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There are concerns about the security of electronic voting machines, as they can potentially be hacked without detection. While there is no evidence of this happening, it cannot be proven that it hasn't or won't happen in the future. Instances of machine errors have been reported, such as recording extra votes for a candidate or subtracting votes instead of adding them. It is unknown how many instances went unnoticed and what impact they had on elections. Legislation is being proposed to require a paper trail for every electronic machine, similar to ATM receipts, to ensure transparency and allow for verification. An investigation is also being requested to assess the effectiveness of voting machines and improve election systems.

In June 2021, we informed them about 25,000+ suspected counterfeit ballots. Despite having over a year to address the issue, they failed to prevent it from happening again in 2022. The GOP spread propaganda to discredit our findings, but everyone knew about it beforehand.

"The use of some 19,000 electronic voting machines in the city of Chicago and Cook County primary on March 21 is now under intense scrutiny." "The US company that makes the machines, Sequoia, was bought in 2005 by Smartmatic, a private company primarily owned by Venezuelan businessmen." "I think that American elections ought to be run by American companies and ought to be run by American citizens, not Venezuelan nationals." "We believe this is a national security issue. There is no way that companies belonging to non US corporations should have access to our elections." "In the case of, Smartmatic, there are a number of unanswered questions." "Certainly, our government should know."

In 2018, the Dallas elections had irregularities, similar to what we're hearing now. Texas hired a cybersecurity group to investigate these irregularities, finding 10 different ways the Dominion equipment could be manipulated. Texas outlawed the use of Dominion, but it was still used. This group spent 2 years reverse engineering how to rig an election using Dominion. Meanwhile, another cybersecurity group, including hackers and other experts, mapped out the election manipulation plan. They approached DHS and CISA for a meeting, but they refused to attend. It's concerning how many people turned a blind eye to this issue. Lawyers involved may not understand the technology, but they should be held accountable.

A senate report revealed that voting machines are aging and vulnerable to exploitation. A hacker demonstrated how easy it is to gain full admin access to a model used in 18 states. Professor Ed Felton documented how unattended voting machines can be manipulated by anyone. Additionally, some machines that claim not to be connected to the internet actually are, while others use cards programmed on internet-connected computers. In summary, all voting machines can be tampered with in some way. As an axe murderer once said, "pretty much everything is hackable."

Two employees from Clark County Technical came forward independently and revealed that they found discrepancies in the number of votes recorded by voting machines. The votes would change between the closing of the polls at night and their reopening the next morning, with votes appearing and disappearing overnight. When they tried to verify the integrity of the voting machines, they were only allowed to visually inspect the outside of a USB drive, which was useless. They were denied a forensic examination.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

"Smartmatic is a labyrinth of international holding companies owned by Venezuelan businessmen." "When Smartmatic bought The US voting machine companies, the US government did not review the sale." "Many experts say those voting machines were manipulated in Venezuela to give president Hugo Chavez a victory." "Exit polls done by The US firm Penn shown in Berlin had Chavez losing 41% to 59%." "But the next day, Chavez declared victory, reversing the score, saying he won 59% of the vote." "All these machines talk to a central computer and report on their results." "And in that mechanism, as they communicate with the center, the central machine can report anything." "The Chavez government gave Bizta, Smartmatic, and another company a $91,000,000 contract to run voting machines for the February."

A computer programmer testified that programs exist to secretly fix elections. He claims that in February, he wrote a prototype for Congressman Tom Feeney that could rig an election. The program could flip the vote to 51-49 for a candidate in any race. He stated that election officials would never detect the program.

A voting machine, which the speaker calls the "worst voting machine used in the United States," was vulnerable to USB attacks. The machine was used in Maryland and Virginia until 2012. By plugging in a pre-programmed USB device, costing around $120, an attacker could gain complete control of the system in seconds. With full control, an attacker could change votes, add candidates, or manipulate results without leaving evidence, because the machine lacks a paper ballot. The speaker demonstrated how easily the machine could be hacked, emphasizing that the process was slowed down for demonstration purposes. The speaker also mentioned that a professor from Denmark wirelessly hacked the same machine in under 30 minutes at DEFCON. Because of vulnerabilities like these, the speaker believes hand-marked paper ballots are necessary to verify election outcomes.

Two Clark County technical employees independently revealed that they found discrepancies in the number of votes recorded by voting machines. The votes would change between the closing of polls at night and their reopening the next morning. This means that votes were appearing and disappearing during the night. When they tried to verify the integrity of the voting machines, they were only allowed to visually inspect the outside of a USB drive, which was useless. They were denied a forensic examination.

During the 2022 midterms, a significant issue arose with the tabulators used for counting ballots. None of the tabulators met the federally regulated EAC standard, and there was no clear pattern in their selection or zeroing. A total of 464,926 ballots were fed into these tabulators, not necessarily from individual voters. Out of these feeds, 217,305 failed, resulting in an alarming 50% ballot read failure rate throughout the entire election day.

In 2022, the speaker presents data on the Maricopa County elections. They show a slide with the names of polling centers and dots representing tabulators. None of the 446 tabulators in the county were compliant with the Election Assistance Corporation regulations. The error rate was significantly higher, with some tabulators failing at a rate of 95%. Despite these failures, they were still used to process 5,000 ballots.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines within minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates basic cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of American voting machines. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close presidential election. Concerns about the possibility of a successful hack are high.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, highlighting the need to assess all voting machines for potential hacking. Researchers have shown that ballot recording machines and other systems are susceptible to tampering, even by hackers with limited resources. Instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes have been reported. The leading seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. The control of voting machines by just three companies poses significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines, leaving the election system vulnerable to interference. The lack of backup paper ballots and reliance on unsupported software further exacerbate the security flaws.

Speaker 0: I want to ask about what if you've changed position on what happened in the twenty twenty election. Speaker 1: Oh, I think it was rigged. Speaker 0: You think it was rigged? Speaker 1: Yeah. I know more now than I did then. What you'd have to do is in February 2021, was a Time Magazine article that was published, it was about Mark Zuckerberg investing $500,000,000 in a get out the Democrat vote campaign. And they focused on the swing states, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona. And they focused in what they did is they basically did what I would refer to as agency capture. And they went in and they captured the, the county clerks and the secretaries of states in these states. They basically said, we have a get out the vote campaign program, and if you will implement it exactly the way that we say that you must implement it, we will give you massive amounts of money to run your elections. But if you do not run it the way that we say, then we can claw all that money back. Well, think about it. If you're a small county in Wisconsin and you get $300,000 from Mark Zuckerberg's foundation to make sure that there are drop boxes in your, in your Democrat heavy areas, that there are, that you've got a, an RV going around and hauling people into the, into the polling places to vote. When you do that, if, if you do not carry out, you take that money, you sign that contract and you do not do exactly what that foundation said, you were gonna have to use public money to pay it back. You most likely would have ended up in prison. I mean, that's just one example of the way that the election was rigged. The Mark Zuckerberg money was huge. $500,000,000 concentrated in Democrat counties for the purpose of getting out the Democrat vote. Speaker 0: How do you know it was to get the Democrat vote out? Because how does exactly do what are the mechanics of that? Of how it was You Speaker 1: I have to read the article. And what the article does is it lays it out, and the title is something along the lines of how a secret group of people were able to save the twenty twenty election, meaning how were they able to get Joe Biden elected.

I urge you all to consider the seriousness of this situation. Can we, as citizens of Maricopa County, afford to use equipment that has a failure rate 235 times higher than the federal standard? Will this further damage or restore confidence in our already broken election system?

The speaker discusses the potential vulnerabilities of electronic voting machines. They mention instances where machines recorded extra votes for a candidate or subtracted votes instead of adding them. These issues were caught and corrected, but it raises concerns about undetected instances and their impact on elections. The speaker emphasizes the need for a paper trail to ensure transparency and accountability. They mention legislation proposed by Rush Holt and Hillary Clinton that calls for electronic machines to provide a printed receipt for voters to verify their choices. They also highlight a case where 4,500 votes were lost due to a machine malfunction. The speaker requests an investigation by the Government Accountability Office to assess the effectiveness of voting machines.

Now now the reason that most of us vote on electronic machines at all has to do with the two thousand election. Very basically, the two thousand election came down to just over a thousand votes in Florida, which triggered a recount, which turned out to be an absolute nightmare because unfortunately, many key Florida precincts used punch card ballots. And a major issue with punch card ballots was the fact that on some of them, little bits of paper or chads might not have punched all the way through, leading to images like this and nonstop news coverage like this. Gore's hopes hang by a Chad. Dimpled Chads. Dangling Chads. Hanging Chads. Indented Chads. Lone Chads. Another claim, Chad buildup. A pregnant Chad. The race comes down to the Chads.

The speaker attended the voting village event, where common voting machines were tested. Surprisingly, major manufacturers like ES and S and Dominion did not provide the machines for testing, so organizers had to buy them on eBay. Hackers, who had never seen these machines before, easily accessed their inner workings. One machine, Dominion's image cast system, had its internals exposed. This is concerning because Georgia recently signed a $100 million contract with Dominion for the same hardware. The machines were found to have vulnerabilities, such as easily accessible admin passwords. Despite these issues, there seems to be little political will to address the security of voting machines. The speaker found the event and the lack of action on voting security alarming.

The speaker highlights that the number of misfeeds in the voting system is much higher than the federal standard of one out of 500. They mention that the insertion errors were a significant issue throughout Election Day, contrary to reports claiming it was a minor problem. The system log files reveal that there were consistently over 7,000 ballot insertion failures every 30 minutes from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m., with some intervals exceeding 8,000 errors. The problem persisted throughout the day despite technicians attempting to fix it.

US voting machines have vulnerabilities allowing malicious software injection. Lawsuit filed against Michigan officials for certifying 2020 election without legal authority. Help America Vote Act passed in 2002 to reform voting systems and create Election Assistance Commission. Voluntary voting system guidelines set standards for election security and transparency. VVSG focuses on certifying tabulation machines for cybersecurity. Michigan counties used Dominion, ES and S, or Hart Fare systems in 2020 election.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines in minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in different states, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of voting machines used by American voters. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close election.