vote tallies. Despite assurances from vendors, the reality is that many machines can be hacked, raising serious concerns about election integrity in close contests. The lack of forensic evidence makes it difficult to confirm whether votes have been altered, leaving the electoral process at risk.

The speaker, a computer science professor, warns that the electronic voting systems used in the US are vulnerable to sabotage and cyber attacks that can change votes. Through their research, they have repeatedly hacked voting machines and found ways for attackers to manipulate them. They emphasize that these vulnerabilities are within reach for America's enemies. While some states have secure voting technology, others are alarmingly vulnerable, putting the entire nation at risk. The speaker debunks the belief that voting machines are secure because they are not connected to the internet, explaining that many machines have wireless modems for faster result uploading. They conclude that it is only a matter of time before these vulnerabilities are exploited.

At the University of Michigan, we may not have the capability to manipulate paper ballots across multiple states to alter the presidential election. However, I believe that my undergraduate security course could have influenced the outcome of this year's election. The situation is extremely concerning. Thank you.

In this video, the speaker discusses the importance of securing election systems. They highlight the risk of connecting these systems to the internet, as it can make them vulnerable to hacking. The speaker suggests that using paper ballots might be a smarter option, as they cannot be hacked like computer systems. By having something tangible to hold on to, like a piece of paper, it becomes more difficult for entities like Russia to interfere with the election process.

Virginia stopped using touchscreen voting machines due to vulnerabilities. Voting machines across the US are at risk of being hacked. In Georgia and Texas, votes were deleted or switched in 2018. The biggest voting machine seller violated cybersecurity practices. Many states have outdated, vulnerable machines. Hackers can easily breach voting machines, potentially altering election results. The lack of paper trails in some states raises concerns about election legitimacy. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them susceptible to cyber attacks. The vulnerability of voting machines poses a threat to the integrity of elections. Stalin emphasized the importance of who counts votes. It is crucial to secure the future of elections and upgrade outdated systems to prevent interference.

Our current voting systems are complicated and messy. Votes are not reconciled and verified at the precinct level in many states. Instead, they are sent to third party entities or counted at centralized locations without public oversight. Mail-in ballots are not secure and can lead to fraud. We need to return to hand counting at the precinct level to ensure accurate accounting and transparency. This system worked for years before 2000 and is still used in France because it is secure. Our current system invites fraud and distrust, so we must act now to restore faith in our elections. Demand hand counting at the precinct level to stop fraud and build back trust in our elections.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

For the safety and security of our nation, we should switch to paper ballots, which cost only 8% of what machines cost. These paper ballots should be watermarked to prevent cheating. Along with paper ballots, we need same-day voting, voter ID, and proof of citizenship. Some states take weeks to finish counting votes, and in a close election, this delay is unacceptable. With paper ballots, everyone would know the results by 10 PM. I asked Elon Musk about voting systems, and he said computers aren't suitable for voting due to too many transactions happening too quickly. The most secure and fastest way to secure elections is with paper ballots. France used mail-in ballots but switched back to paper ballots and had their election results by 10:05 PM with no complaints. We're one of the only countries with mail-in voting.

The majority of election jurisdictions in the US use outdated software that is vulnerable to hacking. States like Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, North Carolina, and even Georgia (despite recent legislation) are at risk. If a small percentage determines the election outcome and people perceive it as unfair, it could seriously damage our democratic system. Experts argue that without a thorough forensic analysis, it is impossible to confirm that no votes were altered in the 2016 election. Additionally, 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some companies refuse to disclose their cybersecurity practices. Five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the accuracy of voting machine results.

Our democracy is at stake, and that is a valid concern. I don't have time for Parlor.

I'm embarrassed that the US can't get its presidential election right. We should not accept this. In some states, there are more dead voters than soldiers buried on historic battlefields. We did not have a free, fair, and transparent vote on November 3rd. Everyone knows who won the election: Donald Trump.

The speaker states that the best investigators are pursuing election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and can be exploited to manipulate vote results. This vulnerability allegedly drives the mandate to implement paper ballots across the country, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

As a computer scientist specializing in election system security, I want to highlight the vulnerabilities in computerized voting equipment used in polling places. These systems can be easily compromised, allowing corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to disrupt elections and potentially alter vote tallies without detection. The poor design and implementation by equipment vendors contribute to these vulnerabilities. Additionally, voter registration databases and systems reporting final results are attractive targets for disruption, with even fewer standards for securing them. It is unrealistic to expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services. We need to address these issues to ensure the integrity of our elections.

- "The electoral systems of The United States can be manipulated by foreign agents or third parties." - "Are you in danger, physical danger, if your true identity is known?" - "Yes." - "We configured the transmission systems and the tally systems." - "I was the national coordinator for voting machines." - "You examined the forensic image of the election management server, that was used in the Mesa County twenty twenty election." - "In the case of Mesa, Colorado, all evidence, all log, all of that was deleted." - "We saw both images, the old one and the new one." - "And the structure changed, the structure of the program changed as compared to the version 5.5." - "Whoever gave the authorization for the system to be updated would be the person responsible for all the files that were deleted." - "It's easy to rig an election with it, and it's hard to audit."

The speaker claims that the public is being deceived about election security. They argue that while individual voting machines may not be connected to the internet, state and county databases are. They allege that votes are stored on a server in Frankfurt, Germany, and that the election software used in 28 states may be infected with malware called Q Snatch. Cybersecurity investigators suggest that this malware could allow hackers to manipulate votes in election databases nationwide. The cofounder of Allied Security Operations supports these claims, stating that the malware collects credentials and enables changes to be made to votes at various stages of the election process. The speaker suggests that this could explain the malicious activities observed during the election.

I'm embarrassed that the US presidential election wasn't conducted properly. We had more dead voters than soldiers buried in historic battlefields. The election on November 3rd was not free, fair, or transparent. Everyone knows that Donald Trump won.

The speaker states that there is no dispute: the conduct of our elections, the way government comes into power, is a national security issue, and the security of our elections is incredibly important. The speaker says they are comforted as a citizen and as someone at the Department of Justice by the fact that national security eyes are on this, as well as criminal and civil rights review. They add that, at the end of the day, as a voter themselves and someone involved in politics before taking the job, they like every citizen to vote. They note that a lot of people don’t vote, don’t have confidence, and don’t care. It is important that people have confidence in, accept the outcome of the elections, and also be more likely to vote. The speaker concludes that this is a very good thing, whoever they’re voting for.

The speaker states that the "best of the best" are investigating election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers and exploitation, allowing for the manipulation of vote results. This allegedly supports the mandate to implement paper ballots nationwide, with the goal of restoring voters' faith in election integrity.

I was told by real pollsters that if we reached 66 million votes, we couldn't lose. But we surpassed that with 75 million votes, yet they say we lost. Does anyone believe Joe got 80 million votes? It's a disgrace. Even 3rd world countries have more honest elections. Last night was chaotic, with people running around and confusion everywhere. We won't allow them to silence us.