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A computer science expert demonstrated how easy it is to hack voting machines in a federal court in Atlanta. Using a pen, he breached security, altered vote totals, and entered superuser mode. The reaction in the courtroom was shocked, with gasps from the plaintiff's counsel and onlookers. The state's defense downplayed the demonstration, claiming precinct security measures would prevent such hacking. The theatrics of the courtroom were evident as each side tried to sell their argument.

In this video, the speaker discusses the importance of securing election systems. They highlight the risk of connecting these systems to the internet, as it can make them vulnerable to hacking. The speaker suggests that using paper ballots might be a smarter option, as they cannot be hacked like computer systems. By having something tangible to hold on to, like a piece of paper, we can ensure the integrity of the election process.

I am concerned about the upcoming election because this voting machine, used in 18 states, can be easily accessed by anyone. I will demonstrate how it can be done in less than 2 minutes without any tools. By opening the machine, removing the card reader and unplugging it, then picking the lock with a ballpoint pen, I gain admin access. I encounter a few error messages, but by clicking Cancel and okay, I bypass them and gain full admin control.

Mark Cook, an election cybersecurity subject matter expert in threat assessment and common sense mitigation, introduces himself: he’s been working on elections nonstop for about six years and has forty years of IT industry experience. He states that he has evidence he hopes to show that there are backdoors built into electronic voting systems that allow flipping, changing of votes. He references a demonstration clip, saying, “backdoors built in to electronic voting systems that allow flipping, changing of votes,” and notes that the testing labs miss this, leaving the systems blindly certified and supposedly safe. He highlights audio he believes was clipped from a recording, insisting that the content shows voting systems are vulnerable: “that allow flipping, changing of votes,” and that testing labs are blind to these issues. He says, “I can demonstrate this to you even while I'm still here in this building.” Cook argues that there is a lack of government transparency, claiming, “the testing labs all miss this, then they're blindly certified, and then we're told, it's shut down our throats, that everything is safe and secure.” He describes the entire system as “built on a pyramid of lies,” and asserts that it must be stopped. He offers to educate and show problems, insisting he can do so, but emphasizes the need for a common-sense approach. He emphasizes practicality and accessibility, arguing that the problem can be solved with straightforward methods: “We're literally filling dots out on paper. We're counting the dots, adding the dots up, and whoever has the most dots wins.” He calls for a change that keeps elections under the control of the people and avoids simply “kicking the can down the road.” He reiterates that the resolution is not complicated and frames the solution as a simple, transparent counting method using paper records rather than electronic manipulation. In summary, Cook asserts the existence of covert backdoors in electronic voting systems, criticizes testing labs for blindly certifying these systems, condemns what he calls a “pyramid of lies,” and advocates a return to a basic, paper-driven, dot-counting approach where the person with the most dots wins, to restore public control over elections. He offers to provide demonstrations and education to support this view.

The video discusses various ways in which technology can be compromised, focusing on seven primary attack vectors. These include exploiting website vulnerabilities, breaching state servers, insider threats, infecting state PCs, poisoned updates at the manufacturer level, spreading malware to state election systems, and compromising state tabulators. The speaker then mentions that they will go through each of these attack vectors one by one, starting with exploiting website vulnerabilities.

Dominion machines are certified and sealed, but vulnerabilities exist. Before elections, a supposed glitch prompts an emergency patch that opens backdoor access from a Serbian office, which is the true operational center of Dominion. This office, despite being presented as a U.S. company, has connections to Chinese nationals and operates on Huawei machines. Using virtual machines, they manipulate election results by creating a hidden environment within the county election equipment. After altering the data, they collapse the virtual machine, leaving no trace unless a forensic audit is conducted. This manipulation is facilitated through connections to China, raising concerns about the integrity of the election process. For more information, visit Stolen Elections Facts.

The speaker, a computer science professor, warns that the electronic voting systems used in the US are vulnerable to sabotage and cyber attacks that can change votes. Through their research, they have repeatedly hacked voting machines and found ways for attackers to manipulate them. They emphasize that these vulnerabilities are within reach for America's enemies. While some states have secure voting technology, others are alarmingly vulnerable, putting the entire nation at risk. The speaker debunks the belief that voting machines are secure because they are not connected to the internet, explaining that many machines have wireless modems for faster result uploading. They conclude that it is only a matter of time before these vulnerabilities are exploited.

The video discusses the vulnerabilities of a specific voting machine, the ES&S Model 650, and the potential for hacking and manipulation of election results. The machine lacks security measures and can be easily accessed through a serial console on the back, providing full root access. With physical access, someone could rewrite the machine's code to manipulate vote counts. The machine's operating system has never received security patches and can be compromised by simply plugging in a zip disk. The video highlights the lack of security in these machines and the potential for widespread hacking.

In this video, the speakers discuss the risks associated with modems in voting machines. They highlight concerns about hacking and the potential for cheating in future elections. ES&S, a voting machine manufacturer, claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, last summer, ES&S voting systems were found online in some precincts across 11 states. Cellular modems are commonly used to transmit election results, but this introduces vulnerabilities. Intruders can intercept data between the cell tower and voting machines, allowing them to alter votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many new machines have wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.

A voting machine, which the speaker calls the "worst voting machine used in the United States," was vulnerable to USB attacks. The machine was used in Maryland and Virginia until 2012. By plugging in a pre-programmed USB device, costing around $120, an attacker could gain complete control of the system in seconds. With full control, an attacker could change votes, add candidates, or manipulate results without leaving evidence, because the machine lacks a paper ballot. The speaker demonstrated how easily the machine could be hacked, emphasizing that the process was slowed down for demonstration purposes. The speaker also mentioned that a professor from Denmark wirelessly hacked the same machine in under 30 minutes at DEFCON. Because of vulnerabilities like these, the speaker believes hand-marked paper ballots are necessary to verify election outcomes.

In this video, the speaker discusses the importance of securing election systems. They highlight the risk of connecting these systems to the internet, as it can make them vulnerable to hacking. The speaker suggests that using paper ballots might be a smarter option, as they cannot be hacked like computer systems. By having something tangible to hold on to, like a piece of paper, it becomes more difficult for entities like Russia to interfere with the election process.

The video discusses the vulnerabilities in election systems and the potential for manipulation by hackers. It mentions that voting machines, campaign networks, and registration databases are all at risk. The speaker explains that attackers can cause mischief without physically accessing the machines, such as by messing up voter files. It is noted that Russia was able to influence the election by breaching DNC computers and targeting election-related systems in multiple states. The speaker emphasizes that manipulating vote counts on every machine in America would be difficult, but flipping a few senate seats could still impact the US Congress. The video concludes by suggesting that nation states and criminals likely have knowledge of these vulnerabilities.

The video highlights instances of vote manipulation in the election database, specifically focusing on Donald Trump's votes. It reveals that votes for Trump were switched and removed from his total, making it appear as if there were no changes. In three counties, over 30,000 votes for Trump disappeared. The video provides a clear example of this manipulation, where Trump's votes were switched with Biden's in a matter of minutes. This type of manipulation can go undetected in state reporting due to the time lag between each state update.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker demonstrated how they were able to boot up the Electionware system on a non-conforming laptop, highlighting violations of security protocols. They revealed that default passwords for election machines are easily accessible online, posing a significant security risk. The speaker emphasized the urgent need for updating security measures and changing passwords to enhance election security. They also pointed out the lack of antivirus protection on crucial election machines, putting counties at risk. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of immediate action to address these vulnerabilities.

The video discusses concerns about the potential manipulation of votes in election software. It questions whether proper validation processes were followed, such as having observers from both parties present during the transmission of SD cards and the transportation of ballots. The speaker also mentions the use of election night reporting data and emphasizes that there is no human entry of totals, which eliminates the possibility of human error.

Cybersecurity experts agree that electronic voting machines are dangerous and obsolete. These machines can be easily hacked, as demonstrated by a computer scientist who has hacked multiple machines and even turned one into a video game console. The vulnerability of these machines puts our election infrastructure at risk of sabotage and cyberattacks. In the 2016 election, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic machines. The speaker reveals a step-by-step process for hacking these machines and stealing votes. The solution proposed is to use paper ballots, which can be quickly scanned and verified by humans. It is emphasized that all elections should be run with paper ballots and audits. The importance of having a paper backup system is highlighted. The concise transcript emphasizes the need to replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots for secure and reliable elections.

Speaker 0: Totals being awarded to Biden and Jorgensen's totals being awarded to Trump. After gaining access to a forensic image of the Dominion election management system in Mesa County, Colorado, IT experts demonstrate how easy it is to switch tens of thousands of votes from Trump to Biden in seconds by simply changing the index number next to each candidate's name. Speaker 1: This is a a backdoor utility called SQL Server Management Studio that is actually installed on the image of the voting system. So is it certified? It is not on the list of certified software. What I'm gonna do first, I'm just gonna pull up the presidential results in Mesa County for that election. And here they are. You can see Biden has 31,000. Trump has 56,000. K. So I'm gonna come up here now, and I'm going to make a quick change. Change that to a two? Yep. I'm changing Trump to a one. Okay. And then I'm going to come up here, and I'm gonna rerun the port. And there you go. Biden, 56,000. Trump, 31,000. So I just flipped the results of the election using a tool that's actually built in to the voting system. And what I did is not even logged. There's no trace of what I just did now. For some reason, the logging of activities by a user that has the password are not retained. Speaker 0: In Pennsylvania on live TV, Trump had 1,690,589 votes, while Biden had 1,252,537 votes. The time was approximately 11:08 Eastern Standard Time. The next interval report shows Trump's votes decreasing to 1,670,631 and Biden's votes increasing to 1,272,495. The time is approximately 11:09PM. Live on CNN, exactly 19,958 votes were switched from Trump to Biden. This means Trump lost 39,916 votes.

Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The machines can be hacked through the machine used to program them, and many of them have wireless modems that can connect to the internet, despite claims that they are not connected. The vulnerabilities in the voting machines, along with the lack of secure systems for voter registration and result reporting, pose a significant risk to the integrity of elections. It is crucial to address these vulnerabilities to ensure the trustworthiness of election results.

In Mesa County, Colorado, IT experts demonstrate how easy it is to switch thousands of votes from Trump to Biden using a backdoor utility in the Dominion election management system. The tool allows them to change the results without leaving a trace. In Pennsylvania, live TV footage shows nearly 20,000 votes being switched from Trump to Biden, resulting in Trump losing almost 40,000 votes. The manipulation occurs within minutes, highlighting vulnerabilities in the voting system.

A computer science professor explains how a voting machine can be easily manipulated by gaining physical access to it. By connecting a computer to the machine's serial port, one can rewrite the code and control the election results. The professor also highlights the lack of security measures on these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Another expert shares their experience of being left alone with voting machines after an election, emphasizing how easily someone could insert malware into them. The central count scanner discussed is widely used in America for counting ballots. The speakers mention the ease of obtaining the machine's software from a Russian server and the numerous individuals who have access to the machines, including potential adversaries. They conclude that the multitude of possible hacks and entry points make it unlikely that someone isn't taking advantage of these vulnerabilities.

Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to security researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The most efficient way to hack the machines is through the machine used to program them, as it can pass rogue software to the voting machines. Contrary to popular belief, many voting machines are connected to the internet, either through wireless modems or other means, making them susceptible to cyber attacks. The lack of proper security measures and outdated systems make it only a matter of time before election results are compromised.

In this video, the speakers demonstrate how a USB drive can be used to manipulate voting systems. They explain that election officials may not be aware of the potential misuse of USB drives. The speaker inserts the USB drive into the voting system, running a backdoor utility that is preinstalled. They show that the screen does not display any indication of the manipulation. By executing commands, they change the election results back to the original numbers. The speakers emphasize the simplicity and accessibility of this method, as USB drives are widely known and inexpensive.

The video discusses evidence of foreign interference in the election, showing how votes were manipulated and which computers were involved. The speakers highlight the importance of cybersecurity experts uncovering the attacks in real-time, preventing potential election manipulation. They express gratitude for the proof of interference and emphasize the significance of having this information. The speakers marvel at the detailed documentation and consider it a miracle to have such insight into the attacks.

In this video, the speaker discusses a governor's race and the use of a program called "fraction magic" to manipulate the results. They mention a candidate named Basil who initially had only 219 votes, but they plan to manipulate the allocation rules to make him the winner. The speaker demonstrates how the program works by injecting new allocation rules into 80,000 votes. They emphasize that they are not a thief but are demonstrating an ethical swap. At the end, they reveal that the new winner of the race is Basil.