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Speaker 0 asserts that Nine-Eleven began as commercial insurance fraud and that in 1988 the Twin Towers were condemned because they did not want to pay to dismantle them, with controlled demolitions forbidden. He says Dick Cheney, as secretary of defense, responded, “praise the lord,” expecting a terrorism event to justify invading Iraq and Afghanistan. He claims Nine-Eleven was planned and executed by “the Zionists,” clarified as not the Jews, describing a “red mafia”—Russians, Israelis, and Americans—controlling Benjamin Netanyahu but not Donald Trump, who he says is biding his time. He contends the NSA is not about safety but keeping money moving, and that the program was canceled because it would reveal Americans complicit in Nine-Eleven. He alleges the intelligence community wastes money on bad actions, focusing only on war and terrorism, and that they start wars and fund terrorists. Speaker 1 recounts a group of Zionists negotiating with the Nazis to allow German Jews to immigrate and transfer assets to Palestine, citing the 1933 Transfer Agreement. He notes that German Jewish settlement in Palestine was Nazi policy for a time and references Der Angriff publishing photos of Jewish life in Palestine with a Nazi series; a medal by Gerbils commemorating this, showing a swastika and Star of David. He states Hitler demanded Zionists reject the call for a boycott of the Reich, which the Zionists conceded. Speaker 2 says some allies have been funding ISIS and Al Qaeda, asks who, implying Saudis and others, and notes that people know this but do not say it publicly. Speaker 3 explains that CIA, Mossad, and intelligence agencies are unnamed but suggests Mossad is under the prime minister’s office and would be called the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service, joking that initials would be ISIS. Speaker 7 makes a snide remark about Julian Maxwell’s father being an Israeli super spy, and Speaker 5 references “antiseptic, Jenny.” Speaker 8 discusses building a relationship with some unspecified actors and acknowledges a trust deficit; he recalls the U.S. support of fighters in Afghanistan against the Soviets, arming mujahideen with Stinger missiles, and leaving them after the Soviet withdrawal, admitting the U.S. helped create the next problems. He notes a pattern of moving in and out of Pakistan, emphasizing that the current fight involves people funded two decades earlier. Speaker 3 adds details about Brzezinski’s 1980s effort to arm the mujahideen while concealing U.S. involvement, speaking warmly of the fighters and their cause. Speaker 4/Speaker 10 discuss a 2017 plan to push against Russia, portraying the fight as against Putin rather than the Russian people, with commitments to inform the American public of Afghan bravery and to support the effort against Putin; Speaker 10 expresses confidence in winning and receiving support. Speaker 11 shifts to the U.S., asking about the assassination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan; Speaker 12 responds that bin Laden was trained by the ISI and CIA along with Al Qaeda two decades earlier, stating that these groups were assets of the Pakistan Army and the ISI. Overall, the transcript presents a series of unverified conspiracy claims about 9/11, Zionist influence, NSA motives, Nazi-Zionist interactions, international funding of extremist groups, and U.S. covert actions in Afghanistan/Pakistan, interwoven with insinuations about intelligence agencies and state actors.

The deep state's open support for Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) is shocking, especially given their role in the Syrian conflict. Despite claiming to oppose Al Qaeda, the U.S. has provided support to groups aligned with them in Syria, raising questions about the rationale behind such actions. There are concerns about backing the wrong factions, with evidence suggesting that U.S. weapons may have ended up with ISIS. Former officials have indicated that the Obama administration ignored warnings about ISIS's rise, and even John Kerry acknowledged the situation's escalation. Historical parallels are drawn to past U.S. support for Mujahideen in Afghanistan, highlighting the long-term consequences of such interventions. The narrative emphasizes the complexity and contradictions in U.S. foreign policy regarding jihadist groups.

Speaker A: The moral concern is that if you can remove the human element, you can use AI or autonomous targeting on individuals, and that could absolve us of the moral conundrum by making it seem like a mistake or that humans weren’t involved because it was AI or a company like Palantir. This worry is top of mind after the Min Minab girls school strike, and whether AI machine-assisted targeting played any role. Speaker B: In some ongoing wars, targeting decisions have been made by machines with no human sign-off. There are examples where the end-stage decision is simply identify and kill, with input data fed in but no human vetting at the final moment. This is a profound change and highly distressing. The analogy is like pager attacks where bombs are triggered with little certainty about who is affected, which many would label an act of terror. There is knowledge of both the use of autonomous weapons and mass surveillance as problematic points that have affected contracting and debates with a major AI company and the administration. Speaker A: In the specific case of the bombing of the girls’ school attached to the Iranian military base, today’s inquiries suggested that AI is involved, but a human pressed play in this particular instance. The key question becomes where the targeting coordinates came from and who supplied them to the United States military. Signals intelligence from Iran is often translated by Israel, a partner in this venture, and there are competing aims: Israel seeks total destruction of Iran, while the United States appears to want to disengage. There is speculation, not confirmation, about attempts to target Iran’s leaders or their officers’ families, which would have far-reaching consequences. The possibility of actions that cross a diplomatic line is a concern, especially given different endgames between the partners. Speaker C: If Israel is trying to push the United States to withdraw from the region, then the technology born and used in Israel—Palantir Maven software linked to DataMiner for tracking and social-media cross-checking—could lead to targeting in the U.S. itself. The greatest fear is that social media data could be used to identify who to track or target, raising the question of the next worst-case scenario in a context where war accelerates social change and can harden attitudes toward brutality and silencing dissent. War tends to make populations more tolerant of atrocities and less tolerant of opposing views, and the endgame could include governance by technology to suppress opposition rather than improve citizens’ lives. Speaker B: War changes societies faster than anything else, and it can produce a range of effects, from shifts in national attitudes to the justification of harsh measures during conflict. The discussion notes the risk of rule by technology and the possibility that the public could become disillusioned or undermined if their political system fails to address their concerns. The conversation also touched on the broader implications for democratic norms and the potential for technology-driven control. (Note: The transcript contains an advertising segment about a probiotic product, which has been omitted from this summary as promotional content.)

Speaker 0 describes a dynamic of collaboration and tension around Iran, noting that the Israelis are “very American” and that they could have shouting matches in meetings over whose idea is best, but then go have lunch and remain amicable. He emphasizes that Israelis are good allies that the U.S. needs to protect, and asserts that CIA and Al Qaeda “worked closely together in Iraq. And Syria.” Speaker 1 adds that in Syria the aim was to overthrow Assad. Speaker 0 explains that there were times when covert action findings allowed meetings to talk to the “quote, unquote, enemies” to try to bring things down, as CIA officers. Speaker 1 observes that most of the world has a problem with Al Qaeda and ISIS (Daesh), but implies the CIA’s cooperation with ISIS and Al Qaeda lowers that problem. Speaker 0 argues that if the plan is for the U.S. to work with them, to work on a security agreement, which has been done with enemies before, the U.S. would have played that role side by side with diplomats and other involved countries, and he wouldn’t be surprised if that were happening; he calls it possibly hopeful. Speaker 1 notes that newspapers in the United States once celebrated Qasem Soleimani as a fighter with American troops against ISIS and Al Qaeda, and now that stance has changed. The speaker concludes with the reversal of priorities: “Now we have to go to Als ISIS and Al Qaeda to go back against Iran.”

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Speaker 1 acknowledges that intelligence sharing between the U.S. and Israel is not total and that allies spy on each other, including domestically. Speaker 1, identifying as conservative, says this is expected because people act in their rational self-interest. Speaker 0 asks if it is in America's interest for Israel to spy on the U.S., including on the president. Speaker 1 responds that the close alliance with Israel provides huge benefits to the U.S. Speaker 0 presses on the issue of spying, asking why an American lawmaker wouldn't tell a client state that spying on the U.S. is not allowed. Speaker 0 expresses that it is weird not to say that, but Speaker 1 seems unable to.

In the 1980s, the United States supported the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden. We funded them because we believed they hated the Russians more than us. However, once they defeated the Russians, they turned against us. This has been a recurring problem in our foreign policy, regardless of political party. We have seen these weapons come back to threaten Israel, and the support for Syrian rebels has also posed a threat. The War Caucus in Congress armed bin Laden and the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union, which was the official position of our State Department. It is clear that this strategy did not work out well.

There have been reports that Israel has been treating wounded Syrian rebel fighters in its hospitals on the border, including fighters from Nusra front, which is, of course, the Al Qaeda proxy in Syria. Do those reports worry you that Israel's helping wounded Al Qaeda aligned fighters? Speaker 1: "As I said before, in a different context, it's always useful also to deal with your enemies in a humane way." "the main consideration, the immediate consideration is humane." "I didn't say there's no tactical, I said the main consideration, the immediate consideration is humane." Speaker 0: "So purely humanitarian you say, so there's no tactical or political strategic" Speaker 1: "No. I don't think so. I don't think there's going to be blowback." "the rules of the game in Syria are such that you can do anything that is not able is not possible to be done anywhere else." Speaker 0: "Would you also treat Hezbollah fighters? No." Speaker 1: "I would not treat Have" "A We different account with Hezbollah, a totally different account because Hezbollah has carried out the type of, actions against us which preclude us from going into what the Al Qaeda has done." "Al Qaeda, to the best of my recollection, has up to now not attacked Israel." Speaker 0: "But has attacked your number one ally and sponsor in The United States Of America."

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

Speaker 0 questions Speaker 1 about the population and ethnic mix of Iran, which Speaker 1 is unable to answer. Speaker 1 defends his lack of knowledge, stating he doesn't memorize population tables. They then argue about whether Iran is trying to murder Donald Trump and whether the U.S. is supporting Israel's military actions. Speaker 0 claims the U.S. government denied acting on Israel's behalf. The discussion shifts to whether it is acceptable for Israel to spy on the U.S., including the president. Speaker 1 says allies spy on each other and that it's in America's interest to be closely allied with Israel, despite the spying. Speaker 0 asks why Speaker 1, as an American lawmaker, doesn't object to the spying. Speaker 2 criticizes Speaker 1's stance, calling it insane and not conservative to defend being spied on.

In 2002, before the Iraq invasion, Netanyahu testified to US Congress, stating Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons and hiding facilities underground. This was allegedly false and led to war. Netanyahu also stated he wanted regime change in Iran and questioned how to achieve it. Speaker 0 asks: How can we trust someone who goaded the US into war in Iraq based on falsehoods? Given recent events, why are we confident Netanyahu won't do the same with Iran, given his 20-year call for regime change? Speaker 1 says the President and Secretary have close working relationships with Netanyahu. The US commitment to Israel's security transcends any government. The US condemns Iran's attacks. Speaker 0 notes Netanyahu heads the Israeli government and there's a difference between condemning actions and the US getting into a war with Iran. Speaker 1 says the US is not interested in an all-out conflict with Iran, but is committed to Israel's security.

An Israeli official stated that a plan to take out the supreme leader of Iran was rejected by the U.S. President over concerns of escalating the conflict. The official believes that removing the supreme leader would end the conflict, not escalate it, claiming Iran spreads terrorism, sabotage, and subversion throughout the Middle East and is bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. According to the official, Israel is preventing a horrific war and bringing peace to the Middle East. They believe that defanging Iran will allow for new heights in the Middle East, expanding the Abraham Accords, trade, tourism, and communication between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The official stated that the U.S. has provided tremendous help, including American pilots shooting down drones, THAAD batteries in Israel, and Aegis ships.

Israel has been reportedly treating wounded Syrian rebel fighters, including those from the Al Qaeda proxy Nusra Front, in its hospitals. When asked if these reports were worrying, Speaker 1 responded that it is useful to deal with enemies in a humane way. While the immediate consideration is humane, Speaker 1 did not say there were no tactical considerations. Speaker 1 does not believe there will be blowback against Israel for treating Nusra Front fighters because the rules of the game in Syria allow things not possible elsewhere. Speaker 1 would not treat Hezbollah fighters because Hezbollah has carried out actions against Israel that Al Qaeda has not. Al Qaeda, to the best of Speaker 1's recollection, has not attacked Israel.

The discussion revolves around the Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, and how it identifies itself in English. After inquiries, it was clarified that they refer to themselves as the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service (ISIS). The conversation then shifts to the historical context of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, highlighting that the fighters being faced today were once supported by the U.S. during the Cold War to counter the Soviet Union. This strategy, backed by President Reagan and Congress, involved recruiting Mujahideen with the help of the Pakistani military, which ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union's collapse. The dialogue also touches on the controversial claim that Hillary Clinton and Obama played roles in the creation of ISIS, while emphasizing the importance of American influence in these geopolitical matters.

The first speaker notes perturbations in intelligence agencies due to political appointees, especially early on when appointees lacked experience with intelligence. He observes some individuals have decided to retire or leave the national security community, but believes many colleagues will continue their work because it is critically important. He suggests professionals are trying to keep their heads down and focus on responsibilities as political winds in Washington blow strongly. The second speaker adds a historical perspective, noting that at the nadir of US-UK political relations around the Suez crisis, US and UK intelligence services (GCHQ and NSA) were working hand in glove, studying the Soviet intervention in Hungary, despite surface tensions. He expresses confidence that professionals will be able to carry on with their duties. The third speaker mentions that, in Washington, civil servants have been behaving like hostages, unable to speak out for fear of saying the wrong thing. He confirms that firings across departments have made people concerned about their livelihoods and ability to continue work. He hopes intelligence officers will continue to provide objective, evidence-based assessments to US policymakers, regardless of White House policy preferences, and notes the importance of the integrity of the intelligence process for both US and British security. He acknowledges that both US and British intelligence have made mistakes, but emphasizes a sense of strong integrity in British intelligence and questions whether US intelligence will maintain the same level of integrity and objectivity. He recalls his experience at CIN at the White House, where he worked closely with British colleagues to pursue Al Qaeda and destroy terrorist organizations. He recounts extensive conversations with British counterparts about the basis of intelligence, what the rules of engagement were, and their desire to understand and support the intelligence basis. He hopes that the rules of engagement and the intelligence basis for US actions around the globe remain strong, allowing British colleagues to continue counting on the US. The second speaker briefly affirms that this mutual reliability and collaboration would be expected to continue.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Some allies that the U.S. works with and protects militarily are sending massive amounts of money to ISIS and Al Qaeda. When asked which countries are doing this, the speaker states, "You know who it is." The speaker then confirms that Saudi Arabia is one of the countries funding these groups, stating, "They're doing it. Everybody knows that." When asked about other countries involved, the speaker says there are others but declines to name them due to having relationships with people from those countries. The speaker asserts that "everybody knows that, and nobody says it."

ISIS and Taliban are enemies fighting each other. The speaker questioned why the US should intervene, suggesting they should let them fight as both are enemies. The generals disagreed and ended up fighting both groups, which the speaker found to be crazy.

Speaker 0 explains that once goals are achieved, Americans understand that “we’re real partners.” Speaker 1 reinforces: “Real partners.” Speaker 0 contends that what has to be done is to have alternative routes instead of going through the choke points of the Hormuz Straits and the Bab El Mandeb Straits in order to have the flow. Speaker 1 prompts: “Wait for it.” Speaker 0 continues: “Just have oil pipelines going west to through the Arabian Peninsula To where? Right up to Israel, right up to our Mediterranean. There” Speaker 1 interjects: “you have it.” Speaker 0 asserts that the real objective of all of this was to intentionally—“they knew that starting a war with Iran would cause a shutdown of both the Bab El Mamdab Straits, which is what the Houthis can affect in the Red Sea, and then the Strait Of Hormuz, which Iran has effectively shut down.” He states that they knew that would happen because their long-term goal has always been to force the Muslim countries in the Arab states, the Gulf Arab states, to route all of their oil exports through Israel. Speaker 1 adds: “Therefore, Israel can now control up to 40% of the world's petroleum. And that amount of control would absolutely make them a superpower, and that's exactly what they want.” Speaker 0 goes on to say that if Iran falls, it’s not going to be Turkey next; it’s going to be Egypt because they have to take back the Suez Canal. He notes that Egypt had control during the Arab-Israeli war for a brief time, but the UN forced them to give it back to Egypt. He emphasizes that they have always wanted that back. Speaker 1 contributes: “Because if they can control the Suez Canal and take that away from Egypt and they can force all the Gulf states to run all their oil through Israel. Israel controls the world, and that's their ultimate objective. That's the objective of this war.”

Clayton discusses with Kevin Ship, a former CIA officer and author of Twilight of the Shadow Government, how false flags allegedly unfold and why they persist in public discourse. Key points: - False flags are planned for months in advance. Kevin suggests that covert operations typically identify a single boogeyman to avoid implying a broader conspiracy, arguing that a lone perpetrator allows authorities to claim “we got him” and deny wider conspiracy. - The pattern cited includes one individual who previously showed no criminal tendencies, who then commits a violent act, followed by quick attribution to a designated boogeyman, with the implication that the operation is over and left without further inquiry. - Specific incidents discussed include the Bondi Beach attack in Australia, with references to Mossad’s involvement and claims that Iran is behind the attack to push for war with Iran. The exchange questions the Australian government’s role and the relevance of Mossad’s presence in investigating the incident. - The conversation links these operations to broader intelligence ecosystem dynamics, noting a close collaboration and “frenemies” relationship between the CIA and Mossad. They describe Mossad as having a pervasive role in Middle East intelligence and describe a history of interactions where Mossad and the CIA share high-level information and sometimes operate in tandem, though at times Mossad may target the CIA as well. - The discussion points to prior examples of disinformation, such as the 9/11 events, where perceptions of evidence (e.g., a passport found near the World Trade Center) are presented as straightforward proof, while being described as an example of ineffective or misused disinformation to shape public belief. - In addressing media influence, Kevin references the CIA’s media liaison office and programs designed to influence how news is presented in the United States. He contends that “Mockingbird”-like media consolidation and complicit outlets help propagate these narratives, especially to audiences that rely primarily on television news. - The conversation notes a perceived pattern of actors or individuals appearing at multiple, unrelated events (e.g., a person claiming responsibility or being present at various incidents) as part of the alleged orchestration of false flag narratives. - They discuss the effectiveness of false flags: despite growing scrutiny and critical reporting, they argue that false flags continue to influence public perception, aided by psychological studies within intelligence communities and the reliance of many viewers on mainstream media for information. - Kevin reiterates his belief that the shadow government—particularly the CIA’s control of elected government and media propaganda programs—remains powerful, with ongoing operations designed to manipulate thinking and push narratives that serve certain geopolitical aims. He emphasizes that false flags are a recurring tactic and predict more of them in the future. - The conversation closes with Kevin urging readers to consider his book Twilight of the Shadow Government and to engage with his perspective on the CIA’s influence over media, politics, and public belief.

Speaker 1 acknowledges that while intelligence is shared between the U.S. and Israel, it is likely not all intelligence. They also assume that allies, including Israel, spy on the U.S., and vice versa. Speaker 1 states that conservatives recognize people act in their own self-interest. Speaker 0 asks if it is in America's interest for Israel to spy on the U.S., including on the president. Speaker 1 responds that the close alliance with Israel provides huge benefits to the U.S. Speaker 0 asks why Speaker 1 won't say that Israel is not allowed to spy on the U.S. and that they don't want to be spied on.

Speaker 0 questions Speaker 1 about Iran, including its population, which Speaker 1 does not know. Speaker 1 defends his lack of knowledge, stating he doesn't memorize population tables. Speaker 0 suggests this information is relevant given Speaker 1's stance on the country. The discussion shifts to whether Iran is trying to murder Donald Trump, which Speaker 1 believes. They also discuss military strikes and US support for Israel. Later, they discuss whether Mossad shares all intelligence with the US, and whether they spy domestically in the United States. Speaker 1 says allies spy on each other, which Speaker 0 questions. Speaker 0 asks if it's in America's interest for Israel to spy on the US, including the president. Speaker 1 says it's in America's interest to be closely allied with Israel, and Speaker 0 questions why Speaker 1 won't say he doesn't want to be spied on.

"This discussion will teach you everything you need to know about US foreign policy over the last seven decades and how we got to where we are today, how we got to a war in Ukraine, an ongoing war in Gaza, The US bombing Iran, a war in Lebanon, and in the last two decades, a war in Iraq, a war in Afghanistan, and just death and destruction across The Middle East." "They were allied with The US against Iran. That includes Al Qaeda." "The defense planning guidance for 1994" ended up being known as the Wolfowitz doctrine: "America will not allow for any power or combination of regional powers anywhere in the world to challenge our military dominance over the planet, and we'll go to war with them first to prevent that from happening." "The purpose of NATO is to keep America in, Germany down, and the Soviets out." Rand Corporation’s "Extending Russia" study warned about "calibration of the amount of weapons that we're pouring in," and CIA officers said "the calibration is off." "Minsk one and Minsk two"; "the Americans in Kyiv refused to implement the thing." "Al Qaeda, nine eleven, the probably America's worst enemy now in our generation, was allied with The US." "Bases in Saudi from which to bomb and blockade Iraq." "Saddam Hussein… ally to The US against Iran." "Iran, even after the revolution, was not an ally of Israel, but Israel was supplying weapons to Iran after the revolution, and that was through The US."

Speaker 1 acknowledges that Mossad likely doesn't share all intelligence with the U.S., just as the U.S. doesn't share everything with them, but emphasizes it's a close alliance. Speaker 1 assumes all allies, including Israel, spy on the U.S., and attributes this to people acting in their rational self-interest. When asked if it's in America's interest for Israel to spy on the U.S., including on the president, Speaker 1 states it's in America's interest to be closely allied with Israel because the U.S. gets huge benefits from it. While acknowledging the spying takes place, Speaker 1 does not express disapproval, but rather focuses on the benefits of the alliance.