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I’m back in Newark after a week in Germany meeting with governments, central banks, and wholesalers—over 50 meetings with wholesalers from Asia, Europe, the US, and others, plus talks with banks acquiring metal. Here are the key points from a few perspectives: - Market backdrop: the world is broadly backed up on retail-ready silver and gold, especially silver. Many markets are backed up three to four months for product. Scottsdale Mint is not as backed up on most products and is working to keep product flowing. There is raw material in the United States, and Scottsdale Mint has no issues with US raw material for minting operations. In Europe, however, there are concerns in the second half of the year about metal flow and supply. - Supply chain and refinery bottlenecks: the refineries are backed up for months, with some booked out for the entire year to premier clients. This is creating logjams and wide spreads in some markets. Some dealers in the US and elsewhere report buy-to-sell ratios around 10-to-1, forcing buybacks due to limited refinery turn-ins at storefronts. - Price and market dynamics: the speaker noted being hit hard by the market, and previously posted a range of “1.50 to 50” (quoted as a guess in a volatile context). There is ongoing contention for physical metal, particularly silver and other critical minerals. The speaker believes the Chinese were bidding heavily and India was alongside them. A fund with a large premium over spot closed on Friday, trapping investors in that fund while futures trading continued, contributing to a cascading effect. When China closed, prices dipped from around 100 to the 70s, then recovered into the 80s. The market is volatile and likely to be a wild ride. - Short-term and long-term outlook: in normal markets, such extreme moves typically take weeks to months to sort out technically, but Shanghai premiums are high enough that the recovery process could look different. The physical market could potentially overwhelm at current prices because every yuan in China buys more ounces than when prices were 20% higher. Silver remains the number one asset in 2026 despite recent declines. The speaker remains cautiously optimistic for the year. - Strategies and advice: dollar-cost averaging, and avoid leverage. These assets should be acquired and held rather than aggressively traded. You can take profits along the way, but those buying ounces should hold. Those who bought last year or recently still own their ounces. - Market entrants and youth movement: new buyers are entering the industry globally, across ages, including the US and Europe. A youth movement is visible on platforms like TikTok, signaling a growing interest in precious metals. This is expected to positively influence the long-term dynamics even as big players (governments, banks) are active and retail has shifted from selling to buying after a period of quiet. - Clarifications and rumors: claims about a major US Mint closure are not accurate; a government entity paused orders to catch up but will resume. There is substantial misinformation, and the speaker plans more updates in the coming days and weeks. Overall, the speaker forecasts a wild opening and anticipates further volatility and potential upside as physical demand and new buyers interact with existing market frictions and refinery constraints.

The video argues that a “new world order” is unfolding in real time, signaling the start of a “great reset.” The host points to events from the past Friday as evidence: 3,000,000 Epstein files released, the biggest one-day drop in the history of the precious metals market, and a large arbitrage developing among Chinese, London, and US precious metals markets. Gold is described as the indicator that a full-blown reset is upon us, with attention drawn to pathways like the US’s approach to Iran and the Epstein files, while claiming a broader resetting dynamic is at work. Context for the moment centers on Friday’s nomination of Kevin Warsh (referred to as Kevin Walsh in the transcript) as the new Fed chairman. The host notes baggage around Warsh, including his appearance in Epstein files, but emphasizes his views: Warsh “hates stimulus money,” “hates quantitative easing,” and “voted against it,” believing it pushes inflation higher. He is said to have shifted on interest rates, from believing higher interest rates were good for the dollar to a different stance, and he allegedly favors slashing the Fed’s balance sheet to lower rates. The implication is that the nomination marks a shift toward a new dollar era and a shift away from a strong USD, which the host frames as a response to concerns about the US owning precious metals and controlling energy markets. The host ties these changes to a new petrodollar era, arguing that the United States, now the largest producer of oil and natural gas, has moved the petrodollar structure away from Saudi Arabia and toward the US. This trifecta—new dollar policy from the Fed, a drop in the precious metals market driven by speculators, and US control over energy policy—constitutes a “reset.” The video asserts that the traditional petrodollar system, once led by OPEC, has shifted, reducing outside leverage over Washington in energy matters. The host also claims a debate over foreign influence in the Middle East and calls for ending involvement in regional wars and bringing troops home, while criticizing mainstream outlets and certain political figures. Four main points are then presented as the crux of the reset: 1) Trump desires a weaker US dollar and is pursuing greater domestic manufacturing to compete with China and India, including the aim to export more and import less; the host frames this as a deliberate strategic shift rather than inflationary debasement. 2) The end of the Fed’s independence, with a collaboration era between the Treasury and the Fed, led by figures like Scott Pissent and Warsh, suggesting much lower interest rates and a shift of debt ownership back to American hands, with foreigners potentially selling US Treasuries. 3) Energy wars are emerging, with the US drilling and producing more oil and natural gas than Russia and Saudi Arabia combined, changing the energy dynamic with China, which remains a large importer of oil and vulnerable to such shifts. 4) Sustaining public support for volatility, with Trump’s team allegedly aiming to declare a housing emergency to lower rates, discourage Wall Street from buying single-family homes, implement tariff dividends to Americans, deliver veterans’ checks, and lower inflation and gas prices in the lead-up to midterms. The host contrasts reactions within the Trump-supporting and anti-Trump camps, asserting the reset is underway regardless of opinion. A sponsor segment then pivots to copper, arguing that copper demand is surging due to global competition for materials, and highlighting Giant Mining Corporation (ticker: BFGFF) as a primary copper idea tied to the Majuba Hill Copper Project in Nevada, noting its favorable infrastructure, past production, and strategic importance to American copper independence. The segment cites executive actions and tariff movements, including a 50% tariff on semi-finished copper products effective August 1, 2025, positioning copper as central to the new industrial reality. The host reiterates Giant Mining as the foremost copper idea and invites viewers to conduct their own research.

Electric vehicles are driving a surge in demand for minerals like lithium, nickel, rare Earth elements, and copper. By 2030, global lithium production needs to increase 8 times to meet Tesla's needs. These cars require 6 times more minerals than conventional vehicles. The mining industry generates $119 billion annually, with a projected 105% increase in nickel demand for transportation by 2026. By 2040, rare Earth element demand will rise by 1,000%. Additionally, copper production must increase significantly as wind turbines require 4.7 tons of copper each.

Copper and aluminum are the primary beneficiaries of the grid spending increase. $800,000,000,000 is going to buy copper, which is money. How big is the oil market compared to the metals market? Crude oil dominates. All metals—iron ore, gold, copper, aluminum, nickel—are thinly traded and critical. There is no chance to get off crude oil; you can’t build electric cars, windmills, solar, or a modern military without these metals. Underwater power cables are expensive, and offshore wind with transmission to Greening efforts illustrates copper’s central role. Copper is the focus: copper is the expected $270,000,000,000 per year market by tomorrow morning. Where will this metal come from? There is no copper inventory. Historically, since Mohenjo Daro, humanity mined 700,000,000 metric tons of copper; about 80% of all copper ever mined is still in human possession. Recycling can recover about 80% of that 700,000,000 tons, but to do so would require tearing down every building in the United States, Europe, Japan, and China. Copper is embedded in buildings and other infrastructure; it can be recycled, but extracting it at scale remains challenging. Currently, we consume 30,000,000 tons of copper a year, with only 4,000,000 tons recycled. To maintain global 3% GDP growth, without electrification and relying on burning oil and gas, we must mine the same amount of copper in the next eighteen years as we mined in the last ten thousand years. In the next eighteen years, we would have to mine the same cumulative amount as in ten thousand years prior, without electrification, without data centers, without solar and wind, and without the greening of the world economy. There is little appreciation for the challenge faced. Since 1900, the energy required to produce copper has increased 16-fold. As ore grades decline, more energy is needed to produce the same metal, while water consumption has doubled. The easy copper deposits are largely depleted; Chile accounts for 24% of global copper mine production, but costs are in the third or fourth quartile. Chile burns coal, and solar isn’t reliable for mining operations since the sun shines only ~five hours a day; solar is useless without grid-scale storage. We are heading for a train wreck in Chile. To meet copper demand, six giant Tier One mines must come online every year from now until 2050. To meet copper demand, 40% of production must come from new mines for electrification, data centers, and grid upgrades. All the talk about AI is fantasy without sufficient energy. Nuclear power could help, but its components require metals, and the U.S. lacks the capability to weld containment vessels in traditional nuclear plants; Korea can build a nuclear power plant.

Mario interviews Professor Yasheng Huang about the evolving US-China trade frictions, the rare-earth pivot, Taiwan considerations, and broader questions about China’s economy and governance. Key points and insights - Rare earths as a bargaining tool: China’s rare-earth processing and export controls would require anyone using Chinese-processed rare earths to submit applications, with civilian uses supposedly allowed but defense uses scrutinized. Huang notes the distinction between civilian and defense usage is unclear, and the policy, if fully implemented, would shock global supply chains because rare earths underpin magnets used in phones, computers, missiles, defense systems, and many other electronics. He stresses that the rule would have a broad, not narrowly targeted, impact on the US and global markets. - Timeline and sequence of tensions: The discussion traces a string of moves beginning with US tariffs on China (and globally) in 2018–2019, a Geneva truce in 2019, and May/June 2019 actions around nanometer-scale chip controls. In August, the US relaxed some restrictions on seven-nanometer chips to China with revenue caps on certain suppliers. In mid–September (the period of this interview), China imposed docking fees on US ships and reportedly added a rare-earth export-control angle. Huang highlights that this combination—docking fees plus a sweeping rare-earth export control—appears to be an escalatory step, potentially timed to influence a forthcoming Xi-Trump summit. He argues China may have overplayed its hand and notes the export-control move is not tightly targeted, suggesting a broader bargaining chip rather than a precise lever against a single demand. - Motives and strategic logic: Huang suggests several motives for China’s move: signaling before a potential summit in South Korea; leveraging weaknesses in US agricultural exports (notably soybeans) during a harvest season; and accelerating a broader shift toward domestic processing capacity for rare earths by other countries. He argues the rare-earth move could spur other nations (Japan, Europe, etc.) to build their own refining and processing capacity, reducing long-run Chinese leverage. Still, in the short term, China holds substantial bargaining weight, given the global reliance on Chinese processing. - Short-term vs. long-term implications: Huang emphasizes the distinction between short-run leverage and long-run consequences. While China can tighten rare-earth supply now, the long-run effect is to incentivize diversification away from Chinese processing. He compares the situation to Apple diversifying production away from China after zero-COVID policies in 2022; it took time to reconfigure supply chains, and some dependence remains. In the long run, this shift could erode China’s near-term advantages in processing and export-driven growth, even as it remains powerful today. - Global role of hard vs. soft assets: The conversation contrasts hard assets (gold, crypto) with soft assets (the dollar, reserve currency status). Huang notes that moving away from the dollar is more feasible for countries in the near term than substituting rare-earth refining and processing. The move away from rare earths would require new refining capacity and supply chains that take years to establish. - China’s economy and productivity: The panel discusses whether China’s growth is sustainable under increasing debt and slowing productivity. Huang explains that while aggregate GDP has grown dramatically, total factor productivity in China has been weaker, and the incremental capital required to generate each additional percentage point of growth has risen. He points to overbuilding—empty housing and excess capacity—as evidence of inefficiencies that add to debt without commensurate output gains. In contrast, he notes that some regions with looser central control performed better historically, and that Deng Xiaoping’s era of opening correlated with stronger personal income growth, even if the overall economy remained autocratic. - Democracy, autocracy, and development: The discussion turns to governance models. Huang argues that examining democracy in the abstract can be misleading; the US system has significant institutional inefficiencies (gerrymandering, the electoral college). He asserts that autocracy is not inherently the driver of China’s growth; rather, China’s earlier phases benefited from partial openness and more open autocracy, with current autocracy not guaranteeing sustained momentum. He cites evidence that in China, personal income growth rose most when political openings were greater in the 1980s, suggesting that more open practices during development correlated with better living standards for individuals, though China remains not a democracy. - Trump, strategy, and global realignments: Huang views Trump as a transactional leader whose approach has elevated autocratic figures’ legitimacy internationally. He notes that Europe and China could move closer if China moderates its Ukraine stance, though rare-earth moves complicate such alignment. He suggests that allies may tolerate Trump’s demands for short-term gains while aiming to protect longer-term economic interests, and that the political landscape in the US could shift with a new president, potentially altering trajectories. - Taiwan and the risk of conflict: The interview underscores that a full-scale invasion of Taiwan would, in Huang’s view, mark the end of China’s current growth model, given the wartime economy transition and the displacement of reliance on outward exports and consumption. He stresses the importance of delaying conflict as a strategic objective and maintains concern about both sides’ leadership approaches to Taiwan. - Taiwan, energy security, and strategic dependencies: The conversation touches on China’s energy imports—especially oil through crucial chokepoints like the Malacca Strait—and the potential vulnerabilities if regional dynamics shift following any escalation on Taiwan. Huang reiterates that a Taiwan invasion would upend China’s economy and government priorities, given the high debt burden and the transition toward a wartime economy. Overall, the dialogue centers on the complex interplay of China’s use of rare-earth leverage, the short- and long-term economic and strategic consequences for the United States and its allies, and the broader questions around governance models, productivity, debt, and geopolitical risk in a shifting global order.

Speaker 0 argues that we are still completely underestimating how short we will be in terms of the global demand-supply dynamics of a handful of critical elements. In the view of the Trump doctrine, the world is no longer as multilateral, and there is a need for unilateral national security. From this lens, the asset set to go absolutely parabolic is copper. Copper is described as the most useful, cheap, amenable, conducted material that we have, and it manifests in everything from data centers to chips to weapon systems. Currently, Jason, we are on a path by 2040 where we will be short about 70% of the global supply at current course and speed. Copper.

Speaker 0 mentions a lack of coordination, but it is unclear what they are referring to. Speaker 1 questions the wisdom of becoming more dependent on and vulnerable to a perceived enemy. They express concerns about the enemy's actions in Latin America, America, and with currency, suggesting they are trying to take down America. Speaker 0 then brings up the supply chain of critical metals for electric vehicles and defense. Speaker 1 acknowledges the information about the need for a 2,000% increase in mining for 20 years to meet the demand for EVs and critical metals.

The speakers discuss a sharp warning signal they see in precious metals and the implications for the broader economy. Speaker 0 notes that gold prices have more than doubled in the last year and silver prices have nearly tripled. They interpret this as a major warning of an impending financial and economic crisis. They compare this to the subprime crisis warning in 2007, when Ben Bernanke said the issue was contained to subprime and many did not grasp its significance. The speaker explains they were short the market and anticipated the crisis, which subsequently materialized about a year later. Based on the current situation, they believe gold and silver’s rise signals a forthcoming dollar crisis and a US Treasury crisis, suggesting it could hit next year and emphasizing that people need to take action while there is time. The core message is that the metal price increases are not merely inflationary signals but warnings of structural vulnerabilities in US sovereign credit and the dollar, with a potentially tight timeframe for response. Speaker 1 adds that a significant portion of our debt remains sustainable in part because we can trade global currencies, which allows politicians to continue spending more than would otherwise be possible. This point underscores how the international currency system enables higher debt levels and ongoing fiscal expansion, contributing to the conditions that the speakers warn about. Key assertions include: 1) gold and silver surges reflect a looming US dollar and US Treasury crisis rather than just typical commodity inflation; 2) the crisis could emerge within a short horizon, possibly next year; 3) historical parallel to the 2007 subprime episode is used to support the claim that seemingly contained problems can escalate into a major crisis; 4) the global currency system’s flexibility enables continued high spending, contributing to fiscal vulnerabilities. The overall message is a warning to prepare for a potential financial crisis tied to sovereign credit and dollar stability, emphasizing swift consideration of actions in light of the perceived urgency.

Copper and aluminum are the primary beneficiaries of the grid spending increase. That $800,000,000,000 is going to buy copper, which is money. The oil market, compared to the metals market, is dwarfed by the demand for metals like copper, aluminum, iron ore, gold, and nickel, which are said to be so thinly traded and critical that there is no chance to get off crude oil. You can’t build electric cars, windmills, solar, or a modern military without these metals. Underwater power cables are expensive, and offshore wind and bringing that electricity green requires copper—copper, copper, copper. Copper now is described as a trillion-dollar annual market by tomorrow morning. There is no copper inventory to meet this demand. Since Mohenjo Daro, humanity has mined 700,000,000 metric tons of copper. If we put that in a big cube for scale (about 4 thirty-meter sides), approximately 80% of all the copper ever mined is still in human possession. Recycling could recover about 80% of that 700,000,000 tons, but it would require tearing down every building in the United States, Europe, Japan, and China. We can recycle copper from buildings and even from the university in front of us, but the consequence would be living in the dark. Currently, we consume 30,000,000 tons of copper per year, with only 4,000,000 tons recycled. To maintain 3% GDP growth with no electrification, this speaker claims we must mine the same amount of copper in the next eighteen years as we mined in the last ten thousand years. In the next eighteen years, we would need to mine the same copper volume as mined in the entire previous span of human history, without electrification, without data centers, without solar and wind, and without the greening of the world economy. Since 1900, the energy required to produce copper has increased sixteen-fold, and as ore grades decline, more energy is needed to produce the same metal while water consumption has doubled. Grades are declining globally, and easy copper mines are depleted; Chile is highlighted as a major producer (24% of global copper mine production), yet costs are in the third or fourth quartile. They burn coal in the Chilean grid, and solar is ineffective for mining because the sun only shines a few hours a day; solar is useless without grid-scale storage. The speaker asserts we are heading for a train wreck in Chile and that we need six giant tier-one mines online every year from now until 2050 to meet copper demand for electrification, data centers, and grid upgrades—40% of the production to come from new mines. All the hype about AI is dismissed as fantasy because we do not have the energy. Nuclear power is proposed as a solution, but what are those plants made of? All the metals mentioned earlier. The country reportedly does not have the capability to weld containment vessels in a traditional nuclear power plant anymore, whereas Korea can build a nuclear power plant.

Mario: Markets react to talk of a US-China trade war, with global attention on China-Taiwan risk. I spoke with Professor Yasheng Huang to discuss China’s real economy, what a trade war could look like in the next two to three years, and whether China might invade Taiwan. Mario: You describe the rare-earth export restrictions China announced as a major move. China refines roughly 90% of the world’s rare earths, mines about 70%, and controls a crucial supply for tech, AI, missiles, private and fighter jets. The official rationale is that the policy is an export control rather than an export ban; those using Chinese-processed rare earths must submit applications. Civilian usage is said to be okay, defense-related usage will be scrutinized or prohibited, though the definitions of civilian versus defense usage are unclear. The move, if fully implemented, would shock global supply chains since rare earths are embedded in almost all electronic production. Professor Huang: The policy could trigger a global production disruption because rare earths are used universally in electronics—phones, computers, and more. The threshold for needing approval is set very low, effectively implicating almost every user of Chinese-processed rare earths. The policy isn’t narrowly targeted at the US; it affects any user of the Chinese process. If fully enacted, it would be a broad economic shock. Mario: The timing follows a series of US actions: fentanyl tariffs on China around 10%, broader US tariffs on many countries including China in April, a Geneva truce for 90 days, and then May’s halting of five-nanometer chip exports to China. August saw partial relaxation, with seven-nanometer chips allowed but capped revenues from China for NVIDIA and AMD at 15%. Then mid-September, the US imposed docking fees on Chinese ships calling US ports, and China retaliated with a rare-earth move. Why did China take this step, and does it aim to pressure for a summit with Xi Jinping and Donald Trump later this month? Professor Huang: The broad timeline is accurate, though mid-September docking fees added asymmetry in favor of the US. The rare-earth move likely predated that, possibly prepared for a summit in South Korea. It’s not well tailored as a bargaining chip since it would affect many countries, not just the US. China may be signaling leverage ahead of a potential Xi-Trump meeting and reflecting tensions in agricultural exports—China has largely stopped buying US soybeans, causing farmer distress. The rare-earth policy is a high-pressure tactic that may overreach. Mario: You compare China’s stance to the US, noting that China seems to be pushing back more aggressively than other countries, and that this move could accelerate a shift away from US-dollar dominance toward hard assets like gold or Bitcoin, and toward domestic rare-earth processing in many countries. Could this be a long-term strategic disadvantage for China? Professor Huang: In the short term, China has substantial bargaining leverage in rare earths since processing capacity is scarce elsewhere. In the long run, the move is likely to spur other countries to build processing capacity, reducing China’s leverage. The analogy with Apple’s supply diversification after China’s zero-COVID policies shows such diversification will take time. If other countries build processing capacity, the relative power shift could occur over a longer horizon. The geopolitical calculus should consider timing: short-term gains may come at long-term costs. Mario: You discuss the difference between hard assets and soft assets like the dollar, and whether China’s move could motivate countries to diversify away from rare earth dependence. Could you expand on that? Professor Huang: Hard assets (gold) and soft assets (dollar credibility) differ in impact. Rare earth processing capacity is a hard asset-like dependency; diversifying away from China’s processing could reduce China’s leverage over time. However, short-term disruption is likely to be broad, since electronics’ reliance on rare earths is pervasive. In the long run, countries will build refining and processing capacity, making the West less dependent on China for these inputs. Mario: Turning to China’s economy, some critics warned of collapse in the early 2000s, but China grew. Now, growth is around 5%, though debt-to-GDP has risen and productivity appears to be slowing. How does Professor Huang reconcile these views? Professor Huang: The early-2000s collapse predictions were incorrect, but today China faces real strains. The debt-to-GDP ratio has risen since 2008, raising the incremental capital needed to generate each percentage point of growth. Productivity has trended downward; there is a difference between the business-executive view and the academic view. Executives see impressive factories and automation, while academics point to waste and overbuilding—factories producing goods no one wants, empty housing, and higher logistical costs. Net economy-wide productivity is negative, due to inefficiencies offsetting gains. Mario: You compare democracy and autocracy. Some argue China’s centralized, long-term planning works for growth, but Professor Huang notes that personal income growth in China was highest when the system was less autocratic. He argues Deng Xiaoping’s openness—less autocratic than today—drove significant growth, while Xi Jinping’s more autocratic leadership coincides with a growth slowdown. How does he view the balance between political structure and economic outcomes? Professor Huang: He distinguishes between ideal democracy and current practice, arguing the US system is flawed in ways that impede governance (gun control, healthcare, etc.). He notes that autocracy is not the sole cause of growth; historically, less autocratic or more open autocracies in East Asia grew more rapidly than more autocratic regimes. For China, the data suggest that more open regions grew faster than tightly controlled ones. The correlation does not support the idea that autocracy automatically delivers robust growth. Mario: Finally, you discuss Trump’s China policy. Trump’s transactional approach, allied with a perceived US weakness, has shifted dynamics. How will China respond if Europe leans toward China, and could Ukraine policy influence that? Professor Huang: Trump elevated autocracy’s legitimacy, potentially aiding leaders like Xi. Europe might move closer to China if China softens its Ukraine stance; however, the rare-earth move complicates that. Indian leaders understand Trump’s transactional approach, encouraging engagement to safeguard national interests. The global balance will depend on China’s actions and Europe’s response, with the Ukraine position remaining a critical factor.

Mining uses toxic chemicals and creates hazardous waste, yet is needed for green technologies. Demand for minerals is expected to increase 400-600%. Years ago, a proposal for Pebble Mine in Alaska was vetoed by the EPA due to environmental concerns, despite scientific studies. A Republican administration removed the EPA veto, but President Biden vetoed it again. Environmental groups and regulators have allegedly killed new mines in America, with permitting taking decades. The Biden administration dealt a blow to Twin Metals mine plans. Environmental groups oppose American mines, but clean energy needs minerals. Windmills, solar panels, and batteries require a massive increase in minerals. The NRDC didn't provide examples of mines they support. The Green Movement has been happy outsourcing mining to disadvantaged countries with child labor. America has child labor laws, safer equipment, and environmental rules. America once led in mineral production, but now depends on other countries. Society can't exist without mines.