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Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, and it's important to assess all voting machines for security. Researchers have shown that voting systems can be tampered with, even by hackers with limited resources. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software. These machines are easily hackable, and three companies control most of them. Many states have outdated and vulnerable machines. Over 40% of American voters use machines with serious security flaws. Aging systems rely on unsupported software and are susceptible to cyber attacks. The risk of foreign interference in elections is high. It is crucial to upgrade election systems and ensure integrity.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of voting machines across the country. Researchers have shown that voting systems can be tampered with, and hackers with limited resources can breach machines in minutes. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to hacking. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Many states have outdated and vulnerable machines, and some lack backup paper ballots. The machines often run on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. The use of modems in voting machines also poses a risk, as they can be connected to the internet. The lack of forensic evidence and audit trails further undermines the security of the machines. The vulnerabilities in the voting system could lead to a compromised election and a loss of faith in the democratic process.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of voting machines across the country. Researchers have demonstrated that these machines can be easily tampered with and hacked. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to fraud and hacking. There are concerns about the use of modems in voting machines, as they can be connected to the internet and pose a risk. Outdated software and lack of paper trails also contribute to the vulnerability of the voting systems. The potential for hacking and interference in elections is a significant concern, and the need for secure and updated voting systems is crucial.

Jen Easterly, director of the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, asserts that foreign adversaries cannot change US election results. While it's difficult to claim anything is impossible, the built-in checks and balances make it highly unlikely. The resilience of the voting system, including oversight from both parties and the use of paper ballots for audits, enhances integrity. Despite concerns about misinformation, the US election infrastructure is robust and secure. Voting machines are not connected to the Internet, and state and local officials continuously work to improve security. The dedication of these officials ensures that the election process remains fair, accurate, and trustworthy, deserving our gratitude for their ongoing efforts.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

A bill exists that would require states to upgrade their elections infrastructure. The best and most secure way to conduct voting is with paper ballots. Russia can't hack a piece of paper. It would be beneficial if the Republican leader would put these bills on the floor for a vote.

We do not view this situation as a full security threat to the state. The actions of our office did not pose an insider threat to elections. In 2021, when Mesa County's voting system passwords leaked, we acknowledged that it was a serious breach of security protocols. However, that incident involved unauthorized access and occurred in a different context. Since then, our security measures have significantly improved, including 24/7 surveillance and enhanced access controls. The laws governing these protocols have also been strengthened. We have implemented multiple layers of security to prevent incidents like Mesa County from happening again, and that is not the case here.

Voting machines remain highly vulnerable to tampering, as researchers have shown. Even those with limited skills can breach these systems quickly. In 2018, machines in Georgia and Texas were reported to have deleted or switched votes. Major manufacturers are compromising security by recommending remote access software, making machines targets for hackers. Many states still use outdated machines that are easy to hack, with 43% of American voters relying on systems known to have serious security flaws. Demonstrations have shown how easily these machines can be compromised. Additionally, aging systems often run unsupported software, increasing their susceptibility to cyber attacks. A successful hack could significantly impact close elections by targeting key swing states or counties. Concerns about potential breaches are growing.

Voting systems are designed to be closed systems without internet connectivity or external devices. Dominion, the company mentioned, does not have any remote access to the equipment or machines. No one has access to the information on the machines remotely.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of voting machines across the country. Researchers have demonstrated that these machines can be easily tampered with, and hackers with limited resources can breach them in minutes. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to fraud and hacking. Additionally, many states have outdated and vulnerable machines, and some lack backup paper ballots. The use of modems in voting machines also poses a risk, as they can be connected to the internet and hacked. The overall consensus is that the current voting systems are insecure and vulnerable to manipulation.

Voting systems are designed as closed systems without any Internet connectivity or external access. They are not meant to connect to the outside world in any way. Is there any remote access to the information on the equipment or within the machines? No, there is no remote access. Does anyone have access, to the best of your knowledge? No, no one has access.

Election machines are not connected to the Internet. Certification processes, beginning at the federal level, mandate that election systems operate in a closed, air-gapped system with no Internet connection.

The machines used in the election are tested by Maricopa County and the Secretary of State's office to ensure there is no tampering. If the machines fail these tests, they cannot be used.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of all voting machines. Researchers have shown that voting systems can be tampered with, and hackers with limited resources can breach machines in minutes. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to hacking. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Many states have outdated and vulnerable machines, and unsupported software increases the risk of cyber attacks. The use of modems in voting machines also poses a security threat. The lack of paper trails and audit trails further compromises the integrity of elections.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker demonstrated how they were able to boot up the Electionware system on a non-conforming laptop, highlighting violations of security protocols. They revealed that default passwords for election machines are easily accessible online, posing a significant security risk. The speaker emphasized the urgent need for updating security measures and changing passwords to enhance election security. They also pointed out the lack of antivirus protection on crucial election machines, putting counties at risk. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of immediate action to address these vulnerabilities.

Cybersecurity experts agree that electronic voting machines are dangerous and obsolete. These machines can be easily hacked, as demonstrated by a computer scientist who has hacked multiple machines and even turned one into a video game console. The vulnerability of these machines puts our election infrastructure at risk of sabotage and cyberattacks. In the 2016 election, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic machines. The speaker reveals a step-by-step process for hacking these machines and stealing votes. The solution proposed is to use paper ballots, which can be quickly scanned and verified by humans. It is emphasized that all elections should be run with paper ballots and audits. The importance of having a paper backup system is highlighted. The concise transcript emphasizes the need to replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots for secure and reliable elections.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, highlighting the need to assess all voting machines for potential hacking. Researchers have shown that ballot recording machines and other systems are susceptible to tampering, even by hackers with limited resources. Instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes have been reported. The leading seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. The control of voting machines by just three companies poses significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines, leaving the election system vulnerable to interference. The lack of backup paper ballots and reliance on unsupported software further exacerbate the security flaws.

The speaker states that the best investigators are pursuing election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and can be exploited to manipulate vote results. This vulnerability allegedly drives the mandate to implement paper ballots across the country, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

America's election infrastructure is more secure than ever, thanks to extensive work by state and local officials. Voters can trust that their votes will be counted accurately. Voting machines are not connected to the Internet, 97% of ballots are paper, and there are multiple safeguards in place, including cybersecurity measures and audits. However, foreign adversaries like Russia and China are spreading disinformation to undermine confidence in the system. As the election approaches, it's crucial for Americans to recognize the potential for increased disinformation. To navigate this, they should rely on information from trusted sources, specifically state and local election officials, who are the experts on election matters.

Speaker 0 notes that there were at least more than two of your direct employees and one indirect at the TCF center, up to nine, though no names are provided to avoid threats; they request clarification on each person’s responsibilities and roles during the process. Speaker 1 states backups were created by Tina Peters, Mesa County, Colorado county clerk. They are receiving information across the country that Dominion reps were going in under the guise of trusted build maintenance and wiping records. Under one dash 12 dash 69, those records by law have to be preserved. They caution not to blame staff, explaining a knee-jerk reaction by Dominion in Michigan to convince clerk staff they must have done something wrong. When discussing county liability, they emphasize listening to Mr. Lindbergh’s expert opinion. Speaker 0 asks about Ethernet access for adjudicators and tabulators in the TCF Center. Speaker 2 responds that the devices are not connected to the Internet; they are designed to be completely standalone and connected locally in a local area network separate from the Internet. Speaker 3 explains the vehicle for transmission from the ICP is a cellular modem, which can be configured in a VPN; Chicago and Cook County work with Verizon to secure that network, implying the same capabilities are available elsewhere. They note that multiple wireless chipsets/modems are supported, depending on jurisdiction preferences and network compatibility. Speaker 4 adds that some jurisdictions use a 3G modem (GSM) but can support multiple modem varieties, including latest 4G/5G standards. They confirm applicability across different networks (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint). They mention transmitting from the ICP in Mongolia, indicating no network limitations. In Puerto Rico, three vendors are used (Claro, AT&T, and T-Mobile) due to incomplete island coverage. Speaker 0 asks again about Ethernet setup to join the LAN. Speaker 5 paraphrases a claim that Dominion could fix the problem, implying Dominion can communicate with the device. Speaker 6 explains, by analogy to Apple remote support, that permission was given to take over the device to reprogram it from Adams Park to SSO 2 A and B at West Balding Drive Elementary. Speaker 7 shares observations from the TCF Center on the third and fourth, noting irregularities on election day. Randy Bishop, who owns radio stations and is IT-savvy, showed him high-speed scanners and tabulators with Ethernet lines running out of the tabulators, all bundled together and connected to routers and a main computer, which he says are connected to the Internet and that such connectivity is illegal and should not happen because it opens them to hacking. Speaker 2 reiterates that the computers in the local area network are connected via an RJ45 connector.

Voting systems are designed as closed systems without internet connectivity or external connections. Dominion does not have remote access to information or the machines themselves. No one has access to the machines to the best of the speaker's knowledge.

Voting systems are designed as closed systems without internet connectivity or external connections. Dominion does not have remote access to information or the machines themselves. No one has access to the machines to the best of the speaker's knowledge.

In 2021, your office stated that the public disclosure of BIOS passwords in Mesa County was a serious breach of voting system security. Given that your office has now leaked passwords, does this also represent a serious breach? No, the situations are distinct. Tina Peters was convicted for her involvement in a larger security breach in Mesa County, which included unauthorized access and stolen passwords. Since then, our security measures have improved significantly, including 24/7 cameras and stricter access protocols. The laws have also been strengthened to prevent similar incidents. The context of the current situation differs from what occurred in Mesa County. You noted that the phrase about passwords alone being a serious breach was from your office's press release.