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China's addition to the World Trade Organization in 2021 led to a surge in manufacturing and shipbuilding. China's dominance in both making and moving goods gives them exponential power. While tariffs address trade barriers, China builds 50% of the world's ships, including 37% of military vessels. These shipyards also produce military equipment like aircraft carriers and submarines. Funding Chinese shipbuilding is seen as sacrificing economic and national security, as money invested goes back into their military. The U.S. is seen as financing China's military, contributing to its own detriment.

I claim to be the chosen one, stating that China has made $500 billion by ripping off the United States through intellectual property theft and other means. I believe someone had to take action, so I am taking on China in trade. And the good news is, we are winning.

To sell to Americans, products must be made in America or face tariffs. China's economic model is uniquely imbalanced, with extremely high export levels relative to GDP and population. China is in a deflationary recession and is trying to export its way out, which the US can't allow. The ideal scenario involves a deal where the US and China rebalance their economies. China would consume more and manufacture less, while the US would consume less and manufacture more. This would level the playing field, although military and economic rivalry would persist. China's business model is considered broken, potentially due to tariffs. Because China has a large deficit with the US, they need US markets to survive. The relationship between President Trump and Chairman Xi provides confidence that details can be worked out and prevent things from going haywire.

China's ultimate goal is not to trade with the United States, but to replace American businesses. The belief that investing in China would lead to a more open market is being replaced by the understanding that China wants to win twice. Despite hopes that trade would bring political change, China remains an authoritarian one-party state with no democracy or independent judiciary. The Chinese Communist Party surveils its people, censors information, tortures dissidents, and persecutes religious and ethnic minorities. China is using its economic power to influence and change America, as recognized by the current administration's China strategy. The CCP's campaign for ideological conformity extends beyond China's borders and aims to exert influence worldwide, including in the United States.

Amazon acknowledges that ideological control and propaganda are part of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) toolkit, yet they are willing to profit from it. Corporate America has been ignoring the CCP's ideological differences with democracies for decades in order to utilize cheap Chinese labor. This undermines America's core principles and shifts jobs to communist China. Amazon's project in China, called China books, promotes CCP propaganda, but it only benefits the CCP, Wall Street, and the elites, not the Chinese people. The US-China partnership does not benefit the Chinese population.

- The speaker asserts that the United States is not just containing China but is attempting a rollback of Chinese economic growth, arguing that military power is largely a function of economic power. - They claim, “The United States… is a ruthless great power,” and that Americans are tough despite liberal rhetoric used to cover up ruthless behavior. - The speaker recounts a late-1980s/early-1990s warning to China: if China continues to grow economically, there will be a fierce security competition, and China would be shocked by how ruthless the United States is. - They state that China did not believe the warning at the time because the United States was treating China very well. - The speaker explains the underlying mechanism: “the structure’s gonna change, and when we go from unipolarity to multipolarity, and you’re a peer competitor, we’re gonna think about you very differently than we think about you now.” - They claim that this structural shift is exactly what is happening, with China moving toward being a peer competitor and the United States now treating China differently as a result.

A 4% tariff on China is insufficient; 400% is necessary because China doesn't adhere to WTO rules, steals IP, and cannot be litigated against in their courts. This isn't just about tariffs; it's about leveling the playing field, something no one has done. The speaker claims to represent millions of Americans whose IP has been stolen. While acknowledging the Chinese people's contributions, the speaker asserts their government cheats and steals. The speaker praises the Trump administration for standing up to China. The speaker believes 400% tariffs would force China to negotiate, as Xi Jinping's leadership depends on employment. The speaker argues America, holding 39% of global consumables and 25% of the world's GDP, has the leverage to pressure China. The speaker advocates implementing 400% tariffs immediately, anticipating a swift resolution.

A young Chinese influencer on TikTok who speaks English posted a minute-and-a-half clip directed at Americans. The clip argues that “they rub you blind, and you thank them for it,” calling it a tragedy and a scam, and says Americans “don’t need a tariff” but “need a revolution.” It claims Americans’ garment and auto industries shipped jobs to China “not for diplomacy, not for peace,” but to exploit cheap labor. It says this hollowed out the middle class, crashed the working class, and pressured people to be proud while their future was sold “for profit.” It contrasts China’s outcomes with the United States: it states China made money but used it to build roads, lift millions out of poverty, fund healthcare, and raise living standards, adding that “we reinvest in our people,” including the influencer’s own family benefiting. It then asserts that Americans’ “oligarchs” bought yachts, private jets, mansions with golf course driveways, manipulated markets, dodged taxes, and poured billions into endless wars. The clip contrasts this with Americans facing “stagnant wages, crippling healthcare costs, cheap dopamine, debt,” and “flaked away public money in China while they pick your pocket.” The clip concludes that for forty years both China and the United States benefited from trade and manufacturing, but only one side used that wealth to build. It states, “This isn’t China’s fault. This is yours. You let this happen,” blaming Americans for accepting lies and then letting those responsible blame China for the resulting problems. It calls for Americans to “wake up” and “take your country back,” repeating that a revolution is needed. In the discussion afterward, the host notes a correction: “we haven’t spent billions on useless wars, we’ve spent trillions on useless wars.” Professor Mearsheimer responds that if the influencer were a student in his class giving that statement, he would “basically agree,” saying the influencer is correct. He adds that the message is in large part something Trump made as a candidate before the 2016, 2020, and 2024 elections, and that it helped get him elected in two of those three cases. He concludes that many people in the country feel exactly the way the Chinese gentleman feels about what has happened.

America and China represent almost half of world GDP, but America is the market that matters. China has an aging population, a difficult case for foreign investment, murky IP rules, and a difficult economic forecast if they shrink. The speaker believes the Biden administration, in partnership with Janet Yellen, pushed America to the brink of financial collapse through debt creation and short-term obligations. The speaker claims that Donald Trump was right about China's entry into the WTO and the fragility of the United States exposed by COVID. The four critical areas that need focus are AI, energy, batteries/rare earths, and pharmaceuticals. The speaker suggests the "establishment" is unable to acknowledge Trump's correct stance and course correct. The speaker asserts that global elites benefited from a 20-year regime of optimizing for profit and low volatility, and are now trying to scaremonger the White House into economic policy. The speaker believes the media is trying to portray the president as having "blinked," but the stock market is only back to where it was in May 2024, not a crash. The speaker concludes that the Trump administration is different because they want to understand what's happening on the ground, even when there are disagreements.

Many Western corporations are unaware of the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leader, Xi Jinping. Throughout history, no organization has survived when dealing with the CCP. Xi Jinping has transformed the party into his own, and it is no longer representative of communism. It is crucial for corporations to realize this for their long-term benefit. The New Federal State of China is a group that possesses internal intelligence about the CCP. They can provide valuable information and protection, not just for profit.

Since the US helped the CCP join the WTO, American manufacturing has lost around 3.4 million well-paid jobs, as shown on a map. The job losses are not limited to the Rust Belt but extend from the East Coast to the West Coast. The trade deficit with China currently stands at $367 billion. The CCP has been engaging in unrestricted economic warfare against the US, violating international rules without consequences. President Trump was the first to hold them accountable for human rights violations and forced labor, but the trade deficit continues to grow. Chinese workers abused by the CCP have been producing goods for major retailers like Target, Walmart, and Kmart. It is crucial to find an alternative to China's dominant supply chain.

The speaker advocates for raising tariffs on Chinese goods to 400% to force China to adhere to trade rules, alleging they haven't followed WTO rules since 2020 and consistently steal American IP. They claim China uses US financial markets unfairly, with Chinese companies not abiding by GAAP while listing on NASDAQ. The speaker says they are willing to accept market volatility to resolve the trade imbalance, which they believe harms American businesses through IP theft and unfair competition. They emphasize the distinction between the Chinese government and its people, criticizing the government's cheating and disregard for rules. The speaker believes the US has leverage due to being the largest consumer market and having a significant GDP. They argue that China needs the US, and this is the time to pressure them into compliance, even if it causes short-term economic disruption.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the implications of the Trump–Xi meeting in Beijing for the US economy, the global economy, and the political economy underlying the encounter. Wolff frames it as part of a broader transition in human history: the decline of American “empire” dominance that has existed since at least World War II, and the rise of China. He argues the US is pulled downward by the end of its dominance and that China has outperformed the West in economic growth over the past thirty to forty years, citing China’s GDP growth about three times the US average (about two to two and a half percent annually for the US). Wolff claims Trump and Xi’s meeting reveals asymmetrical timing. He says one side wants free trade, multilateralism, and open cooperation, while the other side tries to “smash the Chinese down every chance they get,” without success. He also argues China’s approach is distinct: a developmental hybrid combining roughly half of the economy as private capitalist enterprises and the other half as state-owned and state-operated enterprises, all managed by a powerful government supervised by the Communist Party of China. Wolff presents this as “sui generis,” neither the US/Western model nor the Soviet model. He describes a decades-long contest among “private capitalism,” “state capitalism” (including the Soviet system), and China’s hybrid system, saying the Soviet socialism collapsed, leaving Scandinavian/Western European socialism and a Chinese form of socialism. Wolff asserts China “won” at least at this point because China achieved rapid development from extreme poverty to a highly developed standard of living and strong economic dynamism, in spite of receiving little direct external development help compared with other countries. He says China supervised and regulated the process even as private capitalists played an important role in later decades. Wolff then argues the strategic logic of the meeting centers on avoiding war. He says China benefits from time on its side and wants to avoid “rocking the boat,” while the US leadership seeks freedom to resuscitate an imperial order and expects Chinese cooperation. He presents Iran as a “microcosm” of this clash: US aims include removing the Iranian regime, replacing it with a US client, and subdividing Iran, while Wolff says China wants Iran left in place so it can manage the Strait of Hormuz as before and remain aligned with Russia and China. He states China is not driven by oil urgency, citing large Chinese oil reserves, and says the US project fails and has cascading consequences. Wolff extends the argument to propose that the US attempts to revive dominance through energy control (he mentions attacks related to Russia’s energy, Venezuela, Iran, and other oil-related efforts) reflect “empire fantasy.” He argues these actions reveal a broader phenomenon: a decline in US control rather than an ability to impose outcomes. He adds that American public opinion is largely opposed to war, noting that unlike earlier conflicts where patriotic support faded over time with costs and casualties, he says there is already no appetite now, and that domestic economic concerns matter more than grandiose foreign projects. He also references the controversy around a White House “ballroom” as an example of political symbolism amid economic priorities. In response, Glenn asks about how shifting power should change ideological assumptions about development and about what each side wants from the other. Wolff says China’s position is to resolve problems and prevent explosive issues, potentially including disputes such as Taiwan, while the US cannot hear or accept China’s appeal to avoid warfare and instead wants room to restore the empire. He concludes that major issues are at stake even if reported discussion points seem limited, and he expects further efforts by a “declining empire” to preserve its sense of remaining time.

The United States believes China will attack Taiwan because America is always looking to start new wars to justify defense spending. America needs to find new enemies, and it believes that the greatest threat to American empire right now is China, even though there's no evidence of this. Currently, China sends America cheap goods, and the U.S. gives China U.S. dollars. The Communist Party is storing the wealth of the Chinese people in American banks, which benefits America, Wall Street, and the Chinese Communist Party. If China takes over Taiwan, America doesn't lose much. The semiconductor industry in Taiwan could be moved elsewhere. However, America has hubris and must save face.

Speaker 0 argues that China’s economy faces a new threat described as involution, where prices are driven downward by competition rather than up. In many countries, governments complain when prices are too high; in China, the government is angry when prices are too low. Companies are cutting prices to gain market share, and this has forced others to follow, leading to a cycle in which profits plummet and no one gains lasting market share. The phenomenon is linked to aover supply, as many firms have been nurtured by local governments. This has helped certain industries become world-leading—such as solar panels and lithium batteries—but has also resulted in an oversupply of these goods with insufficient demand to meet the production capacity. One concrete example is the automobile industry, where there are now about 130 domestic car companies competing for sales. Discounting is so aggressive that an electric car, the BYD Seagull, can be bought for less than $8,000. While this may seem advantageous for households, the report cautions that profits have fallen, wage growth has stalled, and employment appears weak as a result. The piece notes that China has faced a similar issue before. About a decade ago, a long period of falling industrial prices occurred, and the government responded by cutting capacity in industries like steel and coal to curb production. That approach was crude but effective, leading to higher prices and increased profit margins. However, involution this time is more widespread and different in character. Several reasons differentiate the current involution from the past: many involved firms are privately owned, giving the government less direct control; the sectors affected are high-tech with modern facilities, unlike the older, more polluting plants targeted previously. An alternative strategy some have proposed is flooding foreign markets with goods, but partner countries are pushing back against this approach. Ultimately, the suggested remedy is to boost domestic demand rather than simply curb supply. The report emphasizes that the best response to falling prices is to stimulate demand so that production can be sustained without sacrificing profitability. The piece concludes by highlighting Xi Jinping’s commitment to viewing manufacturing as a core pillar of China’s economy. If customers remain hard to find, the leadership may need to engage in introspection to address involution, because manufacturing’s prominence in the economy is a foundational element of his vision for China.

The transcript argues that the CCP’s most damaging strategies are not just cunning but enabled by Western eagerness to do business with Beijing. It begins with China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. On November 15, 1999, seven unresolved issues remained in negotiations. Chinese negotiator Long Yun Tu recounts that Premier Zhu Rongji told his team to sign the agreement that day, saying, “I will talk to them,” and acting on orders from Jiang Zemin to make major concessions. After signing, Zhu gave a state-council speech stating, “We agree to these conditions just to enter the WTO after we get in, whether we follow them or not. That’s up to us. Every rule has loopholes that we can exploit.” The speaker asserts that this shows China never intended to play fair, then or ever. Following WTO entry in 2001, the CCP, described as hostile to democracy and free markets, gained unprecedented access to Western trade, investment, and institutions. The West’s openness allegedly allowed China to build a global network of influence while the Chinese economy operated as a “war economy,” with the CCP controlling land, resources, factories, supply chains, wages, unions, markets, export prices, currency, and capital flow to serve political goals. Three unlimited resources—natural, human, and fiscal—are used to wage economic war: cheap production and dumping abroad through tax breaks, export rebates, low-interest loans, and subsidies to undercut foreign competitors. This comes at a cost to Chinese citizens, who face low wages, extreme work pressure, unaffordable housing and healthcare, a heavy education burden, and severe environmental degradation. The West’s manufacturing sectors—steel, aluminum, rare earths, electronics, machinery, solar panels, energy storage, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices—shifted to China, gutted U.S. manufacturing, and risked national security. The transcript cites a claim by Yuan Hongbing, via Epoch Times, that Deng Xiaoping-era to Hu Jintao-era CCP elites transferred about RMB 20 trillion overseas (roughly $3 trillion) as “red capital” used to infiltrate Western financial systems. This red capital network allegedly grew as a direct consequence of China’s WTO entry, enabling deep penetration into economic, political, and media systems with Western money and institutions as weapons. Unrestricted warfare is central: “everything is a weapon” and the CCP does not follow rules or compromise. The narrative casts the third kind of war as one with no rules. It links the American fentanyl crisis to CCP strategy, noting that attempts to impose tariffs faced denial of CCP responsibility; if the U.S. bans fentanyl chemicals, Chinese sellers adapt with new formulas, creating a “chemical shell game.” Kash Patel told Joe Rogan that the CCP sees America as its number one enemy and flooding the U.S. with fentanyl is part of a long-term plan to destabilize the country, with tens of thousands of American deaths each year. Negotiations with the CCP, the speaker claims, have never solved problems; the post–Cold War belief that communism collapsed and China embraced capitalism is labeled a miscalculation. The CCP is described as a machine built for total war, designed to achieve victory over its enemies, willing to cross any line and sacrifice anyone, urging the world to hurry in understanding this reality.

In the rest of the world, billionaires buy the government; in Beijing, the government owns the billionaires. The transcript argues that China proved this by erasing one man. In October 2020, Jack Ma was described as the closest thing China had to a “god of capitalism.” He was preparing to launch the Ant Group IPO, a $37 billion offering described as the largest public offering in human history. Ma was portrayed as richer, louder, and more globally respected than the bureaucrats managing the Chinese economy, creating “massive geopolitical” liability. On October 24, 2020, at the Bund summit in Shanghai, Ma delivered remarks that the transcript says publicly humiliated China’s state-owned banking sector, accusing them of operating with a “pawn shop mentality” and suffocating innovation. The transcript also says Ma openly lectured the Chinese Communist Party on how to run a modern economy and forgot Beijing’s “golden rule”: “The wealth is an illusion, the party is the only reality.” The CCP did not debate him; instead, the transcript states they “decapitated his empire.” Days after the speech, President Xi Jinping personally ordered the suspension of the $37 billion Ant Group IPO, and the transcript says Jack Ma then “simply vanished.” For three months, Ma was not seen in public, with “no arrest warrant, no trial, no press conference,” and “absolute silence.” While Ma was absent, the transcript says the state dismantled his leverage. It claims Alibaba was slapped with a record $2.8 billion antitrust fine. It further says the CCP forced Ma to surrender voting control of Ant Group. When Ma was allowed to be seen again months later, the transcript says he was broken and subdued, and that he became interested in philanthropy and studying agriculture. The transcript concludes that Ma was not disappeared because he committed a financial crime, but to broadcast a message to other oligarchs: “You are permitted to build an empire, but the state holds the detonator.”

China’s economy, the transcript says, wouldn’t have done as well without private entrepreneurs. It also states that state-owned enterprises “weren’t doing well at all,” but that the speaker “couldn’t allow the capitalists” to dictate what to do to the economy. The transcript describes a political stance attributed to the period after Mao, in which Mao “attack[ed] him” while the message to entrepreneurs was: “Don’t you dare interfere with the political goals of the Chinese Communist Party.” It emphasizes that the political goals are “supreme” and “primary.” Entrepreneurs are described as being expected to enrich wealth to enable China “to be strong and wealthy,” but “you are not to interfere in politics.” The transcript presents this separation between economic activity and political rule as fundamental in Chinese thinking and also linked to “original Chinese traditional position,” contrasting the “Qian” and the “Shi,” and describing “very different” roles for the “Shang” and the “Shi.” It asserts that “they must be separate,” and that the “Shang must never be allowed to take part in the politics of rule.” The separation is described as “very traditional,” and characterized as a “return… to Chinese roots about the nature of governance.” Finally, the transcript states that this governance model requires “an order” and “a hierarchy,” with “the sirs above that,” and that “you can’t mix up” those roles or positions.

Afshun Rutansi speaks with Professor Zhang Weiwei, director of the China Institute at Fudan University, who has translated for Chinese paramount leaders including Deng Xiaoping. Rutansi frames the discussion around Trump’s visit to China amid the Israel-Iran war context and events including officials meeting in Delhi and a reported Saudi initiative for a West Asian aggression pact with Iran ahead of Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s scheduled meeting in Beijing. Rutansi asks whether Chinese officials understand that Xi Jinping is meeting a U.S. president responsible for attacking one of China’s key energy trading partners. Zhang says many Chinese prefer Trump over Harris for being “slightly more honest,” and contrasts Trump’s “decent respect” for big powers such as Russia and China with perceived hypocrisy from Biden and Harris. He argues that China should manage damage through dialogue given U.S.-China as the two largest economies and military powers. Rutansi raises historical memory, arguing that the U.S. deliberately prevented China from buying grain during Mao’s famine and imposed a naval blockade of food. Zhang responds that, during the Cold War, although no “hot wars” occurred between the U.S. and Soviet Union, China faced the Korean War and the Vietnam War as direct military confrontation with the U.S., and that China remembers the U.S. drawing lessons from those conflicts and that China would fight back if “red lines” were crossed. On claims that Trump is “destroying China while smiling” and attacking China’s energy supplies, Zhang says operations tied to Venezuela and Iran are aimed at controlling oil China needs. He says Venezuela represents less than 3% of China’s total oil imports, so it “will not affect” China’s oil supply, while the Iran situation is “more serious” and is treated as a mistake from which China can benefit due to long-term energy planning pursued for about two decades. Zhang says China’s energy dependency on foreign supply is at maximum 15%, and outlines China’s current energy mix: about 52% from coal described as “processed green coal,” 20% from renewables, and the rest from traditional oil and gas, with roughly 70% of those fuels from foreign sources. He lists diversified oil supply routes including lines from Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar, and highlights a railway connection between China and Iran as “hugely important for Iran.” Rutansi asks whether this railway was bombed as part of a U.S.-Israeli campaign; Zhang says the U.S. “really dare[s]” not to damage it overall and that on the whole it is still moving. Zhang links U.S. efforts to containment with previous trade and tech wars starting in 2018, saying they “failed completely,” and cites an ASPI report comparing critical high-tech technologies where he claims China beats the U.S. in 57 of 64. He argues China’s position is that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open and places responsibility for the crisis’s consequences on U.S. and Israeli military action, while also saying China has “strategic partner” relations with Iran and Gulf states and hopes for reconciliation between Iran and the Gulf States. In part two, Rutansi asks why China was not hosting or acting as intermediary in negotiations and whether China spoke through Pakistan. Zhang says China prefers “behind the scene, low key” approaches. Rutansi then addresses claims that China could use rare earths as leverage and asks why China exports rare earths to the U.S. Zhang says China has exercised stricter control over rare earth exports to the U.S. since the previous year, stating that for a one-year period there would be no rare earths for military purposes, and that China can exercise this control during negotiations. Rutansi asks whether China will reduce exposure to U.S. treasury markets; Zhang says China-U.S. trade relations are normal overall, but that Trump’s trade war led to a sharp drop, and describes China’s “socialist market economy” as driven by private and public enterprises. He rejects “moralistic perspective” as the main lens, stating that China follows international law and Chinese law, condemns aggression, and applies sanctions through the United Nations if necessary. Rutansi criticizes propaganda narratives and asks about the U.N. General Assembly president Annalina Beerbok calling Xi Jinping a dictator, asking whether that makes things difficult for China and the U.N. Zhang argues the issue lies in EU politics and what he calls low caliber of EU, U.S., and NATO leadership, and says he predicted that without political reform, worse leaders would be elected. On whether working classes in NATO countries will see through propaganda that China is the enemy, Zhang says opinion surveys show China’s impression improving gradually in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and in the West, especially among young people, attributing this in part to widespread use of Chinese hardware and software. He also explains that American and other foreign companies invested in China because of profits, and says the trade war and tech war drove high-tech firms to consolidate business interests in China; he mentions Apple, Tesla, Microsoft, and says Boeing has not been purchased in nine years while Boeing’s CEO is now in China.

China's addition to the World Trade Organization in 2021 led to a surge in manufacturing and shipbuilding. China's dominance in both making and moving goods gives them exponential power. While tariffs address trade barriers, China builds 50% of the world's ships, including 37% of military vessels. These shipyards also produce military equipment like aircraft carriers and submarines. Funding Chinese shipyards means the money goes back into their military. This situation sacrifices economic and national security by giving China control, which is maintained at the expense of the United States. The U.S. is financing the building of China's military.

A 4% tariff on China is insufficient; 400% is necessary because China doesn't abide by WTO rules, steals IP, and can't be litigated against in their courts. A 400% tariff would force China to negotiate and level the playing field. No administration has confronted China, but the Trump administration has. This speaker claims to represent millions of Americans whose IP has been stolen. While acknowledging the Chinese people's contributions, the speaker asserts their government cheats and steals. Xi Jinping's leadership depends on employment, and America, controlling 39% of consumables and 25% of global GDP, holds the leverage. The speaker advocates for immediate 400% tariffs, believing it will compel China to negotiate swiftly.

This isn't a recession. This isn't even a crisis in the traditional sense. What we're witnessing is the complete unraveling of the economic model that powered the world's second largest economy for four decades. And the West, we're completely unprepared for what comes next. For forty years, China's growth seemed unstoppable. Double digit GDP increases, gleaming cities rising from farmland, a manufacturing powerhouse that became the world's factory. Western corporations moved their supply chains there. Emerging markets tied their futures to Chinese demand. Everyone believed the twenty first century would belong to Beijing. But beneath the surface, something was fundamentally broken. The property sector that once drove 30% of China's economy has imploded. Evergrande, with its 300,000,000,000 in liabilities, was just the first domino. Country Garden followed, then China, South City. Now even state backed developers are failing.

The evidence against China's adherence to WTO commitments is too significant to ignore. A bipartisan report suggests moving away from the PNTR paradigm and establishing a new economic relationship to counter the CCP's economic aggression. The consequences of inaction include deindustrialization, increased reliance on a hostile regime, and mounting debt. It is time to address this issue rather than simply acknowledging it.

Professor Wang Wen discusses China’s de Americanization as a strategic response to shifts in global power and U.S. policy, not as an outright anti-American project. He outlines six fields of de Americanization that have evolved over seven to eight years: de Americanization of trade, de Americanization of finance, de Americanization of security, demarization of IT knowledge, demarization of high-tech, and demarization of education. He argues the strategy was not China’s initiative but was forced by the United States. Key motivations and timeline - Since China’s reform and opening, China sought a friendly relationship with the U.S., inviting American investment, expanding trade, and learning from American management and financial markets. By 2002–2016, about 20% of China’s trade depended on the United States. The U.S. containment policy, including the Trump administration’s trade war, Huawei actions, and sanctions on Chinese firms, prompted China to respond with countermeasures and adjustments. - A 2022 New York Times piece, cited by Wang, notes that Chinese people have awakened about U.S. hypocrisy and the dangers of relying on the United States. He even states that Trump’s actions educated Chinese perspectives on necessary countermeasures to defend core interests, framing de Americanization as a protective response rather than hostility. Global and economic consequences - Diversification of trade: since the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, China has deepened cooperation with the Global South. Trade with Russia, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has grown faster than with the United States. Five years ago, China–Russia trade was just over $100 billion; now it’s around $250 billion and could exceed $300 billion in five years. China–Latin America trade has surpassed $500 billion and may overtake the China–U.S. trade in the next five years. The U.S.–China trade volume is around $500 billion this year. - The result is a more balanced and secure global trade structure, with the U.S. remaining important but declining in China’s overall trade landscape. China views its “international price revolution” as raising the quality and affordability of goods for the Global South, such as EVs and solar energy products, enabling developing countries to access better products at similar prices. - The U.S. trade war is seen as less successful from China’s perspective because America’s share of China’s trade has fallen from about 20% to roughly 9%. Financial and monetary dimensions - In finance, China has faced over 2,000 U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms in the past seven years, which has spurred dedollarization and efforts to reform international payment systems. Wang argues that dollar hegemony harms the global system and predicts dedollarization and RMB internationalization will expand, with the dollar’s dominance continuing to wane by 2035 as more countries reduce dependence on U.S. currency. Technological rivalry - China’s rise as a technology power is framed as a normal, market-based competition. The U.S. should not weaponize financial or policy instruments to curb China’s development, nor should it fear fair competition. He notes that many foundational technologies (papermaking, the compass, gunpowder) originated in China, and today China builds on existing technologies, including AI and high-speed rail, while denying accusations of coercive theft. - The future of tech competition could benefit humanity if managed rationally, with multiple centers of innovation rather than a single hegemon. The U.S. concern about losing its lead is framed as a driver of misallocations and “malinvestments” in AI funding. Education and culture - Education is a key battleground in de Americanization. China aims to shift from dependence on U.S.-dominated knowledge systems to a normal, China-centered educational ecosystem with autonomous textbooks and disciplinary systems. Many Chinese students studied abroad, especially in the U.S., but a growing number now stay home or return after training. Wang highlights that more than 30% of Silicon Valley AI scientists hold undergraduate degrees from China, illustrating the reverse brain drain benefiting China. - The aim is not decoupling but a normal relationship with the U.S.—one in which China maintains its own knowledge system while continuing constructive cooperation where appropriate. Concluding metaphor - Wang uses the “normal neighbors” metaphor: the U.S. and China should avoid military conflict and embrace a functional, non-dependence-oriented, neighborly relationship rather than an unbalanced marriage, recognizing that diversification and multipolarity can strengthen global resilience. He also warns against color revolutions and NGO-driven civil-society manipulation, advocating for a Japan-like, balanced approach to democracy and civil society that respects national contexts.