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The discussion centers on CNN’s report that the CIA is establishing a foothold in Venezuela, with the claim that the CIA has, for decades, enabled the Venezuelan drug trade. The speakers argue that the attack on Venezuela cannot be about drugs if the CIA itself facilitated drug trafficking. They cite CIA whistleblower Kevin Shipp, who said the CIA has been involved in Venezuela since at least the Cartel of the Sun, run by a general who was a CIA proxy and helped reconstitute Venezuela’s intelligence to penetrate the government; the general named Ramon Gulen allegedly ran narcotics and created the cartel of the sun. They claim the cartel is used by the Trump administration as a pretext to stage attacks on boats and in Venezuela and that the CIA, with its long history, was behind the Secret Service and the general in creating the drug trade and the cartel, with the Trump administration leveraging it to circumvent Congress. There is reference to a 60 Minutes piece from the 1990s reporting that the CIA collaborated with Venezuelan National Guard generals who moved tons of cocaine into the United States. The conversation then moves to John Kerry, who in the mid-1980s led the Contra Cocaine Investigation hearings into U.S. government complicity in the contra drug trade. The Reagan administration resisted the inquiry, attempted to discredit witnesses, and assigned the CIA to monitor the probe. Ten years later, the HITS report (the CIA Inspector General report authorized under Inspector General Frederick HITS) concluded that while the CIA did not officially participate in cocaine trafficking during the Contra War, it knowingly maintained relationships with and protected numerous contra-linked individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade when deemed operationally important, to keep the Contra War alive and to maintain U.S. objectives in Central America, even if it meant enabling and protecting drug lords; the CIA hid this from Congress, contributing to drug flow into the United States. The Iran-Contra framework is referenced as arms to Iran funding the Contras, with connections to cocaine trafficking, forming a single pipeline, allegedly placing the CIA at the center of these operations. The panel critiques CNN’s headline as suggesting the CIA’s new foothold is about establishing a presence, arguing the real aim is to block Russia and China’s influence, not democracy or drugs. Venezuela’s oil trade outside the petrodollar with BRICS nations is noted, with claims that the move away from the petrodollar spurred interference and invasion, and that Venezuela later returned to endorsing the petrodollar after a period of yuan transactions with China. The discourse asserts that the CIA’s purpose is to prevent free trade outside U.S. influence and to suppress alternative financial arrangements like BRICS or yuan-based oil transactions. The participants discuss the idea that the CIA has shifted from operating covertly to openly engaging in such activities, suggesting a normalization of “strategy of tension” and the notion that a third of the population would support the government’s actions, a third oppose, and a third are indifferent, thereby reducing public resistance. They connect these elements to broader media complicity, including Operation Mockingbird and the integration of former intelligence heads into media roles, implying entrenched deep-state influence.

Speaker 0 raises the question of CIA involvement in drug trafficking, referencing a past discussion with former Tel Aviv CIA chief of station Susan Miller and noting a reminder about Iran-Contra. They ask why the CIA would be intimately involved with drug trafficking, and mention Candace Owens discussing it in relation to the Charlie Kirk assassination. Speaker 1 answers that trafficking in drugs allows the CIA to get closer to the targets they want to reach. They point to a popular Netflix series, Narcos, which follows the hunt for Pablo Escobar, the Cali cartel, and other major cartels. They claim that, in the show, and in real life, every time the Drug Enforcement Administration gets close to its primary target, the CIA station chief steps in and ruins the investigation. They state that this happens because the CIA doesn’t care about drugs. Speaker 1 continues that the CIA cares about terrorism and communism, implying there are always some other bigger ideological concerns. Therefore, the CIA is “perfectly happy” to allow cocaine to flood into the United States in the 1980s during the Iran-Contra period, just as it was “perfectly happy” to allow Afghanistan to provide 93% of the world’s heroin once the United States began its occupation of Afghanistan.

- Speaker 0 asks for the first reaction to the news and whether it was clearly a special operations effort to capture Maduro or a larger military operation. Speaker 1 says it quickly became obvious it was a special operations mission, citing the ships and platforms ideal for this, and the ability to fly helicopters into Venezuela as supporting evidence. - On how the operation penetrated Caracas and Maduro’s defenses: Speaker 1 says cyber operations were used to turn off power and to blind the air defense by making tracking and identification difficult, in addition to traditional jamming and excellent on-the-ground intelligence built up over weeks. He also suggests internal help within the Venezuelan regime was likely. - On the possibility of an inside asset and the defensive protections: Speaker 0 notes Cuban intelligence and Venezuelan National Guard protection for Maduro and asks how insiders could have enabled the operation. Speaker 1 says insiders could have assisted, and acknowledges the intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts was very strong. He cautions the president’s administration should not publicly reveal inside help, as that could cause paranoia within the command structure. - On the operation’s execution and its comparison to past regime-change operations: Speaker 1 emphasizes training and technology, noting the unit would include special operations aviation, Delta, and other components; argues this is a joint operation involving army, navy, air force, marines, cyber, and space-based platforms, requiring extensive rehearsals over weeks. He references Noriega’s capture as a point of comparison, but notes Maduro is on a different level. - On the electricity outage in Caracas: Speaker 0 asks if it was a cyber disruption or a kinetic strike. Speaker 1 responds that a cyber disruption to power is more likely than a kinetic strike, given the context. - On Venezuela’s air defense systems (S-300s, BUKs) and the $6 billion investment: Speaker 0 questions whether it’s fair to criticize these systems given the operation. Speaker 1 acknowledges they are sophisticated and capable but not sure of their maintenance and training levels. He notes the United States had telegraphed expectations for weeks and suggests negligence or incompetence in air-defense command and control if surprised. - On possible inside help and seniority of the asset: Speaker 0 asks who within the regime might have cooperated with the CIA. Speaker 1 is reluctant to speculate beyond confirming there was very good intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts. He finds it unlikely that the vice president would have been an internal asset, though he concedes nothing is impossible, given a mix of factions in the regime and third-party interference. - On geopolitical repercussions and messaging to China, Iran, and Russia: Speaker 0 points to the timing with a Chinese delegation in Caracas and asks what message this sends to China and whether the date had symbolic resonance with other events. Speaker 1 says the date was probably driven by weather and other operations rather than a deliberate China signal; he suggests China would reassess oil dependencies and potential leverage now that Maduro is captured. He predicts the next target could be Cuba and discusses logistical challenges, such as Cuba’s island geography and Guantanamo Bay. - On US strategy in the Western Hemisphere and potential targets: Speaker 1 opines that Cuba is a plausible next target and explains why, including electoral considerations in Florida. He notes that a Cuba operation would be more difficult than Venezuela due to geography but could be motivated by domestic political calculation and the Monroe Doctrine as a signal. - On China, Russia, and Iran in the wake of Maduro’s capture: Speaker 1 argues the US demonstrates strong capabilities, and China would need to reassess oil supply and leverage; Russia’s and Iran’s interests could be pressured as the US asserts influence in the region. He mentions that the US might not directly engage in large-scale intervention in Iran but warns against overreach due to domestic political constraints. - On the broader pattern and future: Speaker 1 cautions about the risk of hubris and notes domestic political constraints and upcoming congressional pressures that could shape how far the administration pursues this strategy beyond Venezuela. He stresses the importance of not overestimating the ability to sustain similar moves without a plan for the post-Maduro environment.

The speaker discusses their involvement with drug trafficking and connections to the Clintons and the CIA. They mention landing in Arkansas and the movie "America Made" (originally titled "Mena") being changed due to Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign. They also mention Bill Clinton's brother, Roger, being caught with cocaine and pardoned. The speaker talks about their connections with Escobar and the Colombian drug trade, as well as their use of Panther conversions for transporting drugs. They mention the competition between their airlines and the high volume of drugs being transported.

The discussion centers on claims that the CIA has long been involved in Venezuela, has enabled drug trafficking, and now seeks a visible foothold in the country to counter Russia and China. Speaker 0 argues CNN’s report that the CIA will establish a foothold in Venezuela is emblematic of a duplicative pattern: the CIA has supposedly enabled the drug trade for decades, so the attack on Venezuela cannot be about drugs if the CIA is involved. They cite Kevin Shipp, a CIA whistleblower, who said the CIA has been involved in Venezuela since at least the Cartel of the Sun, run by a general who was a CIA proxy and helped reconstruct Venezuela’s intelligence service to penetrate the government. The general cited is General Ramon Gulen, described as running narcotics and creating and running the Cartel of the Sun. The Cartel is portrayed as a pretext used by the Trump administration to stage attacks and operate around Congress, with the CIA behind past secret dealings tied to it. Speaker 0 then references a 60 Minutes piece from the 1990s reported on by mainstream media that allegedly showed the CIA collaborating with Venezuelan National Guard generals who moved tons of cocaine into the United States. The discussion moves to John Kerry, who led the Contra Cocaine Investigation in the mid-1980s, seeking to determine US government involvement in the contra drug trade. The Reagan administration resisted, stonewalled the Senate, and monitored the probe. The HITS report (the CIA inspector general report authorized under inspector general Frederick HITS) is described as concluding in the late 1990s that while the CIA did not officially participate in cocaine trafficking during the Contra War, it knowingly maintained relationships with and protected numerous contra-linked individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade when operationally useful, to keep the contra war alive and to maintain US objectives in Central America, even if it meant enabling and protecting drug lords. It also states the CIA hid this from Congress, contributing to drugs entering the United States. The Iran-Contra connection is summarized as arms to Iran generating cash to fund the Contras, with the same network tied to cocaine trafficking, implying a single pipeline of influence and criminal activity. The speakers discuss media coverage and relationships with locals in Venezuela, questioning the claimed “relationship-building” as a cover for coercive activities, given sanctions that harm locals. They criticize the notion that the CIA is simply building positive ties, suggesting instead a pattern of disruption and control. The dialogue then shifts to geopolitics: Venezuela reportedly traded oil with BRICS outside the petrodollar since at least 2017, which is framed as undermining US global oil hegemony. A recent move to settle oil transactions in yuan is mentioned, with a snide remark that the CIA’s presence in Venezuela aims to prevent any free-trade diversification away from the petrodollar. The claim is made that the CIA’s objective is to prevent alternative global trade arrangements and maintain US influence by blocking competition from Russia, China, and BRICS members. Speaker 3 adds that the CIA’s actions align with a long-standing pattern of intervention, suggesting that the agency’s open, unapologetic approach reflects a broader strategy of tension, where a third of the population would support such actions, a third would oppose, and a third remain indifferent. They reference Operation Mockingbird and the presence of CIA-linked figures in media, including Mike Pompeo as a Fox News contributor, arguing that mainstream outlets act as channels for the deep state’s messaging, with information often flowing from the CIA to outlets like the New York Times. In sum, the discussion argues that US intervention in Venezuela is less about drugs or democracy and more about strategic counteraction to Russian, Chinese, and BRICS influence, with a long history of CIA involvement in drug trafficking and media manipulation. The speakers invite audience reactions on these points.

Mitch Snow, Fort Huachuca whistleblower, joined a Diligent Spaces edition hosted on X with his cohosts and guests, describing a two-day sequence centered on his attempt to obtain prosecutorial records and the extraordinary presence he observed at Fort Huachuca. Context and purpose for Fort Huachuca visit - Mitch explained that for years he has been trying to obtain records related to his military service, alleged targeting, and a custody fight involving his son. He has been collecting records across the country (Florida, East Coast, Washington DC) to reinforce a prosecutorial case and defend his reputation. - The last records he needed, he said, were at Fort Huachuca, where there had been prosecutions connected to a tunnel associated with a drug trafficking operation involving the Sinaloa cartel. Mitch described laying sensors (seismic and acoustic) as part of a Joint Task Force Six mission in May 1990, discovering an underground tunnel near Douglas, Arizona, with evidence implicating U.S. members. He testified in an army CID deposition related to that case, and described being flown back to Fort Drum after the deposition. - He stated that the tunnel raid led to the tunnel’s partial shutdown, but that it also caused the cartel to redesign distribution methods (submarines, various ports) and that evidence included photographs showing U.S. members with cartel figures. He asserted that he was targeted and harassed for reporting these findings over the years, including attempts to access his clearance information and threats linked to debt-tracking techniques used by cartels. First day at Fort Huachuca (evening of September 8) - Mitch traveled to Fort Huachuca for the records he needed, planning to stay at Candlewood Suites on base. He arrived around 5:00–6:00 PM Mountain Time, checked in with his girlfriend (Amy) via video call, and went to the lobby to speak with staff about access and the building layout. - In the lobby, he noticed a man who seemed like a professional, possibly a special forces contractor, wearing a distinctive watch; he did not approach or engage with the man. - A woman joined the man on a corner couch; Mitch described the woman as having a “sheen” of being well put together, blonde with a ponytail, and noted the eyes as particularly striking. He observed them leave in a green GMC SUV with the woman entering the passenger seat and the man driving, while he headed off to find a place to eat. - Mitch and Amy had dinner off base at a place described as a Mexican sushi restaurant (Takimaki-like name) and returned to the Candlewood Suites. He reported that the base was navigable but had a lot of speed traps; he did not report being stopped or harassed by MPs on arrival, and he described the gate staff as helpful. - A key moment from this first day was Mitch’s observation in the lobby: the woman sitting with the contractor appeared to be a high-profile figure; he was unsure of her identity but described her as distinct from the military guests, not in uniform. - Later, a panel of listeners asked about the exact appearance and actions of the people Mitch observed, including whether the two individuals were romantic or simply meeting, and whether the female wore rings. Mitch answered with limited detail, saying he did not want to discuss some specifics at that time. Observations at the base and the private meeting later that night - On the first night, Mitch described witnessing the duo in the Candlewood lobby, then later seeing the woman with the contractor in the same lobby as he returned. - He described a potential private discussion between the woman and the contractor, with the two leaving together in the vehicle; the following morning, Mitch provided a rough timeline (5:30–6:00 PM for the lobby sighting, with departure around 7:00–7:30 PM MT). - The Host participants, including Sam, Noxie, Destiny, and Lemair, pressed for precise details and identifiers (make of the vehicle, exact times, and the identity of the people), while Mitch occasionally deferred to not reveal certain details yet, citing comfort and safety concerns. - The host and guests discussed Mitch’s prior experiences, his memory, and the fact that a militarized environment often accompanies high-profile investigations. Several speakers affirmed Mitch’s credibility, noting that his level of detail resembled trained observation (salute reports: size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment). Second day and the escalation - On the morning of September 9, Mitch woke early (around 05:30) to try to catch the sunrise and continued documenting with Amy via video calls; he described continuing to record selfies, videos, and notes to share with Amy. - Mitch retraced his attempts to locate the CID (Criminal Investigation Division) building to retrieve the records, describing a lack of clear visitor information and multiple detours across post as he sought the proper location. - He encountered a series of baselined rooms, offices, and signs; at one point, an officer suggested a different building and a different path to obtain the records. Mitch found a room with a podium and two soldiers at a desk; he identified it as a near-time, transitional office with a sign-in log. - Mitch reported the appearance of an entourage of high-ranking officers (captains, majors, lieutenant colonels) and a congressman as the group passed by him while he waited. Detainment, questioning, and consequences - Mitch described being escorted outside the building with his belongings, including his bag of documents and passports, while a security/escort team questioned him about his purpose there. He provided his documents and explained his purpose: to obtain the records and file a report. - The officers suggested bringing in a sergeant major, but he did not return; instead, a group of officers and soldiers surrounded him, including a captain, and a bomb-threat-like scenario unfolded: a vehicle investigation was initiated, and a bomb threat was insinuated as part of the unrelated escalation. - Mitch recounted being driven off post to CID for interrogation; he described the interrogation room with one-way glass and the presence of Captain Neff. He provided his detailed life history and his case history, including the NDA he believed had expired and his request to produce a report number for the encounter. - The post commander reportedly trespassed him from the installation for 24 hours, a decision made after the interrogation; Mitch insisted he would not return if trespassed further and stated he would proceed with his records via other channels. He described a variety of law enforcement vehicles at the scene (marked and unmarked police vehicles, federal agents, and a Park Ranger-type officer) and an elaborate, sometimes surreal, sequence of questioning. He documented his own records, including the OIG number (277 episode) and other documentation, and later traveled back to Tucson to regroup with Amy. - Mitch described that he believed the bomb-threat and the post lockdown were part of an overreaction to his attempt to obtain records, noting that such reactions had occurred in the past when his records were sought. He claimed not to have been charged with any crime, but was escorted off the base and told not to return for 24 hours. Aftermath and ongoing implications - Mitch and Amy returned to Tucson and then continued the process, continuing to seek congressional inquiry and prosecutorial review; they also contemplated FOIA requests. They discussed the reality that Candlewood Suites’ ownership was privately operated, complicating direct FOIA access to hotel footage. They mentioned a separate FOIA attempt by a lawyer (Slickdog) to obtain records about sightings of named individuals on Fort Huachuca, with a focus on gate logs and signage. - The pair connected their experiences to broader political events, including the Charlie Kirk incident, Candace Owens’ involvement, and the allegations around Erica Kirk, Brian Harpole, and Mark Amaday, noting the difficulty in obtaining corroborating evidence. Mitch spoke about Candace Owens’ role in amplifying the story, and his own preference to keep certain details private until appropriate. - Throughout the conversation, Mitch’s credibility was repeatedly supported by the other participants who emphasized his memory and attention to detail as evidence of his lived experience. Several speakers stressed the importance of cross-checking facts against the timeline and urged caution against disinformation and attempts to discredit credible testimony. Closing notes - The space concluded with expressions of support for Mitch and Amy, praise for their courage, and a plan to publish and share Mitch’s full story beyond the space. The host highlighted ongoing efforts to verify details, to preserve the record, and to bring attention to Mitch’s experience as part of a broader pursuit of truth. The event was described as a significant, if contested, documentation of a whistleblower’s eyewitness account at a sensitive military installation, with calls to action for audience members to share the narrative and support Mitch and Amy as they continue their efforts.

The video discusses allegations of gun running, drug smuggling, and CIA involvement in supporting the Contras in Nicaragua. The focus is on John Hall, an American living in Costa Rica, who is accused of supplying weapons and food to the Contras. There are also claims that the CIA used known drug traffickers, including Ocean Hunter, to fund the Contras by smuggling drugs into the United States. The State Department is implicated in providing humanitarian aid money to Ocean Hunter, while the FBI investigates the company for drug smuggling. The CIA and the White House deny knowledge or involvement in these activities.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan political crisis, U.S. involvement, and historical precedents of regime change in the region. The speakers contrast current military buildup around Venezuela with past Latin American coups, and they assess domestic support, international dynamics, and potential outcomes. - Venezuela under Maduro: Speaker 0 notes a broader deployment of military infrastructure than in recent Latin American coups, implying heightened risk or intensity of any intervention. Speaker 1 counters that domestically there is a “rally around the flag” effect in response to U.S. threats, with about 20% of Venezuelans supporting U.S. military intervention and over 55% opposing it. - Regime-change calculus: The conversation asks for the value of regime change when Maduro is willing to open the Venezuelan market to the U.S. Speaker 1 responds that there is no clear political or economic value to regime change; the predicted consequences would include a massive migration wave, civil war, and higher oil prices. They discuss the implications of implementing a regime-change strategy in the Venezuelan context. - Cartel of the Suns: The Cartel of the Suns is discussed as a U.S.-designated terrorist group. Speaker 1 explains that the designation emerged from a DOJ/intelligence collaboration during the Trump era, with William Barr involved in pursuing Maduro. The term traces back to the Reagan era, when the CIA and DEA allegedly allowed drug trafficking through Venezuela to monitor routes, revealing a long history of U.S. involvement in narco-trafficking networks as a tool of influence. Ramon Guillen Davia is named as a Venezuelan National Guard contact, with broader exposure through media such as a 60 Minutes segment and a New York Times expose by Tim Weiner. The cartel’s earlier existence and its resurfacing in U.S. legal actions are tied to broader U.S. efforts to delegitimize Maduro’s government. - Venezuelan political history since Chavez: Speaker 1 outlines Chavez’s rise and popularity (e.g., reducing extreme poverty by 60% before sanctions), the 2002 coup attempt led by opposition figures including Leopoldo Lopez, and the subsequent public support for Chavez when the people protested to restore him. They describe “La Salida” in 2004–2014 as an opposition strategy funded by U.S. entities (NED, USAID) to depose Chavez, with various protests and riots that damaged the economy. After Chavez, Maduro faced U.S. sanctions and a narrative of illegitimacy framed by the opposition’s efforts to install Guaidó as a parallel government in 2019, enabling asset seizures and embargos on Venezuela’s Sitco assets. - 2019 events and aftermath: The 2019 U.S.-backed attempt to install Juan Guaido as interim president is described, including the staged “humanitarian aid” convoy at the Colombia border which failed; Guaidó’s association with Las Bratas (the Las Frastrojos cartel members) is cited as a public-relations embarrassment, corroborated by major outlets. Leopoldo Lopez is described as a persistent organizer of opposition efforts, connected to a broader U.S.-funded framework through the CIA’s ecosystem (Canvas, Einstein Institute), and by extension to regime-change policy. The possibility of Maduro arresting Guaido is discussed as strategically unwise for Maduro to avoid bolstering U.S. claims of repression. - Opposition fragmentation and polling: The panel debates whether the opposition has broad support. Speaker 1 says a November poll by Datanalysis shows Maria Carina Machado at roughly 14–15% and Maduro around 20%, with most voters undecided and younger voters leaning toward external media narratives. Older, rural, and poor Venezuelans—Chavista base—remain a significant portion of the population. Young people are described as more influenced by social media and potentially more susceptible to pro-U.S. messaging but not broadly supportive of the radical opposition. - External actors and drug-trafficking links: The dialogue links narco-trafficking networks to geopolitical strategy, arguing that the U.S. has used or tolerates narcotics channels to fund political aims in Latin America. The discussion covers broader examples, including Ecuador and the Balkans, and references to U.S. figures and policies (e.g., regime-change agendas, naval movements, sanctions, and strategic partnerships) to illustrate how narcotics intersects with geopolitics. - Geopolitical trajectory and outcomes: The speakers speculate on possible futures: (1) a negotiated deal between Trump and Maduro or U.S. diplomacy (with the oil sector’s re-entry and debt relief) being preferable to open intervention; (2) a decapitation strike leading to destabilization and civil war with severe humanitarian and migration consequences; (3) ongoing sanctions and coercive measures as a long-term strategy. They caution that a direct, large-scale military invasion seems unlikely due to political and logistical risks, including American public opinion and potential backlash if U.S. troops are lost. - Global context and strategy: The broader international framework is discussed, including the U.S. strategic doctrine shifting toward a multipolar world and hemispheric dominance concerns. The conversation touches on how U.S. policy toward Venezuela fits into wider ambitions regarding Russia, China, and regional partners, as well as potential domestic political changes in the U.S. that could influence future approaches to Venezuela and Latin America. - Concluding note: The discussion closes with reflections on the complexity of regime-change ambitions, the difficulty of predicting outcomes, and the possibility that diplomacy or limited, targeted pressure may emerge as more viable paths than broad invasion or decapitation strategies. The participants acknowledge the influence of regional personalities and U.S. domestic politics on policy direction.

Airbridge is a term that is common in law enforcement for how drug traffickers move their drugs from multiple countries, Venezuela, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, to our country. It's called an airbridge. And they pay off government officials. They pay people off. They pay off law enforcement officers in their countries to ignore that and to let them fly undetected. We're looking at all that. We're looking at that in multiple countries. We are not done yet. At president Trump's direction, we will continue to fight until every single cartel boss is behind bars and on American soil and in American prisons for the rest of their lives. Thank you.

The speaker claims that the CIA's army, the contras, brought cocaine to Los Angeles, sparking the crack epidemic. Some accuse the CIA of deliberately targeting young African Americans. However, the speaker does not believe there was a conscious decision to poison black America. The controversy surrounding the story continues, with some journalists finding it reckless and wrong. Freeway Ricky Ross, a drug dealer, played a significant role in the crack epidemic. He received a steady supply of cheap cocaine and introduced crack to other cities. While Ross's drug supplier had connections to the contras, there is no evidence of CIA involvement. A Senate investigation found complicity in drug trafficking by individuals supporting the contras, with some using the US government's airlift operation for smuggling.

Director Deutch and Congressman Julian Dixon are interrupted by audience members as they discuss allegations of CIA and agency involvement in drug activities. A former Los Angeles Police narcotics detective, Mike Rupert, asserts that the agency has dealt drugs across the country for a long time. He directs his comments to Director Deutch and references specific agency operations named Amadeus, Pegasus, and Watchtower. Rupert states that he has Watchtower documents that are heavily redacted by the agency, and that he was personally exposed to CIA operations and recruited by CIA personnel in the late 1970s to help protect agency drug operations in the United States. He asks, in the context of the IG’s investigations and Fred Hitz’s work, whether, if evidence of severely criminal activity is found and it is classified, the classification will be used to hide the crime or to tell the American people the truth. The moderator then defers to Director Deutch to speak first and then to Congressman Dixon. A speaker on the panel (Speaker 2) suggests that if there is information about CIA illegal activity in drugs, it should be brought to the Los Angeles Police Department, the inspector general, or to a congressperson. The moderator emphasizes that the audience wants to hear the answer. Another speaker (Speaker 3) adds that if information turns up wrongdoing, the proper recourse is to bring those responsible to justice. Congressman Julian Dixon expresses appreciation for the visit. He thanks the attendee and acknowledges the interest in discussion, inviting the guest to provide information privately or through the committee staff so it can be contacted that evening. A staff member (Speaker 3) asks for the information to be handed up so it can be seen by all. Rupert identifies himself for the record as Mike Rupert, with the spelling of his name given, and notes that he brought this information out eighteen years ago, was shot at, and forced out of the LAPD, and has been on the record for eighteen years. He offers to provide Congress with anything he has. The exchange ends with the acknowledgment of Rupert’s statement and an expression of thanks from Congressman Dixon.

I possibly can. Mister chairman and members of the committee, I'm here today to testify about the failure of the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct a serious and thorough investigation into the allegations of CIA involvement in cocaine trafficking to fund its contra war activities. "Unfortunately, my fear that the CIA would be unable to investigate itself has been confirmed with this report. The inspector general's report lacks credibility. It is fraught with contradictions and illogical conclusions." In a 09/03/1996 memo, then CIA director John Deutsch laid out the framework for this investigation. In his instructions to CIA inspector general Frederick, Pietz, Director Doidge stated, "I have no reason to believe that there's any substance to the allegations published in the Mercury News." Despite his premature conclusion,

Grant and Mike Benz discuss alleged U.S. and CIA involvement in drug trafficking connected to Venezuela and the implications for prosecuting Nicolas Maduro. - Maduro indictment history: The DOJ superseded its 2020 drug trafficking indictment of Nicolas Maduro in 2025. The conversation references the Bay of Piglets failed operation to capture Maduro in 2019 and the 2020 indictment linked to Jordan Goudreaux’s Silvercorp private mercenary firm. The discussion frames this within a broader Cold War context of U.S. actions in Latin America. - CIA and drug trafficking link: The speakers claim the “Cartel of the Suns” (Cartel of the Suns) was a CIA cartel. They state two Venezuelan military brigadier generals who started the Cartel of the Suns were on the CIA payroll. They reference a 1993 confrontation where the head of the DEA resigned in protest after the CIA allegedly greenlit the deliberate importation of 1,500 kilos of cocaine from Venezuela into the U.S. They allege the CIA and DOJ later granted immunity to Venezuelan military officials involved in the operation. This is presented as pre-Hugo Chávez era activity in the 1990s. - Broader historical pattern: The discussion situates these actions within a long-running pattern across the 20th century—U.S. support for pro-American groups (insurgent, rebel, or militia-type entities) funded by drug proceeds. They compare this to past episodes in Afghanistan (Mujahideen, warlords) and to narcotics and intelligence collaborations in South America (Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela). The speakers draw a parallel to a Noriega-style “smash and grab,” noting Noriega’s trial revealed decades of CIA association and payroll. - Implications for Maduro prosecution: Mike Benz suggests the case could be complicated because many allegations about Maduro are “thinly sourced” and relate to minor Venezuelan officials rather than Maduro directly. He notes that many points of evidence are tangential and question whether Maduro’s leadership directly sanctioned drug operations, despite the indictment labeling him as head of the Cartel of the Suns multiple times. The Bush family connections and historic CIA involvement are mentioned to illustrate the complexity of attributing direct responsibility. - Stabilization and funding argument: Benz outlines a three-part stabilization plan for Venezuela—stabilization, privatization, and transition. He describes stabilization as “hearts and minds work,” which in practice involves paying off military, civil society, and business leaders with cash. He cites the CIA’s reported $70,000,000 in drug-money bribes used to influence such actors in stabilization campaigns in Afghanistan and analogous actions in Latin America. - Closing notes: Grant appreciates Benz’s insights and asks where to follow him. Benz directs listeners to X (Twitter) at @mikebencyber, and also mentions YouTube and Rumble. - Notable names: Nicolas Maduro, Jordan Goudreaux, the Silvercorp firm, the Cartel of the Suns, Noriega, the head of the DEA who resigned in 1993, and George H. W. Bush’s historical CIA involvement are referenced to frame claims.

Speaker 0 asks about how common it is for the CIA to use drugs as a weapon or to create cartels for various purposes, and whether it sometimes works as a strategy. Speaker 1 responds that it continues to this day, with key US allies implicated in the drug trade. The Organization for Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, funded by the State Department, is described as an investigative journalist outlet that has a new report about the Noboa family’s ties to the Balkan mafia. The Noboa family controls Ecuador; Daniel Noboa, born in Miami, is the president, and his family owns a Noboa shipping company. The shipping company is alleged to have been involved in sending bananas through the Noboa Bonita Fruit Company packed with cocaine to Europe via routes overseen by the Balkan Mafia. Ecuador is described as the largest drug export center to the United States, per the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, while Venezuela is claimed to be responsible for about 5% of drug transit. Kristi Noem, identified as the DHS secretary, is said to have visited Ecuador to meet with Daniel Noboa and campaign for a referendum to bring US military bases back to Ecuador, a referendum that was rejected by Ecuadorians. Noboa is portrayed as strategically valuable to the US, described as friendly with Marco Rubio, who has touted him as a partner in the war on drugs, yet the claim is made that the issue is about geostrategic interests. Noboa is said to have ended the legacy of social democrat Rafael Correa and is purportedly supporting US military bases on Ecuadorian soil, aligning with US interests even as Ecuador becomes a center of narco-trafficking and cartels destabilize parts of the country. In Mexico, the narrative references Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón, noting Calderón as author of Plan Mérida, a US military-directed program to combat drugs in Mexico. Gennaro García Luna, head of Mexico’s equivalent of the FBI, is described as now in a US federal prison for life for involvement in a conspiracy with the Sinaloa cartel to ship drugs to the United States. The State Department is said to have acknowledged knowing about Luna’s activities while valuing him as a political partner. The Fast and Furious program is mentioned, alleging that the US armed Mexican cartels to track guns, and a 2011 federal court testimony by a Chapo Guzmán lieutenant claimed the US armed the Sinaloa cartel to defeat rivals like the Guadalajara cartel. A recent raid in Oakton, Northern Virginia, on Paul Campo, former director of the DEA’s financial division, is described. Campo was in charge of money laundering investigations and was associated with a CIA asset named Robert Sensi to launder $12,000,000 for the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. The speaker notes ongoing exploration of these connections. Historically, the CIA is said to have worked with narco cartels to fund black operations, funding proxy wars in Central America with off-the-books money. The Guadalajara cartel allegedly funded the Nicaraguan Contras through cartel profits. Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a DEA agent, reportedly discovered the Guadalajara cartel’s involvement in black operations and was captured and tortured, with alleged monitoring by CIA operatives including Felix Rodríguez, who supervised the capture of Che Guevara. This is tied to a documentary on Amazon called The Last NARC.

The witness testifies about the failure of the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct a serious and thorough investigation into the allegations of CIA involvement in cocaine trafficking to fund its contra war activities. He says the fear that the CIA would be unable to investigate itself has been confirmed with this report. The inspector general's report lacks credibility. It is fraught with contradictions and illogical conclusions. In a 09/03/1996 memo, then CIA director John Deutsch laid out the framework for this investigation. In his instructions to CIA inspector general Frederick, Pietz, Director Doidge stated, "I have no reason to believe that there's any substance to the allegations published in the Mercury News." Despite his premature conclusion,

There is a story about a load of cocaine found at Miami International Airport by the DEA that allegedly traced back to Venezuela and led to Brigadier General Ramon Guillen Davila, who was described as the CIA’s man in Venezuela at that time. He was the person who was handling indictments and working with the CIA, acknowledged as the most trusted CIA asset in Venezuela back then. The narrative notes that there is a sixty-minute program focusing on this episode of the war against drugs, portraying drugs winning by a huge score, and alleging that the CIA was working in a different direction than the DEA. The CIA is said to have met with the DEA in Caracas and NASA, and to have allowed Guillen Davila to bring shipments of drugs through the United States in order to make him reliable for their purposes. The story is linked to earlier episodes such as the contract cocaine scandal and the cocaine coup in Bolivia in the eighties, described as another instance of interagency infighting in which the CIA was effectively funding its own operation with drug money. The emblem of these generals is said to be a son, and the operation was referred to as “El Cartel del Sol” in singular, a name that went offline until 2005. In 2005, after all these years, the commander decided to suspend all collaboration with the DA. The name reappears in a Miami Herald report from 2005, cited by a high-level diplomat based in Venezuela who did not want to disclose his name. The diplomat reportedly referred to the resurgence of the name as “El Cartel de los Soles.”

Speaker 0 asks, “How did you kill Jeffrey Epstein? … you’re not in power, but you have all the power.” Speaker 1 responds that “The things they say are so ridiculous. Honestly, I don’t know what I ever did to get them so upset.” Speaker 2 says, “My father is no different than any other powerful man. Any man who’s responsible for other people, like a senator or a president.” Speaker 1 counters that he sounds naive; Speaker 2 asks, “Why?” Speaker 1 asserts, “Senators and presidents don’t have men killed.” Speaker 2 retorts, “Oh, who’s being naive, Kaye?” Speaker 3 mentions a fellow discussing becoming their next congressman, Bill Clinton, calling him a new man. Speaker 4 delivers a hopeful closing address about trusting each other to forge a future that will enrich their lives, strengthen traditions and faith, and make them proud they gave their best; God bless you all. Speaker 5 discusses the term “Clinton body count,” saying it’s become common in pop culture. It’s based on the claim that numerous people connected to Bill Clinton—critics, opponents, associates, and witnesses—died in mysterious ways, far too many to dismiss as coincidence. The term first appeared when Bill Clinton was governor of Arkansas, with at least 20 people connected to him murdered or dying mysteriously, mostly around the CIA’s illegal activities at Mina Intermountain Municipal Airport, part of the Iran-Contra affair, involving smuggling drugs and guns through Mina, Arkansas to fund a revolution in Nicaragua. Speaker 6 explains that the Contras were former Sandinista military officers who had been kicked out of Nicaragua in 1979 and were trying to retake the country with CIA aid. He notes the Contras were a creation of the CIA and were dealing drugs in Los Angeles and elsewhere; drug traffickers met with CIA agents, and the influx of cheap cocaine into South Central Los Angeles coincided with the rise of crack, describing a historical collision. Speaker 5 recalls it was bombshell news in the 1990s when Clinton’s involvement with Mina and the growing number of dead witnesses were covered in documentaries, and even mainstream news covered CIA drug smuggling; however, the narrative moved on to Monica Lewinsky, cigars, and oral sex, and Mina “never happened” in the mainstream. Speaker 7 recounts an encounter with a supervisor in the Saline County Criminal Investigation Division who urged him to drop the case, suggesting it could cause grief if pursued. Speaker 5 notes that the first two names on the list are women: Suzanne Coleman (or Susan Coleman) and Judy Gibbs, with Coleman allegedly pregnant with Clinton’s child and dying of a gunshot to the back of the head; Gibbs dying in a house fire amid rumors of compromising photos with Clinton. Speaker 8 asks about a lobby display. Speaker 9 asks if it’s taken care of. Speaker 5 elaborates: Judy Gibbs, a former model, left modeling to marry Bill Puterbaugh; his son Randy claims Puterbaugh’s father posed Judy for sex with Clinton to gain political favor; Judy’s death followed a fire at their home after a brother-in-law, Dale Bliss, was caught molesting a boy, with a hidden window found of Clinton having sex with Judy; Gibbs and Puterbaugh died in the fire. Judy’s sister Martha and Randy believe Clinton was responsible for Gibbs’s death. Speaker 0 reports Sundinista troops moving from Nicaragua against contras in Honduras. Speaker 8 notes a killer blow to crush freedom fighters while Congress withholds aid and they can’t be resupplied. Speaker 10: Nicaragua’s Sandinistas invade Honduran territory after taking a house vote, with about 1,500 troops; Ortega warns US intervention will lead to war. Speaker 5: On 10/05/1986, a CIA airplane was shot down over Nicaragua; pilot Eugene Hasenfuss captured; he testifies at a press conference that he was part of Operation Enterprise to supply Contras with weapons supervised by the US government. Speaker 0: Hasenfuss described being brought to Miami by former Air America pilot William Cooper and assigned to fly weapons to the Contras. Speaker 12: Hasenfuss testified that flights aimed to resupply the FDN and UNO teams of the Contras. Speaker 0: Under questioning, Hasenfuss did not repeat a charge that two Cuban Americans working with him were CIA operatives. Speaker 5: This linked to the Reagan White House, known as the Iran-Contra affair; the operation involved supplying the Nicaraguan Contras with untraceable weapons, funded by illegal weapons sales to Iran and cocaine distribution through Mina, Arkansas; profits laundered through organizations such as the Arkansas Development Finance Authority created by Webster Hubbel and signed into law by governor Bill Clinton. Oliver North took the blame during hearings; Clinton’s involvement appeared evident as the operation ran through Arkansas. Speaker 13: Barry Seal, a drug smuggler in the Mina operation, set up in Louisiana but moved to Arkansas due to a “sleazy governor,” noted as Bill Clinton being hooked on cocaine. Speaker 14: Clinton was hospitalized for cocaine abuse on at least one or two occasions. Speaker 5: The Mina case involved corrupt cops, judges, and politicians in high positions to support drug smuggling and money laundering. Things progressed until 1987’s events around Don Henry and Kevin Ives. Speaker 15: In 1982, Barry Seal set up a major drug-smuggling operation in Mina under Clinton’s oversight; Seal became an informant for the DEA after a sentencing deal. Speaker 11: Seal was killed in 1986; Milam, a witness, was decapitated in 1987; Malik, Arkansas’s medical examiner, ruled Milam’s death an ulcer and later had the head found elsewhere; questions were raised about Malik’s competence and independence. Speaker 18: The head’s disappearance and later discovery drew scrutiny toward Clinton’s influence over Malik. Speaker 19: The question remains whether stages of the investigation revealed that these deaths were connected to Mina. Speaker 20: Witnesses including Jean Duffy and Keith McCaskill faced threats and murder as investigations pursued the Mina drug operation; several witnesses and officials were murdered or died under suspicious circumstances. Speaker 3, Speaker 1, Speaker 5 discuss the breadth of cases and the idea of a Clinton body count, involving many names and alleged connections to Mina, the Iran-Contra operation, and drug smuggling and its coverups. Speaker 21: Kevin Ives and Don Henry were claimed by some to have been on a drop site; initial autopsy ruled death by train after drugging with marijuana; later autopsies contested this, showing stabbing and skull crushing before being placed on the tracks. Medical examiner Malik’s rulings were criticized; Don Henry and Kevin Ives’s deaths remained a focal point of alleged coverups; the grand jury investigation faced obstruction; witnesses died, and some investigators faced danger or were removed. Speaker 22: The narrative includes multiple other individuals—Gregory Collins, Jeff Rhodes, Richard Winters, Jordan Kettleson, Colonel James Sabo, Arkansas investigator Russell Welch—killed or attacked amid ongoing investigations into Mina’s drug operation and associated corruption; the pattern of deaths persisted through 1992. Speaker 24: A 1983 awareness of a smuggling operation at Mina Airport; 1991 anthrax infection of a government figure; journalist Danny Casalaro found dead in a hotel bathtub in 1991; 1992 security figure Gary Johnson survives a home invasion; 1992 Jennifer Flowers era and related deaths; Plane crash of Victor Razor and his son in 1992; Paul Tully’s death in a hotel room in Little Rock; Paula Grober’s death in a car accident; 1992 ski accident death of Jim Wilhite; the phrase Clinton body count remains associated with these mysteries prior to Clinton’s presidency. Speaker 9 notes Republicans blaming the existence of a small base at Mina on George Bush and Oliver North; the question of national security is raised. Speaker 12 concludes that the airport and events were primarily matters for federal jurisdiction; state had little to do with it.

The cocaine networks in Venezuela were set up by the CIA, not by Maduro. A 1993 60 Minutes episode with Mike Wallace reportedly revealed that the CIA had set up an anti-cocaine warehouse in Venezuela and struck a secret agreement with the Venezuelan National Guard to traffic 1,500 tons of cocaine into Miami, with the proceeds sold on the streets of Miami to support CIA black operations and paramilitary groups. The opposition backed by the US inside Venezuela in 2019 is deeply affiliated with the CIA cocaine networks. There are probably international crimes that Maduro committed, but the idea of charging him with running a cocaine conspiracy, which Venezuela inherited from the central intelligence agency itself, has made this case very tenuous. There is concern that the case could be dismissed because there will be considerable last-minute activity inside the DOJ as the CIA is expected to lean on the DOJ to limit discovery.

The speakers discuss a “most dangerous game” involving human hunting conducted by high-profile figures, described as being driven by mind control and the pleasure those involved received from the act. The narrator, identified as a mind-controlled slave, says he was stripped of clothes and hunted in the woods by George Bush, Dick Cheney, and Bill Clinton, among others, asserting that these individuals subjected him to trauma beyond what was necessary given his preexisting conditioning from mind control programs. Speaker 1 asks for specifics about the base and era when Clinton and Bush were involved. Speaker 0 identifies Lampy, Missouri—just across the Arkansas line—as the location. He notes Bill Clinton was governor of Arkansas at the time and claims Mina, Arkansas was a main hub for bringing people into a CIA compound. He describes a CIA facility in Lampy as an amphitheater-like Swiss villa complex in the woods, with military fencing and mind-control training happening in one building, offices in another, and Swiss-style villas or cabins where officials from the military, CIA, or politics would stay during activities or paramilitary operations. The speaker claims black helicopters and robotic “special forces” were used. Speaker 1 asks which special forces were involved and mentions Delta Force and Navy SEALs, seeking more detail. Speaker 0 answers that Delta Force and Navy SEALS are elite units that are mind-controlled like mercenaries, but says he is more familiar with mercenaries trained to carry out international operations not necessarily sanctioned by Congress, brought into other countries (such as South America) to fulfill orders. He asserts airplanes would return with the driver and be sold on the streets in the U.S. and worldwide. He ties these activities to the CIA’s so-called war on drugs, claiming it was really about eliminating competition and taking over the drug industry, with all components interlinked. The conversation links the Lampy compound to UN-related paramilitary operations. He claims operatives wore black uniforms and used black helicopters, and that the activities were connected to implementing the “new world order” rather than traditional national defense.

Barry, tied to the Clintons and CIA, landed freely in Arkansas. He flew to Nicaragua with Benjamin, met generals, and made connections. Barry and Jerry flew overloaded Panther planes from Colombia to Arkansas in competition. The CIA converted Piper planes were quiet and undetectable. Buying planes with cash was easy back then. They flew at least 8 carloads a week to Clemens Air in Miami. Many died in the business, but the speaker feels blessed to be alive. Translation: Barry and Jerry flew planes from Colombia to Arkansas in competition. The CIA converted Piper planes were quiet and undetectable. Buying planes with cash was easy back then. They flew at least 8 carloads a week to Clemens Air in Miami. Many died in the business, but the speaker feels blessed to be alive.

The transcript portrays Mena, Arkansas as a central hub for large-scale drug trafficking in the 1980s, organized under the approval of governor Bill Clinton. It states that Barry Seal set up one of the United States’ largest smuggling operations in Mena, with Medellin, Cali, Bogota, Colombia as the drug cartels’ international network. U.S. customs estimated that at least 75% of all drug-smuggling aircraft passed through Mena for various reasons, making it a sanctuary for prominent importers of illegal drugs during the early to mid-1980s. A former operator claims Barry Seal attempted to establish drug operations in Louisiana but faced political obstacles, turning to Arkansas due to what is described as a “sleazy governor hooked on cocaine.” The narrative asserts that Seal carried out a first trial run by delivering an enormous quantity of cocaine to a remote airport in Ouachita National Forest, identified as Mena Airport, and that he delivered a personal stash of cocaine and a packet of information from J. Bennett Johnston to Bill Clinton, who allegedly cut two lines of cocaine and inhaled. The speaker further claims sexual experiences with Bill Clinton, describing Clinton as bisexual leaning toward the homosexual end, and asserts Hillary Clinton was involved in “sex programming” and accessed it to fulfill perversions. The speaker also alleges more extensive interactions with Hillary Clinton. The accounts claim that there was $100,000,000 in cocaine moving through Arkansas monthly, creating challenges in laundering such sums in a small state. The testimony describes money accounts accumulating and then showing zero balance at month’s end, implying money laundering connected to the drug trade. In addition to Mena, other parts of Arkansas allegedly served as drop points for money and cocaine. A separate account claims special cargo doors were installed inside planes without FAA permission to drop cocaine in flight through open doors in midair. Clinton is described as having integrated corrupt cops, judges, and politicians into high-level positions to sustain the smuggling and money laundering operations. A former participant says that in fifteen years, he did not encounter corruption comparable to what he found after the Mena investigation. The narrative states that the trafficking, money laundering, and murders involved an unholy alliance among organized crime, high-ranking U.S. political figures, and Colombian drug kingpins, with rumors of CIA conspiracy and links to Nicaraguan contras masked by broader political narratives. The rise of Clinton to the presidency allegedly provided national attention to activities in Arkansas, yet nine state and federal investigations into Mena had been shut down, and a tenth investigation was anticipated but claimed unlikely to reach significant conclusions. When asked in 1994 whether he had knowledge of Mena’s operations, Clinton reportedly answered, “No. They didn’t tell me anything about it,” asserting the issue was federal, not state, jurisdiction. The transcript ends by questioning why, if drug-smuggling persists at Mena, Clinton would have allowed it after becoming president.

Jeffrey Epstein negotiated the contract to move the CIA's proprietary airliner, Southern Air Transport, which was busted for drugs and guns during Iran Contra. He personally was the authorized signatory on the deal with Southern Air Transport to move it to a military base in Columbus, Ohio to service the limited. The speaker then asks how, in 1994, one would convince the Central Intelligence Agency to move its proprietary CIA airline used for covert operations, based in Miami, to Columbus, Ohio just to service Epstein’s personal company. They question whether he cold-called the CIA or schmoozed it, or if it was because he was handling Adnan Khashoggi's money during Iran Contra that purchased the guns that Southern Air Transport, a decade earlier, was moving.

Speaker 0: Have you considered talking to the president of Colombia who you called a drop leader? Speaker 1: No. I haven't really thought too much about him. He's been fairly hostile to The United States, and I haven't given him a lot of thought. He's he's gonna have himself some big problems if he doesn't wise up. Speaker 2: Did you say Colombia is producing a lot of drugs. Have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into The United States. So he better wise up or he'll be next. He'll be next too. I hope he's listening. Speaker 0: So was this operation a message that you're sending to Mexico, to Claudia Scheinbaum, president there? Speaker 2: Well, it wasn't meant to be. We're very friendly with her. She's a good woman, but the cartels are running Mexico. She's not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico. We could be politically correct and be nice and say, oh, yes. Is no. No. She's very, you know, she's very frightened of the cartels that are running Mexico. And I've asked her numerous times, would you like us to take out the cartels? No. No. No, mister president. No. No, no, please. So we have to do something because we lost the real number is 300,000 people, in my opinion. You know, they like to say a 100,000. A 100,000 is a lot of people, but the real number is 300,000 people. And we lost it to drugs, and they come in through the southern border, mostly the southern border. A lot plenty come in through Canada too, by the way, in case you don't know. But but they come in through the southern border, and something's gonna have to be done with Mexico. Cuban government, the Trump administration's next target, mister secretary, very quickly. Speaker 3: Well, the Cuban government is a is a huge problem. Yeah. The the the the Cuban government is a huge problem for Speaker 2: some So is that a yes? Speaker 3: Cuba. But I don't think people fully appreciate. I think they're in a lot of trouble. Yes. I'm not gonna talk talk to you about what our future steps are gonna be and our policies are gonna be right now in this regard, but I don't think it's any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro. His entire, like, internal security force, his internal security opera apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. One of the untold stories here is how, in essence, you talk about colonization because I think you said Dulce Rodriguez mentioned that, the ones who have sort of colonized, at least inside the regime, are Cubans. It was Cubans that guarded Maduro. He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards. In terms of their internal intelligence, who spies on who inside to make sure there are no traitors, those are all Cubans. Speaker 0: He felt very strongly. We we needed for nationals. We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We had some we have so many sites for minerals and oil and everything. We have more oil than any other country in the world. We need Greenland for national security.

The speaker discusses the legal jurisdiction of selling drugs, specifically within the CIA. They mention that the ultimate power over the CIA lies with the executive branch of government. They emphasize that if the executive branch approves selling drugs, then it is considered acceptable. The speaker acknowledges engaging in classified activities in the best interest of protecting Americans. They express a practical mindset, stating that they would choose to sell cocaine to impoverished Latin American countries rather than allowing a hundred Americans to die. The speaker compares their approach to the listener's, implying similarity between them.

Max Blumenthal explains that the January 3 operation in Caracas appeared to be a terrorist assault on Caracas, involving the kidnapping of Nicolas Maduro and his wife Celia Flores. He notes Maduro’s presidential guard was massacred, 32 Cuban officers were killed, and many civilians died, with no US casualties reported. He suggests the operation reflected a long-prepared plan by the US, with initials of a “hay a halo” style high-altitude entry into Miraflores Palace. He cites Venezuelan official Diosdado Cabello stating that Flores demanded to accompany Maduro and may have saved his life, and he questions whether there was a betrayal or widespread military collapse on the Venezuelan side. He interviewed former Venezuelan foreign minister Jorge Arreaza, who denied insider deals or betrayals and supported Maduro’s view, though Blumenthal notes there is backroom dealmaking with the US occurring under Maduro. Ariasso is said to have reported that communication systems were taken out, bases bombed, and key communication towers destroyed, with drones still in Venezuelan airspace; thus, Blumenthal questions whether an order not to scramble Sukhoi jets prevented an escalation. He describes the episode as a “staggering failure of intelligence, counterintelligence, military,” while observing the resilience of the Chavista movement: Delsy Rodriguez as acting president committed to sovereignty, and officials like Cabello and Vladimir Padrino López remaining in place, with collectivos in the streets. He argues Trump must contend with the Chavista movement because they control institutions. He notes Venezuela announced the release of “political prisoners,” arguing many were linked to US-backed opposition efforts, but he cannot provide names. Blumenthal cites Rick Grinnell, Trump’s envoy to Venezuela, who reportedly negotiated directly with Maduro for a deal involving Chevron’s drilling license in exchange for deported Venezuelan migrants; Grinnell implied the opposition, led by Maria Corina Machado, resisted allowing Maduro or Venezuela to strike a deal and instead aimed to delegitimize Maduro. He accuses Rubio of aiding移 deportations of Venezuelan migrants to Nayib Bukele’s El Salvador, where detainees were publicly humiliated and tortured; he claims these actions were designed to prevent deals that would allow Maduro to gain revenue or preserve ties. He argues Maduro was open to a deal, but not one controlled by Trump. Blumenthal asserts Trump’s larger aim is regime change to control Venezuela’s oil and cut ties with Russia and China, pressing Maduro to run Venezuela under US orders, potentially to funnel oil proceeds offshore to avoid US accountability. He claims Trump seeks a 30–50 million barrel oil deal, with revenue used to buy American products, but offshore holdings would enable plunder by Trump Incorporated, and the operation signals a broader Monroe Doctrine-esque strategy. He argues this has implications for multipolar states and regional stability, noting Russia and China’s positions, including Xi’s visit to Miraflores before Maduro’s kidnapping and possible retaliation against Venezuela’s Belt and Road interests. In discussing legality, Blumenthal says kidnapping a head of state and trying him in New York would violate international law; under ICJ precedent, a national court cannot try a head of state without an ICC indictment and transfer to The Hague. He contends the Maduro indictment’s narcoterrorism claim is a fraud; he traces its origins to CIA-linked drug networks from the Reagan era, including “cartel of the Suns.” He discusses Hugo Carvajal (El Pollo) and his cooperation with the US, including a secret plea deal and testimony alleging Maduro’s regime involvement, including a claim that Venezuela’s Smartmatic allegations could be used to convict Maduro. He notes a DOJ superseding indictment calling the cartel a “loose network” rather than a formal cartel, and mentions a DC-9 flight (Cocaine One) allegedly connected to CIA-backed operations, potentially exposing CIA involvement, which Judge Hellerstein did not allow in court. Blumenthal concludes by calling the operation a mafia-like show—“gangsterism”—and suggests the Maduro case could challenge international law; he references prior interviews where he argued the “Cartel de los Soles” was not a real organization, a point later echoed by Washington Post and France 24. He closes acknowledging time constraints.