reSee.it Video Transcript AI Summary
Retired Royal Navy Commodore Steve Jeremy discussed his article, “The Coming War with Russia,” arguing that European leaders are preparing for war without fully accounting for the costs and consequences. He said Europeans assume Russia will “sit quietly” until a future readiness point, while Europe continues to develop and provide missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to attack into Russia without Russian reaction. Jeremy contrasted this with Russian statements and intent, including comments attributed to Putin that Russia would prepare as well if Europeans were preparing for war.
Jeremy argued that, for Russia, the conflict would be a defensive war linked to protecting itself from NATO expansion and military infrastructure moving closer to Russian borders—an issue he said Russia has raised for years. He said Europeans appear to interpret Russian actions as colonial ambition, rather than as defensive posture. He also suggested that Russia would respond early, including a suspicion that the 2022 move into the Donbas was influenced by the idea that waiting would become more damaging, because Russia would face greater forces later.
Jeremy’s scenario began with Russia striking European production facilities in Germany, France, and Britain where drones and cruise missiles are developed for use against Russia. He then suggested that European governments could invoke NATO’s Article 5, but that Article 5 does not guarantee collective action—leading some nations, he said, to provide “warm words” but no monetary support. He further suggested the United States might stand back, predicting that Europeans could find themselves “on their own,” because he believed American concerns would include the risk of a land war on the European continent and reluctance to send American soldiers to fight and die in Europe against Russia.
He next predicted that the E3 (Germany, Britain, and France) might respond with air attacks against Russia, but that they would face effective air defenses and heavy aircraft losses, drawing on the S-400 and S-500 systems. He said Russia would then target Europe’s energy infrastructure similarly to approaches used in Ukraine, and that sanctions and reduced Russian oil and gas supplies could quickly produce an energy crisis, then an economic crisis. He argued that, at that stage, “the only thing” left might be to sue for peace because offensive options would not work. He described the scenario as a scenario rather than a forecast, intended to show potential costs that he said Europeans have not thought through publicly.
In response, Glenn questioned assumptions about escalation control and war being fought elsewhere. He compared past eras where NATO had “complete and total escalation control,” to what he argued would be a new situation without such control once missiles began entering Russia and retaliation began. He also asked how the war would be fought, emphasizing what he saw as a Russian preference for systematic, gradual frontline fighting and “bleeding out” an adversary.
Jeremy replied that the key error is believing the war can be contained in Ukraine. He used Clausewitz, arguing the nature of war must be understood, and said Russia views the conflict as existential. He described a likely Russian approach as defensive: securing Ukraine positions while defending behind lines, then conducting destruction of attacks similar to what he said happened in the first year of the war after a strategic withdrawal. He asserted Russia would focus on defense and deterrence rather than offensive tank advances into Western direction. He also emphasized European vulnerability: he said Europe has limited defense against ballistic missiles and “no defense whatsoever” against hypersonic missiles, describing Europe as “naked.”
Jeremy extended his scenario by suggesting Russia could escalate by threatening or conducting energy strikes in a more graduated or tailored way, potentially including a blockade. He claimed Europe lacks anti-submarine warfare forces to defend against Russian submarines, and that threats alone could turn off shipping and insurance, rapidly disrupting fuel delivery and leading to broad economic harm. He suggested the most consequential open question would be what Britain and France do regarding nuclear deterrence, framing it as a binary choice.
Both speakers repeatedly returned to the need for strategy and public debate rather than closed narratives, discussing how public discourse can label alternative assessments as supportive of Russia or Ukraine depending on which side is described as “winning.” Jeremy argued that diplomacy is possible and should be pursued, calling for a public debate about risks of escalation and “a plan B” involving talks and alternative European strategic architecture. He proposed that alternative media contributes by reopening discussion on risks and diplomacy. The conversation ended with both speakers expressing agreement that boycotts of diplomacy and pressure on the public to avoid discussion are contributing factors, and that clear strategic thinking and public debate are needed to avoid a war they said Europeans did not ask for.