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Today's lecture covers the "Cuban Venezuelan conquest of the United States," focusing on Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution. The lecture will discuss the 1998-2001 revolution, the 2002 counterrevolution, the 2004 recall election, Chavez's consolidation of power, and the rise of a mafia super cartel in Venezuela. According to the speaker, the best businesses in Venezuela are oil and elections. The speaker claims to have met with Venezuela's superintendent of cryptocurrencies in 2018 to discuss the Petro coin. He also claims familiarity with Marxism, communism, Chinese revolutions, and the Bolivarian Revolution. The lecture states that Venezuela's reliance on oil since 1922 led to economic booms and busts. A Marxist left movement emerged in the 60s and 70s, influencing Hugo Chavez in the military. In 1992, Chavez led a failed coup and was imprisoned. After release, he used the phrase "poor Eora for now." In 1998, Chavez campaigned as a man of the people and won the presidency.

Speaker 1 discusses the human cost of Venezuelan and regional instability, noting that Venezuelan people have suffered and that many Hondurans have migrated due to conditions in their own country. He argues that the opposition in Venezuela had been winning elections, but the regime led by Maduro “stole every election,” stating that they have a copy of poll results on the cloud and that the government did not want to see them because they knew they lost. He attributes a high death toll in Honduras to drug trafficking flowing through their country, largely coming from Venezuela, and asserts that the U.S. framework designating drug trafficking as terrorism is justified because the flow of drugs harms the United States and Honduras, causing bloodshed and economic damage. He claims that illegal drug flight and sea routes brought jobs to Honduras but also bloodshed, and that the highest number of lives lost in fifteen years in Honduras occurred due to these drugs. Speaker 0 asks about the stance on U.S. intervention, whether intervention is sometimes warranted, as with Maduro, or if there should be no U.S. intervention in Latin America regardless of administration. He notes that Maduro’s regime has involved U.S. military actions and leadership changes, with claims that the U.S. bombed Venezuela, captured Maduro, killed members of his government, and sent him to jail, a situation some view positively while others see as a breach of international law. Speaker 1 responds from a human perspective, emphasizing the suffering of Venezuelan and regional populations and the mass migration from these countries. He argues that Maduro’s regime stole elections and contrasts this with the citizens’ desire for democracy. He states that the Trump administration’s framework to label drug trafficking as terrorism has implications for Honduras and other neighboring countries affected by drug flows, corruption, and violence. He suggests that President Trump confronted a long-standing attempt by Venezuela and its allies to influence elections in the region, and he asserts that Maduro should be given a chance to defend himself in a trial. He acknowledges sovereignty concerns but argues that many people worldwide do not understand what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. He concludes that intervention decisions depend on whether there is another way to save Venezuela and notes the broader regional consequences of the Venezuelan crisis.

Over the last 20 years, the Venezuelan mafia, with assistance from China and Iran, has been rigging elections in 72 nations across Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. This has allowed them to change the arc of history. The speaker claims to provide the backstory on Hugo Chavez, the Bolivarian Revolution, and the emergence of a Venezuelan super-cartel mafia. The speaker takes responsibility for any felonies committed and references a letter, as explained in his book "Danger Close." He states that Venezuela has put a $25,000,000 bounty on his head, a fact revealed during a legal dispute with Hunter Biden. He requests security if he is to face any legal repercussions. He urges the DOJ to reflect on whether they have similar protections. He asks "real Americans" to share the video and sign up for $5 a month at americaproject.com to help fund the unraveling of this situation. He refers to the situation as the Cuban Venezuelan conquest of the United States of America.

The United States government decides to send the CIA to Venezuela. They say the CIA will conduct operations against Venezuela, against the peace of Venezuela. This is claimed to be unprecedented; the speaker notes that never before has any government since the CIA’s existence publicly said it would order the CIA to kill, to derange, and to topple countries. A historian named Alejandro is invoked to support this claim. The speaker lists past Latin American coups, asserting that all involved the CIA and resulted in governments being overthrown and presidents assassinated, with documents allegedly published by the U.S. government that have since been declassified. Specific examples named are: 1974, Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz; 1965, Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch; 1964, Brazil, Joao Goulart; 1973, Chile, Salvador Allende. The speaker says these are “a few” among many coups in Latin America, all documented through declassified U.S. government documents. Additionally, the case of Mosaddegh in Iran (1952) is cited as another example of a national leader toppled. The speaker asserts that, over time, the CIA apologized for overthrowing these presidents, stating the pretenses were that they were communists or terrorists, but later acknowledging the deception. The speaker uses the term “immorality” to describe those past actions and contrasts them with the present claim, stating that for the first time in history, a U.S. government says it has given authorization and issued orders to attack a country. The speaker concludes with a call to the Venezuelan people, saying their people are clear, united, highly conscious, with “1000000 of eyes and 1000000 of ears,” and that they possess the means to defeat this “open conspiracy” against the peace and stability of Venezuela. The ultimate aim asserted is to restore the peace and stability to which the people of Venezuela have a right, and to ensure they regain and sustain that peace and stability.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan political crisis, U.S. involvement, and historical precedents of regime change in the region. The speakers contrast current military buildup around Venezuela with past Latin American coups, and they assess domestic support, international dynamics, and potential outcomes. - Venezuela under Maduro: Speaker 0 notes a broader deployment of military infrastructure than in recent Latin American coups, implying heightened risk or intensity of any intervention. Speaker 1 counters that domestically there is a “rally around the flag” effect in response to U.S. threats, with about 20% of Venezuelans supporting U.S. military intervention and over 55% opposing it. - Regime-change calculus: The conversation asks for the value of regime change when Maduro is willing to open the Venezuelan market to the U.S. Speaker 1 responds that there is no clear political or economic value to regime change; the predicted consequences would include a massive migration wave, civil war, and higher oil prices. They discuss the implications of implementing a regime-change strategy in the Venezuelan context. - Cartel of the Suns: The Cartel of the Suns is discussed as a U.S.-designated terrorist group. Speaker 1 explains that the designation emerged from a DOJ/intelligence collaboration during the Trump era, with William Barr involved in pursuing Maduro. The term traces back to the Reagan era, when the CIA and DEA allegedly allowed drug trafficking through Venezuela to monitor routes, revealing a long history of U.S. involvement in narco-trafficking networks as a tool of influence. Ramon Guillen Davia is named as a Venezuelan National Guard contact, with broader exposure through media such as a 60 Minutes segment and a New York Times expose by Tim Weiner. The cartel’s earlier existence and its resurfacing in U.S. legal actions are tied to broader U.S. efforts to delegitimize Maduro’s government. - Venezuelan political history since Chavez: Speaker 1 outlines Chavez’s rise and popularity (e.g., reducing extreme poverty by 60% before sanctions), the 2002 coup attempt led by opposition figures including Leopoldo Lopez, and the subsequent public support for Chavez when the people protested to restore him. They describe “La Salida” in 2004–2014 as an opposition strategy funded by U.S. entities (NED, USAID) to depose Chavez, with various protests and riots that damaged the economy. After Chavez, Maduro faced U.S. sanctions and a narrative of illegitimacy framed by the opposition’s efforts to install Guaidó as a parallel government in 2019, enabling asset seizures and embargos on Venezuela’s Sitco assets. - 2019 events and aftermath: The 2019 U.S.-backed attempt to install Juan Guaido as interim president is described, including the staged “humanitarian aid” convoy at the Colombia border which failed; Guaidó’s association with Las Bratas (the Las Frastrojos cartel members) is cited as a public-relations embarrassment, corroborated by major outlets. Leopoldo Lopez is described as a persistent organizer of opposition efforts, connected to a broader U.S.-funded framework through the CIA’s ecosystem (Canvas, Einstein Institute), and by extension to regime-change policy. The possibility of Maduro arresting Guaido is discussed as strategically unwise for Maduro to avoid bolstering U.S. claims of repression. - Opposition fragmentation and polling: The panel debates whether the opposition has broad support. Speaker 1 says a November poll by Datanalysis shows Maria Carina Machado at roughly 14–15% and Maduro around 20%, with most voters undecided and younger voters leaning toward external media narratives. Older, rural, and poor Venezuelans—Chavista base—remain a significant portion of the population. Young people are described as more influenced by social media and potentially more susceptible to pro-U.S. messaging but not broadly supportive of the radical opposition. - External actors and drug-trafficking links: The dialogue links narco-trafficking networks to geopolitical strategy, arguing that the U.S. has used or tolerates narcotics channels to fund political aims in Latin America. The discussion covers broader examples, including Ecuador and the Balkans, and references to U.S. figures and policies (e.g., regime-change agendas, naval movements, sanctions, and strategic partnerships) to illustrate how narcotics intersects with geopolitics. - Geopolitical trajectory and outcomes: The speakers speculate on possible futures: (1) a negotiated deal between Trump and Maduro or U.S. diplomacy (with the oil sector’s re-entry and debt relief) being preferable to open intervention; (2) a decapitation strike leading to destabilization and civil war with severe humanitarian and migration consequences; (3) ongoing sanctions and coercive measures as a long-term strategy. They caution that a direct, large-scale military invasion seems unlikely due to political and logistical risks, including American public opinion and potential backlash if U.S. troops are lost. - Global context and strategy: The broader international framework is discussed, including the U.S. strategic doctrine shifting toward a multipolar world and hemispheric dominance concerns. The conversation touches on how U.S. policy toward Venezuela fits into wider ambitions regarding Russia, China, and regional partners, as well as potential domestic political changes in the U.S. that could influence future approaches to Venezuela and Latin America. - Concluding note: The discussion closes with reflections on the complexity of regime-change ambitions, the difficulty of predicting outcomes, and the possibility that diplomacy or limited, targeted pressure may emerge as more viable paths than broad invasion or decapitation strategies. The participants acknowledge the influence of regional personalities and U.S. domestic politics on policy direction.

Here's a list of South American countries where the CIA has overthrown the government since 1947: Costa Rica in 1948. Guatemala in 1954. El Salvador in 1979. Nicaragua in 1981. Panama in 1989. Paraguay in 1954. Brazil in 1964. Peru in 1968. Chile in 1973. Uruguay in 1973. Argentina in 1976. And Venezuela in February 2002.

Ian and Mario discuss the Venezuelan operation and its wider implications. - Maduro’s regime and Venezuela’s situation are contrasted with Chavez. Maduro is not as popular or charismatic, the economy is in shambles, and Venezuela possesses billions in Russian air defenses that failed to down US helicopters, highlighting a discrepancy between defense systems and battlefield outcomes. - The Washington assessment is that the operation to capture Maduro involved substantial internal support from Maduro’s circles, potentially including CIA-assisted tips and insider cooperation, enabling real-time intelligence on Maduro’s movements. This inside help is seen as a critical factor alongside the United States’ capabilities. - The operation was planned for months, with the White House reportedly approving strikes in advance as long as a window existed. The goal was to capture Maduro and bring him to the United States, not simply to eliminate him; the plan also involved a minimal American casualty count (one helicopter injury, no American deaths). - The vice president, Delsy Rodríguez, is discussed as a possible insider who might have privately engaged with the United States, though it’s not clear she knew the exact timing of the strike. Cuban intelligence was described as protecting Maduro, and Maduro’s inner circle would have had reasons to avoid leaks. - There was emphasis that the operation was not framed as democracy promotion or regime change, but rather about removing Maduro and establishing a transition that could reshape Venezuela’s leadership and oil/drug policy, with the oil sector and sanctions regime central to the US strategy. The leaders around Maduro, not Maduro alone, shape the outcome. - The Venezuelan air defense systems, largely Russian, were targeted and neutralized in advance of the Delta Strike Force. The attack demonstrated US surgical strike capabilities, but also underscored the risk of Venezuelan retaliation and the complexity of operating in a heavily defended airspace. - The discussion shifts to the political implications for allied and regional actors. The operation raises questions for Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Denmark (in terms of leverage and responses to US unilateral actions). Colombia, under Petro, faces considerable pressure as US leverage increases, while Brazil’s stance is tempered by prior sanctions and subsequent negotiations. Denmark and other partners are noted for their responses to geopolitical shifts. - China’s role is addressed: China had a delegation in Caracas at the time, with public shock at the US move. The US did not appear to have given heads-up to China. This underscores the multipolar dynamic where the US can project military power, but economic and technological power remains more distributed. - The broader geopolitical context includes Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities. The Venezuela operation signals American military capability and willingness to act unilaterally, yet Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine illustrate ongoing limits and risks. Moscow’s alliances with Venezuela and Iran are highlighted, but the operation did not rely on formal mutual defense commitments; Russia’s global influence is depicted as waning in the face of US operational decisiveness. - The discussion covers potential long-term effects on global order. The US displays “extraordinary military capability” but faces political constraints as a democracy with checks and balances. The speaker warns of a possible “law of the jungle” trajectory if the US continues to rely on coercive power, potentially diminishing international legitimacy and provoking responses from China and others who possess economic leverage. - The possible phase two is referenced as a strategic instrument; if the new Venezuelan leadership does not align with US aims, offshore oil facilities could be targeted to compel compliance, signaling ongoing leverage without ground troop deployments. - Regarding Iran, there is no current plan for a Maduro-like operation. Israel’s potential pushes against Iran are discussed, but the US position remains cautious: strikes would be contingent on broader strategic considerations, with the US wary of deepening conflicts if not coordinated with partners. - Ian offers forecasts: Iran is likely to face increased pressure domestically and internationally, while Venezuela could see a transitional government for 12–18 months amid power-sharing negotiations, with ongoing instability possible as opposition figures push for more influence. The expectations emphasize ongoing US leverage, limited appetite for full regime change, and the risk that military weakness and political maneuvering will shape outcomes in the near term.

Mario and Max discuss the January 3 operation in Venezuela, its potential objectives, and the wider geopolitical implications. - The operation raised early fears of a full amphibious invasion or a new war, with rapid questions about how Maduro could be kidnapped with so little resistance and whether a single downed helicopter could have produced a catastrophe for Donald Trump. Max notes that 16 guards of Nicolas Maduro were killed, including his personal bodyguard who had guarded Hugo Chavez, and suggests this could indicate the operation was choreographed or left open to a deal through Maduro. - Max says he had woken late and watched the event unfold, and he entertained theories about a negotiated exit for Maduro that would leave the Pesuv (Chavista) structure in place, enabling a transition to a figure like Delsy Rodriguez (the vice president) who would work within Chavismo to exploit Venezuelan resources for Trump’s cronies. He states he predicted that Trump would claim Maria Carina Machado did not have enough support to rule and would not be returned to power, a point he supported with sources and his reading of Trump’s behavior, including Trump’s condemnation of Machado’s Nobel Prize and disregard for Juan Guaido. - Max describes a theory of a deal and questions whether the Venezuelan military stood down. He notes that the US military is dominant but that losing a single helicopter could have become a political disaster for Trump. He mentions Joaquin Padrino Lopez (defense minister) and Diosdado Cabello as other power centers, suggesting that even if Maduro was abducted, a power vacuum could destabilize Venezuela. He cites Cabello signaling resistance by appearing on the street with military figures and the Second Republic flag. - The conversation covers whether Delsy Rodriguez has broad support in Venezuela. Max recalls Rodriguez’s 2021 interview and her role during the COVID response, portraying her as stabilizing economically and presiding over ministries, which aided an economic revival supported by China and others. Max suggests her potential as a US-friendly figure but notes she lacks the military backing to consolidate power against other Pesuv factions. - Mario asks about Maduro’s leadership, and Max rejects the idea that Maduro is purely incompetent, noting corruption under the Bolivarian regime and Maduro’s own background as a student of Simon Bolivar, a former bus driver who rose through the ranks. He argues Maduro was not a stupid leader and contrasts his profile with Trump’s. He warns that achieving regime change would not be simple, given Venezuela’s polarization and the military’s importance. - The discussion turns to the economic situation in Venezuela. Mario references statistics: economy shrinking by around 80% since 2013, 95% in poverty, oil production down, living standards collapsed, and out-migration. Max acknowledges some statistics may be flawed but agrees that Delsy Rodriguez had presided over an economic revival and that China played a central role, purchasing a large share of Venezuelan oil and helping with oil infrastructure, while Iran and Russia also provided support. He notes the impact of US sanctions and the broader “financial terrorism” narrative, arguing that sanctions and IMF-style measures contributed to economic decline and the diaspora’s views. - They debate who bears responsibility for the crisis. Max emphasizes longstanding US sanctions and political interference as primary factors, arguing that the US sought to undermine Venezuela’s sovereignty and to plunder its resources, with Maduro’s government framed by Western outlets as corrupt; he cites evidence of corruption and suggests a pattern of coercive measures against Venezuela. - The conversation covers the purpose behind capturing Maduro. Max suggests the aim might be to replace Maduro with a more pliable figure who would cooperate with US oil interests and allow greater control over Venezuela’s PDVSA structure. He discusses the possibility of grooming a candidate from within Pesuv or returning Machado, though he notes Marco Rubio’s public stance that elections could be delayed to avoid destabilizing Venezuela. - The role of China and the broader multipolar dynamic is addressed. The Chinese envoy’s meeting with Maduro hours before the strikes is seen as signaling China’s interest and as part of a broader message to China, Russia, and Iran about US reach. Max believes the operation sends a wider message of US willingness to act in the hemisphere and to police resource access. - The interview ends with a comparison to the Panama regime change (Manuel Noriega) and a reminder that Maduro will be tried in the Southern District of New York. Max notes that Machado’s supporters and US associates are calculating future power arrangements, while Maduro remains central to ongoing debates about Venezuela’s political and economic future.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the January 3 operation in Venezuela, the speakers explore initial reactions, possible motives, and the broader geopolitical implications. - Initial reaction and early concerns: The exchange begins with the worry that the events marked the start of a full amphibious assault or a new war. Speaker 1 recalls staying up late and being shocked by the “sheer gangsterism” of Maduro’s kidnapping, noting that Maduro was flown out of the country with little resistance. He models several theories around how such an operation could occur with minimal opposition and suggests the possibility of a negotiated exit that would keep the Chavista structure in place through a successor like Delsy Rodriguez. - The “deal” theory and who might be involved: Speaker 1 explains a theory that Donald Trump and Marco Rubio wanted a negotiated exit for Maduro that would allow the Pesuv (Chavista) structure to remain and enable the installation of a figure like Delsy Rodriguez to work within Chavismo to secure resource contracts for Trump’s allies. He cites sources close to negotiations and references coverage in the New York Times supporting elements of this narrative. He also notes Trump’s public dismissal of Maria Carina Machado as lacking support to rule, a point he says he predicted on a livestream. - The military stand-down hypothesis: The conversation delves into why no strikes targeted the helicopters, positing a stand-down order. Speaker 0 asks who would authorize such a stand-down and cites Ian Bremmer’s assessment as a possibility but unlikely due to the risk. Speaker 1 acknowledges the plausibility of many theories, including the idea that a stand-down could spare the country from greater U.S. violence, reminiscent of past operations in Baghdad or Raqqa, and emphasizes that the question of who issued any stand-down order remains unresolved. He mentions Delsy Rodriguez’s potential self-protection concerns and notes Diosdado Cabello’s visible signaling alongside military figures after Maduro’s abduction. - Delsy Rodriguez and potential motivations: The interlocutors discuss Rodriguez’s political stature, her management of Venezuela’s COVID response, and the perception she could pose a more direct challenge to U.S. interests due to her economic stabilization efforts and heavy ties to China. Speaker 1 underscores that Rodriguez stabilized the economy and was central to a revival that included substantial China-driven oil exports, a point supported by a New York Times profile. He clarifies that he did not speculate Rodriguez was the U.S. mole but stresses she would be asked by interviewers about such questions. - Maduro’s leadership and the economic crisis: The participants debate Maduro’s competence, acknowledging corruption and structural issues within a petro-state framework but arguing that the decline in living standards and oil production has deep roots, including U.S. sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Speaker 1 contends that while Maduro was not a “stupid” leader, Chavez-era and post-Chavez mismanagement, together with U.S. financial sanctions and regime-change tactics, contributed to Venezuela’s economic collapse. He insists the regime’s persistence does not hinge on one leader and cautions against simplistic characterizations of Maduro or Chavez as solely responsible for ruin. - Economic dynamics and sanctions: The discussion emphasizes that Venezuela’s economic trajectory has been shaped by sanctions and counter-sanctions, with Speaker 1 asserting that U.S. maximum-pressure campaigns and the theft of assets (including Sitco and gold reserves) severely impacted the economy. He argues the sanctions constitute financial terrorism and compares U.S. policy to broader imperial dynamics centered on dollar dominance and oil leverage. - Regime change prospects and future leadership: The speakers speculate about possible future leadership within the Pesuv or an alternative power structure, including the potential grooming of a candidate from within the regime or the return of Maria Carina Machado if conditions align. They note that a political shift would require military backing, and they discuss whether an eventual election could be staged or delayed to a more favorable time for U.S. interests. They emphasize that, absent military support, it would be difficult for any non-Maduro leadership to emerge. - China, Russia, and global signaling: The conversation covers the Chinese envoy’s presence in Caracas before the operation and the broader implications for China’s role in Venezuela. Speaker 1 argues the operation sent a global message to rivals (China, Russia, Iran) that the U.S. can seize leadership and resources, while also suggesting that China could be leveraged to avoid deeper conflict by permitting continued oil exports. The dialogue also touches on potential retaliatory moves by Russia or China and the broader geopolitical chessboard, including implications for Greenland and other strategic theaters. - Legal proceedings and comparisons to other regime changes: Maduro’s indictment in the Southern District of New York is discussed, with reflections on its weaknesses and how it compares to similar prosecutions (e.g., Juan Orlando Hernandez). The discussion concludes with a sense that Venezuela will likely face a prolonged, complex confrontation, with lingering questions about who will govern next and under what terms.

Today's lecture covers the "Cuban Venezuelan conquest of the United States," focusing on Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution. The lecture will cover the period of 1998-2001, the 2002 counterrevolution, the 2004 recall election, Chavez's consolidation of power, and the rise of a mafia super cartel in Venezuela. According to the speaker, the best businesses in Venezuela are oil and elections. The speaker claims to have met with Venezuela's superintendent of cryptocurrencies in 2018 to discuss the Petro coin. He also claims to have studied Marxism and Chinese culture. Venezuela's economy has relied heavily on oil since 1922, causing economic booms and busts. A Marxist left movement emerged in the sixties and seventies, influencing Hugo Chavez in the military. In 1992, Chavez led a failed coup and was imprisoned. After two years, he was released and began saying "poor Eora for now." In 1998, Chavez campaigned for president and won.

The lecture covers Hugo Chavez's rise in Venezuela, the Bolivarian Revolution, and the emergence of a mafia super-cartel. In 1992, Chavez led a failed coup, later emerging to win the presidency in 1998, initiating a "Bolivarian" revolution. A 2002 counter-revolution briefly ousted him, but he returned to power. By 2004, despite low poll numbers, Chavez won a recall referendum, solidifying his power with Fidel Castro's guidance. The "Cartel de la Soles," composed of military generals, effectively became the Venezuelan government, looting billions from the country's oil reserves. The two key assets seized were PDVSA (the national oil company) and CNE (the National Electoral Council). Smartmatic, a company founded by Venezuelan engineers, created computerized election systems that helped Chavez rig elections. Smartmatic acquired Sequoia, injecting its intellectual property and merging with Diebold hardware. This technology is now found in Dominion, Hart InterCivic, and ES&S election systems. Components are manufactured in China, with Iran facilitating payments to obscure the supply chain. The speaker claims this Venezuelan mafia, with Chinese and Iranian assistance, has been rigging elections in 72 nations. He urges viewers to share the video and support americaproject.com.

Hugo Chavez led a "Bolivarian" revolution in Venezuela, characterized by populism, anti-American sentiment, and focus on programs for the poor. He faced a counter-revolution in 2002, where he was held for 47 hours, but was released after negotiations mediated by the Catholic Church. By 2004, a recall referendum was triggered due to widespread discontent, with polls showing only 30-35% support for Chavez. However, he won the referendum with 58% of the vote. Following the referendum, Chavez consolidated his power, drawing inspiration from Fidel Castro, who became a mentor. By 2012, even Human Rights Watch criticized the concentration and abuse of power in Venezuela under Chavez. He died the following year.

Speaker 0 argued that Maduro was not democratically elected and was not cracking down on drug trafficking to the U.S. and other countries, contrasting this with Honduras’ crackdown on drug trafficking supported by agencies like the DEA and Southcom, which earned praise for the Honduran government. The discussion then turned to U.S. policy. Speaker 0 asked whether the interviewee supports what the Trump administration did, or believes there is a line that should not be crossed. They noted that the U.S. military action against Maduro—bombing the country, entering, capturing Maduro, killing members of his government, and taking him to jail—was seen by some as positive, with Maduro described as a criminal who destroyed the country and economy. Speaker 1 responded by focusing on the human impact in Venezuela and other Latin American countries. They stated that a large portion of the population has suffered, with a notable number of people migrating from Venezuela and Honduras. They asserted that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, stating that the opposition’s poll results were stored in the cloud and the government did not want to see them because they knew they would lose. They described this as not democracy. They added that, since Hondurans left the country due to trafficking, vessels by sea and illegal flights were bringing jobs to Honduras, but also causing deaths and bloodshed. They argued that if the Trump administration framed Drug Trafficking as terrorism, it was warranted because the drug flow to the United States harmed not only U.S. citizens but also Honduras, which faced the highest death toll in fifteen years due to drugs coming through its borders, largely from Venezuela, and that nothing was done about this by prior administrations. Speaker 0 then asked for the stance on U.S. intervention in general: should intervention be allowed only in certain cases (e.g., Maduro), or should there be no U.S. intervention in Latin America under any president? Speaker 1 shared a Venezuelan friend’s view that there are no options to change Venezuela and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From a Honduran perspective, they believed Trump’s actions helped not only Honduras but also other Central American and regional countries along the drug-trafficking routes, by reducing corruption, bloodshed, and deaths. They argued that the political machinery Chavez created and used to stall elections in other Latin American countries had previously gone unchecked by the U.S., and that Trump faced Maduro with a confrontation. They concluded that many people in the world do not know what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. They stated that Trump confronted Maduro, who now has a chance to defend himself in a trial, and emphasized the issue of sovereignty for every country.

- The discussion opens with the possibility of a coup in Venezuela, with Speaker 0 suggesting the first step would be to “take out Maduro.” Speaker 1 notes reports that Maduro sought amnesty from the US to step down, which Trump allegedly refused. - A recurring theme is the idea of watching naval movements to gauge US willingness to attack a country. Speaker 2 emphasizes that an aircraft carrier battle group signals seriousness, citing the USS Gerald R. Ford and 11 associated ships as the indicator that the US is “serious.” He also questions any upside for the US in regime change in Venezuela, noting the US has avoided buying or refining Venezuelan oil and arguing that the policy lacks a clear benefit. - On drugs, Speaker 2 asserts that the drugs in Venezuela are not Venezuelan but come from Colombia and Ecuador, transiting Venezuela to West Africa and then to Europe, with the claim that Europe is the primary market and the US a smaller one. He argues this reflects broader flaws in US foreign policy. - The speakers discuss the potential consequences if Maduro steps down, predicting chaos, and reflect on the broader narrative shift from Iran, Russia, and Ukraine to Venezuela. They discuss whether the military and regional powers would support intervention. Speaker 2 argues that regional powers (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico) are opposed to American intervention, complicating any possible regime-change effort. - The issue of amnesty is revisited. Speaker 2 speculates Trump might want a “scalp” as a symbol of seriousness on drugs, drawing a parallel to Manuel Noriega’s capture, while noting that a post-overthrow stability plan is often missing in US operations. - The conversation touches on China’s role. Speaker 2 suggests China’s refinery investments in the Caribbean represent a strategic shift away from US-dominated refining, arguing that this creates incentives for China and reduces the US’s influence, with Maduro’s regime survival as a central concern. - On whether Maduro would offer US full access to Venezuelan oil, Speaker 2 says he can’t see it changing the strategic calculus, and argues China’s expanding influence makes regime change less sensible for the US. - They discuss the plausibility of using naval movements as a bluff to force Maduro to depart, noting such tactics are used in the South China Sea. However, Speaker 2 cautions that removing Maduro would create a power vacuum, and the military’s stance remains uncertain since the region’s powers oppose intervention. - Regarding the opposition, Speaker 2 downplays Maria Machado’s prospects, suggesting she lacks military backing and that a senior military officer might be the likely successor if Maduro leaves. The Juan Guaido episode is cited to illustrate the fragility and divisiveness of Venezuelan opposition movements. - The feasibility of decapitation-style strikes against Maduro is debated. Speaker 2 stresses Maduro is the internationally recognized president and emphasizes that any coup would require ground forces and a day-two plan, which historically has been lacking in US interventions. - They compare potential outcomes to Libya’s post-overthrow chaos and caution that US-imposed peace rarely lasts. The risk of a renewed crisis in Venezuela, including possible Hezbollah or Iranian connections, is acknowledged as a troubling possibility. - The discussion ends with a somber note that even seasoned policymakers may overestimate the success of regime change, and a reminder of historical lessons about coup outcomes and long-term stability.

Venezuela's significance stems from its connections with Iran, Russia, and China, forming an authoritarian network. A retired admiral in Venezuela highlighted Iranian influence in the Ministry of Defense, prompting research into these ties. The presence of over 350,000 Venezuelans in Syria, more than in Brazil, raises questions about their roles. Historical analysis reveals that after the Cuban Revolution, Cuba aimed to control Venezuela for its oil. Despite initial failures, Syrian operatives trained Venezuelan insurgents, leading to the rise of Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian movement. This deep-rooted Middle Eastern influence explains Iran's strong presence in Venezuela, surpassing that of Russia and China, and shaping the current geopolitical landscape.

The speaker asks, why are we doing this and why are we so opposed to Nicolas Maduro. On the street, most people would say they don’t know who Nicolas Maduro is. But in places like South Florida, where people recognize Maduro and can identify Venezuela on a map, the typical answer shifts: because he’s a communist or a socialist. The speaker asserts that this is true: Nicolas Maduro and his government are very left wing on economics. The speaker notes an interesting distinction: this left-wing stance is economic, not social. In Venezuela, gay marriage is banned, abortion is banned, and sex changes for transgender individuals are banned. The speaker describes Venezuela as one of the very few countries in the entire hemisphere with those social policies, emphasizing that these policies are conservative socially. The speaker adds that Venezuela is one of the very few nations in the region with those social policies, specifying that it is on social policy, not defending the regime. The speaker mentions that only El Salvador comes close in conservatism, though El Salvador is much smaller. Additionally, the speaker brings up a political point: the US-backed opposition leader who would take Maduro’s place, if Maduro were removed, is described as eager to implement gay marriage in Venezuela. This is presented as a counterpoint to the idea that the opposition is globally liberal or that the regime is uniquely opposed to liberal social policies. The speaker references the notion of a “global homo” project and implies that the reality is different from that belief, labeling the project as not crazy after all. The overall argument ties Maduro’s economic leftism to social policy conservatism, and contrasts Venezuelan social policy with potential shifts under the opposition, while noting public recognition differences about Maduro.

Over the last 20 years, the Venezuelan mafia, with assistance from China and Iran, has been rigging elections in 72 nations across Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. This has changed the arc of history. The speaker provided the backstory on Hugo Chavez, the Bolivarian Revolution, and the emergence of a Venezuelan super cartel mafia where oil and elections are the best businesses. The speaker claims responsibility for any felonies committed and refers to a letter, referencing his book "Danger Close." The speaker states Venezuela has put a $25,000,000 bounty on his head, revealed during a legal issue with Hunter Biden. He requests security to return and face any charges. He urges the DOJ to reflect on whether they have similar protections. He asks Americans to share the video and sign up for $5 a month at americaproject.com to help fund the unraveling of this situation. He calls it the Cuban Venezuelan conquest of the United States of America.

A Venezuelan American speaker describes the impact of the regime on their family and millions of others. Their family lost everything—work, savings, investments—wiped out by a narco dictatorship that has held Venezuela in a death grip for over twenty-five years. The Venezuelan exodus is described as the second largest displacement crisis on Earth after Syria, a humanitarian disaster and not just tragedy. The regime has jailed hundreds of political prisoners and thousands have been murdered for speaking out. More than a third of the population has fled, not for opportunity or the American dream, but to survive because staying often means death. The speaker contends Venezuela is not merely a collapsed state but an occupied one, with territory, natural resources, and institutions overrun by hostile foreign powers: Iranian militias, Chinese corporations, Russian intelligence, all exploiting the country with impunity. Venezuela, they argue, is no longer a local crisis but a geopolitical threat endangering the Western Hemisphere, a launchpad for authoritarian expansion in the Americas. Amid this, Maria Corina Machado is highlighted as a leader who dared to push for freedom. In 2024, she supposedly led a peaceful democratic uprising that won the election. Her team allegedly smuggled physical voting receipts out of the country—hard proof of victory the regime attempted to bury. The speaker says her courage has sparked belief among millions of Venezuelans that change is possible. Some people have questioned Machado’s decision to dedicate her Nobel Prize to Donald Trump. The speaker accepts the criticism but argues it was a brilliant strategic move on the global political stage. Machado is portrayed as understanding Trump’s character, his campaign for the prize, and the symbolic, personal value of the recognition to him. The claim is that this gesture might keep Trump’s attention focused on Venezuela at a time when U.S. presence and pressure in the Caribbean is rising. The dedication is described not as flattery or optics, but as a strategic act to protect and preserve a form of power that could shift history, grounded in the belief that the ultimate aim is freedom. The speaker emphasizes that Machado is not asking for a U.S. invasion or war; Venezuela is already invaded and held hostage by a narco state with foreign agents and enemies of democracy—Russians, Iranians, Chinese—operating freely to expand influence across Latin America. Machado is calling for the support of the only military capable of countering that threat, framed as liberation rather than imperialism. The argument is that the fight is for Venezuela’s life, not theory or politics, and that the world should recognize what’s at stake. The fight for Venezuela is a fight for freedom, democracy, and continental stability, and if liberty, human dignity, and peace in the Americas matter, Venezuela’s fight must matter to all.

Voter participation is crucial to prevent authoritarian regimes like those in Cuba and Venezuela from influencing America. Hugo Chavez rose to power in Venezuela through a coup, became a dictator, and established a mafia-controlled government that seized the oil and election industries. Despite low popular support, Chavez manipulated elections with the help of Smartmatic, a company created by Venezuelan engineers to rig election technology. This system has spread to the U.S. election infrastructure, posing a threat to democracy. The Venezuelan mafia, backed by China and Iran, has interfered in elections across 72 countries. It's vital to stay informed, vote, and support initiatives that promote fair elections.

Hugo Chavez, a communist dictator, came to power in Venezuela in 1999, leading a mafia known as the "cartel of the suns." The Venezuelan military generals, referred to as generalissimos, control this mafia. Upon seizing power, they took control of the oil industry, amassing $4 trillion while the population suffered. To maintain their grip, they also seized the election council, creating a software package to rig elections. This software was commercialized under the name Smartmatic, which serves as a front for the Venezuelan election council, a subsidiary of the mafia. Smartmatic's technology became integral to major voting systems like Dominion and ES&S.

The lecture covers Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution, the Venezuelan mafia (Cartel de la Soles), and alleged election rigging. Chavez, after a failed 1992 coup, rose to power in 1998, initiating a "Bolivarian" revolution. A 2002 counter-revolution failed, and Chavez consolidated power, mentored by Fidel Castro. The Cartel de la Soles, composed of military generals, effectively became the Venezuelan government, looting billions from the country's oil reserves. The two best businesses in Venezuela are oil and elections. Smartmatic, a company founded by Venezuelan engineers, allegedly created a computerized election system for Chavez, using technology from Olivetti, an Italian lottery terminal manufacturer. The Smartmatic software, it is claimed, was integrated into Dominion, Hart InterCivic, and ES&S voting systems. Components are allegedly sourced from a factory near Beijing, China, with Iran facilitating payments to obscure the supply chain. The speaker claims Jorge Rodriguez hinted at rigging elections in other countries. He concludes that the Venezuelan mafia, with assistance from China and Iran, has been rigging elections in 72 nations. He asks the DOJ to hold him responsible and requests security due to a $25 million bounty on his head by Venezuela. He urges listeners to share the video and donate to americaproject.com.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that "economic statecraft" is a euphemism for coercion, describing it as "war by economic means" used largely by the United States to crush other economies rather than to promote development or cooperation. He notes that treasury officials have framed it proudly as a tool to bring about regime change, citing Scott Besent’s Davos remarks about crushing the Iranian economy to foment change. Sachs emphasizes that this machinery is "warfare" aimed at destruction, not at improving well-being or enriching the United States, and it has real human costs—driving impoverishment, health crises, and rising mortality. To understand this tool, Sachs situates it within American imperial practice, which he says relies on indirect rule through puppet regimes rather than outright territorial conquest. He traces the lineage to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, the phasing of interventions in Latin America under the Monroe Doctrine’s Roosevelt Corollary, and the 1954 Guatemalan coup against Jacobo Arbenz. He cites Lindsey O’Rourke’s Covert Regime Change, which counted 64 covert regime-change operations by the United States between 1947 and 1989. Economic statecraft, in his view, can function as a regime-change instrument by weakening an economy enough to destabilize a government, facilitating CIA-led or CIA-backed interventions, sometimes wrapped as color revolutions. In the Venezuela case, Sachs traces the shift from a failed 2002 coup attempt to economic coercion as the primary mechanism of pressure. He explains how Venezuela’s oil wealth, once seen as the world’s largest reserves, interacted with U.S. corporate and political power—ExxonMobil and Chevron among them—and how that dynamic fed efforts to topple the Chávez/Maduro governments. He describes the sequence starting with 2014 color-revolution attempts, the role of U.S. funding and media operations via organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy, and the crackdown that followed protests. Sanctions escalated under Obama with the designation of Venezuela as a national security emergency and intensified under Trump, including confiscating foreign-exchange reserves, freezing accounts, and declaring PDVSA under sanction. This culminated in Severe economic collapse: oil production fell about 75% from 2016 to 2020, currency and import capacities deteriorated, and per-capita output dropped by about two-thirds, which Sachs characterizes as "worse than a war." He also points to Trump’s unorthodox actions, such as naming Juan Guaidó as president in IMF context, signaling a unilateral reshaping of legitimacy. For Iran, Sachs describes decades of comprehensive sanctions and Trump’s renewed push to crush the economy using OFAC and extraterritorial sanctions. He cites Scott Besant’s interview claiming that by December, the currency had plummeted and dollar shortages followed, framing this as a deliberate regime-change strategy. He notes that mainstream media largely omitted the causal narrative—U.S. role in provoking protests—despite Besant’s public account. Looking ahead, Sachs discusses the multi-polarity challenge. He suggests that the dollar's dominance is waning as alternative settlement systems emerge, such as non-dollar currencies and parallel institutions, notably driven by China and BRICS members. He envisions a shift toward non-dollar settlements—potentially 25% of global transactions within ten years—enabled by digital settlements and new infrastructure that reduces the reach of U.S. extraterritorial sanctions. However, achieving this requires new, dollar-independent institutions, since existing banks remain reluctant to abandon dollar-based business due to sanctions risk. He concludes by noting that the United States’ heavy-handed currency policy may not be sustainable in the long run, as sanctions reach could lessen once non-dollar settlement networks gain traction. The host closes, recognizing this as a pivotal moment where U.S. coercion could either deter rivals or precipitate broader self-harm, and thanks Sachs for his insights.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.