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Glenn (Speaker 0) and Seyed Mohamed Marandi discuss the posturing and developments in the Iran–US confrontation around May 2026, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, regional dynamics, and potential war trajectories. - Glenn notes that the United States had announced it would break open the Strait of Hormuz and that conflicting reports followed, seeking clarity on whether the conflict was moving toward all-out war. - Seyed Marandi says the situation is moving toward all-out war. He explains that the Americans initiated a new stage by attempting to carry out an operation to take ships out of the Strait of Hormuz, which did not succeed; instead, civilian boats were destroyed, and there were no military boats involved according to Iran. Iran is not using its military boats in these circumstances; it is using missiles as warnings, to avoid initiating a full war. - He states the Americans bombed boats carrying goods, resulting in five civilian deaths, citing news reports but noting Western media often follows the official narrative. Iran issued a statement blaming the Americans regarding Emirati targets being struck, though he acknowledges it could be read as either an American action or as American fault for the Emirati strikes. - Marandi asserts the operation was a failure for the United States: the Strait of Hormuz was not opened, and the Emiratis suffered damage. He describes the Emirates as an ally of the Israeli regime, noting its distancing from other Arab states, leaving OPEC, and paying for social media campaigns to shape public perception. He observes worldwide street sentiment toward Iran is largely supportive, except among Wahhabi/Salafi groups aligned with intelligence agencies and those who historically opposed Iran. - He contends that the global economy is entering a crisis phase: high oil and energy prices and rising food costs are the “fever,” with supply chains at risk of collapse and the global economy vulnerable to interruptions in any single link. He argues Iran’s economy is a “resistance economy” under siege for decades, while other global economies are more interlinked and fragile. - On troop movements and targets, Marandi says large US troop numbers and equipment have been deployed in the region, with many ground troops potentially based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates; air refueling and other assets involve Saudi Arabia, the Israeli regime, and Qatar. - Glenn asks why the UAE is disproportionately aggressive toward Iran compared with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Marandi explains the UAE’s alignment with Israel, its departure from OPEC, and the perception that striking Emirati targets amounts to striking Israeli targets. - They discuss predictability of Iran’s strategy: Marandi has long warned Iran would disrupt oil and gas production; he notes Iranian officials have historically warned about the Strait of Hormuz. He criticizes Western analyses of Iran’s capabilities as underestimating Tehran’s military and strategic sophistication, while Western narratives have repeatedly expected Iran to collapse in various wars, which Iran has repeatedly resisted. - On the potential course of a renewed war, Marandi outlines two broad scenarios: a short, intense clash with limited strikes on non-critical infrastructure could provoke a strong Iranian response, including missiles at Israel and allied targets; a more extensive war targeting Iran’s critical infrastructure, such as power plants and bridges, could devastate Persian Gulf countries and precipitate a global economic downturn. He emphasizes that Iran has historically avoided targeting civilians, but warns that destruction of critical infrastructure could force populations to flee. - Regarding escalation and timing, Marandi argues the Americans misjudged Iran’s resolve and that Tehran has rebuilt assets and developed new capabilities since ceasefire discussions. He suggests Trump’s aim may have been to probe whether Iran would capitulate or escalate, a calculation he believes underestimated Iran’s preparedness. - He predicts that the scale and duration of escalation will hinge on American choices: the Red Sea’s closure and Gulf actions depend on how far the United States escalates, what targets are attacked, and how long the strikes last. In general, he contends that the world economy’s vulnerability will intensify with any extended or severe conflict, particularly if critical infrastructure is targeted. - In closing, Glenn and Marandi acknowledge the peril of the situation, with Marandi urging awareness of the broader implications, including regional stability and global economic impacts, and both hoping for a path away from further escalation.

Glenn: Welcome back with professor Richard Wolff to discuss economic fury, the economic weaponization of the US campaign against Iran. How do you assess this effort, given the mix of oil sanctions, open markets for oil, and port blockades? Wolff: I’ll be blunt: I don’t know how to answer cleanly because the statements keep flipping on/off and have become “herky jerky.” The steps are inconsistent, sometimes increasing supply of oil and pushing down prices, other times constraining it. It’s not clear which way any given move will go, and the sequence is hard to parse. He notes that Gulf states are pressing for dollar swaps—foreign central banks can access dollars via swaps rather than buying them on markets. These swaps have shifted from weekly to daily, signaling worry about dollar access. The Gulf states—UAE and others—allege they depend on dollar-denominated oil revenues to service debts incurred through investments abroad. If dollars tighten due to strait closures and sanctions, they may be forced to sell assets in the US, including Treasury securities, which would lower bond prices and raise interest rates, potentially triggering a US recession. They could also sell holdings in the American stock market, affecting prices. Wolff emphasizes this as a surface manifestation of a broader global liquidity and debt dilemma tied to the Persian Gulf and the dollar’s role in the world economy. Glenn: So essentially the petrodollar is being unraveled because if Gulf states price and sell oil in dollars, but if they’re not exporting and not receiving dollars, they can’t pay debts or roll them over. They might sell treasuries or assets to cover shortfalls. How far can the US hold this position? Wolff: I don’t have a crystal ball, but I think the likely scenario is a political and economic squeeze. Trump has lost parts of his base—issues like the Epstein file and the economy’s inflation and job market. He relies on a narrative of victory; his base may be shrinking, while the wealthier 10% who own stock might be more supportive as the stock market stays buoyant. If the Gulf states must exchange dollars for debt relief or to cover losses, the government may have to grant more dollar swaps to prevent a spike in interest rates and a stock sell-off. Steven Bannon has warned that war could cost Trump the election, so the administration may shore up swaps to protect markets. Wolff suggests this is a desperate regime trying to exit a bad position with minimal damage. Glenn: You describe a broader pattern: the petrodollar’s decline, and the US dollar’s dwindling centrality in global reserves. How does this fit into the larger arc of American empire and capitalism? Wolff: It fits as part of the decline of the American empire and the corresponding decline of American capitalism. BRICS, China’s rise, and the shift away from dollar-dominated trade illuminate a trend toward reduced dollar dominance. Sanctions in Ukraine exposed the limits of that model, and there’s growing acceptance of payments outside the dollar for oil. The United States remains influential, but the dollar’s dominance is waning, and there’s no clear strategy to reverse that trend. Manufacturing has moved to other countries, notably China, which maintains low inflation and large-scale production. The world is moving toward multipolar arrangements, and the dollar’s preeminence is no longer assured. Glenn: Given this trajectory, is there any viable way to salvage the petrodollar, or is it beyond rescue? Wolff: I don’t predict the future with certainty, but I view the larger context as a decline in American hegemony and an erosion of dollar dominance. The war in Iran, like the war in Ukraine, demonstrates the limits of sanctions and the unintended consequences of aggressive confrontation. The dollar’s global reserve role is shrinking, and other powers are willing to transact outside it. He emphasizes this as a systemic shift, not a temporary setback. Glenn: Any final thoughts on how history and memory shape current policy? Wolff: History often gets reframed to fit current aims. There’s a tendency to present “victories” regardless of outcome, especially in wartime rhetoric. The dialogue in Europe and the US reflects a mix of nostalgia for past dominance and struggle to adapt to a changing global order. The conversation ends with questions about how Europe and the US should reorient foreign policy toward a multipolar world, where old assumptions no longer hold.

- New footage from Tel Aviv is shown, including videos outside windows of what sources say they are seeing, with a claim that Fox News is not covering this damage in Tel Aviv. The discussion centers on the reality of buildings being hit near City Hall, and questions why it isn’t being widely covered by Fox News. - The conversation shifts to missile stocks and interceptors. A comment references Keith Kellogg on Fox News discussing a Wall Street Journal report about running out of interceptor missiles within four to five weeks, and a claim that there is no problem because orders were placed and allies could supply missiles. The speaker notes that UAE reportedly has about a week left of interceptor missiles and says missiles from Iran are getting through “like a sieve.” - It is argued that the U.S. has a limited stockpile because many missiles have been transferred to Israel and Ukraine over the past years, leaving the U.S. inventory low. The claim is made that continuing the war with depleted missiles would heighten national security risk and vulnerability globally. - The transcript discusses potential international responses. The speaker contends that Europe’s mobilization rhetoric (France, Greece) should not be expected to deter Iran, noting that Greece does not have a major army and that NATO-funded contingents are involved rather than independent power. The assertion is made that Iran’s strikes in Tel Aviv, Tehran, Qom, and other cities show that Iran believes it can strike back effectively, signaling a preference to fight the United States and Israel rather than submit again. - The central point is that the conflict is described as 100% about missiles and air-defense missiles, not ground forces. The speaker argues Iran likely has enough offensive missiles to prolong the conflict for months, possibly longer than U.S. capacity to sustain it, especially with Hormuz potentially shut or partially shut, which could hurt the western economy. - Admiral James Stavridis is cited by Speaker 0, noting that as the U.S. and Israel expend hundreds of precision weapons, the focus should shift to logistics and stockpiles. The discussion emphasizes the need for inventory clarity, planning, and alignment between political objectives and military capabilities. - Speaker 1 asserts that the planning should have assessed inventories, timeframes, and whether the means match the objectives. The argument states that risking all resources without sufficient offensive or defensive capacity is a dangerous gamble, suggesting the current course could be a “huge blunder.” - The conversation touches on General Dan Kane, who reportedly told the president two weeks earlier that there were not enough ammunition and it would not be pretty to win. A reference is made to Trump’s Truth Social claiming Kane’s assessment was incorrect, with talk of whether Kane did or did not say the president’s characterization was accurate. The claim is made that there are concerns about integrity and whether senior leaders would publicly contradict the administration’s framing if necessary. - A follow-up question is raised about whether admitting a ground invasion would imply insufficient missiles to sustain the mission, with Speaker 1 acknowledging that admitting ground troops would signal a lack of missiles for sustained action. - The segment then shifts to a sponsorship note about depression treatment options, promoting Ataybekli and its lead program BPL-003 (a nasal spray psychedelic-based therapy) developed for treatment-resistant depression, with background on the company, its investors, and the roadmap toward Phase 3 in 2026. It emphasizes the potential for faster, more scalable treatment sessions and invites viewers to learn more at a website, with disclaimers about not providing medical or financial advice.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Glenn: Welcome back, with Janis Varoufakis, former Greek finance minister and founder of DM25. The world has grown more dangerous. He notes the war in Iran is asymmetric: the US is more powerful but Iran can shut down energy trade and view the conflict as existential, willing to shut down the global economy to avoid defeat. Glenn asks where the war is headed and whether there is an off-ramp. Yanis: The US has a history of asymmetric conflicts where it enters with confidence and exits with its wings clipped—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria. Iran has faced stronger opposition than those cases, and despite striking Tel Aviv and Gulf bases, the US pain threshold seems lower than Iran’s. He points out the difference this time is a broader regional and global resistance and Iran’s capacity to respond through strategic actions like shutting Hormuz, making escalation costly for the US. Glenn: Economics show that industrial might, supply chains, and technological sovereignty matter, suggesting a shift away from free trade. He asks whether these lessons will redefine Western ideology and asks about the role of deindustrialization over the last decades. Yanıs: He says the shift began after Bretton Woods and the era of financialization and neoliberalism, with industrial capacity shipped out and the West leveraging finance and, later, big tech. He notes Margaret Thatcher’s role in deindustrialization and shipping capacity abroad, and he is surprised Trump fell into a war against Iran without a clear exit strategy. He argues Netanyahu’s influence pulled the US into a long war, framing it as a tactic to keep Israelis in fear and justify annexation moves in the West Bank, thus sustaining conflict. He also addresses the liberal-imperialist claim of liberating women, stating that women of Iran do not need bombs and that liberation would require defeating the powers that prevent peace and democracy, citing the 1953 coup and the suppression of the left in Iran after 1979. He emphasizes that the regime’s survival has involved neoliberal policies within Iran and that both reformists and conservatives in Iran ultimately align around survival and regional power, with the regime having benefited from long-term Western hostility and recent escalations. Glenn: Raises the point that the US miscalculated even the narrative—often incoherent, with statements about “liberating women” fluctuating between aims of freeing women and destroying Iran’s ability to rebuild. Yanīs: He challenges the idea that this war is about liberating women, and reiterates that the people of Iran face a stark choice between the current regime and a failed-state trajectory. He argues the regime's popularity is enough to sustain it, and that external pressures are not driving a straightforward democratic outcome. He notes that the real losers are ordinary people in the US, Iran, and globally, with rising food and energy prices, while the leaders of Iran may see gains in rallying around a common external threat. Glenn: Cites Trump’s tweets about higher oil prices and questions the populist credentials when the impact is on the average person. Yanīs: He discusses the changing nature of warfare, highlighting drone technology as a major shift. A drone economy makes cheap drones capable of challenging costly missiles, altering the political economy of war and enabling autonomous, AI-driven weapons. He notes that drone warfare, as seen in Ukraine and now Iran, could lead to a permanent-war dynamic where peace becomes a system error. He mentions how tech companies like Palantir train AI for civilian and military applications, including hospital management, illustrating the broader commercialization of war tech. Glenn: Reflects on how competition among NATO, Russia, and China could reshape power dynamics, particularly with autonomous weapons and the ability of adversaries to strike at vulnerabilities. Yanīs: He cautions about the risk of a broader great-power war and notes that drones, autonomy, and AI could enable rapid decision-making with less human oversight, expanding the lethality and reducing accountability. Glenn: Observes that Iran can absorb pain and still threaten Hormuz, while the US and Israel may be unable to declare a decisive victory without economic and political costs. He asks where US and Israel go from here. Yanīs: He argues Netanyahu seeks permanent war to justify expansion, while the Trump administration would like a quick victory. He underscores that a clear victory is hard to define when Hormuz remains contested, and that Trump’s options may be to declare a triumph or continue the conflict, depending on midterm politics. He emphasizes that the war’s outcomes are measured by the cost to ordinary people rather than leaders’ narratives. Glenn: Adds that the war’s casualties and economic effects will hit working people hardest, and notes Trump’s failure to align populism with real-world costs. Yanīs: Returns to the moral dimension, explaining that he has opposed illegal wars by the US and Israel in various contexts and that his duty is to call out both sides, stressing international law and stopping his own governments from dropping bombs on Iran as the top priority. Glenn: Agrees, adding that human rights should restrain war, not justify it, and warns against substituting humanitarian rhetoric for power plays. Yanīs: Concludes by recalling past anti-war activism and reiterates that solidarity should resist imperialism, not substitute it with bombings of other regimes. He emphasizes choosing international law and opposing the gang-like rule of Western governments. Glenn: Thanks Yanis; Yanis thanks him as well.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

The discussion centers on Israel, Iran, and the United States’ role, focusing on perceived double standards about “foreign agents,” changing U.S. policy under Donald Trump, and concerns about influence inside American politics. Mario and the other speaker open by reacting to news claiming Netanyahu intends to tap pro-Israel Republican lawmakers and media figures such as Mark Levin to help undo progress toward a peace deal with Iran. They argue that Netanyahu’s position is not about nuclear weapons in practice, but about continuing pressure on Iran. The speaker says deterrence and nuclear power mean Israel will not be attacked the way it fears, and that Iran’s role as a regional power has checked aggression. They also claim there is no military option to change Iran’s position, which is presented as part of why Trump signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU). The conversation then turns to a perceived double standard in U.S. discourse about foreign influence: critics fearmongering about certain countries and allegedly demonizing anyone who is complimentary or fair toward them. The speaker says careers are threatened and people are accused of being foreign agents in one case, while Israel-related foreign influence is treated as normal. They emphasize that if the U.S. treats Russia differently from Israel regarding foreign agents, the same standard should apply to both. They discuss frustration with criticism aimed at people outside the U.S. for caring about democracy and sovereignty, and note that Americans are not portrayed in similar stories to the same extent as prominent pro-Israel media figures. The speaker also argues that foreigners can support Israel verbally without risking lives or bankrolls in the way Americans would. On the war with Iran and the MOU, the speaker says Trump’s shift and signing reflect inability to pursue a military alternative, and that “math is math.” They emphasize that Iran is described as having control over the Strait of Hormuz and that prolonged conflict would worsen economic and material pressures, including a fertilizer crisis, beyond oil and gas. They argue that continuing engagement risks restarting a pointless war, especially given claims that Netanyahu is working to sabotage peace efforts. The speaker highlights Netanyahu’s stated intent to continue offensive actions in Lebanon and questions what the U.S. would do after Iran’s retaliation. Lindsey Graham’s support for the MOU is described as notable, and they debate whether this represents short-term defeat-acknowledgment while planning longer-term sabotage, versus a genuine shift. The speaker says it is difficult to determine directly but claims Israel has exerted pressure on U.S. policy for a long time and suggests the relationship is not based on genuine closeness between Trump and Netanyahu. They state Israel’s acceptance of U.S. support is framed as financially and militarily asymmetrical: the U.S. is described as funding roughly half of Israel’s military and providing major foreign aid, while the speaker claims Israel’s intelligence provided to the U.S. has allegedly pulled the U.S. into wars. A related topic is the potential merger of U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence structures. The speaker calls it “wild,” says it would make it “nearly impossible to get rid of” personnel they describe as Israeli infiltrators, and warns that it could lead to violent domestic upheaval if the trend continues. They also claim Senator Tom Cotton is pushing to merge Mossad and the CIA and call into question whether he is influenced by something like cash. The conversation includes discussion of political outcomes and voter behavior, including a claim that Israel-aligned influence may be “lucky” when fighting happens in primaries because voters are more galvanized and less focused in general elections. They argue that non-voters form a large block, that media division contributes to atomization, and that the system needs change rather than demonizing ordinary citizens. Turning to Israel’s internal perspective, the speaker says Israelis may believe they are entitled to border expansion and claims that U.S. support for decades conditions Israel to think its actions are acceptable. They argue that this makes it harder for Israeli society to undo narratives that justify harming civilians. They reject empathy toward “terrorists,” and claim that when critics label wrongdoing as terrorism, they are accused of anti-Semitism. The transcript discusses Mike Huckabee’s remarks that the U.S. “wouldn’t exist without Israel.” The speaker responds that the U.S. is older than Israel and argues that Israel cannot exist without U.S. support. They also link Huckabee’s stance to evangelical Christian beliefs about Israel’s role in the second coming, stating that those beliefs affect support for the state of Israel. They reference Huckabee’s meeting with Jonathan Pollard (described as a U.S. traitor) and say the White House response was no but there was “no problem,” expressing anger that such actions would not be treated as unacceptable. On whether Trump is under duress, they discuss claims that Trump’s behavior shifted after the 2024 assassination attempt. The speaker says they are not an insider but is influenced by Joe Kent’s claims and says Israel “has the capacity and capability” to carry out assassinations and use blackmail. They continue that Trump’s choices may reflect constraints rather than ideological alignment. Finally, they discuss how much control a U.S. president truly has, describing the deep state, unelected bureaucrats, and agency autonomy as factors that allow decisions to be made without presidential approval, including references to CENTCOM and past claims that “authorization from the U.S.” does not necessarily mean Trump personally authorized actions. The conversation concludes with the speaker expressing hope Trump continues working toward peace, while emphasizing skepticism that the MOU will lead to a lasting peace deal, and warning that U.S. influence structures and institutional autonomy could undermine desired outcomes.

Clayton interviews Professor Morandi about the Iranian military situation amid claims of a US-Israeli aggression and a media blackout. - Morandi asserts the Iranian air force is intact. He says Americans and Israelis bomb decoys and provides examples of footage showing explosions on painted ground objects that do not move afterward, indicating decoys are being used to mislead about real strikes. He states Iran has deployed decoys across the region for planes, helicopters, and missile launchers. The navy’s true strength is described as underground, with bases full of speedboats that fire surface-to-sea and sea-to-surface missiles; these underground bases are reported as intact. The Iranian air force is not heavily used, operating mainly from bases to the east/northeast where access is more limited. Missiles and drones are fired day and night. - Morandi contends that Iran’s naval power for asymmetrical warfare remains intact, and that the enemy’s claims of dwindling launchers or missiles are inaccurate. He notes the initial use of older, cheap missiles to exhaust air defenses, after which Iran fires fewer missiles but still successfully penetrates defenses. - On the strategic Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, Morandi dismisses the idea that capturing Kharg Island would significantly alter outcomes. He argues that even if Kharg Island were taken, the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless Iran agrees to reopen it. Iran has long prepared defenses across the Persian Gulf, including naval and shore defenses, anticipating possible US attack. Iran’s missile, drone, and naval capabilities—long-, medium-, and short-range missiles, cruise and ballistic missiles, drones, and speedboats in underground bases—are positioned to deter. - If the US were to open the Strait by attacking, Morandi foresees heavy casualties, destruction of tankers and oil/gas installations, and a collapse of global oil prices, potentially around extreme levels like $250 a barrel, with severe global economic consequences. He argues the United States would lose more than Iran and would need compensation from Gulf regimes hosting US bases for allowing attacks. He asserts that traditional negotiations fail with the US given past breaches of agreements (citing the JCPOA) and implies distrust toward Washington. - Regarding a reported border invasion by Kurds or other groups, Morandi says US collaboration with Kurdish forces would likely be defeated by Iran, who would then threaten the autonomous Kurdish regional government in Northern Iraq. He suggests such actions would harm regional economies and erode Western influence, noting that Gulf states have borne significant economic and political costs from the conflict. He argues the US has harmed its own interests by engaging in war with Iran, increasing oil prices, and pushing regional countries toward confrontation. - Morandi concludes by stating that without genuine assurances on non-aggression and guarantees on future behavior, negotiations with the US are untrustworthy. He emphasizes that the US’s hostility affects not only Iran but the broader regional and global economy, and he criticizes American leadership as acting in concert with the Israeli regime.

Professor Zhang returns to discuss the Iran war and geopolitics through historical patterns and game theory. He argues that Trump has failed to articulate a clear purpose or strategy for the war. Initially, the narrative centered on preventing Iran’s nuclear uranium enrichment, but the Oman foreign minister reportedly told observers that Iranians had already agreed to zero uranium enrichment even for civilian purposes, calling the nuclear weapon pretext into question. He notes that Rubio proposed preempting Israel’s anticipated attack, suggesting the U.S. acted to defend itself. After initial strikes, Iran bombarded U.S. bases in the GCC and closed the Strait of Hormuz, causing significant global economic disruption as oil prices rose toward around $120 a barrel. Iran’s aim, Zhang says, is to pressure global economies and the GCC to push Trump to end the war, while the United States and its allies pursue a destructive approach, including strikes on desalination and oil facilities, which he characterizes as civilian targets that would jeopardize civilians’ access to water and fuel. He cites a 170 schoolgirls’ deaths in a Tomahawk strike as an example of the civilian toll and argues the war’s conduct suggests a focus on destroying Iran rather than regime change. Glenn observes the narrative’s inconsistency and compares it with other wars, where a single organizing narrative typically emerges. Zhang expands the view: the war is a war of attrition for Iran, pressuring global energy supplies and GCC partners to influence Washington to end the conflict, whereas the United States and Israel pursue a path of destruction. He emphasizes Iran’s vulnerability of Gulf States, arguing their dependence on U.S. protection—despite their vulnerability when Hormuz closes and their desalination capacity is threatened. He explains that Gulf economies depend on oil revenue and import food and water; closing Hormuz and attacking desalination plants could collapse the GCC’s economic and physical stability. He contends that the Gulf’s petrodollar system ties the region to the U.S. economy, and destroying that link would threaten both American debt and the AI/flood of investment in the United States from Gulf capital. Zhang further argues that the war’s broader global impact could unsettle the current liberal international order. Iran seeks to push the U.S. out of the Middle East, gain control of Hormuz, and finance rebuilding domestically, while the U.S. and its allies resist recognizing the limits of empire. He asserts that the petrodollar system ties Gulf investments to the U.S. economy; if Gulf States stop funding American growth, an AI-driven financial bubble could burst, triggering a severe downturn reminiscent of a Great Depression. He counters a belief that the United States could gracefully withdraw from the region, labeling such thinking as wishful and attributing the U.S. position to imperial hubris. Glenn asks about the war’s potential global spread and how the conflict might draw in other powers, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Pakistan. Zhang contends there is likely no off-ramp; Israel intends to widen the conflict to achieve its Greater Israel project, while Iran would strike GCC targets more than Israel. He notes Turkey’s weakness and predicts possible broad regional engagement, with Pakistan obligated to defend Saudi Arabia and potentially becoming a participant due to mutual defense pacts. He suggests a multi-vector expansion: from Pakistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan to secure the Shatt al-Arab and Hormuz, leading to broader regional escalation and eventual intervention by Southeast Asian economies reliant on Hormuz oil. Discussing Russia, Zhang argues that Vladimir Putin has a grand strategy. He believes Putin is waiting for a U.S. ground invasion of Iran; once U.S. forces commit ground troops, Russia could exploit the distraction to advance objectives, notably Odessa, potentially triggering a European defense and a prolonged, draining conflict. This, he says, would exhaust Europe and push for a political realignment favorable to Russia, potentially replacing the current order with a new balance of power. Towards the end, Zhang forecasts three major post-war trends: deindustrialization due to energy scarcity, mercantilism with localized supply networks, and remilitarization as Pax Americana ends and Pax Judaica or similar regional orders emerge. He suggests Japan might lead East Asia in deindustrialization and remilitarization, while China remains tied to the old global order. He predicts a potential rapprochement between the United States and China but maintains the global order will not be saved. He also notes that Europe is in a dire condition, facing demographic and economic strain, refugee integration challenges, and political fragmentation, which undercuts Western liberal hegemonies. In closing, Zhang reiterates that his earlier prediction from two years prior—that the United States would invade Iran—has been fulfilled with shock, and he expresses sympathy with the unsettling realization of the unfolding dynamics.

The conversation centers on a newly discussed MOU involving Iran, Israel, the GCC, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and the downstream effects on markets, alliances, and investment. Regarding the MOU, Jeffrey Krigsmann says it is the same MOU that was meant to be signed Sunday but is now on Friday, and that not all parties have agreed publicly to its terms. He says Israelis and GCC members have been kept in the dark, raising questions about sustainability: if Israel launches attacks on Hezbollah immediately after signing, he argues, Iran’s actions regarding the straits could affect shipping operations. He notes that Maersk has already said it will not change plans because of it, and that how long the arrangement lasts matters for ship movement and whether ships can be brought back out. Krigsmann also says other parties were not consulted on the “logistics service fee,” described as tolls. He highlights a key point: when J.D. Vance was asked about $300 billion in who pays it, Vance indicated Gulf friends are paying it. He frames this as a large cost for some party to shoulder. If Gulf states are not paying, he says the U.S. would have to, and he connects that to the need for congressional involvement. He adds that Iranian reporting has already circulated the $300 billion figure and that parties are claiming victories even though nothing is broadly agreed. The discussion then shifts to details of what the MOU actually states: the host notes that leaks suggest Iran would manage shipping and reopen the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian management, but the fee is not clearly stated in the MOU details they have seen. Krigsmann says he has not seen the details yet. The host asks whether Iran will control the Strait of Hormuz, how significant that is for Iran and the global economy, and whether there could be a long-term deal integrating Iran into the global economy that investors are considering. Krigsmann says investors are not currently talking about it but argues it should be brought back into focus as the leverage Iran wanted from its nuclear program, describing that leverage as the most it has had since the revolution. On how the Gulf is hurt and how long recovery takes, Krigsmann says the region is a big victim, especially countries like Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and also Iraq. He says Saudi and the Emiratis are richer and can roll with impacts more easily, but countries such as Qatar derive a large share of GDP from oil and gas, and he says Qatar’s major LNG facilities have been permanently damaged. He argues that if Gulf states were paying war reparations, it would be an insult for countries severely hurt as bystanders. When asked whether security and stability perceptions in places like the UAE will return, the host suggests people forget quickly and references COVID. Krigsmann compares the dynamic to the Global Financial Crisis and says a key lesson is diversification—specifically diversification of energy supply. He says the Middle East will likely remain a dominant energy supplier but with alternative routes that cost more. He argues that a similar “new set of players” dynamic followed the 2008 crisis, and he expects a parallel shift on the energy side. He adds that the pain could become more asymmetric as shortages approach and restart takes time. The host broadens diversification beyond energy and mentions security and alliance structures. Krigsmann says countries will try to be self-sufficient and diversify friends, with Middle East alliances shifting and becoming transactional. He frames diversification across supply lines, defense, and finance as a response to the risk of being dependent on one entity. The conversation then turns to asset flows and market behavior. Krigsmann describes a rotation out of “new economy” tech into “old economy” commodities that he says ran through the ceasefire on April 8, with commodity names later giving back gains during a sell-off. He argues that capital has flowed into SpaceX/NASDAQ and tech, and because it is a “zero-sum game,” less capital going into energy and commodities means they fall. He also says retail investors destock physical commodities and sell equity exposure expecting cheaper prices tomorrow. He expresses concerns about how uncertainty and volatility affect markets, arguing that the “information content” of markets is reduced when rules shift. He cites regulatory changes in the U.S. and Europe as reasons markets may not function with the stable regulatory framework they previously relied on. He says oil companies are down and oil price down because uncertainty is too high to hold positions, making it too painful to hold long or short. He references volatility swinging sharply within months and states this pushes people out because holding positions has become too dangerous. On Asia, he says conditions calmed somewhat because it is before peak summer driving season and before heating/cooling ramps, but he says places like Japan and Korea face problems ahead. He estimates that oil shut-ins fell from about 12 million barrels per day to about 10 million due to leaks from the Gulf, and he says trapped ships decreased after ships were freed through the strait, though he says it is not a long-term solution. Strategically and economically, Krigsmann says the U.S. has not “actually had to feel it yet,” but that impacts will be evident in years. He contrasts the situation with 1991: he argues this is a different strategic world where globalization “blew” apart opposite to the Gulf War I context and describes a game-changing shift with polarization. He also argues that the “grand bargain” broken—sea-lane security by the U.S. Navy in exchange for dollar-based trade—means questions about strategic alliances and the link between oil, dollar, and navy. When asked about integrating Iran into the global economy, he says capital wants certainty and confidence that investments will not lose everything. He calls Iran “uninvestable right now,” comparing it to Venezuela where guarantees were offered and where investment viability depended on them. He says guarantees are what institutions like the World Bank and IMF were designed to support after World War II, and he asks who would provide guarantees for Iran. The host adds that Iran has looked for guarantees from multiple countries, but no one could guarantee U.S. promises, leaving the guarantor as the party that cannot guarantee. The discussion concludes with agreement that uncertainty is unprecedented and that hard assets may benefit, followed by closing remarks about the show and upcoming guests.

Dr. Trita Parsi, cofounder and executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, analyzes the current Gulf dynamics amid the ceasefire discussions and regional volatility. - Israel–Saudi normalization’s core flaw: these arrangements were intended to secure U.S. commitment to regional security rather than enable the U.S. to disengage. The normalization linked U.S. security guarantees for Israel with those for several GCC states as a counterweight to Iran, but after October 7 the basis for that alignment began to erode amid Israel’s actions in Gaza. - Post-Oct 7 shifts: Saudi officials increasingly said Iran is not the region’s problem; Israel is. This undercut the Abrams Accord, which was seen largely as an anti-Iran coalition. Iran has managed to survive and, in some ways, strengthen, controlling key leverage points like the straits, and conveying that threats of U.S. force against Iran are not highly effective. - U.S. strategic trajectory: the current dynamics may push the United States to accelerate its exit from the Persian Gulf. This could leave Saudi Arabia in a position where it must recalibrate with Iran—potentially angrier but more powerful—while also considering how to respond to Iran’s actions in the war and its own security concerns. - Saudi–Israel implications: without a reliable U.S. shield, Saudi Arabia might drift back toward closer ties with Israel, though domestically that would be difficult. The Saudis had hoped for continued U.S. backing until Iran was significantly checked; given there were no viable escalatory options for the U.S. in the war, staying in could have produced worse outcomes, whereas exiting poses risks of instability and reshaping alliances. - Host’s interpretation of the ceasefire: the host questions whether the ceasefire is genuine or a lull to restock weapons, while Parsi emphasizes the timeline issue—interceptors and THAAD remnants take years to replenish, and two weeks is insufficient for a real reset. He suggests Trump’s possible aim might be to exit the region, not secure a deal, leaving Iran to control the Strait and Israel to decide its own path thereafter. - Historical analogies: Parsi likens U.S. occupation decisions to Bremer’s post-2003 Iraq policies, arguing that exiting could have avoided amplifying regional instability and the rise of insurgent problems, even if the outcome would still be painful. - Overall takeaway: the future may involve the United States stepping back, Iran consolidating strategic leverage in the Strait of Hormuz, and Saudi Arabia facing a choice between recalibrating its regional strategy with Iran and coordinating more closely with Israel, all amid unresolved tensions and limited U.S. military capacity for a quick rebuild.

President Trump tells reporters in the White House that he has called off strikes against Iran because a deal is close, with multiple parties involved and the agreement potentially finalized within the next two to three days. Speaker 2 compares this to a repeating pattern attributed to Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu since February 28: declarations of victory, claims that the other side is begging to surrender, orders to announce an imminent deal, bombing again, and repetition. Speaker 2 says the cycle has happened “over 38 times,” arguing that a weekend bombing follows the claim of an imminent deal. Glenn Greenwald is referenced as having posted that the same pattern repeats weekly. Speaker 2 connects the discussion to earlier commentary by Tucker Carlson about Trump’s alleged dealmaking, then shifts to claims about sovereignty. In Speaker 1’s monologue, the United States is described as lacking sovereignty in decisions that “change the course of history,” with the war in Iran said to be decided by the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, rather than the president of the United States. Speaker 1 argues that this challenges the premise that people control outcomes through voting, claiming that on major questions elected officials are not in charge. Speaker 2 asks who is driving any potential peace agreement, stating that Iran has said there is no agreement and that Speaker 2 calls that claim a “total lie,” adding that negotiations had not yet involved speaking with Iran. Speaker 2 brings in Colonel Douglas McGregor to interpret Trump’s statements alongside reports of overnight attacks involving Gulf states, U.S. infrastructure, U.S. bases, and F-35s, with deaths inside Iran. Colonel McGregor says he asked someone in Wall Street what was going on and was told “there’s no truth” to the deal claims. He frames Trump’s behavior as persuasive like Bernie Madoff, saying Trump creates “the illusion of control.” McGregor describes possible outcomes: leaving and pretending nothing happened (described as unlikely), leaving without acting with Israel (said to risk Israeli use of a nuclear weapon), freezing everything into a prolonged “hot-cold war,” and continued escalation he believes Trump cannot control fully. Speaker 0 shifts to consequences, saying the stock market can respond to illusions, that continuous threats to kill people as national policy damage the psyche, and that there should be consequences for the repeated pattern. McGregor also argues that Gulf states are seeking security arrangements beyond the U.S., referencing Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, and saying Arab states and the Arabian Peninsula are discussing security with Russia because the U.S. cannot protect what it promised. He suggests this marks the start of an end to what he calls the “American military empire,” with Koreans, Japanese, Persian Gulf states, and Europeans possibly asking the U.S. to leave. Speaker 2 reports “from insider sources” that Iran denies a deal Trump is bragging about, including the “new Ayatollah,” and claims negotiating teams are frustrated because Trump and his team allegedly sabotage negotiations by preemptively announcing “bullshit” online. Speaker 2 calls the situation “total theater.” McGregor explains constraints he believes apply to Trump regarding Israel: he says Israel would not stop attacking without destruction of Iran, while Trump would not want an agreement that prevents him from declaring victory. He warns that if Israel becomes a rogue actor, other states could seek nuclear access for protection. Speaker 0 mentions a morning claim about taking “Karg Island” and other oil infrastructure in a way he associates with Venezuela, then asks whether it is bluster and whether such action is feasible. McGregor responds that taking the island would involve “terrible risks,” questions what would be done with it afterward, and argues Iranians have more routes for oil than cargo islands. He adds that destroying facilities could affect China, Japan, and others with strategic petroleum reserves, while the U.S. reserve is said to be dropping. Speaker 2 asks what happens next and questions U.S. Central Command posts about the Strait of Hormuz remaining open while reports say commercial shipping is severely restricted. McGregor says the “open” message conflicts with reality, describes possible queuing and payment-for-priority claims in the Gulf, and says oil is being moved because Iran permits it, whether through regulation or bribery. He emphasizes that Trump would not admit limited control, warning against blockading indefinitely and against a prolonged shadow war involving troops facing ballistic missiles and armed drones. In closing, McGregor says he worries that resuming attacks could produce more losses, including credibility and prestige with the world, and that intervening in the Gulf with air mobile infantry would be a “disaster waiting to happen.” He says he cannot answer whether Americans have suffered unrevealed base losses but believes more losses are likely if attacks continue.

Mario and Professor Glenn discuss escalating tensions in the Ukraine war and a new Zelensky statement warning Belarus to withdraw military equipment from the border or face strikes within a week. Glenn says Zelensky’s goal appears to be pulling NATO deeper into the war; Belarus is unlikely to join directly, but Zelensky is targeting Russian-linked equipment that supports drones, while Belarus assists Russia in other ways. Glenn also frames the broader pattern as a critical-phase dynamic: if Ukraine is losing, “the losing part… gets desperate,” increasing the risk of major escalation involving Russia, NATO, and Ukraine. They then turn to the “spectacular attack on Moscow,” described as unprecedented—an attack on Russia’s capital—after prior actions Glenn cites including strikes on Russia’s early warning systems and nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Glenn says NATO is not “losing anything” in his framing because NATO countries fight with Ukrainians, so Russia’s retaliation against Ukraine does not deter NATO. He argues that Russia may eventually conclude it must strike a NATO country to establish a red line against launching massive attacks on capitals, and that once Russia decides to retaliate against NATO, escalation control becomes an “illusion,” potentially involving tactical nuclear weapons and becoming “unpredictable.” The conversation shifts to Iran and a U.S. MOU referenced as involving Switzerland, with Glenn arguing it is unlikely to be implemented in full and that the Americans are “buying for time.” He says the U.S. signed what he characterizes as a declaration of surrender because, per Trump’s claims, they are running out of fuel within four weeks and need time to replenish oil supplies and move ships through. Mario and Glenn discuss rhetoric changes attributed to Trump and J.D. Vance, including Trump’s language about Iran as a “government” caring for their people and his justification of Iran’s ballistic missile program. Glenn says such rhetoric shocks political media circles in Iran and the U.S. and creates space for previously restricted arguments. Glenn also describes the memorandum as outlining U.S. concessions and Iran’s gains: he cites termination of the U.S. naval blockade within 30 days, suspension of certain fees or charges for 60 days, and a plan requiring the U.S. and partners to come up with at least $300 billion for reconstruction and economic development of Iran. He says the memorandum includes terminating all sanctions on Iran and not implementing new ones, while not addressing items Iran would be required to give up as he lists them (including civilian nuclear program, partnerships with Yemen, Hezbollah, Hamas, and ballistic missile program). Glenn argues that this reflects defeat rather than success and compares it to broader Western war-narrative incentives where claims like “America is winning” or “Iran is winning” change what is considered acceptable to say. Mario says the pattern resembles how he has seen discourse function during other conflicts: arguing strategic facts leads to being labeled, and dialogue becomes difficult because one must “cheer for one side.” Glenn agrees that open rhetoric from leadership changes what others are allowed to say and describes how media narratives shift after confirmation in major outlets. They address expectations that the MOU will not last or that the U.S. will return to war. Glenn says the key obstacle is not only Israeli influence but also structural inability to enforce outcomes: sanctions approval hurdles, possible reinterpretation of text, and the likelihood the $300 billion and related plans will not be fully implemented. He argues the Gulf states would read the memorandum and conclude Iran “won,” forcing them to adjust security strategies away from relying entirely on an anti-Iranian American alliance. When asked whether Ukraine or Iran worries him more over the next five years, Glenn says Ukraine more, describing a risk of direct NATO-Russia war as Russia retaliates and escalation becomes uncontrollable. He says Russia’s nuclear doctrine was changed to lower the threshold, arguing this is about escalation pressure once retaliation begins. He also claims that European actors celebrating deep strikes inside Russia do not appreciate the pressure on Russia to respond. In closing, Mario and Glenn discuss debates and past warnings. Glenn references former CIA Director William Burns’s “Net means net” warning that pulling Ukraine into NATO could lead to civil conflict and compel Russia to intervene. Mario and Glenn also discuss Dmitry Poliansky, describing him as cautious but warning that nuclear war or nuclear strike against Europe is no longer taboo, and saying Poliansky argued war with NATO is more likely than the war in Ukraine ending.

The discussion centers on the rapid escalations in the Iran-Israel-US-Russia dynamic over the last 48 hours, with each side framing the situation differently. The hosts contrast the Trump administration’s claims of control and progress toward a ceasefire with Iranian statements about targeting Middle East bases and oil infrastructure. They also reference Sergei Lavrov’s assertion of a “new era” and a realignment of global actors as the conflict unfolds, asking who is in control: Iran, Israel, the United States, or Russia. Captain Matthew Ho, an Iraq war veteran and former state department officer, is brought on to analyze the situation. He is framed as anti-war and thoughtful about these issues. The hosts ask for a high-level assessment of the past 48 hours and the likely trajectory. Captain Ho argues that the conflict is proceeding as many had anticipated: after an initial American-Israeli shock-and-awe campaign, the Iranians demonstrated they can execute a strategy to achieve clear political objectives, both immediate (deterrence and protecting sovereignty) and long-term. He notes that while the Americans and Israelis can continue bombing, there is no clear pathway to success for them, whereas Iran has built a durable capability through missiles, drones, and naval forces, and has shown strategic patience. He points to economic signals, such as West Texas Intermediate crude around $105 per barrel, as evidence of Iranian deterrence taking shape. Ho emphasizes that the Americans are increasingly perceived as desperate and lacking initiative, with Iran in control of the war’s momentum. He cites examples of countries pushing back on American basing plans and airspace access (Spain, Italy), suggesting a broader erosion of Western unity and credibility as the conflict persists. He also notes the entrance of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) into the war, arguing that Iran’s axis of resistance—now including Yemen, Iraq, and Hezbollah—has captured the initiative and constrained American options, potentially making ground invasions a consideration rather than a plan that is likely to succeed. He warns that the idea of an imminent American ground invasion is driven by public-relations calculations to claim a victory and exit, rather than a coherent strategic objective. The conversation then turns to the potential ground campaign, including landings on islands like Karg Island and other objectives tied to controlling oil exports routed through Iranian territory. Ho argues that a credible administration would not reveal specific invasion plots, suggesting such disclosures are distractions or misstatements aimed at shaping perception. He questions whether Washington’s real aim is regime change or something else, but asserts that the United States lacks a clear, controllable narrative and initiative. Beyond the immediate battlefield, the discussion touches on how Iran’s strategy extends to economic and geopolitical disruption: deterring future conflicts by making them costly, leveraging energy routes through the Strait of Hormuz, and enabling a shift toward a multipolar world. Ho argues that Iran’s long-range vision may transform global power structures, potentially involving tolled passage in the strait and dedollarization implications, with economic consequences for the United States and its allies. The European response is analyzed as fracturing from the United States: countries like Italy and Spain resist unilateral American actions or airspace usage, and even Germany’s stance has cooled. The hosts explore how Europe’s alliance with the United States is fraying, with NATO’s future in question as European leadership grapples with economic and political hollowing and a rethinking of strategic dependencies. Ho concludes that the war’s trajectory could redefine the post-World War II order if it continues, marking a potential shift toward a multipolar world and altering US dominance. He emphasizes the importance of understanding Iran’s preparation, patience, and coordination with allied forces in the region, which together shape a war where US objectives—beyond regime change—are not clearly defined or likely to be achieved through traditional means.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss the evolving confrontation between the United States and Iran and its broader economic and strategic implications. Speaker 0 highlights three predictions: (1) Trump would win, (2) he would start a war with Iran, and (3) the US would lose that war, asking if these predictions are still valid. Speaker 1 characterizes the current phase as a war of attrition between the United States and Iran, noting that Iranians have been preparing for twenty years and now possess “a pretty good strategy of how to weaken and ultimately destroy the American empire.” He asserts that Iran is waging war against the global economy by striking Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and targeting critical energy infrastructure and waterways such as the Baghdad channel and the Hormuz Strait, and eventually water desalination plants, which are vital to Gulf nations. He emphasizes that the Gulf States are the linchpin of the American economy because they sell petrodollars, which are recycled into the American economy through investments, including in the stock market. He claims the American economy is sustained by AI investments in data centers, much of which come from the Gulf States. If the Gulf States cease oil sales and finance AI, he predicts the AI bubble in the United States would burst, collapsing the broader American economy, described as a financial “ponzi scheme.” Speaker 2 notes a concrete example: an Amazon data center was hit in the UAE. He also mentions the United States racing to complete its Iran mission before munitions run out. Speaker 1 expands on the military dynamic, arguing that the United States military is not designed for a twenty-first-century war. He attributes this to the post–World War II military-industrial complex, which was built for the Cold War and its goals of technological superiority. He explains that American military strategy relies on highly sophisticated, expensive technology—the air defense system—leading to an asymmetry in the current conflict: million-dollar missiles attempting to shoot down $50,000 drones. He suggests this gap is unsustainable in the long term and describes it as the puncturing of the aura of invincibility that has sustained American hegemony for the past twenty years.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

Professor Richard Wolff discusses the US-Iran situation framed as a memorandum of understanding rather than a peace agreement, arguing that it represents a tactical retreat by Washington after misjudging its capabilities and overreaching. He says the underlying drive toward overreach will persist and that the Middle East/Western Asia remains an open arena—especially if Israeli leadership shifts in Lebanon or if Bennett’s approach to Turkey continues, with implications for Turkey’s ties to NATO, Russia, and the United States. Wolff also argues that American media and centrist Democrats would not reduce support for Israel or European stances on Ukraine if Democrats win in November, and that international alignments already reflect that pattern. On economic consequences, Wolff argues Iran “won” regardless of what the memorandum says, while emphasizing uncertainty in oil and gas markets, strategic petroleum reserve depletion, and how long prices might remain lower even if they fall. He frames these outcomes as evidence of a declining American empire whose deterioration shapes where and when overreach happens, producing devastating consequences. He adds that many voices do not yet connect declining-empire dynamics to current events. A major “momentous consequence,” Wolff says, is the Strait of Hormuz shifting from US authority to Iranian management via a fee rather than a toll, with the fee described as covering costs such as navigation assistance, safety infrastructure, safe and rescue, and environmental issues. He characterizes this as a validation of “declining empire” logic and a change of management from the United States as the authority in fact to Iran as the authority in fact, with Iranian oversight and missile deterrence described as extending throughout the strait. Wolff says US control can still be challenged through actions such as reimposing blockades or bombing again, and he notes that headlines about potential renewed bombing exist. He links the result to broader security turmoil for Israel, Gulf states, and Europe. Wolff further argues that European Russophobia functions politically to deflect anxieties and justify political and economic adjustments, describing an internal European squeeze between the United States and China. He characterizes European political leadership as using Russia as a “usual suspect” while responding to urgent demands for government support from business, including energy-cost relief and shifts in welfare-state spending. He suggests the United States is “throwing up disasters” as it crashes downward in its historical trajectory, including misjudging Iran and distancing from allies. In discussing global ramifications, Wolff shifts to an economic lens: he portrays China as a “bemused spectator” focused on growth, avoiding being bombed, building military capacity, and benefiting from BRICS alignment. He says Iran’s BRICS membership contributed to support from Russia and China and changes the balance between BRICS and the G7, predicting that Gulf and Asian states that hesitated about BRICS will hesitate less. He describes the event as another indication that countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia are already in BRICS, Turkey may join, and questions remain about Turkey’s relationship to NATO. Wolff also argues that within the United States, support for Israel has shifted: he claims Israel lost the majority of American people, citing lobbying power and political alignment as weaker than during his lifetime. He gives an example from New York City, where a Muslim socialist mayoral candidate reportedly said he would arrest Benjamin Netanyahu if Netanyahu comes to New York, and where, Wolff says, the majority voted for him. He connects this to broader questioning of capitalism and the decline of the empire pulling down the economic system expressed through it. When asked “where this is all going,” Wolff says China will likely be the major player deciding whether the next phase becomes a Chinese empire or some form of genuine multilateral order beyond empire logic. He compares the risk to how empires provoke revolutions against them, and he calls for domestic economic arrangements that can support multilateral working-out rather than war-driven national-state competition. He argues capitalism’s dynamics and internal wealth concentration drive great-power conflict outcomes, linking imperial overreach and decline to economic structure. As a final thought, Wolff ties the empire question to democratic legitimacy and wealth concentration, citing Felix Frankfurter’s statement that great concentrations of wealth cannot coexist with democracy. He describes the United States as having extreme inequality and a government “bought and paid for,” and he uses Israel as an example: he claims US funding for Israel, Israel funding AIPAC, and AIPAC buying the government that funds Israel. He concludes that handling capitalism’s dynamic is central to how the world’s great-power trajectory—especially China’s—turns out, suggesting internal economic management will determine whether China avoids the “evolutionary dead end” he attributes to the United States.

The discussion centers on Iran’s response to the latest US peace terms and the broader trajectory of the conflict. Iran publicly rejected the terms, calling them “completely unrealistic” and signaling that they would not open the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the claim is made that the rumblings from US outlets and the president’s rhetoric suggested closeness to a deal, but those impressions are challenged as inconsistent with Iran’s stance. Project Freedom is said to have been shelved after Saudi Arabia reportedly refused to allow US forces to use its airspace and a key regional airbase, making the Trump administration’s stated option to advance that plan unworkable. The host asks where things stand on the escalation ladder. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, describes the situation as a trap. He argues that the fundamental issues in play have not changed since the bombs began falling about seventy days ago. He praises the US military’s tactical performance—air, naval, and leadership-target strikes—but criticizes the strategy as fundamentally flawed. According to Pape, tactical successes do not yield meaningful strategic results, and Iran’s power is growing due to geography and cheap technologies like drones and mines. He notes that even after sinking Iran’s navy, the impact was negligible because Iran’s power persists and expands, especially given a Gulf-wide vulnerability to Hormuz. A critical development discussed is Iran’s action near the UAE, striking a pipeline that bypassed Hormuz and moved nearly 2,000,000 barrels of oil per day. This demonstrated Iran’s capacity to inflict damage despite a naval blockade, contributing to Gulf states’ reluctance to participate in or support US actions. The implication is that US punitive measures—hitting energy infrastructure or power grids—are unlikely to force Iran to kneel and may instead provoke greater retaliation. Pape warns that the escalation could drag on for months, with consequences such as rising gasoline prices in the US, potentially reaching about $6 in May or higher in some places like Chicago. The conversation turns to more immediate developments: fresh drone attacks around Kishem Island with Iran claiming air defenses intercepted the assaults; Iranian officials reportedly require compensation for damages and the withdrawal of all US forces from the Gulf as preconditions for ending the war. Pape reframes these attacks as part of Iran’s effort to keep the United States off balance and off leadership leverage, suggesting that Trump’s approach—driven by civilian leadership and charisma—misses the realities of great-power politics. He discusses the broader risk of increased Gulf infrastructure targeting if the US escalates, including the potential for higher gas prices and substantial infrastructure repair costs. The interview ends with reflections on the limits of punishment as a strategy, the enduring influence of Iran’s geopolitical position, and the likelihood that even if further force is used, it may not yield the desired strategic outcome. The speakers acknowledge the difficulty of predicting exact moves but emphasize the persistence of the escalation trap and the real-world consequences for energy markets and regional stability.

Speaker 0 begins by noting a new escalation in the war: after the president's Easter-weekend speech, the United States struck a massive bridge in Tehran, described as part of Tehran’s pride because it would cut about an hour from Iranians’ commutes. Trump posts, “the biggest bridge in Iran comes tumbling down, never to be used again,” and says, “Make a deal before it’s too late.” He warns that nothing is left of what could still become a great country. Speaker 1 responds with skepticism about the administration, mocking the idea of “the Nord Stream pipeline” being blown up as a lie by the prior administration. Speaker 0 notes that Trump boasted about the bridge strike on Truth Social and questions the strategic value of targeting civilian infrastructure, comparing it to striking the Golden Gate Bridge and asking whether that would be labeled a war crime. Iranian retaliation follows: a strike at the center of Tehran (clarified as Tel Aviv in error in the transcript) with a ballistic missile, causing a neighborhood to burn, as shown on Fox News and circulating on social media. Reports also emerge that an Amazon data center was struck in Bahrain, Oracle in the UAE, and that Iran had claimed it would strike Microsoft, Google, Amazon and other large American companies. The United States is not protecting them. Speaker 2 engages Colonel Daniel Davis, host of The Deep Dive with Dan Davis, to assess the latest moves alongside the president’s speech. Speaker 2 argues that the president’s remarks about “bomb you back into the stone age” indicate punishing the civilian population, not just military targets, which could unite Iranians against the United States and Israel. The bridge strike appears to align with that stance, making a regional outcome that contradicts any stated aims. He calls it nearly a war crime, since civilian infrastructure has no military utility in this context. He suggests the action undermines any potential peace path and could prompt stronger resistance within Iran. He warns that, politically, Trump could face war-crimes scrutiny, especially under a Democratic-controlled House, and that it damages the United States’ reputation by appearing to disregard the rule of law and morality. Speaker 1 asks whether such tactics are ever effective, noting a lack of evidence that inflicting civilian suffering yields political concession. Speaker 0 and Speaker 2 reference historical examples (Nazis, British during the Battle of Britain, Hiroshima-era considerations) to suggest such tactics have not succeeded in breaking civilian resolve, arguing this approach would harden Iranian resistance. Speaker 2 cites broader historical or regional patterns: torture or collective punishment has failed against Germans, Japanese, Palestinians in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. He contends the appeal of using such power is seductive but dangerous, likening it to “war porn.” He notes that the number of Iranian fatalities floated by Trump has fluctuated (3,000, 10,000, 30,000, then 45,000), describing them as not credible, yet the administration seems unconcerned with accuracy. Speaker 3 adds that the rhetoric justifies escalating violence with humanitarian consequences, including potential energy-system disruption. Speaker 0 asks about the discrepancy between Trump’s claim of decimating Iran and subsequent attacks on multiple targets in the Gulf and the firepower Iran still holds, including underground facilities and missile capabilities. Speaker 2 explains that Iran can absorb punishment and still strike back, suggesting that the Strait of Hormuz cannot be opened by force and that escalation could involve considerations of a larger false-flag scenario. He mentions a warning about a potential nine-eleven-level attack and potential media complicity, implying fears of a false-flag operation blamed on Iran. Speaker 0 notes the possibility of Israeli involvement undermining negotiations and cites JD Vance’s planned meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, noting Kharazi’s injury and his wife’s death, implying an assassination attempt. Speaker 2 critiques U.S. reliance on allies, arguing that Israel’s actions threaten U.S. interests and that the White House should constrain Israel. He asserts there is no military solution to the conflict, warns of long-term costs to the United States and its European and Asian relations, and predicts economic consequences if the conflict continues. Speaker 1 remarks that Iranian leaders’ letter to the American people shows civilian intent not to surrender, while Speaker 0 and Speaker 2 emphasize the risk of ongoing conflict, with Colonel Davis concluding that there is no feasible open-strand resolution. The discussion ends with thanks to Colonel Davis for his analysis.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the Iran ceasefire and the market's reaction, along with broader geopolitical dynamics and historical patterns around war and finance. - On the ceasefire and markets: Alex argues that reading optimism from markets is unreliable, noting that markets can remain irrational for longer than a person can stay solvent. He was surprised by the ceasefire and authored a newsletter piece suggesting the peace was unlikely to hold and that the probability of lasting peace was near zero. He observed the ceasefire narrative already fraying as he finished his article. He emphasizes that the ultimate incentive for war is the conquest of collateral: Iran’s vast natural-resource wealth (estimated at about $35 trillion) could become collateral for Western banking interests. He contends that war is driven by a desire to secure new money-like collateral to prevent systemic collapse caused by fiat money expansion and liquidity injections. - Narrative and hypocrisy in war discourse: Glenn notes how narratives about values, feminism, or democracy are used to sell wars. Alex adds that wars are often sold by demonizing the other side, citing examples from past interventions (Syria, Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Allende, Ortega, Chavez, Maduro, Castro) to illustrate a recurring pattern of manufactured villains and “slaying dragons” to justify action. He also cites Afghanistan as an example where Western intervention harmed women’s rights and long-term outcomes (mass malnutrition and stunting among children) despite rhetoric about protecting women. - Lebanon and the ceasefire framework: They discuss whether Lebanon was included in the ceasefire framework as communicated by the Pakistani prime minister and why Israel then attacked Lebanon. Alex argues the U.S. may be posturing to present the ceasefire as a U.S.-led result, while Iran shaped the negotiation terms. He also suggests the U.S. was already preparing for broader action, including ground invasion plans and troop movements. - U.S. strategic posture and global ambitions: They consider whether Trump’s administration genuinely sought to retreat from global policing or if transition plans were undermined by the Iran decision. Alex recalls a shift in 2019 where Trump reportedly resisted war against Iran, then changed course on 28 February, risking severe consequences. He argues Europe may bear more hardship from the conflict, with the U.S. potentially cushioning its own impact, while Europe could face stagflation, currency pressures, and social unrest. - European exposure and dollar dynamics: Glenn notes hedge funds betting against European stocks and asks how Europe will fare if the ceasefire holds but the damage persists. Alex describes Europe as cornered: cutting off Russian energy while maintaining vulnerability due to limited alternative supplies (Qatar/US), and the potential fragility of dollar liquidity for European banks. He warns that swap lines could be withdrawn, threatening the euro and triggering inflationary crises. He cites Eurostat data showing high living-cost pressures and suggests social revolts or civil unrest could emerge across Europe. He forecasts a possible major war against Russia as a political stabilization tactic. - Global realignment and multipolarity: They foresee massive fracturing in the Middle East and Europe, leading to a multipolar global order. The United States could retreat to its own hemisphere and rethink its monetary system, with the banking oligarchy remaining a central lever of power. They discuss Gulf states’ vulnerability to Western policy and consider whether Saudi Arabia, among others, will fare better or worse depending on access to U.S. dollars and geopolitical alignments. Alex argues that the broader strategy aims to reconfigure Eurasia by weakening or fragmenting Iran, Russia, and China in sequence, using proxy wars, regime-change efforts, and economic coercion. - Long-run structural shift: The conversation concludes with the assertion that the current dynamics reflect a persistent pattern: Western powers leveraging financial and military instruments to secure strategic advantages, while portraying their actions as defending democracy and rights. They reiterate that the overarching driver remains financial hegemony and control of collateral, with the war system persistently extending into Eurasia through interconnected corridors, ports, and infrastructure projects. The dialogue ends with the claim that wars are driven by banking and financial interests rather than purely ideological aims.