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The discussion centers on CNN’s report that the CIA is establishing a foothold in Venezuela, with the claim that the CIA has, for decades, enabled the Venezuelan drug trade. The speakers argue that the attack on Venezuela cannot be about drugs if the CIA itself facilitated drug trafficking. They cite CIA whistleblower Kevin Shipp, who said the CIA has been involved in Venezuela since at least the Cartel of the Sun, run by a general who was a CIA proxy and helped reconstitute Venezuela’s intelligence to penetrate the government; the general named Ramon Gulen allegedly ran narcotics and created the cartel of the sun. They claim the cartel is used by the Trump administration as a pretext to stage attacks on boats and in Venezuela and that the CIA, with its long history, was behind the Secret Service and the general in creating the drug trade and the cartel, with the Trump administration leveraging it to circumvent Congress. There is reference to a 60 Minutes piece from the 1990s reporting that the CIA collaborated with Venezuelan National Guard generals who moved tons of cocaine into the United States. The conversation then moves to John Kerry, who in the mid-1980s led the Contra Cocaine Investigation hearings into U.S. government complicity in the contra drug trade. The Reagan administration resisted the inquiry, attempted to discredit witnesses, and assigned the CIA to monitor the probe. Ten years later, the HITS report (the CIA Inspector General report authorized under Inspector General Frederick HITS) concluded that while the CIA did not officially participate in cocaine trafficking during the Contra War, it knowingly maintained relationships with and protected numerous contra-linked individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade when deemed operationally important, to keep the Contra War alive and to maintain U.S. objectives in Central America, even if it meant enabling and protecting drug lords; the CIA hid this from Congress, contributing to drug flow into the United States. The Iran-Contra framework is referenced as arms to Iran funding the Contras, with connections to cocaine trafficking, forming a single pipeline, allegedly placing the CIA at the center of these operations. The panel critiques CNN’s headline as suggesting the CIA’s new foothold is about establishing a presence, arguing the real aim is to block Russia and China’s influence, not democracy or drugs. Venezuela’s oil trade outside the petrodollar with BRICS nations is noted, with claims that the move away from the petrodollar spurred interference and invasion, and that Venezuela later returned to endorsing the petrodollar after a period of yuan transactions with China. The discourse asserts that the CIA’s purpose is to prevent free trade outside U.S. influence and to suppress alternative financial arrangements like BRICS or yuan-based oil transactions. The participants discuss the idea that the CIA has shifted from operating covertly to openly engaging in such activities, suggesting a normalization of “strategy of tension” and the notion that a third of the population would support the government’s actions, a third oppose, and a third are indifferent, thereby reducing public resistance. They connect these elements to broader media complicity, including Operation Mockingbird and the integration of former intelligence heads into media roles, implying entrenched deep-state influence.

Speaker 1 discusses the human cost of Venezuelan and regional instability, noting that Venezuelan people have suffered and that many Hondurans have migrated due to conditions in their own country. He argues that the opposition in Venezuela had been winning elections, but the regime led by Maduro “stole every election,” stating that they have a copy of poll results on the cloud and that the government did not want to see them because they knew they lost. He attributes a high death toll in Honduras to drug trafficking flowing through their country, largely coming from Venezuela, and asserts that the U.S. framework designating drug trafficking as terrorism is justified because the flow of drugs harms the United States and Honduras, causing bloodshed and economic damage. He claims that illegal drug flight and sea routes brought jobs to Honduras but also bloodshed, and that the highest number of lives lost in fifteen years in Honduras occurred due to these drugs. Speaker 0 asks about the stance on U.S. intervention, whether intervention is sometimes warranted, as with Maduro, or if there should be no U.S. intervention in Latin America regardless of administration. He notes that Maduro’s regime has involved U.S. military actions and leadership changes, with claims that the U.S. bombed Venezuela, captured Maduro, killed members of his government, and sent him to jail, a situation some view positively while others see as a breach of international law. Speaker 1 responds from a human perspective, emphasizing the suffering of Venezuelan and regional populations and the mass migration from these countries. He argues that Maduro’s regime stole elections and contrasts this with the citizens’ desire for democracy. He states that the Trump administration’s framework to label drug trafficking as terrorism has implications for Honduras and other neighboring countries affected by drug flows, corruption, and violence. He suggests that President Trump confronted a long-standing attempt by Venezuela and its allies to influence elections in the region, and he asserts that Maduro should be given a chance to defend himself in a trial. He acknowledges sovereignty concerns but argues that many people worldwide do not understand what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. He concludes that intervention decisions depend on whether there is another way to save Venezuela and notes the broader regional consequences of the Venezuelan crisis.

Fox News alert: B-52 bombers are flying off the coast of Venezuela. Trump is not bluffing. More than 10,000 US soldiers are built up in the Caribbean on ships in Puerto Rico, locked and loaded. Special operations helicopters were seen 90 miles from Venezuela’s coast, used by Delta Force, Navy SEALs, and the Green Berets. The Black Ops were spotted off the coast of Trinidad. Also spotted are little birds—smaller but faster, designed for quick insertion of special operators behind enemy lines. The Ghost was confirmed in the Caribbean. The Ghost is the nickname for MV Ocean Trader, the kind of ship that doesn’t want to be found, designed for black ops and special missions because it’s dark and blends with cargo. There’s more: 10% of the US naval power is now in the region, including subs, several destroyers, and F-35 fighters in Puerto Rico, on top of “coke boats” being smoked to pieces by the week as kilos of cocaine wash ashore. Dozens of bad hombres are being shark bait. Maduro’s attention is piqued; he’s described as the dictator of the narco state, a very bad hombre, and the US has doubled the bounty on his head to 50 million dollars. According to the New York Times, Maduro offered the US a dominant stake in Venezuela’s oil, gold, and mineral wealth, and promised to cut ties with Russia and China. Trump and Rubio said no. That suggests the gunboat diplomacy is going to end up with no Maduro and a Venezuela aligned with the US, not Putin or China. American action in Latin America hasn’t always ended well; Bay of Pigs is referenced as a comparison. Other times, it’s been a piece of cake. It’s the backyard, and Trump is reestablishing the Monroe Doctrine, aka the Dunro Doctrine. The piece hopes a Venezuelan general does the right thing and collects the $50,000,000 bounty. No one wants a messy conflict in South America. Maduro controls drug traffickers who are pretty strapped and have military-grade weapons, and Biden let hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans into the country, who could be activated. If Trump can pull this off and kick China and Russia out of Venezuela after what he did with the Iranians, it’ll give him power to deter Russia and Ukraine and China and Taiwan.

Mario and John discuss the potential Venezuelan regime change and the broader implications of U.S. policy. - If a coup proceeds, the first step in the plan would be to remove Maduro. There are reports that Maduro sought amnesty from the U.S. to step down, and Trump reportedly refused amnesty. - John notes that when the U.S. government is serious about attacking a country, naval movements are a key indicator he learned at the CIA. He observes that the U.S. recently sent the USS Gerald R. Ford and its 11 accompanying battleships and supply ships, signaling seriousness about action. - The CIA’s alleged use of drugs to weaken other countries is mentioned. John asserts that drugs in Venezuela are not Venezuelan; they originate in Colombia and Ecuador and transit Venezuela en route to West Africa, ultimately to Europe. - In considering what would happen in Venezuela if Maduro steps down, the expectation is chaos. The discussion notes that the narrative around Venezuela has shifted alongside discussions of Iran, Russia, Ukraine, and China, and asks what the initial reaction would be when seeing this narrative shift. - John reiterates the naval-movement heuristic for assessing U.S. seriousness about regime change, noting the presence of carrier groups as a sign of intent. He questions the upside for the U.S. in removing Maduro, given that the U.S. excludes Venezuelan oil from purchase and refining and there seems to be no clear upside. He adds that the U.S. would ideally want to strengthen Venezuela’s economy to reduce immigration, but that is not reflected in current policy. He also discusses drugs, reaffirming that Venezuelan drug flows are primarily transiting to Europe, not the U.S., and adds that China’s five-year-ago decision to build a Caribbean refinery is a factor, arguing that the refinery shift is a strategic move opposed by the U.S. - Mario notes Maduro’s offer of full access for U.S. oil, but John emphasizes regime survival as Maduro’s main concern and questions whether Maduro’s offer would be a valid solution. He points out that China is expanding and becoming a major trading partner in Latin America, but he does not see this as a direct solution to regime change. - The conversation touches on the possibility that naval movements could be a bluff to force Maduro to withdraw. John says such moves happen in the South China Sea and could lead to Maduro fleeing, but they would create a power vacuum with pro-M Maduro factions within the military and without regional support from Colombia, Brazil, or Mexico, complicating U.S. aims. - They discuss the possibility of the U.S. offering Maduro safe passage rather than an outright coup. John suggests that a large-scale ground invasion is unlikely, given public opinion and the country’s size and terrain. He compares potential post-regime outcomes to Libya, warning that U.S. attempts to impose a peace post-regime change often fail, leaving chaos and long-term instability. - The dialogue turns to the opposition figure Maria Machado, with John stating that she does not command armies and is not clearly more viable than Juan Guaidó; he suggests the next leader, if Maduro leaves, might be a senior military officer. - They consider the long-term consequences of regime change, including the risk of chaotic transitions and a military-based government. John shares a cautionary Libyan analogy about a constitutions project that never materialized into stable governance. He recalls a 2003 Iraqi intervention example to illustrate misjudgments that history often repeats. - The discussion closes with references to Hezbollah and Iran connections in Venezuela and the hope to avoid another Libya-like outcome, emphasizing the potential heartbreak for Venezuela and the complexity of foreign involvement.

Speaker 0: Decision on whether to supply Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine or sell them to NATO and let them sell them to Ukraine. Speaker 1: Yeah. I've sort of made a decision pretty much if if if you consider. Yeah. I I think I wanna find out what they're doing with them. Yes. Speaker 0: Yes. Speaker 2: Donald Trump's recent statement to the press about mulling over sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine has elicited a response from the Kremlin today. Putin announced that the peace process with the Trump administration to end the Ukraine war is officially, quote, unquote, exhausted. Trump and Putin have had a very, you know, strange relationship, a little touch and go since Trump returned to the presidency. At first, to end the Ukraine war on his very first day in office, Trump has meandered a bit on the issue and is now apparently settling on the Biden administration's policy of arming Ukraine and NATO to the hilt. But can Tomahawk cruise missiles even make much of a difference given that the Russian military has achieved supremacy on the battlefield and maintained that dominance for at least the last year and a half, maybe even longer, if you will. We're now joined by, and we're so pleased he's with us, retired US Army colonel Douglas MacGregor. He's the author of I'm sorry. We also have Brandon Weichert with us, the author of Ukraine. Go cross wires there, a disaster of their own making, how the West lost to Ukraine. Thank you both for being with us. Speaker 3: Sure. Speaker 4: Thank you for having me. Speaker 2: Colonel McGregor, welcome to the show. We're so glad to especially have your perspective on this. And what we're gonna kinda do is a tour, if you will, around the globe because there's several, ongoing and pending conflicts. Right? So let's start with this breaking news out of Russia where Putin says that these talks, these negotiations are exhausted. Are they, as a matter of fact, exhausted, colonel? Speaker 3: Well, I think he was referring specifically to what happened in Alaska. And I think president Trump showed up, you know, in grandiose fashion with the goal of overwhelming, president Putin and his team with his charm and grace and power, and it all failed miserably. President Trump never really listened carefully to anything the Russians said to him. He didn't read any of the material that was pertinent to the discussion. He came completely unprepared, and that was the the message that came out after the meeting. So the Russians were very disappointed. If you don't read their proposals, you don't read what they're doing and what they're trying to accomplish, then you're not gonna get very far. So now, president Trump has completed his transformation into Joe Biden. He's become another version of Joe Biden. Speaker 2: What it is so unexpected. And, you know, it's hard for a lot of a lot of Trump voters to hear because specifically part of voting for him and the mandate that he had going into this term was in these conflicts. Right? Specifically, the one in Ukraine. He didn't start any new conflicts while in office in the first term. Why this version of Trump this term? I know you, like I, look into the hiring, the administration, the pressures from the outside on the president. What is influencing where he is now on Ukraine, colonel MacGregor? Speaker 3: Well, that's a that's a difficult question. I mean, first of all, he grossly underestimated the complexity of the of the war. If you don't understand the foundations for the conflict, how this conflict came about, I mean, I I was standing around listening to someone like Brzezinski in the nineteen nineties trying to tell president Clinton that it was critical to address Ukraine's borders because Eastern Ukraine was, quote, unquote, Russified and effectively not Ukrainian. Nobody would listen to Brzezinski, and so we walked away from that very problem. And in the run up to this thing back in 2014, I was on several different programs, and I pointed to the electoral map, And it showed you who voted for what where. It was very obvious that the East and the Northeast voted to stay with the Russian pro Russian candidate, and everybody else voted against the pro Russian candidate. So none of this should come as a surprise, but I don't think president Trump is aware of any of that. I don't think he studied any of that. And so he's got a lot of people around him pushing him in the direction of the status quo. He went through this during his first term, disappointed all of us because he could never quite escape from the Washington status quo. So he simply returned to it, and I don't see anything positive occurring in the near future. Speaker 2: That's sort of the same as well, with other agencies like the the DOJ, which I wanna get into a little bit later. Brandon, you've been writing about this as a national interest. So what what do you make of it? Speaker 4: Well, I think that right now, this is a lot of vamping from Trump. I think the colonel is a 100% correct when he says Trump really didn't come prepared to the Alaska meeting. I think ultimately Trump's default is to still try to get a deal with Putin on things like rare earth mineral development and trade. I think it's very important to note, I believe it was Friday or Thursday of last week, Putin was on a stage at an event and he reiterated his desire to reopen trade relations with The United States and he wants to do a deal with Trump on multiple other fronts. So that's a positive thing. But ultimately, I think that people need to realize that Trump says a lot of stuff in the moment. The follow through is the question. I am very skeptical that he's actually going to follow through on the Tomahawk transfer if only because logistically, it's not practical. Ukraine lacks the launchers. They lack the training. The the targeting data has to come exclusively and be approved exclusively by the Pentagon, which means that Trump will be on the hook even more for Joe Biden's war, which runs against what he says he wants to get done, which is peace. Regardless of whether it's been exhausted or not that process, Trump I think default wants peace. So I think this is a lot of bluster and I think ultimately it will not lead to the Tomahawk transfer. Last of all because we don't have enough of these Tomahawks. Right? I mean, that that is a a finite amount. I think we have about 3,500 left in our arsenal. We have 400 we're sending to the Japanese Navy, and we're gonna need these systems for any other potential contingency in South America or God forbid another Middle East contingency or certainly in the Indo Pacific. So I think that at some point, the reality will hit, you know, hit the cameras and Trump will not actually follow through on this. Speaker 2: So speaking of South America, let's head that way. Colonel McGregor, I I don't know if you know. I've been covering this pretty extensively what's been going on with the Trump administration's actions on Venezuela. So a bit of breaking news. Today, the US State Department claims that Venezuela is planning to attack their embassy, which has a small maintenance and security board other than, you know, diplomatic staff. Meanwhile, Maduro's regime argues they're just foiled a right wing terrorist plot that's that was planning to stage a false flag against the US embassy to give the US Navy fleet. There's a lot off in Venezuela's coast the impetus to attack Maduro. I've been getting some pushback, you know, on this reporting related to Venezuela, because, you know, Trump's base largely doesn't want any new conflicts. They're afraid this is sort of foreign influence wanting wanting him to go there. Are we justified in what Trump is doing as far as the buildup and what we are hearing is an impending invasion? Is it is the Trump administration justified in this action, colonel MacGregor, in Venezuela? Speaker 3: No. I I don't think there's any, pressing pressing need for us to invade or attack Venezuela at all. But we have to go back and look at his actions to this point. He's just suspended diplomatic relations with Venezuela, which is usually a signal of some sort of impending military action. I don't know what he's being told. I don't know what sort of briefing he's received, what sort of planning has been discussed, but we need to keep a few things in mind. First of all, the Venezuelan people, whether they love or do not love Maduro, are very proud of their country, and they have a long history of rebelling against foreign influence, particularly against Spain. And they're not likely to take, an invasion or an intervention of any kind from The United States lately. Secondly, they've got about 400,000 people in the militias, but they can expect, at least a 100,000 or more paramilitaries to come in from Brazil and Colombia and other Latin American states. It's why the whole thing could result in a Latin American crusade against The United States. And finally, we ought to keep in mind that the coastline is 1,700 miles long. That's almost as long as the border between The United States and Mexico. The border with Brazil and with Colombia is each of them are about 1,380 kilometers long. You start running the math and you're dealing with an area the size of Germany and and France combined. This is not something that one should sink one's teeth in without carefully considering the consequences. So I don't know what the underlying assumptions are, but my own experience is that they're usually a series of what we call rosy scenarios and assume things that just aren't true. So I I'm very concerned we'll get into it. We'll waste a lot of time and money. We'll poison the well down there. If we really want access to the oil and and gas, I think we can get it without invading the place. And they also have emerald mines and gold mines. So I think they'd be happy to do business with us. But this obsession with regime change is very dangerous, and I think it's unnecessary. Speaker 2: That is definitely what it seems they're going for. When I talk to my sources, ChromaGregor, and then I'll get your take on it, Brandon, they say it's a four pronged issue. Right? That it's the drug that, of course, the drugs that come through Venezuela into The United States, Trend Aragua, which we know the ODNI and Tulsi Gabbard, DNI, Tulsi Gabbard was briefed on specifically, that the right of trend in Aragua and how they were flooded into the country, counterintelligence issues, a Venezuelan influence in, you know, in some of our intelligence operations, and, just the narco terrorist state that it is. But you feel that given even if all of that is true and the Venezuela oh, excuse me, in the election fraud. Right? The election interference via the Smartmatic software. Given all that, you still feel it's not best to invade, colonel. You how do we handle it? How do we counter these threats coming from Venezuela? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, you secure your borders. You secure your coastal waters. You get control of the people who are inside The United States. We have an estimated 50,000,000 illegals. Somewhere between twenty five and thirty million of them poured into the country, thanks to president Biden's betrayal of the American people and his decision to open the borders with the help of mister Mayorkas that facilitated this massive invasion. I would start at home. The drug problem is not down in Venezuela. The drug problem is here in The United States. If you're serious, anybody who deals in drugs or is involved in human trafficking, particularly child trafficking, should face, the death penalty. Unless you do those kinds of things, you're not gonna fundamentally change the problem here. Now as the narco state title, I think, is a lot of nonsense. The drugs overwhelmingly come out of Colombia. They don't come out of Venezuela. A very small amount goes through Venezuela. I'm sure there are generals in the Venezuelan army that are skimming off the top and putting extra cash in their banks, but it's not a big it's not a big source from our standpoint. We have a much more serious problem in Mexico right now. Mexico is effectively an organized crime state, and I don't think, what Maduro is doing is is really, in that same category. On the other hand, I think Maduro is courting the Chinese and the Russians. And I think he's doing that because he feels threatened by us, and he's looking for whatever assistance or support he can get. And right now, given our behavior towards the Russians in Ukraine, it makes infinite sense for the Russians to cultivate a proxy against us in Central And South America. This is the way things are done, unfortunately. We there are consequences for our actions. I don't think we've thought any of them through. Speaker 2: Well, in in in talking about turning this into a broader conflict or a bigger problem, I I I I know, Brandon, you had heard that that Russia basically told Maduro, don't look to us. Don't come to us. But now this was a couple weeks ago. Yep. Yep. Like you just said, colonel MacGregor, things have changed a little bit. Right? Especially looking at what Putin said today. So will Russia now come to Venezuela's aid, to Maduro's aid? Speaker 3: I think it's distinctly possible, but it's not going to be overt. It'll be clandestine. It'll be behind the scenes. The Chinese are also gonna do business with Maduro. They have an interest in the largest known vindicated oil reserves in the world. The bottom line is and this you go back to this tomahawk thing, which I think Brandon talked about. It's very, very important. The tomahawk is a devastating weapon. Can they be shot down? Absolutely. The Serbs shot them down back in 1999 during this Kosovo air campaign. However, it carries a pretty substantial warhead, roughly a thousand pounds. It has a range of roughly a thousand miles. And I think president Trump has finally been briefed on that, and he has said, yeah. I I wanna know where they're going to fire them, whom they're going to target. Well, the Ukrainians have targeted almost exclusively whatever they could in terms of Russian civilian infrastructure and Russian civilians. They've killed them as often and as much as they could. So the notion if you're gonna give these things to these people or you're gonna shoot for them, you can expect the worst, and that would precipitate a terrible response from the Russians. I don't think we understand how seriously attacks on Russian cities is gonna be taken by the Russians. So I would say, they will provide the Venezuelans with enough to do damage to us if if it's required, but I don't think they expect the Venezuelans to overwhelm us or march into America. That's Mexico's job right now with organized crime. That's where I think we have a much more serious problem. Speaker 4: I I agree with the colonel on that. I think also there's an issue. Now I happen to think we we because of the election fraud that you talk a lot about, Emerald, I think there is a threat in Maduro, and I I do think that that there is a more serious threat than we realize coming out of that sort of left wing miasma in Latin America. And I I think the colonel's correct though in saying that we're we're making it worse with some of our actions. I will point out on the technical side. I broke this story last week. The Venezuelan government, the military Padrino, the the defense minister there, claimed that his radar systems actually detected a tranche of US Marine Corps f 35 b's using these Russian made radars that they have. This is not the first time, by the way, a Russian made radar system using these really and I'm not going get into the technical details here, but using really innovative ways of detecting American stealth planes. It's not the first time a Russian system has been able to do this. And so we are now deploying large relatively large number of f 35 b's into the region. Obviously, it's a build up for some kind of strike package. And there are other countermeasures that the f 35 b has in the event it's detected. But I will point out that this plane is supposed to be basically invisible, and we think the Venezuelans are so technologically inferior, we do need to be preparing our forces for the fact that the Venezuelans will be using innovative tactics, in order to stymie our advances over their territory. It's not to say we can't defeat them, but we are not prepared, I don't think, for for having these systems, seen on radar by the Venezuelans, and that is something the Russians have helped the Venezuelans do. Speaker 2: Very complex. Before we run out of time, do wanna get your thoughts, colonel MacGregor, on, the expectation that Israel will strike Iran again. Will we again come to their aid? And do you think we should? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, stealth can delay detection but cannot resist it. Yeah. I think the stealth is grossly exaggerated in terms of its value. It causes an enormous price tag Yeah. When you buy the damn plane. And the f 35, from a readiness standpoint, is a disaster anyway. So, you know, I I think we have to understand that, yes, mister Netanyahu has to fight Iran. Iran has to be balkanized and reduced to rubble the way the Israelis with help from us and the British have reduced Syria to chaos, broken up into different parts. This is an Israeli strategy for the region. It's always been there. If you can balkanize your neighbors, your neighbors don't threaten you. Now I don't subscribe to the Israeli view that Iran is this permanent existential threat that has to be destroyed, but it doesn't matter what I think. What matters is what they think. They think Iran is a permanent existential threat and therefore must be destroyed. Your question is, will they find a way to attack Iran? The answer is yes. Sooner rather than later. The longer they wait, the more robust and capable Iran becomes. And, I think that's in the near term that we'll see we'll see some trigger. Somehow, there'll be a trigger and Iran will strike. And will we support them? Absolutely. We're already moving assets into the region along with large quantities of missiles and ammunition, but our inventories, as I'm sure you're aware, are limited. We fired a lot of missiles. We don't have a surge capacity in the industrial base. We need one. Our factories are not operating twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. The Russian factories are. Their manufacturing base can keep up. And by the way, the Chinese are right there with them. They have the largest manufacturing base in the world. So if it comes down to who could produce and fire the most missiles, well, we're gonna lose that game, and Israel is gonna lose with us. But right now, I don't see any evidence that anyone's worried about that. Speaker 4: Yeah. Speaker 2: You know what? Colonel McGregor, I I I don't know if I feel any safer after you joined us today. It is very concerning. It's it's a concerning situation we find ourselves in, and I feel like so many people because they feel the election turned out the way they wanted to wanted it to, are not concerned anymore. Right? But we are in Speaker 1: a finite amount of time and there's still great pressures upon the president. There are many voices whispering in his ear. And so we constantly have to be calling out what we Speaker 2: see and explaining to people why it matters. Speaker 3: Remember, this president has said this. Everybody dealing with the administration has said this. It's a very transactional administration. Yep. Follow the money. Who has poured billions into his campaign and bought the White House and Congress for him? When you understand those facts in, you can explain the policy positions. Speaker 1: And I think that's also why we're, the leading conversation we're seeing on acts and social media. Right now, Colonel McGregor, thank you so much for joining us today. We hope you'll come back soon. Speaker 3: Sure. Thank you. Speaker 2: And, Brandon, as always, good to see you, my friend. Thank you. Speaker 4: See you again. Nice to meet you, colonel. Speaker 3: Very nice to see you. Bye bye.

Dr. Paul and the other speaker discuss a sequence of public claims and shifts regarding Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, and the Cartel de los Soles. They begin by recalling a $50,000,000 bounty on President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, arguing that Maduro is the head of a narco-terrorist drug cartel called Cartel de los Soles. They note that Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio stated in November that the State Department intends to designate Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization headed by the illegitimate Nicolas Maduro, asserting that the group has corrupted Venezuela’s institutions and is responsible for terrorist violence conducted with other designated foreign terrorist organizations, as well as for trafficking drugs into the U.S. and Europe. The speakers claim that for weeks Americans were exposed to a narrative portraying foreign narco-terrorist cartels running the country and that this narrative influenced public opinion, making some believe it might be acceptable to take drastic actions, including attacking boats, on the premise that “they’re all terrorists.” They then point to a development that “dropped yesterday,” presenting a clip that, once Maduro was “in their grasp,” the Justice Department allegedly dropped the claim that Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles is an actual group. They assert that after months of hype intended to drum up support for invading Venezuela, the claim was retracted, with the implication that the government figures had misrepresented the situation. The speakers compare this sequence to the Iraq WMD narrative, asserting that officials “swore up and down for years” about WMDs, and when the invasion occurred they were shown joking about the existence of WMDs. They recall President George W. Bush joking about WMDs at a White House Correspondents’ Dinner, looking under the couch and the coffee table, asking “Where’s those WMDs?” They conclude by likening the Cartel de los Soles to the WMDs of their operation, arguing that the construct is already completely falling apart. The overarching claim is that the Cartel de los Soles was used as a justification for aggressive action, and that the narrative surrounding the cartel has been exposed as unreliable or false.

Fox News alert: B-52 bombers are flying off the coast of Venezuela. Trump says he’s not bluffing. Right now, more than 10,000 US soldiers are built up in the Caribbean on ships in Puerto Rico, locked and loaded. Special operations helicopters were seen 90 miles from Venezuela’s coast. The chopper units are used by Delta Force, Navy SEALs, and the Green Berets. The Black Ops were spotted off the coast of Trinidad. Also seen were little birds—smaller but faster aircraft designed for quick insertion of special operators behind enemy lines. The Ghost was also confirmed to be in the Caribbean. That’s the nickname for MV Ocean Trader, a ship designed for black ops and special missions because it’s dark and blends in with cargo. There’s more. 10% of US naval power is now in the region. It’s a major shift with submarines, several destroyers, and F-35 fighters in Puerto Rico, on top of the cocaine boats being smoked to pieces by the week. Kilos of cocaine are washing ashore. Don’t tell Hunter. Dozens of bad hombres are being described as shark bait. Maduro’s attention is captured. He’s the dictator of the narco state, and the US has doubled the bounty on his head to 50 million dollars. According to the New York Times, Maduro offered the United States a dominant stake in Venezuela’s oil, gold, and mineral wealth and promised to cut ties with Russia and China. Trump and Rubio said no. That suggests the gunboat diplomacy could end with Maduro removed and Venezuela aligned with the US, not Putin or China. American action in Latin America hasn’t always ended well; the Bay of Pigs is cited as a historical reference. It’s the US backyard, and Trump is reestablishing the Monroe Doctrine, referred to here as the Dunro Doctrine. Hopefully, a Venezuelan general does the right thing and collects the 50-million-dollar bounty. No one wants a messy conflict in South America. Maduro controls drug traffickers who are well-armed, and Biden allowed hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans into the United States, who could be activated. If Trump can pull this off and push China and Russia out of Venezuela after what he did with the Iranians, it will give him significant power to deter Russia and Ukraine and China and Taiwan.

Speaker 0 argued that Maduro was not democratically elected and was not cracking down on drug trafficking to the U.S. and other countries, contrasting this with Honduras’ crackdown on drug trafficking supported by agencies like the DEA and Southcom, which earned praise for the Honduran government. The discussion then turned to U.S. policy. Speaker 0 asked whether the interviewee supports what the Trump administration did, or believes there is a line that should not be crossed. They noted that the U.S. military action against Maduro—bombing the country, entering, capturing Maduro, killing members of his government, and taking him to jail—was seen by some as positive, with Maduro described as a criminal who destroyed the country and economy. Speaker 1 responded by focusing on the human impact in Venezuela and other Latin American countries. They stated that a large portion of the population has suffered, with a notable number of people migrating from Venezuela and Honduras. They asserted that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, stating that the opposition’s poll results were stored in the cloud and the government did not want to see them because they knew they would lose. They described this as not democracy. They added that, since Hondurans left the country due to trafficking, vessels by sea and illegal flights were bringing jobs to Honduras, but also causing deaths and bloodshed. They argued that if the Trump administration framed Drug Trafficking as terrorism, it was warranted because the drug flow to the United States harmed not only U.S. citizens but also Honduras, which faced the highest death toll in fifteen years due to drugs coming through its borders, largely from Venezuela, and that nothing was done about this by prior administrations. Speaker 0 then asked for the stance on U.S. intervention in general: should intervention be allowed only in certain cases (e.g., Maduro), or should there be no U.S. intervention in Latin America under any president? Speaker 1 shared a Venezuelan friend’s view that there are no options to change Venezuela and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From a Honduran perspective, they believed Trump’s actions helped not only Honduras but also other Central American and regional countries along the drug-trafficking routes, by reducing corruption, bloodshed, and deaths. They argued that the political machinery Chavez created and used to stall elections in other Latin American countries had previously gone unchecked by the U.S., and that Trump faced Maduro with a confrontation. They concluded that many people in the world do not know what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. They stated that Trump confronted Maduro, who now has a chance to defend himself in a trial, and emphasized the issue of sovereignty for every country.

- The discussion opens with the possibility of a coup in Venezuela, with Speaker 0 suggesting the first step would be to “take out Maduro.” Speaker 1 notes reports that Maduro sought amnesty from the US to step down, which Trump allegedly refused. - A recurring theme is the idea of watching naval movements to gauge US willingness to attack a country. Speaker 2 emphasizes that an aircraft carrier battle group signals seriousness, citing the USS Gerald R. Ford and 11 associated ships as the indicator that the US is “serious.” He also questions any upside for the US in regime change in Venezuela, noting the US has avoided buying or refining Venezuelan oil and arguing that the policy lacks a clear benefit. - On drugs, Speaker 2 asserts that the drugs in Venezuela are not Venezuelan but come from Colombia and Ecuador, transiting Venezuela to West Africa and then to Europe, with the claim that Europe is the primary market and the US a smaller one. He argues this reflects broader flaws in US foreign policy. - The speakers discuss the potential consequences if Maduro steps down, predicting chaos, and reflect on the broader narrative shift from Iran, Russia, and Ukraine to Venezuela. They discuss whether the military and regional powers would support intervention. Speaker 2 argues that regional powers (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico) are opposed to American intervention, complicating any possible regime-change effort. - The issue of amnesty is revisited. Speaker 2 speculates Trump might want a “scalp” as a symbol of seriousness on drugs, drawing a parallel to Manuel Noriega’s capture, while noting that a post-overthrow stability plan is often missing in US operations. - The conversation touches on China’s role. Speaker 2 suggests China’s refinery investments in the Caribbean represent a strategic shift away from US-dominated refining, arguing that this creates incentives for China and reduces the US’s influence, with Maduro’s regime survival as a central concern. - On whether Maduro would offer US full access to Venezuelan oil, Speaker 2 says he can’t see it changing the strategic calculus, and argues China’s expanding influence makes regime change less sensible for the US. - They discuss the plausibility of using naval movements as a bluff to force Maduro to depart, noting such tactics are used in the South China Sea. However, Speaker 2 cautions that removing Maduro would create a power vacuum, and the military’s stance remains uncertain since the region’s powers oppose intervention. - Regarding the opposition, Speaker 2 downplays Maria Machado’s prospects, suggesting she lacks military backing and that a senior military officer might be the likely successor if Maduro leaves. The Juan Guaido episode is cited to illustrate the fragility and divisiveness of Venezuelan opposition movements. - The feasibility of decapitation-style strikes against Maduro is debated. Speaker 2 stresses Maduro is the internationally recognized president and emphasizes that any coup would require ground forces and a day-two plan, which historically has been lacking in US interventions. - They compare potential outcomes to Libya’s post-overthrow chaos and caution that US-imposed peace rarely lasts. The risk of a renewed crisis in Venezuela, including possible Hezbollah or Iranian connections, is acknowledged as a troubling possibility. - The discussion ends with a somber note that even seasoned policymakers may overestimate the success of regime change, and a reminder of historical lessons about coup outcomes and long-term stability.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some action, so we could say we had to respond to set the stage for a military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert CIA action to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective is to get control of the oil. That's the number one priority, with an eye toward the risk of a renewed Iran conflict and the prospect of shutdown of the Persian Gulf, and the need to have an alternative supplier. Ukraine defeating Russia was the plan, and Russia’s military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: What’s your initial reaction to Venezuela? I talked to John Kuriaki who said to read naval movements to gauge what the military plans. The buildup on the coast of Venezuela is significant. They’ve got 14, 12 warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing or this is a Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the Central America branch, and the CIA’s analytical thrust was to provoke Noriega into taking action to justify a response and invasion. That happened in 1988. But that time there were US bases in Panama; Quarry Heights was full. Southern Command was there. Now Southern Command has moved to Miami, just near Southcom. Another issue: within the military, the concept of supported and supporting commands means the special operations command (SOCOM) would normally be the supporting commander, but here Southern Command would be subordinate to SOCOM, which is problematic because SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war. Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, and others are light infantry for raids, not mass warfare. So launching shells or sending ground forces won’t solve Venezuela; terrain is rugged and favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, body bags would likely exceed those from Iraq and Afghanistan. Venezuelans will fight, and insurgents from Brazil and Colombia could join. Decapitation strikes against Maduro could provoke an insurgency that the US would struggle to pacify. Mario: Could we see a decapitation strike like Israel against Hezbollah and Iran? Larry: Decapitating Maduro would still leave loyalists and other actors with weapons; an insurgency could erupt, and the US would be unable to pacify it. The real objective here is unclear. The State Department’s INL/INSCR programs have long documented Venezuela as a transit point for drugs; Trump claimed fentanyl is the issue, but most cocaine also goes to Europe. The 2018 Trump era mentioned the Trendy Aragua as a pretext to justify covert actions; I believe Trump signed a finding authorizing a CIA operation to remove Maduro, leading to Guaidó, but that failed. The broader agenda appears to be regaining oil influence and countering Russia, China, and Iran’s influence in Venezuela. Mario: Elaborate the agenda and strategy behind these strikes on boats out of Venezuela and Trump’s public acknowledgement of a CIA covert operation. What’s the strategy and intention? Larry: The objective is to restore oil control in Venezuela and reduce adversary influence. Maduro once aligned with the CIA, and Chavez/Maduro have maintained cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing. The US aims to curtail BRICS and reduce Venezuelan ties to Russia, China, and Iran, potentially moving Venezuela away from the dollar-based system. The theory that this is a message to Putin circulates, but if that were the aim, it’s a poor strategy given the broader geopolitical dynamics in Syria, Iran, and the Palestinian-Israeli arena. The US previously overpromised in the Red Sea and failed to secure freedom of navigation, signaling limited military capacity for large-scale campaigns. The objective of any Venezuela action must be concrete, otherwise it risks entanglement in an insurgency. Mario: Turning to general foreign policy under Trump. What about the national security strategy? Europe’s criticisms, and Trump’s approach to Ukraine—Witkoff and Kushner meeting Putin? Larry: The 2025 national security strategy signals change, but these documents are not blueprints; they’re guidelines. Europe is being asked to step up, while the US distances itself, arguing Europe’s resources and industrial capacity have diminished while Russia and China shift. Europe’s censorship and defense spending are under scrutiny. The US–UK intelligence relationship still lingers, but overall the West’s ability to project force is questioned. Russia and China’s relationship is deep and mutually reinforcing; the Rand Corporation’s earlier ideas that Ukraine would defeat Russia to force Moscow to join the West have not materialized. Ukraine’s fight has forced Russia to mobilize and shift front lines; casualty counts are contested, but Russia’s front has expanded with a larger force and higher attrition. Mario: What about Ukraine negotiations and Putin’s terms? Larry: Putin’s terms (as stated on 06/14/2024) are: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw forces from those territories before negotiations begin. An election must be held in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president, potentially replacing Zelenskyy, and Russia would then talk to Ukraine. Russia’s stance treats these territories as non-negotiable; freezing lines is not acceptable to Russia. If negotiations fail, Russia is likely to maintain control over large parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine, potentially extending into Kharkiv and Odessa. Western military support is insufficient in scale to match Russia’s production; Russia’s oil revenue remains a significant portion of GDP, and the global south is pivoting toward BRICS, with Modi’s meeting signaling stronger ties with Russia and China. The strategic trend is a shift away from Western dominance toward a multipolar order. Mario: Larry, appreciate your time. Larry: Pleasure as always, Mario.

The discussion covers Iran, its regional threats, and potential US actions, along with broader geopolitical implications. - Iranian capabilities and external support: The on-hand capabilities are said to be far more lethal and the Iranian position stronger, with enormous recent investment by Iran, notably with Chinese and Russian involvement over the last six months. Russia is aiding integrated air defenses and China has reportedly provided missiles; the exact mix and ranges are not fully disclosed. The panelists expect Iranian air and missile defenses to work much better with Russian and Chinese assistance this time. - Protests in Iran and US strike calculations: The protests were described as legitimate initially, driven by economic distress, with two groups present: reform-minded and more conservative elements. The Mossad, with CIA and MI6, allegedly joined to provoke brutality by the regime, aiming to push it toward a brutal crackdown and to exploit the protests as a regime-change opportunity. It was claimed that 40,000 starlight terminals were smuggled in to orchestrate protests but were discovered and eliminated, marking the operation as a failure. Consequently, strikes were deemed impractical unless more firepower and longer duration were available, leading to a predicted extended air campaign rather than a quick strike. - Maduro kidnapping and Venezuela: The operation involved paying off those in the way and exploiting air defenses; one air-defense battery fired, hitting a helicopter but not bringing it down. The new president in Venezuela reportedly refuses to take instructions from Washington, raising questions about regime-change outcomes. There is speculation about continued income from oil captured and sold illegally, and about who will protect Venezuelan oil interests as drilling resumes, including potential mercenaries and maverick oil groups. The oil leadership reportedly lacks interest in going down there unless it is highly profitable. - Secret weapon discussions: The “discombobulator” and other secret weapons mentioned by Trump are described as exaggerated; the speaker notes there are weapons kept secret for dire circumstances but declines to elaborate beyond public knowledge, given high-level clearance. - Iran-focused air campaign planning: The US would rely on a prolonged air campaign, potentially comparable to the Kosovo campaign in 1999, avoiding nuclear weapons and using extensive air power with support from bases in Europe and the region. The Navy would be complemented by the Air Force with a long campaign, while the Navy would need replenishment and time to rearm. - Missile and weapon capabilities: Iran’s capabilities have evolved, aided by Chinese missiles (allegedly hundreds) and Russian support. The range of missiles questions whether they can reach Diego Garcia, with concerns about more capable missiles hitting US bases in the region. Russia’s supply of Reshnik missiles (hypersonic, multiple warheads) is viewed as unlikely; the focus is on Iranian missiles that can threaten ships and bases in the Middle East. - US force posture and diplomacy: The force buildup (aircraft, submarines, drones, THAAD, Patriot) signals a “play for time” strategy while pursuing negotiations, including enriched uranium discussions. There is debate about what agreement might be possible on enriched uranium and JCPOA-related issues; Iran reportedly rejects several Netanyahu/Trump demand points, including missile constraints as a non-starter. - Russia, China, and Turkey as wild cards: Russia would likely intervene militarily only if Iran’s regime faces collapse; China would likely use economic means and some political leverage. Turkey is seen as a wild card; it could join a regional confrontation and potentially align against Israel or the US, with NATO’s response viewed as uncertain and largely lacking a unified, decisive stance. - Nuclear arms and START: The May suspension of START is mentioned; Russia claims willingness to extend, while the US has not responded, raising concerns about unconstrained Russian nuclear activity if treaties lapse. - Ukraine and Taiwan implications: European nerves and NATO dynamics are evolving; the Europeans are portrayed as vacillating between opposing and challenging Trump-era policies, with NATO potentially facing existential questions. A strike on Iran could shift focus away from Ukraine and Taiwan, empowering adversaries, or strengthen deterrence depending on actions and diplomacy. The speaker suggests that, pragmatically, Taiwan poses a far more difficult strategic challenge and that escalation there would be highly unrewarding, potentially increasing China’s incentives to avoid direct conflict.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of a coup in Venezuela and the implications of U.S. actions. They emphasize naval movements as a signal of U.S. seriousness, noting the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and associated ships as a trigger that indicates a real threat or action. They remark that if Maduro steps down, chaos could follow, and acknowledge that Maduro has discussed amnesty with the U.S. that Trump reportedly refused. Speaker 2 repeatedly highlights naval movements as a metric for U.S. intent to attack a country, recalling lessons from the CIA. He argues the U.S. is not strategically benefiting from intervention in Venezuela, given that the U.S. has decided not to buy or refine Venezuelan oil, and questions what upside there is for the U.S. in such action. He asserts that drugs in Venezuela originate from Colombia and Ecuador and transit through Venezuela to West Africa and Europe, rather than serving the U.S. market, and he links this to broader critiques of U.S. foreign policy. Both speakers discuss the regional calculus: China’s increasing influence in Latin America, including a Caribbean refinery operation that refines Venezuelan crude, challenging U.S. refinery interests. They suggest China’s refiners and pipelines complicate U.S. strategies. They also discuss the potential role of Pakistan, Iran, or other powers in shaping outcomes, noting that many regional players (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and others) oppose U.S. intervention. Speaker 1 notes that a regime-change operation could undermine U.S. trust as an ally and references a platform called Polymarket where Maduro’s potential departure had been speculated, though newer developments show Maduro mobilizing the military. They raise a question about whether Maduro sought amnesty for the U.S. to step down, and say Trump’s refusal could reflect a desire for a political “scalp” to prove anti-drug policy, comparing this to the Panama case of Manuel Noriega. Speaker 2 elaborates that covert action programs are highly classified, and that even discussing them publicly is risky. He suggests that any coup would require a limited force to seize the presidential palace, pacify the military, and control key communications, with no clear plan for post-coup governance. They discuss the opposition leadership, noting Maria Machado as potentially not more effective than Juan Guaidó and suggesting the military would likely take power after Maduro’s departure. They compare possible futures to Libya post-NATO intervention, warning that anticipated constitutions and reforms often do not materialize in practice, leading to prolonged conflict. Speaker 2 emphasizes the international unpopularity of regime-change in Venezuela and argues that U.S. actions could provoke regional instability and further migration. The dialogue ends with reflections on the inherent dangers of regime change, the lessons from past interventions, and the possibility of Venezuelan instability if Maduro leaves. They caution against assuming flowers will greet invading forces and stress that historical outcomes often diverge from planners’ expectations, with a warning that a hypothetical post-regime-change period could be chaotic and military-led.