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Ashton Rifenski opens Going Underground from the UAE, referencing Antonio Gramsci and the idea of hegemony, and frames the day as one where the UN Security Council discusses maritime security in the context of what he describes as calls by Donald Trump that have “destroyed” that security, highlighting the Strait of Hormuz as half Iranian and half Omani owned and the broader global impact on prices for fuel, medicine, and food. He notes a visit by a “vassal state king” to Trump and contrasts it with the anticipated visit of Trump to the country with the largest economy by PPP powered by Iranian and Russian energy, suggesting that when Trump meets Xi Jinping, the U.S. life expectancy gap with Shanghai will be evident. Victor Gao, vice president of the Center for China and Globalization, joins from Beijing. Rifenski asks about a Financial Times headline claiming Tehran deployed a Chinese satellite to target U.S. bases in the Middle East and about U.S. claims that foreign entities, principally based in China, are engaged in deliberate industrial-scale campaigns, questioning whether China is supplying weapons to Iran. Gao responds by challenging the Financial Times’ premise, asserting that the UK paper is “owned by Japanese interests” and that China provides commercial satellite services openly available for international cooperation. He contends that China can engage in “commercial normal satellite services with any country,” including Iran, and says targeting versus weapons are distinct issues. He reiterates China’s position that it does not supply weapons to any country at war, and notes that China calls for an immediate end to the war and supports the UN Charter and international law, mentioning that the UN Secretary-General described the war as an aggression by the United States and Israel against Iran. Rifenski presses Gao on why China wouldn’t supply arms to Iran despite Iran’s energy ties with China. Gao emphasizes Iran’s capability to defend its sovereignty and notes no specific requests have been made by Iran for Chinese military aid, asserting China’s opposition to any allegation of arming Iran. He adds that Iran has demonstrated drones, missiles, and long-range capabilities, and states that China supports ending the war rather than escalating it. The discussion then shifts to whether China should have hosted negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. Gao notes Trump’s recent acknowledgment of China’s role in nudging Iran and the U.S. toward talks, highlighting Beijing’s diplomatic outreach via Wang Yi to over 20 foreign ministers to de-escalate. He mentions Pakistan as an intermediary and argues that China has sought a positive role, possibly facilitating or supplementing Pakistan’s efforts, while acknowledging uncertainty over Israel’s willingness to support a peace deal. Gao insists China’s commitment is to end the war and achieve peace. Rifenski and Gao discuss the broader implications of U.S.-China relations, the perception that the war is a test of U.S. strength, and the notion that China views a war with the United States as unwinnable for the U.S. He asserts that China aims to avoid headlined confrontations and prefers behind-the-scenes diplomacy, contrasting China’s approach with Western narratives. Gao argues that the global economy would suffer from U.S. aggression and asserts that the so-called Pax Americana is ending, accelerated by Trump’s policies. He notes China’s decreasing holdings of U.S. Treasuries and suggests the yuan’s growing role in international trade, predicting yuan settlement could rise from about 2.5-3% to 25-30% in the long term as more oil trades settle in renminbi. The interview closes with Gao offering advice to GCC countries, stressing that China’s involvement has historically led to peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia, while U.S. and Israeli involvement has led to hostility. He urges Middle Eastern actors to engage with China as a defender of free trade and peace, and to consider cooperation with China after the war to foster long-term regional stability.

Glenn: Welcome back with professor Richard Wolff to discuss economic fury, the economic weaponization of the US campaign against Iran. How do you assess this effort, given the mix of oil sanctions, open markets for oil, and port blockades? Wolff: I’ll be blunt: I don’t know how to answer cleanly because the statements keep flipping on/off and have become “herky jerky.” The steps are inconsistent, sometimes increasing supply of oil and pushing down prices, other times constraining it. It’s not clear which way any given move will go, and the sequence is hard to parse. He notes that Gulf states are pressing for dollar swaps—foreign central banks can access dollars via swaps rather than buying them on markets. These swaps have shifted from weekly to daily, signaling worry about dollar access. The Gulf states—UAE and others—allege they depend on dollar-denominated oil revenues to service debts incurred through investments abroad. If dollars tighten due to strait closures and sanctions, they may be forced to sell assets in the US, including Treasury securities, which would lower bond prices and raise interest rates, potentially triggering a US recession. They could also sell holdings in the American stock market, affecting prices. Wolff emphasizes this as a surface manifestation of a broader global liquidity and debt dilemma tied to the Persian Gulf and the dollar’s role in the world economy. Glenn: So essentially the petrodollar is being unraveled because if Gulf states price and sell oil in dollars, but if they’re not exporting and not receiving dollars, they can’t pay debts or roll them over. They might sell treasuries or assets to cover shortfalls. How far can the US hold this position? Wolff: I don’t have a crystal ball, but I think the likely scenario is a political and economic squeeze. Trump has lost parts of his base—issues like the Epstein file and the economy’s inflation and job market. He relies on a narrative of victory; his base may be shrinking, while the wealthier 10% who own stock might be more supportive as the stock market stays buoyant. If the Gulf states must exchange dollars for debt relief or to cover losses, the government may have to grant more dollar swaps to prevent a spike in interest rates and a stock sell-off. Steven Bannon has warned that war could cost Trump the election, so the administration may shore up swaps to protect markets. Wolff suggests this is a desperate regime trying to exit a bad position with minimal damage. Glenn: You describe a broader pattern: the petrodollar’s decline, and the US dollar’s dwindling centrality in global reserves. How does this fit into the larger arc of American empire and capitalism? Wolff: It fits as part of the decline of the American empire and the corresponding decline of American capitalism. BRICS, China’s rise, and the shift away from dollar-dominated trade illuminate a trend toward reduced dollar dominance. Sanctions in Ukraine exposed the limits of that model, and there’s growing acceptance of payments outside the dollar for oil. The United States remains influential, but the dollar’s dominance is waning, and there’s no clear strategy to reverse that trend. Manufacturing has moved to other countries, notably China, which maintains low inflation and large-scale production. The world is moving toward multipolar arrangements, and the dollar’s preeminence is no longer assured. Glenn: Given this trajectory, is there any viable way to salvage the petrodollar, or is it beyond rescue? Wolff: I don’t predict the future with certainty, but I view the larger context as a decline in American hegemony and an erosion of dollar dominance. The war in Iran, like the war in Ukraine, demonstrates the limits of sanctions and the unintended consequences of aggressive confrontation. The dollar’s global reserve role is shrinking, and other powers are willing to transact outside it. He emphasizes this as a systemic shift, not a temporary setback. Glenn: Any final thoughts on how history and memory shape current policy? Wolff: History often gets reframed to fit current aims. There’s a tendency to present “victories” regardless of outcome, especially in wartime rhetoric. The dialogue in Europe and the US reflects a mix of nostalgia for past dominance and struggle to adapt to a changing global order. The conversation ends with questions about how Europe and the US should reorient foreign policy toward a multipolar world, where old assumptions no longer hold.

Chas Freeman and the host Glenn discuss how sea power has shaped global politics and why the current era may be signaling a shift toward land power and new kinds of strategic leverage. - Historical context of maritime dominance: Freeman traces a long arc from British naval hegemony after the Seven Years’ War to American preeminence after World War II, noting that naval power helped sustain a rules-based order and open sea lanes. He argues that dominance of the seas is no longer guaranteed, highlighting evolving ranges of weapons and the emergence of land-based controls that can threaten naval movements. - The evolving limits of naval power: He notes that artillery ranges kept territorial seas limited to about three miles in the eighteenth century, but advances in missiles and shore-based defenses have eroded that traditional maritime advantage. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s 12-mile territorial limit is described as a political compromise rather than a fixed physical law. Modern missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers enable coastal forces to threaten carriers far from home waters, while shore installations can enforce blockades from land, as seen with Yemen’s Houthis in Bab El Mandeb and Iran in Hormuz. - The Strait of Hormuz as a strategic focal point: Freeman describes the current blockade as a sea-change that challenges the historic assumption that ships can freely operate in open waters. Aircraft carriers must stay well back from Iranian batteries, and surface ships at risk from Iran’s cruise missiles and drones. He emphasizes that control of Hormuz now rests more on land-based capabilities than on naval forces, making open-sea dominance increasingly untenable. - Implications for the traditional order: The discussion suggests that Anglo-American naval dominance, which helped sustain a liberal international order, is becoming less viable. Freedom of navigation operations and the appearant stability they created are no longer sufficient or sustainable in the new environment, where land-power and non-military instruments (energy, finance, and partnerships) matter more. - Energy, finance, and the petrodollar: The energy-trade dimension is central. Freeman and Glenn consider how the Strait of Hormuz underpins the petrodollar system, and discuss recent currency-swaps and dollar-reliance questions. They propose that if Gulf states shift toward the yuan or other currencies, U.S. financial hegemony could be challenged, catalyzing broader strategic realignments. China’s willingness to tolerate sanctions resistance and issue directives to its banks suggests a pushback against U.S. financial dominance. - China, Iran, and strategic realignments: Freeman notes China’s rise as a major sea power but argues China will not inherit Western maritime hegemony. He highlights China’s land-based connectivity initiatives (rail, roads, free-trade zones) that have maritime dimensions but are primarily land-centric, including Iran’s overland oil transport to China. He underscores a broader multipolar shift and the potential for Chinese and Iranian strategies to erode the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. - Negotiations and potential outcomes: The conversation concludes that there is no viable military path to open Hormuz or a negotiated settlement in sight. Freeman describes the situation as a high-stakes stalemate with no clear diplomatic avenue. He suggests that the war could subside into a lower-intensity conflict reminiscent of Israel-Iran dynamics in the region, with ongoing tensions and episodic explosions rather than a decisive end. - NATO, Europe, and Israel: The hosts discuss the potential decline or reform of NATO, the pivot of U.S. strategy away from Europe toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and how these shifts could affect European security. Freeman questions the future viability of Israel given shifting U.S. stance and waning Western consensus, noting domestic and international criticisms of Israeli actions and leadership. He observes growing Western skepticism toward Netanyahu’s approach, and the broader political costs for Israel on the world stage. - Final reflections: Both speakers anticipate profound, systemic changes in international relations—multipolarity, weakened sea-power advantages, a possible redefined European security architecture, and a reevaluation of essential alliances. They caution against overreliance on any single power’s hegemonic framework and emphasize gradual, incremental reforms over abrupt, destabilizing shocks.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to Germany for the Munich Security Conference and delivered what the speakers describe as “the most important American speech in the last thirty years,” calling on Europe to join Trump’s new world order or face consequences. He told NATO allies that “playtime is over right now,” that a new world order is being written by the United States, and that “you’re either with us or you’re against us.” He previewed the speech on the tarmac, then argued that the West must thrive again and that European leaders are “total losers” managing Europe’s decline, particularly in Germany. He framed NATO as a transaction: “NATO is a transaction between countries, that NATO is only worth supporting if you are worth defending,” and claimed Europe is “declining fast under stupid policies,” making NATO a questionable expense. Rubio criticized a liberal globalist, borderless agenda of mass immigration and sovereignty transfers to Brussels, calling the transformation of the economy foolish and voluntary, leaving the U.S. dependent on others and vulnerable to crisis. The discussion notes that Rubio’s rhetoric is not subtle, stating that “the rules that govern the world are dead” and the old order has ended, with these conversations already ongoing with allies and world leaders behind closed doors. The segment connects Rubio’s speech to broader strategic implications: the United States wants Europe “with us,” but is prepared to rebuild the global order alone if necessary. The commentary emphasizes a leverage play: pick a side—join the U.S. or face consequences—and links this to economic policy and currency strategy. On economic and currency policy, the program asserts that the dollar’s reserve status and the old world order are being challenged. Trump’s team reportedly signals that a strong dollar is no longer the default; a weaker dollar would help U.S. exports and reshoring, mirroring a Chinese approach that kept the yuan cheap for decades to build export power. The segment cites Reuters that China’s treasury holdings have fallen to their lowest level since 2008 as banks are urged to curb exposure to U.S. Treasuries, with pressure to bring holdings home to fund their own needs. China is also tightening rare earth export controls, aiming to influence the “factory floor.” The discussion suggests a currency war with a weaker dollar in the U.S. plan and a stronger yuan as China seeks global reserve status, while Europe is squeezed in the middle, invited to align with the U.S. or step aside. The synthesis notes a GOP intra-party knife fight: Rubio aligns with neocon perspectives; JD Vance is viewed as problematic for expansion of military conflicts, potentially contrasting with a no-war stance. The overall takeaway is that Rubio’s Munich speech is framed as a signal flare indicating the West’s reorganization and the dollar’s vulnerability. Sponsor segment: The host discusses critical minerals and North American independence, highlighting Project Vault, a $12 billion strategic mineral reserve designed to shield the private sector from supply shocks in essential minerals. At a Critical Minerals Ministerial, JD Vance and Marco Rubio delivered a message to China that the U.S. will no longer allow market flooding to kill domestic projects. The segment focuses on niobium, a rare earth mineral with no domestic US production, currently sourced abroad, and vital for space and defense applications. North American Niobium (ticker NIOMF) is exploring in Quebec, with drilling permits planned; the company also targets neodymium and praseodymium magnets. The leadership includes Joseph Carrabas, former Rio Tinto and Cliffs Natural Resources figures, and Carrie Lynn Findlay, a former Canadian cabinet minister. The sponsor emphasizes the strategic importance of niobium and rare earths for U.S. security and manufacturing resilience.

Warwick Powell says the Iran war is affecting East Asia in longer-term, structural ways. The immediate impact is through reduced oil and liquid fuel flows, which exposes Southeast Asian economies and Australia because they depend on Middle East crude and on fuels refined from it. He notes countries have adjusted by reaching out to other suppliers: Russia and Indonesia (Malaysia has done so), and Japan has sought to secure its position with the Sakhalin II project. He adds that Russian “European Urals” oil is chemically similar to Middle East oil and suits diesel manufacturing, while Singapore has refused Russian oil and therefore had to find other workarounds. He also highlights pressure on fertilizers and petrochemicals, with Japanese naphtha-market constraints already affecting related industries and pushing some firms to seek alternative supply options in China. Powell argues energy shocks do not end abruptly and that the downstream implications are likely to be manifold. He cites a consumer-level shift toward electrified transportation, especially Chinese EVs exported into Southeast Asia and Australia, which he says has increased dramatically over the last hundred days. He also says countries are increasing interest in energy technologies that support “energy sovereignty,” with Chinese clean-energy technologies positioned as central. He further emphasizes a defense and security dimension: the United States’ global power-projection base network is no longer defendable. He connects damaged or destroyed Persian Gulf bases with American pullbacks and says this has created shockwaves across Southeast Asia and Eastern North Asia. Powell argues Asia’s U.S. deterrence posture has relied on American bases across the First Island Chain (from Japan to the Philippines), so if those bases become unsustainable, the regional security architecture is forced to change while China expands its military posture over decades of modernization. Glenn links this to a broader post–Cold War U.S. hegemonic strategy and argues that in a multipolar world the U.S. cannot be everywhere. Powell responds by describing the effects of U.S. weapons and attention being diverted across multiple theaters, which he says reflects a failure to prioritize and contributes to European and Gulf states feeling betrayed or exposed, especially those portrayed as frontline states. He says that in East Asia, frontline states risk becoming targets for America’s adversaries while the U.S. cannot protect them as intended. Powell outlines differing regional responses. He says Japan has been remilitarizing for about a decade for domestic political reasons and for concerns about the U.S. security “blanket,” with similar pressures in South Korea, including public distrust about the American nuclear umbrella and growing demands for nuclearization. He also says this aligns with an American strategy of outsourcing funding, material responsibility, and frontline risk to allied states. He adds that U.S. basing in Japan and South Korea still helps keep them under U.S. influence, while he describes Philippine efforts to move closer to Washington and the economic pressures that have accompanied it. Powell claims oil-flow disruptions have caused significant economic problems in the Philippines, and that the Philippines reached out to China for support in fuel supply; he says Marcos indicated in late March that the Philippines was interested in re-engaging Beijing on joint exploration and development in the South China Sea. He notes public opposition building in multiple countries, including Australia’s renewed AUKUS debate at the Shangri-La Dialogues. Powell describes a public inquiry into AUKUS initiated by former federal labor minister Peter Garrett, arguing Parliament has not investigated the merits, handling, or process. He presents Pete Hegseth’s Shangri-La keynote as a “capstone” point, saying Hegseth described the U.S. role in Asia as ensuring no single power becomes a regional hegemon, and Powell contrasts this with the U.S. insistence in Powell’s memory that it was the sole hegemon in Asia. Powell then turns to whether Japan’s rearmament increases autonomy or becomes an instrument for U.S. frontline strategy. He says the outcome is double-edged, tied to whether U.S. bases remain defensible given shortages and Chinese capabilities, and he references U.S. force shifts such as relocating some forces away from Okinawa. He argues U.S. capability limitations suggest bases and stored airplanes might not last through the first week of serious conflict, and he says Japan will continue rearming, but autonomy depends on U.S. ability to keep Japan “under control.” He says Southeast Asia has lingering memories of Japanese militarization in the 1930s and 1940s and that this could make Asia tense. Powell also claims the Chinese economy’s scale limits the feasibility of balancing China militarily, stating he sees the real issue as how to live with China as the major power. On China’s ability to withstand attempts to disrupt its energy, Powell says China’s energy structure is less dependent on oil than 25 years ago, citing a diesel peak about two years ago and declining diesel consumption, plus a two-decade diversification through electrification, storage, renewables, and major expansion of coal and nuclear generation. He adds terrestrial transport across Eurasia improved, with Russia and Central Asia supplying oil and gas to China in ways that are harder to interdict than maritime choke points. He also says global energy markets are more fragmented than U.S. “energy monopoly” assumptions imply, and he argues that alternatives and new technologies make containment via energy choke points increasingly hard to execute. He concludes China should be “reasonably unscathed,” citing preparedness, growing global demand for Chinese clean-energy technologies, increased Chinese foreign direct investment, and deeper integration with Southeast Asia—especially through energy, commodities, finished products, and payment-system expansion that reduces reliance on American infrastructure and institutions like the dollar and SWIFT. When asked about India, Powell says India’s non-alignment tradition means it can appear to “waiver,” but that India faces challenges tied to economic development and elite relationships with the U.S., along with anxieties and unavoidable realities due to the land border and tensions with China. He says India’s key long-term problem is becoming a more autonomous economic actor with less exposure to U.S.-linked risk, including fertilizer and energy access problems and domestic infrastructure and industrialization gaps. He calls for a more cordial India-China relationship and says leadership is needed to transcend anxieties toward China. He also argues against bloc politics and describes the ASEAN-led approach as quietly successful in keeping a diverse region cohesive around economic development and prosperity, including RCEP and related expansions. He highlights payments infrastructure that can settle trade in national currencies and argues ASEAN—especially Indonesia—could be pivotal in maintaining a multipolar, “indivisible security” region. Powell says the Shanghai Cooperation Organization offers an institutional model that could be extended toward North Asia and Southeast Asia to support multipolar security, counter bloc politics, and reduce the risk of miscalculation and conflict. Powell closes by saying Asia-Pacific security could also benefit from engaging Russia, since Russia is a Pacific power, and he frames block politics as a path to suspicion, arms races, and eventual conflict. He ends by suggesting further discussion on Indonesia next time and directs readers to his Substack (warwickpaul.substack.com) and his book *Thermo Economics in the Time of Monsters*.

The video argues that a “new world order” is unfolding in real time, signaling the start of a “great reset.” The host points to events from the past Friday as evidence: 3,000,000 Epstein files released, the biggest one-day drop in the history of the precious metals market, and a large arbitrage developing among Chinese, London, and US precious metals markets. Gold is described as the indicator that a full-blown reset is upon us, with attention drawn to pathways like the US’s approach to Iran and the Epstein files, while claiming a broader resetting dynamic is at work. Context for the moment centers on Friday’s nomination of Kevin Warsh (referred to as Kevin Walsh in the transcript) as the new Fed chairman. The host notes baggage around Warsh, including his appearance in Epstein files, but emphasizes his views: Warsh “hates stimulus money,” “hates quantitative easing,” and “voted against it,” believing it pushes inflation higher. He is said to have shifted on interest rates, from believing higher interest rates were good for the dollar to a different stance, and he allegedly favors slashing the Fed’s balance sheet to lower rates. The implication is that the nomination marks a shift toward a new dollar era and a shift away from a strong USD, which the host frames as a response to concerns about the US owning precious metals and controlling energy markets. The host ties these changes to a new petrodollar era, arguing that the United States, now the largest producer of oil and natural gas, has moved the petrodollar structure away from Saudi Arabia and toward the US. This trifecta—new dollar policy from the Fed, a drop in the precious metals market driven by speculators, and US control over energy policy—constitutes a “reset.” The video asserts that the traditional petrodollar system, once led by OPEC, has shifted, reducing outside leverage over Washington in energy matters. The host also claims a debate over foreign influence in the Middle East and calls for ending involvement in regional wars and bringing troops home, while criticizing mainstream outlets and certain political figures. Four main points are then presented as the crux of the reset: 1) Trump desires a weaker US dollar and is pursuing greater domestic manufacturing to compete with China and India, including the aim to export more and import less; the host frames this as a deliberate strategic shift rather than inflationary debasement. 2) The end of the Fed’s independence, with a collaboration era between the Treasury and the Fed, led by figures like Scott Pissent and Warsh, suggesting much lower interest rates and a shift of debt ownership back to American hands, with foreigners potentially selling US Treasuries. 3) Energy wars are emerging, with the US drilling and producing more oil and natural gas than Russia and Saudi Arabia combined, changing the energy dynamic with China, which remains a large importer of oil and vulnerable to such shifts. 4) Sustaining public support for volatility, with Trump’s team allegedly aiming to declare a housing emergency to lower rates, discourage Wall Street from buying single-family homes, implement tariff dividends to Americans, deliver veterans’ checks, and lower inflation and gas prices in the lead-up to midterms. The host contrasts reactions within the Trump-supporting and anti-Trump camps, asserting the reset is underway regardless of opinion. A sponsor segment then pivots to copper, arguing that copper demand is surging due to global competition for materials, and highlighting Giant Mining Corporation (ticker: BFGFF) as a primary copper idea tied to the Majuba Hill Copper Project in Nevada, noting its favorable infrastructure, past production, and strategic importance to American copper independence. The segment cites executive actions and tariff movements, including a 50% tariff on semi-finished copper products effective August 1, 2025, positioning copper as central to the new industrial reality. The host reiterates Giant Mining as the foremost copper idea and invites viewers to conduct their own research.

Mario interviews Professor Yasheng Huang about the evolving US-China trade frictions, the rare-earth pivot, Taiwan considerations, and broader questions about China’s economy and governance. Key points and insights - Rare earths as a bargaining tool: China’s rare-earth processing and export controls would require anyone using Chinese-processed rare earths to submit applications, with civilian uses supposedly allowed but defense uses scrutinized. Huang notes the distinction between civilian and defense usage is unclear, and the policy, if fully implemented, would shock global supply chains because rare earths underpin magnets used in phones, computers, missiles, defense systems, and many other electronics. He stresses that the rule would have a broad, not narrowly targeted, impact on the US and global markets. - Timeline and sequence of tensions: The discussion traces a string of moves beginning with US tariffs on China (and globally) in 2018–2019, a Geneva truce in 2019, and May/June 2019 actions around nanometer-scale chip controls. In August, the US relaxed some restrictions on seven-nanometer chips to China with revenue caps on certain suppliers. In mid–September (the period of this interview), China imposed docking fees on US ships and reportedly added a rare-earth export-control angle. Huang highlights that this combination—docking fees plus a sweeping rare-earth export control—appears to be an escalatory step, potentially timed to influence a forthcoming Xi-Trump summit. He argues China may have overplayed its hand and notes the export-control move is not tightly targeted, suggesting a broader bargaining chip rather than a precise lever against a single demand. - Motives and strategic logic: Huang suggests several motives for China’s move: signaling before a potential summit in South Korea; leveraging weaknesses in US agricultural exports (notably soybeans) during a harvest season; and accelerating a broader shift toward domestic processing capacity for rare earths by other countries. He argues the rare-earth move could spur other nations (Japan, Europe, etc.) to build their own refining and processing capacity, reducing long-run Chinese leverage. Still, in the short term, China holds substantial bargaining weight, given the global reliance on Chinese processing. - Short-term vs. long-term implications: Huang emphasizes the distinction between short-run leverage and long-run consequences. While China can tighten rare-earth supply now, the long-run effect is to incentivize diversification away from Chinese processing. He compares the situation to Apple diversifying production away from China after zero-COVID policies in 2022; it took time to reconfigure supply chains, and some dependence remains. In the long run, this shift could erode China’s near-term advantages in processing and export-driven growth, even as it remains powerful today. - Global role of hard vs. soft assets: The conversation contrasts hard assets (gold, crypto) with soft assets (the dollar, reserve currency status). Huang notes that moving away from the dollar is more feasible for countries in the near term than substituting rare-earth refining and processing. The move away from rare earths would require new refining capacity and supply chains that take years to establish. - China’s economy and productivity: The panel discusses whether China’s growth is sustainable under increasing debt and slowing productivity. Huang explains that while aggregate GDP has grown dramatically, total factor productivity in China has been weaker, and the incremental capital required to generate each additional percentage point of growth has risen. He points to overbuilding—empty housing and excess capacity—as evidence of inefficiencies that add to debt without commensurate output gains. In contrast, he notes that some regions with looser central control performed better historically, and that Deng Xiaoping’s era of opening correlated with stronger personal income growth, even if the overall economy remained autocratic. - Democracy, autocracy, and development: The discussion turns to governance models. Huang argues that examining democracy in the abstract can be misleading; the US system has significant institutional inefficiencies (gerrymandering, the electoral college). He asserts that autocracy is not inherently the driver of China’s growth; rather, China’s earlier phases benefited from partial openness and more open autocracy, with current autocracy not guaranteeing sustained momentum. He cites evidence that in China, personal income growth rose most when political openings were greater in the 1980s, suggesting that more open practices during development correlated with better living standards for individuals, though China remains not a democracy. - Trump, strategy, and global realignments: Huang views Trump as a transactional leader whose approach has elevated autocratic figures’ legitimacy internationally. He notes that Europe and China could move closer if China moderates its Ukraine stance, though rare-earth moves complicate such alignment. He suggests that allies may tolerate Trump’s demands for short-term gains while aiming to protect longer-term economic interests, and that the political landscape in the US could shift with a new president, potentially altering trajectories. - Taiwan and the risk of conflict: The interview underscores that a full-scale invasion of Taiwan would, in Huang’s view, mark the end of China’s current growth model, given the wartime economy transition and the displacement of reliance on outward exports and consumption. He stresses the importance of delaying conflict as a strategic objective and maintains concern about both sides’ leadership approaches to Taiwan. - Taiwan, energy security, and strategic dependencies: The conversation touches on China’s energy imports—especially oil through crucial chokepoints like the Malacca Strait—and the potential vulnerabilities if regional dynamics shift following any escalation on Taiwan. Huang reiterates that a Taiwan invasion would upend China’s economy and government priorities, given the high debt burden and the transition toward a wartime economy. Overall, the dialogue centers on the complex interplay of China’s use of rare-earth leverage, the short- and long-term economic and strategic consequences for the United States and its allies, and the broader questions around governance models, productivity, debt, and geopolitical risk in a shifting global order.

Speaker 0: The GCC allies are largely blockaded and not getting anything through; only UAE or Oman might be getting a few shipments due to being on the Gulf of Oman side. This is driving higher oil prices. We can’t simply bluff or "play a game of chicken" because it affects the entire world—Asia, Africa, Europe, and the United States. The shortage extends beyond oil to things like helium, and it’s impacting chip manufacturing and broader economic activity. These are medium-term issues already baked in and in short supply, so we’re facing real problems and a question of how long we can endure this. Speaker 1: As energy becomes more expensive—oil at $110, then $120, $130, $140, $150, rising until this crisis ends globally—the risk is a financial collapse worse than 2007–2008, potentially a depression in much of the world. Economists predict a serious recession, possibly a depression, and these dynamics are what Putin was trying to convey to Trump because Americans are perceived as potentially catastrophic. China is dependent on energy but is expanding nuclear power, has substantial coal, and is investing in renewables; China will survive this. Japan and Korea are on the edge; India is affected; Egypt is trying to feed 100,000,000 and facing famine; Turkey is involved. These states are being pushed toward war not just with Israel but with the United States, since without Israel none of this would be happening, and they know it. Russia, China, Egypt, Turkey, India, and possibly others may join a coalition to force the United States to stop. The speaker would prefer not to go there and believes President Trump should end the blockade, which was adopted because it was the only measure short of returning to war, but the blockade won’t work because the world won’t tolerate it. The president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has publicly said it’s time for Korea to defend itself. It’s been time for Korea to take control of its own armed forces for a long time, but the U.S. currently controls all their armed forces and Koreans have not liked that for at least twenty years. Now they want control of their own armed forces. The speaker expects the dissolution of the United States’ unofficial overseas imperial holdings, predicting the Koreans will expel the U.S., with Japan likely following. In the Pacific, trilateral efforts among Korea, the Philippines, and Japan are forming to cooperate with the U.S. in a future war with China—not in our lifetimes or on the planet, as no one wants war with China. Nobody wants war with China; China is increasingly seen as a safer place for cash and investments in the U.S. This shift began when the U.S. began telling Russians they would not allow them to access billions of rubles and may seize funds, possibly giving cash to Ukrainians. People are watching and asking whether they want to depend on the U.S. financial system or face interference with bank accounts. There are many bad developments right now, and the last thing the American people need is a war, certainly not one involving China, Russia, or any other powers along with Iran, yet that seems to the direction in which things are headed.

Professor Robert Pape warned on X that within ten days parts of the global economy will start running short of critical goods, based on thirty years studying economic sanctions and blockades. He said this would bring not just higher prices but shortages, and that markets are not ready for this. The Kobelisi letter stated the world is experiencing its biggest energy crisis in history with 600,000,000 barrels of lost oil supply, US gas prices up 47% since December, and inflation approaching 4% in a path similar to the 1970s. The discussion then touched on Iran’s war potentially returning to open conflict. The United States seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship, which Larry Johnson described as piracy and an act of war aimed at clearing the Strait of Hormuz; Tehran called it armed piracy and promised a response. JD Vance was headed to Islamabad for talks, though Iranian officials said they had not agreed to anything. Fox’s Tel Aviv correspondent relayed that Trump told him they would blow up everything in Iran if they didn’t come to the table, saying the deal would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and prevent Iran from possessing highly enriched uranium. Professor Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago and author of Escalation Trap on Substack, joined the program. He referenced his April 12 post predicting shortages within forty-five to sixty days and described three stages: Stage one, the first ~45 days with price increases; Stage two (40–60 days) with shortages emerging; Stage three (day 60–90) with worsening shortages and then contraction, beginning around May 31. He explained that shortages would escalate into reduced production of commodities, fewer airline seats, and broader disruptions across supply chains. Pape detailed the implications for air travel and energy: jet fuel shortages could cause European and global aviation reductions, with Europe’s ~110,000,000 monthly air passengers dropping to potentially 80 million or fewer as fuel becomes scarce; cargo, mail, and just-in-time deliveries would be affected, and overall product availability would contract. He argued that 20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz and that Iran’s potential shutdown and the U.S. response would complicate efforts to keep that oil flowing. He emphasized that the contraction would begin even as oil access becomes more difficult and other nations (including the U.S.) struggle to secure energy. The conversation then shifted to China. Pape noted that in China, the impact on GDP could be modest (about 1%), but the U.S. could be drawn into a larger conflict that could benefit China. He observed China’s preparation for energy independence: stockpiling oil, relying on solar, nuclear, and coal, and maintaining a robust energy strategy even during tensions with the U.S. He suggested that tariffs and conflicts did not significantly disrupt China’s planning, which could lead to China gaining relative advantage as the U.S. faces a widening energy and economic crisis. There was discussion about the United States’ energy independence. Pape stated he has long advocated energy independence since 2005, but warned that the broader picture involves debt, energy policy, and strategic choices that could threaten American leadership. He stressed the need for a concrete five-year plan to navigate the crisis without harming the economy in the short term and cautioned against escalating war in Iran. In addressing the everyday impact, the speakers considered who would be hardest hit: the poorest, and particularly non-college-educated white working-class voters, who had experienced the largest deterioration in income since 1990. The conversation included proposals to mitigate consumer pain, such as targeted economic measures for working Americans affected by rising gas prices, potentially including tax considerations or subsidies for those whose jobs require fuel, while avoiding broad handouts. Pape reiterated that his Escalation Trap Substack presents a framework based on twenty-one years of modeling the bombing of Iran and indicates that the stages he predicted are unfolding faster than anticipated, with a focus on concrete policy options that could be enacted by May 1. He emphasized that his analysis centers on consequences for ordinary people and urged practical policy steps to address the crisis.

Speaker 0: China appears to be the only country pushing back against Trump’s tariff stance, with other countries—including neighboring ones and India—reaching deals with Trump. India, which initially showed resilience, moved toward China after the Shanghai summit and the tariffs. Recently, India and the US signed a deal to gradually reduce Russia oil exports to 50% of imports. This suggests China is the sole major power resisting the US in this round of measures. The discussion then shifts to a broader pattern: the US has overplayed its hand in its dollar dominance and control of the financial system via SWIFT. In the wake of sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine conflict—freezing assets and limiting access to SWIFT—many nations have begun moving away from the US dollar toward gold. The speaker sees China’s current move as accelerating other countries’ push toward self-reliance, particularly in rare earths. The US is investing in its own rare earth industry, while Europe seeks alternatives. There is mention of a US deal with Ukraine involving rare earths, and speculation that Greenland’s abundant rare earth reserves could be relevant to what Trump sought with Greenland. The long-term downside or repercussions for China from this move are noted. Speaker 1: The discussion distinguishes between the financial sanctions used after the Ukraine war and the current situation. While sanctions are not perfect substitutes for dollar assets like crypto or gold, they remain available, so US leverage is not as strong as China’s leverage in rare earths. The speaker agrees that in the long term, China’s move will push other countries to build processing capacity for rare earths. Although rare earths are not truly rare, the processing and concentration are. Countries will be motivated to develop processing facilities. Japan is innovating substitutes for rare earths, which may take time and will not provide immediate relief for the US.

Peter Schiff, CEO of Euro Pacific Asset Management and host of The Peter Schiff Show, joins the discussion to assess the economic and market implications of ongoing geopolitical tensions, monetary policy, and structural issues in the US and global economy. Schiff argues that the Iran-related conflict is highly disruptive to supply chains, especially in energy and agriculture, and warns that markets are overly optimistic about a quick resolution and a rapid drop in oil prices. He says the war may not end soon, could restart, and that even deep peace deals might unravel. He expects oil prices to remain elevated or not revert to pre-war levels, with prices pressured higher by factors beyond the war, notably a weakening US dollar. He notes that the dollar’s weakness is likely to resume as the conflict subsides, which would also push bond yields higher, alongside rising deficits, more money printing, and inflation. On the dollar, Schiff highlights a diminished dollar rally in response to risk, pointing out that the dollar has largely stagnated after the initial reaction. He predicts a slow decline followed by a rapid collapse, describing the transition as something that could be quick once it begins. He emphasizes that the fiscal trajectory is worsening due to higher military spending, baseline deficits, and autopilot interest costs with higher rates, with insufficient political willingness to reverse spending. Regarding international demand for US treasuries, Schiff describes a reflexive safety move into the dollar during wartime, but notes that foreign demand is waning as deficits grow. He cites a trend of markets moving capital out of dollars and treasuries into gold, a trend he expects to continue, including among major holders like China. He explains that China is diversifying its reserves away from the dollar, increasing gold holdings, and moving toward alternative currencies, signaling a strategic shift away from the dollar. Schiff critiques government intervention in markets, citing the Spirit Airlines bankruptcy case and the canceled JetBlue-Spirit merger as examples of missteps. He argues that government actions and antitrust policies can hinder competition and long-term efficiency, ultimately reducing overall market outcomes. He claims tariffs are not a solution for reindustrialization and asserts that a root cause of deindustrialization is the reliance on an overvalued dollar, which had enabled a consumption-based economy funded by foreign production and lending. On energy and and agricultural costs, Schiff explains that higher prices constrain discretionary spending, leading to weaker job creation in affected sectors. While the US is a net energy exporter, the broader economy does not benefit from energy price spikes due to higher costs for consumers and producers, even though oil producers may gain. Turning to investment strategy, Schiff recommends exposure to precious metals, commodities, and emerging markets, arguing that smart money is moving in those directions. He promotes Europe Pacific Asset Management, Shift Gold, and gold/silver as hedges, encouraging listeners to engage with his funds and resources. He also discusses Europe’s investment landscape, noting that while Europe has problems, selective European companies with growth potential and exposure to emerging markets could benefit when the dollar declines. Schiff closes by inviting listeners to follow him on shiftradio.com, his YouTube channel, and X, emphasizing his goal of sharing what he sees as the truth and expanding his audience to counter what he describes as a chorus of lies.

Speaker 0 argues that despite claims that the United States kidnapped Maduro in Venezuela to seize oil resources, the true motive was to counter China. China, according to the speaker, has tools and weapons that could destabilize the U.S. dollar, which would impact civil markets. At the start of the year, China announced it would restrict exports of its silver, and since China dominates the silver market, this caused the price of silver to surge. The speaker asserts that if the United States embargoed China's oil, China could dump its U.S. Treasuries and cause financial havoc, potentially destroying both nations. A central metaphor is presented: a ladder over an abyss, with both China and the United States attempting to climb it together. The United States supposedly insists on remaining higher than China; if the U.S. goes too far and falls behind, the latter destabilizes and both fall into the abyss. Conversely, if China overtakes and climbs too far, they both fall. The speaker contends that the American financial industry currently lacks the capacity to self-correct, and a market collapse could pull the entire economy down. Another major problem cited is over-financialization. Regarding silver, the speaker asserts that China needs silver, but in the United States it is used for speculation, describing silver as “really just paper silver.” They claim that some companies, such as JPMorgan, are significantly overleveraged—“300 to one”—so every ounce of silver they hold is promised 300 on paper. The speaker then shifts to a geopolitical forecast: “This war will be settled in Odessa.” NATO, they claim, will commit to defending Odessa; Russia will encircle and blockade, and NATO will be unable to hold on. Europeans would be forced to be conscripted to fight in Odessa, would refuse, and civil war would ensue across Europe. The timeframe is given as five to ten years, with a note that it would be a slow death for Europe, and that some aspects are expected to unfold “this year.”

- The discussion opens with trying to map a post-war world, considering both a quick end to the war and a prolonged one, with a focus on US–China relations, US allies, Iran, and the broader region. A participant notes a broader battle between a China–Russia–Iran alignment and the Western alliance, including financial systems. - A major regional shift is already underway: by 2000, the top banks were dominated by Japanese and European players; by 2025, China dominates the top four banks. The speaker argues that power is moving from Western banks to China, and that countries with US-dollar-denominated debt are converting debt into renminbi because it’s cheaper. - In the last week, Russia and China signaled to Iran a push to revisit the Gulf security architecture. Putin spoke to Iraq about Gulf security; Wang Yi did the same. The implied shift is toward a Gulf security framework less dependent on US protection. - The current Gulf security model is described as US bases guaranteeing protection from Iran, coupled with a demand that recipient states buy US Treasuries and military equipment. The speakers argue this model left Gulf states vulnerable and exposed as US defense systems failed to prevent Iranian attacks in the recent episode. - Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the UAE) are discussed as potentially moving away from the United States toward Russia and China. A Pakistani ISI general reportedly said Saudi and Qatari leaders are breaking from the US; one NBC report cited Trump canceling Project Freedom due to Saudi resistance to air operations from Prince Saud Air Base. The implication is a Persian Gulf broadly shifting into the Russian–Chinese sphere, potentially altering Gulf financial flows away from the US dollar toward gold and the yuan. - An opposing view, aired by another economist, suggests the US will strengthen its deterrence in the Gulf, with UAE as an indicator. The counterpoint argues that the Gulf countries previously supported Iran’s adversaries, including indirect funding for attacks on Iran, implying US deterrence remains necessary. - The conversation emphasizes the gulf’s deterrence history: Iran has largely avoided offensive military action in the Gulf against the region, while Gulf states have relied on US protection. The lack of a robust Chinese or Russian security guarantee in the region is highlighted as a real risk to Gulf security calculations. - There is a debate about whether US military power remains credible. One participant argues the US has not won a major war since World War II, with recent actions described as limited or draw outcomes; another contends that US protection remains essential despite past failures, given Iran’s capabilities and history. - Military-strategy discussions cover the feasibility of a ground invasion vs. airstrike-only approaches. The speakers outline logistical challenges (water, supply lines, mountainous terrain) and the scale of forces needed (potentially large, multi-month training and buildup) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Arguments are made that holding the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if Iran can still launch missiles and drones from interior positions. - The strategic importance of Gulf exports is quantified: Gulf oil about 32% of world supply; LNG around 20% (centered on Qatar and the Gulf), urea and sulfur for agriculture and industry (urea ~36%; sulfur for refining and semiconductors), and helium from Qatar at about 33%. Keeping the Gulf open is framed as essential to global energy, inflation, and agriculture. - A possible pathway to open the Hormuz is proposed: Iran could offer broad access to global markets except for countries allied with Israel or those that attacked Iran; Iran would leverage this to restart global flows, particularly to Asia. The idea is that a near-term crisis could force a negotiated settlement with Iran. - The timeline mentions a forthcoming peace negotiation in Beijing next week, with skepticism about it proceeding smoothly. If negotiations occur, Trump would not likely receive a warm reception due to recent sanctions and US actions against China; China has signaled resolve against US sanctions, instructing its companies not to acquiesce to pressure. - Overall, the dialogue frames the war as a potential catalyst for a broader realignment: power shifting toward China and Russia, a Gulf region hedging its security through new alliances, and the global economy recalibrating around yuan- and gold-based financial flows, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central strategic chokepoint.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss the evolving confrontation between the United States and Iran and its broader economic and strategic implications. Speaker 0 highlights three predictions: (1) Trump would win, (2) he would start a war with Iran, and (3) the US would lose that war, asking if these predictions are still valid. Speaker 1 characterizes the current phase as a war of attrition between the United States and Iran, noting that Iranians have been preparing for twenty years and now possess “a pretty good strategy of how to weaken and ultimately destroy the American empire.” He asserts that Iran is waging war against the global economy by striking Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and targeting critical energy infrastructure and waterways such as the Baghdad channel and the Hormuz Strait, and eventually water desalination plants, which are vital to Gulf nations. He emphasizes that the Gulf States are the linchpin of the American economy because they sell petrodollars, which are recycled into the American economy through investments, including in the stock market. He claims the American economy is sustained by AI investments in data centers, much of which come from the Gulf States. If the Gulf States cease oil sales and finance AI, he predicts the AI bubble in the United States would burst, collapsing the broader American economy, described as a financial “ponzi scheme.” Speaker 2 notes a concrete example: an Amazon data center was hit in the UAE. He also mentions the United States racing to complete its Iran mission before munitions run out. Speaker 1 expands on the military dynamic, arguing that the United States military is not designed for a twenty-first-century war. He attributes this to the post–World War II military-industrial complex, which was built for the Cold War and its goals of technological superiority. He explains that American military strategy relies on highly sophisticated, expensive technology—the air defense system—leading to an asymmetry in the current conflict: million-dollar missiles attempting to shoot down $50,000 drones. He suggests this gap is unsustainable in the long term and describes it as the puncturing of the aura of invincibility that has sustained American hegemony for the past twenty years.

Einar Tangin and Glenn discuss the forthcoming Xi Jinping–Donald Trump meeting and the broader strategic landscape shaping U.S.–China competition. - On the Trump–Xi meeting: Tangin expects very little substantive outcome. China’s strategy toward the United States is to keep engagement open rather than push Trump into a corner, despite Trump’s past actions and their consequences. He notes a narrow scope to be discussed in a California meeting, with Trump volunteers unprepared and pushing “the usual maximist stuff.” China is signaling that Taiwan will be a red line. Beyond that, the Chinese may accept limited concessions such as grain, gas, or oil purchases, but no sweeping arrangements. The overall takeaway: continued engagement, but not a game-changing breakthrough. - U.S. energy and global strategy: Tangin argues the United States uses energy as a tool of influence, aiming to control access and shape markets (the petrodollar legacy, strategic chokepoints). The Ukraine war has accelerated Europe’s decoupling from Russia and the U.S. seeks to expand similar dynamics in East Asia. He emphasizes that the energy game is dynamic: oil prices impact inflation, and long-term, demand destruction and a shift to alternatives (electricity, renewables) will reshape markets. He points to new energy tech and scale: batteries and storage (CATL’s battery capacity) enable large-scale decoupling from fossil fuels; China’s plans to deploy up to 50 nuclear plants at a time and to pursue commercially available fusion power could transform the energy landscape. The U.S. may face higher exploration costs and geopolitical risk in sustaining high oil output, while heavy reliance on fossil fuels could erode long-term economic viability. - Global consequences and who bears the pain: In the short term, countries without reserves (notably parts of the Global South, including India) will face fertilizer and diesel shortages during planting seasons, with potential 15–25% yield reductions and elevated inflation. Food security risks loom as energy costs ripple through fertilizer, transport, processing, and farming inputs. The analysis highlights fertilizer nitrogen production’s energy intensity and the cascading nature of energy in food supply chains. The discussion stresses that global south economies will be hit hardest early on, with food and fuel inflation compounding social and political pressure. - The Iran war and maritime strategy: The discussion connects the Persian Gulf crisis to broader blockades and maritime competition. A naval blockade approach risks escalation and confrontation with China, which has extensive trade links through ASEAN and other partners that would be harmed by disruption. Tangin notes that China cannot be easily forced into combat in Europe or the Middle East; any escalation involving tactical nuclear use would be dangerous. He suggests that Europe’s elites may push for confrontation against Russia, but the political climate and energy constraints could destabilize Western allies and push towards alternative alignments, particularly with China. - China’s strategic posture and alternative world order: Tangin emphasizes that China has a model that emphasizes no ideology between states, sovereignty, and mutual non-interference, echoing a Westphalian framework. He describes China’s global governance concept as a peer-to-peer, negotiation-centered approach, where disputes are settled at the table rather than through force. He frames China’s proposition as simple: “No more ideology between countries. Every country should be secure. Security should not depend on the insecurity of another country. Every country has the right to choose its own path of development.” This is presented as a peaceful, governance-based alternative to U.S.-led hegemony. - Europe’s strategic crossroads and the future: Europe faces existential economic strains, competitiveness challenges, and the temptation of isolationist or right-wing governance. The conversation predicts prolonged political volatility if energy prices and inflation persist, with potential swings between different leaderships. China’s strategy, in this vision, is to promote internal diversification and consumption-led growth while engaging with international partners on a governance framework that reduces the incentives for confrontation. - Concluding note: The speakers agree that Europe’s willingness to embrace China’s model, rather than clinging to a confrontational U.S.-led paradigm, could shape a more stable global order. They caution that the old order has ended, and creative destruction is underway, with China advocating a negotiated, governance-based path forward.

America would want China's help to avoid fighting too many wars, ensuring China continues buying US dollars to sustain American debt. Also, historically, Russia has been more of a threat to China, so US friendship with China would force Putin to focus on defense. China is now transferring its US dollars into gold, encouraging others to do the same because America's debt is a huge problem. It makes sense for China and the US to be friends because the US is a huge market for Chinese exports and provides technology. China wants to be friends with Russia because it feels threatened by the US, which has military bases surrounding China. China needs oil and food imports to sustain its economy, and if the US launches an embargo, China collapses. China needs new trade routes, and Russia is the best partner for energy and oil access. Chinese policymakers know China's economy and demographics have collapsed, making it vulnerable and dependent on the world.

Alistair Crook argues that the “Iran war” is not only a regional crisis but an inflection point reshaping multiple geopolitical centers, beginning with Israel. He describes a crisis inside Israel tied to Netanyahu: Israeli reporting suggests Netanyahu is “in despair” about a potential agreement opposed to him, while pending corruption cases and the lack of the promised erasure/pardon contribute to growing tensions. Crook says Israeli speculation increasingly favors Netanyahu resigning before elections, which are expected in September rather than October, partly to distance from the resonance of October 7. He also notes internal pressure about conscription and Orthodox groups, and says growing criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza is broad enough that the government could implode. If Netanyahu is gone, Crook poses uncertainty over who could carry forward the long-standing Likud/Nanyahu agenda and whether the broader political structure built over roughly two decades could fragment into internal faction fighting. He frames Iran’s outcome in Israel as an “internalized” shift from expectations of U.S. destruction of Iran to the belief that “Iran has won the war,” leaving Israel trapped in “unwinnable wars” without sufficient troops, and without a clear way out. Crook then links Iran’s impact to Russia and China. He cites Russian strategist Sergey Karaganov arguing Russia should “take the lessons” from Iran, specifically how Iran used conventional missile weapons to hit vulnerable Western targets and how the West “backed off and withdrew.” Crook says this moves Russian thinking toward conventional weapons alongside a return to nuclear deterrence, emphasizing fear as necessary for deterrence. He describes a changing European mood: European ratcheting of support for Ukraine through missiles and drones, including claims that NATO space could protect against Russian retribution, is portrayed as potentially mistaken. Crook says Russia instead indicates it will attack decision-making centers, which he claims are in Britain, France, and Germany rather than Latvia, and that this is “changing rapidly,” including after the summit in Beijing between Putin and Xi. On China, Crook says Beijing is pushing back mainly through economic measures: restricting purchases of Chinese holdings or access via U.S. stock markets, opposing elements of U.S. efforts to expand dollar/digital-currency influence, and strengthening the role of China-linked assets as collateral in bond markets—alongside European issuers issuing yuan-denominated bonds. He argues this reflects a broader move into a “hard-nosed” posture toward the West and that Chinese pushback is intensifying through measures rather than noise. In the discussion, Crook emphasizes a shift in Russia’s and Europe’s psychology. He contrasts the Western “luxury” of past decades—where wars were fought elsewhere with escalation control—with the current Russian desire for restraint and fear-based deterrence. He says Western actions that target Russian capabilities risk forcing Russia toward retaliation, including nuclear escalation at some point. A central theme is that fear and psychological awareness matter for deterrence, and that complacency in Europe is a threat. Crook expands to Israel and Iran’s strategic constraints and the possibility of a “third strategy” beyond all-or-nothing defeat. He argues Israel could eventually change relations with Iran and recalls that after the Iranian Revolution Israel had a period of better relations with Tehran. He attributes Israel’s later shift to internal Israeli political changes: the Labor Party’s attempt to invert the earlier equation (periphery allies vs. Arab states enemy) and the subsequent need to maintain an Iran “enemy” narrative within U.S. domestic support structures. He also proposes that changing the regional equation could lead to renewed dialogue with Iran. He links this to Gulf security developments: Crook describes Gulf states moving toward a Gulf-led security architecture without American participation, driven by fear of future attacks on Iran and their consequences, and says Iran has made clear it could accept Gulf security arrangements that do not leave Gulf states under Iranian dominance. Crook argues Iran’s leverage is not only military but also economic and logistical: controlling the Strait of Hormuz reduces dependence on crippling sanctions and enables toll-based incentives and pressure, including dismantling petrodollar-linked arrangements. He claims this would affect Gulf financial systems and the Gulf’s petrodollar/financialized Western architecture and also complicate AI/data-center investments tied to Western and U.S. security assumptions, because Gulf reliance on U.S. protection is weakened and ties to Iran must adjust. He adds that many states are already attempting to open relations with Iran—he cites “about thirty” states—and predicts that these changes will become more open and fixed, altering the region’s complexion.

Chas Freeman and Glenn discuss the broader geopolitical implications of the ongoing war with Iran, focusing on perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States, and then turning to regional dynamics involving Israel, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and others. Freeman argues that China does not have a unified view on the Iran war. He notes that some in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are pleased to see the United States seemingly disarmed by its own stalemate and by depleting weapons stockpiles, including the pivot away from stationing intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific. Geopolitical thinkers fear the war destabilizes a central region for global commerce and energy, with the Hormuz Strait now effectively impassable. He asserts that Azerbaijan has become a primary route for Asia-to-Europe transit, while Iran’s control of the strait and safe passage for Chinese tankers complicate sanctions regimes. China, he says, is also recalibrating its economy toward renewables and away from fossil fuels due to the war’s effects. Freeman highlights how Asia-Pacific dynamics are affected: Japan is highly dependent on oil and gas imports and is stressed; Taiwan faces limits due to its own energy constraints; South Korea is economically hurt by the strait closure; Southeast Asia suffers from reduced petroleum exports; and the war pushes China closer to Russia, with Russia’s planned Siberia gas project gaining traction as a diversified supply route away from maritime routes. He also mentions Brazil and South Africa increasing military cooperation, noting potential Brazilian-Japanese collaborations and rising defense spending in Japan, with implications for US influence and global supply chains. Freeman then discusses Russia, noting Trump’s call with Putin and the possibility that Russia is seeking to influence or assist in ending the war with Iran. He asserts Iran seeks to deter or destroy Israel and to decolonize West Asia, including removing American forces from the Gulf. He emphasizes that Russia and China do not want Iran subjugated and abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning Iran, aiming to avoid offending Gulf Arabs while not endorsing the war. The war has drawn Iran closer to Russia, with Iranian drones and technology transfers now in Russian use, and Russia increasing influence in Iran as Gulf reconstruction becomes necessary. Freeman also points out that Iran has demanded reparations and sanctions relief, and that sanctions have deeply distressed the Iranian population. He argues that Russia benefits from higher oil and gas prices and European energy dependence on Russian supply, while the conflict complicates Western weapon stockpiles and European defense needs. He contends Putin benefits from divisions within the US and diminished American global leadership, while the war is not advantageous for the United States overall. Freeman emphasizes a broader moral and strategic dimension, criticizing what he sees as a departure from international law and ethical norms, including the suspension of targeting guidelines and collateral-damage assessments in certain operations. He cites concerns about human rights and humanitarian law, warning that the erosion of a universal moral order could have long-term consequences for Western diplomacy. He invokes historical and religious ethical frameworks (Kant, Grotius, and others) to argue for a return to principled conduct in war and postwar reconciliation. The conversation turns to Israel, with Freeman suggesting that Netanyahu’s long-standing aim to reshape Israel’s security and borders faces a difficult reckoning as Iran becomes a tangible military threat. Freeman contends that Israel’s plan for regime change in Iran is failing, and he questions what Plan B might be if Israel cannot secure its strategic goals. He warns that Israel could contemplate extreme options, including nuclear considerations, if it feels existentially threatened, while noting the potential for Israel’s positions to undermine American public support for Israel and complicate US domestic civil liberties and freedom of inquiry. Glenn and Freeman close by acknowledging that the situation has created a shifting web of alliances and rivalries, with European willingness to appease Trump waning and broader questions about coexistence in the Middle East. They stress the need for a more sustainable approach to regional security and a reconsideration of diplomatic norms to avoid escalating toward broader conflict.

Mario: Markets react to talk of a US-China trade war, with global attention on China-Taiwan risk. I spoke with Professor Yasheng Huang to discuss China’s real economy, what a trade war could look like in the next two to three years, and whether China might invade Taiwan. Mario: You describe the rare-earth export restrictions China announced as a major move. China refines roughly 90% of the world’s rare earths, mines about 70%, and controls a crucial supply for tech, AI, missiles, private and fighter jets. The official rationale is that the policy is an export control rather than an export ban; those using Chinese-processed rare earths must submit applications. Civilian usage is said to be okay, defense-related usage will be scrutinized or prohibited, though the definitions of civilian versus defense usage are unclear. The move, if fully implemented, would shock global supply chains since rare earths are embedded in almost all electronic production. Professor Huang: The policy could trigger a global production disruption because rare earths are used universally in electronics—phones, computers, and more. The threshold for needing approval is set very low, effectively implicating almost every user of Chinese-processed rare earths. The policy isn’t narrowly targeted at the US; it affects any user of the Chinese process. If fully enacted, it would be a broad economic shock. Mario: The timing follows a series of US actions: fentanyl tariffs on China around 10%, broader US tariffs on many countries including China in April, a Geneva truce for 90 days, and then May’s halting of five-nanometer chip exports to China. August saw partial relaxation, with seven-nanometer chips allowed but capped revenues from China for NVIDIA and AMD at 15%. Then mid-September, the US imposed docking fees on Chinese ships calling US ports, and China retaliated with a rare-earth move. Why did China take this step, and does it aim to pressure for a summit with Xi Jinping and Donald Trump later this month? Professor Huang: The broad timeline is accurate, though mid-September docking fees added asymmetry in favor of the US. The rare-earth move likely predated that, possibly prepared for a summit in South Korea. It’s not well tailored as a bargaining chip since it would affect many countries, not just the US. China may be signaling leverage ahead of a potential Xi-Trump meeting and reflecting tensions in agricultural exports—China has largely stopped buying US soybeans, causing farmer distress. The rare-earth policy is a high-pressure tactic that may overreach. Mario: You compare China’s stance to the US, noting that China seems to be pushing back more aggressively than other countries, and that this move could accelerate a shift away from US-dollar dominance toward hard assets like gold or Bitcoin, and toward domestic rare-earth processing in many countries. Could this be a long-term strategic disadvantage for China? Professor Huang: In the short term, China has substantial bargaining leverage in rare earths since processing capacity is scarce elsewhere. In the long run, the move is likely to spur other countries to build processing capacity, reducing China’s leverage. The analogy with Apple’s supply diversification after China’s zero-COVID policies shows such diversification will take time. If other countries build processing capacity, the relative power shift could occur over a longer horizon. The geopolitical calculus should consider timing: short-term gains may come at long-term costs. Mario: You discuss the difference between hard assets and soft assets like the dollar, and whether China’s move could motivate countries to diversify away from rare earth dependence. Could you expand on that? Professor Huang: Hard assets (gold) and soft assets (dollar credibility) differ in impact. Rare earth processing capacity is a hard asset-like dependency; diversifying away from China’s processing could reduce China’s leverage over time. However, short-term disruption is likely to be broad, since electronics’ reliance on rare earths is pervasive. In the long run, countries will build refining and processing capacity, making the West less dependent on China for these inputs. Mario: Turning to China’s economy, some critics warned of collapse in the early 2000s, but China grew. Now, growth is around 5%, though debt-to-GDP has risen and productivity appears to be slowing. How does Professor Huang reconcile these views? Professor Huang: The early-2000s collapse predictions were incorrect, but today China faces real strains. The debt-to-GDP ratio has risen since 2008, raising the incremental capital needed to generate each percentage point of growth. Productivity has trended downward; there is a difference between the business-executive view and the academic view. Executives see impressive factories and automation, while academics point to waste and overbuilding—factories producing goods no one wants, empty housing, and higher logistical costs. Net economy-wide productivity is negative, due to inefficiencies offsetting gains. Mario: You compare democracy and autocracy. Some argue China’s centralized, long-term planning works for growth, but Professor Huang notes that personal income growth in China was highest when the system was less autocratic. He argues Deng Xiaoping’s openness—less autocratic than today—drove significant growth, while Xi Jinping’s more autocratic leadership coincides with a growth slowdown. How does he view the balance between political structure and economic outcomes? Professor Huang: He distinguishes between ideal democracy and current practice, arguing the US system is flawed in ways that impede governance (gun control, healthcare, etc.). He notes that autocracy is not the sole cause of growth; historically, less autocratic or more open autocracies in East Asia grew more rapidly than more autocratic regimes. For China, the data suggest that more open regions grew faster than tightly controlled ones. The correlation does not support the idea that autocracy automatically delivers robust growth. Mario: Finally, you discuss Trump’s China policy. Trump’s transactional approach, allied with a perceived US weakness, has shifted dynamics. How will China respond if Europe leans toward China, and could Ukraine policy influence that? Professor Huang: Trump elevated autocracy’s legitimacy, potentially aiding leaders like Xi. Europe might move closer to China if China softens its Ukraine stance; however, the rare-earth move complicates that. Indian leaders understand Trump’s transactional approach, encouraging engagement to safeguard national interests. The global balance will depend on China’s actions and Europe’s response, with the Ukraine position remaining a critical factor.

Speaker 0 describes a high-stakes geopolitical confrontation framed as a poker match between the United States and BRICS, especially China. He asserts that the early 2026 period is explosive and that US actions against Iran are imminent, escalating the stakes. He then lays out a narrative beginning with Venezuela, a key Chinese trading partner, where the United States not only sanctioned and condemned Venezuela but launched “devastating strikes,” captured Nicolas Maduro and his wife, and brought them to New York City for prosecution. He claims the Chinese delegation was meeting Maduro in Venezuela on Saturday, but Trump’s actions disrupted the meeting, and the Chinese delegation remains in Venezuela as of Sunday morning. He argues that this is not about narcoterrorism or fentanyl but a larger strategic move, and notes the apparent lack of resistance from Maduro’s side, suggesting direct CIA involvement and a stand-down agreement to allow the operation. He condenms what he calls “phony outrage,” arguing Democrats are not truly anti-war and contending that the incident marks a dangerous precedent for militarized actions in sovereign nations. Speaker 1 contributes by agreeing that China and Russia are not stupid enough to threaten the United States militarily in the homeland, but contends they will act through economic and financial measures. He predicts China and Russia will liquidate debt holdings and trigger negative impacts on the U.S. bond market, while avoiding direct military confrontation. He emphasizes that the response will be economic rather than kinetic. Speaker 0 returns to the 30,000-foot view, stating that the Venezuelan event signals an open head-to-head between the U.S. and China, with globalization receding and regionalization rising. He highlights two key leverage moves: the United States using tariffs as a market-access tool, while China employs choke points through export controls on critical materials. He notes that China quietly moved nearly $2 billion worth of silver out of Venezuela before Trump’s invasion. He points to China’s January 1 policy implementing a new export license system for silver, requiring government permission and designed to squeeze foreign buyers, which coincided with a sharp rise in silver prices. He connects this to broader concerns about supply chains and critical inputs like rare earths and magnets, noting that China produces over 90% of the world’s processed rare earth minerals and magnets, a powerfully strategic lever. He argues that China has tightened rare earth export controls targeting overseas defenses and semiconductor users, and that these factors contribute to a shift from globalization to regionalization where supply chains become weapons. He frames Trump’s tariff strategy as a means to gain access to the U.S. market, branding April 2 as “liberation day” for tariffs due to how markets reacted, and mentions discussions of a tariff dividend proposal to fund a new economic model, as floated by the administration. Speaker 0 concludes that Venezuela is a focal point where resources, influence, and dollars collide, with potential implications for the U.S. dollar, and asserts that the geopolitical chessboard is being redrawn as the U.S. and China move into open competition. He ends by forecasting further moves, including a controversial note about Greenland, and invites viewers to subscribe for coverage of stories the “Mockingbird media” will not discuss.

Mario and Jeff discuss what the current geopolitical and monetary environment means for gold, the US dollar, and the broader system that underpins global finance. - Gold and asset roles - Gold is a portfolio asset that does not compete with the dollar; it competes with the stock market and tends to rise when people are concerned about risky assets. It is a “safe haven store value” rather than a monetary instrument aimed at replacing the dollar. - Historically, gold did not reliably hedge inflation in 2021–2022 when the economy seemed to be recovering; in downturns, gold becomes more attractive as a store of value. Recent moves up in gold price over the last two months are viewed as pricing in multiple factors, including potential economic downturn and questionable macro conditions. - The dollar and de-dollarization - The eurodollar system is a vast, largely ledger-based network of US-dollar balances held offshore, allowing near-instantaneous movement of funds. It is not simply “the euro,” and it predates and outlived any single country’s policy. Replacing it would be like recreating the Internet from scratch. - De-dollarization discussions are driven more by political narratives than monetary mechanics. Central banks selling dollar assets during shortages is a liquidity management response, not a repudiation of the dollar. - The dollar’s dominance remains intact because there is no ready substitute meeting all its functions. Replacing the dollar would require replacing the entire set of dollar functions across global settlement, payments, and liquidity provisioning. - Bank reserves, reserves composition, and the size of the eurodollar market - The share of US dollars in foreign reserves has declined, but this is not seen as a meaningful signal about the system’s functionality or dominance; the real issue is the level of settlement and liquidity, which remains heavily dollar-based. - The eurodollar market is enormous and largely offshore, with little public reporting. It is described as a “black hole” that drives movements in the system and is extremely hard to measure precisely. - Current dynamics: debt, safety, and liquidity - The debt ceiling and growing US debt are acknowledged as concerns, but the view presented is that debt dynamics do not destabilize the Treasury market as long as demand for safety and liquidity remains high. In a depression-like environment, US Treasuries are still viewed as the safest and most liquid form of debt, which sustains their price and keeps yields relatively contained. - Gold is safe but not highly liquid as collateral; Treasuries provide liquidity. Central banks use gold to diversify reserves and stabilize currencies (e.g., yuan), but Treasuries remain central to collateral needs in a broad financial system. - China, the US, and global growth - China’s economy faces deflationary pressures, with ten consecutive quarters of deflation in the Chinese GDP deflator, raising questions about domestic demand. Attempts to stimulate have had limited success; overproduction and rebalancing efforts aim to reduce supply to match demand, potentially increasing unemployment and lowering investment. - The US faces a weakening labor market; recent job shedding and rising delinquencies in consumer and corporate credit markets heighten uncertainty about the credit system. This underpins gold’s appeal as a store of value. - China remains heavily dependent on the US consumer; despite decoupling rhetoric, demand for Chinese goods and the global supply chain ties keep the US-China relationship central to global dynamics. The prospect of a Chinese-led fourth industrial revolution (AI, quantum computing) is viewed skeptically as unlikely to overcome structural inefficiencies of a centralized planning model. - Gold, Bitcoin, and alternative systems - Bitcoin is described as a Nasdaq-stock-like store of value tied to tech equities; it is not seen as a robust currency or a wide-scale payment system based on liquidity. It could, in theory, be a superior version of gold someday, but today it behaves like other speculative assets. - The conversation weighs the potential for a shift away from the eurodollar toward private digital currencies or a mix of public-private digital currencies. The idea that a completely decentralized system could replace the eurodollar is acknowledged as a long-term possibility, but currently, stablecoins are evolving toward stand-alone viability rather than a wholesale replacement. - The broader arc and forecast - The trade war is seen as a redistribution of productive capacity rather than a definitive win for either side; macroeconomic outcomes in the 2020s are shaped by monetary conditions and the eurodollar system’s functioning more than by policy interventions alone. - The speakers foresee a future with multipolarity and a gradually evolving monetary regime, possibly moving from the eurodollar toward a suite of digital currencies—some private, some public—while gold remains a key store of value in times of systemic risk. - Argentina, Russia, and Europe - Argentina’s crisis is framed as an outcome of eurodollar malfunctioning; IMF interventions offer only temporary stabilization in the face of ongoing liquidity and deflationary pressures. - Russia remains integrated with global finance through channels like the eurodollar system, even after sanctions; the resilience of energy sectors and external support from partners like China helps it endure. - Europe is acknowledged as facing a difficult, depressing outlook, reinforcing the broader narrative of a challenging global macro environment. Overall, gold is framed as a prudent hedge within a complex, interconnected, and evolving eurodollar system, with no imminent replacement of the dollar in sight, while the path toward a multi-currency or digital-currency future remains uncertain and gradual.

Professor Zhang argues that geopolitics is a game where players maximize their self-interest, with predictions built on game theory rather than ideology. For 2026, the central event is Trump’s state visit to China in April, and the US–China relationship is identified as the key uncertain variable, while Russia–Ukraine is considered settled and Europe–NATO–Russia largely forecastable. Zhang outlines the grand strategy behind current tensions: Trump supposedly aims to force a grand bargain with China by leveraging the destabilization of the Middle East and Western Hemisphere to push China into continuing to buy US dollars. He contends that since Nixon’s 1971 decision to float the dollar, the US has relied on two pillars—the petrodollar system and opening China to American technology and markets. As the US then ran deficits and engaged in Middle East wars, China sought to internationalize the yuan and reduce dependence on the dollar via instruments like the Shanghai gold exchange. This, in his view, destabilizes the dollar, prompting Trump to push China to maintain dollar demand by destabilizing oil supply routes and minerals for China’s EV, AI, and other sectors. By invading Venezuela and potentially destabilizing Iran, Trump allegedly aims to force China to rely more on Western Hemisphere oil, silver, gold, lithium, copper, etc., and thus buy more US Treasuries to support the dollar. The discussion then shifts to possible bifurcations: if the United States truly wants China to use the dollar, it would create trust and a predictable, rules-based order; yet current actions—such as cutting China off from semiconductors or “crushing its tech industry”—could push China away, making it more independent and less dependent on the dollar. The Venezuelan case is cited as evidence that the aim is to obstruct China rather than claim oil directly; it would rather block rival powers than simply seize resources. The two powers are described as codependent: China imports about three-quarters of its oil, with roughly 50% from the Middle East and 20% from Russia; China would face a long and costly transition to replace Russian oil entirely, including pipelines. China also has tools to push back, such as triggering instability in silver markets (where China dominates) or other commodities used for manufacturing, a dynamic described as mutually assured economic destruction if either side overplays. When asked how the US could simultaneously pursue trust and coercion, Zhang asserts it cannot have both; the US is described as a global hegemon that should treat China as an equal, but instead presses to subordinate China. This creates a “ladder over an abyss” metaphor: both sides must climb together, or both fall; overt coercion could push China toward a different strategic alignment, possibly toward Russia or a diversified energy portfolio. Zhang emphasizes the role of hubris and racism in US policy, rather than pure ideology, and says the US dollar’s strength is also its vulnerability. Looking at US domestic dynamics, Zhang predicts a potential US economic crisis could magnify political instability. He identifies three US fragilities: (1) AI-driven GDP components that may not generate enduring profits, as data centers consume vast resources and job loss looms; (2) over-financialization, including a speculative silver market and leverage in commodities; and (3) cryptocurrency de-coupled from real utility, with quantum easing allowing continued money printing. He argues these weaknesses could precipitate a fiscal crisis and civil conflict if not contained, potentially catalyzing a broader crisis of state legitimacy. In Europe, Zhang foresees militarization and a misguided pro-war stance despite domestic discontent, predicting irrational policies and a possible collapse of NATO’s existing framework. He forecasts intensified Europe–Russia tensions, including a possible endgame around Odessa, with NATO likely to be overwhelmed militarily, leading to civil unrest and a “slow death” for European cohesion over five to ten years. He contends Europe’s strategic autonomy is eroding under multiculturalist policies and internal polarization, undermining willingness to fight. Regarding the United States’ global posture, Zhang argues Washington is moving toward transactional empire-building—exploiting its vassals when advantageous and abandoning them when not—while projecting power from the Western Hemisphere as a core strategy. He argues that this approach will erode Europe’s relevance and provoke global backlash. Finally, Zhang returns to Iran: Trump’s push for regime change there is linked to leveraging support from Israel and influential backers, such as Adelson and Elon Musk, with the likely aim of a ground invasion. Yet the plausibility of a successful invasion is questionable, given Iran’s size and power, and Trump’s emphasis on optics over sustained policy. The main unknown is China’s response; factions within China differ on dependence on Russia versus diversified oil sources, and the April meeting will shape whether a grand bargain reduces conflict or merely preserves the empire’s decline. To conclude, the April China meeting is pivotal, with four scheduled meetings in 2026; a China–US deal could stabilize some tensions, but the underlying imperial collapse is expected to persist, fueling wars and confrontations worldwide regardless of occasional bargains.

Marco Rubio traveled to Germany for the Munich Security Conference and delivered what the program calls the most important American speech in the last thirty years, calling on Europe to join Trump's new world order or face the consequences. He told NATO allies that playtime is over and that a new world order is being written by the United States; Europe is asked to join, or face being left behind. Rubio framed NATO as a transaction between countries and said it is only worth defending if you are worth defending, accusing European leaders of managing Europe’s decline and warning that if Europe continues on a liberal, destructive path, the United States will be done with them. He criticized a liberal globalist agenda of a borderless world and mass immigration, and argued for reform of the existing international order rather than dismantling it. Rubio asserted that the old rules of the world are dead and that the West must adapt to a new era of geopolitics. He indicated that these are conversations he has been having with allies and other world leaders behind closed doors, and that these talks are accelerating. The speech conveyed a clear ultimatum: the US wants Europe with us, but is prepared to rebuild the global order alone if necessary. Rubio stated that the US would prefer to act with Europe, but would do so independently if Europe does not align. The discussion then ties these geopolitics to currency and economics. The US dollar’s role as the reserve currency and its strength are central to the old world order. The Trump administration is signaling that the strong dollar religion is over, with the dollar weakened in Trump’s second term to make US exports cheaper. Reuters is cited as reporting that China’s treasury holdings have dropped to their lowest level since 2008 as banks are urged to curb exposure to US treasuries, suggesting China is stepping back from funding America and that the burden may shift to US funding via domestic sources. The narrative contrasts this with China’s push for a stronger yuan and global reserve status, including potential expansion of currency use in trade, while Europe sits in the middle, invited to join the US-led shift or be sidelined. There is mention of a possible April Beijing trip by Trump to meet Xi Jinping. The segment also notes internal GOP dynamics, describing Rubio as a neocon favorite and predicting a contest between Rubio’s hawkish approach and JD Vance, who reportedly does not want broad war expansions. The speaker frames Rubio’s speech as a signal flare indicating a real-time reorganization of the West, with the dollar at the blast radius. The sponsor segment follows, tying the topics to critical minerals and a program named Project Vault, a $12 billion strategic reserve for precious minerals to protect the private sector from supply shocks. At a Critical Minerals Ministerial, JD Vance and Marco Rubio delivered a message to China about preventing market flooding from killing domestic projects. The sponsor promotes North American Niobium, a company exploring for niobium and two rare earths (neodymium and praseodymium), describing niobium as critical for aerospace and defense applications, with no domestic US production and 90% global supply controlled by Brazil. The company’s base includes Quebec, Canada, and it highlights leadership from Joseph Carrabas of Rio Tinto and Cliffs Natural Resources fame, and Carrie Lynn Findlay, a former Canadian cabinet minister. The ticker symbol NIOMF is provided, with notes that shares are tradable on major US brokerages, and a reminder for due diligence.