reSee.it - Related Video Feed

The conversation centers on Iran, its 47-year regime, and how to think about protest, reform, and potential change from the perspective of an Iranian-American who has lived in the United States most of his life. The speakers discuss the severity of the regime, the nature of the opposition, and the calculus involved in any push for change. - Freedom and the cost of change: Freedom is described as nasty and the regime as “nasty.” The speakers assert that the regime, including the IRGC, is not likely to give up Iran in a peaceful way. They emphasize that protests and resistance have been ongoing, and that the regime has a track record of destroying opposition. They use the imagery of public executions and a ruthless approach to suppression, comparing the regime’s behavior to a brutal, game-of-thrones-like motto. - Personal history and perspective: The guest notes his life trajectory—born during the 1978 revolution, living through the Shah’s era briefly, and then the Khomeini years—giving him a long historical frame for evaluating leadership and revolution. He remarks that he has no moral authority to tell Iranians how to protest or whether to risk their families, acknowledging the severe personal stakes for those on the ground. He stresses the bravery and resilience of the Iranian people and explains the immense pressures that drive ordinary citizens to protest. - The strategic challenge of regime change: The guest asserts that the regime wants to stretch negotiations and extend days to avoid losing resources, implying a protracted endurance tactic. He insists that replacing or reforming the regime would be extremely difficult, given the depth of the regime’s networks and its long tenure. - Reza Pahlavi and leadership dynamics: The discussion revisits Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, noting his recent high-profile activity, meetings in Washington, and televised statements. The guest acknowledges both praise and criticism of Reza Pahlavi, arguing that leadership in Iran would require clear, tough decisions and that those who criticize him must provide constructive counterarguments rather than ad hominem attacks. He discusses the complexity of leadership in exile and the challenges of returning to Iran to lead, including loyalty issues within the military and the risk of betrayal. - The US and foreign policy angle: The hosts debate what role the United States should play, including the consideration of strikes or sanctions. The guest uses a parable about a local offense (a killer in Miami) to illustrate how a country should commit to eliminating a threat without broad interference in other regions’ problems. He argues for public support of a targeted objective but cautions against broad, nation-building wars that could trigger larger conflicts. He also notes the influence of other actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and European nations, on the Iran situation, suggesting a multi-layered and opaque calculus in any action. - The question of strikes and objectives: The speakers discuss whether strikes should aim to completely destroy the regime or merely pressure it, emphasizing that the intention behind any military action matters more than the action itself. They consider the risk of a dangerous power vacuum, comparing potential outcomes to Libya or Iraq, and discuss the possibility of negotiating with a different leadership that could concede to protesters’ demands while minimizing harm to the broader population. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a favorable outcome without risking unintended consequences. - The role of sanctions and diplomacy: The sanctions are described as byproducts of the regime’s leadership and its lack of diplomacy, with the argument that sanctions affect the Iranian people more than the ruling elite. The dialogue touches on questions of accountability for the regime’s behavior and the broader regional dynamics, including public sentiment in Iran and international responses. - Mossad and external involvement: The guest asserts that Mossad and Israel are heavily involved in Iran’s internal dynamics and protests, given the existential stakes and the perception of threats against Iranian leadership. He contends that foreign intelligence communities are active in shaping events and information, including potential misdirection and propaganda. - The broader takeaway: The discussion ends by underscoring the need for multiple options and credible leadership in Iran, the difficulty of changing a deeply entrenched regime, and the reality that any transition would be complex, potentially dangerous, and require careful, strategic consideration of long-term impacts rather than quick, sweeping actions. The host reflects on the remarkable intensity and busyness of US politics and foreign policy under a dynamic administration, noting that such a convergence of domestic and international pressures makes this period historically singular.

The discussion centers on the U.S. military buildup in the Middle East amid tensions with Iran and the broader regional dynamics driving the potential conflict. Key points include: - Military posture and numbers: The 82nd Airborne Division and 5,000 U.S. Marines are traveling to the region, with CENTCOM confirming roughly 50,000 U.S. troops already there. President Biden previously acknowledged that American forces were “sitting ducks” and that an attack was imminent. The hosts note that ground forces are arriving by Friday, with the Marine Expeditionary Unit from the Pacific on station soon, and reference a pattern of rapid escalation around Fridays into Saturdays in past conflicts. - Public reaction and political stance: Representative Nancy Mace says she will not support troops on the ground in Iran, even after briefing. The panel questions what powers she or others have to restrict presidential war powers, noting a perception that both parties are in lockstep on war funding. - Open-source intelligence on deployments: There is a reported flow of special operations elements—Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, Task Force 160, 75th Ranger Regiment—into or toward the Middle East, with multiple flights of SEACEs and C-17s observed in the last 48 hours. The discussion emphasizes the significance of such ground-force movements and their possible outcomes. - Iranian messaging and claims: An IRGC spokesman claimed that if the American public knew the true casualties, there would be outrage, and that “all American bases in the region have effectively been destroyed,” with American soldiers “hiding in locations adjacent to these locations and they are basically being hunted down.” - Expert analysis on negotiations and off-ramps: Doctor Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute argues that an off-ramp would require behind-the-scenes talks and cautions that the 15-point plan reportedly leaked to the Israeli press is not a basis for serious negotiation. He suggests a diplomacy path could involve sanctions relief and restricted military actions, but warns the public leaks risk undermining negotiations. - Israel’s role and objectives: Parsi states that Israel has aimed to sabotage negotiations and that Netanyahu’s objectives differ from U.S. aims. He suggests Israel desires a prolonged war to degrade Iran, while Trump’s objective may be to declare victory and withdraw. The panel discusses how Israeli influence and regional actions (Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon) relate to U.S. strategy and regional stability. - Saudi Arabia and other regional players: New York Times reporting indicates Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman privately lobbied Trump to keep the conflict going and even push for boots on the ground. The Saudi position is described as complex, with the foreign ministry potentially opposing war tones while MBS may have privately supported escalating the conflict. The guests discuss whether Saudi wealth is tied to the petrodollar and how a potential Iranian escalation could impact the region economically and politically. - Iran’s potential targets and escalatory capacity: Iran could retaliate against UAE and Bahrain, which are closely linked to the Abraham Accords and Israel. Iran’s capacity to strike urban centers and critical infrastructures in the Gulf region is acknowledged, and the discussion underscores the risk of significant disruption to desalination plants and strategic assets. - Propaganda and public perception: Iran released a viral video portraying global victims of U.S. and Israeli actions; the panel notes the messaging is aimed at shaping U.S. domestic opinion and demonstrates the intensity of propaganda on both sides during war. - Two emphasized “truths” (from Parsi): first, there has been a misperception about the efficiency of Iran’s missiles due to media censorship and selective reporting; second, U.S. and Israeli interests in the region have diverged, calling for a reassessment of national interest over coalition pressures. - Additional context: The conversation touches on U.S. military readiness, enrollment trends, and the broader historical pattern of wars shaped by executive decisions and external influences, including pressure from regional powers. The discussion ends with thanks to Dr. Parsi and an invitation for future conversations.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

Two weeks into the conflict, the official casualty toll for Americans is rising. The Pentagon has publicly acknowledged about 140 wounded, after Redacted reported at least 137 and Reuters later published an exclusive saying as many as 150 US troops wounded. The panel notes this number and questions why it wasn’t more prominently reported earlier by major outlets. Iran asserts talks with the United States are off the table for now and vows to keep striking as long as it takes, with an “eye for an eye” stance. The discussion asks what “eye for an eye” would actually entail, debating whether it means targeting civilian or infrastructure components in retaliation. The Strait of Hormuz is deteriorating rapidly with intelligence tracking Iranian mine-laying threats, and Gulf energy infrastructure suffering damage. About 1,900,000 barrels per day of refining capacity across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is down, and CBS reports shipping through the Strait has ground to a virtual halt. On the broader geopolitical stage, Israel is bombarding Beirut’s southern suburbs and Lebanon, effectively expanding its operations in the region. In Washington, Lindsey Graham is openly urging Americans in the South to push their sons and daughters to fight in the Middle East, urging allied countries to step up and end back-channel support, including public pressure to move air bases out of Spain. The panel criticizes this rhetoric as urging others to bear the burden of conflict. Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins to discuss wounded American troops and casualties. He notes March 4 at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, whose memo told pregnant women not to come for births, signaling a surge of casualties. He adds a nearby Kaiserslautern blood drive was issued on March 5, underscoring higher inbound casualties. Johnson explains Iran’s capacity to respond with drones, missiles, and other weapons, suggesting the Strait’s disruption affects global energy markets—oil and liquefied natural gas—while noting the impact on major economies: India and others depending on Gulf energy, with Russia benefiting from higher oil prices as Western sanctions shift flows. He highlights Russia’s oil diplomacy shifts, including India’s discounted imports and Berlin’s and BRICS dynamics, and observes that Russia’s price at about $89 a barrel reflects new market conditions. Johnson discusses how some in Washington may be leaking assessments to shift blame for any future outcomes, pointing to a leak of the National Intelligence Council memo warning against expecting regime change in Iran. He suggests there are warhawk factions in the Trump administration with aggressive aims, including potentially targeting Kharg Island, a critical oil export hub for Iran, which could provoke drone and missile countermeasures from Iran. The conversation notes that Iran could respond with drones and missiles rather than by ceding control of Hormuz, emphasizing that taking Kharg Island would be dangerous due to Iran’s drone capabilities and air defenses. Overall, the dialogue conveys a war that is not winding down as messaging might imply, with escalating casualties, strategic waterway disruption, and high-stakes diplomatic and military posturing across the region.

The U.S. appears to be moving toward conflict with Iran, with little opposition from Republicans. Senator Lindsey Graham suggests military action against Iran if Hezbollah attacks Israel. Former Colonel Douglas McGregor warns that such actions could escalate into a broader war, involving Russia and destabilizing the Middle East. He highlights the risks to U.S. military bases in the region and the potential for domestic terrorism due to open borders. McGregor emphasizes the inadequacy of U.S. military readiness and the moral dilemmas of collective punishment in Gaza. He calls for careful consideration of the consequences of war, noting that many policymakers may not fully grasp the implications for the U.S. and its allies. Ultimately, he believes that a regional conflict could threaten Israel's existence and worsen the U.S. economic situation.

Trump's bombing of Baghdad airport, resulting in the targeted killing of Iran's top military general, is considered an act of war lacking congressional authorization. This action has escalated the conflict with Iran, potentially leading to an endless quagmire. The speaker questions the ultimate goal of this action, asserting that Trump's policies are damaging and undermine national security. The proposed solution is to withdraw troops from Iraq and Syria to prevent further entanglement in a war with Iran.

We're heading toward war with Iran, with few Republicans pushing back. Bombing Iran's oil infrastructure, as Senator Graham suggests, could lead to disaster. About 20% of the world's oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz and Iran has missiles that can reach as far as 1,200 miles. If we attack Iran, our bases in Iraq and Syria will be targeted. Hezbollah, with a presence in Mexico, could cause trouble here at home. Our sanctions haven't stopped Iran from developing advanced missiles and cyber warfare capabilities. Our military isn't in a strong position to respond to a war with Iran, and our naval power may not have the impact we desire. The army is depleted and lacks the capacity for rapid deployment. Destroying Hamas means systematically rooting them out and likely causing mass civilian casualties. The support for Israel will erode as more destruction is captured coming out of Gaza.

Joe Kent is accused of misrepresenting the truth. However, another speaker defends Kent, stating he worked as a paramilitary contractor and served in the US military. Kent's wife was killed in Syria during one of these wars, making him a credible critic of US foreign policy. The speaker claims the CIA dislikes Kent because he understands their operations. Nick Fuentes is accused of targeting Kent, who was a primary target for those supporting neocon foreign policy. The speaker alleges that Fuentes is participating in a super PAC to remove Kent, someone who can credibly criticize foreign policy due to his personal experience and knowledge.

The U.S. appears to be moving toward war with Iran, with few Republicans opposing this direction. Senator Lindsey Graham advocates for military action against Iran if Hezbollah attacks Israel. Former Colonel Douglas McGregor warns that such a conflict could have severe global implications, including targeting U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria and escalating tensions with Russia. He emphasizes that sanctions on Iran have not diminished its military capabilities. The U.S. military is currently not in a strong position, and any military engagement could lead to significant casualties and regional instability. McGregor stresses the need for careful consideration of the consequences, as collective punishment in Gaza could further unite opposition against Israel and the U.S. He suggests that while some leaders understand the risks, their voices are not being heard in the current political climate.

The U.S. appears to be moving toward war with Iran, with little opposition from Republicans. Senator Lindsey Graham suggests military action against Iran if Hezbollah attacks Israel. Former Colonel Douglas McGregor warns that such actions could lead to significant consequences, including economic turmoil and military retaliation from Iran, potentially drawing in Russia and Turkey. He emphasizes that sanctions have not weakened Iran's military capabilities, which remain advanced. McGregor expresses concern about the U.S. military's readiness and the potential for domestic terrorism due to open borders. He cautions against the moral implications of collective punishment in Gaza and suggests that the situation could escalate into a regional conflict, urging for careful consideration of the long-term effects of U.S. actions.

The speaker criticizes the White House for downplaying previous attacks by Iranian proxies on US interests. They question the classification of Navy SEALs and contractors as troops, suggesting they are not given the same recognition. The speaker highlights Iran's use of decoys and expresses frustration at the delay in responding to recent attacks. They imply that the delay is due to the fear of upsetting the Ayatollah and losing the financial support provided by the Obama administration. The speaker accuses the current administration of supporting both sides of the war.

Following a drone attack that killed three US soldiers in Jordan and wounded 40 others, the US is preparing retaliatory strikes against Iran-backed militants. President Biden stated he holds Iran responsible for supplying the weapons used in the attack, but does not seek a wider war in the Middle East. The response, according to a US official, will strike multiple targets over several days, focusing on facilities that enabled the drone attack, primarily inside Syria, but likely avoiding direct strikes on Iran itself. One of the Iranian-backed groups, Khatab Hezbollah, claims it is suspending attacks on US forces, but the Pentagon says actions speak louder than words. President Biden spoke with the families of the fallen soldiers: Sergeant William Rivers, Sergeant Brianna Moffett, and Sergeant Kennedy Sanders. Moffett and Sanders were posthumously promoted to the rank of sergeant.

Speaker 0: Nearly two weeks into this conflict, the official story is cracking, and the number of Americans wounded is slowly coming out. Yesterday, we reported based on our sources that the number of American wounded was at least one hundred and thirty seven. After our report ran, the Pentagon has now publicly acknowledged about one hundred and forty wounded. That confirms our sources on this. So why did it take a little news show like ours to report this information? Why wasn't Fox News reporting this information? The Pentagon I know it's really weird. Why is the mainstream media silent on this? The Pentagon finally comes out and actually admits to this. Speaker 1: Reuters comes out and reports this. Exclusive. As many as one hundred and fifty US troops wounded so far in Iran war. They just published this today, this morning. March 10. That's remarkable. Exclusive. Just curious how that's an exclusive when we reported it yesterday. Yesterday. Whatever. Hey, Reuters. Bite me. Anyway, this war is clearly not winding down no matter what the messaging says. President Trump is saying the war could end very soon. But Iran says talks with The United States are off the table for now. Tehran is prepared to keep striking as long as it takes. And they're vowing an eye for an eye. So what is an eye for an eye actually mean? Does it mean you hey, you killed our leader. We kill yours? Does it mean, hey, you killed all these girls who were the daughters of members of the the Iranian Navy at a girls school, do we also do that to you? Like, what is actually does that look like? Speaker 0: Does it mean we took out your water infrastructures or you took out ours? So we do that. Right. Your gas infrastructure, civilian infrastructure, that's that's a war crime. But we did it. Your oil infrastructure, we do that. Like, what exactly does that look like? Meanwhile, the Strait Of Hormuz is getting worse by the minute. US intelligence tracking Iranian mine laying threats now as Gulf energy infrastructure there is taking a major hit with about 1,900,000 barrels per day of refining capacity across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and The UAE. All down. CBS now says shipping through the Strait Of Hormuz has ground to a virtual halt. Nothing getting through. That's of just a few minutes ago. And Israel's hammering Beirut's southern suburbs and Lebanon. So they've essentially invaded Lebanon. Speaker 2: And then there's the neocon political class in Washington saying the quiet part out loud. Senator Lindsey Graham is now openly talking about, you know, going back to South Carolina to tell the sons and daughters in South Carolina, you know, you gotta send your loved ones to the Middle East. That's what I'm doing here in South Carolina. I gotta tell them to go fight in the Middle East, and he's calling on other Middle East countries that have been sitting on the fence that we've supported over the years as allies. Get off the fence. Go bomb Iran. Help out with Iran. And, oh, by the way, Spain, we're pissed off at you because you don't want us using your air bases or airspace to bomb Iran. Listen. Speaker 0: To our allies step up, get our air bases out of Spain. They're not reliable. Move all those airplanes to a country that would let us use them when we're threatened by a regime like Iran. To our friends in Spain, man, you have lost your way. I don't wanna do business with you anymore. I want our air bases our air bases out of Spain into a country that will let us use them. To our Arab friends, I've tried to help you construct a new Mideast. You need to up your game here. I can't go to South Carolina and say we're fighting and you won't publicly fight. What you're doing behind the scenes, that has to stop. The double dealing of the Arab world when it comes to this stuff needs to end. I go back to South Carolina. I'm asking them to send their sons and daughters over to the Mideast. What I want you to do in The Mideast to our friends in Saudi Arabia and other places, step forward and say this is my fight too. I join America. I'm publicly involved in bringing this regime down. If you don't, you're making a great mistake, and you're gonna cut off the ability to have a better relationship with The United States. I say this as a friend. Speaker 1: Ugh. He's an odious friend. Speaker 0: Say this as a friend. Speaker 3: With friends pick up a gun and go fight yourself, you coward. Yeah. I freaking hate that. But you're calling so, like, bluntly for somebody else to go die for his stupid cause. Speaker 0: Yeah. Speaker 1: I am so curious about this. I mean, he's a liar. But how many people in South Carolina are really walking up to him and saying, who are we gonna get to fight with us? Who are we gonna get to fight Iran? Worried about this. My son can go, but who's going with him? Let's make some war playdates. Who does that? Speaker 0: Larry Johnson is a former CIA analyst, NRA gun trainer, and, he's been looking at all of this and doing some incredible writing over at his website, Sonar twenty one. Larry, thank you for joining us. Great to see you back on the show. Speaker 4: Hi, guys. Good to see you. Speaker 0: So I wanna talk about the American war wounded first because Mhmm. I know that this is, near and dear to your heart and, of course, something that you've been watching, closely. And the lies, of course, that are coming out about this. Again, I spoke to sources over the past forty eight hours that were telling us here at Redacted about 137 Americans wounded. Then the Pentagon comes out and then confirms about a hundred and forty. So right pretty much right on the nose. And does that number sound low to you? Or does that sound about right? Speaker 4: That sounds a little low. So on March 4, let's go to Germany. Stuttgart, just North West of Germany, there is a hospital called Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Landstuhl's primary mission is to handle American war wounded. On March 4, they issued a memo telling all the pregnant women that were about to give birth that, sorry, don't come here. We're not birthing any more babies. We gotta focus on our main mission. So that was the first clue that there was there were a lot of casualties inbound. I know, without mentioning his name, somebody who was involved dealing with the combat casualties during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and he dealt with the personnel at Lunstul. And he called someone up and said, can't say anything, but there's a lot of casualties. Then 13 miles to the east of Landstuhl is an army base called Kaiserslautern. Kaiserslautern and the Stars and Stripes issued for that base had an appeal, a blood drive appeal. Hey. We need lots of people to show up and donate blood. So those that was on March 5. So I wrote about this March 6. So I wrote about this four days ago, that, yeah, we had a lot more casualties, and there are more coming, because Iran's not gonna stop. You know, right now, we're getting signals that the Trump administration is reaching out, trying, oh, hey, let's talk, let's talk cease fire. Iran's having none of it. They've been betrayed twice by Donald Trump and his group of clowns. Speaker 0: Right. Speaker 4: You know? And and so they're not ready to say no. No. They've got the world, by the testicles is the polite way of saying it, withholding the Strait Of Hormuz. They've shut down the movement of not only oil, liquid natural gas. They're the supplier of about 25%, 25 to 30% of the world's liquid natural gas, and, about 30%, 30 to 35% of the world's urea, which is used for fertilizer. Now, that may not I just learned that that may not be as important as I once thought it was because most of it comes out of Oman. Oman, you don't have to worry about things going through the Strait Of Hormuz. But on oil and liquid natural gas, huge. 94% of The Philippines depended upon the flow of gas, both liquid and the petroleum oil, out of the Persian Gulf. India, 80%. Japan, South Korea. So this is gonna have a major impact on certain economies in the world. Now there there I I I've said this ironically. I I think Vladimir Putin's sitting there going, maybe Donald Trump really does like me, because what he's done is he's making Russia rich again in a way I mean, they're getting, you know, they were selling they were forced to sell their oil previously under sanctions at, like, $55 a barrel. Now they're getting $88.90 dollars a barrel. Well, and they just opened it up to India. I mean, that story over the past forty eight hours, like, so they The United States has eased its restriction on Russian oil flowing to India. I mean, talk about an absolute disaster. Speaker 4: Well, yeah. And remember what had happened there is India was playing a double game too. You know, bricks India is the I in bricks, and Iran is the new I in bricks. And so what was India doing? Well, India was pretending to play along with The United States, but then going to Russia and saying, hey, Russia. Yeah. We'll buy we'll buy your oil, but we needed a discount because we're going against the sanctions, and we need to cover ourselves. So Russia said, okay. As a BRICS partner, we'll let you have for $55 barrel. So they got a discount. So now when all of a sudden the the the oil tap is turned off, including the liquid natural gas, India goes running back to Russia. Now remember, on, February 25-26, India was in Israel buttering up the rear end of BB, Net, and Yahoo, kissing rear end all they could. Oh, man. It was a love fest. We're partners with Israel. And then Israel attacks their BRICS partner. And what does India say? Nothing. Zero. They don't say a thing about the murdered girls. So now all of a sudden, the oil's turned off. It's nine days now with no oil coming out of there for India. They go running back to Russia. Hey, buddy. Let's let's get back together. And Russia says, sure. That's great. But it's gonna cost you $89 now a barrel. No more friends and family program. Gonna get market conditions. Speaker 0: We've had many journalist friends that have had their bank accounts shut down. We were literally in the middle of an interview with a great journalist from the gray zone who found out that his banking was just shut down. Literally, in the middle of an interview, he got a message that his banking was shut down. Well, Rumble Wallet prevents that, because Rumble can't even touch it. No one can touch it. Rumble Wallet lets you control your money, not a bank, not a government, not a tech company, not even Rumble can touch it. It's yours, only yours, yours to protect your future and your family. You can buy and save digital assets like Bitcoin, Tether Gold, and now the new USA USA app USAT, which is Tether's US regulated stablecoin all in one place. Tether Gold is real gold on the blockchain with ownership of physical gold bars, and USAT keeps your money steady against inflation. No banks needed. It's not only a wallet to buy and save, but it also allows you to support your favorite creators by easily tipping them if you want with the click of a button. There'll be no fees when you tip our channel or others, and we actually receive the tip instantly unlike other platforms where we have to wait for payouts. So support our show today and other creators by clicking the tip button on our Rumble channel. Speaker 1: Now I wanna ask you about president Trump responding to CBS News reports that there may be mines in the Strait Of Hormuz. That doesn't make a ton of sense. He says we have no indication that they did, but they better not. But they are picking and choosing who gets to go through, and their allies can go through. So why would they mine their allies? What do we make of this? Do we need to respond to this at all? Speaker 4: Yeah. I don't think they've done it yet. But let's recall the last time Iran mined the Persian Gulf. They didn't mine the Strait Of Hormuz. They mined farther up. It was 1987, 1988. Why did they do that? Well, in September 1980, when Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski were still in office, The United States encouraged a guy named Saddam Hussein, don't know if you've ever heard of him, but they encouraged Saddam Hussein to launch a war against Iran. And then Ronald Reagan comes in with Donald Rumsfeld and Cap Weinberger, and by 1983 had provided chemical weapons, or the precursors that Iraq needed to build chemical weapons, and Iraq started using chemical weapons against Iran in 1983 and continued to do it in '84, 85, 86. During that entire time, Iran never retaliated with chemical weapons. They were not going because they saw it as an act against God. They were serious about the religion. So 'eighty seven, 'eighty eight, they start dropping mines there in the Persian Gulf. Well, at that time, they didn't have all these missiles, so the United States Navy, a Navy SEAL, a good friend of mine, set up what was called the Hercules barge, and he had a Navy SEAL unit with him, and they fought off attacks by Iranian gunboats. He had some Little Bird helicopters from the one sixtieth, the special operations wing of the Air Force. And but we ended up disrupting the Iranian plan to mine The Gulf back then. Well, we couldn't do that today. We do not have that capability because Iran would blow us out of the water with drones and with missiles. You as we've seen, it's been happening over the last ten days. So United States would be in a real pickle. Speaker 1: And especially given the rhetoric of US war hawks in power for three decades. Like Yeah. Yes. They kind of had to prepare all of this time. Did we think that they weren't paying attention when we said it to the world? Speaker 4: Well, when we're writing our own press clippings and then reading them, there is a tendency to say, god, I am great. Can you see this? How good we are? And so they really believed that our air def the Patriot air defense systems and the THAAD systems would be they they could shut down the Iranian missiles and drones. And what they discovered was, nope. They didn't work. And they worked at an even lower level than the you know, Pentagon kept foul. We're shooting down 90%.

The speakers discuss the potential for war between Iran and Israel, with one noting the US embassy in Iraq evacuated nonessential personnel and military bases were told to evacuate non-military personnel. One speaker expresses disappointment that Trump, who campaigned on preventing new wars, seems to be leading the US toward conflict. One speaker claims Trump could stop the conflict by telling Israel they are on their own, withholding intelligence and support. They lament American troops being in danger for no reason. The speakers criticize Trump for acting like Biden, merely expressing disapproval without taking action. They claim Congress is completely in Israel's pocket, despite public opinion, especially among younger Republicans, being unfavorable towards Israel. One speaker cites a post from Tom Cotton about Iran seeking nuclear weapons, likening it to the lead-up to the Iraq War.

Joe Kent, the recently resigned head of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), discusses the reasons behind his departure and its broader political implications. He says the resignation received more attention outside national security circles than he anticipated, and he notes the response from some former colleagues has been substantial. Kent addresses criticisms from figures like Sebastian Gorka, including a voicemail, and defends his stance and conduct during his tenure and resignation. The central issue Kent highlights is his belief that the United States entered a war with Iran under pressure from Israel and its American lobby, rather than because Iran posed an imminent threat. He argues that the decision to go to war was made under intense influence from allied actors and that the administration’s posture was driven by demands for zero enrichment and regime change, which he views as misguided. He states his hope that President Trump will consider alternative advice and potentially change course, given concerns about the trajectory of the conflict. Kent describes the current situation as heading toward a catastrophic direction economically and strategically. He cites the global market and energy production in the Gulf as areas already experiencing massive impacts, and he contends that the United States’ role as security guarantor in the region has deteriorated. He also expresses concern about American casualties and the possibility that the Israeli leadership might be tempted to escalate further, including the possibility of a nuclear strike by Israel if the conflict worsens. He emphasizes that restraining Israel is a fundamental prerequisite for any credible negotiation or attempted de-escalation. Regarding intelligence and threat assessment, Kent asserts that there was no imminent Iranian threat. He explains that, in his view, the Iranian escalation ladder is understood through various data sources, and he claims Romney-style consensus within the NSC warned against aggressive strikes that would backfire by rallying Iranian hardliners. He criticizes the influence of Israeli channels and media surrogates on American policy, arguing that this contributed to the misreading of Iran’s capabilities and intentions. He links these dynamics to past errors such as the Iraq War, alleging Israeli involvement in pushing for interventions and misrepresenting the existence of weapons of mass destruction. Kent also discusses U.S. policy in Syria, arguing that the United States should have limited its engagement with the regime led by former al-Qaeda-linked figures. He contends that the U.S. became too closely involved with HTS/Jalani’s government and that these actions tied Washington to concessions and a broader Syrian outcome that is not aligned with American interests. He notes tension between Israeli and Turkish aims in Syria and predicts conflicts between those two actors as they vie for influence. On the domestic terrorism front, Kent notes that the biggest open-source threat comes from inspired, lone actors rather than organized cells. He references data indicating tens of thousands of known or suspected terrorists and underscores uncertainty about who is currently within the United States due to porous borders. He suggests that while we can disrupt cells, lone actors driven by inspiration remain a significant concern because they are harder to detect and interdict. Throughout the discussion, there is a recurring emphasis on the need for American leadership to consider “what is in it for The United States” in major policy decisions, rather than yielding to external lobbies or ally-driven narratives. Both Joe Kent and Dr. Mike Scheuer critique what they see as the overreliance on special operations and on partners like Israel to push objectives, arguing for a more measured, strategically coherent approach that restrains aggressive actions by allies when they threaten broader American interests or stability in global currency and energy dynamics. As the interview closes, the hosts announce that Kent will appear on Mark Levin’s show, signaling ongoing public engagement in the debate over U.S. policy toward Iran, Israel, and the broader Middle East. The conversation touches on the potential of negotiated settlements and the controversial notion of large-scale special forces operations as a path forward, with Kent reiterating the primacy of restraining Israeli actions as essential to any viable policy outcome.

Alastair Crook outlines a two-component Iranian retaliation that is unfolding in three stages. The first component, driven by Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, was expected to target American bases in the Persian Gulf and Gulf area rather than Gulf States themselves. Ali Larragyani has stressed that the attack is not on Gulf States but on American bases and CIA facilities that use Gulf States to pursue Iran’s conflict. The second element, aimed at Israel, focuses on degrading Israel’s early warning radar systems and AIGs that allow United States and Israel to monitor Iran. This involves striking major radar sites in Gulf States such as Qatar and other locations to hinder Israel’s ability to attack Iran. The second phase then employs older missiles and drones to exhaust Israeli air defenses, wearing them down so they can no longer intercept subsequent strikes. Observations of Israeli intercepts against incoming missiles, with many intercept attempts yet frequent misses, are cited as evidence of this wear-down strategy. In the Gulf, Iranian drones have begun to operate more freely over Dubai and other sites, indicating that Gulf air defenses are strained or exhausted. Iran may continue destroying American bases and evacuating certain installations, notably in Bahrain, where the Fifth Fleet facilities have suffered significant damage. In the Israel domain, after degrading radar and defense networks, Iran may transition to more modern, faster missiles. There is speculation about hypersonic missiles with higher speeds (potentially Mach 8–10) and multi-warhead configurations arriving in Iranian inventories, though Crook hedges that he is not a military expert. A longer-term objective of Iran, according to Crook, is to drive the United States out of the Middle East, with the broader aim of reconfiguring regional power dynamics and energy infrastructure—potentially shifting influence toward BRICS and reducing Western dominance over seaborne oil and gas routes. He notes signs that the United States is attempting to control chokepoints and detain or seize tankers linked to Russia, China, or sanctioned states, albeit with questionable legal justification. The economic and geopolitical costs are significant: gas prices for Europe have surged, oil prices are up, and markets are crashing. He suggests the Gulf States may never be the same, with security concerns driving some Western residents to relocate. The conflict is also prompting discussions among Gulf States about changing their relationships with Iran and potentially limiting future American or British military presence on Gulf bases, as illustrated by warnings to the British about the Cyprus and broader Gulf basing roles. On the American side, Crook argues that the U.S. strategy is not going as planned. He asserts the killing of the Iranian supreme leader (Khamenei) was a grave miscalculation that failed to trigger regime change and instead sparked widespread protests in Baghdad, Bahrain, and Iraq, potentially destabilizing Bahrain’s ruling Emir and provoking regional unrest. He emphasizes that the attack undermined U.S. credibility and highlighted the vulnerability of American interests, with protests and regional backlash challenging the U.S. narrative and complicating domestic political considerations, including potential ramifications for Trump’s political standing. Regarding the Israeli-American relationship, Crook suggests the clash and miscalculations are likely to affect U.S.–Israel ties. He argues that attempts at decapitation strikes and hopes for a Western-aligned Iran have not only failed but also intensified anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment in parts of the region, challenging the traditional “Israel-first” posture and implying significant implications for how the United States will engage with Israel in future policy, diplomacy, and security commitments. He also notes that even within the Democratic Party, there may be demand for a thorough rethink of U.S.–Israel relations. Crook concludes that Iran’s hard-to-predict responses, combined with U.S. miscalculations and regional blowback, signal broad and potentially lasting geopolitical shifts in West Asia, with the possibility of broader implications for Russia–Ukraine dynamics and global energy security. The discussion ends with an acknowledgment that an immediate diplomatic de-escalation seems unlikely unless substantial concessions—such as lifting sanctions, returning frozen Iranian assets, and a broader shift in U.S. policy—are offered.

- The discussion opens with claims that President Trump says “we’ve won the war against Iran,” but Israel allegedly wants the war to destroy Iran’s entire government structure, requiring boots on the ground for regime change. It’s argued that air strikes cannot achieve regime change and that Israel’s relatively small army would need U.S. ground forces, given Iran’s larger conventional force, to accomplish its objectives. - Senator Richard Blumenthal is cited as warning about American lives potentially being at risk from deploying ground troops in Iran, following a private White House briefing. - The new National Defense Authorization Act is described as renewing the involuntary draft; by year’s end, an involuntary draft could take place in the United States, pending full congressional approval. Dan McAdams of the Ron Paul Institute is described as expressing strong concern, arguing the draft would treat the government as owning citizens’ bodies, a stance attributed to him as supporting a view that “presumption is that the government owns you.” - The conversation contrasts Trump’s public desire to end the war quickly with Netanyahu’s government, which reportedly envisions a much larger military objective in the region, including a demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon akin to Gaza, and a broader aim to remove Hezbollah. The implication is that the United States and Israel may not share the same endgame. - Tucker Carlson is introduced as a guest to discuss these issues and offer predictions about consequences for the American people, including energy disruption, economic impacts, and shifts in U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf. - Carlson responds that he would not credit himself with prescience, but notes predictable consequences: disruption to global energy supplies, effects on the U.S. economy, potential loss of U.S. bases in the Gulf, and a shrinking American empire. He suggests that the war’s true goal may be to weaken the United States and withdraw from the Middle East; he questions whether diplomacy remains viable given the current trajectory. - Carlson discusses Iran’s new supreme leader Khomeini’s communique, highlighting threats to shut Hormuz “forever,” vows to avenge martyrs, and calls for all U.S. bases in the region to be closed. He notes that Tehran asserts it will target American bases while claiming it is not an enemy of surrounding countries, though bombs affect neighbors as well. - The exchange notes Trump’s remarks about possibly using nuclear weapons, and Carlson explains Iran’s internal factions, suggesting some seek negotiated settlements while others push for sustained conflict. Carlson emphasizes that Israel’s leadership may be pushing escalation in ways that diverge from U.S. interests and warns about the dangers of a joint operation with Israel, which would blur U.S. sovereignty in war decisions. - A discussion on the use of a term Amalek is explored: Carlson’s guest explains Amalek from the Old Testament as enemies of the Jewish people, with a historical biblical command to annihilate Amalek, including women and children, which the guest notes Christianity rejects; Netanyahu has used the term repeatedly in the conflict context, which Carlson characterizes as alarming and barbaric. - The guests debate how much influence is exerted in the White House, with Carlson noting limited direct advocacy for war among principal policymakers and attributing decisive pressure largely to Netanyahu’s threats. They question why Israel, a client state of the U.S., is allowed to dictate war steps, especially given the strategic importance of Hormuz and American assets in the region. - They discuss the ethical drift in U.S. policy, likening it to adopting the ethics of the Israeli government, and criticize the idea of targeting family members or civilians as a military strategy. They contrast Western civilization’s emphasis on individual moral responsibility with perceived tribal rationales. - The conversation touches on the potential rise of AI-assisted targeting or autonomous weapons: Carlson’s guest confirms that in some conflicts, targeting decisions have been made by machines with no human sign-off, though in the discussed case a human did press play on the attack. The coordinates and data sources for strikes are scrutinized, with suspicion cast on whether Israel supplied SIGINT or coordinates. - The guests warn about the broader societal impact of war on civil liberties, mentioning the increasing surveillance and the risk that technology could be used to suppress dissent or control the population. They discuss how war accelerates social change and potentially normalizes drastic actions or internal coercion. - The media’s role in selling the war is criticized as “propaganda,” with examples of government messaging and pop culture campaigns (including a White House-supported video game-like portrayal of U.S. military power). They debate whether propaganda can be effective without a clear, articulated rationale for war and without public buy-in. - They question the behavior of mainstream outlets and “access journalism,” arguing that reporters often avoid tough questions about how the war ends, the timetable, and the off-ramps, instead reinforcing government narratives. - In closing, Carlson and his co-hosts reflect on the political division surrounding the war, the erosion of trust in media, and the possibility of rebuilding a coalition of ordinary Americans who want effective governance without perpetual conflict or degradation of civil liberties. Carlson emphasizes a longing for a politics centered on improving lives rather than escalating war. - The segment ends with Carlson’s continued critique of media dynamics, the moral implications of the war, and a call for more transparent discussion about the true aims and consequences of extended military engagement in the region.