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Two American speakers express trust in Vladimir Putin, with one stating that he found Putin to be straightforward and trustworthy. Another speaker praises Putin for his initial move towards democracy and describes him as very smart. The same speaker also mentions having a good relationship with Putin and states that he kept his word in their agreements. Another speaker acknowledges the challenges faced by the Russian president, including the need for economic restructuring and rebuilding civic society. This speaker believes it is understandable that Putin presents himself as a strong and patriotic leader. Lastly, one speaker expresses confidence in improved cooperation between NATO members and Russia. However, another speaker predicts that Putin will eventually take over all of Ukraine.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

The speaker discusses the lack of communication between Putin and Biden, highlighting the importance of maintaining open lines of communication between countries. They emphasize the need for strong leadership in the White House to address this issue and suggest bringing in someone like Donald J. Trump to improve the situation.

In this video, the speakers discuss the idea of Eastern Europe remaining under Russian influence and the expansion of the EU and NATO. Speaker 0 criticizes this imperialistic idea and mentions that Germany was not afraid of the expansion. Speaker 1 tries to redirect the conversation to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure to establish a new security architecture for Europe, including Russia. Speaker 0 suggests that the West did not want this, leading to the current situation. The speakers question why this is the case, and Speaker 0 mentions that the Russians expected to have a dominant role due to their size.

The speaker suggests they rely on Putin's worldview due to their knowledge of the United States' actions, citing the US bombing of Belgrade to create Kosovo and install a NATO base. They claim the US has repeatedly engaged in illegal wars, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and that the US overthrew Yanukovych in Kiev in 2014, despite an EU agreement for early elections. The speaker says that in 2015, Russia advocated for peace through negotiations, leading to the Minsk 2 agreement, which was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council. However, the speaker claims the US government laughed at it, and Angela Merkel admitted it was a holding pattern to allow Ukraine to build strength. The speaker distrusts the US government and wants both sides to agree on terms publicly. They propose that the US and Russia commit to not overthrowing governments or expanding beyond agreed boundaries, and that NATO halt its enlargement.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the long-running effort to build civil society in the former Soviet Union, focusing on the Open Society Foundation’s role in Ukraine and the broader European reception of Vladimir Putin. Speaker 1 explains that the Cultural Initiative Foundation began in 1987 within the Soviet Union, and a branch was set up in Ukraine in 1990 two years before Ukraine’s independence. The foundation provided scholarships and supported civil society, and Speaker 1 asserts that the civil society’s maturity twenty-five years later is largely the work of the foundation. He notes that the foundation’s scholarships helped create a generation of leaders: those who were students twenty-five years ago became leaders later. Speaker 0 adds a personal observation that the new Ukrainian government and its leadership have been touched by Open Society and by Georgia, with many individuals personally benefiting from scholarships or having family members who did. The conversation then turns to the appeal of Ukraine as a model of open society, contrasted with broader European admiration for or susceptibility to Vladimir Putin. Speaker 0 points out that not all Europeans share the Ukrainian sympathy; she mentions that Hungary’s leader described Putin as a model, and cites Greece’s trips to Moscow and France’s Marielle Le Pen having close contacts with Putin. She asks how Speaker 1 explains Putin’s influence and appeal in Europe. Speaker 1 responds by situating the discussion in a political and historical context, noting his involvement in the collapse of the Soviet system. He describes himself as a political philanthropist and frames his perspective around the broader historical forces at play, implying that the appeal of Putin in some European circles is tied to these transformative historical currents. Key points: - The Cultural Initiative Foundation (established 1987 in the Soviet Union) and its Ukraine branch (1990) funded scholarships and civil-society work. - The foundation contributed to the maturation of civil society in Ukraine, with beneficiaries who became leaders two decades later. - Personal and institutional ties to Open Society and Georgia have touched Ukraine’s political leadership. - There is a notable divergence in Europe regarding Putin’s influence, with some leaders or groups appearing attracted to or engaging with Putin, while Ukraine’s open-society model is presented as a contrasting example. - Speaker 1 frames his view within a broader historical assessment of the collapse of the Soviet system, identifying as a political philanthropist.

I know Putin well, and we had a remarkably good, blunt relationship. I'd describe it as brutally blunt. While never physical, I believe in being brutally honest with people in private. It's also important to avoid embarrassing them publicly if you want their cooperation. In my experience, most leaders appreciated my honesty about our interests and objectives. They also valued discretion when possible. Putin, specifically, never reneged on a personal agreement he made with me. Behind closed doors, he kept his word and could be trusted.

I found it interesting that Putin didn't criticize Joe Biden or NATO during our conversation. As an American, it would feel strange to badmouth the American president to a foreign leader, even if I have doubts about Biden's presidency. It just doesn't sit right with me. Maybe I'm just old-fashioned.

Various speakers express opinions about Vladimir Putin. One speaker vouches for Putin's trustworthiness, stating they looked him in the eye and sensed his soul, adding they wouldn't have invited him to their ranch otherwise. Another speaker recalls Biden praising Putin two decades ago for moving toward democracy, with another being amazed by Putin's initial move to the West, comparing him to Peter the Great. One speaker states Putin is smart and that they had a good, blunt relationship, noting Putin never reneged on a personal agreement and kept his word in all deals. Another speaker emphasizes the scale of problems Putin faces, including restructuring the economy and rebuilding civic society. One speaker was confident that cooperation between NATO and Russia would change the world for the better. However, one speaker believes Putin will ultimately take over all of Ukraine.

The Alaska Summit reinforced my belief that while difficult pieces within reach, I believe that in a very significant step, President Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine, and this is one of the key points that we need to consider. We're going to be considering that at the table, also, like who will do what, essentially. I'm optimistic that collectively we can reach an agreement.

Speaker 1: We have not gone to war with Russia. Russia is isolated, more than five years ago, a regional power threatening neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness. Ukraine had influence for decades since the Soviet breakup. We have considerable influence on our neighbors and generally don't need to invade to have cooperation. Russia's military action violates international law and signals less influence. They don't pose the number one national security threat to United States; I am concerned about a nuclear weapon going off in Manhattan. Speaker 2: It is up to the Ukrainian people to decide how they organize themselves. The Ukrainian government is prepared to negotiate with Russia, and the international community supports a diplomatic process to de-escalate tensions, move Russian troops back from Ukraine's borders, and organize elections; the Ukrainian people will choose leadership. They will want a relationship with Europe and with Russia; this is not a zero-sum game.

Vladimir Putin is seen as smart and tough by the speaker, who emphasizes the need for peaceful negotiations rather than name-calling. The speaker criticizes past actions by the US and European leaders regarding Ukraine, urging for dialogue and diplomacy to prevent conflict. The focus is on avoiding war and finding peaceful solutions through negotiation, referencing historical examples like the Cuban Missile Crisis. Peaceful negotiations are emphasized over insults and aggression.

Speaker 0 says the other side hates Putin and "I could be tougher than any human being you've ever seen. I'd be so tough, but you're never gonna get a deal that way," adding he's aligned with Europe and wants a deal. Speaker 1 argues four years of tough talk didn't stop Putin and "the path to peace and the path to prosperity is maybe engaging in diplomacy." Speaker 2 recalls 2014, when "he occupied it" in Ukraine, says "we signed ceasefire... We signed the exchange of prisoners, but he didn't do it," and that Putin broke the ceasefire and killed people. The dialogue covers diplomacy versus confrontation, conscription, and Western aid: "We gave you the javelins" and "Obama gave you sheets." They discuss a ceasefire and warn against gambling with "World War three," noting "without us, you don't have the cards."

The speakers discuss the ideological differences between the United States and Russia, as well as the historical context of their relationship. They mention the individualistic nature of American society compared to the collectivist nature of Russian society. The conversation touches on the colonization of the American continent and the ethnic cleansing that occurred, as well as the history of slavery in the United States. The speakers highlight the importance of understanding and finding ways to cooperate despite these differences, as there have been periods of unity between the two countries in the past. They emphasize the need to focus on common interests and positive aspects to foster collaboration.

News alert discusses Tulsi Gabbard releasing a report alleging a conspiracy by a sitting president, Barack Obama, and U.S. intel agencies to undermine Donald Trump’s presidency and the 2016 election. The report claims there is irrefutable evidence that Obama and his national security team directed the creation of an intelligence community assessment they knew was false, promoting a narrative that Russia interfered in 2016 to help Trump win. Gabbard says she obtained a House Intelligence Committee report that had been locked away in a CIA vault for nearly a decade, and investigators spent over two thousand hours interviewing 20 CIA and FBI officials. The assertion is that the Obama administration doctored intelligence to imply Putin and Trump colluded to steal the election, with a highly unusual, rush-developed assessment produced a month after Trump’s victory. John Brennan allegedly handpicked five CIA analysts to write the assessment, who were siloed and not aware of each other’s work, with only one analyst in charge of drafting. The process was described as a rush job with no coordination with other intelligence agencies, essentially “home cooking” for Obama. The four key elements repeated in the assessment, forming the basis of the Russia hoax and the Mueller investigation, are: 1) that Vladimir Putin wanted Trump to win; 2) Putin took actions to help Trump win; 3) the Russians had blackmail on Trump (the Steele dossier); and 4) that the Russians tried colluding with the Trump campaign. The claim is that none of these were true, and there was no reliable intelligence to support them. Senior CIA officials allegedly refused to propagate these allegations, but were overruled by CIA Director Brennan and FBI Director Comey, who pressed for them despite lacking verifiable evidence. The report alleges the Obama administration cherry-picked intelligence, misquoted sources, did not corroborate claims, suppressed counter-evidence, and even used anonymous internet postings. Rank-and-file CIA personnel allegedly admitted that these actions violated tradecraft standards, with a pressure campaign emanating from political appointees, the CIA director, and Obama himself. Speaker 1 asserts that Donald Trump knows Russia helped him win in 2016. Speaker 2 suggests Putin’s preference for Trump came from his dislike of Hillary Clinton, who was running, while Speaker 3 states Russia sought to interfere systematically to advance Trump’s prospects. The conversation notes that at one point, 60% of Democrats believed Russia hacked voting machines to aid Trump, yet the report contends Russians aimed to create chaos and undermine faith in democracy, with solid intelligence indicating Putin had no clear preference between Clinton and Trump but had dirt on Clinton that was not released. The discussion questions why the dirt from the DNC emails and claims about Clinton’s health, including tranquilizers, were not leaked to aid Trump, and whether the information about Clinton’s health is credible. The panel suggests that if Russia sought to influence the election, more damning information would have been released. The speakers claim Obama and top intelligence leaders mischaracterized intelligence and relied on dubious sources to craft a narrative of Putin’s preference for Trump. They contend Obama continued pushing the hoax after the election, describing it as undermining democracy. Towards the end, there is mention of potential criminal implications, with references to referrals to the Department of Justice and FBI for investigation, including possible liability for Obama. A tester voices that Brennan may have committed perjury before Congress. A final note asserts that the CIA did not rely on the Steele dossier for the intelligence community assessment, countering a claim made in the discussion. The segment closes with a call for accountability.

The speaker thanks the US, its people, and the President for their bipartisan support over the past two years. They acknowledge the challenging period for both Ukraine and the United States and express a desire to hear the Senator's thoughts on future support. The Senator admires what Ukraine has been able to do for two years, recalling predictions of a swift fall. The Senator states Putin won in a landslide with 87% of the vote because 88% would look bad. The speaker notes the tenth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea and anticipates better days ahead for Ukraine, asserting that Putin will go down in history like others of his kind.

In a recent interview with Vladimir Putin, the speaker discusses the unexpected nature of the conversation and his frustration with Putin's lengthy historical explanations. However, he recognizes that Putin's understanding of the region is based on the history and formation of Russia, including its connection to Ukraine. The speaker also notes that Putin is wounded by the rejection of the West and expresses his desire for a peace deal in Ukraine. He argues against the belief that Russia is an expansionist power and highlights the importance of Crimea to Russia. The speaker criticizes US officials for their unrealistic expectations and warns against destabilizing a country with a large nuclear stockpile.

Speaker 0 states he wanted Ukraine, not Russia, to join NATO. He felt Ukraine needed to be in the EU and NATO. Speaker 1 brings up that Secretary of State Baker primed Gorbachev in the early nineties not to expand NATO. Speaker 0 responds that times change and the United States must be flexible and adjust to the times, which is why there is strong support for Speaker 1's country now. Speaker 1 says it doesn't matter what Baker primed Gorbachev with in the past, and that we have to see what is going on now.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.

The speaker expresses displeasure with Putin's actions in Ukraine, stating that Putin is "killing a lot of people" by "sending rockets into cities." The speaker says they have known Putin for a long time and "always gotten along with him," so they are surprised by his current behavior. When asked about a reported drone attack from Ukraine that Putin was almost caught in, the speaker responds that they had not heard about that, but "maybe that would be a reason" for Putin's behavior. The speaker reiterates, "I don't like what Putin is doing, not even a little bit."

In an interview with Vladimir Putin, the speaker asked about Russia's actions in Ukraine. Putin explained that he felt threatened by NATO and feared the presence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The speaker found Putin's response frustrating and believed he was filibustering. However, the speaker realized that Putin's detailed explanation was a window into his thinking about the region. Putin expressed his frustration with the West's rejection of Russia and his desire for a peace deal in Ukraine. The speaker also argued against the idea that Russia is an expansionist power and criticized US officials for demanding that Russia give up Crimea. The speaker emphasized the dangers of destabilizing Russia, a large country with a significant nuclear arsenal.

Two speakers, one being former President George W. Bush, express trust in Vladimir Putin, praising his straightforwardness and trustworthiness. Another speaker, possibly Joe Biden, acknowledges Putin's intelligence and their good relationship, stating that Putin kept his word in personal agreements. Another speaker highlights the challenges Putin faces as the President of Russia, including the need for economic restructuring, rebuilding civic society, and overcoming historical legacies in external relations. The transcript ends with a statement expressing confidence in a new level of cooperation between NATO members and Russia.

Speaker 0: This thing over with. You see the hatred he's got for Putin. It's very tough for me to make a deal with that kind of hate. I'm aligned with the world. I wanna get the things set. If you want me to be tough? I could be tougher than any human being you've ever seen, but you're never gonna get a deal that way. Speaker 1: For four years in The United States Of America... we had a president who stood up at press conferences and talked tough about Vladimir Putin, and then Putin invaded Ukraine. The path to peace... is engaging in diplomacy. Speaker 2: He occupied it, our parts, big parts of Ukraine, parts of East and Crimea. So 2014. We signed ceasefire, gas contract, but after that, he broken the ceasefire, he killed our people, and he didn't exchange prisoners. What kind of diplomacy? Speaker 0: You should be thanking the president for trying to bring it into this conference. Speaker 2: We have problems. Speaker 0: You're gambling with World War three. You have the cards. With us, you have the cards. Without us you don't have any cards. I gave you the javelins to take out all those tanks. Obama gave you sheets. What if Russia breaks his fire?

Speaker 1 argues that the United States has repeatedly engaged in illegal military actions and regime changes in multiple countries, starting with the bombing of Belgrade for 78 days to change borders of a European state, with the aim of breaking Serbia and installing Bondsteel, a large NATO base in the Balkans, under Clinton. They claim this was done without UN authority and described as a NATO mission. Speaker 1 continues, alleging that the US has subsequently waged war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, where, according to them, the Obama administration and Hillary Clinton tasked the CIA with overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. They also claim NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi, and that in Kyiv in February 2014 the US overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian military forces, noting that the overthrow happened the day after EU representatives had reached an agreement with Yanukovych for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down of both sides. They assert that the US supported the new government immediately afterward, despite that agreement and without addressing it as unconstitutional. Speaker 1 asserts that Russia, the United States, and the EU were parties to the 2015 Minsk two agreement, which was unanimously voted on by the UN Security Council, signed by the government of Ukraine, and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. They contend that Minsk II was dismissed as a holding pattern by inside-US government circles, despite the UN Security Council approval. They claim Angela Merkel later said Minsk II was a holding pattern to allow Ukraine time to build its strength, countering the assertion that Minsk II was meant to end the war. The speaker emphasizes distrust of the United States government and calls for all sides to sit down publicly to agree on terms, with both the United States and Russia committing to specific boundaries, and for NATO not to enlarge, so that a written, global judgment can be made. Speaker 2 adds that there has been an ongoing effort to create an anti-Russian platform in Ukraine, describing it as an enclave, and accusing the US and its allies of lying about not expanding NATO multiple times. Speaker 3 states that President Putin sent a draft treaty asking NATO to promise no more enlargement as a precondition for not invading Ukraine, and notes that this draft was not signed.