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In May 2024, 194 WHO member states will vote on international agreements for pandemic prevention behind closed doors. These agreements give the WHO leadership in health matters related to pandemics, but the process is not widely reported or discussed in the media, parliaments, universities, or society.

Supporting countries with funding and institutions is crucial for better pandemic preparedness. However, the challenge lies in dealing with disinformation and communication issues. Diagnostic testing and political decision-making are key interventions before a vaccine is available. Disinformation and propaganda can hinder effective decision-making, and the media should fulfill their responsibilities. Science institutions play a vital role in addressing the pandemic, selecting expert panels, and summarizing knowledge. Scientists should prioritize serving society over personal gain.

We need to be proactive in searching for emerging diseases before they become a global threat. Peter Daszak, who collaborated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, discovered 50 previously unknown Coronaviruses in bats. These Coronaviruses have the potential to jump from wildlife to humans. Our organization works with labs worldwide, subcontracting the work and ensuring we have a country program officer in each location to manage our projects.

The discussion centers on gain-of-function (GoF) research, its regulation, and the motivations behind it. The first speaker notes the administration’s goal to end GoF research and asks where that stands. The second speaker says progress has been made, and the White House is working on a formal policy. He then defines the issue in stages: what GoF research is, why someone would do it, and how to regulate it to prevent dangerous projects that could catastrophically harm human populations. He clarifies that GoF research is not inherently bad, but dangerous GoF research is. He gives an insulin example: creating bacteria to produce insulin is a legitimate GoF that benefits diabetics. In contrast, taking a virus from bat caves, bringing it to a lab in a densely populated city with weak biosafety, and manipulating it to be more transmissible among humans is a dangerous GoF that should not be supported. The administration’s policy aims to prevent such dangerous work entirely, and the President signed an executive order in April or May endorsing this policy. Next, he discusses implementation: how to create incentives to ensure this research does not recur. He explains that the utopian idea behind such research was to prevent all pandemics by collecting viruses from wild places, testing their potential to infect humans by increasing their pathogenicity, and then preparing countermeasures in advance (vaccines, antivirals) and stockpiling them, even though those countermeasures would not have been tested against humans yet. If a virus did leap to humans, the foreseen countermeasures might prove ineffective because evolution is unpredictable. This “triage” approach—identifying pathogens most likely to leap and preemptively preparing against them—was the rationale for dangerous GoF work, a rationale he characterizes as flawed. He notes that many scientists considered this an effort to do bioweapons research under the guise of safety and defense. The work is dual-use. The U.S. is a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention and does not conduct offensive bio-weapons research, but other countries might. The discussion highlights that the GoF research discussed during the pandemic can backfire and may not align with true biodefense, since countermeasures might not match whatever pathogen actually emerges. The speaker concludes that this agenda—pursuing GoF to prevent pandemics—has drawn substantial support from parts of the Western world and other countries for about two and a half decades, but he implies it is not deserving of continuation.

In 2019, preparations began for a new pandemic by searching for viruses globally. The aim was to create crisis situations for global management, rather than being limited to the United States or specific technologies.

The world's perception of influenza needs to change in order to address the problem effectively. There is a possibility of a novel avian virus outbreak in China, which could have devastating consequences. If another pandemic were to occur, millions of people could die within a short period of time. Disruptive and iterative approaches are necessary to tackle this issue. The government has a role to play in pushing the industry to prioritize public health over profit. The perception of influenza is not as serious as other diseases, which makes it difficult to bring about change. Resources need to be allocated more efficiently during crises, and synthetic-based vaccines could revolutionize the field. The goal is to align different capabilities, funding streams, and incentives towards a common goal. More resources and financial incentives could attract new talent to the field.

We are launching partnerships to intensify the search for a vaccine, strengthen treatments, and increase diagnostic capacities for COVID-19. Our goal is to ensure equitable access to improved diagnostics, accelerated therapies, and the development of a safe and effective vaccine.

There is a consensus that appears in the World Health Organization’s ten-year plan, which has been in place for a long time. The plan states that people should prepare for the coming ten years because a major infectious crisis is anticipated. In other words, the plan foretells that over the next decade there will be a significant infectious-health emergency. The speaker notes that “this was year 1,” indicating that the current year is the first year of that ten-year horizon outlined by the plan.

In this exchange, the speakers reference the World Health Organization’s ten-year plan. The first speaker states that the plan has long warned: “for the coming 10 years, there will be a large infectious disease crisis,” and notes that “this was year 1.” The second speaker adds that the aim is to prepare and help, should a second pandemic occur, and asserts that, based on years of the speakers’ discussions, “the chance that a second pandemic comes is very large.” The first speaker reiterates that there is consensus and that the plan has anticipated a major infectious disease crisis over the decade, emphasizing that the warning has been a longstanding part of the plan.

We need a medical reserve corps paired with the military for fast response. Simulations are crucial to identify weaknesses. Research in vaccines and diagnostics is vital, with potential breakthroughs like the deano associated virus. The cost is likely modest compared to potential harm. The World Bank estimates a global flu epidemic could cause over $3 trillion in economic loss and millions of deaths.

We are addressing real and critical threats related to a novel coronavirus called CAPS, which is similar to the viruses that caused the SARS epidemic and MERS outbreaks. We need to be prepared for a fast-moving and highly lethal pandemic of a respiratory pathogen. This disease is more transmissible than SARS or MERS and as contagious as influenza. The virus can be easily transmitted through the air, making everyone susceptible. Asymptomatic individuals can also spread the virus, leading to a severe pandemic that affects people worldwide. Many countries will be affected simultaneously.

Testing could have been increased rapidly in countries like Taiwan, New Zealand, and Australia, which effectively avoided the epidemic. These countries learned from their past experiences and were better prepared, enabling them to act swiftly. It is crucial that we learn from this and be ready for the next outbreak, as it will undoubtedly receive significant attention.

Latin American countries alerted the WHO of outbreaks of a new infectious disease that could cause a severe pandemic if containment and mitigation efforts fail. Pandemics are political, financial, and global health risks. National leadership is crucial, along with support for local and national responses, training, and regional solidarity. Communication is key, involving scientists, social, religious, and political leaders. Trust is essential and needs to be rebuilt among countries, populations, and healthcare systems. The WHO should strengthen its role as a voice for the voiceless. Over a billion cases and 20 million deaths, including 15 million children, have been reported worldwide. Pandemic preparedness and response teams were established, but more countries should have participated. Lessons learned should be applied to future pandemics.

In the future, there may be a deadly airborne disease. To effectively deal with it, we need to establish a global infrastructure that enables us to quickly detect, isolate, and respond to such outbreaks. By investing in this infrastructure now, we can be better prepared for future strains of flu, like the Spanish flu, that may emerge in the next five to ten years. It is a wise investment to make.

We should not return to our complacency about pandemics. In the future, we can have mega testing platforms that are quick, inexpensive, and can test 20% of the population weekly. Monoclonal antibodies show promise in reducing death rates by 80%. The mRNA platform will make vaccine development faster, easier, and cheaper. To prevent future pandemics, we need a global alert system to detect disease outbreaks worldwide. We also need a group of infectious disease responders, like pandemic firefighters, who can quickly build capacity and respond to new pathogens. This investment is like the best insurance policy the world could buy.

We must support 40 countries to govern themselves to be prepared for future pandemics. Communication and disinformation are critical issues. Media must fulfill their responsibilities and science should guide decision-making. Top scientists should provide expertise to society through scientific institutions.

We should not return to our complacency about pandemics. In the future, we can have mega testing platforms that are quick, inexpensive, and can test 20% of the population weekly. Monoclonal antibodies are a promising treatment that can reduce death rates by 80%. The development of new vaccines will be faster, easier, and cheaper thanks to the mRNA platform. To prevent future pandemics, we need a global alert system and a group of infectious disease responders who can act quickly. This investment is like the best insurance policy the world could buy.

In the future, there might be a deadly airborne disease. To effectively handle it, we need a global infrastructure that enables us to detect, isolate, and respond to it swiftly. This infrastructure should be in place not only in our country but worldwide. By investing in this infrastructure, we can be better prepared to tackle future outbreaks, such as a new strain of flu similar to the Spanish flu, that may emerge in the next five or ten years.

We discussed pandemic readiness with Tony, proposing a mock outbreak to test fast vaccine production. Despite skepticism, we aimed to deliver a GMP dose within 60 days. When news of a new coronavirus emerged, we quickly recognized the need for action. Transitioning from traditional egg-based vaccine production to new methods requires disruptive innovation. The urgency for a faster, disruptive approach to address outbreaks is evident. The potential for rapid response to novel viruses by sharing RNA sequences globally is crucial. Investigation into motives for outbreaks is essential.

Officials in two Latin American countries have reported outbreaks of a new infectious disease, severe epidemic enterovirus respiratory syndrome 2025, with 500 confirmed or suspected cases in the last six weeks. Without effective containment, this virus poses a risk of a severe pandemic. National leadership is crucial for managing the outbreak, and local responses must be supported. Training and equipping local health workers, along with fostering trust among populations, are essential. As of now, there are an estimated 1 billion cases globally, resulting in over 20 million deaths, including nearly 15 million children. Successful countries had invested in pandemic preparedness, with dedicated teams conducting operational planning and drills. Greater participation and adherence to guidance could have reduced the impact significantly.

The speaker argues that confronting future pandemics requires the development and integration of several new tools and capabilities, implemented continuously so societies are never caught off guard again. A central element is environmental surveillance conducted on an ongoing basis, forming a persistent early-warning system that can detect emerging threats before they escalate. A second key capability is the ability to produce diagnostics at an unprecedented scale: literally billions of diagnostics within a few months, with the combination of very low cost and high accuracy. The implication is that rapid, widespread testing would be feasible, enabling quick identification and response to infectious threats and reducing the chance of uncontrolled spread. Third, the speaker emphasizes the need for a worldwide network of vaccine manufacturing capacity. This network should include mRNA vaccine factories at multiple levels of capacity, designed to operate at very low cost and capable of producing vaccines that are affordable for broad populations. The emphasis is on creating scalable, geographically distributed production to ensure rapid deployment of vaccines during health emergencies. The speaker notes that recent advances funded by various foundations and organizations are enabling these capabilities, particularly in establishing such vaccine manufacturing infrastructure. These advances are described as enabling the global network to be established and to function efficiently when a new threat emerges. When these elements—surveillance, a global health core, diagnostics, antibody capacities, and other related capabilities—are integrated, the speaker asserts that if a pathogen like COVID-19 were faced again, the response would be dramatically better. The proposed combination of continuous monitoring, mass diagnostic production, and distributed vaccine manufacturing is presented as the key to substantially improving outcomes in future pandemics. Finally, the speaker asserts an aspirational outcome: every country should perform better in a future pandemic than even the very best countries did in the past. This sets a benchmark for international preparedness and underscores the belief that the described toolkit—surveillance, diagnostics, manufacturing capacity, and allied resources—can elevate global response to levels that surpass current best practices.

As a kid, nuclear war was the big fear. Now, a highly infectious virus is the greatest global catastrophe risk. An epidemic, whether natural or intentional, is the most likely cause of over ten million deaths in the coming decades. We are not ready for the next epidemic, and it's surprising how little preparedness there is. To prepare, we need to run simulations, like germ games instead of war games, to identify our weaknesses. If we start now, we can be ready.

I'm just gonna give you a punch list of some of the clandestine things the WHO has been doing behind closed doors on the pandemic treaty front, but on the sort of global convergence of, you know, emergency crisis response. But what they don't tell you is that emergency means climate change or racial inequity. Take your pick of woke buzzword. But they created the public health and social measures decision navigator, The two point o platform, which will quote, identify relevant content from websites, social media, and other public sources to identify important health events. It's called the epidemic intelligence from open sources, and essentially, they launched a new AI pandemic tracker that's going to be monitoring and essentially patrolling social media to see what kind of misinformation they need to crack down on their fusing essentially new AI tools, to be able to do this so they can process more sources, get probably more of your social media posts, more of the war room clips, that you share. They've also announced progress. This is another story of mine on what they call the pathogen access and benefit sharing system. They have a nice little acronym for it, the PABSS system, where they this one's actually quite wild. They're working on a pandemic causing pathogen database global sharing initiative. Yes. You heard that right. They didn't learn anything from COVID, or I guess maybe they learned everything if what they cared to learn was how to cause a global pandemic. They're pretty good at that. But they are providing quotes, catch this, safe, transparent, and accountable access to pathogens with pandemic potential to all WHO member states, not just China, but every country. They also want to guarantee, quote, equitable, rapid, and timely sharing of countermeasures buried there. What they don't tell you, they mean vaccines. And they also want to, quote, strengthen global health preparedness by pooling resources across borders, which as you and I both know, that is just a dog whistle for suppressing not just nationalism, but the idea of hypernational supply chains and not being reliant on what we saw. It was the completely defunct and completely inadequate globalized supply chains that failed, that are, of course, reliant on probably the UN, WHO's largest benefactor, China, but totally failed during COVID. That's just some of the latest things that the WHO is working on. It's absolutely wild. And I think it goes back to sort of the key point that Nora was making. And even you see with the Bolton stuff, right, Even when we come after these people and rightfully so, they are not just sitting and cowering. They are rebranding. They are like a hydra. They are coming back with even greater force because they know they are lashing out in their last few breaths, again, metaphorically, but seeking because they understand, right, that this is a a serious existential threat.

Latin American countries have reported outbreaks of a new infectious disease called severe epidemic enterovirus WFTR syndrome 2025. There have been 500 confirmed or suspected cases in the past six weeks. If containment and mitigation efforts fail, this virus could lead to a severe pandemic. The World Health Organization (WHO) is concerned about the global health and security risks associated with such a pandemic. Pandemics are complex and involve political, financial, and broader issues. National leadership is crucial, and the WHO should be involved in decision-making. Trust between countries, populations, healthcare systems, and governments needs to be rebuilt. The WHO needs to be strengthened and become a voice for the voiceless. Preparedness and training are key to successfully managing pandemics.