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Today, I have three exclusive pieces of intelligence to share. Firstly, the CCP has built 11 secret bio labs in the Middle East, Africa, and South America, capable of manufacturing and releasing deadly viruses. Secondly, the CCP has deployed 3,500 ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with more on the way, including nuclear ICBMs that can reach the US. Lastly, the CCP is supporting a terrorist group in the Middle East, with an army of mercenaries ready to join Hamas. Whistleblowers from China have provided this information, as previous attempts to disclose it have been hindered by CCP infiltration.

Two THAAD missile batteries are in Israel, 'one quarter of the world's total supply of THAAD missile batteries,' manned by US personnel to protect Israel. Since 10/07/2023, 'the United States has spent at minimum $30,000,000,000 defending Israel,' while the Israeli military budget before October 7 was 'about 25,000,000,000.' Over its existence, 'the United States has put 300,000,000,000, at least those are just the on books numbers, into supporting Israel,' making Israel 'the largest recipient of USAID over time and currently.' Egypt is second, and spending in Egypt is 'at the request of Israel.' The speaker argues this shows disproportionate US attention, noting that India and China combined represent more than a third of the world’s population.

So right now, as we speak tonight, there are two THAAD missile batteries in Israel. That's one quarter of the world's total supply of THAAD missile batteries. They are American military personnel, and they are manning these batteries to protect Israel. And that shouldn't surprise you because since 10/07/2023, which is a little less than two years ago, The United States has spent at minimum $30,000,000,000 defending Israel. Israel is by far, no one comes close, the largest recipient of USAID over time and currently. They don't know how disproportionate our attention to Israel and our spending on Israel is relative to the rest of the world.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Sources say Russia has been capturing US-made, US-provided equipment on the battlefield in Ukraine and sending it to Iran, including shoulder-fired missiles such as Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft systems, and also the NATO equivalent. They reportedly send equipment that Ukrainians are forced to leave behind so Iran can reverse engineer it and potentially reproduce its own version. Russia is doing this to keep Iran helping in their war in Ukraine. This is part of a growing Iran–Russia defense partnership, with Iran providing hundreds of drones to Russia, and Russia paying back by sharing Western gear for reverse engineering. Iranians are adept at this, having reproduced an American anti tank missile from the 1970s and an American-made drone intercepted in 2011 that crossed into Israeli airspace before 2018. This could be dangerous to Israel and other regional allies as the partnership grows closer.

Speaker 0 argues that on a public policy level, reparative policies are not as effective as people want. He cites Holocaust reparations from Germany as an example, noting there was a huge debate in Israel over whether survivors should accept reparations, with the view that accepting payments could be seen as expiating past sins or buying off history. He asserts that reparations are not the reason Israel has become economically successful; rather, success comes from a determined effort to meet the meritocratic standards of success. He then discusses US foreign assistance to Israel, calling it a bargain for the United States because Israel “doesn’t need the money,” and contrasts this with other fiscal considerations. He mentions a claim that the black community would gladly take foreign assistance, though he notes he cannot speak for them. He provides a related financial context: “it’s like $3,000,000,000 a year” in some form of aid, and adds comparative U.S. military expenditure on bases abroad—“we spend $6,000,000,000 a year on our military bases in Japan, $5,000,000,000 a year on our military bases in Germany.” He emphasizes that a substantial amount of U.S. money helps other countries and underlines that Israel does not simply receive money but receives military product produced in the United States. The speaker explains that the relationship includes intelligence sharing and Israel’s development of its own technology, which the U.S. benefits from through disseminating tech they develop. He gives a concrete example: helmets used by F-35 pilots, noting these are Israeli-developed helmets, illustrating technology add-ons that the U.S. can leverage. He insists that the notion of a zero-sum dynamic—money sent out with nothing in return—is inaccurate, because the arrangement yields reciprocal benefits through defense collaboration and technology development.

So right now, as we speak tonight, there are two THAAD missile batteries in Israel. That's one quarter of the world's total supply of THAAD missile batteries. The THAAD missile battery is an American made, very high-tech missile battery that takes incoming missiles out of the sky. And one quarter of the world's entire supply of these is in Israel right now manned by US troops, by Americans in uniform or not. Since 10/07/2023, which is a little less than two years ago, The United States has spent at minimum $30,000,000,000 defending Israel. So anyone who says, oh, it's just a drop in the bucket. It's totally insignificant is lying or doesn't know the numbers. We are spending our time, our money, and we're taking enormous risks on behalf of a country that geopolitically is not significant at all.

Eight days remain until April 6, the date President Trump says Iran must comply or face an even more devastating next phase of the war. The timeframe has shifted by ten days, but the reality on the ground over the last 24 hours contradicts the Washington, Tel Aviv, and mainstream media narrative. Key battlefield facts cited: - The United States has burned through more than 850 Tomahawk missiles in four weeks, entering a second month of the war. - U.S. intelligence can confirm with any certainty that about one third of Iran's missile arsenal has been destroyed; officials say 10,000 targets have been hit, yet only a portion of Iran’s missiles appear eliminated. - Iran remains in the fight and has held back its most advanced weapons, reportedly planning to deploy them when the timing is right. - The Houthis in Yemen launched their first attack on Israel in this war, with timing alleged to be aimed at raising the strategic economic cost by threatening access to the Red Sea, particularly Saudi ports like Jeddah. - The presence of the Houthis expands the conflict to a regional, multi-front scenario beyond Iran and Israel, potentially spreading from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. - The Red Sea disruption could become an economic disaster, as roughly 12% of world trade passes through that corridor. - The Pentagon has deployed the USS Tripoli carrying about 3,500 soldiers, bringing total U.S. forces in the region to well over 50,000—the largest American posture in the Middle East in more than twenty years. - Iran attacked Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia on Friday, injuring at least 15 troops; Iranian sources claim more than 500 Americans have been wounded or killed so far. - China is alleged to be supporting Iran by providing hardware before the war and, publicly, top Chinese chipmakers are said to be supplying technology to Iran’s military-industrial complex. Reuters reported Iran was nearing a deal with China for anti-ship cruise missiles. - The claim is that U.S. aircraft (including F-35s) were downed or disabled due to Chinese targeting; Iran has not yet deployed its most advanced hypersonic systems, according to sources. - Much of Iran’s arsenal is believed buried in underground tunnels and bunkers, making it difficult to assess losses; missiles continue to be fired despite repeated bombing. - Casualty reporting includes a recent figure from Israel’s health ministry: 142 people were brought to hospitals in the last 24 hours; Israeli casualty numbers reportedly exceed 5,000 wounded, though such figures are not consistently reflected in all media. - Oil markets react to the conflict: Brent crude closed around $112 per barrel, with the Strait of Hormuz effectively at risk and Reuters estimating roughly 11 million barrels per day of global oil supply affected. - The overall message pushes back against the notion that the war is under control or that the U.S. and its allies are winning decisively, describing the conflict as escalating and the U.S. burning through firepower faster than it can replace. Strategic framing: - The speaker argues the conflict is moving toward escalation through exhaustion rather than peace through strength. - They describe a growing regionalization of the war, with China assisting Iran and the Houthis expanding the battlefield, making a rapid, decisive victory unlikely in the near term. - NATO is criticized as being a “paper tiger” by Trump, with comments implying a reduced role for the alliance in this period. Note: A sponsor segment discussing copper and investment opportunities followed the news analysis; this portion has been omitted from this summary per guidance to exclude promotional content.

Speaker 0 discusses China’s newest radar systems and their potential impact on battlefield reliability, suggesting that the US’s long-held advantages could become obsolete. The segment centers on emerging technologies such as quantum radar, which, according to the presentation, would make even the stealthiest aircraft lose its most potent capability. Speaker 1 states that China may have just flipped the game on stealth technology. A new six g powered system backed by cutting edge photonics can generate over 3,600 radar illusions and even jam and communicate simultaneously. It is designed to target frequencies used by advanced jets like the F-thirty five, potentially exposing them to detection. With the ability to link 300 plus platforms in real time, this innovation could reshape the future of aerial operations. The question raised is whether this marks the end of stealth as we know it. To dive deeper, the presenters set out the following points: China’s latest radar technology is described as a significant international development with the potential to alter how stealth capabilities are perceived and utilized in modern warfare. The six g powered system is highlighted for its photonics-driven capabilities, enabling it to create a large number of radar illusions while simultaneously jamming and communicating. The system’s targeting of frequencies associated with advanced jets, including the F-35, is presented as a key factor in its potential to expose otherwise stealthy platforms to detection. A further capability emphasized is the system’s capacity to link more than 300 platforms in real time, suggesting a highly integrated and coordinated network that could redefine aerial operations. The discussion implies that these features collectively could challenge established stealth advantages and prompt a reevaluation of modern air superiority strategies. The phrase “quantum radar, which could make even the stealthiest aircraft lose its most potent capability” is repeated as a framing device for the advanced technology under consideration. The overall message is that China’s developing radar and photonics-enabled systems, combined with networked platform linkage, are positioned to alter the balance in aerial combat and provoke questions about the durability of stealth in future warfare.

The CCP's Hongqi missile system, which relies on the Bay du navigation satellite, is intended for export. It will be deployed in Serbia, Middle Eastern countries, the Balkans, and neighboring small countries. The CCP has already sent 56 platoons of Hongqi missiles to Saudi Arabia and nearly 50 platoons to Iran. Indonesia and Djibouti will also receive these missiles, posing a threat to American aircraft. NATO and the United States are likely to target the CCP's BeiDou satellite. The Hongqi missile is a cheaper and accurate version of the American Stinger missile, developed through copying and stealing American technology. It poses a significant threat to the United States and Europe.

Two THAAD missile batteries in Israel. "one quarter of the world's total supply of THAAD missile batteries." "The THAAD missile battery is an American made, very high-tech missile battery that takes incoming missiles out of the sky." "one quarter of the world's entire supply of these is in Israel right now manned by US troops, by Americans in uniform or not." "They are American military personnel, and they are manning these batteries to protect Israel." Since "10/07/2023," the United States has spent at minimum $30,000,000,000 defending Israel. The entire Israeli military budget before October 7 was about 25,000,000,000. So United States has put at least 30,000,000,000 into defending Israel in less than two years. Over the course of its existence, a little less than eighty years, The United States has put 300,000,000,000, at least those are just the on books numbers, into supporting Israel. "Israel is by far, no one comes close, the largest recipient of USAID over time and currently." "Number two is Egypt." "We are spending our time, our money, and we're taking enormous risks on behalf of a country that geopolitically is not significant at all." "India and China combined represent more than a third of the entire world's population." It's a massive displacement of people and killing on a grand scale of unarmed people, of unarmed combatants, of civilians, of women and children.

China has been developing laser weapons for over 60 years, with a focus on anti-satellite capabilities. They have ground-based laser systems that can target objects in space and have been caught using laser weapons to probe foreign satellites. China has also developed a directed energy weapon called the relativistic klystron amplifier (RKA), which can be mounted on satellites to destroy their electronics. The US is aware of the threat and has responded by prioritizing laser weapons in its defense budget. The Army has the IFPC HEL and the DEM SHORAD, the Air Force has the SHIELD program, and the Navy has the Helios laser weapon. The battle between the US and China extends across all domains and services.

The transcript discusses insights from a video about Epstein Adnan Khashoggi, Safari Club, and a Fake Passport, and their relation to the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace framework. The author notes that the Egyptian telecommunications project was proposed by Adnan Khashoggi as a “gift” or favor in relation to Sadat agreeing to the Camp David frameworks. The author argues that the two participants received gifts beyond this—namely, Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize, suggesting it was a political bargaining chip to bring them to the negotiation table. Background on Begin is provided: Begin was a disciple of Vladimir Ziev Jabotinsky and joined the Ergun, an underground Zionist terrorist organization, ultimately leading it in 1944 to press Britain to remove troops from Palestine, with the King David Hotel bombing cited as a historic example. The author contends Begin was a terrorist-turned-leader, challenging peaceful-imagery narratives. A key source cited is The Weapon Wizards, describing a February 1979 covert Israeli delegation to China, with high-level participants traveling in secrecy because the trip could provoke US anger. The book questions whether Americans were furious, and whether “Americans” refers to the general public or the Carter administration, noting the narrative in the book that this was done without US knowledge and controlled by Israelis. The author then presents a counterpoint: there is Zionist influence in the United States, suggesting little risk to US–Israel relations over Israel’s relationship with China. A 1997 New York Post piece by Yuri Dam is cited, reporting that Israeli Prime Minister Begin received US approval for a $10,000,000,000, ten-year deal to modernize the Chinese armed forces, described as one of the most important in Israeli history, with China insisting on secrecy. The Times article from 3/15/1979 is cited stating Carter planned $4,000,000,000 in economic and military assistance to Egypt and Israel over three years, with allocation not yet decided. The article reiterates the Safari Club objective to secure Camp David Accord acceptance by both sides and connects this to the Saudi Arabia and Reagan doctrine, suggesting the aim was to bring Israel and Egypt into a pro-US axis with regional partners. The Safari Club Charter reportedly planned an operation center in Cairo by 9/1/1976. Additional connections are drawn: Khashoggi’s associates, including Israeli arms dealers Yaakov Nimrodhi and David Kimchi, a Korean Mossad officer, and Iranian middleman Gobanifer, as well as their roles as Israeli agents and intermediaries in arms deals and the airlift of Ethiopian Jews. The piece notes Diane and Ezer (Diane and Eze) Weisman’s involvement, with Weisman as Israeli defense minister managing Israel’s sales to China and later partnering in Elube Technologies. The author also points to Zayara International, a travel firm founded by Nimrodi and Khashoggi to attract Islamic tourists to Jerusalem, and mentions the Talpiot program founded in 1979, suggesting it may have been established to facilitate high-technology transfer as part of the Camp David negotiations. The piece closes by urging viewers to like, subscribe, and share.

Israel allegedly engaged in defense deals with China during the 1980s, surpassing the US in terms of value. Although many of these collaborations have only been alleged and not confirmed, some notable examples include Israel assisting China with guidance technology for missiles, selling night vision and radio technology, and aiding in the modernization of tanks. Israeli firms also allegedly provided radar technology to the Chinese navy and engaged in aerospace technology transfers. Claims of trading Patriot missile system technology and cooperation in aircraft design were also made. However, the extent of these collaborations remains uncertain.

China didn't build Beidou just for navigation; they built it because the United States quietly sought to limit, delay, and outmaneuver China's rise in space. In 1996, during the Taiwan Strait crisis, China watched American aircraft carriers move toward Taiwan in real time using US GPS, and realized that if the US wanted, it could switch off the GPS signal over China instantly. A superpower dependent on rival satellites seemed impossible, and that moment changed everything. The US never openly said China couldn't build its own GPS; it relied on selective access, giving China the weaker low-accuracy GPS signal that could be jammed or downgraded at any moment, while reserving the full-power precision signal for America and its closest allies. China understood what that meant. So China pursued another route. In the early 2000s, they attempted to join Europe’s Galileo program to gain access to a reliable high-precision navigation system, investing money, helping design parts, and expecting a seat at the table. Washington quietly pressured Europe to curb China’s influence, restrict access to encrypted signals, and push China into a junior role. China was gradually squeezed out of the core of Galileo, not by accident but strategically, leading to a decision: build its own system from scratch. What followed was one of the fastest satellite build-outs in history. China launched satellites nonstop, erected ground stations across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and developed precision timing technology to match the world’s best. By 2020, Beidou was fully operational worldwide with more satellites than the US GPS network. The US responded not by halting China, but by upgrading GPS—stronger encrypted signals, better accuracy, and improved anti-jamming—shifting the aim from stopping China to staying ahead in a new silent space race. The twist is that the US never stopped China; the pressure pushed Beijing to pursue an even more ambitious project. Today, Beidou is used across Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, global shipping routes, and Belt and Road infrastructure. For the first time, the world has a true alternative to American GPS. Many people still view GPS as just for Google Maps, unaware that this was a geopolitical battle and one of the quietest space races ever fought.

One speaker considers the possibility that China, India, or Pakistan might escort a ship through the Strait of Hormuz and worries about a potential direct confrontation between the United States and those countries. He notes there is no expected confrontation between Pakistan and India, highlighting an open line of communication, a good relationship, and that one of them is a mediator in negotiations. China, however, is described as a different case, with increasing parallels to what was seen between the United States and Russia in the early Cold War era. The other speaker expresses hope that the Chinese will not decide to confront the Americans over the Strait. He bluntly states that the Chinese are not friends with the United States anymore; while they have long-term economic partnership and linked economies, the current administration has been placing tariffs on China and threatening more tariffs. News reports are cited indicating that China will provide the HQ-9 air defense system, which is described as far superior to the Russian S-300, to Iran. He emphasizes these are defensive weapons, not offensive capabilities, and notes that the administration is likely to be distressed by this development. Despite the administration’s stance, the speaker asserts that providing defensive weapons to another country is something done routinely and acknowledges that this move could enhance Iran’s defensive posture. He mentions the possibility that the Chinese supply could even enable Iran to detect F-35 aircraft, though he notes uncertainty about this point. The situation is characterized as a game changer and described as a behind-the-scenes nuance that the average American might not fully understand, as well as perhaps the administration not fully grasping it. The speaker reiterates that the Chinese plan is to provide these defensive weapons to Iran, describing it as a soon-to-occur development.

Speaker 0 reports that while attention was on US aircraft carriers, China quietly broke the air blockade in Asia over the past forty-eight hours. The claim is that 16 Chinese Y-20 military cargo planes took off, then vanished from radar, turning their transponders off and flying completely dark. Their destination is stated as Iran. According to multiple intel sources cited in the transcript, what these planes carried was not food or humanitarian aid but advanced electronic warfare systems. The systems are described as the kind built to blind US carrier-based F-35 jets. The assertion is that China may have provided Iran with technology to jam American aircraft right in the middle of the Persian Gulf standoff. The sequence is summarized as: 16 aircraft, zero radio signals, and a full airborne supply chain delivered under America’s nose. The transcript emphasizes the supposed significance of this development, suggesting that if true, the balance of power over the Middle East could have shifted without widespread notice. The final framing centers on the potential implications: the real question posed is what action the United States will take next, given the alleged delivery of electronic warfare capability to Iran and the covert nature of the operation. The account stresses that this development allegedly occurred while global attention was focused on US aircraft carriers, implying it represents a strategic surprise with potentially far-reaching consequences for regional and global security dynamics.

Hamas released a video of its October 7 attack on Israel, using a drone it calls a Shahab, which is a copy of the Iranian Ababil-2 loitering drone. Most weapons used by Hamas and Islamic Jihad are Iranian-designed or built, such as the Iranian RAD anti-tank missile, the Iranian-designed 120mm M-48 mortar, and an Iranian-made surface-to-air missile. Since the early 1990s, Iran has provided weapons to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, initially through Hezbollah camps. Later, weapons were shipped to Gaza via Sudan, Egypt's Sinai Deserts, and tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border, including anti-tank missiles, RPG rounds, small arms, and Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets. Iran also provided training and technical know-how to manufacture weapons in Gaza. Iranian officials and Palestinian groups have confirmed Iran's economic and military assistance, though both claim Palestinians planned the October 7 attack independently. While Hamas' rocket capabilities were expected, their infrequent use of suicide drones was surprising. The attack involved smart planning but mostly utilized basic weaponry like rifles, RPGs, motorcycles, and basic drones.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is allegedly planning to engage the United States in four separate wars, including one involving a terrorist organization. Recent attacks by Hamas on Israel seem to align with this plan. There are reports that Taliban weapons left by the US have reached terrorists in Gaza, and Iran may have played a role in coordinating these attacks. However, what is receiving less attention is the meeting between CCP leader Xi Jinping and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas in June. They announced the establishment of a China Palestine strategic partnership, which Xi Jinping described as a significant milestone in their bilateral relations.

The Chinese j 35 a has many physical similarities to the American f 35 stealth fighter. The United States has at multiple times claimed that Beijing has obtained classified and sensitive data from the f 35 program. However, China says it has not copied the jet and that the j 35 a is entirely an original concept. China has become only second nation in the world to have two different types of stealth fighter jets, which are also made indigenously. The first is the J-twenty Mighty Dragon and now there's the J-35A. China says it is confident that the aircraft will be a successful air dominance fighter, and the j 35 a has already raised eyebrows. China's all weather friend, Pakistan, says it will buy the Chinese stealth fighter jet. Pakistani media has reported that pilots from the Pakistan Air Force are already training in China on the j 35.

The Huthis’ attack on Israel was conducted with a mix of Iranian-engineered ballistic and semi-hypersonic missiles, using a skip trajectory to bypass Israel’s Iron Dome and Arrow defense networks. The key factor enabling interception evasion was maneuverability: unlike traditional ballistic missiles that arc predictably, these weapons zigzag midflight, shifting trajectory at extreme speeds to confuse interceptor radars down to impact. The Palestine Two missile, a hypersonic ballistic weapon, reportedly reaches speeds up to Mach 16 and traveled from Yemen to Israel in minutes, leaving defenders little time to react. It appears to employ a skip gliding mechanism, allowing midflight trajectory changes that complicate interception. Experts believe it is not purely hypersonic but has semi-hypersonic characteristics that enable sharp maneuvers during flight. This capability likely involved a glide vehicle that detaches and enables the missile to maneuver and glide at speeds between Mach 5 and 16, potentially following a lower-than-usual flight path to evade radar coverage. The strike demonstrated vulnerabilities even within highly defended airspace, revealing how non-state actors can access advanced weaponry once thought exclusive to major powers. The Palestine Two is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle to maneuver and evade aero missiles defenses such as Israel’s, and travels around 1,500 kilometers, only slightly more than its Palestine One predecessor (Fatah One). Iran’s missile program, including Shahab-3 variants, provides the underlying technology. The Shahab-3 is the foundation for Iran’s medium-range missiles, using liquid propellant and capable of carrying a warhead between 760 and 1,200 kilograms. The typical sequence involves launching at a 90-degree angle, a trajectory that travels near or into space, warhead separation from the rocket, and re-entry to target. Warheads may be single or multiple, depending on the variant. The circular error probable for older weapons is about 300 to 450 meters, meaning 50% of missiles would land within that radius. Israel’s air defense comprises three tiers: the long-range Arrow system designed to intercept missiles outside the atmosphere, the David’s Sling system for missiles and drones, and the Iron Dome for short-range rocket attacks. The Arrow system includes the Arrow launcher, Green Pine radar, and the Arrow missile. The Arrow three kill vehicle uses a solid-propellant rocket with a thrust-vectoring nozzle and a seeker capable of pivoting to track targets. THAAD employs divert attitude control thrusters and has different burn characteristics and radar data requirements. The deterrent success of these defenses depends on precise targeting data from radars and seekers, as interceptor missiles must adjust trajectories based on updated flight information to intercept intercontinental ballistic trajectories.

China's support for Iran and Iran's support for Hamas are concerning in the broader geopolitical context. China and Iran have a 25-year weapons deal, making them firm partners. Recently, China and Russia blocked any response to a terror attack in Israel, which undermines relationships between the US and Gulf Arab States. The administration's dealings with China have negatively impacted the American economy. The Chinese Communist Party sees the attacks in Israel as advantageous for their geostrategic goals and their plans regarding Taiwan.

Israel's potential attack on Iran, despite Trump's desire for a deal, raises questions about the U.S.-Israel relationship, especially since the U.S. funds Israel's weapons. It's questioned whether Israel is acting as an ally, considering its close ties with China, including alleged transfers of military technology, even American tech. China operates the Port of Haifa. Past presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush confronted Israel, with Reagan halting the Israeli bombing of Lebanon. Bush conditioned loan guarantees on halting West Bank settlements, facing accusations of antisemitism led by Bill Clinton. The speakers highlight the need for open discussion about U.S. national interests and the U.S.-Israel relationship, despite potential backlash and smears. They draw a parallel to the left's use of identity politics to shut down conversations, arguing that similar tactics are used to stifle discussion about Israel.