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Stanislav Krapivnik and the host discuss the current phase of the war in Ukraine, focusing on the southern front around Zaporizhzhia and the broader strategic implications. - On the southern front, the Russians are advancing along the Zaporizhzhia axis, with the last defensible Ukrainian positions in the area being Arakha (Orakhivka) and Zaporizhzhia city. Gulyaipol has fallen after Russians breached a fortified eastern line by exploiting open terrain and flanking from the east; the Ukrainians’ straight-line northern assaults into Gulyaipol are described as unsustainable under heavy drone and open-ground fire. Russian forces have moved along the river edge and toward a 15-kilometer radius from Zaporizhzhia City, entering suburban zones and pressing east to overhang Arakha from the north. Zaporizhzhia City itself is an open terrain area with a major bridge over the Nieper; the speaker asserts it would be hard to hold under drone and air superiority, and predicts a ruinous but ultimately unsustainable defense there. - The Russians have established a corridor along the river edge, with continued advances toward the eastern outskirts and suburbia north of Zaporizhzhia City. From there, a potential northward push could flank from the south toward Krivyi Rih and Nikolaev, creating a threat toward Odessa if a bridgehead across Kherson is rebuilt and maintained. The argument is that taking Nikolaev is a prerequisite to threatening Odessa and that control of Kherson remains a strategic hinge. - Ukraine’s attempts to retake territory are described as costly and often ineffective PR moves, including “suicidal” assaults on Gulyaipol where fighters up on exposed ground are eliminated by drone and artillery fire. The Russians are said to have flanked Ukrainian positions with new lines north of fortified areas, rolling up fortifications and leaving Ukrainian defenders with few exits. - In the north and center, fighting around Konstantinovka continues, with a southwest push into the area and Ukraine concentrating reserves to stop it. Kosytivka is described as about 65% surrounded, Mirnograd and Pokrovsk are said to be effectively finished, though small pockets hold out. In Sumy and Kharkiv directions, new incursions are occurring but are relatively small; the border is being “flattened” or straightened as Ukraine’s reserves are used. - Weather and terrain play a critical role. Mud, freezing and thaw cycles, fog, rain, and wind hamper heavy mechanized movement and drone operations. Western equipment struggles in mud due to narrow tracks, while Russian equipment with wider tracks traverses better but still encounters problems. Drones do not fly well in fog or rain, and heavy winds impede operations; Russia is leveraging fog to move infantry in close combat. - The broader war and geopolitics are discussed. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is a major target; European willingness to sustain support is framed as a bandage on a jugular wound, insufficient for a long-term victory. The host notes a perceived drift in European strategy, with French signals of compromise and American mediation and hints at how US priorities ( Greenland, Iceland, Iran, Cuba) could pull attention away from Ukraine. The Arashnik hypersonic system is described as capable of delivering a devastating plasma envelope and kinetic energy, with the potential to destroy bunkers and infrastructure anywhere in the world. - On the strategic horizon, there is skepticism about negotiations. The guest dismisses talk of a near-term deal and describes the last 10% of a push as the “bridge too far,” arguing that Russian gains in Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are eroding Western leverage as they advance kilometer-by-kilometer. Zelensky is portrayed as a stationed beneficiary whose personal and backers’ financial interests may drive bargaining positions, with claims that he does not care about Ukrainians and is motivated by extraction from the conflict. - The guest contends that a gradual Russian advance, backed by logistics and local tactical wins, is more likely than a dramatic collapse, while insisting that a full-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and Europe remains unlikely unless the United States and NATO become deeply involved. The Arashnik discussion notes the potential for a limited exchange, but emphasizes Russia’s stated preference not to escalate, arguing Russia would not “want Europe” but would respond decisively if pushed. - The discussion also touches on global logistics and Western cohesion. A veteran anecdote about US military logistics in 2002 is used to illustrate how NATO’s naval and merchant fleets depend on non-Western partners for transport, underscoring European vulnerability in sustained conflict. Mercedes-Benz re-registering in Russia is noted as a sign of shifting economic realities, with wider implications for European-company strategy amid sanctions and isolation. - The program ends with a return to the practicalities of ongoing combat—daily casualties, the erosion of Ukrainian defensive lines, and the intensifying pressure on Ukrainian supply and morale—before signing off.

Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer from Donbas, returns to discuss the escalation of NATO-Russia proxy warfare, the role of drones, and potential strategic escalations. The conversation centers on how Europe is contributing to deep strikes in Russia, especially against energy installations, and the resulting danger of a broader conflict. Key points and claims, as presented: - Drones and deep strikes: The EU, through its defense alignment, aims to overwhelm Russian air defenses and threaten strategic assets, including nuclear-capable targets, by using long-range drones. The objective is to degrade Russian defensive systems and the production rate of missiles, potentially opening the path to strikes on radars, early warning systems, strategic assets like bombers, and even nuclear submarines in port. - Nuclear war risk: The interviewee asserts that by mid-to-late summer there could be a zone of possible nuclear war if ground warfare arises or escalates due to Western actions. He notes that Russia’s anti-aircraft and early warning capabilities are limited to manageable scopes, with occasional corridors allowing strikes in, and that Europe’s current strategy could push the conflict toward a nuclear dimension. - Deterrence and first strikes: The discussion contrasts U.S. first-strike doctrine with other nations’ second-strike assurances. The speaker argues that in a blinded Russia, the logic for targeted first strikes becomes stronger for the other side, while lamenting that Europe’s leadership might be pushing toward a nuclear exchange. He cites studies suggesting that as few as 47 key targets could collapse the U.S. in a nuclear context, highlighting the fragility of a high-tech economy under nuclear disruption. - European psyche and policy: There is criticism of what the speaker describes as a mass psychosis in Europe, where warnings about striking Russia’s early radar or deterrent systems are dismissed in favor of defending Ukraine. The rhetoric suggests deep political and media reinforcement of pro-Ukraine narratives, with limited space for risk discussion about nuclear consequences. - Energy installations and economy: While drone strikes have targeted oil facilities, the speaker notes that most damage has been to storage facilities rather than critical infrastructure like pipelines or refineries. Refineries are large, and damage to some vessels can take longer to repair. Russia’s production has not been significantly reduced, but the attacks are accelerating a shift of energy facilities eastward toward Asia, while Europe faces higher oil prices on the spot market and potential disruptions to gas routes like TurkStream and Caspian Pipeline Authority, with broader economic impact on Southeastern Europe and Turkey. - Russia’s response and drone modernization: The Russian military has reorganized its drone capabilities, forming dedicated drone battalions and establishing new schools to standardize and professionalize drone operations. The move encompasses reconnaissance, kamikaze, bombing, and supply drones, with adjustments after initial disorganization. Ukrainians reportedly helped inspire and provide drone countermeasures, and Russia’s modernization integrates drones with air defenses. - Zelensky and Victory Day threat: The possibility of Zelensky threatening to strike Moscow’s Victory Day parade is discussed. The guest suggests Zelensky would want to be at the head of such a move, while acknowledging the uncertainty of who controls decisions in Kyiv and the level of Western involvement. The parade’s downscaled format is noted, but the broader question remains whether such a strike could occur. The guest asserts that Russian deterrence may have been eroded, and Western actors might not take credible deterrence seriously until an incident occurs. - Africa and Mali: Russia’s activities in Africa, especially Mali, are described as significant. Mali’s leadership under Asimi Goata is navigating between Western and Russian influence. Russian forces, including elements from the former Wagner group now under the Russian defense ministry, are described as rebuilding Mali’s military and supporting a campaign by jihadist groups. The situation includes rapid, mobile “flying columns” that can cause chaos but lack staying power against organized defenses. Russian drones and aviation (including ME-20 aircraft) are reportedly effective, and Mali is moving toward energy and resource development, including three nuclear power plants proposed by Russia to Elektrify the country. France’s position is framed as colonial, with Mali’s uranium, gold, and other resources creating strategic interest. Burkina Faso’s involvement and regional dynamics involving Niger are cited as part of a broader, expanding conflict network across Africa. - Global frontlines and war risk: The guest argues that multiple frontlines are forming—Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, and Western Africa—and that they could merge into a single broader conflict if not stopped. He asserts that the West is driving this escalation, and he characterizes Western public sentiment as often indifferent to Ukrainian casualties, focusing instead on political or financial gains from the conflict. - Frontline realities: On the ground, Ukraine has tactical successes but limited staying power due to heavy casualties and supply problems. Russian forces are reportedly stronger in Donbas, Kherson, and Sumy, while Ukrainian forces face difficult conditions, including open fields and heavy artillery advantages for the Russians. Drone warfare has prompted reorganized Russian drone corps, with improved training and standardized units. The discussion ends with a warning that the conflict has global implications, with fronts expanding and risks of a broader, possibly world-scale war if not curtailed. The interviewee emphasizes that the West’s actions are fueling escalation and that African theaters, particularly Mali, are becoming an integral part of the wider confrontation.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discussed escalating conflicts involving Iran and Europe, arguing that renewed fighting is likely and that current ceasefire dynamics favor increased damage on both sides. He said the United States is “loaded to the gills” with air and naval munitions and aircraft and that there appears to be a similar amount of ammunition in reserve, which would allow an intense campaign to last “five to seven days” rather than a shorter, first-wave bombardment. He argued targeting would be an attempt to determine which air and naval target sets could compel Iran to collapse or surrender, while noting CIA-linked reporting that Iran emerged from the last round with “virtually 90%” intact, implying further Iranian readiness. MacGregor said both sides also appear to have added capabilities: claims included Russian additional radars and Chinese additional missiles, including a new cruise missile designed to sink ships at sea out to 300 kilometers, with some Russian and Chinese technicians allegedly operating systems on the ground. He stated he expected major damage this time, especially that Iran would “finish off the oil infrastructure on the West Side Of The Persian Gulf,” and that Iran might also attack desalination plants critical to Saudi Arabia, arguing that destroying the Al Shaba’il facility could force Riyadh to evacuate the capital due to lack of drinking water. He described the moment as one reflecting “a certain level of desperation” tied to Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, and said “every conceivable form of attack” would be used with far more intensity, short of a nuclear weapon. On reported differences between Trump and Netanyahu, MacGregor said he believes there is likely a split but also portrayed Trump as constrained with “no easy exit.” He compared Trump to “Hotel California,” asserting he wants to check out but cannot. He said Trump’s obligations to Israeli interests and donors, plus the lack of maneuver room, create pressure to restart war if pause outcomes don’t lead to a favorable path. He also outlined potential constraints on any prolonged campaign, including low strategic petroleum reserve levels by “the end of June, the beginning of July,” limits on crude exports needed to support U.S. refining, issues with exporting shale oil due to refinery mismatch, and broader financial stress if long-term bond yields rise toward “the 5% ceiling.” He argued gold replacing the dollar and “battle between bricks and The US dominated Western financial system” could undermine the ability to sustain war, framing this as a squeeze on Trump if the conflict continues. MacGregor then shifted to Ukraine and long-range drone strikes. He said flight paths and targeting for long-range Ukrainian drone strikes have been provided by American military capability and that U.S. surveillance aircraft and satellites have mapped refineries, oil derricks, airfields, and other strategic installations in Russia. He argued Russia has limited options besides “revenge strikes” because Ukrainians lack ground offensive capability and described Russian patience running out as public pressure grows to “crush this or declare war or both.” He tied Western escalation risk to European political and social dynamics, saying Europe’s policies have become economically and culturally destructive and that Germany is “on the edge of exploding,” which could drive a shift in European stance. He also argued the Baltic states facilitate or tolerate drone-strike operations and that European decisions aiding long-range drone construction are dangerous, with potential escalation if Russia believes it must strike directly. When asked whether the U.S. would come to the rescue if Article 5 were invoked, he said the United States would not use nuclear weapons and that missile inventories could be largely depleted, arguing attrition would likely favor Russia and China because they can produce more. In concluding, MacGregor returned to the Persian Gulf and U.S. posture, saying Americans are “finished in the Middle East” if the U.S. cannot break Iran’s grip on the Persian Gulf and force a return. He reiterated his long-held view that forward military presence is obsolete because bases are target arrays vulnerable to ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and he argued defense is superior to offense under current conditions. He compared the danger of renewed conflict to needing to choose between Persian Gulf realities and financial-system pressures, ending with the question of “which one is gonna break first.”

- The conversation opens with a discussion of escalating dynamics in the Ukraine conflict as a new year begins, focusing on how the rules of war have shifted over the past four years, including the depth of NATO involvement and when actions cross into direct war. The speakers note that political leadership has largely been exempt from the war, but Russia has had opportunities to strike Ukrainian leaders that have been avoided, raising questions about future targets and the diplomatic path. - Speaker 1 argues that the political leadership has indeed been outside the war, and that voices inside Russia are growing more critical. They challenge the Western portrayal of Vladimir Putin as a dictator, suggesting Putin has restrained destruction that could hit the West, and asserting that the West and Zelenskyy have grown comfortable with exemptions. They warn that continued escalation could lead to a nuclear conflict with Europe at risk due to its geographic compactness, citing the potential fallout from attacks on American nuclear bases and the broader geopolitical consequences. - The discussion moves to the potential consequences of Western strikes on energy infrastructure and frontline energy targets, including refineries and civilian vessels. The speakers examine how Russia might respond if its assets are attacked at sea or in the Black Sea, and the possibility of Russia forcing Ukraine to lose access to the Black Sea through strategic military actions. The analysis includes a few provocative specifics: British and European actors allegedly orchestrating or enabling attacks, the role of third-country-flagged ships, and the idea that reflagging to Russian flags could be treated as an act of war by Russia. - The dialogue delves into the operational dynamics of the Mediterranean and Black Sea theatres, noting incidents such as sunflowers and other oil cargo damage, the Caspian transit company's facilities, and the implications for Turkish oil revenue and Western economies. The speakers argue that Western powers are drawing in broader international actors and that the war could expand beyond Ukraine, potentially dragging in NATO ships and submarines in a conflict at sea. They warn that if escalation continues, it could trigger a broader, more destructive war in Europe. - The conversation shifts to the likely trajectory of the battlefield, with Speaker 1 offering a grim assessment: the Donbas front and the Zaporozhye region are nearing collapse for Ukrainian forces, with Russian forces dominating missile and drone capabilities and outmaneuvering on three axes. The analysis suggests that within two to three months, upper-river-front areas, including the Zaporozhzhia and surrounding Donbas fronts, could be fully compromised, leaving only a few large urban pockets. The absence of civilian protection and the encirclement of cities would accelerate Ukrainian withdrawals and surrender, while Russia could enhance pressure on remaining fronts, including Donbas and Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnieper regions, as weather and terrain favor Russian movements. - The speakers discuss the impact of collapsing command posts and morale, likening the abandonment of Gudai Poia to a sign of impending broader collapse, with open terrain making Ukrainian forces vulnerable to rapid Russian breakthroughs. They suggest that strategic fortifications will be overwhelmed as the front line collapses and supply lines are severed, with a predicted sequence of encirclements and city sieges. - The US role is analyzed as both a negotiator and strategist, with the assertion that the United States has long led the proxy dimension of the conflict and continues to influence targeting and weapons delivery. The discussion questions the coherence of US policy under Trump versus Biden, arguing the conflict remains a US-led enterprise despite attempts to reframe or outsources it. The speakers describe the US as hedging its bets through ongoing military support, budgets, and intelligence cooperation, while insisting that Ukraine remains a core objective of US hegemony. - A critical examination of European Union leadership follows, with strong claims that the EU is increasingly tyrannical and undemocratic, sanctioning dissidents andSuppressing speech. The dialogue condemns the deplatforming of individuals and argues that the EU’s leadership has undermined diplomacy and negotiated peace, instead pushing toward a broader confrontation with Russia. The speakers suggest that several European countries and elites are pursuing escalating policies to maintain power, even at the risk of deepening European instability and economic collapse. - The conversation ends with reflections on broader historical patterns, invoking Kennan’s warnings about NATO expansion and the risk of Russian backlash, and noting the potential for the EU to fracture under pressure. The participants acknowledge the risk of a wider conflict that could redefine global power and economic structures, while expressing concern about censorship, deplatforming, and the erosion of diplomacy as barriers to resolving the crisis. They conclude with a cautious note to prepare for worst-case scenarios and hope for, but not rely on, better circumstances in the near term.

It shows that the Ukrainian armed forces do not have these capabilities. They are not capable of large scale offensive operations. They are only trying to defend the frontline that they have. And the example that I cited is not the only time it happened. It is happening along the entire frontline. And it proves it is an evidence. And not only our experts believe that the western experts also believe that that the Ukrainian Armed Forces deficit of reserves and military capable units are staffed at 47, 48%, and that's almost the critical line.

Ukrainians at the NATO Innovation Summit stated 30% of their casualties were from drone strikes. In the Kursk offensive, drones account for the majority, if not almost all, of Russian tank and vehicle losses. FPV drones are currently operated in a one v one fashion. In the next few years, drone warfare will evolve to one v many. Command and data links, essential for drone operation, are becoming more vital. Countermeasures exist to jam or deny these links. The goal is to make drones more autonomous, enabling one operator to control many drones simultaneously.

The conversation began with domestic politics on the U.S. right, focusing on claims that figures such as Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene are “walking away” from the Republican Party. Malcolm described a shift within conservative politics from older conservative movements associated with figures like William F. Buckley to later, more extremist influences. He argued that Trump’s “superpower” was communicating directly to “the lowest common denominator,” and compared Tucker Carlson’s role to earlier conservative media influence, describing Carlson as “intellectualizing” extremist ideologies. Malcolm portrayed Rush Limbaugh as a central force behind talk-radio conservatism, asserting that he never saw fault within his own party. He claimed this trajectory helped produce a new “neo-MAGA” that recognizes Trump’s influence as finite and expects the movement to end with Trump. He described MAGA as built on radicalism and threats toward enemies, while also claiming it functions in a way he equated to libertarianism. A major theme was ideological fragmentation and attempted succession after Trump. Malcolm said Marjorie Taylor Greene moved from QAnon beliefs about secret CIA operations and mass arrests/executions to “Super MAGA,” and then shifted to an “America First” platform, which Malcolm linked historically to the pre–World War II “America First” movement. He also argued that the conservative right has been pushed toward loyalty tests that prioritize loving Trump above family or religious commitments. Malcolm then pivoted to foreign policy and military spending. He criticized a pattern he associated with the U.S. defense establishment, invoking Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning about the defense industrial establishment and describing how defense contractors profited through periods including World War II, the Vietnam War, and later post–Cold War military posture. He said budgets increased again after 9/11 and that systems and contracts continued to flow to defense contractors. He argued that various U.S. weapons programs—built for decades—remain in the inventory and are used in the context of contemporary wars, and claimed the U.S. spends on capabilities he said are unnecessary or misallocated. He also discussed what he described as a drone “swarm” threat allegedly observed by an F-15 pilot who saw “hundreds of Iranian drones” forming an aerial “minefield.” Malcolm compared the concept to drone-fireworks light-show patterns, arguing that placing explosives on many drones and dispersing them in staggered formations could create a hard-to-defeat mesh. He described loitering/hunter-killer dynamics in the swarm, explained why a wall of drones could cause “foreign object damage,” and said the relevant problem is detecting and neutralizing the system before it engages. He tied this to a broader critique of how quickly the U.S. can adapt and to the gap between experimental or contractor proposals and field-ready defensive solutions. Asked what Americans should do, Malcolm claimed U.S. intelligence and defense institutions are “gutted,” describing a loyalty-based purge linked to MAGA, which he said would prevent serious attention to such reports. He contrasted that with Ukrainian tactics, including intelligence debriefing and operational adaptation. He then described Ukrainian-style drone and cyber/kinetic tactics, including an example involving swarming drones used to strike targets in urban areas during crises. The conversation moved to Ukraine’s broader drone-centric battlefield transformation. Malcolm said drones have “completely supplanted artillery,” and he described changing tactical norms such as press badges becoming targets for drones. He characterized Russian drone operators as “human hunters” and referenced documentaries about Russian drone operator teams in Kherson, describing civilian casualties as part of the drone-operator training approach. He added that the Ukrainian priority includes hunting down drone operators. Kirill Budanov (head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, as discussed) was also discussed. Malcolm described Budanov as having “street cred” from earlier command roles and as a thinker who adapted tactics rapidly, with drone warfare treated as a distinct, scaled capability. Another participant discussed visiting Ukraine and the tight security around Budanov. Finally, the discussion returned to a “Sarajevo Safari” allegation. Malcolm described his own military experience as a designated marksman/reconnaissance sniper in the Ukrainian army and explained how civilians would not be allowed near weapon systems. He then connected to stories alleging wealthy foreigners paid to occupy Bosnian Serb sniper positions during the 1992–1996 siege of Sarajevo. The other participant summarized that late-2025 and 2026 attention included reports of wealthy foreigners allegedly paying large sums (with numbers cited such as 80,000–100,000 pounds/ euros in today’s money), that claims were popularized by a 2022 documentary, and that investigations were opened in multiple countries, though some allegations remained unproven and under investigation. Malcolm emphasized that, in his view, modern drone warfare would make such “tourism” impractical, and argued that money-driven participation does not provide protection from modern battlefield targeting.

The speaker asserts that the Russian army of 2022 differs greatly from the present army due to combat experience. They claim that the experience gained across all units during the special military operation distinguishes the Russian army from all others, and any other army would suffer huge damage trying to gain that experience. The speaker believes that currently, Russia has the strongest, most professional army globally. They state that aside from the Russian and Ukrainian armies, no other army truly knows how to fight, because until an army engages in real war, combat challenges remain hidden. The speaker says that Russia has processed all of this over the past three years and is advancing technologically.

The speaker believes no factors will help the Ukrainian Armed Forces succeed in the long term. After three years, the speaker is convinced that Ukraine cannot stop them, and success depends entirely on their actions. Ukraine can only delay and slow them down, even with thousands of drones. The speaker claims their assault troops will eventually take any fortified position. They cite the Avdivka fortified area in Donetsk People's Republic as an example of a formidable fortification that they captured, despite its heavy concrete reinforcement that rendered even the Sonsepioc heavy flamethrower system ineffective. They also claim to have taken Sooja. The speaker concludes that Ukraine will not achieve success in the special military operation zone, regardless of circumstances.

Russia is holding on due to its size and army of a million. An army of 700,000 advancing on a million is slow. Putin wages war as a special military operation to avoid overheating Russian society, keeping it minimal. Russia spends 5-7% of its budget, a background mode of war with volunteers, not mobilization, while Ukraine is collapsing. If Russia drafted 2,000,000, strained the budget by 40%, Ukraine would be over in three months. They're not really fighting because they don't call up 1.5 million men. There is no real war because Medinsky feels sorry for everyone. They attack with fewer than Ukraine defends. War is a threefold superiority in breakthrough areas, 12-15 times concentration of forces, destruction to operational depth. They could create a threefold superiority of manpower and Putin may carry out another mobilization.

Russia has relative freedom in Ukraine for drone and missile operations, with good intelligence coverage. Patriot batteries transferred to Ukraine are likely to be detected and destroyed by Russia before installation. Therefore, sending Patriot batteries to Ukraine is a waste of money. At best, it will extend the war by weeks, resulting in more Ukrainian and Russian deaths, but it will not change the outcome of the war.

Drones: A year ago, Ukraine had more drones, but now drone numbers are roughly at parity. Both sides launch a similar number of drones. Russia uses fiber optic drones more actively, which are immune to Western electronic warfare systems. These drones render jamming antennas useless. The army is actively using unmanned systems, including remotely controlled carts that can carry ammo, food, evacuate wounded soldiers, or carry explosives. Russia considers its approach to warfare as complex, dangerous, and highly professional.

Speaker 0 argues that many narratives about the Russia–Ukraine war lack internal logic. They say that claims Ukraine is “winning” are supported by evidence such as Russians taking massive casualties and Ukrainians recapturing territory. However, they point to reported exchanges of dead soldiers (including reparation of remains and prisoner-related dead exchanges) where the ratio is often described as around 1 to 20 or even 1 to 40, which they say implies far more dead Ukrainian soldiers than Russian soldiers and “doesn't really make any sense.” They also argue that if casualties were higher overall, the ratios would be reversed. Speaker 0 adds that advocates using these claims “get away with it.” Speaker 1 responds by focusing on casualty figures. They reference a New York Times piece that presented relative casualty numbers—killed in action plus wounded—and also separate killed-in-action counts for both sides. Speaker 1 says the New York Times article was based on a CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) study in Washington, D.C., which estimated roughly 450,000 Russians dead and between 125,000 and 150,000 Ukrainians dead. Speaker 1 uses the Ukrainians’ high-end figure of 150,000 against 450,000 for Russians, producing a “three to one ratio” (three Russians dead for every Ukrainian), and says this cannot be the case. They argue that the main battlefield killer is artillery and that estimates suggest Russians held an advantage in artillery throughout most of the war, ranging from 5 to 1 to 7 to 1 or 10 to 1. They also point to Russian smart bomb inventories as a reason Russians have been able to strike Ukrainian forces more heavily, while saying Ukrainians have virtually no smart bombs deployed against Russians. Speaker 1 further disputes the idea that differences in casualty totals can be explained by posture. They say Ukrainians have been on the offensive for much of the war, citing the Kursk offensive and a June 4, 2023 offensive described as aiming for a blitzkrieg that would reach the Sea of Azov and cut Russian front lines in half. Speaker 1 also cites major Ukrainian offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv in 2022 after noting Russian defeats. They argue that because Ukrainians have frequently conducted offensive operations—and because offense generally produces higher casualties than defense—those numbers do not align with how casualties should look. Speaker 1 says they expect that Ukrainians likely lost around a million men killed in action rather than 150,000, and that the lower figure is “ludicrous.” They add that these casualty narratives are reported and then used by various people to decide what should be done “moving forward,” including arguments for escalating support to “clobber the Russians” and end them as a great power. Speaker 1 concludes by saying elites have told themselves a story they believe and continue “march[ing] forward based on these false narratives.”

Scott Ritter says the Ukraine conflict is dire; "Russians have been waging attritional warfare in a very systemic fashion for some time now." He notes Ukraine's 2022 counteroffensive—"armed with $48,000,000,000 worth of US weapons and NATO training"—was a "total betrayal" after Russia signaled withdrawal. Russia mobilized "300,000" to "man the Sorovykan line" and begin a war of attrition; NATO's 2023 offensive with Abrams, Bradley, Leopards was destroyed by Russian defenses; drones dominate modern warfare, making mass tank assaults obsolete. Putin will tell Trump that "Mother Russia is Mother Russia" and "We will not yield." Ritter argues a ceasefire is the entrance, not the end. Trump can win by pressuring Zelensky to negotiate; sanctions cannot deter Russia. He warns of nuclear risk: CIA warned of "greater than 50% chance of a nuclear war" and notes New Start expires Feb 4. He frames a "Russian gift" of improved relations and peace.

They are using strategic resources to break the defense line, move forward, and settle in the territory, but they have not reached any results. Their losses are very high, more than one to ten compared to Russian army losses. They have lost 186 tanks and 417 armed vehicles. There are no successes in any areas.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.

Scott Ritter discusses the Iran talks, U.S. and Iranian positions, and the broader implications for U.S. foreign policy. - He states the talks aren’t over, describing them as a process. The United States came in crudely and with a stunt, while the Iranians were well prepared with technical papers and talking points. The talks remain ongoing, with both sides leaving technical teams behind after high-level visits; the ceasefire is two weeks and has not been terminated, so the process continues. - Ritter characterizes the situation as “the theater of the absurd” and warns it’s dangerous and could spin out of control. He criticizes Donald Trump’s approach as bluster and high-stakes posturing, saying the Iranians haven’t budged and that the U.S. has no clear objectives in the negotiations. He notes the president allegedly has “hard commitment” to Iran not producing a nuclear bomb, but asserts the fatwa against nuclear weapons remains in place and U.S. actions have undercut that position by killing the official who put the fatwa on the table. - He argues the easiest deal would be to sit down with the Iranians and “shut the door on any potential of Iran ever producing a nuclear weapon,” provided genuine experts were involved, but claims the U.S. isn’t there to make that deal. The aim, he says, is to project U.S. control and to frame Trump as the winner, irrespective of the actual outcomes. - Ritter contends Trump’s inner circle includes JD Vance, Marco Rubio, and others; he asserts Trump is using public appearances (e.g., an MMA event) to signal who is in charge and to replace others who opposed the war. He claims JD Vance did not support the war and is being sidelined or publicly discredited. He also criticizes Rubio as nominally in charge of foreign affairs but notes the State Department has been gutted, lacking a full team and interagency process. - He predicts the next two weeks will yield a deal that makes Trump the winner and Vance the loser, suggesting Rubio isn’t being promoted much and that Trump will throw everyone under the bus. He asserts there is no real change in U.S. capabilities, noting the stockpiles of missiles have not been rebuilt. - On NATO and the Ukraine war, Ritter argues drones are redefining warfare: the Ukrainian and Russian use of drones is changing battlefield dynamics, with drone operators becoming central to military effectiveness. He asserts NATO and the U.S. do not fully understand how to fight this war, and claims the conflict demonstrates the end of NATO and a broader “empire terminating event” linked to America’s failure in Iran. He stresses that drone dominance could break the battlefield’s traditional dynamics, leaving tanks and infantry less decisive. - He claims the Ukraine war’s drone innovation is the most significant development in warfare since dynamite, saying without drones you cannot prevail on the battlefield. - On Melania Trump and Epstein, Ritter declines to engage with the specifics of Melania’s personal involvement, but discusses Epstein as emblematic of America’s elite rot. He argues that Melania normalized relationships with Epstein and Maxine and that she will be seen as an enabler, whether or not criminal liability is established. He contends this politics of normalization reflects deeper decay in American power elites.

Ukrainians are not superheroes and face casualties on a daily basis. Today, I will show you unique videos of Russians destroying Ukrainian equipment. "This is an American m triple seven howitzer." "The Russian UAV hits the exact target and destroys the howitzer." "The rare and valuable SAM has been destroyed." "The UAV dives and hits the target." "This is a Polish AHS Crab Self Propelled Artillery Unit. The hit causes fire and destroys the launcher." "A battery of Ukrainian S-three 100 SAMs." "A kamikaze drone strike on the installations leads to a powerful explosion and the destruction of an adjacent installation." "Everything that you saw earlier was the work of the Russian Zala Lancet UAV." "At least 250 different pieces of equipment were destroyed by Russians using it." "The range of such a warhead drone is about 70 kilometers." "Lancets are launched with a metal rail." "The Russians are increasingly using lancets."

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

Many on the right oppose U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war, but the speaker believes it's a bargain for America. While the U.S. spends trillions on national defense, $20 billion sent to Ukraine has crippled the aggressive Russian military, which has been a challenge for multiple administrations. Putin miscalculated, thinking he could easily take Kyiv. Ukraine's success isn't just about numbers; NATO armaments and sophisticated microchip systems give them a technical advantage over Russia, which sometimes uses World War II-era ordnance. The speaker claims that Ukraine's superior technology has led to approximately 150,000 Russian soldier deaths. The Ukraine war has effectively neutralized Russia's fighting force as a global threat.

Mario and the Colonel discuss the latest developments in the Ukraine-Russia conflict and their implications for peace negotiations and the battlefield. - The hosts walk through conflicting claims about an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on Putin’s residence, timed with Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump. Ukraine denied the claims; Russia asserted the opposite; a CIA report then said the drones targeted a Russian military base in the region and that this wasn’t the first time such a base had been targeted. The Colonel notes that all sides may be using disinformation, and no one can say with authority what happened. He emphasizes that what matters is how each side uses the information to bolster its position and public support, including Lavrov’s stated threat of retaliation. He argues the military reality on the ground continues to be unfavorable for Ukraine, and that Russia will use any incident to justify gains or concessions on its terms. - On negotiations, the 90–95% of an agreement reportedly already accepted is contrasted with two sticking points: security guarantees and territory. Zelenskyy is said to be nearing some form of security guarantee solution, but Donbas territorial concessions remain unresolved. The Colonel suggests evaluating who benefits from the alleged incident; if true, it could be used to sabotage peace talks. He notes competing narratives: Ukraine seeks to portray Russia as untrustworthy, while Russia portrays Ukraine as the aggressor and untrustworthy, both using the incident to justify their positions. He questions whether any side actually benefits, proposing that Russia might use the event domestically to rally support and push negotiations toward its terms. - The discussion moves to strategic weapons and timing. They note the Arashnik missiles in Belarus, described as nuclear-capable, with high speed and multiple warheads. The Colonel says Russia has signaled willingness to escalate but would likely reserve Arashniks for decisive moments or major escalations, possibly a clash with NATO, rather than using them routinely. He cites Putin’s statements about negotiating or taking actions by force and explains that Russia’s leadership appears to have reached a point where battlefield gains could be prioritized if diplomacy stalls. - On Ukraine’s ability to advance, the Colonel argues that Russia prioritizes territorial gains but is not constrained by time, with large manpower advantages and sustained firepower. He asserts Russia’s advance has accelerated over 2024–2025 and could continue, potentially enabling breakthroughs even if the Donbas remains a long-term objective. He contrasts this with potential Ukrainian vulnerabilities, including troop losses, desertions, and mobilization limits, suggesting Ukraine could face a collapse in the front line by spring or summer, though there is uncertainty about exact outcomes. - Regarding Ukraine’s effort to disrupt Russia’s economy by targeting the Black Sea fleet and shipping, the Colonel is skeptical that such actions would decisively affect Russia, given Russia’s diversification away from sea-based revenues and Ukraine’s parallel economic strains, including power shortages and refineries. He emphasizes that neither side’s economic measures have produced a decisive effect, and that Russia has prepared countermeasures. - Trump’s post claiming that “Putin’s attack bluster” shows Russia stands in the way of peace is discussed. The Colonel says Trump is echoing Western lines and that such rhetoric will not by itself alter the course of negotiations; an eventual settlement requires both sides to agree on terms, not slogans. - On possible Russian retaliation, the Colonel suggests targeted responses within Kyiv’s power sector or leadership and possibly infrastructure, but he cautions against predicting escalation, noting Russia’s risk-averse tendencies and potential to strike second- and third-tier Ukrainian leaders or critical infrastructure if deemed necessary for domestic purposes. - Looking ahead twelve months, the Colonel predicts continued war, potential major battlefield moves with accelerating territorial changes, and the possibility of a breakthrough or a sharp escalation. He warns that a purely defensive posture will not win and that the pace of Russian advances could lead to significant shifts by late 2026, with Donbas negotiations remaining unsettled. He concludes that the conflict is likely to continue, with hybrid warfare and broader Western responses shaping developments.

The discussion claims Europe, including the EU, Germany, and the UK, is escalating toward direct war with Russia, pointing to “mobilization” already underway. It asserts that new long-range missile testing systems—described as including 250 kg warheads—are being used to help Ukraine “bomb Moscow directly,” portrayed as a “going away present” tied to Keir Starmer’s departure. It also claims Germany delivered 6,000 new medium-range drones to Ukraine, citing drone strikes on civilian infrastructure inside Moscow and referencing attacks from the previous week. Vladimir Putin is cited as saying the West is preparing for war with Russia, using offensive budgets and a pattern in which Western threats force Russia to act for self-defense, followed by accusations meant to justify continued aggressive policy. The transcript also quotes remarks about Ukraine being made into an “anti-Russian regime” through a coup and about the war in Donbas being started using aviation, artillery, and attacks against civilians. It says Russia tried to “talk reason” for eight years before being “forced” to come to the rescue of people described as part of the “Russian world,” including Russian-language communities. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter responds after recently visiting St. Petersburg, Moscow, and front-line areas including Lugansk, Donetsk, and Zaporozhye. He says there are “two mindsets” in major cities, but argues the West is running “major information warfare” using Ukraine as a proxy. He describes drone strikes on Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Voronezh as harassment, claiming they do not cripple Russia or break morale, including describing an incident when 500 drones were launched and residents “just get on with their lives.” He claims some Russians believe Putin’s lack of decisive response shows weakness, while others believe Putin’s pragmatism shows weakness and Russia must “double down,” and he asserts that Putin listens more to front-line soldiers than elites. Ritter claims Russians are advancing decisively and threatening captures including Slovyansk and Kramatorsk before summer, with Donetsk falling and then Zaporizhzhia Front falling. He says Ukrainian drone warfare is ongoing and dangerous, including attacks on civilian infrastructure and vehicles on the highway linking Mariupol with Crimea, and he reports effects like closed gas stations, gas shortages, and areas without electricity and water. He describes what he portrays as Ukrainian use of civilians as human shields, including people remaining in liberated areas and being targeted by drones, artillery, and mortars. He recounts visiting refugee camps and claims elders hid in basements for 20–30 days without food or water, with those who ventured outside allegedly killed, and that Russian soldiers then evacuated them under attack. He also asserts drone warfare complicates logistics but does not stymie Russian advances. On weapons and supply, Ritter states that Hornet drones used in attacks were American-made and that a company funded by Eric Schmidt is linked to them. He further claims drones use Starlink terminals and describes how AI chips allocate battery power to target-finding and then transition to “free kill mode.” He claims these capabilities drive civilians off highways so military traffic is struck. When asked about life in towns after Russian advance, he says he stayed close to the front only briefly, emphasizes that returning to the gray zone is dangerous, and describes the process of clearing buildings for civilians in basements. He says wars have changed due to drones, making movement and tactics slower and different. On the cost of the conflict, the transcript cites David Petraeus as claiming Russia is outnumbered and cannot sustain the war. Ritter rejects the claim as “full of it” and argues there is rough parity in overall troop numbers, while noting Ukraine’s casualties and emphasis on drone troops. He describes Russian assaults as supported by drones and precision artillery rather than “human wave” attacks, while claiming Wagner operations used prisoner “human wave” assaults in 2022–2023 and that Wagner casualties are not incorporated into Russian official numbers. He says Russia’s advantage has shifted from “12 to 1” toward “two or three to one,” and provides a daily claim that Russians kill 1,000 to 2,000 Ukrainians, implying Russian casualties as well. He also argues drone warfare has moved ahead of training for some Russian units, leading to heavy casualties when officers use outdated tactics against FPV drone threats. He cites a commander, Abdi Al-Adinov of Akhmed Special Forces, as using modern warfare methods and achieving advances with relatively low casualties. He says Russia is developing counter-drone capabilities, including interceptor drones, but scaling them takes time and money. Ritter concludes that Russia is advancing and inflicting horrific casualties but pays a heavy price, and says Petraeus is correct that Russia has lost more men than the United States lost in World War II.