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Charles (Speaker 0) and Mario (Speaker 1) discuss a wide range of intelligence topics, personal history, and contemporary covert operations, emphasizing experiences from the CIA and reflections on global security dynamics. Charles begins by outlining his background: growing up on a farm in Ohio, enlisting in the Navy as a law enforcement specialist at 17, studying East Asian languages and Mandarin, and eventually learning Persian. He joined the CIA in July 2001 as an operations officer, spending most of his career in the Middle East with stints in Europe and Asia, and leaving the CIA in 2019. Afterward, he worked at Tesla to set up an insider threat program and manage global information security investigations. He notes extensive experience with China, Russia, Israel, France, and South Korea, and emphasizes the prevalence of intellectual property theft and proprietary-systems concerns in the private sector, including the role of motivated individuals and cross-border actors seeking to commercialize advanced technology. The conversation turns to leadership targeting and decapitation concepts. Charles references how the Iraq War began with an attempted decapitation strike at Saddam, asking whether removing a center of gravity leadership could end a conflict decisively and whether that would be humane. He discusses Iran as a persistent factor across the region, arguing that Iran’s meddling contributed to problems in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and that without Iranian involvement, upheaval might be less intense, though turmoil remains possible. Mario expresses fascination with intelligence capabilities, particularly related to Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Maduro, and asks about Charles’s CIA background and roles. Charles explains that his work involved recruiting individuals with access to foreign governments to commit espionage and provide secret information—“human operations.” He emphasizes the dramatic realism of espionage as two people engaging in a life-changing conversation, rather than high-action TV tropes. They discuss border crossings and the reality of intelligence work. Charles notes that the hardest border crossings were often returning to the United States, when travel appearances didn’t match and documents or identities could be scrutinized. He stresses the difference between romanticized espionage and the real tension of crossing borders with non-legitimate materials, relying on confidence, charisma, and interaction under stress. On private-sector and national-security crossover, Charles highlights the complexity of cyber threats and corporate espionage. He describes a Tesla case involving a Russian criminal organization attempting to install malware, with FBI involvement and the arrest of a Russian national. He explains that in cyber threats, the distinction between government-sponsored and private actors is often blurred, with organized crime sometimes acting as proxies for larger state agendas. He notes that entrepreneurial actors seek to accelerate development by acquiring others’ material, not building entire systems from scratch. He also comments on the blurry boundary between nation-states and private actors in tech espionage and the difficulty of attributing responsibility. The Mossad’s capabilities are analyzed in depth. Charles argues Mossad excels by focusing on high-impact targets within a narrow geopolitical scope (Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq) and by strong locational intelligence—understanding where leaders live, work, and their access points. He emphasizes Mossad’s willingness to act decisively, using surrogates and superior technology for surveillance. He mentions the head of Mossad and a quote from his book about ubiquitous surveillance through devices like phones and watches. He notes the “pager operation” against Hezbollah as a case study in supply-chain manipulation and the use of compromised intermediaries, and he cautions that modern operations involve cyber manipulation and near-constant information-flow considerations. Both discuss real-world operations, including the 2010 Dubai operation targeting a Hamas logistics figure, and general lessons about operational security, noting that some details cannot be disclosed publicly. They reflect on the “gentleman’s rules of the game,” acknowledging that lethal operations and leadership-targeting can be controversial and legally complex; they discuss how different regimes and leaders are perceived and targeted. The Maduro operation is revisited. Charles describes gathering information through satellites, drones (including covert, stealth, and micro-drones), and human intelligence; he stresses determining a target’s pattern of life, where a leader lives, sleeps, moves, whom they meet, and what they eat. He notes that insider sources and the right informants are critical, and he discusses the balance between opportunities created by regime instability and the risk of compromised sources. He emphasizes that in times of turmoil, there is opportunistic recruitment, as some individuals see few options other than cooperating with outside powers. Privacy is a recurring theme. Charles asserts that privacy is not dead but requires effort to protect. He compares privacy to fitness, arguing that modern technologies make it easy to be public, but steps can be taken to reduce attack surfaces, including privacy consulting, careful metadata handling, and secure, layered security (physical security and cyber measures). He uses anecdotes about Strava revealing location data and a submarine commander whose Strava activity was linked to his demise, illustrating how personal data can reveal sensitive information. Towards the end, Mario and Charles discuss strategic ambiguity and unpredictability in political leadership, including Trump’s posture and international signaling. They touch on the potential paths for Iran if regime change occurs, debating the likelihood and consequences of upheaval, the role of Western policy, and how regional dynamics might shift if the mullahs and IRGC structures are altered. The conversation ends with mutual appreciation for the complexity of global security issues and the rapid pace of geopolitical change.

I used to work for the FBI's foreign counterintelligence unit and did surveillance on various intelligence groups. One interesting topic is the Wuhan virus, which I believe is a bioweapon developed by the Chinese military. Many countries, including the US and Russia, have bioweapons. The FBI confirmed it was a bioweapon within 48 hours and traced its origin using specialized equipment. China's goal is not to destroy the US but to colonize it gradually, starting with media and schools. They have been spying since the 1970s, attending trade and science shows, and now they are deeply involved in universities, gathering data for new weapons.

I discovered the CIA's involvement in vaccine production while researching Pfizer. Notably, the CEO of In-Q-Tel, the CIA's investment group, is on the board of Resilience, a biotech company that partnered with Moderna. Resilience has received significant government funding and has ties to various high-profile investors. Key figures like Bob Nelson and Luciana Borio, who have connections to the intelligence community and the FDA, are involved with Resilience. During Operation Warp Speed, Moderna collaborated with this newly formed company, which aims to innovate biomanufacturing and develop gene therapies and vaccines. The connections between these organizations and individuals raise questions about the intertwining of intelligence, big pharma, and government interests in public health initiatives.

An Israeli intelligence company called First Health Infrastructure partnered with CISA, an organization responsible for protecting critical infrastructure in the US. Originally focused on American hospitals, they have expanded their services to include dams, water systems, and nuclear reactors. This foreign intelligence-founded nonprofit now has access to these crucial systems in the United States. The deep connections between Israel and the US seem to play a role in allowing this partnership.

We are undercover in Ukraine under State Department cover, providing intelligence and advice. We conduct credible fear interviews for asylum seekers. I managed multimillion-dollar contracts, including in Ukraine. The CIA could benefit from TikTok becoming American-owned. TikTok provides valuable intelligence, but it's banned due to Chinese ownership. If it's American-owned, we could use it for our advantage. Congress debates breaking up TikTok to make it usable for us.

I was concerned that planted stories meant for foreign audiences were being circulated and believed here at home. This would mean that the CIA could manipulate the news in the United States by channeling it through another country. We are looking into this very carefully. We do have people who submit pieces to American journals. I think that getting into the details of whether we have people paid by the CIA who are working for television networks should be handled in a closed session. By 1954, relationships with the CIA had been established at CBS. I was told about them and asked if I'd carry on with them. We will evaluate the information we have, and we will include any evidence of wrongdoing in our final report and make recommendations. Whether we name the news organizations in our final report remains to be decided.

An individual asked who in the Obama administration authorized foreign nationals' involvement in a government database, given Microsoft's contract stipulated foreign tech support. In 2016, the speaker inquired about the approval authority with Insight Global, raising concerns and requesting documentation, but received no information until 2020. In 2020, after being recruited by Insight Global as a principal software developer, the speaker claims to have discovered that Barack Obama authorized everything between 2014 and 2016. The speaker assumes Obama also approved similar agreements with companies like Amazon and Oracle, possibly during the final years of his administration.

The transcript centers on Amjed Fassisi, a CIA contractor who works with Deloitte and, at times, within the CIA’s China Mission Center on cyber operations. He describes a career path that includes time at the CIA starting in 2008, a stint at the NSA for two years, then a return to the CIA in 2011, where he managed about 80 cybersecurity practitioners and later helped stand up a threat program inside the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Fassisi asserts that he holds a high-level clearance (top secret/SCIs) and that his role involves cross-agency work across the enterprise, though he does not disclose specific details. Key, repeated claims attributed to Fassisi: - The higher-ups in the intelligence community, including CIA directors Gina Haspel and Mike Pompeo, and the upper echelons of their staffs, colluded to withhold information from sitting President Donald Trump. Fassisi states, “We kept information from him,” and later explains “the executive staff” (the director and subordinates) were involved. - Fassisi contends that the CIA and other agencies monitored Trump and his inner circle, using human sources and surveillance. He mentions that Trump could be targeted or spied on, including claims that he would “call Vladimir Putin and tell him” secrets, and that “the intelligence agencies thought that president Trump was a, quote, fucking dumbass and would disclose information.” - He asserts that information about Trump’s activities was intentionally withheld from him by the intelligence community, and that this withholding involved high-level officials who would not share details with the president. - Fassisi suggests that the intelligence community engaged in surveillance of Trump and his team using methods such as human intelligence rather than only wiretaps, and that the FBI, NSA, and other agencies were involved, with implications that FISA-related processes were used to monitor Trump. - He asserts distrust and lack of information-sharing among agencies, stating “the NSA and CIA don’t share information” and describing internal fragmentation and territoriality between agencies as a problem. - Fassisi alleges that there was a broader pattern of weaponizing the CIA and collaborating with foreign partners to influence or monitor Trump associates, referencing the broader narrative around Trump and Russia and implying ongoing monitoring of Trump’s activities post-presidency as well. - He makes broad allegations about Israel and other allies, asserting distrust and claiming Israel “steals intelligence” from the U.S.; he frames relations with allies as fraught and unreliable. - Fassisi describes the reporting by Michael Schellenberger and Matt Taibbi as validated by his claims, and positions the ongoing investigation as exposing corruption within the CIA, FBI, and Department of Justice, with a narrative that information was hidden from the public and from Trump. Supporting context around the interview: - The exchange includes tense moments where Fassisi is shown a CIA badge and discusses his role; the interviewer questions the plausibility and provenance of his claims, pressing for documentation or proof, while Fassisi provides limited responses about his clearance, division (China Mission Center), and contractor status. - The segment also includes editorial framing by the presenter, interjecting with external commentary and promotional content not directly related to Fassisi’s assertions. The interviewer promises follow-up coverage and frames Fassisi’s statements as part of a broader whistleblower narrative. - Throughout, the content repeatedly emphasizes claims of withheld information from Trump, surveillance of Trump and his associates, inter-agency distrust, and internal CIA culture, without providing verifiable documentation within the interview itself.

To create a defensive program against bioterrorism, the speaker consulted with unconventional sources. These included former U.S. bioweapons experts from decades ago, international figures from countries like the U.K., and defectors from the Soviet Union. The speaker learned from these experts to inform the development of a multi-billion dollar program.

After being elected governor, I was interviewed by 23 CIA members who wouldn't reveal their purpose. They refused to share their names or roles, which was unsettling. They questioned me about my election, and I was struck by the diverse group present, resembling everyday people. We need to engage with those in this field to understand their activities and who they are monitoring. It's important to uncover the extent of surveillance happening.

I'm not with the CIA now, nor was I when I started out 25 years ago. I was with good people in the CIA when Donald Trump was elected to take the country back from globalists. Communist Chinese, the EU, Hollywood, and big banks run this country and broke its back. Forget the CIA. It's huge. Don't treat the CIA like it's mysterious or cool. Think of it like the post office. The CIA gets its talking points from me and other patriots, not the other way around. I run the CIA.

Taking on the intelligence community is incredibly risky. They have numerous ways to retaliate. Even a shrewd businessman would be foolish to antagonize them. I've heard they're extremely angry about how they've been treated and spoken about. I don't know exactly what they might do if provoked, but it's a dangerous game to play.

We are reporting from the heart of the campus that sparked a global student movement for Palestine. We’re seeing right now, Chris, we’re trapped in a dorm room. There are 10 white PDs barricading the doors, and we’re not allowed to leave. What started off as a protest against genocide at an elite Ivy League university was met with a military-style operation to suppress it. We need to find a way to get some spare medication. So when Columbia University sent the NYPD on the campus, they were willing to deploy violent militarized police to maintain their active investment in genocide. This is not about students expressing ideas. It is about a change in tactics that presents a concern and a normalization and mainstreaming of rhetoric. And I’m not just talking about language. I’m now talking about tactics, and that’s what shifted our response yesterday. But a normalization and mainstreaming of rhetoric associated with terrorism has now become pretty common on college campuses. Right? You see people wearing headbands associated with foreign terrorist organizations. This happened in October when you had a viral TikTok reissuing Osama bin Laden’s 2002 letter to America. So that’s a larger concern. It’s separate from what happened yesterday, but they’re related. Speaker 3 asks what was found: basically, NYPD changed the way it did business after the attacks of September Eleventh. It not only changed the way it did business, it created a very deep connection with the CIA. They started to build these intelligence programs that infiltrated Muslim communities in ways that, if the federal government did it, would totally go against rules designed to protect civil liberties. And they did it with an unusual partnership with the CIA. A very senior CIA officer was dispatched by CIA Director George Tenet to be his personal representative to the NYPD and help create these intelligence gathering programs, directing and supervising the intelligence gathering, and that relationship continues today. Speaker 3 notes: Recently, the CIA sent one of its most senior undercover officers to work out of 1 Police Plaza in New York as a covert officer. So we’re talking about former CIA agents now working within the New York Police Department. Well, they’re current CIA; they’re on CIA payroll. They’re on the CIA payroll, working with the NYPD, traveling abroad, and using intelligence in conjunction with the NYPD. Speaker 2 describes one element: there is a program called the demographics program. Officers described it as mapping the human terrain of the city. They placed undercover officers, ethnic officers inside Middle Eastern neighborhoods to blend in and look for things that are suspicious. That could be something as simple as who’s looking at radical books in a bookstore or who’s watching Al Jazeera and perhaps applauds at a report about an IED in Iraq, and that could be enough to get you into a report at the NYPD. They also have informants called mosque crawlers who go to the mosque as the eyes and ears for the NYPD. The FBI places informants in mosques with a criterion of specific information related to criminal activity, while the NYPD reportedly does not have that bar and says they follow leads; but those involved with the mosque crawler program say they’re there as eyes and ears.

I'm not with the CIA now, and I wasn't 25 years ago when I started out. I was with good people in the CIA when Donald Trump was elected, working to take the country back from globalist control. We're under the control of the communist Chinese, the EU, Hollywood, and the big banks, who are running and breaking this country. Forget the CIA, it's too big to understand. Think of it like the post office. The CIA gets its talking points from me and other patriots, not the other way around. I run the CIA.

General Shiroishi knew whoever controlled disease could control the world. The material shared links the CIA to involvement of this lab and to expanding this program for the last eighty years.

I'm not with the CIA now, nor was I when I started out 25 years ago. When Donald Trump was elected, I aligned myself with the good elements of the CIA to reclaim the country from globalist control. Communist China, the EU, Hollywood, and big banks are running and ruining this country. Forget any preconceived notions about the CIA. The CIA gets its talking points from patriots like me, not the other way around. I run the CIA.

I had access to a large amount of mailing records, victim records, internet protocol records, and emails. I used this information to track down criminals in Russia. I reached out to the Russian Embassy in Washington and asked for the Russian FSB Liaison Officer. After a few conversations, they introduced me to Sergei Mikhailov, the Deputy Head of the Information Security Center for the Russian FSB. It was an interesting experience.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the ongoing investigations into the Epstein-Israel connection. Speaker 1 explains that Robsat has been examining Epstein’s ties to the Israeli government, Israeli security services, and Israeli private firms connected to the security sector, which are heavily involved in tech surveillance. Epstein is described as a very critical node in this network. The recent email dump is noted as chaotic and not fully accessible, with about 3,000,000 documents released, roughly half of what the DOJ reportedly has. There is mention of another roughly 3,000,000 files that remain unseen, and that lawmakers like Ro Khanna and Thomas Massey have raised this issue. The currently released material may only be the tip of the iceberg, and fuller analysis awaits chronological organization to understand the conversations in context. Speaker 1 notes that prior reporting relied on very limited Epstein files and involuntary releases from hacked material—such as an intrusion into Ehud Barak’s inbox—which revealed Epstein’s extensive, far-reaching involvement with figures and institutions in Israel’s political and security establishment. Epstein’s role is described as a resource and a critical node used for connections, money, political leverage, and global influence, rather than simply being a Mossad agent. The forthcoming documents are expected to enable more stories about Israel’s global influence through Epstein, including in Africa, Central Asia, Europe, North America, and Russia. Speaker 0 asks about the significance of Epstein informing Ehud Barak, especially in light of Palantir’s actions, and why Barak would need this information if Palantir would proceed independently. Speaker 1 responds by noting that Ehud Barak was leaving public service and, like many former politicians, sought to leverage access gained in office to generate private wealth while pursuing ongoing political aims. Epstein was assisting Barak in developing him as a tech security mogul. Barak apparently did not know Palantir well at that time, illustrating Epstein’s role in shaping and linking these tech surveillance interests. Speaker 1 adds that Palantir was reportedly attempting to hire Israel’s UN ambassador, Ron Prosor, indicating a very intimate relationship between the Israeli political/security establishment and Palantir, which also has ties to the American intelligence community. Epstein’s interest in surveillance technology aligned with his broader access to intelligence networks and financial resources to influence the technological landscape. The transcript ends with Speaker 0 interjecting a promotional advertisement for gold and silver (which should be omitted from the summary per instructions).

The Wuhan Institute of Virology is believed by some, including the speakers, to be a bioweapons lab with Chinese Communist Party officials. The speakers suggest that the US government may have been collecting intelligence on the lab through a scientist named Peter Daszak, who had a relationship with the CIA. They propose that the US government traded advanced biotech for access to the lab. The second speaker agrees with this theory and mentions that he received leaked documents related to the lab. The Department of Defense is also mentioned.

Speaker 0 discusses working with the Israelis, describing them as “very American” and noting that they could get into shouting matches during meetings over whose idea was best, followed by casual lunch and reconciliation. He emphasizes that Israel is a good ally that the U.S. needs to protect and support, and he asserts that CIA and Al Qaeda had worked closely together in Iraq and in Syria, and that there are times when covert action allowed meetings with the “quote unquote, enemies” to try to bring things down as CIA officers. Speaker 1 adds that most of the world has a problem with Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh, but there is less of a problem because the CIA worked with ISIS/Daesh and Al Qaeda. He suggests that if the CIA worked with them, it would be better to understand what they were doing, and if the plan is for the U.S. to work with them on a security agreement, which has been done with enemies before, then this has been done in concert with diplomats and other countries involved. He indicates he wouldn’t be surprised if that was happening and would call it possibly hopeful. Speaker 0 continues by noting that newspapers in the United States once celebrated Qasem Soleimani as a fighter with American troops against ISIS and Al Qaeda. He states that Soleimani “was, and now it's switched,” implying a shift in perception or policy. The overarching theme is the idea of collaboration or coordination with hostile or extremist groups in pursuit of broader strategic objectives, including countering Iran, and the possibility that such collaborations could be framed as necessary or hopeful within a complex web of alliances and covert actions. Speaker 0 ends by reiterating the shift in stance: “Now we have to go to al ISIS and Al Qaeda to go back against Iran.” This underscores a cyclical or ironic pivot in U.S. strategy, moving from partnering with certain adversaries against common threats to reengaging those same groups to counter another adversary. The dialogue presents a candid view of realpolitik, suggesting that relationships with seemingly incompatible actors and shifts in alliances occur as part of broader geopolitical objectives, with collaboration sometimes described as acceptable when it serves strategic goals, and public narratives sometimes contrasting with behind-the-scenes actions.

Forget the CIA. It's huge, like the post office, not some cool, mysterious entity. The CIA gets its talking points from me and other patriots. I'm not saying you're with the CIA, and when I started 25 years ago, I was with the good elements of the CIA when Donald Trump was elected to take the country back from the globalists. We're under globalist control: the communist Chinese, the EU, Hollywood, the big banks—they run this country and broke its back. I run the CIA.

In late 2015, my boss, Peter Daskin, approached me and asked if we should work with the CIA. I used to work in a classified environment and have experience in national security, so I wasn't surprised. I told him it wouldn't hurt to talk to them, as there could be financial benefits. Peter mentioned that the CIA was interested in our work in China and the data we were collecting. After this conversation, he confirmed the relationship with the CIA over the next two months. I wasn't shocked because programs like this are often used to gather intelligence on foreign laboratories.

Since 2008, McKinsey has received nearly $1 billion in consulting work from the U.S. government, with the Department of Defense as its top client. In 2021 alone, McKinsey secured $850 million in contracts with the Defense Department and other security agencies. Simultaneously, McKinsey is also doing business with the Chinese government and Chinese controlled entities. This creates a national security concern because McKinsey reportedly helped China consider how to outcompete U.S. technology firms and strengthen Made in China 2025 to advance their goals for technological dominance. This is directly at odds with the interests of the U.S. government and McKinsey's corporate clients in the United States. Furthermore, other firms doing business in China are getting raided by the Chinese government, which means that their data is no longer secure. If they have U.S. client data on those servers, that data is now in the hands of the Chinese government.