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Speaker 0 describes Tim Ballard as having worked with Glenn Beck to build Underground Railroad, portraying Beck as Ballard’s close ally whenever Ballard needed to break a story on child trafficking. When Ballard considered running for Senate and would have likely won with momentum after the Sound of Freedom release, attacks began, and Glenn Beck reportedly “threw him under the bus.” Speaker 0 asserts that Beck pledged allegiance to Israel, is “bought and paid for,” and “Israel's bitch,” claiming Ballard watched a video and realized this. Speaker 1 adds a claim about theSound of Freedom narrative: the child trafficking ring Ballard busted in South America, depicted in the movie, was an Israeli-run sex trafficking ring, run by Israelis. The head of that ring allegedly escaped to Portugal where a judge let him go, and nobody knows where this guy ended up. The speakers state that this is the real story of Sound of Freedom and that “It was an Israeli run sex trafficking ring,” noting that this is not told to the audience and urging others to research it. Speaker 1 then transitions to commentary on Twitter, stating that Twitter is not a free speech platform and is not an open information highway; it is a military application, a propaganda operation, highly bodied, highly artificial, highly synthetic, and manipulated. They acknowledge using it daily but emphasize that not everything is as it seems on the platform. They caution that prominent accounts cannot be taken at face value because campaigns are run, the algorithm is manipulated, and there are bots and unauthentic accounts. The speakers urge awareness of the battlefield on which Twitter is engaged, and advise developing a wary eye toward content, encouraging audiences to examine profiles, retweets, boosts, follows, and networks to understand who is using the same messaging and why.

John McAfee explains that using Gmail for email provides privacy, or rather a lack of it, despite people believing in encrypted systems like ProtonMail or encrypted messaging like Signal. He argues that encryption was designed thirty-five years ago to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack between transmission and receipt, but there is no longer a need for such protection because there is no man in the middle anymore. He states that smartphones are the surveillance devices preferred by governments worldwide and that malware installation is easy to accomplish. McAfee claims that visiting Pornhub can result in someone listening to you, because a drive-by of a website can set the download of unauthorized applications as a flag. He asserts that with the first click, malware can be installed, and this malware can both watch inputs before they are encrypted and read outputs after they are encrypted. He concludes that encryption is a worthless piece of shit and old technology marketed as a safe system. He emphasizes that there is no safety and no privacy anymore. He explains his personal choice of Gmail for one reason: Gmail is the last company that requires a government subpoena to provide information, and their lawyers have thirty days to review the subpoena. He says that thirty days is enough for him, and that he changes his email every fifteen days. He urges the audience to wake up, stating that there is no more privacy and that people are being sold a useless bill of goods with encryption. Thank you for listening.

Please only share information about yourself that you're comfortable with. You can keep your camera muted and introduce yourself in a way that makes you feel at ease. When discussing potential actions, it's best to speak hypothetically to avoid any misunderstandings. If you want to discuss specific actions or higher-risk topics, exchange contact information and use the secure messaging app Signal to communicate privately. This will ensure that sensitive information remains confidential.

Good morning. John McAfee here. Let’s talk about privacy. If you think encrypted systems like ProtonMail or Signal offer you privacy, you’re mistaken. Encryption was designed to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, but that’s no longer the issue. Your smartphone is the primary surveillance tool for governments worldwide. Malware can easily be installed just by visiting certain websites, allowing attackers to monitor your inputs and outputs, rendering encryption ineffective. I use Gmail because it requires a subpoena for information, giving their lawyers 30 days to review it. That’s enough time for me to change my email frequently. Wake up—privacy is a myth, and encryption is outdated technology being falsely marketed as safe. Thank you for listening.

Facebook and other platforms should measure and share the impact of misinformation, along with the audience it reaches. They should work with the public to create strong enforcement strategies that apply across all their properties. Transparency about rules is important, so people shouldn't be banned from one platform while allowed on others for spreading misinformation.

We propose linking digital identities like France Identité or La Poste's digital identity to Facebook accounts. This would confirm that there is a real person behind the account and provide an encrypted code that only authorities can decipher in specific cases of illegal activity. The idea is to know who you are, even if you use a pseudonym and a cat photo on Facebook. Anonymity is not the goal; instead, we want to associate your account with a digital identity to ensure you are not anonymous in the end.

Speaker 0: When I first met Tim Ballard, he was in this wild legal fight, and Glenn Beck helped him build Underground Railroad. They were best friends. Whenever Sam or Tim needed to break a story about child trafficking, Glenn Beck was “his fucking dude.” Then Tim was considering running for Senate or Congress, and with the momentum from Sound of Freedom, he seemed like a shoo-in, and he was set to upset some politician. After those attacks began, Glenn Beck “threw him under the bus,” and Tim told me, “I can’t believe that Glenn would fucking do that to me.” That exact video I showed him—Tim’s friend pledging allegiance to Israel, “he’s bought and paid for,” “not your friend,” “controlled by our intelligence agencies,” “Israel’s bitch.” Tim watched that one video and said, “holy fuck.” Speaker 1: Ryan, you might know this—the child ring Tim Ballard busted up in South America, depicted in Sound of Freedom, was Israeli-run. It was run by Israelis. The head of that ring escaped to Portugal, where a judge basically let him go, and nobody knows where that guy ended up. That’s the real story of Sound of Freedom: an Israeli-run sex-trafficking ring. You’re not told that. Do research and find out about it. That’s who was running the ring. So there’s a lot of interconnection—it's always them, man. It always comes back to them. It seems to always come back to them. It’s like 6,000,000 to one odds. Speaker 0: Every single time. Every single time. It’s strange how that happens. But you wanna wrap it up, Sam? Speaker 1: Yeah. Let’s wrap it up. Listen, everybody. Twitter is not a free speech platform. It is not an open, super highway of information. It is a military application. It is a propaganda operation. It is highly bodied, highly artificial, highly synthetic and manipulated. I’m not saying don’t use it; I use it every day. We absolutely must use it as best we can, but I need everybody to be aware that not everything is as it seems on this platform. You cannot take this platform at face value. Many of the big accounts you see mainstream through your feed aren’t to be taken at face value. They’re running campaigns, being paid, boosted, the algorithm manipulated, with bots and unauthentic accounts. You must be aware of the battlefield you’re engaging on. And I’m not saying you should leave. On the contrary, I want you here, battling. But it’s not what it seems. There’s a lot of smoke and mirrors, shadows, espionage, and spy games on this platform, and you need to be savvy. Don’t develop mistrust of everybody, but develop a wary eye. Look at people’s Twitter profiles, scroll through their feeds, see who they’re retweeting, who they’re boosting, who they’re following, who their networks are, who’s using the same message.

Do not share misinformation on social media. Trust information from police and law enforcement. Check official websites and social media for updates. Police will share any credible information about risks or threats with the community. Trust the police for accurate information, not social media.

We have to fight back. How do we fight back? Our influencers. They're very important. And secondly, we're gonna have to use the tools of battle. The weapons change over time. You can't fight today with swords. You can't fight with cavalry. And you have these new things, you know, like drones, things like that. But we have to fight with the weapons that apply to the battlefields in which we're engaged, and the most important ones are in social media. And the most important purchase that is going on right now is class Followers. Five followers. TikTok. What? TikTok. Number one. Number one. And I hope it goes through because it's it can be consequential. Mhmm. And the other one what's the other one that's most important? X. X. X. Oh. That's Successful. Very good.

Signal, a company, may be asked by the regulator Ofcom about the data they gather. Signal claims they don't collect data on people's messages. However, the concern is that the bill doesn't specify this and instead gives Ofcom the power to demand spyware downloads to check messages against a permissible database. This sets a precedent for authoritarian regimes and goes against the principles of a liberal democracy. It is seen as unprecedented and a negative shift in surveillance practices.

The speaker asks if there's any reason to allow law enforcement access to Telegram due to unacceptable activity. Speaker 1 responds that encryption cannot be secure for some people only. Speaker 0 claims ISIS uses Telegram to spread propaganda. Speaker 1 says it's impossible to stop them, and ISIS could create their own messaging solution quickly. Speaker 0 notes Durov has been purging ISIS propaganda but would refuse to unlock private messages, citing encryption. Speaker 0 asks if Speaker 1's hands are tied. Speaker 1 confirms they cannot unlock messages. Speaker 0 frames this as a debate between shutting down terrorism and preserving privacy. Speaker 1 states they are personally for privacy, arguing that making an exception for law enforcement endangers the private communications of millions because encryption is either secure or not.

The speaker argues that the battles are fought with the tools that work on the relevant battlefields, listing social media as the most important. The most critical action right now is acquiring followers on TikTok—“Glass Followers. Five followers. TikTok. TikTok. Number one. Number one.” The other key platform mentioned is X (Twitter), described as “Successful.” The speaker emphasizes the need to engage with Elon Musk, stating, “We should talk to him. Now if we can get those two things, we get a lot.” The speaker also says that Elon is not an enemy but a friend. If those two objectives—the TikTok followers and engagement on X—are achieved, the speaker suggests, “I could go on on other things.”

The speakers discuss the breadth and invasiveness of data that can be accessed from a person’s phone, highlighting how such information can be retrieved and used in investigations. They enumerate the various types of data that can be obtained: call logs, chats, cookies, device notifications, emails, instant messages, and passwords. They note that deleted conversations on encrypted apps like WhatsApp and Signal can also be accessible, as well as Millie’s deleted web browsing history. The speakers emphasize that contact information for everyone the person has spoken to, and the locations of all their calls, can be seen. They point out that information about other people’s phone numbers can be accessed, and they ask whether those people’s messages to the person can be seen, with the answer being yes. The police can obtain information about people the person has contacted, not only in relation to any arrest that might have occurred but also concerning individuals who may have contacted the person securely (for example, through Signal) about work. The speakers express that the most worrying aspect is that this kind of data access can happen at the time of arrest, even when charges are never brought, and that it can also apply to witnesses and victims. They argue that there appears to be little clarity about deletion, implying that the police can effectively do what they want when they obtain someone’s phone, which they describe as a scary amount of information. Despite the fear, they also acknowledge that this data is extremely useful for the police in investigations. A central concern raised is the current lack of a required warrant to obtain any of this information. They argue that there should be a degree of checks and balances to determine whether it is proportionate to access such data in a given case, stating that in some cases it may not be necessary to access a person’s phone. Overall, the discussion highlights a tension between the usefulness of comprehensive digital data for investigative purposes and the potential for overreach or abuse in the absence of warrants or robust safeguards.

The speaker advises federal government employees to leak information to journalists from mainstream press outlets like ProPublica and Politico. They suggest using Signal to communicate and recommend saving emails and recording meetings. The speaker also suggests writing poorly to make the administration look bad. Whistleblower protections are discussed, and the speaker acknowledges the risk involved in their actions. They mention the possibility of finding another job and suggest passing on information to a colleague with a higher risk threshold. The importance of finding ethical journalists who will protect sources is emphasized.

Hakim Anwar, CEO and founder of Above Phone, joins Clayton to discuss pervasive surveillance and how to protect personal privacy in 2025–2026. The conversation covers why traditional devices and services—especially iPhones, Samsung/Android phones, and their app ecosystems—are highly surveilled, the role of Amazon Web Services in monitoring traffic, and how messaging apps on these devices are tracked. They frame the problem as a loss of personal privacy and a move toward centralized infrastructure that can be controlled or cut off by large tech platforms. Hakim explains the origin of Above Phone. He started as a software engineer, was already aware of surveillance concerns, and became involved in freedom-based social networks. He pivoted toward open-source technology (Linux, degoogled phones, open-source software) and, five years ago, helped establish Above Phone to create usable privacy-centric devices that are actually functional for daily life. The goal is to be more usable and more private than big tech. The product philosophy emphasizes usable privacy. Above Phone builds on open-source operating systems like GrapheneOS, modeling them off Android but severing ties with Google and other big tech. Hakim notes that typical Samsung/Google Android devices have “god mode” access by Google (and to some extent Samsung), and emphasizes that Above Phone devices are designed to have zero connections to big tech by default, while still enabling users to run necessary apps. Users can choose to install Google services if needed, but in a limited, privacy-conscious way—these services act like normal apps on the device rather than the centralized, all-encompassing control found on stock devices. The phones can be used with existing cell service, and data transfer from iPhone or Android is supported, with live, in-person setup assistance. Setup and operation details: - You can switch to the Above Phone by moving your number with the SIM card (five-minute process), or use the Above Phone in parallel while migrating. - The Above Phone supports both physical SIMs and eSIMs; the data SIM service is eSIM-based. - A private, in-person support team helps with data transfer and setup. - The device can run a sandboxed second profile for Google services, isolating them from personal data. This sandbox can hold essential apps (e.g., WhatsApp) while the primary profile remains private. If needed, Google services can be used in a fully isolated manner, or work apps can be run entirely without Google involvement. Open-source equivalents are provided for many common apps (navigation, messaging, etc.). Privacy mechanics and surveillance: - Hakim explains that big tech devices continually “phone home,” with independent studies showing frequent data transmission to Google and Apple. Enhanced visual search on iPhone, enabled by default, scans photos for landmarks and can link to private indexes, illustrating how centralized platforms can harvest data even without explicit user consent. - Above Phone disconnects from Google’s update stream and ships with zero Google services by default; updates come from open-source developers, not from Google/Apple. Users can still opt to install Google services, but these are constrained and do not have the same “god mode” permissions as on stock devices. - The device supports a private, end-to-end encrypted messaging protocol based on XMPP (Jabber), which is decentralized and can run on a self-hosted or community-driven network. WhatsApp, he notes, is still built on XMPP. The Above Book Linux laptop is highlighted as a privacy-oriented alternative to mainstream Windows/Mac ecosystems. Linux is presented as cooperative, transparent, and less profit-driven. The Above Book ships with an easy-to-use Linux variant designed to avoid terminal use, includes a privacy-focused web browser (Ungoogled Chromium), and offers open-source software replacements (office apps, photo editing, etc.) that store data locally. The laptop supports local AI with Mike Adams’ Brighteon AI integration via LM Studio, enabling private, offline AI capabilities on the device. The company positions Linux and Above Book as enabling local work, with offline AI and offline maps via OpenStreetMap-like tooling. Hakim closes with a forward-looking stance on digital ID and the “surveillance grid” being advanced through regulatory acts into 2027–2030. He frames the investment in Above Phone and Above Book as a preparation for a world where privacy must be actively preserved, and encourages viewers to explore abovephone.com/redacted and abovephone.com for more information and products. David and Clayton engage on skepticism, marketing, and the broader implications of privacy-centric technologies, reinforcing the idea that the goal is practical privacy and education rather than ideology.

Sam: I hope that someday anybody who’s gone over there and touched that wall will never be able to walk out in public without hanging their head in shame ever again. Brian: It’s funny, Sam, because Tim Ballard was going through crazy lawfare. Glenn Beck helped him build underground railroad—they were best friends. When Sam needed or Tim needed to break a story about child trafficking, Glenn Beck was his guy. Then, when Tim was considering running for senate (or congress) and would have momentum after the Sound of Freedom release, attacks started. Glenn Beck threw him under the bus, and Sam shows him a video where Beck pledges allegiance to Israel; he’s bought and paid for, not Tim’s friend, controlled by our intelligence agencies, Israel’s bitch. He watched that video and was shocked. Sam: Brian, you probably know this. Most people don’t know this. The child ring Tim Ballard busted up in South America, the one portrayed in Sound of Freedom, was Israeli-run. It was run by Israelis. The head of that ring escaped to Portugal where a judge let him go, and nobody knows where he ended up. So that’s the real story of Sound of Freedom. It was an Israeli-run sex trafficking ring. You’re not told that. You should go research and find out who was running the ring. So a lot of intro—it’s always them, man. It always comes back to them. Brian: Every single time. Every single time. It’s like 6,000,000 to 1 odds. You know? It’s just strange how that happens. But you wanna wrap it up, Sam? Sam: Yeah. Let’s wrap it up. Listen, everybody. Twitter is not an open, superhighway of information. It is a military application. It is a propaganda operation. It is highly bodied, highly artificial, highly synthetic and manipulated. And I’m not saying don’t use it. I use it every day. We absolutely must use it as best we can. But I need everybody to be aware that not everything is as it seems on this platform. You cannot take this platform at face value. Many of the big accounts that these mainstream accounts you see coming through your feed, you cannot take them at face value. You must be aware that they’re running campaigns. They’re being paid. They’re boosted. The algorithm is being manipulated. There are bots and unauthentic accounts and fake accounts. You must be aware of the battlefield on which you’re engaging. I’m not telling you to go leave. On the contrary, I want you here, battling, but it is not what it seems. There’s a lot of smoke and mirrors and shadows and espionage and spy games on this platform. You really need to be aware of that. You need to get savvy to it. And I don’t want you to develop a mistrust of everybody. I want you to develop a more wary eye of what’s going on. I want you to look at people’s Twitter profiles. Scroll through their feeds and see who they’re retweeting, who they’re boosting, who they’re following, who their little networks are, who’s using the same messaging. Why? Brian: Because— Sam: they...

The speaker discusses the use of burner phones and emails for disinformation response. They mention a book that provides instructions on using burner phones and emails, as well as creating pseudonyms and identities. The speaker suggests using services like Sudo for creating pseudonyms and associated email, phone, text, web browsing, and payment accounts. They also mention the option of using disposable temporary email addresses for anonymity. Various options for burner phones are mentioned, including Tracfone. The speaker briefly mentions their experience selling Obamaphones.

The speaker claims that Telegram receives excessive attention from US security agencies. During a US visit, an engineer working for Telegram was allegedly approached by cybersecurity agents attempting a secret hire. The agents were interested in Telegram's open-source libraries and tried persuading the engineer to integrate specific open-source tools that the speaker believes would function as backdoors, potentially enabling government surveillance of Telegram users. The speaker also recounts personal experiences of being met by FBI agents at US airports and visited at their residence. They believe the FBI's interest was in gathering details about Telegram and establishing a relationship to better control the platform. While acknowledging the agents were doing their job, the speaker suggests this level of scrutiny made the US a less-than-ideal environment for running a privacy-focused social media platform.

For secure cell phone usage, follow these tips: If you need to contact someone in Europe, set your phone to German language and use only German apps, sending voice messages instead of typing. Avoid Chinese language and apps, regardless of the phone you use. In the UK, buy a phone there and communicate in English, again using voice messages instead of typing. Avoid connecting to WiFi and keep each phone in a separate location with different language settings. To ensure safety, periodically switch to new phones and discard the old ones.