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There are concerns about the security of electronic voting machines, as they can potentially be hacked without detection. While there is no evidence of this happening, it cannot be proven that it hasn't or won't happen in the future. Instances of machine errors have been reported, such as recording extra votes for a candidate or subtracting votes instead of adding them. It is unknown how many instances went unnoticed and what impact they had on elections. Legislation is being proposed to require a paper trail for every electronic machine, similar to ATM receipts, to ensure transparency and allow for verification. An investigation is also being requested to assess the effectiveness of voting machines and improve election systems.

In a local county commissioner race, the Dominion machine results showed Lorne Alexander with 34.67%, Marshall Orson with 41.35%, and Michelle Long Spears with 23.98%. Since no candidate reached 50%, a runoff was needed. Spears found precincts where she received zero votes, including her own. A hand recount revealed discrepancies, with Spears gaining 3,620 votes. The hand count showed 2,810 more votes than the machines reported, raising concerns about the machines' accuracy. This highlights the need for trustworthy voting systems. If Spears hadn't raised concerns, the discrepancies may have gone unnoticed. Translation: In a local election, the Dominion machines initially showed Lorne Alexander and Marshall Orson leading, but Michelle Long Spears raised concerns after receiving no votes in some precincts, including her own. A hand recount revealed significant discrepancies, with Spears gaining thousands of votes. This raised doubts about the accuracy of the machines and the need for reliable voting systems. Without Spears' intervention, the issues may have gone unnoticed.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of voting machines across the country. Researchers have demonstrated that these machines can be easily tampered with and hacked. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to fraud and hacking. There are concerns about the use of modems in voting machines, as they can be connected to the internet and pose a risk. Outdated software and lack of paper trails also contribute to the vulnerability of the voting systems. The potential for hacking and interference in elections is a significant concern, and the need for secure and updated voting systems is crucial.

In the 2020 Maricopa General Election, 120,867 ballots, or 6% of the total, were compromised through forced adjudication. This represents 9 times the deciding outcome of the election. The compromise was an intentional and avoidable paper and ink hack, where control over the ballot stock was necessary. The use of Sharpie pens, which were encouraged for the first time in history, combined with inferior ballot paper, caused bleed-through votes that confused the scanning machine. This allowed for extra votes to be counted, leading to potential election manipulation. The net effect of this hack in Maricopa County was approximately 120,867 compromised ballots.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines even violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Antiquated machines in many states are particularly vulnerable. Demonstrations have shown how easily these machines can be hacked, with workers switching votes. Approximately 43% of American voters use machines with serious security flaws. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them even more susceptible to cyberattacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could significantly impact a close presidential election.

In 2016, it was known that hacking could occur during the presidential election. The election results were surprisingly close compared to the polls, indicating possible interference. However, no US states examined enough paper ballots to determine if the computers were hacked. This revealed a significant gap in our system. With a deadline approaching for states to finalize their electoral college votes, there was a need to expose any fraud that may have occurred. Election integrity advocates struggled to find a solution to ensure the examination of physical evidence that could detect cyber attacks.

Two Clark County technical employees independently revealed that they found discrepancies in the number of votes recorded by voting machines. The votes would change between the closing of polls at night and their reopening the next morning. This means that votes were appearing and disappearing during the night. When they tried to verify the integrity of the voting machines, they were only allowed to visually inspect the outside of a USB drive, which was useless. They were denied a forensic examination.

On election night, the results from tabulating machines appeared inaccurate. The board decided to conduct a hand recount to ensure accurate election results. The speaker questions this decision, stating they have advocated for hand recounts for twenty years.

During the 2022 midterms, a significant issue arose with the tabulators used for counting ballots. None of the tabulators met the federally regulated EAC standard, and there was no clear pattern in their selection or zeroing. A total of 464,926 ballots were fed into these tabulators, not necessarily from individual voters. Out of these feeds, 217,305 failed, resulting in an alarming 50% ballot read failure rate throughout the entire election day.

Approximately 25,000 ballots were not created from the usual PDF format for the election process in Maricopa County. These ballots are tailored to specific geographical areas to account for different voting preferences. The ballots are created in advance in PDF format for mail-in and early voting convenience. However, the quality of the printed ballots in this case was significantly lower than expected, indicating a problem with the printing process.

In 2022, the speaker presents data on the Maricopa County elections. They show a slide with the names of polling centers and dots representing tabulators. None of the 446 tabulators in the county were compliant with the Election Assistance Corporation regulations. The error rate was significantly higher, with some tabulators failing at a rate of 95%. Despite these failures, they were still used to process 5,000 ballots.

Disturbing breaches of protocol were observed during the election. USB vCard drives from voting machines were mixed together with cartridges and paper tapes, destroying any chance of forensic auditability and compromising the chain of custody. Despite objections, an individual plugged unsecured USB cards into vote counting computers, resulting in a sudden increase of 50,000 votes for Vice President Biden. Initially, 47 USB cards were missing, but that number has reportedly grown to 64. Additionally, a room containing 60,000 to 70,000 unopened mail-in ballots was discovered days after the vote count, with no knowledge of their origin or whereabouts. The absence of signed chain of custody documents raises questions about the source and destination of these ballots.

On election night, the results from tabulating machines appeared inaccurate. The board decided to conduct a hand recount to ensure accurate election results. The speaker notes that they have been advocating for hand recounts for twenty years.

Cybersecurity experts agree that electronic voting machines are dangerous and obsolete. These machines can be easily hacked, as demonstrated by a computer scientist who has hacked multiple machines and even turned one into a video game console. The vulnerability of these machines puts our election infrastructure at risk of sabotage and cyberattacks. In the 2016 election, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic machines. The speaker reveals a step-by-step process for hacking these machines and stealing votes. The solution proposed is to use paper ballots, which can be quickly scanned and verified by humans. It is emphasized that all elections should be run with paper ballots and audits. The importance of having a paper backup system is highlighted. The concise transcript emphasizes the need to replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots for secure and reliable elections.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines within minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates basic cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of American voting machines. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close presidential election. Concerns about the possibility of a successful hack are high.

County technical employees reported independently that the vote counts recorded by machines and stored on USB drives changed between the closing of polls and their reopening the next morning. Votes appeared and disappeared overnight. Attempts to verify the integrity of these voting machines were limited to a superficial visual inspection of the USB drives, and a forensic examination was denied.

There was fraud in the election, including dead people voting. The machines played a role in this fraud. Instead of having hidden ballots, they stored them in a secret folder. After the polls closed, the machines matched unvoted ballots with unvoted voters. This was evident when the vote percentage reached 99% but the votes kept coming in. The denominator, which represents the remaining ballots, started increasing, indicating that they were unloading the hidden ballots and matching them to unvoted voters. This allowed them to barely cross the finish line with enough votes.

During the election, there were damaged mail-in ballots that couldn't be read by scanners. The board decided to duplicate these ballots using pink highlighters. However, the highlighter couldn't be read by the scanners either, so all the duplicated ballots had to be fixed. The solution was to give workers stacks of blank mail-in ballots to individually fill in the correct ovals with a dark pen. This process went on for hours without observation until the observers confronted the deputy commissioner. Eventually, thousands of mail-in ballots were counted this way. This raises concerns about the integrity of the process.

Speaker 0 mentions the possibility of printing out something. Speaker 1 asks about the reason for the uncounted votes. Speaker 2 clarifies that there is no concrete explanation for why those votes were not counted by the machine. Speaker 1 confirms that they don't know why the votes didn't get scanned. Speaker 2 asks if the Dominion Tech guys have figured out the reason, but Speaker 0 says they are not allowed to comment. Speaker 2 points out that it hasn't been confirmed if it was a memory card issue. Speaker 1 agrees and suggests it could be human error. Speaker 0 says the ballots didn't transfer over correctly, but they don't have a definite answer yet. Speaker 2 asks if it could be a software issue, but Speaker 0 refuses to speculate. They conclude that they don't have a pinpointed answer at the moment.

Clark County technical employees reported independently discovering that the number of votes recorded by voting machines and stored on USB drives would change between the time the polls were closed and when they were reopened. Votes were allegedly appearing and disappearing overnight. When attempts were made to verify the integrity of these voting machines, only a visual inspection of the outside of a USB drive was permitted, and a forensic examination was denied.

Senator Bennett and others discuss how ballots are read by tabulation machines and what causes rejections. The corner marks (timing marks) determine top/bottom of the ballot, while the side marks determine the alignment of the bubble to be counted for a candidate or measure. The machines reject ballots when timing marks are incorrect or too small. The speakers explain that if timing marks are not exactly the right size and they are not perfectly black, the software will reject the ballot; blotchy printing can also trigger rejection because timing marks must be 100% black and of the correct size. Madam chair notes that many unreadable ballots were attributed to printers being set incorrectly and printing too lightly. The first reason ballots are rejected is timing marks being too small. A presenting slide shows that the bottom ballot has timing marks that are 5% larger on the edges, but the computer program requires precise, perfectly black timing marks; any white specs in the black box render the timing mark invalid and the ballot ejected. The blotchy printing is linked to printer fuser temperature settings; ballots printed on heavier paper (80 or 100 pound) require higher fuser temperatures. If the temperature isn’t high enough, toner doesn’t bind and appears blotchy, causing invalid timing marks. Speaker 1 asks whether central count machines or other systems could be set to accept lighter print, vs. those used at voting centers. Speaker 0 rejects this, stating the same ballot definition file is used and central count did not allow looser image requirements. The discussion clarifies two types of marks: timing marks (must be perfectly black and correctly sized) and voter bubbles (the threshold for counting a vote). The threshold setting on the scanner determines whether a bubble is counted: typically between 14% and 35% fill. If a bubble is less than about 14% filled, it is considered a stray mark; if more than about 35% filled, it is counted for the selected option. Some voters may partially fill an oval, or fill more extensively, and the software uses this threshold to decide if a vote is cast. In summary, ballots are rejected if timing marks are not perfectly black or incorrectly sized, or if printing is blotchy due to inappropriate printer settings. Central count uses the same ballot definition file, so lighter prints are not accepted. The bubble threshold determines which marks are counted as votes, with explicit percentage cutoffs to distinguish stray marks from valid votes.

One result of that mess was that America became nervous about punch card ballots. In 02/2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act, offering states $3,900,000,000 to help administer federal elections and buy voting equipment. But the chair of the Election Assistance Commission realized there was a problem: "I was forced to send $2,300,000,000 to the 50 states to buy equipment even though the equipment was not ready to be bought." "So why'd you do it? We had to do it. begged congress, let us do the research before we send the money, and congress said no." "So the politicians knew these machines wouldn't work?" "The politicians don't care. Washington believes that the machines can't be that bad because after all, it produced them." "So if they won the race, how bad can the machine be? The machine can't be bad because it produced me. That is some faulty logic right there."

The "fit to print" issue has occurred in previous elections, specifically the August 2020 primary, the November 2020 general election, and the August 2022 primary election. It is related to human error on election day while trying to resolve a printer problem. The total number of ballots impacted by this issue was just under 1300.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines in minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in different states, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of voting machines used by American voters. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close election.

The speaker asserts that there was direct access to the Antrim County election management system (EMS). According to the forensic images, on November 5 an anonymous user logged on to the EMS remotely with escalated privileges and made changes to the database while attempting to retabulate the election. This is presented as a major development indicating remote access to the machines, and specifically remote access by an anonymous user with elevated privileges. Additionally, the speaker describes intentional modifications to ballot components. Ballots have black boxes along the side, with boxes 59 in total. The forensic images allegedly show that blocks 15, 18, 28, 41, and 44 were intentionally modified, altering their height and width to generate errors. The claimed consequence of these modifications is that errors were produced which led to ballot rejections. Specifically, ballots in which a voter chose Donald Trump and then fed the ballot into the machine were rejected at a rate 20% higher than ballots for Joe Biden.