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Glenn (Speaker 0) and Seyed Mohamed Marandi discuss the posturing and developments in the Iran–US confrontation around May 2026, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, regional dynamics, and potential war trajectories. - Glenn notes that the United States had announced it would break open the Strait of Hormuz and that conflicting reports followed, seeking clarity on whether the conflict was moving toward all-out war. - Seyed Marandi says the situation is moving toward all-out war. He explains that the Americans initiated a new stage by attempting to carry out an operation to take ships out of the Strait of Hormuz, which did not succeed; instead, civilian boats were destroyed, and there were no military boats involved according to Iran. Iran is not using its military boats in these circumstances; it is using missiles as warnings, to avoid initiating a full war. - He states the Americans bombed boats carrying goods, resulting in five civilian deaths, citing news reports but noting Western media often follows the official narrative. Iran issued a statement blaming the Americans regarding Emirati targets being struck, though he acknowledges it could be read as either an American action or as American fault for the Emirati strikes. - Marandi asserts the operation was a failure for the United States: the Strait of Hormuz was not opened, and the Emiratis suffered damage. He describes the Emirates as an ally of the Israeli regime, noting its distancing from other Arab states, leaving OPEC, and paying for social media campaigns to shape public perception. He observes worldwide street sentiment toward Iran is largely supportive, except among Wahhabi/Salafi groups aligned with intelligence agencies and those who historically opposed Iran. - He contends that the global economy is entering a crisis phase: high oil and energy prices and rising food costs are the “fever,” with supply chains at risk of collapse and the global economy vulnerable to interruptions in any single link. He argues Iran’s economy is a “resistance economy” under siege for decades, while other global economies are more interlinked and fragile. - On troop movements and targets, Marandi says large US troop numbers and equipment have been deployed in the region, with many ground troops potentially based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates; air refueling and other assets involve Saudi Arabia, the Israeli regime, and Qatar. - Glenn asks why the UAE is disproportionately aggressive toward Iran compared with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Marandi explains the UAE’s alignment with Israel, its departure from OPEC, and the perception that striking Emirati targets amounts to striking Israeli targets. - They discuss predictability of Iran’s strategy: Marandi has long warned Iran would disrupt oil and gas production; he notes Iranian officials have historically warned about the Strait of Hormuz. He criticizes Western analyses of Iran’s capabilities as underestimating Tehran’s military and strategic sophistication, while Western narratives have repeatedly expected Iran to collapse in various wars, which Iran has repeatedly resisted. - On the potential course of a renewed war, Marandi outlines two broad scenarios: a short, intense clash with limited strikes on non-critical infrastructure could provoke a strong Iranian response, including missiles at Israel and allied targets; a more extensive war targeting Iran’s critical infrastructure, such as power plants and bridges, could devastate Persian Gulf countries and precipitate a global economic downturn. He emphasizes that Iran has historically avoided targeting civilians, but warns that destruction of critical infrastructure could force populations to flee. - Regarding escalation and timing, Marandi argues the Americans misjudged Iran’s resolve and that Tehran has rebuilt assets and developed new capabilities since ceasefire discussions. He suggests Trump’s aim may have been to probe whether Iran would capitulate or escalate, a calculation he believes underestimated Iran’s preparedness. - He predicts that the scale and duration of escalation will hinge on American choices: the Red Sea’s closure and Gulf actions depend on how far the United States escalates, what targets are attacked, and how long the strikes last. In general, he contends that the world economy’s vulnerability will intensify with any extended or severe conflict, particularly if critical infrastructure is targeted. - In closing, Glenn and Marandi acknowledge the peril of the situation, with Marandi urging awareness of the broader implications, including regional stability and global economic impacts, and both hoping for a path away from further escalation.

Ashton Rutansi opens Going Underground from Dubai, arguing that the UAE has defended itself militarily in a conflict it did not start. He claims the US and Israel violated Article 2 of the UN Charter, with thousands killed or wounded in what he calls a war of aggression against Iran, including an assassination in Ramadan of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei and his family. Iran reportedly retaliated with drone and missile attacks on US bases in West Asia. The UAE is said to have intercepted nearly every Iranian projectile with what is described as the most sophisticated air defense system in the world, and the country maintains that UAE territory is not and will not be used in any military operation against Iran. Rutansi also asserts that NATO-aligned mainstream media are attempting to besmirch Dubai’s reputation as a destination for hundreds of thousands of people. He speaks with Mohammed Barun, director general of the Dubai Public Policy Research Center, and former deputy director of Wahtani (the UAE’s national identity initiative) and former editor of Gulf Defense Magazine. Barun notes Gulf News headlines about “UAE stands united and resolute,” emergency air corridors, and fast-moving responses to flights and tourism disruptions. He discusses the UAE’s air defense response and the claim that missiles used against the US consulate were produced in the UAE, calling this a long-planned capability coming to fruition. Barun describes the UAE as feeling a surprising nonchalance about the attacks, noting that life in Dubai goes on with malls, restaurants, mosques, and the like, while first responders act quickly to distinguish fires and aid evacuees. He highlights the UAE’s efforts to extend hotel stays for stranded tourists and gradually reopen corridors to allow people to return home, viewing this as a testament to years of planning and resilience. Rutansi raises questions about why international media and NATO voices target Dubai, suggesting the UAE did not allow US bases to be used, and asks whether there is envy over Dubai bearing the brunt of retaliation. Barun responds that the misrepresentation is not solely NATO-driven but reflects a broader pattern of media framing, noting this has occurred in 2008, 2020, and during COVID-19. He says the UAE’s response is not a function of NATO influence, and that the country’s experience shows the value of resilience and planning. Rutansi and Barun discuss regional dynamics and the implications of the UAE not joining the war, contrasting UAE and Saudi positions with Qatar and Bahrain, which host US bases. Barun argues that most GCC states, including the UAE, maintain that the war is not their decision and that they did not choose this conflict. He suggests the UAE’s response seeks opportunities amid calamities and emphasizes the importance of Iranian and regional interests aligning for any future solution. The conversation touches on tensions within BRICS, with Barun expressing disappointment that BRICS has not decisively helped stabilize the region, viewing the UN’s diplomacy as lacking and noting that the UAE and others have taken independent diplomatic steps. He questions whether a multipolar order could deliver security in the region. Barun concludes that negotiations may be transactional and focused on space for future talks rather than a comprehensive peace deal today, insisting that any solution must consider Iran’s 100,000,000 people and their aspirations. The program ends with Barun thanking the host and urging safety, while Rutansi invites listeners to stay engaged and to follow Going Underground for updates.

The discussion centers on the U.S. military buildup in the Middle East amid tensions with Iran and the broader regional dynamics driving the potential conflict. Key points include: - Military posture and numbers: The 82nd Airborne Division and 5,000 U.S. Marines are traveling to the region, with CENTCOM confirming roughly 50,000 U.S. troops already there. President Biden previously acknowledged that American forces were “sitting ducks” and that an attack was imminent. The hosts note that ground forces are arriving by Friday, with the Marine Expeditionary Unit from the Pacific on station soon, and reference a pattern of rapid escalation around Fridays into Saturdays in past conflicts. - Public reaction and political stance: Representative Nancy Mace says she will not support troops on the ground in Iran, even after briefing. The panel questions what powers she or others have to restrict presidential war powers, noting a perception that both parties are in lockstep on war funding. - Open-source intelligence on deployments: There is a reported flow of special operations elements—Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, Task Force 160, 75th Ranger Regiment—into or toward the Middle East, with multiple flights of SEACEs and C-17s observed in the last 48 hours. The discussion emphasizes the significance of such ground-force movements and their possible outcomes. - Iranian messaging and claims: An IRGC spokesman claimed that if the American public knew the true casualties, there would be outrage, and that “all American bases in the region have effectively been destroyed,” with American soldiers “hiding in locations adjacent to these locations and they are basically being hunted down.” - Expert analysis on negotiations and off-ramps: Doctor Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute argues that an off-ramp would require behind-the-scenes talks and cautions that the 15-point plan reportedly leaked to the Israeli press is not a basis for serious negotiation. He suggests a diplomacy path could involve sanctions relief and restricted military actions, but warns the public leaks risk undermining negotiations. - Israel’s role and objectives: Parsi states that Israel has aimed to sabotage negotiations and that Netanyahu’s objectives differ from U.S. aims. He suggests Israel desires a prolonged war to degrade Iran, while Trump’s objective may be to declare victory and withdraw. The panel discusses how Israeli influence and regional actions (Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon) relate to U.S. strategy and regional stability. - Saudi Arabia and other regional players: New York Times reporting indicates Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman privately lobbied Trump to keep the conflict going and even push for boots on the ground. The Saudi position is described as complex, with the foreign ministry potentially opposing war tones while MBS may have privately supported escalating the conflict. The guests discuss whether Saudi wealth is tied to the petrodollar and how a potential Iranian escalation could impact the region economically and politically. - Iran’s potential targets and escalatory capacity: Iran could retaliate against UAE and Bahrain, which are closely linked to the Abraham Accords and Israel. Iran’s capacity to strike urban centers and critical infrastructures in the Gulf region is acknowledged, and the discussion underscores the risk of significant disruption to desalination plants and strategic assets. - Propaganda and public perception: Iran released a viral video portraying global victims of U.S. and Israeli actions; the panel notes the messaging is aimed at shaping U.S. domestic opinion and demonstrates the intensity of propaganda on both sides during war. - Two emphasized “truths” (from Parsi): first, there has been a misperception about the efficiency of Iran’s missiles due to media censorship and selective reporting; second, U.S. and Israeli interests in the region have diverged, calling for a reassessment of national interest over coalition pressures. - Additional context: The conversation touches on U.S. military readiness, enrollment trends, and the broader historical pattern of wars shaped by executive decisions and external influences, including pressure from regional powers. The discussion ends with thanks to Dr. Parsi and an invitation for future conversations.

The dialogue centers on the current crisis between the United States and Iran, two weeks after a previous discussion. The speakers outline the evolution of events, the prospects for negotiations, and the broader political and ideological context driving the confrontation. Key events and the trajectory of negotiations - Speaker 1 describes recent moves as undermining talks: “Trump announced this blockade, which is an act of war under international law. … And then they were supposed to have a second round of negotiations … and The US shot at an Iranian ship, took over the ship, took the crew hostage.” Negotiations are framed as lacking good faith, with derisive language used by Trump toward Iran. - The atmosphere is described as deteriorating: “democracy diplomacy is not doing well. More chances of a military confrontation.” - There is concern over a potential new round of attacks by the US, and about the legality of continued operations beyond a sixty-day War Powers window without congressional authorization. Iran’s leverage, demands, and feasibility of a deal - The discussion centers on whether Iran’s demands—such as delaying nuclear negotiations, removing the blockade, and controlling who passes through the Strait of Hormuz and at what cost—are feasible for a deal. Speaker 0 notes Iran’s desire to delay negotiations and control Hormuz, while asking whether Trump would accept not getting any concessions and whether Iran’s price could be feasible for a settlement. - Speaker 1 counters that Iran has long-held leverage over Hormuz, which the US seeks to counter with pressure, and argues that both sides seek a diplomatic solution but with differing terms. There is an assertion that blockade of Hormuz is illegal and that Iran has a right to respond under self-defense if attacked. Strategic calculations and potential actions - The Strait of Hormuz is treated as a central strategic chokepoint; Iran’s coastal status and territorial waters are discussed at length. The possibility that Iran would shoot back if attacked is framed as legal self-defense, while the blockade is described as an act of war. - Speaker 1 entertains a mixed approach for Iran: “Both. I would advise Iranian leaders to do both. Give diplomacy opportunity if Trump is interested. … don’t accept bullying because if you accept bullying, then you have to hand over Iranian oil to Trump.” - There is acknowledgment that if Iran chooses to respond, it would be legal and within its rights to do so, given the blockade’s status. Regional dynamics and actors - The UAE’s actions are scrutinized: Israel’s presence and the UAE’s alignment with the US and Israel are discussed, including the UAE’s role in OPEC and broad regional ties. Speaker 1 characterizes UAE as having provided more support to US/Israeli aims and notes a “wrong decision” by the UAE in its current course, suggesting a potential recalibration. - Iran’s broader strategy of “resisting” is described as its single option, with emphasis on not accepting bullying or endless concessions, and with a call to pursue both diplomacy and sustained pressure. Ideology, governance, and internal critique - The conversation shifts to a discussion of the Iranian revolution’s ideology and its domestic implications. Quotes attributed to the late leader Ayatollah Khomeini are examined, with Speaker 1 arguing that translation matters matter and that Islam, properly understood, is a world religion that seeks justice, not domination. The claim is made that Islam is not inherently violent and that the misperception of Islam as a violent force is part of Islamophobia. - A critique is offered of Iran’s domestic social sciences: Iran’s engineering and medical achievements are praised, while the social sciences are described as underdeveloped and too reliant on Western frameworks. The suggestion is that Iran should develop indigenous social sciences to better guide policy and society, arguing that “Iran could do much more” in this area. Personal outlook and conclusions - The speakers acknowledge that both sides appear unwilling to yield on core issues, with a double-track approach suggested: pursue diplomacy when possible, but prepare to resist and potentially escalate if pressures persist. - The conversation closes with an openness to future discussions, including the possibility of a separate program focused on Iran’s internal dynamics and the revolution’s core tenets, to better understand regional concerns and policy decisions.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the unfolding Iran war three days in, arguing that the conflict has become a regional war with global economic and strategic reverberations. Key points and allegations: - Iran has targeted at least 27 bases and port facilities across the region, from Kirlik Airbase to Dubai, effectively regionalizing the war. Oil markets anticipate disruption; Europe’s open price rose about 20% on expectations of supply cuts, with a potential rise above $100 per barrel. - In the Gulf, inexpensive drones have breached what appear to be expensive air and missile defenses, affecting airstrips and airports. A large expatriate workforce in the UAE (about 4.6 million Indians and many Europeans and Americans) is stranded, highlighting economic disruption. Oil infrastructure damage is just beginning, with some Saudi refineries struck; more damage anticipated. - The war’s consequences extend beyond Iran and Israel, potentially affecting India, Northeast Asia, Turkey, and Europe. The conflict did not begin with a joint US-Israeli attack; it began with an Israeli attack, with Rubio (Secretary of State-like comment) indicating that Israel started it, which the US later joined due to perceived insufficient posture. - Reports indicate three F-15s were downed; casualties include American sailors and Marines, though the exact numbers are unclear. - The rhetoric from Secretary Hagel (likely Hagerty) and Trump about Iran as a state sponsor tied to Israel is criticized as incautious. MacGregor argues the focus should be on Pakistan and Syria (where remnants of ISIS/Al Qaeda reside), noting Pakistan’s long-standing role as an incubator of radical Islam. He views the war as primarily about Israel’s aim to destroy Iran to enable greater Israeli regional hegemony, with the US fully committed. - He predicts a long regional war and warns that logistics will be decisive: missiles are finite, and the US may exhaust its stock; many missiles used in Ukraine reduce available stock for Iran-related defense. He notes Hypersonic missiles and decoys complicate defense capabilities. - European involvement is uncertain; Britain’s rapid response is unclear, and the broader European willingness to intervene remains doubtful. China and Russia are viewed as potentially pivotal if they decide to intervene; India is suggested as a potential mediator, given cultural ties and BRICS interests. - The US’s strategic credibility and military power are questioned. MacGregor contends the US has shown unreliability, damaging its legitimacy and triggering broader regional and global realignments. He emphasizes that the world is moving toward a new order, with the end of Sykes-Picot-era maps and shifting alliances; Gulf monarchies may seek US withdrawal. - Iran’s resilience is stressed: even if the supreme leader was killed, unity of command remains, and Iran’s dispersed military network complicates US efforts. Iran’s survival could enhance its regional influence; the longer the conflict lasts, the weaker the US and Israel appear, and the stronger Iran, Turkey, and others may become. - The possibility of an escalation to nuclear warfare is raised: if Israel uses a tactical nuclear weapon to stop Iran’s missiles, Russia and China might intervene; this could force a broader confrontation. MacGregor doubts Israel’s ability to sustain a large front and warns this could lead to a strategic pivot by major powers. - On outcomes and endgames: Iran seeks US withdrawal from the region; the US’s presence is likely to be forced out as Gulf states demand it. The interview suggests a collapse of US influence and a reshaping of the Middle East, with Persia re-emerging stronger. Israel’s survival is uncertain; extended fronts and exhaustion are anticipated. - Trump’s role is described as constrained by Netanyahu: Trump is not a free agent, and there is little expectation of near-term strategic change in Washington. The potential for a negotiated end is deemed unlikely so long as Iran remains intact and steadfast. Overall, the conversation frames the conflict as a turning point: a regional war with profound economic and geopolitical ripple effects, signaling the decline of US military hegemony in the Middle East and the possible reconfiguration of global power blocs, with Iran poised to gain relative strength if the conflict persists.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Larry Johnson, former CI analyst and writer at Sonar Twenty One. Where do things stand in the Iran war and the information war surrounding it? Larry: The Gulf is too wide for a negotiated settlement. Iran has positions of principle: sanctions lifted immediately and assets unfrozen; recognition that they control the Strait of Hormuz; attacks on Palestinians, Lebanon, and Hezbollah must stop. They won’t back off from enriching nuclear material within limits; they insist on being treated as a sovereign state and as a signatory to the NPT. The U.S. portrayal of Iran as a vicious terrorist state is, in his view, widely believed in the West, and Washington thinks continued pressure will force surrender. He argues the leadership in Iran is not as split as some claim; figures like Pozeskin and Arakchi and Golubov are IRGC-associated, contrary to “moderates” narratives. On the economy, the U.S. pretends Iran is blockaded, but Iran has opened land routes through Caspian Sea access, Pakistan (seven routes now into Iran), and connections to Russia; the largest deepwater port in Pakistan supports Iranian trade. China and Russia are quietly reshaping Gulf security dynamics. After Arakashi met Putin in Saint Petersburg, Putin spoke of the Gulf security architecture; Wang Yi echoed the theme with Oraqi. Project Freedom was ended after Saudis told the U.S. not to use their territory or base for it. A Pakistani ISI general told Glenn that Saudi Arabia and Qatar may cut ties with the U.S. militarily, or push the U.S. out of the region. If true, this aligns with China and Russia’s push to restructure the Gulf security framework, reducing U.S. military footprint. Iran’s ability to retaliate has so far been limited as China, Russia, and Pakistan counsel restraint. Glenn: The nonproliferation treaty is central here. Iran is a signatory and seeks its civilian nuclear program within limits; the U.S. demands no civilian program. The treaty’s articles and U.S. behavior are contentious, and the discussion underscores broader questions about security architecture in the region and whether Iran can be included in a new, inclusive security order. Larry: Regarding current fighting, it’s a tit-for-tat dynamic. Iran retains control of the Strait of Hormuz; U.S. ships are claimed to be active but in practice may avoid direct engagement in the gulf. Iran has supposedly neutralized several U.S. bases and radar systems; the Fifth Fleet HQ in Bahrain is reportedly out of action, and Al Udeid’s operations center may have shifted. The possibility of returning personnel remains doubtful, given the extent of damage and the host nations’ willingness to rebuild with China/Russia in the mix. The UAE’s stance stands out: they blocked flights supporting Project Freedom for a time, then re-opened under restrictions, signaling a shift toward diversifying security partners beyond the U.S. They face pressures related to strategic position and possible leverage by Iran. On oil and markets, Glenn notes that strategic reserves releases are perceived as signaling decisiveness but may fail to stabilize prices once reserves run dry. Larry explains that a supply shock, not just demand, drives price increases; with reserves exhausted, prices will rise unless demand collapses, which would be a sign of broader economic distress. He contends that Iran’s leverage is growing as Gulf states move away from U.S. protection and toward China/Russia, potentially seeking alternative security arrangements and currencies beyond the petrodollar. The war’s domestic branding in the U.S. is another theme. Trump declared victory after 60 days, then launched “Epic Fury,” later signaling “Project Freedom.” Larry suggests this is a rebranding to justify further U.S. intervention and to replenish defense-industrial stockpiles, rather than a substantive strategic settlement. The broader goal is to secure new round of allocations for weapons manufacturers, regardless of Iran’s position. Larry concludes that the move toward a more inclusive regional security architecture—recognizing security interests of opponents and reducing exclusive reliance on the U.S.—appears unlikely in current discourse, even as China and Russia push for such restructuring. Hormuz remains central to Iran’s strategic security, and without meaningful diplomacy, the region’s stability will continue to be threatened. Glenn signs off, thanking Larry for the discussion.

Mario: Daniel, after decades of diplomacy, the Middle East is now at war. Early on you suggested Hormuz and economic leverage; as the conflict evolved, US ground invasion talk, targeted Iranian leadership, and new developments—like JD Vance’s reaction to US intel and Israel striking energy infrastructure in Iran—have shaped concerns that Israel wields outsized influence. Broad question: how did we get here and why? Daniel: There’s a long history of American and Israeli influence in play. There is American agency and a geopolitical logic tying chokepoints like Hormuz to broader aims, such as reasserting US primacy vis-à-vis China. But this doesn’t fully explain how the last 10 yards into war were crossed. Netanyahu’s long effort to shape a strategic environment culminated when he found a president open to using American power in the region. Israel’s strategy appears to be to assert greater regional dominion by leveraging US military power and creating dependencies with Gulf states. Netanyahu reportedly offered the president an actionable plan, including on-the-ground assets, to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spark a broader upheaval, which helped push the White House toward a twelve-day war in June. Israel also presented a narrative of rapid US escalation to secure its aims, while the American interagency process—though deteriorated in recent years—had to interpret unusually aggressive, yet selective, Israeli intelligence and objectives. The result is a complex dynamic where US rhetoric and decisions are deeply entangled with Israeli designs for regional hegemony, an outcome that was not broadly anticipated by many regional partners. Mario: If the US administration had not fully understood Israel’s project, how did this come to pass? And how does Mossad factor in? Daniel: Israel has tremendous access to influence over an American administration through lobbying, media echo chambers, and political finance, which Netanyahu exploited to drive a course toward major confrontation with Iran. Before Trump’s term, Netanyahu was nervous about a president who could pivot against allies; he devised a strategy that culminated in Operation Midnight Hammer and subsequent US-Israeli collaboration, reinforced by the possibility of rapid decapitation of Iran’s leadership. There are reports (and debates) about Mossad presenting on-the-ground assets and the possibility of instigating a street revolution in Iran, which may not have been fully believed by Washington but was persuasive enough to shape policy. The question remains how much of Israeli intelligence makes it to Trump and his inner circle, especially given concerns about cognitive ability and decision-making in the White House at that time. Netanyahu’s aim, according to Daniel, was not simply to topple Iran but to maximize Israel’s regional leverage by using American power while reducing other regional peers’ influence. Mario: What about Gulf states and broader regional realignments? How did the Gulf respond, and what does this mean for their security calculus? Daniel: The Gulf states face a stark dilemma. They fear Iran's retaliatory capabilities but also distrust America’s consistency and question whether US support will be cost-effective. Iran’s strikes into the Gulf have forced Gulf capitals to reassess their reliance on US protection and Israel’s influence, particularly given Israel’s aggressive posture and expanded regional footprint—Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—with potential implications for the Gulf’s own security and economic interests. Some Gulf actors worry about over-dependence on American security assurances while Israel intensifies operational reach. The GCC’s calculus is shifting: they confront a choice between continuing alignment with the US-Israel bloc or seeking more independent security arrangements. The possibility of a broader Gulf-Israel axis, or at least closer coordination, is tempered by concerns over long-term regional stability, public opinion, and the risk of escalation. Mario: How has this affected perceptions of Iran, Israel, and the broader regional order? Has the Gulf’s stance shifted? Daniel: The region’s balance has been unsettled. Iran’s actions have damaged Gulf trust in its neighbors’ security guarantees, while Israel’s aggressive posture and reliance on US power have complicated Gulf states’ calculations. Turkey’s role is pivotal as it balances concerns about Iran and Israel, while also watching how the region realigns. The possibility of a future where Iran’s power is weakened is weighed against the risk of destabilization and long-term security costs. Negotiations between the US, Iran, and regional actors—stoked by Turkish diplomacy and shifting Gulf positions—are ongoing, with Turkey signaling that diplomacy remains important, even as Gulf states reassess their security dependencies. Mario: What about Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the potential for broader spillover? Daniel: Lebanon faces severe consequences: displacement, civilian harm, and a domestic political paralysis that complicates relations with Israel. Hezbollah remains a factor, with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and the South. Israel’s goal of establishing security-control in Lebanon risks reigniting long-standing conflicts, while Lebanon’s government seeks a balance that could prevent further escalation, if possible. The broader picture is that Israel’s approach—driven by a perceived need to neutralize Iran and all potential threats—could provoke wider regional blowback, complicating already fragile domestic politics across the Levant. Mario: Final thoughts as the war unfolds? Daniel: Israel’s strategic ambitions appear to extend beyond countering Iran to shaping a broader order in which it remains the dominant regional power, aided by US military leverage. Gulf states face a difficult reorientation, reassessing longstanding alliances in light of perceptions of US reliability. The coming months will reveal whether regional actors can recalibrate toward diplomatic resolutions or wind up in a deeper, more protracted conflict. The question remains whether a political path could replace military escalation, and whether external powers can deter further aggression and stabilize the region without allowing a broader conflagration.

The conversation centers on a newly discussed MOU involving Iran, Israel, the GCC, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and the downstream effects on markets, alliances, and investment. Regarding the MOU, Jeffrey Krigsmann says it is the same MOU that was meant to be signed Sunday but is now on Friday, and that not all parties have agreed publicly to its terms. He says Israelis and GCC members have been kept in the dark, raising questions about sustainability: if Israel launches attacks on Hezbollah immediately after signing, he argues, Iran’s actions regarding the straits could affect shipping operations. He notes that Maersk has already said it will not change plans because of it, and that how long the arrangement lasts matters for ship movement and whether ships can be brought back out. Krigsmann also says other parties were not consulted on the “logistics service fee,” described as tolls. He highlights a key point: when J.D. Vance was asked about $300 billion in who pays it, Vance indicated Gulf friends are paying it. He frames this as a large cost for some party to shoulder. If Gulf states are not paying, he says the U.S. would have to, and he connects that to the need for congressional involvement. He adds that Iranian reporting has already circulated the $300 billion figure and that parties are claiming victories even though nothing is broadly agreed. The discussion then shifts to details of what the MOU actually states: the host notes that leaks suggest Iran would manage shipping and reopen the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian management, but the fee is not clearly stated in the MOU details they have seen. Krigsmann says he has not seen the details yet. The host asks whether Iran will control the Strait of Hormuz, how significant that is for Iran and the global economy, and whether there could be a long-term deal integrating Iran into the global economy that investors are considering. Krigsmann says investors are not currently talking about it but argues it should be brought back into focus as the leverage Iran wanted from its nuclear program, describing that leverage as the most it has had since the revolution. On how the Gulf is hurt and how long recovery takes, Krigsmann says the region is a big victim, especially countries like Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and also Iraq. He says Saudi and the Emiratis are richer and can roll with impacts more easily, but countries such as Qatar derive a large share of GDP from oil and gas, and he says Qatar’s major LNG facilities have been permanently damaged. He argues that if Gulf states were paying war reparations, it would be an insult for countries severely hurt as bystanders. When asked whether security and stability perceptions in places like the UAE will return, the host suggests people forget quickly and references COVID. Krigsmann compares the dynamic to the Global Financial Crisis and says a key lesson is diversification—specifically diversification of energy supply. He says the Middle East will likely remain a dominant energy supplier but with alternative routes that cost more. He argues that a similar “new set of players” dynamic followed the 2008 crisis, and he expects a parallel shift on the energy side. He adds that the pain could become more asymmetric as shortages approach and restart takes time. The host broadens diversification beyond energy and mentions security and alliance structures. Krigsmann says countries will try to be self-sufficient and diversify friends, with Middle East alliances shifting and becoming transactional. He frames diversification across supply lines, defense, and finance as a response to the risk of being dependent on one entity. The conversation then turns to asset flows and market behavior. Krigsmann describes a rotation out of “new economy” tech into “old economy” commodities that he says ran through the ceasefire on April 8, with commodity names later giving back gains during a sell-off. He argues that capital has flowed into SpaceX/NASDAQ and tech, and because it is a “zero-sum game,” less capital going into energy and commodities means they fall. He also says retail investors destock physical commodities and sell equity exposure expecting cheaper prices tomorrow. He expresses concerns about how uncertainty and volatility affect markets, arguing that the “information content” of markets is reduced when rules shift. He cites regulatory changes in the U.S. and Europe as reasons markets may not function with the stable regulatory framework they previously relied on. He says oil companies are down and oil price down because uncertainty is too high to hold positions, making it too painful to hold long or short. He references volatility swinging sharply within months and states this pushes people out because holding positions has become too dangerous. On Asia, he says conditions calmed somewhat because it is before peak summer driving season and before heating/cooling ramps, but he says places like Japan and Korea face problems ahead. He estimates that oil shut-ins fell from about 12 million barrels per day to about 10 million due to leaks from the Gulf, and he says trapped ships decreased after ships were freed through the strait, though he says it is not a long-term solution. Strategically and economically, Krigsmann says the U.S. has not “actually had to feel it yet,” but that impacts will be evident in years. He contrasts the situation with 1991: he argues this is a different strategic world where globalization “blew” apart opposite to the Gulf War I context and describes a game-changing shift with polarization. He also argues that the “grand bargain” broken—sea-lane security by the U.S. Navy in exchange for dollar-based trade—means questions about strategic alliances and the link between oil, dollar, and navy. When asked about integrating Iran into the global economy, he says capital wants certainty and confidence that investments will not lose everything. He calls Iran “uninvestable right now,” comparing it to Venezuela where guarantees were offered and where investment viability depended on them. He says guarantees are what institutions like the World Bank and IMF were designed to support after World War II, and he asks who would provide guarantees for Iran. The host adds that Iran has looked for guarantees from multiple countries, but no one could guarantee U.S. promises, leaving the guarantor as the party that cannot guarantee. The discussion concludes with agreement that uncertainty is unprecedented and that hard assets may benefit, followed by closing remarks about the show and upcoming guests.

Dubai is officially 83% turned off, with the city of gold described as a ghost town in less than a month, and the entire country framed as a political version of Disneyland. Larry Johnson is cited as exposing “the disgusting reality the travel influencers won’t tell you.” The narrative asserts massive high rises, most of them lacking a sewage system, requiring a fleet of trucks to haul human waste out into the desert every single day. It is claimed they built golden toilets for westerners but forgot the foundation, and now that foundation is crumbling. The UAE is labeled as not a nation but “an artificial mirage.” The transcript contends that international trade in the UAE is dead, tourism is dead, and the construction industry is a graveyard. It states that 25% of their oil isn’t even leaving the port. Larry Johnson is quoted as saying that “The UAE won’t survive the week as an intact country because they have no economic floor left to stand on.” The broader regional backdrop is described as the Gulf collapsing. In parallel geopolitical commentary, it is claimed that while the Gulf collapses, Donald Trump is posting that he is in serious negotiations with a new Iranian regime, but insiders say he is talking to ghosts. The excerpt describes this as the psychiatrist’s couch scenario, with Trump haggling over prices like a real estate deal, but Iran isn’t even in the room. The demands are asserted as 100% fixed: the United States out of the Gulf, end the sanctions, and pay reparations. It is stated there is no middle ground here. Regarding the U.S. administration’s posture, the White House is described as bragging about 9,000 strikes, even as oil prices are indicated to be “screaming toward $120 a barrel.” The narrative claims that people are being sold a fake victory while 5,000 Marines are being prepped for an April 6 invasion of islands that are described as literally pre-mapped kill zones. The speaker contends that the situation is a repetition of the two-thousand-three Iraq scud lie on a global scale.

Afshin Ratansi opens Going Underground ahead of an annual two-day NATO summit starting tomorrow, hosted this year by Tehkir, broadcast from the UAE. He says NATO member the United Kingdom is being represented by Prime Minister Starmer, who was forced to quit after deception surrounding his top diplomat in Washington and “child rapist, Jeffrey Epstein.” Ratansi links Starmer’s leadership to Britain’s crisis: more than 2.5 million people needing emergency food parcels, 12 million unable to afford heating, nearly one in four children in deprivation, and real-terms public healthcare funding cut by more than a quarter since 2010. He adds that Starmer will be joined by other NATO leaders “not favored at home,” citing opinion polling. Ratansi contrasts NATO’s economic footprint—he says NATO nations represent less than a third of global GDP by PPP—against BRICS at 41% including Russia, Iran, China, and the UAE. He claims NATO’s agenda is militarization, spending billions to fight China and Russia through Ukraine, and arming wars on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. He then introduces Tobias Elwood, described as former chairman of the UK Defence Select Committee and former UK Minister and Defence Minister, author of Ten Steps to Prevent World War III. In discussing why Britain cannot keep a prime minister for a full five-year term, Elwood says it is “a reflection of where politics has gone,” arguing social media and impatience for fast results fuel early challenges to a leader’s place. He says MPs increasingly look at poll ratings and believe they “could probably do better with somebody else,” which he describes as unusual compared with the past. Ratansi broadens the point, saying unfavorable ratings are high across Western Europe for leaders including Starmer, Macron, Germany’s MERT, and Maloney. Elwood responds that while Western leaders face tough times—global fragmentation, Russia and China working closer, America disengaging—there is a key difference: those leaders are not being “churned out” halfway through office. He says domestic change under a successor like Andy Burnham would be possible but foreign-policy change likely would not be. On Iran and Trump’s use of Diego Garcia for bombing, Elwood says it was right to challenge Trump’s actions initially and describes the outcome as leaving Iran “arguably more empowered” than before. He frames Britain’s role as supporting the international order associated with the Atlantic Charter and says Trump has “thrown all that out the window,” favoring U.S. interests over international organizations. Elwood addresses the relationship with the CIA and MI6 and the Five Eyes trust, and says the question is whether relations “click back into place” after Trump or whether a new era of U.S. disengagement has begun. He argues Trump is trying to leave Europe “to our own devices,” pushing Europe to work together more closely. Elwood also discusses Israel/Gaza: he says the West has “turned a blind eye” and has not stood up to Israel or pursued a two-state solution, and warns that expanding settlements makes a two-state outcome increasingly unlikely. On RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, he says it was “used as part of understanding the intelligence” after Hamas’s attack and for controlling the environment afterward, while saying Britain should have “done far, far more” in advocating a clearer strategy and standing up to Netanyahu. He distinguishes support for Israel’s right to exist from criticism of Netanyahu’s decisions and says arms policy would need U.S. involvement to influence Israel’s actions. He says Trump is the only country he believes can stand up to Netanyahu in the way needed, referencing Trump’s comments about not destroying entire residential blocks when targeting Hezbollah. Ratansi shifts to Russia, saying the UAE treats Russia as a “strategic partner” after MBZ’s Moscow visit. Elwood says this reflects fragmentation of global order and alliances of convenience as leaders choose partners based on perceived momentum and resources. He connects this to “a rival global order” led by China supported by Russia and argues the world is splintering into competing systems, forcing countries to choose between the dollar and RMB, GPS and other alternatives, and between trade routes. Asked why Britain supports Ukraine, Elwood argues that Putin’s invasion of another European country should be opposed and compares it to “1937 politics,” saying deterrence and standing up to a bully are necessary because Russia would not stop if it succeeded. He rejects the idea of inviting Russia’s advance due to British weakness and says Russia attacks Britain through cyber attacks, undersea cable threats, and other means rather than conventional warfare. He argues dialogue with Russia risks appeasement, warning it could allow Putin to rearm, regroup, and advance. In the closing exchange, Ratansi challenges Elwood with claims about military spending and timing; Elwood rejects the conclusion and says “that’s daft.” The interview ends with further disagreement, including Elwood stating he cannot accept that Putin “was wrong to invade Ukraine,” and Ratansi’s final remarks conclude the episode.

Afshin Rattansi introduces New Order as broadcasting worldwide, including to RT India, focusing on how India and its allies are reshaping the 21st-century geopolitical landscape. The show references reports of a first high-level face-to-face security meeting between the UAE and Iran since the “Epstein War” began against Iran. It also discusses the G7 meeting, branding it “Genocide 7,” and notes that the G7 is hosting India’s longest-serving Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Rattansi turns to Moscow for foreign policy scholar Dr. Andrey Kortunov of the Valdai Discussion Club, asking how to characterize India–Russia relations given that Modi has defied U.S. threats about buying oil from Russia, has connections with Iran, and this week India summoned a U.S. diplomat over “US Navy blockade violence” off the coast of Oman. Dr. Kortunov says the period is important for India’s transition into a “global actor” rather than a regional power, and argues India must now be responsible for “the reproduction of global commons,” requiring an independent foreign policy strategy and responsibility for the emerging global order. He describes India–Russia relations as one of the few major-power relationships that remains stable and predictable amid global instability, emphasizing trust and continuity despite divergences on specific issues. He states that Russia can rely on India and India can rely on Russia. On the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support Agreement (RELOS), Dr. Kortunov calls it a rapid and significant development. He says both sides agreed to provide each other access to military infrastructure, expanding mutual outreach. He adds that India could be permanently present in the Arctic region while Russia could gain access to the Indian Ocean, framing this as symbolic and strategically tied to diversifying communication routes and extending presence in remote Eurasian regions. Rattansi raises U.S. concerns and reactions, and Dr. Kortunov argues the United States still views India as a junior partner that will serve U.S. interests in confrontation with China, aiming to break India–Russia ties. He says India is too big to be “hijacked,” and expects India to maintain relations with Russia and Iran even while developing ties with the United States for technology and investment. The discussion then addresses India summoning a U.S. diplomat over an attack on an Indian tanker in the Strait of Hormuz and asks how long India can sustain this while remaining friends with Iran. Dr. Kortunov says the limits of U.S. power matter more than India’s choices. He references Trump granting waivers allowing Russian oil to reach global markets and India to buy Russian oil without secondary sanctions threats, and says it may take time for the U.S. to formally recognize limitations. On future oil waivers, the discussion notes an expiration date of June 17, and it is argued that even without renewed waivers, Russia’s oil would still reach end users due to the global oil market, with the U.S. able to complicate exports but not stop them. On the Quad, Dr. Kortunov frames it primarily as a “China problem,” arguing Russia has little to do with it “at least for the time being.” He says Quad is not an alliance and that its development depends on New Delhi, particularly if India prioritizes cooperation in technologies or logistics. He adds that “Quad II,” involving West Indian Ocean countries, could be shaped by similar limits. After returning to BRICS, Dr. Kortunov says the Trump administration is portrayed as obsessed with BRICS because Trump believes it is anti-American, while Dr. Kortunov argues BRICS is a non-Western group that can offer views on the emerging world order and global financial and trade rules. He says BRICS is diverse and difficult to reach consensus within, giving the example of US–Iran conflict, where both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the UAE are members and are reported to be in talks. He argues Gulf security cannot remain stable without involving Iran, making an “Arab NATO” that contains and deters Iran “not a very promising option.” Rattansi asks about the Russia–Ukraine war and why it has not ended, with Dr. Kortunov saying the dynamic suggests a goal of saving lives and achieving a steady advance in Donbas, while Western support and complications such as Ukrainian drone attacks must be considered. He says both sides believe time benefits them and notes difficulty seeing flexibility from either side. He also responds to claims about the Russian economy, saying similar predictions have been made since the conflict began and that he does not expect immediate collapse, describing “spectacular resilience” and “adaptivity.” The conversation ends with Zahra Khan fielding viewer questions. One asks whether India is changing global politics or playing better; Zahra Khan cites India’s GDP and growth and claims India’s actions—such as summoning U.S. diplomats—demonstrate strategic power. Another asks about Emirates and “shuddering US imperialism,” with discussion connecting UAE–India trade and the UAE’s position within BRICS and as a Shanghai Cooperation Organization dialogue partner. The segment concludes with a viewer question: whether the Ukraine proxy war will end in 2026.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

- The discussion opens with trying to map a post-war world, considering both a quick end to the war and a prolonged one, with a focus on US–China relations, US allies, Iran, and the broader region. A participant notes a broader battle between a China–Russia–Iran alignment and the Western alliance, including financial systems. - A major regional shift is already underway: by 2000, the top banks were dominated by Japanese and European players; by 2025, China dominates the top four banks. The speaker argues that power is moving from Western banks to China, and that countries with US-dollar-denominated debt are converting debt into renminbi because it’s cheaper. - In the last week, Russia and China signaled to Iran a push to revisit the Gulf security architecture. Putin spoke to Iraq about Gulf security; Wang Yi did the same. The implied shift is toward a Gulf security framework less dependent on US protection. - The current Gulf security model is described as US bases guaranteeing protection from Iran, coupled with a demand that recipient states buy US Treasuries and military equipment. The speakers argue this model left Gulf states vulnerable and exposed as US defense systems failed to prevent Iranian attacks in the recent episode. - Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the UAE) are discussed as potentially moving away from the United States toward Russia and China. A Pakistani ISI general reportedly said Saudi and Qatari leaders are breaking from the US; one NBC report cited Trump canceling Project Freedom due to Saudi resistance to air operations from Prince Saud Air Base. The implication is a Persian Gulf broadly shifting into the Russian–Chinese sphere, potentially altering Gulf financial flows away from the US dollar toward gold and the yuan. - An opposing view, aired by another economist, suggests the US will strengthen its deterrence in the Gulf, with UAE as an indicator. The counterpoint argues that the Gulf countries previously supported Iran’s adversaries, including indirect funding for attacks on Iran, implying US deterrence remains necessary. - The conversation emphasizes the gulf’s deterrence history: Iran has largely avoided offensive military action in the Gulf against the region, while Gulf states have relied on US protection. The lack of a robust Chinese or Russian security guarantee in the region is highlighted as a real risk to Gulf security calculations. - There is a debate about whether US military power remains credible. One participant argues the US has not won a major war since World War II, with recent actions described as limited or draw outcomes; another contends that US protection remains essential despite past failures, given Iran’s capabilities and history. - Military-strategy discussions cover the feasibility of a ground invasion vs. airstrike-only approaches. The speakers outline logistical challenges (water, supply lines, mountainous terrain) and the scale of forces needed (potentially large, multi-month training and buildup) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Arguments are made that holding the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if Iran can still launch missiles and drones from interior positions. - The strategic importance of Gulf exports is quantified: Gulf oil about 32% of world supply; LNG around 20% (centered on Qatar and the Gulf), urea and sulfur for agriculture and industry (urea ~36%; sulfur for refining and semiconductors), and helium from Qatar at about 33%. Keeping the Gulf open is framed as essential to global energy, inflation, and agriculture. - A possible pathway to open the Hormuz is proposed: Iran could offer broad access to global markets except for countries allied with Israel or those that attacked Iran; Iran would leverage this to restart global flows, particularly to Asia. The idea is that a near-term crisis could force a negotiated settlement with Iran. - The timeline mentions a forthcoming peace negotiation in Beijing next week, with skepticism about it proceeding smoothly. If negotiations occur, Trump would not likely receive a warm reception due to recent sanctions and US actions against China; China has signaled resolve against US sanctions, instructing its companies not to acquiesce to pressure. - Overall, the dialogue frames the war as a potential catalyst for a broader realignment: power shifting toward China and Russia, a Gulf region hedging its security through new alliances, and the global economy recalibrating around yuan- and gold-based financial flows, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central strategic chokepoint.

The discussion centers on escalation between the United States and Iran after the U.S. lifted a sanctions waiver tied to the MOU on Iranian oil and petrochemicals, and after earlier talk suggested the strikes might end. Despite Iran not striking ships in the Strait of Hormuz on the day in question, the U.S. launched strikes on Iran again at multiple coastal locations, described as similar to targets previously hit, including Bushir, Bandar Kangan, Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lenge, Abu Musa Island, Kashim and Kashim Island, Sirik, Jask, Konarak, and Shabahar. The targets were said to include radar sites, missile launcher positions for anti-ship missiles, and small attack boats. Trump’s remarks were highlighted as framing the MOU as dead, while CNN reported the ceasefire had at least temporarily ceased, with U.S. officials warning the situation remained highly fluid and additional strikes were possible. Attention then shifted to whether Iran would retaliate and how it might do so. One recurring theme was that U.S. actions were violating the MOU, while Iranian enforcement of Strait of Hormuz routes was said to be in harmony with it. The debate also included a view that Iran’s biggest leverage is the Strait of Hormuz and that continuing to control traffic there could inflict more pain than attacking U.S. bases. Another counterpoint emphasized that Iran would want to both hit U.S. capabilities and maintain Strait of Hormuz pressure. Military buildup and movement were discussed using satellite imagery and reporting: U.S. Air Force aerial refueling tankers reportedly redeployed from Ben Gurion, including to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, with references to around 47 tankers stationed at airports as of the prior day and a total of 32 departing Ben Gurion in the cited time window. The argument was that these aircraft could facilitate attacks on Iran. Additional notes included U.S. warships patrolling across the Middle East per CENTCOM and reports about aircraft movements toward Turkish airspace and potential fueling for strikes. The conversation covered disputed interpretations of what counts as retaliation and how far escalation should go. On the Iranian side, the statements discussed included that retaliatory behavior would continue and that the Strait of Hormuz was not closed. The Iranian officials’ messaging included major MOU violations by the U.S., threats of further strikes, reinstated oil sanctions, and attacks on southern Iran, alongside claims that the “era of bullying and extortion is over.” The participants also discussed Khomeini’s funeral attendance claims from Iranian sources and timing questions about burial and processions. Trump’s comments were extensively quoted as describing repeated, escalating strike logic tied to attacks on ships, including claims about hitting Iran “very hard,” a 20-to-1 ratio, and statements that the U.S. might strike without a deal. The transcript also references threats about destroying bridges, power generation, and desalination plants, and speculation about seizing the Iranian island of Kharg. At the same time, it cited Trump saying he did not think a wider war in Iran would restart and that any actions would happen “very fast” rather than long term. Another segment focused on oil market implications. The discussion linked crack spreads and futures to costs and shortages, including claims that refined product prices were rising quickly relative to spot indicators. It described an argument that refineries face much higher costs for oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, with “crack spreads” spiking alongside futures. The participants debated explanations including demand destruction and oversupply from prior purchasing ahead of the war. They also discussed the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve refilling, contrasting “sweet crude” versus “sour crude,” and argued about U.S. refinery capabilities for converting sour crude into diesel and aviation fuel. Iranian military actions and U.S. counter-strikes were described as including anti-ship missiles and drones targeting U.S. facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, along with claims of drone shootdowns. OSINT-style references were made to U.S. strikes targeting communications towers at an IRGC Navy base in Sirik for a third time, a site north of Bandar Abbas Airport described as having been an S-200 SAM and surveillance radar location, and fire detected at coordinates inside Bandar Abbas fishing port. Trump’s treatment of the “111 missiles” claim was also discussed. In parallel, regional diplomatic and political developments were mentioned: a meeting between Trump and Al-Shara was said to include talk of unifying Syria and removing Syria from the state-sponsored terrorism list, with reports that removal had been actioned or requested. Al-Shara’s alleged commitments regarding Hezbollah were framed as a key indicator for future regional outcomes. Additional mention included Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warning regional countries not to allow their territory to be used for U.S. strikes on Iran, and Oman condemning attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait without naming Iran. Overall, the discussion concludes with repeated emphasis that the pattern is back-and-forth without a formal peace deal, uncertainty about how far retaliation will go, and a belief that the biggest risk is miscalculation leading to disproportionate escalation. The transcript also states that if Iran’s retaliation begins, it would most likely target Bahrain and Kuwait, while noting other possible targets such as the Emirates.

The conversation centers on Iran, potential U.S. action, and the wider strategic spillovers across the Middle East and beyond. The speakers discuss what prompted a delay in striking Iran, the likelihood of a broader attack, and how regional and great-power dynamics might unfold. - On why a strike against Iran was postponed, the consensus from the guest is that Netanyahu asked for more time to prepare for defending against Iranian missiles and to enable a larger attack footprint. The guest also cites public statements by U.S. figures supporting a bigger operation: Lindsey Graham emphatically said last Friday that the delay was so we can go bigger; General Jack Keane stated that military operations would target political and military leaders and destroy their military infrastructure to take the regime out. The guest emphasizes that the most likely scenario is an expanded target set and greater combat power in the region to defend bases and improve the attack’s effectiveness, rather than a symbolic strike. - Regarding whether Russia or China would become involved, the guest doubts active involvement by either country, but suggests indirect support or intelligence help could occur. The logic is that direct involvement would be costly for these powers, though they might assist Iran indirectly. - On the readiness and capability of Iran, the guest argues Iran is now far more prepared than in the twelve-day war. They note that insiders were purged after the prior conflict, defenses were strengthened, and missile production likely accelerated since June, with production areas shielded from prior attacks. Iran’s ability to respond quickly and with significant damage is viewed as higher, and the guest warns that if Iran experiences an existential threat, it could abandon restraint and retaliate in a way that makes a broader war more likely. - The discussion covers U.S. bases in the region, where the guest concedes that the U.S. air defense is not at the level of Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling, THAAD, and other integrated systems. Some bases lack robust defense against ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats, and, while 30,000 U.S. troops remain in the area, the overall air-defense capability is described as insufficient to stop all Iranian missiles. - Would Iran strike Gulf nations directly to pressure them to push the U.S. to end the war? The guest says not likely, arguing that Iranian leadership has signaled a preference for good relations with Gulf states and that attacking Gulf bases or cities would create more enemies and complicate Iran’s strategic posture. - A decapitation strike targeting leadership is considered plausible by some but deemed risky. The guest notes Iran has continuity of government plans and could designate successors; even if leadership is removed, a power vacuum could ignite internal fighting. The possibility of an existential attack by Iran—coupled with a broader regional war—could be catastrophic and is something to avoid. - The discussion turns to Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and the broader spillover risk. The guest suggests that if Iran’s retaliation is strong and Hamas or Hezbollah see an opportunity, there could be escalations, including potential involvement by Turkey. However, Iran would likely avoid opening new fronts that would diffuse its capability to strike U.S. bases in the region. - The problem of Iran’s internal diversity is highlighted: Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmen, among others, complicate any post-regime-change scenario. The guest argues Iran could fragment, but emphasizes that a successful Western-backed regime change could still lead to civil strife rather than a stable replacement, warning of a “textbook failed regime change” akin to past Middle East interventions. - On NATO and Western unity, the guest asserts NATO is dead or in deep trouble, citing European leaders who doubt U.S. stability and reliability. He notes European politicians discuss building an autonomous European security architecture, implying growing European reluctance to rely on U.S. leadership for defense. - Greenland as a strategic issue: the guest argues there is no rational military need for Greenland for security, and that the notion of occupying or militarizing Greenland is driven more by Trump’s personal preferences than strategic necessity. He points out that even if Greenland were militarized, Russia and China would have little to gain, given logistical and strategic barriers. - Finally, the future trajectory: the guest predicts Iran will likely be pressed hard in a large strike but warns that the consequences could be severe, including regional destabilization, potential civil conflict inside Iran, and long-term strategic costs for the U.S. and its European partners. He suggests that as long as the U.S. overextends itself in multiple theaters (Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, Venezuela), global stability and the U.S. economic footing could be endangered. The guest closes by highlighting the uncertainty of Trump’s next moves, citing possible abrupt shifts and cognitive concerns that could influence decisions in unpredictable ways.

Glenn and Stanislav Krapivnik discuss a string of escalating security and geopolitical crises with a focus on drone incidents, NATO-Russia tensions, and the broader international energy and security implications. - Baltic drone incidents: Glenn asks about an attack on a key Russian port in the Baltic Sea, noting drones entered from NATO territory through the Baltic States and may have circumvented Belarus. Stanislav explains that two drones hit targets in the Baltics—one at an Estonian power-plant chimney and another at a separate object in Latvia—and suggests dozens of drones may have flown through airspace, possibly from Ukraine via Poland and the Baltics or launched from the pre-Baltics. He argues this is not a one-off event and raises two possibilities: either NATO member states have incompetent security, or they are directly engaged, with the more likely conclusion that the pre-Baltic states are direct participants in the war. - Deterrence and red lines: The conversation notes that NATO has aimed to pressure Russia economically (targeting energy, shipping, and oil). Glenn asks how these actions affect sentiment and Kremlin incentives. Stanislav counters that Tallinn and other Baltic leadership have crossed red lines, citing past incidents (Estonia drone attack on Skowabur Air Base) and suggesting Estonian actions are part of a broader pattern of Russophobia. He argues that Estonia’s leadership and policies threaten deterrence calculations and calls for accountability, positing that deterrence must be reset against Estonia given the perceived egregious escalations. - Interconnected conflicts and the Iran-Russia axis: The speakers discuss Sergei Lavrov’s remarks about a potential third world war linked to Iran and Russia. Stanislav asserts that conflicts are becoming highly interconnected, with the West having fomented them through proxies and direct actions. He asserts that Western leaders, whom he characterizes as pursuing broad war aims, are willing to sacrifice lives for geopolitical objectives, and he highlights ongoing cross-border terrorism and sanctions on supply chains. He emphasizes that Russia has long been involved in Iran’s military upgrades and drones, noting that Russian components power Iranian drones. He also points to the potential for China to align with expanding conflict dynamics, suggesting that Russia has already embedded itself in supporting Iran and that a fall of Iran would threaten Russia’s regional borders, especially along the Kazakhstani frontier. - Energy, fertilizer, and economic shocks: Stanislav draws on his supply-chain experience to describe the cascading effects of war on energy and fertilizer. He explains the logistical challenges of large-scale industrial repair after missile strikes, including the long lead times for steel, valves, and large refinery components, and argues that Europe’s gas and steel supply are constrained. He notes Russia’s restriction on diesel exports and Qatar’s role in fertilizer, highlighting how Europe has become dependent on Russian and Qatari supplies and is now left vulnerable by policy choices. He foresees a multi-year disruption of energy, fertilizer, and food supplies, warning of price spikes and potential starvation in parts of Europe and beyond as planting seasons approach. He highlights that fertilizer production relies on natural gas and that gas-rich regions are facing supply limitations, which would prolong and intensify food insecurity and economic disruption. - Gulf energy states and strategic calculations: The discussion turns to the Gulf, describing Gulf states as corporate-like entities run by wealthy families. Stanislav speculates on the strategic calculations of states like Qatar and the UAE, including the possibility that political and economic incentives could shape decisions about involvement in broader regional conflict, arms supplies, or island and maritime control. He argues that damage to energy infrastructure, maritime chokepoints, and desalination plants could have devastating regional consequences, potentially forcing costly rebuilding campaigns over several years. - Military capability and future risks: Stanislav critiques U.S. military capability for large-scale ground campaigns, arguing that the U.S. is not a traditional land-power and that a sustained invasion of Iran would face enormous logistical and manpower challenges. He emphasizes the scale and difficulty of mobilizing, training, and sustaining a large force in conflict terrain, particularly in Iran’s mountainous, fortified landscape. He also discusses the domestic constraints of U.S. recruitment, obesity rates, and the challenges of sustaining a 21st-century volunteer force in a major war. - Final reflections on leadership and narrative: The conversation closes with a discussion of Trump-era war briefs, characterizing them as short, sensational videos focused on explosions rather than reality, and a broader critique of political leadership and messaging in wartime decision-making. Glenn and Stanislav note the risk that political leaders may oversell battlefield successes and struggle to withdraw from costly, escalating commitments. In sum, the discussion centers on cross-border drone activity and its implications for NATO-Russia dynamics, the widening economic and energy-security consequences of contemporary conflicts, the deepening Iran-Russia alignment, and the daunting logistical and strategic challenges of any potential military escalation in the Middle East, including Iran.

The conversation covers a wide, interwoven set of points about Iran, the Gulf, and international power dynamics, centering on how Iran’s posture and regional actions are shaping the future balance of power. - Strait of Hormuz and ownership: The speakers discuss whether Iran believes the Strait of Hormuz permanently belongs to Iran. There is mention of a deputy parliamentary speaker saying “the Strait Of Hormuz belongs forever to the great nation of Iran,” and the implications of Iran’s rhetoric for sanctions, cables, and fees. The dialogue notes that this rhetoric risks pushing Trump toward continued conflict and highlights a distinction between legal territorial claims and the practical control Iran seeks to exercise. - Leverage, sanctions, and war aims: Speaker 1 argues Iran faces immense pressure and has suffered enormous casualties and damage, and would use all leverage to prevent a US victory. The frame presented is that Trump cannot easily compensate Iran for its losses, and that Iran’s leadership seeks to deter further US action, potentially by threatening critical regional chokepoints and economic channels. - UAE, Israel, and regional bases: The discussion addresses UAE’s normalization and hosting Israeli assets, with Speaker 1 insisting that if a country starts an illegal war, “you get to hit these assets.” They note Israeli presence in the UAE before the war and Israeli bases in the region, arguing that alliance and bases do not equal occupation, and acknowledging the UAE’s sovereign choices amid a complex security environment. - Iranian strategy and volume of attacks: The participants discuss why Iran used hundreds of drones and missiles against the UAE and other targets, suggesting the aim was to overcome air defenses and to send a signal given the breadth of anti-missile systems in the region. There is acknowledgment that while such strikes cause damage, they occur within a context of a broader blockade and ongoing hostilities, including the broader war dynamics in Lebanon, Gaza, and beyond. - Fujairah and other theaters: The discussion turns to the Fujairah incident (and a similar strike in Qatari waters) and whether Iran officially claimed responsibility. Speaker 1 notes that Iran did not accept responsibility due to ceasefire constraints, invoking terminology from Persian/Arabic to describe such “shots that come out of the blue.” There is speculation about other potential targets along alternative routes to bypass Hormuz, including Fujairah and Yanbu, to deter or disrupt overflow routes. - Regional outlook and strategic lists: The speakers speculate that Iran may maintain a prioritized list of targets among those responsible for significant damage to Iran (including Fujairah and Saudi pipeline routes) and that it could pursue other routes as part of a broader strategy to constrain Hormuz and diversify its leverage. - Ideology vs national interest in Iran: A major thread concerns whether Iran’s Islamic-republic ideology should or will give way to more pragmatic, interests-based diplomacy (such as re-entering or renegotiating the nuclear deal, minimizing sanctions, and engaging with the US while criticizing its allies). Speaker 0 argues the ideology often appears to guide policy, while Speaker 1 contends that Iran’s ideology is an enduring element of its foreign policy, shaping its support for Palestinians, Lebanese groups, and other allies, and that this ideological frame is not easily separated from national interests. - JCPOA and US policy: The dialogue references missed opportunities to return to the 2015 JCPOA framework, highlighting Robert Malley’s position that a revised, longer, stronger agreement could have been pursued after 2015, and noting that the withdrawal under Trump and subsequent sanctions contributed to the current crisis. There is critique of US internal politics and alleged influence from various actors, including assertions about the role of the “Epstein class” and other external pressures. - Post-ceasefire expectations: Looking ahead, Speaker 1 anticipates Iran becoming more aggressive in advancing its interests after any ceasefire, while Speaker 0 probes how Iran’s approach might shift if diplomacy were more effective, and whether a more calibrated policy toward the US and Israel could ease sanctions and improve conditions for ordinary Iranians. - Concluding note: The dialogue closes with mutual reflections on the enduring competition between ideology and national interests, regional power dynamics, and the potential trajectories for Iran and its neighbors in a post-ceasefire or negotiated settlement environment.

Afshan Rutansky presents Going Underground from the UAE, noting that seven weeks into the US-Israel war in Iran, the region faces continuing conflict and hardship. She claims the war began with Trump and Netanyahu assassinating Iran’s leader and his family, leading to millions killed, wounded, or displaced in Iran and Lebanon, and global disruption of fuel and petrochemical supplies. She marks Iran’s National Army Day, noting a traditional military parade and speech, but says this year’s observance comes after the US threatened to destroy Iran’s civilization in one night, and after a claimed “fake” Trump blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. She asserts adversaries of the US government have gained through destruction of US power and preferential pricing, citing visits of regional leaders to China and Moscow following visits by UAE’s MBZ and the Malaysian king. She introduces Bill Astoria (twenty-year US Air Force veteran, former professor of history, author of several works on militarism) from Yarmouth, Massachusetts, and asks why he says Iran has “won this war on Iran.” Astoria responds that while Iran may not have definitively won yet, the United States is losing the war because its stated rationales—regime change, nuclear threat elimination, destroying ballistic missiles—have not been achieved. He argues Iran is more unified and a bigger world player than before, while the US and Israel have failed to meet their war aims. He suggests long-term consequences indicate the United States is in decline, including unsustainable Pentagon spending (citing proposed rises to approximately $1.5 trillion plus $500 billion in the next fiscal year) and the war used to justify this expansion. From Iran’s perspective, he says, there is no imminent existential threat from Iran; rather, the existential threat is perceived to come from nuclear-armed Israel and America. Rutansky raises a Financial Times headline about Goldman Sachs clients benefiting from Iran diversion and “military Keynesianism” returning as a driver for wealth, implying the defense budget primarily enriches the rich oligarchy. Astoria counters that the American public mainly experiences propaganda, noting a 50% budget increase framed as defense, and calls the Pentagon budget a department for perpetual war rather than true defense. He contends Trump’s rhetoric and actions reveal a shift toward imperial aims, and points to multiple operations in places like Venezuela, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, Cuba, and Greenland. He also notes that diplomacy has been undermined by prior bombings and assassinations, reducing Iran’s trust in US negotiations. The conversation touches on the notion that Trump’s antiwar appeal was undermined by a militarized approach; Astoria stresses that military Keynesianism will not revive America and may increase authoritarianism and domestic repression, including harsher homeland security measures and militarized policing. He asserts Trump is a culmination of a warrior mentality in US policy, and that the Pope’s recent rejection of the war represents a related moral stance. Discussing Israel’s role, Astoria claims Israel poses a national security threat to the US in a nuanced way, suggesting Israeli influence over US foreign policy—particularly regarding Iraq, Iran, and the broader Middle East—casts doubt on whether Israel is a true friend to the United States. He argues the Ukraine war has faded from front-page coverage in US media, with continued support for Ukraine framed as necessary by American outlets. Toward the end, the host asks about censorship and media control; Astoria agrees that censorship is increasing as the conflict persists, noting that mainstream coverage emphasizes antiseptic imagery while omitting civilian casualties. He predicts more suppression of antiwar voices as the public becomes more aware of the war’s costs. The program closes with thanks to Astoria and a note that future guests will include a former Iraq War veteran now advising Robert Kennedy Jr. and working in Trump’s cabinet.

The Strait of Hormuz has been closed for eleven weeks, and the USA is poised to resume military strikes against Iran, with Israel expected to escalate further. A nuclear power facility in the UAE was struck by drones, which they say came from the West, though the speaker argues the drones could also be from Iran, from Iraq, or a false flag launched from a secret base in Iraq. The speaker says they do not believe Iran is taking responsibility, but notes they may be wrong. Overall, the speaker frames escalation as continuing without a resolution to the Strait. A limited development occurred when about a dozen ships were allowed to pass through after Trump met with China’s President Xi, with an arrangement that also involved Iran giving China permission to allow a certain number of ships to sail through. The speaker emphasizes this does not approach normal traffic levels (such as the previous 120/day figure). They argue that the crisis is not apparent to many Westerners because shipments already contained about eight weeks’ worth of supplies (oil, gas, fertilizer, helium, sulfuric acid, polyethylene, and other inputs). With week 11 underway, the speaker claims there are few remaining ships headed to Western countries. The speaker explains that even if countries have their own oil suppliers, global refining and crude type requirements create dependency on imported heavier crude while exporting sweet light crude. They predict scarcity issues if the supply chain runs out. They highlight shortages already affecting motor oil and describe how recovery will take easily the rest of the year even if the war ends quickly. The speaker urges people to buy motor oil immediately or within two days because blenders are reporting that orders for base oils are being rejected, meaning blended engine oil will not reach shelves. The speaker reports early warnings from retailers and manufacturers (including AutoZone, Honda, Nissan, and others) that engine oil supply problems are approaching. They also give guidance on oil labeling, stating that the first number (e.g., in 5W-30, 0W-20, 10W-40) indicates viscosity at cold start, while the second number indicates viscosity at 100°C, and that the second number matters more for matching what an engine needs. They advise matching the second number to avoid major issues, and they prefer oil that is slightly off spec over running dirty oil too long. Beyond motor oil, the speaker predicts broader shortages tied to polyethylene feedstock loss from the Persian Gulf (attributed to Qatar). They connect polyethylene to many supply chain items, including car parts, machine parts, barrels, containers for food storage, industrial shipping containers, and containers used to ship oil, arguing the resulting erosion of supply will cause widespread disruption. They compare the situation to COVID supply chain shortages but argue this is different because reopening factories would not solve it and the lag time will persist for months. They state shortages could continue into 2027. They recommend people prepare backup supplies and essential parts, and encourage neighbors and family to become aware as shelves begin to empty. The speaker also forecasts rising food and transportation costs, higher travel expenses, increased shipping fees for many items, higher e-commerce prices, and more common shipping delays. They say these effects may worsen around midterms, with political blame falling on GOP and Trump. They claim strategic petroleum reserve releases and attempts to keep energy prices low cannot last indefinitely and predict gasoline could reach around $10 per gallon. They add that EV sales may rise because driving costs are lower and EVs avoid engine oil. Finally, the speaker argues that shifting energy demand to the power grid could stress infrastructure already strained by data centers, and they cite California as vulnerable due to lack of local refining and reduced oil infrastructure, plus limited nuclear power capacity. They conclude that with week 11 and no solution in sight, the situation could continue for months and recommend preparedness for oil, water, gas, solar, and battery storage.

The discussion centers on the prospect of a renewed full-scale war in the Middle East, the motivations behind it, and the strategic implications for the United States, Israel, Iran, and regional partners. - Probability of renewed conflict: Speaker 1 argues that the chances of another US-Israeli assault are high and could be imminent. The war’s continuation is described as driven by Zionist policy, not by US national interests, and there is belief that “the forces surrounding Trump” are not rational. The capacity and readiness for a major operation are described as significant, with US equipment and ground-force preparations in Kuwait, the Emirates, and Bahrain, plus jets in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. - Iran’s stance and Hormuz: The conversation asserts that Iran did not intend to take control of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, that move came as a response to the war and hostile actions in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s side contends that the Strait should not be used as a foothold to wage war against Iran, and that its demand for secure passage is tied to preventing further attacks on Iranian infrastructure. The claim is that Netanyahu pushed for occupying the region and that the war’s origins relate to Zionism. - Netanyahu and policy: The speakers attribute the onset of the war to Netanyahu’s actions, arguing that his approach forced escalation and that the US reoriented its strategy in line with Netanyahu’s goals. The claim is made that the real policy of the US and Europe supports a scenario in which Israel could dominate the region, with the two-state solution presented as a long-standing facade. - Trump’s stance and rhetoric: The dialogue notes fluctuations in Trump’s rhetoric, including posts that reference military action against Iran. It is suggested that Trump wants to withdraw but is constrained by the gap between Iranian demands and what the US is willing to concede. There is a sense that Iran is not satisfied with limited concessions and that Tehran seeks broader sanctions relief plus a permanent adjustment to the Hormuz situation. - Negotiations and concessions: The speakers discuss the negotiations’ sticking points, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. There is a view that Iran should retain control over the Strait of Hormuz permanently, rejecting any plan to relinquish control or limit enrichment in a way that would be perceived as a concession to Trump or the West. The suggestion is that while limits could be easy to manage through the IAEA, the control of Hormuz must not be offered as a temporary concession. - UAE and Gulf dynamics: The UAE is described as strategically vulnerable and heavily aligned with the US and Israel, creating a target profile for Iran. Iran’s attacks are framed not as personal but as strategic, aiming to impact the global economy by targeting the UAE as a hub. The UAE’s role in regional politics is portrayed as aggressive in its push toward conflict, although the possibility of reconciliation with Iran is acknowledged. - Alaster Crook and decision-making: An anecdote about Alastair Crook is used to illustrate a point about Western decision-making, suggesting that rational analysis often does not drive policy; emotional factors and perceptions influence choices in Washington and European capitals. - Human costs and damage: The discussion references the human and infrastructural toll, including the destruction seen in Gaza and Lebanon, and alleges the US and Israeli campaigns have caused widespread harm, including to schools and civilians. The speakers assert that the war has inflicted severe economic and humanitarian costs and warn of deeper global recession or depression if conflict deepens. - Specific incident and online safety concerns: The host reveals that Speaker 1 has a bounty on his head, stemming from a Twitter account fundraising for kidnapping him; the account was initially not removed, drawing attention to online threats associated with the conflict. - Nuclear diplomacy and a potential deal: When considering a hypothetical deal, Speaker 1 asserts that Hormuz control must be permanent and rejects a proposal for temporary limits or enrichment concessions in exchange for sanctions relief or assets unfrozen. He emphasizes that Iran believes its nuclear program is a sovereign right and should be handled through international mechanisms like the IAEA rather than through punitive terms tied to Hormuz control. He also reiterates that the nuclear issue has long been used as a pretext for broader policy aims. - Final takeaway: The conversation closes with a sense of caution about the likelihood of avoiding a renewed war, a recognition of the high stakes involved, and an insistence that Hormuz control be non-negotiable for Iran, while acknowledging the potential for reconciliation if Gulf states reevaluate alignment with Israel and the US.

The conversation discusses recent developments and long-running concerns about regional security, especially around Iran, Turkey, and Israel. In Dubai, an alert was issued for a supposed drone or missile attack and people were told to seek shelter; it turned out to be a false alarm, which triggered memories of earlier periods when desalination targets and potential strikes were being openly debated during shows, though “it’s calmer times now.” The discussion then turns to Turkey and Israel. Trump has been praised for his reported engagement with President Erdogan, including the possibility of supplying F-35s to Turkey. The Israeli minister of science and technology is cited as saying he has “no doubt” that the Iranian regime will eventually fall and that after it ends, the Ottoman Empire’s ambition will expand influence, making Turkey a “real future threat” to Israel’s citizens. Foreign Minister Gideon Saar is also mentioned as requesting official recognition of the Armenian genocide in retaliation, with Netanyahu having recognized it personally but not the country yet. The speakers link these moves to Trump weighing possible F-35 sales to Turkey and to broader talk about the risk of Turkey and Israel clashing. The main guest argues that the war with Iran is not over, pointing to a “massive missile assault by the Iranians against Israel” as retaliation for Israeli attacks in northern Lebanon, and contends that assumptions of regional safety are mistaken. He further claims Iran is strong militarily and politically, and that Iran has powerful allies such as China and Russia. He also states that Turkey has historically been the principal threat to Israel’s existence and argues that Israel unnecessarily provoked the Iran conflict. He contrasts Iran’s and Turkey’s likely priorities, focusing on what he says are Turkish ambitions tied to former Ottoman territories and the central issue of Kurdistan and the Kurds. Trump’s reported idea to invite Sunni Islamists described as part of ISIS to kill Hezbollah is criticized as “asinine talk,” with the guest arguing it would insert a Turkish-relevant subordinate element into Lebanon, allowing Turkey to intervene later. He denies the idea of “friendship” in international relations and emphasizes “only interests,” claiming Turkey views Syria as a Turkish province and Northern Iraq as a Turkish area. He argues Turkey’s NATO membership is “nice but irrelevant,” asserting Turkey’s cultural foundation and future focus are in the Middle East and Central Asia rather than Europe, and that Turkey does not want war with Russia, instead cultivating good relations with it. The guest then addresses the possibility that an incentive-based arrangement could produce an outcome involving Lebanon: he references reporting that military buildup on the Lebanese border accelerated after Trump’s comments, and considers theories offered by other guests about border control or arms flow to Hezbollah through Syrian territory. He also describes Trump’s approval of a $700 million sale of General Electric jet engines for use by Turkey and its new fighter “Khan,” and suggests Trump is hoping to achieve a broader political outcome against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while arguing the larger picture makes control unrealistic. A central theme is proposed “disengagement.” The guest argues the only way to end the “mess” is unilateral withdrawal, saying Americans cannot protect forward bases under modern missile ranges and that any strategy of “doubling down” merely postpones outcomes. He argues Trump is under “duress,” explaining it not through specific allegations from files but through leverage from “Zionist billionaires” and the Israel lobby, suggesting support can be withdrawn if Iran is not destroyed, and that political consequences could follow. He also claims that Trump cannot simply “say no” because Congress cannot simply “say no,” citing the role of money in U.S. politics. In response to questions about whether disengagement is starting—citing Vance’s and Trump’s rhetoric, and discussions of F-35s to Turkey—the guest agrees there are internal indications that people think they must “get out,” including after demonstrating that the U.S. military approach failed to produce the desired outcome against Iran. Later, the discussion asks what would happen if the U.S. distances itself from Israel, lessening battlefield support. The guest says a looming U.S. financial crisis could be the event that disrupts engagement, because economic problems would constrain attention and priorities, potentially affecting alliance behavior. He suggests that absent such a financial shock, the alliance would not break up, framing it as a partnership sustained by mutual interests rather than a formal, easily separable alliance. Finally, the interview closes by asking the likelihood of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey over the next five to 10 years and what the biggest risks would be. The guest predicts Turkey will seek dominance over northern Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula and that Arabs either negotiate with Turkey or are “march[ed] in” upon. He portrays Iran’s focus as southern Iraq and protection of Shiites in the Gulf region. He concludes that these developments reflect shifting regional power centers and that Middle East borders created by Sykes-Picot are “on the road to extinction.”