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Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

The discussion centered on whether Iran would retaliate to an Israeli strike on Beirut and how that could affect an expected U.S.-Israel-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU). Iran was described as having made retaliation a “red line,” particularly because Israel had previously tested it and Iran launched a “pretty aggressive attack” about a week earlier. The strike on Beirut was also noted as occurring on the same day as the MOU was meant to be signed. Glenn argued that Iran faced a dilemma: retaliating would invite Israel’s full-force response against Iran, leading to a “high-intensity war” and derailing talks about peace; not retaliating would leave Iran to uphold a new deterrence reality while still facing the possibility Israel intended to sabotage the agreement. He suggested the bombing timing could be a trap set by Israel, with both options “unfavorable” and difficult for Iran’s “hawks” and leadership. He also emphasized that speculation about whether Israel had U.S. authorization (or only informed the U.S.) was complicated by limited transparency, but that the timing and wording in public statements pointed to attempts to shape escalation and the political narrative. Trump’s public messaging was a major focus. Trump was quoted urging “stand down,” blaming Netanyahu’s “fucking attack” and arguing it should not have happened on a special day close to peace, while also telling media outlets he believed the Iran agreement would still be signed that day. Trump also said he told Iran “not to respond” and warned that retaliation would “ruin everything,” and claimed Iran should not launch missiles. Glenn discussed how this rhetoric could be intended for multiple audiences—Iranians, Americans, and Israelis—potentially weakening U.S.-Israeli relations while simultaneously trying to pressure escalation. A video clip of the strike was discussed as showing a “precision strike” rather than buildings being leveled as in earlier examples. The channel guest also drew parallels to how ceasefires are framed alongside continued attacks, arguing that targeting choices under a “precision” label still raises concerns about what peace means in practice. He linked the lack of clarity to possible gaps in the MOU, especially sequencing and specificity about obligations—particularly from the Iranian side, which was described as skeptical that the U.S. would implement commitments. The guest cited concerns that Iran wanted either a complete peace or no peace, and that otherwise the U.S. and Israel might pause intense conflict while continuing incremental actions against Hezbollah and potentially later resume fighting Iran. There was also discussion of whether Israel would remain part of the Lebanese peace framework. Since Israel was said to be not part of the MOU, questions were raised about whether provisions for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon would be included, and whether Trump could force Israel to pull out given Israel’s actions on the day the agreement was supposed to be signed. Iranian political and military statements were highlighted as reinforcing the “red line” theme. The head of Iran’s National Security Commission was cited as saying the Beirut attack proved the U.S. was weak and that “a strong response is coming.” Iranian commanders were cited warning that the strike would not go unanswered. Another post by an Iranian official urging punishment of the “Zionist child killers” was mentioned as deleted after Trump’s comments, raising uncertainty about whether threats were being walked back. The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council was also cited as saying violating Iran’s red lines “will not be tolerated,” with Lebanon framed as “our life.” As the conversation ended, they returned to the central uncertainty: whether Iran would retaliate and, if it did, whether Israel and Iran would repeat prior cycles of exchange in a limited de-escalation pattern or escalate significantly harder. The overarching theme was whether the strike was designed to provoke retaliation and derail the MOU, or whether Iran could decide to avoid escalation—both of which were described as heavily dependent on interpretation of intentions and the MOU’s specific terms.

The conversation centers on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iran, and regional dynamics, with Speaker 0 (a former prime minister) offering sharp criticisms of the current Israeli government while outlining a path he sees as in Israel’s long-term interest. Speaker 1 presses on US interests, Lebanon, and the ethics and consequences of the war. Key points and claims retained as stated: - Iran and the war: Speaker 0 says he supported the American strike against Iran’s leadership, calling Ayatollah Khamenei’s regime a brutal threat and praising the move as punishment for Iran’s actions, including backing Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. He questions why there was a lack of a clear next-step strategy after the initial attack and asks whether a diplomatic alternative, similar to Obama’s Iran agreement, could have achieved nuclear supervision without war. He notes the broader regional risk posed by Iran’s proxies and ballistic missiles and emphasizes the goal of constraining Iran’s nuclear program, while acknowledging the economic and security costs of the war. - On Netanyahu and influence: Speaker 1 references the New York Times report about Netanyahu’s influence on Trump and asks how much Netanyahu affected the decision to go to war. Speaker 0 says he isn’t certain he’s the best judge of Netanyahu’s influence but believes Netanyahu sought to push the war forward even during a ceasefire and that Iran’s threat required action, though he questions whether the next steps beyond initial strikes were properly planned. He states, “Iran deserve to be punished,” and reiterates the need for a strategy to end hostilities and stabilize the region. - Proxies and regional instability: The discussion highlights Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as Iranian proxies destabilizing the Middle East, with Speaker 0 insisting that Iran’s support for these groups explains much of the regional violence and Israel’s security concerns. He argues that eliminating or significantly curbing Iran’s influence is essential for regional stability. - Gaza, West Bank, and war ethics: Speaker 1 cites humanitarian and civilian-impact statistics from Gaza, arguing that the war has gone beyond a proportionate response. Speaker 0 concedes there were crimes and unacceptable actions, stating there were “war crimes” and praising investigations and accountability, while resisting the accusation of genocide. He criticizes certain Israeli political figures (e.g., Ben-Gvir, Smotrich) for rhetoric and policies that could protract conflict, and he condemns the idea of broad acceptance of annexation policies in the South of Lebanon. - Lebanon and Hezbollah: The core policy debate is about disarming Hezbollah and the future of Lebanon-Israel normalization. Speaker 0 argues against annexing South Lebanon and says disarming Hezbollah must be part of any Israel–Lebanon peace process. He rejects “artificial” solutions like merging Hezbollah into the Lebanese army with weapons, arguing that Hezbollah cannot be permitted to operate as an independent armed force. He believes disarming Hezbollah should be achieved through an agreement that involves Iran’s influence, potentially allowing Hezbollah to be integrated into Lebanon’s political order if fully disarmed and bound by Lebanese sovereignty, and with international support (France cited). - Practical path to peace: Both speakers acknowledge the need for a negotiated two-state solution. Speaker 0 reiterates a longstanding plan: a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Old City administered under a shared trust (involving Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and the United States). He emphasizes that this vision remains essential to changing the regional dynamic and that the current Israeli government’s approach conflicts with this pathway. He frames his opposition to the present government as tied to this broader objective and says he will continue opposing it until it is replaced. - Personal reflections on leadership and regional hope: The exchange ends with mutual recognition that the cycle of violence is fueled by leadership choices on both sides. Speaker 0 asserts that a different Israeli administration could yield a more hopeful trajectory toward peace, while Speaker 1 stresses the importance of accountability for war crimes and the dangers of rhetoric that could undermine regional stability. Speaker 0 maintains it is possible to pursue peace through a viable, enforceable two-state framework, and urges focusing on disarming Hezbollah, negotiating with Lebanon, and pulling back to an international front to prevent further escalation. Overall, the dialogue juxtaposes urgent punitive action against Iran with the imperative of a negotiated regional settlement, disarmament of proxies, and a concrete two-state solution as the viable long-term path, while condemning certain actions and rhetoric that risk perpetuating conflict.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

The conversation centers on multiple competing narratives about the war and its wider regional significance, with the speakers presenting their interpretations and challenging each other’s points. - The hosts open by acknowledging competing narratives: some view the war as a necessary action against a regime seen as destabilizing and dangerous (nuclear ambitions, regional havoc); others see it as Israel removing a geopolitical threat with U.S. involvement; a third perspective argues it stemmed from miscalculations by Trump, perhaps driven by Israeli influence. The dialogue frames the war within broader questions of American, Israeli, and Iranian aims. - Speaker 1 references Joseph Kent’s resignation letter, arguing Iran was not an immediate U.S. threat and that Netanyahu and the Israeli lobby influenced Trump toward war. They assert Trump’s stated interest in Iranian oil and control of the Strait of Hormuz; they describe Trump as guided by business interests. They frame U.S. actions as part of a long-standing pattern of demonizing enemies to justify intervention, citing Trump’s “animals” comment toward Iranians and labeling this demonization as colonial practice. - Speaker 0 pushes back on Trump’s rhetoric but notes it suggested a willingness to pressure Iran for concessions. They question whether Trump could transition from ending some wars to endorsing genocidal framing, acknowledging disagreement with some of Trump’s statements but agreeing that Israeli influence and Hormuz control were important factors. They also inquire whether Trump miscalculated a prolonged conflict and ask how Iran continued to fire missiles and drones despite expectations of regime collapse, seeking clarity on Iran’s resilience. - Speaker 1 clarifies that the Iranian system is a government, not a regime, and explains that Iranian missile and drone capabilities were prepared in advance, especially after Gaza conflicts. They note Iran’s warning that an attack would trigger a regional war, and reference U.S. intelligence assessments stating Iran does not have a nuclear weapon or a program for one at present, which Trump publicly dismissed in favor of Netanyahu’s view. They recount that Iran’s leaders warned of stronger responses if attacked, and argue Iran’s counterstrikes reflected a strategic calculus to deter further aggression while acknowledging Iran’s weaker, yet still capable, position. - The discussion shifts to regional dynamics: the balance of power, the loss of Israel’s “card” of American support if Iran can close Hormuz, and the broader implications for U.S.-Israel regional leverage. Speaker 1 emphasizes the influence of the Israeli lobby in Congress, while also suggesting Mossad files could influence Trump, and notes that the war leverages Netanyahu’s stance but may not fully explain U.S. decisions. - The two then debate Gulf states’ roles: Saudi Arabia and the UAE are depicted as providing bases and support to the United States; Kuwait as a near neighbor with vulnerability to Iranian action and strategic bases for American forces. They discuss international law, noting the war’s alleged illegality without a UN Security Council authorization, and reference the unwilling-or-unable doctrine to explain Gulf state complicity. - The conversation covers Iran’s and Lebanon’s involvement: Iran’s leverage via missiles and drones, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization with Iranian support. They discuss Hezbollah’s origins in response to Israeli aggression and their current stance—driving Lebanon into conflict for Iran’s sake, while Hezbollah asserts independence and Lebanon’s interests. They acknowledge Lebanon’s ceasefire violations on both sides and debate who bears responsibility for dragging Lebanon into war; Hezbollah’s leaders are described as navigating loyalties to Iran, Lebanon, and their people, with some insistence that Hezbollah acts as a defender of Lebanon rather than a mere proxy. - Towards the end, the speakers reflect on personal impact and future dialogue. They acknowledge the war’s wide, long-lasting consequences for Lebanon and the region, and express interest in continuing the discussion, potentially in person, to further explore these complex dynamics.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Prof. Syed Muhammad Marandi of Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. The latest news is a U.S. peace proposal for Iran, with expectations of Iran’s response. The deal reportedly doesn’t address nuclear issues or the Strait of Hormuz. What can we make of this, and what wider negotiations are taking place? Marandi: Regarding the American proposal, we’ll have to wait to see the content, but Iran’s position is clear and unlikely to shift from its current priorities. First, a ceasefire and end to the fighting. The United States and the Israeli regime are currently violating the ceasefire, and until they end the slaughter in Lebanon and Gaza and the siege, there will be no possibility to move forward. After that, it will be the 10 Plan that Iran put forward and Trump accepted. Iran is not going to move away from that. If the Americans think over time this is just internal consumption, they are mistaken. It’s a major miscalculation akin to the miscalculation of launching the war. The Americans are now insisting that Iran respond within a time frame; Iran will respond when ready, possibly a day or two or three later, to avoid being intimidated. The American proposal, if true, likely violates Iran’s sovereignty and seeks something it could not gain on the battlefield. Iran would be flexible on issues but not on principles. On nuclear program, enrichment, sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, these won’t be given up. Iran is willing to do a deal, like in 2015, but not the Obama-era version; it would need an upgraded agreement that Iran envisions, not one Trump thinks is upgraded. Any deal, if it occurs, would have to be far more favorable than the 2015 agreement. The war participants gambled and lost; an attack could still occur. There’s a strong possibility of an imminent attack, and Iranian preparations reflect that outlook. No ships have left the Strait of Hormuz; Iran’s response to previous U.S. actions has been robust, while avoiding heavy escalation. The Strait of Hormuz has not been closed by Iran; it remains open for friendly states and those who have not joined the war against Iran. Glenn: It does seem the U.S. is returning to potential all-out war against Iran, though the U.S. may have limitations in what it can actually achieve. You mentioned Lebanon and Israel; has the push to address Lebanon’s siege dropped out of talks, or is it still on the table from the American side? Marandi: Iran’s stance is that there must be a regional ceasefire that includes Gaza; Lebanon is part of that regional ceasefire condition. Iran will not remove that from the table. Washington and Netanyahu demanded unconditional surrender at the war’s start, but after 39 days they accepted Iran’s 10-Plan as the basis for negotiations. Iran will not accept a shift in the American position, nor the continued slaughter of Palestinians and Lebanese as a precondition for talking. Glenn: What about disruption in Gulf cooperation with the U.S.? Saudi airspace was limited then reversed; are there splits in the U.S.-led alliance, or was that transient? Marandi: It’s unclear; the Iranians know U.S. airpower is concentrated in Qatar, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. The Iranians are prepared for attack and believe the U.S. has not yet achieved its aims. Western reporting suggests Iran’s missiles and drones have advanced beyond what was seen in the 39-day war, with new underground-produced systems demonstrating greater capability. Glenn: On China, Xi Jinping and Iran recently met; how will that affect talks with the U.S. President and Xi’s approach? Marandi: China and Iran held a good meeting; China is impressed by Iran’s performance in the war, as are Russia and many others. China recognizes that the U.S. is targeting China, Russia, and Iran simultaneously. Iran’s relations with China are strong, but Iran won the war largely on its own—resilience, leadership, and the people’s support. The Strait of Hormuz is controlled by Iran, and the U.S. cannot overturn that within any negotiation framework. Glenn: If the U.S. returns to full-scale war, what red lines would Iran consider triggers for a broader conflict? Marandi: The likelihood is a major assault combined with terrorist incursions from northern Iraq and Pakistan-based groups, with ground actions against Iran. Iran believes it could counter and destroy critical infrastructure, including in Gulf states, which would escalate and likely devastate regional and global markets. Iran would retaliate against infrastructure targets, maintaining restraint toward civilians, but would not refrain from destroying critical assets if Iran’s infrastructure is attacked. If a new war begins, Iran expects a comprehensive defeat of the invading forces and non-cooperation with further aggression. Glenn: Thank you for the insights. We’ll likely speak again as this situation evolves. Marandi: Thank you, I appreciate it.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an award-winning author, discussed developments around the Iran war and the prospect of a near-term diplomatic breakthrough. Parsi addressed whether the Trump administration is attempting to expel him personally after his criticisms. He said it is not simply “the Trump administration,” but that there are elements inside and outside the government attempting to escalate pressure toward deportation. He referenced pro-Israeli social media influencers pushing for it, including an AI video depicting his deportation. He said a recent investigation claim in the Free Press was denied within hours by the State Department, which he described as unusual. Parsi argued this is part of a long-term pattern: for 25 years he said neocons and warmongers in Washington have tried to cancel, silence, discredit, and accuse him of being an Iranian agent, but that this is the first moment he has seen a more public push toward deportation. He also said other elements inside the administration pushed back, making the situation more complicated than a single unified effort. He then discussed how discourse around wars has deteriorated, not only in the United States but also internationally, describing it as driven by team-slogan logic rather than explanation and context. Parsi argued that wars of choice require eliminating nuance and context, which he said leads to attacks on those who explain alternative perspectives. He emphasized that moralism can become counterproductive by preventing discussion of opponents’ security concerns and undermining compromise and peace. Parsi connected this to earlier U.S. policy toward Iran, saying decision-makers misread Iran’s behavior by assuming Iran is weaker and fears war more than surrender. He said he tried to communicate that Iran would not surrender, that it fears surrender more than war, and that it likely would absorb pain if it viewed the threat as existential. He argued the fundamentals of the approach were erroneous and that the resulting negotiation dynamics differ from the terms originally imagined. He also described how intelligence and evidence can be ignored when groupthink and only listening to certain voices, such as Israelis, leads to miscalculation—especially regarding options like closing or disrupting the Strait of Hormuz and striking Gulf Cooperation Council states. On strategy and propaganda, Parsi contrasted earlier public rational debate with more coercive moral framing. He cited examples from Afghanistan and broader great-power practice of selling war as peace, including using women’s rights narratives and prominent collaborations between political and celebrity figures. He said this moral framing functions to block strategic discussion and prevents evaluation of whether interventions serve stated objectives. In shifting to the current Iran talks, Parsi responded to the claim that a peace deal could be signed within 24 hours. He said he believes it is “different,” describing it as the “39th time,” but closer than ever based on conversations with “folks on both sides.” He said the proposal is back in Iran’s court and that delays stem from the internal need for buy-in across Iran’s dispersed power structure, particularly under a new Supreme Leader whose authority is not fully established. He said hardline elements that would never agree are part of the challenge, but that signals suggest the majority has already agreed in substance. Parsi said the Iranian foreign minister, U.S. President Donald Trump’s retweet of the Iranian foreign minister, and Pakistan’s prime minister’s messaging all point to momentum—while emphasizing the process is still a memorandum of understanding and a “pit stop” toward a final deal, not an end to the war. He warned sabotage could occur, including through attacks elsewhere such as Lebanon, which he said could destabilize the diplomatic process even without direct action against either party. Regarding what is in the MOU, Parsi said Iran’s position is that it needs U.S. buy-in through an exchange affecting leverage. He said Iran views opening the Strait of Hormuz—described as major leverage, more than a 60% enriched uranium stockpile—as part of what is being given up, and it argues the U.S. blockade (he called it counterproductive to the U.S.) is being removed. He said Iran is asking for 12 billion upfront, with an additional 12 billion at the end tied to the MOU. He also said some funds were previously supposed to be released in connection with a prisoner exchange in August 2022, but that the deal was reneged after the Mahsa Amini protests began, meaning Iran does not want to renegotiate those promised first amounts. He said the U.S. side has avoided direct release for reasons including avoiding comparison to Obama-era actions, so others proposed a workaround where a third party provides equivalent funds initially, followed by accounting later. Parsi said Iran appears to be moving toward accepting an approach that ensures it receives the money even if it is not unfreezing directly by the U.S. He added that ambiguity about key terms—like “open” regarding the Strait of Hormuz—could allow both sides to interpret commitments domestically, but that too much vagueness could make the agreement like “Swiss cheese.” On the Strait of Hormuz, Parsi distinguished between the idea of reopening while it is not closed—potentially involving fees/tolls or administrative management rather than full restoration of prior arrangements—and he said legal disputes about whether it is international waters or Iranian/Omani waters shape how the language can be framed. He said he does not expect Iran to give up control entirely and instead expects a change from the pre-existing status quo. Finally, Parsi discussed regional security after Iran’s direct attack on Israel following Israel’s bombing of Lebanon, which he described as an attempt to establish extended deterrence, or “the new equation,” backed by large-scale Iranian capability rather than limited attacks attributed to the Houthis. He said Israel’s subsequent actions—striking Iran and later Southern Lebanon rather than Beirut—do not prove the equation is fully established, though it could increase the perceived cost of further escalation. He said that if an MOU is agreed, it is unlikely Iran would do so without a region-wide ceasefire, especially because restarting war in Lebanon could spill over into Iran. He argued Iran’s priorities include shrinking U.S. military presence in the region, diversified security arrangements for GCC states, and deeper economic and security rehabilitation for Iran—moving away from a decades-long U.S. organizing principle of containment and isolation.

The conversation centers on Israel’s war with Iran and its broader regional implications, with Speaker 0 (an Israeli prime minister) offering his assessment and critiques, and Speaker 1 pushing for clarification on motives, strategy, and policy directions. Key points about the Iran war and its origins - Speaker 0 recalls learning of the war on February 28 in Washington, and states his initial reaction: the United States’ claim that Iran is an enemy threatening annihilation of Israel is understandable and something to be supported, but questions what the next steps and the endgame would be. - He argues that Iran, through proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, posed a global and regional threat by arming missiles and pursuing nuclear capacity, and asserts that Iran deserved punishment for its actions. He raises the question of whether the outcome could have been achieved without war through a prior agreement supervised by international bodies. - He emphasizes that the lack of a clear, articulated next step or strategy undermines the legitimacy of the war’s continuation, even as he concedes the necessity of addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. - He also notes that the war affected the global economy and regional stability, and stresses the importance of coordinating a path that would end hostilities and stabilize the region. Speaker 1’s analysis and queries about U.S. interests and Netanyahu’s influence - Speaker 1 questions the rationale behind U.S. involvement, suggesting that strategic interests around the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program were not the only drivers, and cites reporting that Netanyahu presented Iran as weak to push Trump toward regime change, with limited pushback within the U.S. administration. - He asks how much influence Netanyahu had over Trump, and whether the war was pushed by Netanyahu or driven by broader strategic calculations, including concerns about global economic consequences. - He notes that, even if Iran was making concessions on nuclear issues, the war’s continuation raises concerns about broader U.S. and global interests and the potential damage to European and allied relationships. Israeli-Lebanese dimension and Hezbollah - The discussion moves to Lebanon and the question of a ground presence in the South of Lebanon. Speaker 1 asks whether Netanyahu’s administration intends annexation of Lebanese territory and whether there is a real risk of such plans, given the recent destruction of villages and the broader context of regional diplomacy. - Speaker 0 distinguishes between military necessity and political strategy. He says the ground operation in southern Lebanon is unnecessary because Hezbollah missiles extend beyond 50 kilometers from the border, and he argues for negotiating a peace process with Lebanon, potentially aided by the international community (notably France), to disarm Hezbollah as part of a larger framework. - He asserts that there are voices in the Israeli cabinet that view South Lebanon as part of a Greater Israel and would seek annexation, but he insists that such annexation would be unacceptable in Israel and that disarming Hezbollah should be tied to a broader peace with Lebanon and Iran’s agreement if a negotiations-based settlement is reached. - The idea of integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese military is rejected as artificial; disarmament is preferred, with the caveat that Hezbollah could not be dissolved as a military force if Iran remains a principal backer. Speaker 0 suggests that a Hezbollah disarmed and integrated into Lebanon’s political-military system would require careful design, potentially with international participation, to prevent Hezbollah from acting as an independent proxy. War crimes and accountability - The participants discuss imagery like a soldier breaking a statue of Jesus and broader allegations of misconduct during the Gaza war. Speaker 0 condemns the act as outrageous and unacceptable, while Speaker 1 notes that individual soldier actions do not represent an entire army and contrasts external reactions to abuses with a broader critique of proportionality in Gaza. - Speaker 0 acknowledges that there were crimes against humanity and war crimes by Israel, rejects genocide, and endorses investigations and accountability for those responsible, while criticizing the political leadership’s rhetoric and the behavior of certain ministers. - They touch on the controversial death-penalty bill for Palestinians convicted of lethal attacks, with Speaker 0 characterizing the Israeli government as run by “thugs” and criticizing ministers for celebratory conduct, while Speaker 1 argues that such rhetoric inflames tensions. Two-state solution and long-term vision - The conversation culminates in Speaker 0 presenting a long-standing two-state plan: a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and the Old City of Jerusalem not under exclusive sovereignty but administered by a five-nation trust (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and the United States). - He asserts that this approach represents an alternative to the current government’s policies and reiterates his commitment to opposing Netanyahu’s administration until it is replaced. - They close with mutual acknowledgment of the need for a durable peace framework and reiterate that Hezbollah’s disarmament must be a condition for normalization between Israel and Lebanon, while cautioning against artificial or compromised arrangements that would leave Hezbollah armed or entrenched.

Professor and Host engage in a wide-ranging discussion about the Iran-Israel-Lebanon dynamic, the prospects for war, and the potential paths to change. - They open with tensions around Iran, suggesting that Netanyahu and the Israeli lobby won’t let Iran “rest,” and that Iran is implicated in the current Lebanon conflict while insisting that Lebanon’s fight is Lebanon’s own. The Professor stresses that Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization and not a direct Iranian proxy, and that Iran’s involvement is framed by its own interests rather than as an intrusive occupation of Lebanon. - The Host challenges this view, noting that Lebanon’s government decided not to join the war and that Hezbollah rearmed in the south, arguing that Iran has influence in Lebanon and that Hezbollah’s actions reflect a broader proxy dynamic in the country. The Professor counters that Hezbollah is not a proxy and emphasizes Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal affairs, while arguing that Iran can assist resistance groups when asked but should not be blamed for all Lebanese actions. - They discuss the state of the conflict: is the war over or a ceasefire that could resume? The Host asks for a probability estimate (1–10); the Professor places it at six or seven that it could re-ignite, arguing that Trump and Netanyahu will continue to push Iran and that the regime in Tehran will respond, given new leadership and a determination to avoid being disarmed or appeased. - On aims and capabilities, the Professor cites Trump’s stated desire to take over Iranian oil (per a Financial Times interview) and to “change Iran’s government,” including the idea of disintegrating Iran and establishing an Israeli-driven hegemony in the region. He also suggests Trump views oil leverage as a strategic tool against China, drawing on broader geopolitical ambitions such as the North-South Corridor. The Host and Professor discuss the idea of leveraging Iran’s oil to pressure or blockade China and to influence global power dynamics. - The conversation moves to the larger question of how to achieve U.S. objectives short of full-scale war. The Host suggests non-military options beyond sanctions, including possible tolls, business deals, or new arrangements around the Strait of Hormuz, while the Professor argues that sanctions relief would require Congressional action and that Netanyahu’s influence makes relief unlikely. The Host proposes that sanctions relief could be tied to dismantling proxies like Hezbollah, with Iran receiving asset unfreezing in exchange, and a tollbooth mechanism as possible recompense. - They compare political systems: the Host asks whether a more pragmatic Iranian leadership could compromise with the West, while the Professor challenges the notion of embracing Israel or normalization absent broader regional changes. They discuss Iranian internal politics, including protests and the 2021–2024 leadership shifts, arguing that the current leadership is generally more energetic and less likely to exercise restraint under renewed pressure. - The Wall Street Journal summary is invoked: a shift to a harderline leadership within Iran, with Mustafa Khamenei described as consolidating power and surrounding himself with hardliners who view destroying Israel as central. The Host and Professor debate whether this portends greater confrontation or potential pragmatism in dealing with the United States, emphasizing that any significant rapprochement would hinge on broader regional dynamics and the role of Israel. - The discussion turns to the prospects for a two-state solution versus a one-state outcome in Palestine. The Professor contends that a one-state solution would be unlikely unless Israel changes fundamentally, while the Host notes shifts in Western public opinion and some American youths showing increasing sympathy for Palestinian rights. They acknowledge that most polling in the U.S. still supports a two-state framework, even as younger demographics show divergent views. - They close with mutual acknowledgement that there is no straightforward path to peace, reiterating concerns about possible future confrontations, the influence of external powers, and the complexities of Lebanon’s sovereignty, Hezbollah’s role, and Iran’s internal politics. The Host and Professor each express hopes for peace, while recognizing the likelihood of continued strategic competition rather than a clear, immediate resolution.

The discussion centers on the alleged failure of Trump’s ceasefire with Iran and the dramatic military moves around it. The hosts point to Reuters and other outlets reporting thousands of Marines being rapidly transferred from San Diego into the region, suggesting preparations for a potential ground invasion rather than a real ceasefire. They highlight that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are involved in the efforts, and question why American forces are being moved if a ceasefire is in place. They argue that the U.S. and Israel show no intention of a genuine ceasefire or meeting Iran’s ten-point plan. After Trump’s administration celebrated a “ceasefire breakthrough” with Iran, Israel reportedly launched a series of attacks inside Lebanon, with Lebanese sources claiming hundreds of civilians were killed (more than 300) and millions displaced, undermining the ceasefire. They note Israel’s continued strikes on Lebanon, with Netanyahu’s side stating they would not stop and would continue to strike Hezbollah with full force, portraying Hezbollah as a target tied to Iran and Lebanon’s invasion. The program raises questions about whether the ceasefire could be limited to the United States and Iran, excluding Israel, and whether Iran could exclude Israel. They wonder if the ceasefire is a mechanism to reset or rearm rather than to establish lasting peace. They reference a draft ceasefire approved by the U.S., which Lebanese Hezbollah and others argue should include an end to Israeli expansion in Lebanon. Trump spokespeople claimed Lebanon was not included, but the hosts and guests argue Lebanon was indeed part of the terms, noting that the U.S. supplied a draft to Pakistan’s prime minister that included Lebanon, which Pakistan reposted. Dave DeCamp (antiwar.com) and Max Blumenthal (The Grey Zone) join to discuss. Dave notes that Iran’s ceasefire includes Lebanon, and Israel escalated with “operation eternal darkness,” killing hundreds. He questions JD Vance’s comments that Lebanon was never part of the terms and suggests the negotiations hint at a deal only between the U.S. and Iran, potentially allowing Iran and Israel to fight. He notes the involvement of Kushner and Witkoff in negotiations and observes that the day after the ceasefire was announced, the U.S. and Israel acted in ways inconsistent with a real ceasefire. Max adds that the White House has rebranded operations to “Epic Fury” and suggests a ground invasion appears more likely as a response to a failed ceasefire. He argues the ceasefire has fallen apart within hours and asserts the broader geopolitical dynamics—where the Straits of Hormuz act as a choke point and Iran uses cryptocurrency-based tolls—shift leverage toward Iran. He contends the war strengthens Iran’s political position while weakening those advocating appeasement or renewal of the JCPOA, and asserts that the U.S. can only cause more death and destruction. They discuss the international response to the Beirut bombing, noting tepid Western condemnation and arguing the U.S. and Israel depend on U.S. weapons and bombs to carry out the assault. They observe that Western officials have not condemned the attack vigorously, and that the Lebanese public is rallying around Hezbollah and seeking Iranian intervention in response to Israel’s actions. They reference New York Times reporting about Israel “dragging the United States into war” and the backlash against that characterization. They discuss the Pentagon’s integration with Israeli/Israeli-linked operations, and suggest that senior Trump advisers may have disputed Netanyahu’s narrative, with Ratcliffe expressing doubts about Israeli intelligence. They note internal tensions and potential fall guys like Pete Hegseth, while acknowledging Trump’s central role and the possibility of accountability at the ballot box. In closing, they emphasize the ongoing travel of Kushner, Vance, and other figures to broker a 10-point plan in Pakistan, while questioning trust in the process and urging scrutiny of who is driving the talks and under what terms. They promote Dave DeCamp’s antiwar.com coverage as a resource.

A discussion centers on a report that Trump allegedly called Netanyahu an “effing idiot” during a tense phone call, with claims that Netanyahu received U.S. permission for an operation involving Beirut that was intended as a “bluff” with an evacuation order rather than actual bombing. The conversation explores whether Netanyahu could have obtained authority to strike Beirut through other officials in the U.S. administration without Trump’s direct approval, emphasizing how leaders can “work the system” via gaps between decision-makers. The colonel argues that the characters and relationships among decision-makers heavily shape national security outcomes, citing volatile leadership dynamics and describing how powerful political figures can conflict even when both consider each other “indispensable.” He links Netanyahu’s increasing vulnerability to domestic political setbacks, including the Knesset moving elections up, and to attacks from political opponents using Netanyahu’s perceived responsiveness to Trump’s instructions as a weapon. According to the discussion, Netanyahu initially seemed likely to follow Trump’s guidance about Lebanon, but the issue escalated across Jerusalem through diplomatic and political spillover, leading Netanyahu to reverse course and return to a “warpath” posture in Lebanon. The speakers discuss how rhetoric may diverge from action, and then broaden into a broader pattern: opponents are portrayed as escalating pressure by citing Netanyahu’s listening to the U.S. president in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Iran, accusing him of not securing enough U.S. action. The colonel also points to Netanyahu’s use of terminology described as invoking “final solution” and says the phrase about completing the Iran mission “in a way that constitutes a final solution” is “nasty terminology,” while stating a hope that it is being used as material to “bluff.” Another major thread claims that Pakistan has moved toward China and Iran as its preferred alignment, with a described arrangement involving Pakistan’s ISI and the military and a transfer or provision of nuclear weapons capabilities to Iran, framed around AQ Khan’s network and Pakistan’s nuclear history. The discussion claims that logistics networks connecting rail and ports (including a Chinese rail route into Iran and maritime routes) support Hezbollah and Iran’s resupply, especially for ballistic missiles, and argues that the Strait of Hormuz situation is being worsened by continued confrontation rather than contained by it, with the claim that many ships have passed after paying tolls and that Iran would benefit if it gained full control. The speakers criticize what they describe as a lack of direct diplomacy with Iran, arguing that third-party communications and intermediaries have replaced real talks, and describe Iran responding more aggressively in Lebanon by freezing talks, threatening strikes on Israeli forces inside Lebanon, and issuing evacuation orders for northern Israel. The conversation also discusses whether Iran could develop or already have the capability to match warheads to missiles quickly and whether Iran might conduct a nuclear test as a warning to the U.S. and Israel to deter further strikes. A point is raised that openly demonstrating could force Trump into escalation, while another perspective suggests Iran might focus on deterrence vis-à-vis Netanyahu. The dialogue extends into nuclear deterrence and first-strike capability debates, alongside references to U.S. nuclear posture thinking and the idea that some in the U.S. government argue for using nuclear weapons rather than relying solely on deterrence. In closing, the conversation turns briefly to Ukraine and NATO, with a claim that Putin is seriously considering striking NATO and an argument that a “Not a penny more” approach from Trump could pressure Zelensky and NATO allies toward an outcome without needing NATO strikes. The host also plans to bring up the nuclear-warning-shot discussion with an upcoming guest and references a Pakistani-source report that Iran may already have a nuclear weapon and might do a test to deter further attacks.

Rula and Mario discuss the broader and regional dimensions of the Israel-Palestine-Lebanon conflict, focusing on the perception of Israel’s actions, Iran’s role, and the future of Lebanon and the wider Middle East. - Rula frames the war as centered on the greater Israel project, describing the military occupation, domination, and violence in Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian territories as the core issue. She argues Israel is an occupying power under international law and questions the rationale of asking Palestinians and Lebanese to disarm while occupation persists. - Mario challenges the view that Israel as a single, unified actor always seeks expansion, noting that in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s presence arises from past Israeli actions and that some Israelis want coexistence with Lebanon. He contends there are variations within Israeli society, with some advocating for annexation or permanent conflict, while others prefer coexistence or diplomacy, though he acknowledges a radicalized current in Israeli politics. - The conversation moves to Iran’s role and regional dynamics. Mario argues the conflict has become regional and global, with Iran signaling willingness to act ruthlessly to mirror US and Israeli actions, and with other powers (Gulf states, China, Russia, the US) shaping the war’s scope. He asserts Israel’s strategic goals diverge from American goals, claiming the war serves the Greater Israel project and that Netanyahu has long pursued this vision, aided by a perceived, multi-decade alignment with American power and money from pro-Israel donors. - Rula emphasizes the internal Israeli political and social landscape, citing the Gatekeepers documentary as evidence that Israeli leadership has used Hamas and other actors as strategic tools, and she argues that the state’s actions are guided by a broader ideology (which she attributes to a form of Jewish supremacism) rather than conventional security concerns. She contends that Israel’s security narrative relies on perpetual conflict, and she asserts the United States has become financially and politically subservient to pro-Israel interests through campaign financing and lobbying. - The dialogue addresses US and international responses. Mario notes the US and Western support for Israel, while acknowledging criticisms of American influence. Rula counters by pointing out that US actions, such as sanctioning international courts to shield Netanyahu from war crimes prosecution, reflect a deep, structural alignment with Israeli policy. They discuss how this alignment influences regional dynamics, including the US response to challenges from Iran, Syria, and Hamas. - On Lebanon specifically, they debate whether Israel intends to annex parts of Lebanon or seek coexistence with Lebanese authorities and Hezbollah. Rula argues that Israel historically aimed to push toward annexation or subjugation of Lebanon, driven by a broader Greater Israel agenda, while Mario suggests Israel may prefer coexisting arrangements similar to Egypt and Jordan, though she counters that such coexistence would still come with coercive power dynamics and that Israeli policy has repeatedly demonstrated willingness to decimate Lebanon’s infrastructure and Hezbollah targets when framed as security operations. - The discussion covers ceasefires and ceasefire violations. They note that Hezbollah reportedly agreed to disarm and withdraw from certain areas, but ceasefire breaches occurred on both sides, including Hezbollah rocket fire and Israeli strikes. They debate who has honored or violated agreements, with Rula asserting that Israel breached ceasefires multiple times and Mario emphasizing parallel violations by Hezbollah. - They touch on the humanitarian and civilian toll, highlighting Lebanese displacement, destruction in Lebanon similar to Gaza, and the long-term risk of further fragmentation in the Middle East. Mario and Rula acknowledge Lebanon’s multi-sectarian society and express a lament for its potential loss of stability and coexistence. - Towards the end, they reflect on Israeli societal attitudes, referencing nationalist and supremacist sentiments inside Israel, including debates over Palestinian and Arab citizens, and they discuss the relative popularity of hardline policies among Israelis, contrasted with poll data that vary by source about two-state solutions or diplomatic options. - The exchange closes with mutual appreciation for the dialogue, a hint of residual mistrust in negotiated outcomes, and a light aside about a potential inquiry to an Israeli spokesperson about unpaid propaganda work, signaling ongoing attempts to scrutinize public messaging. Key points reiterated: - The war seen as part of a broader Greater Israel project, with occupation central to the conflict. - Iran and regional powers are pivotal in expanding the war beyond the Middle East. - Israeli internal politics, donor influence, and demographic shifts shape policy and willingness to pursue or resist further conflict. - Hezbollah and Lebanon are central but contested elements in debates about annexation versus coexistence. - Ceasefire dynamics reflect mutual distrust and ongoing violence on both sides. - There is a strong emphasis on the need to address underlying crises and the danger of perpetuating permanent warfare, with appeals to listen to diverse Israeli voices and to consider the humanitarian consequences for Lebanon and Palestinians.

Glenn welcomes Seyyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, to discuss the fast-escalating conflict involving Israel, Iran, Lebanon, and the region. Marandi says that while in Tehran—busy interviewing Ph.D. candidates—he did not hear airstrikes, though he understands several missile strikes occurred. Marandi frames the situation as unfavorable for the “Americans” and says Iranian missile strikes have been effective. He describes Iran’s retaliation as occurring after Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Israel’s subsequent attacks on Iran, and claims Iran fired “five waves of missiles” and then large numbers afterward, with the total approaching “a hundred.” He also says Trump posted on Truth Social calling for action “to end this immediately,” while Marandi argues the United States had no intention of bringing about a ceasefire in Lebanon. Marandi contends that Lebanese leadership—including the president and prime minister—concluded negotiations against Lebanese law and received “death” in return, citing an Israeli bombing of a Lebanese military convoy soon after a CNN interview by Lebanon’s president attacking Iran. He adds that Lebanese authorities allegedly prevent refugees from moving within Lebanon, “corner” Shia-majority refugees, and try to make the situation sectarian, with Western NGOs and embassies encouraging restrictions in neighborhoods. He further alleges that proxies in Syria and Lebanon are working with Israel to keep borders closed and block assistance coming from Iran or Iraq, while claiming people nevertheless gather aid in Iran and Iraq that cannot be sent into Lebanon. He argues Iran and Hezbollah have continued striking effectively even during escalation, and suggests Iranian actions are tied to preventing Israeli plans to level areas of Beirut, describing a shift in Iran’s deterrence posture. Marandi says Iran warned that if Israel bombed Beirut, Iran would strike the Israeli regime, and that Israel refrained from striking Beirut for several days before resuming after the Pakistani interior minister delivered a message (Pakistan as mediator). He says the pattern mirrors earlier instances where U.S. attacks were met by larger Iranian counterstrikes. Discussing U.S. strategy, Marandi says the U.S. and allies appear to seek “low intensity” escalation to weaken and intimidate Iran while avoiding a “hot war,” but he claims Iran’s responses have instead sent signals that Iran is prepared to restart a more explosive war. He highlights that Iran has allegedly shut down the Strait of Hormuz and that, following Yemen’s announced disruption of Israel’s Red Sea access, Marandi says escalation stakes increase further. When asked about potential negotiations, Marandi says what matters to Iran is not Trump’s statements but what his regime does. He lists Iran’s stated terms: end to the war in Lebanon, regime retreat, end to the slaughter in Gaza, lifting siege, waiving sanctions on Iran’s oil/energy exports for the duration, and returning “stolen assets.” He argues Iran will not provide concessions that go beyond those conditions. On U.S.-Israel relations, Marandi addresses Axios reporting about differences between Trump and Netanyahu and says the publication itself matters because it portrays Netanyahu as despised and “crazy,” which he says damaged Netanyahu politically in Israel and also in the United States. He suggests a possible objective of weakening Netanyahu and emphasizes that Trump’s public disavowal (“I told him not to attack”) is undermining. Marandi then turns to what Iran may do next as escalation rises. He says Iran has changed the “rules of the game” by signaling that strikes on Lebanon trigger retaliation. He claims Iran will retaliate not only for attacks on itself but for attacks on Lebanon and, in further statements, for attacks on petrochemical and Persian Gulf energy-related installations affiliated with the United States or Israel. He asserts Iran threatens to strike Persian Gulf infrastructure and “the Americans too,” and says this extends Iran’s deterrence beyond Israel. He also says Hezbollah’s drones and ambush-style strikes harm the regime, while Iran’s deterrence against touching Beirut hampers offensive capability. Marandi concludes that he does not foresee a favorable outcome for the United States or Israel, and says the global economy remains close to a worsening point as the conflict intensifies. As a “footnote,” he says Iran carried out an operation on the Pakistan border against Wahhabi/Salafi militants, killing some and capturing others, portraying multiple extremist groups as attacking the same enemies rather than Israel.

In the dialogue, Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiation adviser, discusses the prospect of renewed U.S. aggression against Iran and the stability of any ceasefire. He says that since the ceasefire began, preparations for war in Tehran have been ongoing “twenty four hours a day,” driven by the belief that Trump will not accept defeat and that the “Zionist lobbying” and the Israeli regime remain behind the war. He suggests that although it is not certain, a new round of conflict could erupt over a weekend or soon after markets close, noting that the U.S. and Netanyahu’s positions previously clashed with ceasefire terms. He recounts that Iran had insisted on an off-ramp when Netanyahu accepted the ceasefire, but Trump then claimed the Strait of Hormuz would remain open while maintaining a siege on Iranian ports, implying that an off-ramp was possible but not pursued. Marandi emphasizes that the Strait of Hormuz was never closed by Iran, except to ships linked to adversaries, and argues that the escalation followed Netanyahu’s actions despite Iranian signals. He asserts that even if a limited agreement allows more ships through, the broader pain from any renewed conflict will persist, potentially causing a global economic depression if critical infrastructure is destroyed or if negotiations on Hormuz or Gaza/ Lebanon ceasefires are delayed for weeks due to fighting. On the U.S. side, the host notes that the U.S. was in trouble and desperate, pointing to missile defenses and ammunition shortages as signs of strain, and remarks that Trump accepted Iran’s 10-point plan as a ceasefire framework but later abandoned it, while presenting an extended ceasefire as a favor. Marandi agrees that Trump’s actions have been inconsistent and that the Iranians might expect the U.S. to pursue assassinations and infrastructure strikes again, with Iran prepared to retaliate robustly. A key point is Iran’s stated willingness to escalate in response to attacks on its leadership and critical infrastructure. An Iranian MP, associated with the Islamabad delegation, reportedly warned that if any assassinations occur, Iran will target leaders of Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Bahrain, the Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) because they are complicit in the war. The discussion outlines that Iran would retaliate not only against Israeli targets but also within the Persian Gulf region, potentially striking infrastructure and power facilities, with implications for the region’s electricity and climate conditions during the hot season. Marandi argues that Iran has already demonstrated strategic restraint, saying that Iranian authorities aim to minimize civilian casualties and that Iranians would respond to attacks on critical Iranian infrastructure by striking broader targets in the Israeli regime and in regional partners. He contends that Iran does not initiate escalation but escalates in response, pointing to past cycles where Iran’s retaliation was effective without targeting civilians. He notes that Iran has assets across its mountainous interior, including deep underground factories and bases, which he claims the United States underestimates, leading to miscalculations about Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Regarding the broader geopolitical landscape, Marandi notes rising Western and Israeli concerns about Iran’s expanding influence, while acknowledging growing sympathy for Iran in parts of the world, including some shifts in India and Latin America. He highlights the Putin-Trump dynamic, suggesting Putin’s meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister and Russia’s praise for the Iranian people signal a strengthening axis of resistance against Western pressures. He also remarks that Iran’s resilience under sanctions and its ability to mobilize regional allies, such as Hezbollah, complicates Western expectations of quick regime change. Finally, Marandi suggests that Iran’s role on the global stage is shifting perceptions of Iran’s strength and legitimacy, and he foresees continued pressure, potential escalation, and a regional balance of power that narrows Western maneuvering space as the crisis evolves.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

The discussion centers on conflicting statements attributed to Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump shortly after a call, with Netanyahu saying there would be no ceasefire and operations would continue as normal, while Trump allegedly claimed a full ceasefire would take effect. The speakers argue this contradiction is expected, and they suggest Netanyahu may pause for 24–48 hours but will likely resume operations, framing the conflict as continuing rather than stopping. They describe Netanyahu’s political survival as the key driver, arguing he cannot afford politically to end the war, and instead needs to maintain momentum to justify his leadership to the Israeli public and handle legal and political challenges that they expect to intensify after the war. They also claim Netanyahu would prefer “the man on top of a burning cinder” to losing position in a more stable environment. The speakers say Trump may use harsh language to pressure Netanyahu, but that Netanyahu has “experienced far worse” from other U.S. presidents, with Obama cited as particularly difficult due to resisting involvement and pursuing an attempted nuclear agreement with Iran. A separate point is raised about U.S. legislative constraints—specifically Section 224 of the Pending National Defense Authorization Act—described as ensuring future administrations cannot reverse aid to Israel and integrating Israel more fully into U.S. defense and industrial infrastructure, making it harder to disentangle. On escalation and de-escalation, the speakers say a real de-escalation is not happening, arguing that violence resumes quickly when ceasefire arrangements break down. They claim Israeli actions show they are not pulling back, including continued strikes and specific reference to Beirut. They argue that Israel could be slowing or “slow-walking” strikes temporarily, potentially to reposition, while Hezbollah prepares defenses and maintains contingency planning. The conversation also addresses an I24-reported assessment that Hezbollah has not resumed its core leadership or central command structure in southern Beirut’s Dahi district since the ceasefire, with Hezbollah reportedly relocating major parts of its command network to other Beirut areas. Israeli officials in the report are described as believing additional Israeli strikes on Dahi would have limited impact on Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, and that Israel’s push toward Beirut is partly to pressure Lebanese actors against Hezbollah. A broader strategic framing is offered: the speakers suggest Iran’s threats to strike Israel’s northern homeland could provide Netanyahu with political leverage to portray continued fighting as existential and necessary. They also discuss “red lines,” saying Iran drew a red line and that what comes next depends on which side dictates actions. Trump is described as wanting a peace deal, while the speakers claim Israel does not mind sabotaging it. Regarding Iran’s posture, the speakers say Iran escalated in a way that surprised them less than it might have otherwise, noting Iran threatened significant escalation against Israel and recommended citizen evacuations. They argue this looks more like calibrated retaliation than chaotic escalation, describing Iran as a “counter puncher” and suggesting the conflict could include off-ramps. They also criticize rhetoric that labels Iran “crazy,” arguing that ceasefire terms involving Lebanon were not implemented and Israel was breaching the ceasefire. The conversation extends to the broader question of U.S. involvement, debating arguments that the U.S. should walk away versus the idea that the U.S. owes allies an effort to stabilize—particularly stopping hostilities in Lebanon. One speaker argues the U.S. struggles with post-war stabilization and that pulling back could force regional actors to be more reasonable, describing this as reducing moral hazard. Finally, the speakers discuss press access and censorship, including reporting that the Pentagon restricted journalists by designating its press office as a classified area and barring journalists from entering to interact with public affairs staff. They argue this is inconsistent with claims of free speech, and they also mention bans or restrictions in the UK against controversial media figures in connection with Israel-related debates. The transcript closes with the host listing additional interviews and guests from the channel lineup and stating more interviews will follow.

Glenn welcomed Seyyed Muhammad Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiator adviser, and asked about the terms of the current ceasefire and why clarity is hard to get. Marandi explained the progression: the U.S. initially demanded unconditional surrender, then shifted to a “15 plan,” which Iran rejected. Iran developed its own plan, with the Supreme National Security Council sending a modified version to the leader, Ayatollah Bahamani, who finalized it and sent it to Pakistan. Trump ostensibly accepted Iran’s framework as the basis for negotiations, though “that doesn’t mean that we’re going to have peace” and there’s little faith in U.S. willingness to concede the 10 points Iran presented. He described the U.S. as an empire whose capitulation is unlikely, given internal and international pressure and the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He warned that the U.S. military footprint in the region would be hard to sustain and would face logistical and environmental strain, which could complicate any new war; nonetheless, Iran is preparing for the worst, having previously negotiated with the U.S. twice and seeing both efforts end in renewed conflict. He attributed recent Israeli actions against Lebanon as an effort to derail the ceasefire, noting that Israeli leadership (Netanyahu) appears motivated to induce more violence to gain leverage domestically, while Western media outlets largely abstain from criticizing these actions. Glenn pressed on how to interpret the two-week window for negotiations and whether Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire remains valid. Marandi reiterated skepticism that the full Iran-focused 10-point plan would be accepted by the United States, calling Trump inconsistent and unpredictable. He suggested the two-week period might be extended if negotiations progress modestly, but doubted any comprehensive agreement would be reached given the U.S. tendency to resist rights-based terms and to change positions rapidly. The two discussed the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran conflict, with Iran continuing to strike at Israeli targets and American assets in the Gulf if necessary. The conversation then moved to the question of who bears responsibility for the broader regional disruption. Marandi argued that Gulf regimes (the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar) are not in a position to fight Iran; without electricity and infrastructure, they would suffer cataclysmic losses. He asserted that the U.S. could not unify the Gulf states in a new campaign and that Iran would control the Strait of Hormuz if attacked. The UAE’s rumored strike on petrochemical facilities was cited as an example of the ongoing broader conflict. He also suggested Lebanon’s fate is tied to whether Israel continues striking Lebanon or shifts its focus back to Iran, and warned that a failure to constrain Israel would undermine any peace talks. Marandi asserted that the ceasefire’s terms could be undermined by the “Epstein class” influence over Western media and governments, arguing that the global media’s support for Israel’s actions betrays a broader humanitarian and democratic legitimacy crisis in the West. He also noted that Oman’s cooperation around Hormuz might be part of a negotiated arrangement, given Oman’s more favorable relationship with Iran and its geographic position on the strait. He stressed that Iran’s apparent victory could reshape global power dynamics, weakening the U.S. and empowering Iran and other Global South actors, with implications for the petrodollar system and regional alignments. Towards the end, Glenn and Marandi touched on the potential long-term regional changes, including borders and governance in the Gulf, and the broader economic and political costs for Gulf monarchies. Marandi attributed the crisis to Zionist influence on U.S. policy and lamented missed opportunities to pursue normal relations with the United States, referencing authors Flint and Leverett and their book Going to Tehran, which he suggested could have altered current events if heeded. He concluded by reiterating that lessons were not learned and that the war’s consequences would be lasting.

Speaker 0 begins by noting a new escalation in the war: after the president's Easter-weekend speech, the United States struck a massive bridge in Tehran, described as part of Tehran’s pride because it would cut about an hour from Iranians’ commutes. Trump posts, “the biggest bridge in Iran comes tumbling down, never to be used again,” and says, “Make a deal before it’s too late.” He warns that nothing is left of what could still become a great country. Speaker 1 responds with skepticism about the administration, mocking the idea of “the Nord Stream pipeline” being blown up as a lie by the prior administration. Speaker 0 notes that Trump boasted about the bridge strike on Truth Social and questions the strategic value of targeting civilian infrastructure, comparing it to striking the Golden Gate Bridge and asking whether that would be labeled a war crime. Iranian retaliation follows: a strike at the center of Tehran (clarified as Tel Aviv in error in the transcript) with a ballistic missile, causing a neighborhood to burn, as shown on Fox News and circulating on social media. Reports also emerge that an Amazon data center was struck in Bahrain, Oracle in the UAE, and that Iran had claimed it would strike Microsoft, Google, Amazon and other large American companies. The United States is not protecting them. Speaker 2 engages Colonel Daniel Davis, host of The Deep Dive with Dan Davis, to assess the latest moves alongside the president’s speech. Speaker 2 argues that the president’s remarks about “bomb you back into the stone age” indicate punishing the civilian population, not just military targets, which could unite Iranians against the United States and Israel. The bridge strike appears to align with that stance, making a regional outcome that contradicts any stated aims. He calls it nearly a war crime, since civilian infrastructure has no military utility in this context. He suggests the action undermines any potential peace path and could prompt stronger resistance within Iran. He warns that, politically, Trump could face war-crimes scrutiny, especially under a Democratic-controlled House, and that it damages the United States’ reputation by appearing to disregard the rule of law and morality. Speaker 1 asks whether such tactics are ever effective, noting a lack of evidence that inflicting civilian suffering yields political concession. Speaker 0 and Speaker 2 reference historical examples (Nazis, British during the Battle of Britain, Hiroshima-era considerations) to suggest such tactics have not succeeded in breaking civilian resolve, arguing this approach would harden Iranian resistance. Speaker 2 cites broader historical or regional patterns: torture or collective punishment has failed against Germans, Japanese, Palestinians in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. He contends the appeal of using such power is seductive but dangerous, likening it to “war porn.” He notes that the number of Iranian fatalities floated by Trump has fluctuated (3,000, 10,000, 30,000, then 45,000), describing them as not credible, yet the administration seems unconcerned with accuracy. Speaker 3 adds that the rhetoric justifies escalating violence with humanitarian consequences, including potential energy-system disruption. Speaker 0 asks about the discrepancy between Trump’s claim of decimating Iran and subsequent attacks on multiple targets in the Gulf and the firepower Iran still holds, including underground facilities and missile capabilities. Speaker 2 explains that Iran can absorb punishment and still strike back, suggesting that the Strait of Hormuz cannot be opened by force and that escalation could involve considerations of a larger false-flag scenario. He mentions a warning about a potential nine-eleven-level attack and potential media complicity, implying fears of a false-flag operation blamed on Iran. Speaker 0 notes the possibility of Israeli involvement undermining negotiations and cites JD Vance’s planned meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, noting Kharazi’s injury and his wife’s death, implying an assassination attempt. Speaker 2 critiques U.S. reliance on allies, arguing that Israel’s actions threaten U.S. interests and that the White House should constrain Israel. He asserts there is no military solution to the conflict, warns of long-term costs to the United States and its European and Asian relations, and predicts economic consequences if the conflict continues. Speaker 1 remarks that Iranian leaders’ letter to the American people shows civilian intent not to surrender, while Speaker 0 and Speaker 2 emphasize the risk of ongoing conflict, with Colonel Davis concluding that there is no feasible open-strand resolution. The discussion ends with thanks to Colonel Davis for his analysis.

The conversation centers on Iran’s current crisis and the likelihood, timing, and aims of potential U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran. The speakers discuss whether protests inside Iran are driving any attack plans or if those plans were made beforehand, and what the objectives might be if war occurs. Key points and claims, preserved as stated: - The Iranian regime is described as facing its worst crisis since 1979, with reports of thousands dead, and questions about whether the U.S. and possibly Israel will strike Iran, and what their objectives would be (regime change vs installing a new leader under the supreme leader). - The interviewer introduces Trita Parsi, noting his nuanced, non-dual position and his personal history of fleeing Iran around the revolution. - The analysts discuss whether a war plan against Iran existed before the protests; Speaker 1 (Parsi) argues the plan was made prior to the protests and that the protests did not cause the decision. He says the Israelis intended to provoke the U.S. into war, but the sequence shifted so the United States would lead with Israel in a supporting role. He notes Netanyahu’s unusual quiet and suggests a deliberate effort to present this as Trump’s war, not Israel’s, though he believes the plan originated in Washington in late December at the White House. - The protests are said to be organic and not instigated from abroad, with possible slight slowing of plans due to the protests. The rationale for striking Iran initially emphasized Israeli concerns about Iranian missile capabilities and their potential rebuilding of missiles and, ambiguously, nuclear ambitions; there was no credible media evidence presented to support new nuclear development claims, according to Speaker 1. - The justification for an attack is viewed as a pretext tied to “unfinished business,” with the broader aim of addressing Iran’s missile program and perceived threats, rather than the protests alone. The discussion notes that pro-Iran regime factions in the U.S. may find protests more persuasive among centrist Democrats, but less so among MAGA or core Trump supporters. - The origins of the protests are described as organic, driven by currency collapse and sanctions, which Speaker 1 connects to decades of sanctions and the economic crisis in Iran. He states sanctions were designed to produce desperation to create a window for outside intervention, though he emphasizes this does not mean the protests are purely externally driven. - The role of sanctions is elaborated: Pompeo’s “maximum pressure” statement is cited as intentional to create conditions for regime change, with Speaker 0 highlighting the destruction of Iran’s economy as a method to weaken the regime and empower opposition. Speaker 1 agrees the sanctions contributed to economic distress but stresses that the protests’ roots are broader than the economy alone. - The discussion considers whether the protests could be used to justify external action and whether a regional or global backlash could ensue, including refugee flows and regional instability affecting Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and GCC states. It’s noted that the U.S. and some regional actors would prefer to avoid a total collapse of Iran, while Israel would welcome greater upheaval if it constrains Iranian capabilities. - The question of a power vacuum inside Iran is addressed. Speaker 1 argues there is no obvious internal opposition strong enough to quickly replace the regime; MeK is excluded as a coalition partner in current Iran opposition movements. The Pahlavi (Reza Pallavi) faction is discussed as a possible figurehead outside Iran, with debate about his domestic support. The MEK is described as outside any coalition due to its history. - Pallavi’s potential role: Speaker 1 suggests Pallavi has gained closer ties with Israel and some pro-Israel circles in Washington, but emphasizes that domestic support inside Iran remains uncertain and difficult to gauge. Pallavi says he would seek a democratically elected leader if the regime falls; Speaker 1 cautions that words alone are insufficient without proven ability to secure loyalty from security forces and to persuade key societal sectors. - The Shah’s legacy and comparison: The Shah’s regime is described as highly repressive but comparatively more open socially and economically, though with a discredited political system. The current regime disperses power within a more complex system where the supreme leader is central but not incomparable to past autocrats. - The potential for separatism and regional spillover is discussed, including Kurdish separatism in western Iran. Speaker 1 clarifies that the Kurdish group is not part of the protests but a separate element taking advantage of the situation; the risk of civil war if the state collapses is acknowledged as a nightmare scenario. - The possibility of a Maduro-like approach (managed transition through elite elements) is considered. While channels of communication exist, Speaker 1 doubts the same dynamics as Venezuela; Iran lacks internal continuity in the security establishment, making a similar path unlikely. - Military retaliation dynamics are examined: Iran’s response to limited U.S. strikes could be symbolic or broader, including potential strikes on U.S. bases in the region. The possibility that Israel would push the United States to target Iran’s military capabilities rather than just decapitation is discussed, with notes about potential after-effects and regional reactions. - The 12-day war context and Iran’s current military capabilities: There is debate about whether Iran’s military could be a greater threat to U.S. bases than previously believed and about how easily Iranian missile launches could be located and neutralized. - The closing forecast: The likely trajectory depends on the next few days. A limited, negotiated strike could lead to negotiations and a transformed regime with lifted sanctions, perhaps avoiding a wholesale regime change; a more aggressive or decapitating approach could provoke substantial instability and regional repercussions. The conversation ends with a personal note of concern for Parsi’s family in Iran. - Final reflection: The interview ends with expressions of concern for family safety and a mutual appreciation for the discussion.

The transcript claims that since the United States was founded, it has started wars with other nations once every ten years, while Iran “hasn’t started any,” and it links modern foreign interest in Iran to early 1900s oil interests. It states that the Anglo-Persian oil company led to British dependence on Iranian oil, followed by “a century of betrayals, strategic deception, and psychological operations,” including Britain overthrowing the Iranian government in 1921. It further claims that during World War II, Britain and the USSR invaded Iran to steal oil, and in 1953 Britain and the USA overthrew the Iranian government. The transcript then asserts that after 9/11, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were blamed, that Western intelligence assets were involved, and that foreign Zionists began a mass-murder campaign in the region with a death count “in the millions.” It also claims that when Zionist forces occupied Iraq, Iranians “knew they were coming” and prepared. It says that less than 48 hours before a US-Israel attack on Iran on February 28, the United States had concluded “the most productive round of nuclear negotiations in years” and agreed to meet again in four days. It states that an independent mediator said a peace deal was within reach, claiming Iran agreed it would never have enough nuclear material to create a bomb and offered full IAEA access to nuclear sites. It also says Iran offered to down blend highly enriched uranium to the lowest possible level and convert it into irreversible fuel, with technical talks scheduled in Vienna and a fourth round of political negotiations within the week. The transcript claims that 48 hours later, Trump and Israel launched an attack on Iran, including strikes targeting the nation’s leader and “178 Iranian school girls,” allegedly murdered with a double strike of Tomahawk missiles. It alleges that the “army, navy, and air force” were decoys to waste munitions and that Iran’s “real military is underground,” including “a massive city of tunnels” beneath the country with missile stockpiles and launch sites. It describes custom weapon systems and technologies, including swarms of thousands of drones, missiles with no fins to reduce radar lock, missiles steering away from predicted flight paths, missiles deploying multiple warheads to evade interceptors, and hypersonic missiles. It claims that on March 21, Iran launched a strike against Israel’s nuclear facilities at Damona and hit the target, presenting it as a message that Iran can “target Israel’s nukes at will.” It also claims Iran’s actions are transparent, announcing actions and targets and following through, contrasting this with US-Israeli “deception, and terror.” It states Iran’s real navy is underground with thousands of unmanned surface vehicles operating as swarms to attack ships in the Gulf, and claims Iran has planned and effectively “nationalized the Strait Of Hormuz,” citing planning since 2003. The transcript concludes by asserting Iran has munitions for years, is continuing to produce more underground, and can “tank the world economy” if needed, while claiming the US and Israel are already running out.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins the program to discuss the dramatic developments in the war against Iran. The conversation centers on the strike on Karg Island, the strategic choke point for Iran’s oil exports, and the broader implications of escalating U.S. actions. - Karg Island and the oil threat: The host notes that Karg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports and asks why Trump isn’t targeting this area. Johnson argues the attack on Karg Island makes little strategic sense and points out that Iran has five oil terminals; destroying one would not end Iran’s potential revenue. He emphasizes that the U.S. bombed the runway of the major airport on the island, which he says remains irrelevant to Iran’s overall capacity to generate revenue. He notes the runway damage would not support U.S. objectives for invading the island, given runway length constraints (6,000 feet measured vs. need for 3,500–3,700 feet for certain aircraft) and the limited air force in Iran. Johnson asserts that Iran has indicated it would retaliate against oil terminals and Gulf neighbors if oil resources or energy infrastructure are attacked. - Economic and strategic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz: Johnson states that the action effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil supply, 25% of global LNG, and 35% of the world’s urea for fertilizer. He explains fertilizer’s criticality to global agriculture and notes that rising gas and diesel prices in the United States would impact consumer costs, given many Americans live paycheck to paycheck. He suggests the price hikes contribute to inflationary pressure and could trigger a global recession, especially since Persian Gulf countries are pivotal energy suppliers. He also points out that the U.S. cannot easily reopen Hormuz without unacceptable losses and that Iran has prepared for contingencies for thirty years, with robust defenses including tunnels and coastal fortifications. - Military feasibility and strategy: The discussion covers the impracticality of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran, given the size of Iran’s army and the modern battlefield’s drone and missile threats. Johnson notes the U.S. Army and Marine numbers, the logistical challenges of sustaining an amphibious or airborne assault, and the vulnerability of American ships and troops to drones and missiles. He highlights that a mass deployment would be highly costly and dangerous, with historical evidence showing air power alone cannot win wars. The hosts discuss limited U.S. options and the possible futility of attempts to seize or occupy Iran’s territory. - Internal U.S. decision-making and DC dynamics: The program mentions a split inside Washington between anti-war voices and those pressing toward Tehran, with leaks suggesting that top officials warned Trump about major obstacles and potential losses. Johnson cites a leak from the National Intelligence Council indicating regime change in Tehran is unlikely, even with significant U.S. effort. He asserts the Pentagon’s credibility has been questioned after disputed reports (e.g., the KC-135 shootdown) and notes that Trump’s advisors who counsel restraint are being sidelined. - Iranian retaliation and targets: The discussion covers Iran’s targeting of air defenses and critical infrastructure, including radars at embassies and bases in the region, and the destruction of five Saudi air refueling tankers, which Trump later dismissed as fake news. Johnson says Iran aims to degrade Israel economically and militarily, while carefully avoiding mass civilian casualties in some instances. He observes Iran’s restraint in striking desalination plants, which would have caused a humanitarian catastrophe, suggesting a deliberate choice to keep certain targets within bounds. - Global realignments and the role of Russia, China, and India: The conversation touches on broader geopolitical shifts. Johnson argues that Russia and China are offering alternatives to the dollar-dominated order, strengthening ties with Gulf states and BRICS members. He suggests Gulf allies may be considering decoupling from U.S. security guarantees, seeking to diversify away from the petrodollar system. The discussion includes India’s position, noting Modi’s visit to Israel and India’s balancing act amid U.S. pressure and Iran relations; Iran’s ultimatum to allow passage for flag vessels and its diplomacy toward India is highlighted as a measured approach, even as India’s stance has attracted scrutiny. - Israel, casualties, and the broader landscape: The speakers discuss Israeli casualties and infrastructure under sustained Iranian strikes, noting limited information from within Israel due to media constraints and possible censorship. Johnson presents a game-theory view: if Israel threatens a nuclear option, Iran might be compelled to develop a nuclear capability as a deterrent, altering calculations for both Israel and the United States. - Terrorism narrative and historical context: The speakers challenge the U.S. portrayal of Iran as the world’s top sponsor of terrorism, arguing that ISIS and the Taliban have caused far more deaths in recent years, and that Iran’s responses to threats have historically prioritized restraint. They emphasize Iran’s chemical weapons restraint during the Iran-Iraq war, contrasting it with U.S. and Iraqi actions in the 1980s. - Final reflections: The discussion emphasizes the cascade effects of the conflict, including potential impacts on Taiwan’s energy and semiconductor production, multiplied by China’s leverage, and Russia’s increasing global influence. Johnson warns that the war’s end will likely be achieved through shifting alignments and economic realignments rather than a conventional battlefield victory, with the goal of U.S. withdrawal from the region as part of any settlement. The conversation closes with mutual thanks and a reaffirmation of ongoing analysis of these evolving dynamics.