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There are concerns about the security of electronic voting machines, as they can potentially be hacked without detection. While there is no evidence of this happening, it cannot be proven that it hasn't or won't happen in the future. Instances of machine errors have been reported, such as recording extra votes for a candidate or subtracting votes instead of adding them. It is unknown how many instances went unnoticed and what impact they had on elections. Legislation is being proposed to require a paper trail for every electronic machine, similar to ATM receipts, to ensure transparency and allow for verification. An investigation is also being requested to assess the effectiveness of voting machines and improve election systems.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

The speaker states they are investigating dangerous and negative consequences with the "best of the best." They claim electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and open to exploitation, allowing manipulation of vote results. This vulnerability purportedly reinforces the need for paper ballots nationwide, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

The speaker observed a broken chain of custody in the handling of mail-in ballots, drop box ballots, and Election Day USB card flash drives. They witnessed the voting machine warehouse supervisor uploading USB cards to the machines multiple times without being observed by the proper authorities. The speaker raised their concerns to the deputy sheriff and the Clerk of Elections, noting that the supervisor was carrying baggies and inserting USBs into the machines. This happened over 24 times.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

The speaker, a computer science professor, warns that the electronic voting systems used in the US are vulnerable to sabotage and cyber attacks that can change votes. Through their research, they have repeatedly hacked voting machines and found ways for attackers to manipulate them. They emphasize that these vulnerabilities are within reach for America's enemies. While some states have secure voting technology, others are alarmingly vulnerable, putting the entire nation at risk. The speaker debunks the belief that voting machines are secure because they are not connected to the internet, explaining that many machines have wireless modems for faster result uploading. They conclude that it is only a matter of time before these vulnerabilities are exploited.

The transcript discusses concerns about election irregularities and voting machines. One speaker claims a voting machine subtracted votes, displaying a negative number. Another speaker states that such subtraction cannot occur accidentally and that someone consciously tried to steal votes. A third speaker says that when they press the button next to their name, another person's name appears on the display, questioning the accuracy of the vote count. Another speaker asserts that the machines are working correctly, recording votes accurately, and that the results will be accurate and reliable. One speaker expresses concern about private corporations controlling the voting system and calls for a formal debate about election irregularities, warning that the democracy and republic are at risk.

The speaker discusses cybersecurity concerns in the election system, alleging that votes are stored on servers in Germany and could be manipulated by hackers. They point to suspicious vote count changes in swing states and highlight vulnerabilities in the software that could allow for vote manipulation. The speaker questions the transparency of the election process and calls for investigations into potential fraud. In Georgia, a hand recount of all ballots was announced following demands from the Trump campaign.

The speaker claims to have personally witnessed a man inserting USB drives into voting machines on over 24 occasions, which they reported to a deputy sheriff and the clerk of elections. They were told that leaving USBs in voting machines is normal, but later learned this was not the case. The speaker alleges that 47 USB cards are now missing. They demanded that vote counts be updated live, and when they were, the count showed 50,000 votes, which they claim were for Vice President Biden. The speaker says they asked multiple law enforcement agencies to examine the computers for forensic evidence, but this was not done. The speaker further claims that chain of custody logs, records, and yellow sheets are gone, and that poll workers were invited to recreate the logs. They state there are 100,000 to 120,000 ballots in question and that there is no remedy for this regarding the presidential election. They do not believe anyone could certify the vote in good conscience.

In the exchange, concerns are raised about mail-in ballots in Allegheny and Philadelphia counties and how they were counted. Speaker 0 notes that ballots were counted without observers, citing 682,770 ballots observed and asking about the 1,823,148 mailed-out ballots, contrasted with a final count showing 2,589,242 mail-in ballots. The core question is: what explains the roughly 700,000 mail-in ballots that “appeared from nowhere”? Speaker 1 responds that their cyber team uses white-hat hacking techniques to gather publicly available information from the secretary of state’s website, which has been updated as late as 11:16 this morning with provisional and mail-in ballots, though those numbers continue to change. He adds that the 2,500,000 figure is no longer on the website, and it has “just been taken off.” There is no annotation explaining why. Speaker 2 then describes an on-the-ground observation: a deputy sheriff, a senior law enforcement officer, was seen not being observed and walking in with baggies, with USBs being inserted into machines. The witness claims to have personally witnessed this 24 times, with additional witnesses including Democrat poll watchers. They were told by an attorney that every election leaves a couple of USB cards in the voting machines to be brought back by the warehouse manager, but this account is contradicted by law enforcement and other officials. The witness states that 47 USB cards are missing and “they’re nowhere to be found,” and that 32 to 30 cards uploaded were not present in the live vote update. The witness demanded timely live upload of vote results, which showed 50,000 votes; they assert those votes were for Vice President Biden, though they note that identifying who those votes were for should not matter to a computer scientist. Speaker 1 emphasizes that forensic evidence from the computers was not obtained: the procedure would involve turning off the computer, imaging the drive with BitLocker, under law enforcement observation, which would take about an hour for five machines. This forensic imaging was never performed, despite objections three weeks earlier. They later learned that virtually all chain-of-custody logs, yellow sheets, and forensic records in Delaware County were gone; a signing party attempted to recreate the logs with poll workers but was unsuccessful in recovering them all. The discussion concludes with a claim that there are 100,000 to 120,000 ballots, both mail-in and USB, in question, and that there is no remedy or “cure” within the local charter for certifying a presidential vote, leaving the speaker asserting that nobody could certify the vote in good conscience.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker demonstrated how they were able to boot up the Electionware system on a non-conforming laptop, highlighting violations of security protocols. They revealed that default passwords for election machines are easily accessible online, posing a significant security risk. The speaker emphasized the urgent need for updating security measures and changing passwords to enhance election security. They also pointed out the lack of antivirus protection on crucial election machines, putting counties at risk. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of immediate action to address these vulnerabilities.

The video discusses concerns about the potential manipulation of votes in election software. It questions whether proper validation processes were followed, such as having observers from both parties present during the transmission of SD cards and the transportation of ballots. The speaker also mentions the use of election night reporting data and emphasizes that there is no human entry of totals, which eliminates the possibility of human error.

- Speaker 0 asserts that mail-in ballots are corrupt and that a Republican-led effort will end mail-in ballots, including drafting an executive order by “the best lawyers in the country.” They claim the U.S. is nearly the only country using mail-in ballots and cite “massive fraud all over the place,” arguing that secure, paper-ballot elections with watermarking would produce faster results (claims that paper ballots provide results the same night, whereas machines allegedly take two weeks). - The conversation references a specific election night anomaly: a block of 138,000 votes (Speaker 1 and Speaker 2 confirm “138,000” votes) all reportedly voting for Biden with no Trump votes in that segment, described as inexplicable and not consistent with expected linear reporting. They note the timing as around 04:30–06:30 in the morning and suggest the results should not be linear given numerous counters reporting across states. They also complain that Nevada stopped counting mid-day, calling it inexplicable and illogical. - Speaker 4 claims a counting software glitch caused a 6,000-vote swing in a county, where ballots counted for Democrats were miscalculated for Republicans; she states that 47 counties use the same software. - Speaker 5 demonstrates concerns about voting-machine security: he shows how a bad actor could gain full admin access in under two minutes by opening a device, removing the card reader, and bypassing error messages, implying easy manipulation of tabulation in 18 states using the machine. - Speaker 6 describes observed ballot processing irregularities: a ballot-stuffing environment where ballots are stamped and filled in rapidly at the top of tickets, with security oversight present but gaps noted in workflow. - Speaker 7 discusses absentee/mail-in ballots with suspicions about sequence numbers: numbers appeared almost sequential, suggesting they could not be from mailed-in ballots, as mailed ballots typically arrive at different numbers; they note there was no date on envelopes and that some details would not be in poll books or the system, alleging irregularities in how ballots were handled. - Speaker 8 reports ongoing theft of duplicate ballots: a table for duplicates existed, but ballots were copied and redistributed at various tables, with duplicates not fully processed and ballots stashed under boxes; the speaker claims this occurred throughout the night. - Speaker 9 recounts a local media denial of fraud at the TCF center, contrasted with video obtained later showing a van delivering ballots after hours; she describes escort cars, a back-and-forth of ballots, and suggests the presence of unobserved ballots and a lack of witnesses during tabulation. She notes that the video was shared publicly and led to the suspension of a social-media account. - Speaker 10 provides a timeline from October 21, detailing a driver delivering mail-in ballots from New York to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and then to Lancaster, with the driver faced hours of waiting, lack of slips, and unclear purpose for moving the load; the driver states that this was the only time he transported mail-in ballots and expresses a belief in the importance of honest elections for Americans.

I observed a senior law enforcement officer entering the voting area with USBs, which he inserted into the machines. This occurred over 24 times, and multiple witnesses, including Democrat poll watchers, corroborated this. Despite claims that leaving USBs in machines is standard, I found out that having more than two is unusual. Currently, 47 USB cards are missing, and I demanded immediate updates on the vote count, which showed 50,000 votes. I urged law enforcement to collect forensic evidence from the machines, but this was never done. Recently, I learned that all chain of custody records in Delaware County are missing, and efforts to recreate them have failed. This raises serious concerns about 100,000 to 120,000 questionable ballots, with no remedy available for the presidential election, making it impossible to certify the vote with good conscience.

County technical employees reported independently that the vote counts recorded by machines and stored on USB drives changed between the closing of polls and their reopening the next morning. Votes appeared and disappeared overnight. Attempts to verify the integrity of these voting machines were limited to a superficial visual inspection of the USB drives, and a forensic examination was denied.

The speaker states that the best investigators are pursuing election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and can be exploited to manipulate vote results. This vulnerability allegedly drives the mandate to implement paper ballots across the country, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

The speaker discusses the potential vulnerabilities of electronic voting machines. They mention instances where machines recorded extra votes for a candidate or subtracted votes instead of adding them. These issues were caught and corrected, but it raises concerns about undetected instances and their impact on elections. The speaker emphasizes the need for a paper trail to ensure transparency and accountability. They mention legislation proposed by Rush Holt and Hillary Clinton that calls for electronic machines to provide a printed receipt for voters to verify their choices. They also highlight a case where 4,500 votes were lost due to a machine malfunction. The speaker requests an investigation by the Government Accountability Office to assess the effectiveness of voting machines.

A senior law enforcement officer witnessed unauthorized individuals inserting USBs into voting machines multiple times. Despite demands for forensic evidence collection, no action was taken. Chain of custody logs and records in Delaware County are missing, leaving 100,000-120,000 ballots in question with no remedy available. The speaker believes certifying the vote would be unconscionable. Translation: A senior law enforcement officer saw unauthorized people inserting USBs into voting machines multiple times. Despite requests for forensic evidence collection, no action was taken. Chain of custody logs and records in Delaware County are missing, leaving 100,000-120,000 ballots in question with no solution available. The speaker believes certifying the vote would be unethical.

The speaker claims that the public is being deceived about election security. They argue that while individual voting machines may not be connected to the internet, state and county databases are. They allege that votes are stored on a server in Frankfurt, Germany, and that the election software used in 28 states may be infected with malware called Q Snatch. Cybersecurity investigators suggest that this malware could allow hackers to manipulate votes in election databases nationwide. The cofounder of Allied Security Operations supports these claims, stating that the malware collects credentials and enables changes to be made to votes at various stages of the election process. The speaker suggests that this could explain the malicious activities observed during the election.

The speaker discusses various issues related to the election. They mention instances of duplicate scanning of ballots and non-unique cast vote records in Allegheny. They also bring up a case in Antrim County, Michigan, where software settings changed the winner in a small area. Another instance is mentioned in Fulton County, Pennsylvania, where an IP address connected to the voting system from a foreign location. The speaker expresses concern about the security and transparency of the election due to the possibility of data being transmitted to foreign IP addresses. They mention a Python script and a foreign IP address found on the same adjudication workstation. Additionally, they highlight a signature mismatch error code in Georgia's system log files.

Contrary to the current political narrative, the speaker emphasizes that voting machines are not connected to the internet and the Department of Homeland Security claims the 2020 election was secure. However, in 2018, there were instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes. The speaker mentions that hackers were able to breach these machines easily, even with limited knowledge and resources. They also mention the concern of remote access software making the machines vulnerable to fraudsters and hackers. The speaker then addresses the controversy surrounding Dominion, stating that there were no switched or deleted votes involving their machines and that the company has no ties to communism or China. However, there are concerns that some machines may be connected to the internet despite being designed as closed systems.

The speaker witnessed multiple instances where the Delaware County Board of Elections did not follow proper procedures during the election. They personally saw the voting machine warehouse supervisor uploading USB cards into the machines without being observed. The speaker raised concerns to the deputy sheriff and the clerk of elections, but their objections were ignored. It was later revealed that the warehouse manager usually inserts a few USBs into the machines after each election, but the number observed was unusually high. Currently, 47 USB cards are missing and cannot be located.

Nederlandse samenvatting: Al dingen mee doen die leiden tot verstoringen en dan misschien dus niet tot geslaagde verkiezingsfraude, dat is het allerergste, maar wel tot bijvoorbeeld onrust in het proces en daarmee mogelijk verlies van het vertrouwen in het proces. De Kiesraad zegt dat het veilig is, maar wat zeg jij dan? "Ja, dat is dezelfde Kiesraad die de stamcomputers in 2006 ook goed vond." De spreker vraagt: "Wat is jouw antwoord tegenover dan ik vertrouw je niet, maar hoe vind jij het niet veilig?" Hij noemt ontbrekende details: "Ik zie helemaal niks over bijvoorbeeld gedetailleerde eisen en normen over hoe de systemen ingericht moeten worden, waar die software op draait." Toezicht ontbreekt; "Je moet dat toch heel gedetailleerd en fanatiek inregelen." "En wie zijn dat dan?" "Als een gemeente IT grotendeels heeft uitbesteed, worden de computers die de stemmen tellen ingericht door medewerkers van een privaat bedrijf?" De zorg: zonder toezicht en zonder oplossingen voor eenvoudige softwarebugs "kunnen ... leiden tot heel veel risico's" en ons vertrouwen in dit proces. English translation: Doing things that lead to disruptions and then maybe not to successful election fraud, that is the worst, but also for example unrest in the process and thereby possible loss of trust in the process, and that is nearly as bad as fraud. The Electoral Board says it is safe, but what do you say? "Yes, that is the same Electoral Board that the stamcomputers in 2006 also found to be good." The speaker asks: "What is your answer to I don’t trust you, but how do you find it not safe?" He cites missing details: "I see nothing about, for example, detailed requirements and standards for how the systems should be configured, where the software runs." Oversight is missing; "you have to arrange this in very detailed and rigorous manner." "And who are those people then?" "If a municipality largely outsources IT, are the vote-counting computers then set up by employees of a private company?" The concern: without oversight and without solutions for simple software bugs, "they can lead to a lot of risks" and our trust in this process.

The speaker states that the "best of the best" are investigating election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers and exploitation, allowing for the manipulation of vote results. This allegedly supports the mandate to implement paper ballots nationwide, with the goal of restoring voters' faith in election integrity.