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The speaker states that the United States is conducting an operation with a clear goal: to eliminate the threat posed by Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and by Iran’s navy to naval assets. The speaker says the operation is focused on this objective and is progressing “quite successfully,” with the details of tactics and progress to be discussed by the Pentagon and the Department of War. Two reasons are given for acting now. First, the speaker asserts that if Iran came under attack by the United States, Israel, or another party, Iran would respond against the United States. According to the speaker, orders had been delegated down to field commanders, and within an hour of the initial attack on Iran’s leadership compound, the Iranian missile forces in the south and in the north were activated to launch. The speaker notes that those forces were “prepositioned.” Second, the speaker explains that the assessment was that if the United States stood and waited for Iran’s attack to come first, American casualties would be much higher. Therefore, the president made the decision to act preemptively. The speaker emphasizes that they knew there would be an Israeli action, and that action would precipitate an attack against American forces. The implication is that delaying a preemptive strike would result in greater casualties, potentially billions of dollars in losses, and more American lives at risk. The overarching message is that the preemptive operation aims to neutralize Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and navy threats before they are used in consolidation with anticipated Israeli actions and any Iranian counterattacks against U.S. forces. The speaker frames the decision as prudent and anticipatory, intended to prevent higher casualties and to maintain safety for American personnel and assets. The speaker stops short of detailing specific tactical methods, pointing listeners to the Pentagon and the Department of War for a deeper discussion of tactics and progress.

"I'd give it a 12 to a 15. Their army is gone. They're just about look. Their navy is gone. Their communications are gone. Their leaders are gone. Two sets of their leaders are gone. They're down to their third set. Their air force is wiped out entirely. Think of it, they have 32 ships. All 32 are at the bottom of the ocean. Other than that, they're doing very well, Coach. Very well. We're doing our military is doing phenomenally. That's the big thing for this week. We seem to have a new thing every week. But the situation with a very bad and very sick group of leaders who were killing a lot of people, a lot of our people were"

Under Joe Biden, the world has become more dangerous due to the threat of nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles. These missiles move at incredible speeds and can cause widespread destruction. To prevent a catastrophic conflict, we need to be prepared with advanced technology and strength. As commander in chief, I will work with Congress and military leaders to build a state-of-the-art missile defense shield, similar to Israel's Iron Dome. We have the technology and capability to protect our homeland, allies, and military assets from hypersonic missile threats. Our adversaries must know that launching missiles against us will result in their total destruction. The Space Force will also play a vital role in this defense. By rebuilding our military and nuclear capabilities, we can ensure peace through strength, as demonstrated during the Trump administration. Thank you.

- The discussion frames Iranian capabilities as the current biggest threat to the US Navy, noting that Iran’s position is now stronger, with significant new efforts in the last six months supported by China and Russia. The guest emphasizes that Iranian capabilities today are far more lethal than in 2020 and that Iran has benefited from Chinese and Russian involvement, including help with integrated air defenses. - On the protests in Iran, the guest contends that Mossad, with CIA and MI6, joined the efforts to provoke the regime into a brutal crackdown, aiming to trigger a stronger US response. He argues the protests were legitimate at their core (economic grievances and reformist aims) and that the attempt to exploit them for regime change failed. He explains that, after discovering 40,000 starlight terminals used to orchestrate regime-change efforts, the intelligence community judged the operation a failure, and President Trump was advised that a broader, more forceful campaign would be required, potentially including more firepower and assets. - Regarding Russia and China’s responses to potential regime collapse in Iran, the guest asserts that Russia would intervene only if the regime seemed in danger of collapsing, and China would respond similarly, considering strategic and financial consequences. - In the Maduro Venezuela operation, the guest recounts paying off many actors to enable the abduction of Maduro and his wife, noting air defenses largely stood down due to bribes, with one battery reportedly firing and damaging a helicopter. He suggests the operation accomplished regime alteration but not a change in leadership style, since the new president reportedly will not take instructions from Washington. He speculates that continued oil income from the captured Venezuelan oil could influence outcomes, and he notes skepticism about the profitability of Venezuelan drilling for major oil corporations, who may turn to private or mercenary groups. - The “secret weapon” comment (the discombobulator) is described as an exaggeration; the guest hints at undisclosed capabilities but declines further public discussion, citing high clearance and Pentagon confidentiality. - On Iran’s protests and possible US strikes, the guest reiterates that the initial protests were economically driven and that the Mossad-CIA-MI6 effort to provoke a harsher regime response stalled, leading to the decision for a larger potential strike. He outlines a plan for a prolonged air campaign with multiple carriers and a heavy emphasis on air power over naval action, suggesting a Kosovo-like approach with extensive air sorties to degrade Iran’s air and missile defenses, using surface ships as needed but relying on air power for sustained damage. He notes that the air campaign would require time and additional assets, possibly two to three more carrier groups, and would hinge on the ability to degrade defenses to enable broader bombing operations. - When discussing Iranian capabilities against the US Navy, the guest says Iran’s current capabilities are more dangerous, with Iran receiving about 500 missiles from China and improved Russian integrated air defenses. He notes concern about long-range missiles capable of reaching US bases and questions whether Iran’s Orion missiles could reach Diego Garcia. He asserts that Russian help could be more for deterrence or limited military support rather than supplying exotic missiles like Reshnik, and that the Chinese missiles could threaten ships at sea. - On the US mobilization (Lincoln, submarines, aircraft, drones, HIMARS, Patriot/THAAD), the guest says the response is a time-buying effort to pressure negotiations, with more assets likely and ongoing dialogue with Iran. He suggests the US may pursue enriched uranium settlements, acknowledging Netanyahu’s and Trump’s positions, while noting Iran’s insistence that missile development is not negotiable and that JCPOA prospects are unlikely. - About Iran’s possible escalation strategies, the guest analyzes several options: drone swarms could threaten bases; sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz would be a last resort but remain a hazard; a swarm of boats and diesel submarines pose challenges but are not existential threats to carriers; and long-range missiles (including those supplied by China) could target US bases or ships. He emphasizes that the navy can defend against many of these threats but highlights the difficulty of countering missiles and the threat submarines pose in shallow gulf waters. - On Russia and China’s potential responses if the regime falls: Russia would likely intervene militarily or economically to prevent regime disintegration, while China could leverage financial power (including debt leverage) and maintain strategic flexibility. The Turkish role is described as a wild card; Turkey could be motivated to counter Israeli hegemony in the region, potentially drawing NATO into conflict, despite NATO’s current limited capacity. - Finally, the guest touches on broader geopolitical implications: he suggests Europe is drifting towards greater autonomy from the US, NATO’s effectiveness is questionable, and the regime’s fall could trigger wider regional instability. He argues Taiwan is a separate, less feasible target for conflict, given distance and economic stakes, and calls for more cautious rhetoric regarding Taiwan. He closes by noting that Ukraine’s fate and Europe’s stance will influence how the US and its allies manage any Iran escalation.

Chas Freeman and the host Glenn discuss how sea power has shaped global politics and why the current era may be signaling a shift toward land power and new kinds of strategic leverage. - Historical context of maritime dominance: Freeman traces a long arc from British naval hegemony after the Seven Years’ War to American preeminence after World War II, noting that naval power helped sustain a rules-based order and open sea lanes. He argues that dominance of the seas is no longer guaranteed, highlighting evolving ranges of weapons and the emergence of land-based controls that can threaten naval movements. - The evolving limits of naval power: He notes that artillery ranges kept territorial seas limited to about three miles in the eighteenth century, but advances in missiles and shore-based defenses have eroded that traditional maritime advantage. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s 12-mile territorial limit is described as a political compromise rather than a fixed physical law. Modern missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers enable coastal forces to threaten carriers far from home waters, while shore installations can enforce blockades from land, as seen with Yemen’s Houthis in Bab El Mandeb and Iran in Hormuz. - The Strait of Hormuz as a strategic focal point: Freeman describes the current blockade as a sea-change that challenges the historic assumption that ships can freely operate in open waters. Aircraft carriers must stay well back from Iranian batteries, and surface ships at risk from Iran’s cruise missiles and drones. He emphasizes that control of Hormuz now rests more on land-based capabilities than on naval forces, making open-sea dominance increasingly untenable. - Implications for the traditional order: The discussion suggests that Anglo-American naval dominance, which helped sustain a liberal international order, is becoming less viable. Freedom of navigation operations and the appearant stability they created are no longer sufficient or sustainable in the new environment, where land-power and non-military instruments (energy, finance, and partnerships) matter more. - Energy, finance, and the petrodollar: The energy-trade dimension is central. Freeman and Glenn consider how the Strait of Hormuz underpins the petrodollar system, and discuss recent currency-swaps and dollar-reliance questions. They propose that if Gulf states shift toward the yuan or other currencies, U.S. financial hegemony could be challenged, catalyzing broader strategic realignments. China’s willingness to tolerate sanctions resistance and issue directives to its banks suggests a pushback against U.S. financial dominance. - China, Iran, and strategic realignments: Freeman notes China’s rise as a major sea power but argues China will not inherit Western maritime hegemony. He highlights China’s land-based connectivity initiatives (rail, roads, free-trade zones) that have maritime dimensions but are primarily land-centric, including Iran’s overland oil transport to China. He underscores a broader multipolar shift and the potential for Chinese and Iranian strategies to erode the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. - Negotiations and potential outcomes: The conversation concludes that there is no viable military path to open Hormuz or a negotiated settlement in sight. Freeman describes the situation as a high-stakes stalemate with no clear diplomatic avenue. He suggests that the war could subside into a lower-intensity conflict reminiscent of Israel-Iran dynamics in the region, with ongoing tensions and episodic explosions rather than a decisive end. - NATO, Europe, and Israel: The hosts discuss the potential decline or reform of NATO, the pivot of U.S. strategy away from Europe toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and how these shifts could affect European security. Freeman questions the future viability of Israel given shifting U.S. stance and waning Western consensus, noting domestic and international criticisms of Israeli actions and leadership. He observes growing Western skepticism toward Netanyahu’s approach, and the broader political costs for Israel on the world stage. - Final reflections: Both speakers anticipate profound, systemic changes in international relations—multipolarity, weakened sea-power advantages, a possible redefined European security architecture, and a reevaluation of essential alliances. They caution against overreliance on any single power’s hegemonic framework and emphasize gradual, incremental reforms over abrupt, destabilizing shocks.

The speaker outlines a strategy of overwhelming air power aimed at Iran, emphasizing ongoing aerial pressure over Tehran and the capital, with the IRGC and Iranian leadership under constant surveillance by US and Israeli air power until the objective is achieved. The described arsenal includes B-2s, B-52s, B-1s, Predator drones, and fighters “controlling the skies,” delivering “death and destruction from the sky all day long.” The message asserts that “we’re playing for keeps,” and that war fighters have “maximum authorities granted personally by the president and yours truly.” The speaker asserts that “Our rules of engagement are bold, precise, and designed to unleash American power, not shackle it.” He emphasizes that the situation was never intended to be a fair fight and is not a fair fight, stating, “We are punching them while they're down, which is exactly how it should be.”

First speaker: Let me ask you. Regardless of what he thinks, what do you think, militarily speaking, looking at all just the fundamentals, if if The United States attacks Iran in any capacity and they respond back and they hit, we'll say, Al Udeid or any of these other bases that are in the area, the the the naval area at Bahrain, what would happen? What do you think would be the result on the ground? Second speaker: American casualties and then Israel will be destroyed. That's all nearly destroyed. That's pretty much what is gonna happen. And, the issue here is, how they can, basically preserve their US Navy's assets in the area. Obviously, United States has tomahawks, and many people do not understand. United States has about two and a half thousand tomahawks in general. It's the block four and block five, which is still I mean, it's it's a long range. It's about 2,000 kilometers. But the point is for the country like, Iran, 2,000 Tomahawks are nothing. You know? And so, they can still hit some political leadership. But, the moment they begin to fly, there will be a really, really serious repercussions for the liberal and fifth column in, Iran. And after that, we might have only the hardening of the regime if you wish. Because even if they kill Khamenei, okay. So what is gonna happen? Well, he becomes a martyr. And, Iranian people, they're they're they're courageous. I mean, they will fight back.

This is not just a nuclear carrier or nuclear weapons carrier. This is a nuclear missile or nuclear submarine drone. Because it's in the water, it can carry a much larger payload than something flying through the air. So you've got two systems now operating with nuclear reactors in them. This is a whole new level of technology. The US created a nuclear missile once. It was nuclear powered. It was contamination in flight. Everything around was contaminated. They had to back off. They couldn't master the technology. But it was traceable too because of the radiation. It was leaking everywhere. These systems don't leak radiation. They're very effective. And what they are, first of all, just to understand, is they're second strike systems. So if The US, in this case, starts getting feisty and psychotic and tries to because The US, by the way, does have a policy of first strike, whether it's from space or whether it's missile bound or whether it's submarines out of coast. If The US thinks that they can decapitate the Russian leadership and somehow take out all the Russian missiles that are on tracked carriers, on rail carriers, on ships all over the place. But let's assume somehow they decide they can do this. You've got two issues here. One, you've got the Poseidon, which may already be in place or can be launched from a carrier and travel over three, four, five days to get in place and then explode and create a wave. I mean, if they could actually put a 100 megaton explosion, I mean, a city buster missile is one megaton. 10 megatons is something that you wipe out the entirety of something like the size of New York. If they could put a 100 megaton warhead as has been proposed, you'd be facing a 200 meter wave, a 150, 200 meter wave that would destroy most anything in its path. And that considering 80%, almost 80% of the American population lives on either of the East or the West Coast, the majority being on the East Coast, that's one of those vengeance weapons that would just destroy The US effectively as a country. Then you've got the Borovayashnik, which can fly for weeks, months maybe. Who knows nobody knows exactly how long it can actually fly. If tensions are growing very high, you put a five, six, 10 of those up in the air, and they're just doing circles and waiting for command. So the enemy knows that if they do a decapitating strike, they're gonna get wet. They're gonna get a surprise.

In the discussion, Speaker 1 argues that Iran’s objective is simply to survive; their strategy is to continue lobbing missiles, launching drones, and striking back as the U.S. approaches within Iran’s vicinity. He contends Iran has maintained command and control, dispersed forces, and possesses a large and enduring supply of missiles and drones, so the minimal victory for Iran is to endure the conflict. When asked what the U.S. should do to win, Speaker 1 criticizes bombastic rhetoric about U.S. superiority and questions the efficacy of regime change through bombing. He suggests that killing the supreme leader backfires by galvanizing the population and Shiites worldwide, noting Iran’s developed succession mechanisms that compensate for leadership losses. He argues that attempts to destroy Iran or disintegrate its society are misguided and that, if the U.S. pushes toward such aims, it may trigger greater confrontation with China and Russia. He also implies mixed signals from U.S. leadership, contrasting expectations under Biden with actual actions, and contemplates a similar pattern under Trump. Speaker 2 adds that President Trump could claim success by neutralizing key figures like the Ayatollah, but suggests that Israel’s preferences are driving U.S. policy, implying limited autonomy for America. He notes the risk of being drawn back into conflict and emphasizes uncertainty about public perception as the war continues. He remarks on the presence of pro-war voices and social media pushback, interpreting it as a sign that the audience may be “over the target.” Speaker 0 seeks a military assessment of the current state: the Iranian capacity, the Israeli position, and American casualty figures. Speaker 1 assesses Israel as internally distressed: internal unrest, exhausted armed forces, and a large exodus of citizens; he predicts Israel faces an ominous future and foresees Israel possibly deteriorating before Iran. He describes Israel’s use of mercenaries and acknowledges substantial damage on both sides, with Netanyahu’s visibility limited. In the broader Persian Gulf, Speaker 1 states that deterrence has failed among regional powers such as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The United States is perceived as hampered by a long logistical footprint; uncertainty about missile stocks and intercepts persists, but Speaker 1 asserts that Iran can sustain war for a long time and that bombing alone will not compel Iranian capitulation. He foresees intensified U.S. troop and firepower deployment, including three carrier battle groups over the next two weeks, to replace the current forces. Overall, the conversation centers on Iran’s resilience, the limited likelihood that bombing will force regime change, the risk of broader great-power involvement, and growing weariness and strategic complications for all sides, with Iran poised to endure and possibly prevail in the long term.

How many genders are there? Two. What is the diameter of an M4A1 rifle round? It's 5.56. How many push-ups can you do? I did 5 sets of 47 this morning. What's the most important strategic base? Guam is significant. How many rounds fit in an M4 magazine? Standard is 30. What does the M9 Beretta fire? A 9 millimeter. What batteries for night vision goggles? Duracell. Your qualifications show you understand the battlefield. Decisions made here can lead to the deaths of young Americans, often from lower middle-income families. When they join the military, they do so for various reasons, and when mistakes happen, they don’t come home. My priority is ensuring you support the warfighters. That’s what matters most to me, and you have my support despite the process.

Jorge Pabon, known on air as JP, reveals his identity on national television after decades in shadow. He describes a career in the United States Army focused on special classified UFO and space programs, including work related to moon bases and underground ocean bases. He states his full name, rank, and service details, sharing documents (redacted in parts) to verify his background: he was a 91 Juliet quartermaster of chemical repairs, dealing with water purification, and he also served as a translator in the Army. He explains he knew three languages (Spanish, Portuguese, and another) and that he was a paratrooper attached to the 7th Special Forces Group, though not a Green Beret. He clarifies his rank as E-4 during that period. Discharge and disclosures: Pabon left the Army in August of the previous year. He signed non-disclosure agreements, with certain restrictions remaining; he has received a “green light” to talk about some topics from contacts connected to Washington, though the channels and specifics are not fully disclosed. He notes growing calls for disclosure, including videos and officers’ testimonies, and he anticipates more soldiers like him coming forward in documentaries about their experiences. Prior encounters and witnesses: Before enlisting, Pabon was approached by individuals in tactical gear who urged him to take photographs of unusual aircraft (including TR-3B-type triangular craft). He was repeatedly approached by “white hats” who told him when to look up and photograph ships. He faced two opposing forces: one encouraging disclosure and another urging secrecy or intimidation; at times he and his family were pressured or harassed as a consequence of his disclosures. He states that hundreds of thousands of soldiers worldwide have seen similar phenomena and that others in his network are cautious about coming forward due to security and spiritual implications. UFO sightings and military projects: Pabon describes a range of experiences, including a significant pre-military sightings period with cigar-shaped craft observed in Tampa and Orlando, often near helicopters. He sent photographs to Dr. Michael E. Sala and other outlets; the Tampa Bay Times and others discussed his work without naming him. He recalls being approached by both supporters and suppressors of disclosure, with some encounters including armed individuals in tactical gear who questioned or escorted him. Underwater arcs and extraterrestrial bases: A central claim is the existence of massive, ancient arc ships—underwater “arcs” or cities—scattered around the world, including near Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, near India, and Antarctica. He describes arcs as immense, city-like structures with multiple levels, capable of movement between air and water, and reportedly housing diverse personnel from multiple nations and even other species. He asserts the arcs are ancient, far more advanced than current human technology, and contain departments for different regions (e.g., Pacific arcs). These bases purportedly facilitate collaboration among humans and various extraterrestrial groups, including Nordics and other beings. Transportation and operations: Missions to arcs involve multi-branch and international collaboration, with personnel from the Army, Navy, and other services, sometimes deployed via Osprey, Black Hawk, or C-130 aircraft, to water-adjacent sites where ships lower into the water and reveal arc facilities. He describes landing on a navy-type ship that houses arcs and can extend underwater; ducts and elevators move personnel to arc interiors with unfamiliar materials and technologies. He emphasizes that the arcs are self-contained bases with the ability to move rapidly underwater. Beings and contact: Pabon reports encounters with Nordics, “ant people” (ant-like beings with large eyes and distinctive hair-like projections), and occasional gray entities observed at distance. He claims some beings can change appearance to blend with humans. He suggests a hierarchical structure among ETs, with Nordics involved in training or coordinating certain activities with human forces, including pilots and Artemis Accord participants. He links interdimensional and spiritual dimensions to the phenomena, describing experiences of consciousness, presence, and a sense of ships as living or alive. Personal perspective and beliefs: He discusses the intersection of faith and ufology, noting his Christian background and the complexity of interpreting these experiences as spiritual or demonic, but maintaining openness to a broad spectrum of phenomena, including interdimensional aspects and ancient AI-like technologies. He mentions the Monroe Institute and gateway experiences as contextual references for understanding interdimensional communication. He asserts a belief that the United States has access to advanced technologies—potentially borrowed through collaboration with Nordics and other groups—and that global cooperation among nations is part of these programs. Locations and additional claims: In addition to Puerto Rico, Bermuda, and Atlantic sites, Pabon mentions Antarctica as a locus of high technology and space-relevant radio-frequency systems. He references Alabama as a site where Nordics allegedly trained pilots connected to Artemis Accord activities. He recounts Brazil as an early personal contact point where an arc allegedly appeared near Cardos Novas, leading to a transformative personal experience. He claims a Brazilian arc has been publicly recognized as the Arc of Brazil. Closing perspective: The interview underscores a belief that disclosure may occur in phases, with multiple arcs and interactions across nations and a variety of ET groups. Pabon emphasizes the personal risks he and his family have faced, the complexity of the network surrounding disclosure, and his hope that public exposure will advance understanding of these phenomena.

Every place we've gone, we've had tremendous success. But while we're doing all of these things, we're achieving major strides toward completing our military objective. And some people could say they're pretty well complete. We've wiped every single force in Iran out very completely. Most of Iran's naval power power has been sunk. It's on the bottom of the sea. Think it's almost 50 ships. I was just notified it's 51 ships.

Following unprecedented strikes against Iran's nuclear enrichment sites in Isfahan, Fordo, and Natanz, three B-2 bombers were involved, each carrying two 15-ton bunker-busting bombs. A flight of B-2s flew east, likely three of them, and annihilated Fordow's, likely destroying Iran's nuclear enrichment program. A separate flight of six B-2 bombers flew west over the Pacific, refueling over Hawaii, but these were decoys. Thirty Tomahawks were fired from a sub. President Trump has made clear for eleven years that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon, and tonight, he enforced it.

Dmitry Sims junior introduces Brandon Weichert, a geopolitical analyst and author, and notes that Trump has floated annexing Greenland, the Panama Canal, and Canada, and the discussion aims to go beyond hype. Weichert argues that Trump’s approach is generally an art-of-the-deal tactic, starting with extreme positions to push concessions, and he breaks down the issues individually. On the Panama Canal Zone, Weichert says Trump is very serious about co-opting it. He notes the Canal was built by Americans and argues it should not have been handed over to Panamanians, who have allowed Chinese influence to grow in the area, including two large ports at both ends and $1 billion in infrastructure by state-owned Chinese firms. He suggests Chinese presence enables power projection and that the Canal Zone has been used for fentanyl flows and illegal migrants. Citing a colleague, Joe Humeyer, he asserts that a permanent U.S. hold could interdict fentanyl and migrant flows at the source, rather than at the border. On Greenland, Weichert describes the move as part of the art-of-the-deal dynamic, noting public opinion among Greenlanders is shifting toward independence from Denmark and could lead to rapid incorporation into the United States if independence occurs, drawing an analogy to Texas and California in the 19th century. For Canada, he contends the issue is likely a negotiation tactic: U.S. leverage over Canada’s trade benefits—which the U.S. says props up the Canadian economy—could destabilize Canada or trigger a regime change, potentially leading to U.S. annexation of parts like Alberta and Saskatchewan. He ties this to a broader Arctic great game among the United States, Russia, and China. Weichert adds a smaller, less widely reported point: Trump allegedly cut deals with tech magnates (David Sacks, Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, Marc Andreessen, Steve Bannon) to secure AI-dominance, including allowing tech workers (H-1B visas) and ensuring access to energy, with Canada’s geothermal resources (notably in Alberta) playing a key role, thereby linking energy to AI ambitions. On prioritizing the Arctic, Weichert ranks Greenland as the most important, as it is the geographical pivot around which the Arctic orbits, enabling power projection and deterring Chinese access to rare earth resources. Canada follows as a longer-term project; the Northwest Passage represents a strategic alternative to Russia’s Northern Sea Route, and pressure on Canada could push toward surrender or realignment over the Passage. Regarding Greenland’s Arctic significance, Weichert says Russian analysts view U.S. drilling in the Arctic as an attempt to counter submarine threats, including Poseidon, a nuclear torpedo, and to establish a base network to mitigate submarine threats. He agrees deterrence is a factor, noting U.S. neglect of northern deterrence and the need to project naval power in the Arctic. Weichert distinguishes the primary driver as China, while acknowledging Moscow and Beijing’s alignment has grown due to Russia’s Arctic foothold and the Ukraine war, which has pushed Russia and China closer. He doesn’t deny that squeezing Russia in the Arctic is a Washington aim, but argues the main impetus for Trump is countering China. On implementation, Weichert says the Panama Canal Zone could be reabsorbed via a national security clawback, regardless of Panama’s preferences. Greenland, if independence occurs, could be absorbed or granted statehood, with congressional movement underway. He notes potential opposition from Democrats and Republicans alike, but predicts House Republicans and Senate Republicans will largely back Trump on Greenland, while Canada faces stronger pushback. Macron’s EU opposition to Greenland annexation is dismissed by Weichert as Europe being subordinate to U.S. and Russian interests; he muses that ending NATO over Greenland and Canada could simplify the great-power dynamics, though he acknowledges such a move would be controversial. Weichert maintains Greenland’s development of natural gas, oil, and rare earth minerals is central; Greenland’s resources and environmental regulations could facilitate rapid U.S. development if Greenland becomes a U.S. territory or state. He addresses U.S. shipbuilding capacity and Arctic power, noting the U.S. defense industrial base lags behind Russia and the need to revitalize shipyards with a new mission and potential reforms under the Trump administration, possibly aided by experts like John Conrad of gCaptain, to dramatically increase production within two years.

Mike Adams discusses China’s potential moves in the context of the US war with Iran, sharing thoughts from an interview with Eric Yong, a Chinese citizen living in Hong Kong who travels between Hong Kong, Beijing, and other Chinese cities, and who has family in Taiwan. Yong is described as an advocate of gold and silver and a successful former manufacturer. Key points: - China imports oil despite domestic production, with about 30% of its oil produced domestically. China maintains large oil storage and a diverse supplier list, but does not want its tankers interdicted or pirated by the US Navy on the high seas. - A Chinese official reportedly said the US should not interfere with China’s trade agreements with Iran. Trump is portrayed as opposing this, threatening to disrupt ships. - Yong’s view (not a military expert) is that China would likely provide naval escorts for its tankers to protect trade routes and agreements. Such escorts would aim to signal to the US Navy that these tankers are off-limits; according to Yong, this could avoid escalation. - Adams notes a broader shift in naval power dynamics: the US Navy’s role as global police may be waning. He references comments about the US Navy’s vulnerabilities, including equipment issues and the difficulty of maintaining access in conflicts like Iran or Yemen, where Iranian forces reportedly kept the US Navy at bay. - The future of warfare is described as moving away from traditional aircraft carriers toward drone carriers and missiles capable of striking ships globally. Iran’s actions are used to support the claim that the US Navy cannot easily project power near Iran or in key chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. - The potential for a reconfiguration of global naval strategy is discussed: if the US cannot enforce its will universally, other nations will consider escorting their own trade routes, possibly through multilateral or regional arrangements, and the dollar’s dominance could decline as the petrodollar system weakens. - The Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz are highlighted as critical chokepoints. Indonesia’s reported plan to impose fees on ships transiting the Strait of Malacca is mentioned as an example of new cost structures in maritime trade. The toll through Hormuz could be paid in Chinese yuan, Bitcoin, gold, or other currencies, rather than dollars, according to the discussion. - Adams predicts a multipolar world where the US is not the sole arbiter of global trade. He suggests that even major powers like Russia, China, and Iran are recalibrating their defense and economic strategies around drone and underwater drones, shore-based missiles, and other forms of non-traditional military capabilities. - The conversation emphasizes the need for states to secure sea lanes through self-defense measures, potentially including drones on transport ships, as the era of universal naval dominance by the US declines. He cautions against the world of “Mad Max ocean” where piracy and escalatory actions raise costs and risk for all, and notes a shift away from a unipolar policing model toward negotiated trade and multipolar cooperation. - Adams concludes with a call for a shift toward peaceful trade, reducing aggressive postures, and rethinking US reliance on the dollar, arguing for broader global trade partnerships and renewed domestic priorities. Note: The latter part of the transcript contains promotional content for gold and health products. This summary excludes those promotional sections and focuses on the discussion of geopolitics, naval strategy, and economic implications.

Following unprecedented strikes against Iran's nuclear enrichment sites in Isfahan, Fordo, and Natanz, it's reported that three B-2 bombers were involved, each carrying two 15-ton bunker-busting bombs. A flight of B-2s flying west over the Pacific and refueling over Hawaii at 11 PM were likely decoys. Another flight of three B-2s flew east, annihilated Fordow, and likely destroyed Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Thirty Tomahawks were fired from a submarine. President Trump has made clear for eleven years that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon, and tonight, he enforced it.

Speaker 0: In a few days, America is already running out of weapons against Iran, despite spending about $1,000,000,000,000 a year on defense. The administration is meeting with top defense contractors at the White House because strikes on Iran are diminishing US stockpiles, especially long-range munitions like Tomahawk missiles. Interceptor missiles are being exhausted by Iranian attacks. This is not getting wide play in the mainstream media; there is a blackout. CNN reported that Israel told them they are not allowed to show incoming rocket attacks. Speaker 1: One go up there. We're not showing you that because we're not gonna show. The Israeli government does not allow us or want us to show where that may have come up, that interceptor. Speaker 0: The most powerful military machine in history is not calling a meeting because it's winning too hard. It’s calling a meeting because the shelves are getting bare. Axios and The Wall Street Journal report that the reality contradicts slogans of unlimited munitions. War is fought with inventory and magazine depth, not slogans. The White House is seeking more supply as munitions run low. Speaker 0: The dirty little secret is that war isn’t fought with slogans; it’s fought with inventory. The Iran fight is the worst kind of war for stockpiles because it’s strike targets and defense of everything you own at the same time. A CIA station house in Riyadh was hit; Iran could strike a CIA station, and telemetry data may have come from China or Russia. Iran doesn’t need to beat the US head-to-head in aircraft carriers to bleed us dry. Speaker 0: Aircraft carriers are relics of the post-World War II era and are vulnerable to hypersonic weapons. France is sending a carrier; it’s not about carriers but about forcing us to burn high-end interceptors faster than we can replace them. It comes down to math: a $50,000 drone versus a $4,000,000 interceptor or a naval missile defense shot. We’re bleeding resources. Speaker 0: Tomahawks are expensive long-range munitions. The Pentagon plans to buy only 72 Tomahawks in fiscal year 2025 and 57 in fiscal year 2026, while operations have consumed hundreds. Each missile is around $1,300,000. Raytheon and others are ramping Tomahawk production from roughly 60 per year to eventually 1,000 per year. How long will that take? The defense supply chain is strained. Speaker 0: The entire defensive layer is under strain: Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, costing about $4,000,000 each; Lockheed is moving to more than triple capacity, roughly from 600 per year to roughly 2,000 per year. Interceptors are expensive, and ramping production cannot fix the immediate shortfall. Speaker 0: Ukraine aid is enormous in dollar terms—State Department reporting puts military assistance since 2022 at over or close to $70,000,000,000, likely higher. Ukraine has been a grinding logistics war; Iran is turning into a high-end missile and air defense consumption war. Boots on the ground are being considered as necessary; air campaigns alone cannot achieve regime change. 155-millimeter shells production is around 40,150 rounds per month as of 2024–2025, but Ukraine’s consumption is far higher. Mineral shortages also constrain production, prompting the White House to convene the defense industry. Speaker 0: The war plan may be to destroy enough of Iran’s launch capability before magazines run shallow—a brutal last-call scenario. The US is fighting on two tracks: attack and defense, using Tomahawks, B-2 bombers, and 2,000-pound bombs, along with low-cost drones around $35,000 each. The message to Middle East allies is that the US cannot fully protect them as stocks thin. Putin and China are watching, waiting to see if the US can prevent a massive Russian advance or another major theater’s strain. The White House meeting with CEOs reads like a panic flare, not victory, as munitions are consumed faster than they can be replenished. The speaker notes the high death toll on Iran’s side and asks for more transparency on American casualties, while reiterating the commitment to anti-war principles.

Speaker 0 expresses concern that Iran’s escalation leads to automatic draft registration and that many people voted against the Biden administration and Kamala Harris because of floated draft ideas for Russia. They reference a report on Liberty Report about this automatic involuntary draft registration. Speaker 1 describes the NDAA as a must-pass bill that often includes dangerous language. He says the bill will automatically register young men aged 18 to 26 for the draft and create a database, removing any choice about whether to register or not. He argues this presumes the government owns you and your body, equating it to slavery. He contends that if a war is unpopular or unconstitutional, people will still be forced to register. He notes a belief that the current war is obviously unconstitutional and asserts confidence in young Americans defending their country if attacked, though he questions whether an attack has occurred. Speaker 2 counters that the threat is not existential from Iran, but argues it comes from elsewhere, including issues at the southern border. He reframes the concern as domestic rather than a direct external threat from Iran. Speaker 3 agrees and adds that the U.S. lacks a sufficiently large army due to prior cuts and a focus on exotic weapons and a large surface fleet. He contends the army is too small to project power, and any ground invasion into the Middle East would face immediate, formidable opposition, including precision missiles and drones, making a conventional ground war implausible. He criticizes naval power’s utility in modern conflicts and suggests an invasion would be impractical. Speaker 2 asks for more detail about Karg Island, a strategic island off Iran’s coast, noting 90% of oil flows through Iran from that area. He mentions talk among Trump administration officials about capturing the island and asks how the U.S. could secure it. Speaker 3 explains that much of the oil from Karg Island goes to India, China, Japan, and South Korea; destroying or occupying the island would require moving ground forces and crossing water, which would be extremely dangerous. He warns that destroying oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf would lead Iran to target refineries, drilling rigs, and storage tanks, and notes that Gulf States heavily rely on desalination plants. He cautions that destroying these plants could cause mass death and devastate Gulf economies. He adds that the Israelis previously struck a desalination plant in Iran, which would amplify consequences for regional economies. Speaker 0 asks how the public should feel about the conflict, noting that the government started it on false pretenses and that the country’s leaders and military performance have been disappointing. They seek guidance on how to view the situation and how to respond. Speaker 1 expresses domestic concern about a potential false flag, citing FBI warnings that Iran may have launched attack drones off the West Coast, suggesting a false flag could be used to erode civil liberties. Speaker 2 agrees with the false-flag concern and notes that Israel has a history of false flags and mentions events in Azerbaijan and Turkey. He emphasizes the need for Americans to understand the consequences of U.S. actions for people in the region and to push the president and administration to stop inflammatory language. Speaker 3 clarifies that Iranian officials have instructed contacts in the Western Hemisphere not to harm the United States, arguing that causing harm would benefit Israel. He concedes that false-flag analysis is plausible but unlikely in the long run, and stresses the importance of public awareness of consequences and maintaining peaceful regional relations after the war ends.

Iran warned the United States that the USS Abraham Lincoln could be sunk if a war erupts. The USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group, America’s largest warship, is moving closer to Iranian waters with fighter jets, destroyers, and support vessels in tow. The Lincoln’s arrival is part of what Washington calls a massive armada aimed at pressuring Tehran. Iranian commanders have responded with blunt warnings, with top military leaders saying their forces are on high alert with fingers on the trigger and threatening immediate retaliation not just regionally but directly against US bases and ships if any attack occurs. This isn’t simple rhetoric. Iran’s expanding missile and drone arsenal gives it asymmetric tools that could swarm and target American vessels, a reality Tehran often highlights as a deterrent. For the United States, moving the Abraham Lincoln into strike range marks one of the biggest military deployments since tensions with Iran exploded after the June 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Diplomacy hasn’t worked so far. Negotiations are stalled, with Washington demanding significant changes to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and Tehran refusing anything that undermines its strategic autonomy. This standoff isn’t just about aircraft carriers anymore; it’s about whether a confrontation spirals into a full-scale conflict that could pull in the entire region. One miscalculation could be all it takes.

- "We have begun preliminary mobilization of long-range bombers, aerial refueling aircraft, and forward support units." "US S Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is moving from the South China Sea to the Middle East, to deter Seigou and provide immediate striking capability." "On the other hand, Iran side is entering the highest state of defense readiness, including a long-range air defense system like Barzriv(?) and a virtual air defense network, and a regional force including Hizballah Shiite faction prepared to oppose the US military air operations." "They are prepared to resist our air campaigns." China and Russia are watching our next moves. "What is that?" "That is the judgment above." "Damn, the protracted conflict in the Middle East would not give China room to move toward Taiwan; all would be delayed, and a single strike would end it." "The United States will cut the backbone of the system." "Are other powers ready to respond to that scale of reaction?" "Moscow speaks, Beijing watches; neither side will shed blood for Teheran." "What matters is what happens after Revolutionary Guards first act, and what fills the vacuum." "Your and my move—as long as your AIM and ideas bring— I am prepared to transition." "Never forget, it was us who raised you from a nameless origin; AIMs will defend Israel’s line against these wild men, and will continue to do so." "We have targeted Odesa's ideas, energy facilities, bridges, and other critical infrastructure." "From cities’ iron-walled defenses, distant from the front lines, ground forces maintain the line while these attacks keep draining Ukraine’s economy. Support is cut." "We will strip away what remains in the dirty chains and, in the end, the key will kneel at negotiation." "Together we hope to cooperate; we mark moments of strength daily." "That is a signal to the world that both nations move forward with resolve." "Coordination is not mere exchange; it is building trust and sharing objectives." "China must act with confidence and restraint, and there is no need to showcase force."

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

The speaker describes a missile defense scenario: missiles launched; “Missiles launching. They're launching.” They mention “Missile 101 missiles coming at them.” They say, “We have to have, like, eleven seconds to make a determination. Then at seven seconds, fire, fire, fire.” The actions are described as, “fire, boom. Fire, boom.” One at a time, the missiles are knocked out “like they were nothing,” and the situation is called “Genius.”

Speaker describes Russia’s nuclear underwater weapon project, the Status Six oceanic multipurpose system, codenamed Poseidon. Public reports begin in September 2015. Poseidon is an unmanned torpedo-shaped drone that can be loaded onto and launched by a submarine, or remain dormant in a box on the ocean floor until activated. Once armed, it has a range of 10,000 kilometers and travels slowly across the ocean for weeks or months to avoid detection, then accelerates to over 100 miles per hour when near an enemy coastline to detonate its nuclear bomb before detection. The bomb carried by Poseidon is allegedly the most powerful nuclear device ever created, capable of 200 megatons of explosive power and detonated underwater. For comparison, the Tsar Bomba, the largest tested nuclear device, was 50 megatons. The Poseidon bomb is described as a cobalt bomb designed to unleash more radioactive fallout than a normal nuclear bomb, making the resulting wave both enormous and highly radioactive. A 200-megaton underwater detonation is said to unleash a 500-meter-high tsunami toward an enemy coastline, far taller than most structures. The comparison notes that the Empire State Building would be minuscule beside such a wave, and even the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami maxed at about 30 meters, which Poseidon’s 500-meter wave would exceed by a wide margin. The tsunami would deliver catastrophic devastation, with highly radioactive water contaminating ground and drinking water. The transcript states that the Russian Navy has allegedly ordered 30 Poseidon armed drones, with half assigned to the Northern Fleet in the Arctic Ocean and half to the Pacific Fleet based in Vladivostok. Poseidon is described as a weapon of last resort, intended to be used only when all other hope in a war seems lost, and once initiated there is “never any going back.” The speakers emphasize Poseidon’s purpose as a last-ditch option designed to circumvent capable US and European missile defense systems. The description includes a hypothetical modeling finding from the University of Washington: a 100-megaton underwater detonation off the coast of Long Island would flood Long Island, New York City, and portions of surrounding states; Poseidon’s 200-megaton capacity would double that destructive potential, creating a far larger, more radioactive flood. The overall portrayal frames Poseidon as an extraordinarily powerful, nuclear underwater weapon with dramatic strategic implications, reserved for extreme scenarios.

The US has developed a new laser firing aircraft carrier that operates with incredible precision. It can target specific areas, like a ship's engine, without causing damage to other parts. The laser is silent and invisible, making it a surprise for enemies. It can target moving objects on land, water, or in the air. The laser generates an infrared beam from a solid state laser array and has a lightning-fast response. It can eliminate threats in less than a second due to its speed of light. Additionally, it can fire multiple shots without traditional ammunition, resulting in a lower cost per shot.

The ability to make better and faster decisions is crucial in fueling new technologies. It's not just about technology for the sake of it, but about enabling war fighters to improve their decision-making. AI plays a central role in our innovation agenda, allowing us to compute faster, share information more effectively, and leverage other platforms. This is essential for future battles.