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Successful covert influence campaigns don't create societal fractures. Instead, they identify pre-existing fractures and exploit them to further divide populations. This exploitation of existing divisions is presented as an "iron law of physics" governing covert influence.

The discussion centers on allegations that the United States has used or could use domestic and international mechanisms to effect regime change, including through domestic unrest and foreign influence operations. Speaker 0 describes a 2021 Special Operations Command instruction manual, framed as a vision for 2021 and beyond, that purportedly contains instructions and examples on how the military could work with the State Department, intelligence services, and USAID to use race riots to destabilize nations. He points to examples labeled as part of this manual’s guidance for destabilization via combined military-government-civilian efforts. Speaker 1 lays out a model of how revolutions are allegedly structured, starting with a government at the top and support funneled through USAID, the State Department, or other administration entities. He then describes a degree of separation through privatized NGOs, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, and similar organizations, with money flowing from entities such as George Soros’s Open Society Foundations through tides and government-funded NGOs like NED. He suggests money ultimately comes from the people, and that demonstrators, youth movements, a sympathetic media, and labor unions contribute to organizing protests. He outlines conditions for regime change: an unpopular incumbent, a semi-automatic regime (not fully autocratic), a united and organized opposition, the ability to quickly frame the voting results as falsified, media amplification of that falsification, an opposition capable of mobilizing thousands, and divisions among coercive forces like the military or police. He asks whether those conditions are present and implies they are. Speaker 2 cites a declassified CIA guide from 1983 aimed at training operatives to organize riots in foreign countries, including using agitators and hiring professional criminals to manipulate mass meetings, with the goal of turning general anger into violence against the regime. The guide describes creating a climate where a few hundred agitators could mobilize tens of thousands, using 200 back channels and 200 human assets to generate a 10,000–20,000 demonstration. It also notes strategies such as setting up job fairs near riots to enlist disaffected workers. He references USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), implying that “transition” is a code for regime change, and cites a 2009 congressional report warning that OTI was a foreign operation aimed at toppling governments through organized political warfare, including mobilizing unions, boycotts, and shutdowns of roads, transportation, hospitals, and schools. Fulton Armstrong’s quote is cited regarding government secrecy surrounding such operations. The speakers conclude by condemning actions conducted in the shadows, destabilizing nations using race wars to achieve political aims, and advocating that the military be involved, arguing these efforts occur without oversight.

The speaker argues that to understand how the American government actually works at the highest levels, you must know that Richard Nixon was historically the most popular president, elected with a massive margin in 1972, yet he was forced to resign and was replaced by Gerald Ford, an unelected president. The speaker asserts this demonstrates that the federal agencies undermine the American system, a point Nixon allegedly warned about and was right about. Key events and connections highlighted include: - Nixon’s meeting with CIA director Richard Helms on June 23, 1972, during which Nixon allegedly implied knowledge of who killed John F. Kennedy and suggested CIA involvement in Kennedy’s assassination; Helms reportedly remained silent. - Four days earlier, the Washington Post published the first Watergate break-in story; the speaker notes that four of the five burglars worked for the CIA and that Bob Woodward, the reporter, had a background in the classified realm and worked with intelligence agencies; Woodward’s main source was Mark Felt, deputy director of the FBI, who allegedly ran COINTELPRO to discredit Nixon and other political targets. - The FBI’s COINTELPRO program is cited as a mechanism used to take down Nixon’s vice president, Spiro Agnew, who was indicted for tax evasion in 1973 and forced to resign; Ford, a Warren Commission member, replaced Agnew, with the claim that Ford’s qualifications were tied to his involvement with the Commission’s conclusion that the CIA bore no responsibility for Kennedy’s assassination. - The speaker alleges that Nixon was strong-armed into accepting Gerald Ford as president by Democrats in Congress, with the claim that Ford’s rise demonstrated a systemic pattern in which the presidency could be controlled by federal agencies and political elites rather than by elected representatives or voters. The narrative then shifts to the Trump era, stating that Michael Flynn—an Army intelligence veteran who had led the Defense Intelligence Agency—was targeted by the FBI shortly after Trump’s inauguration, lured into a meeting without legal counsel, and pressured to resign based on fabricated crimes; this is presented as evidence of how the system operates against national-security-minded figures who seek to push back. The speaker contrasts this with Joe Biden, claiming he was similarly harmed by the justice system and portraying Biden as deserving neither sympathy nor special treatment, while contending that the broader electorate deserves a genuine democracy in which people who are not elected to lead do not run everything. The overarching claim is that “democracy becomes a joke” when unelected actors wield real power.

- The transcript analyzes a declassified 1983 CIA guide intended to train operatives in organizing riots in foreign countries. It includes a section (Tab f) on using agitators, including hiring professional criminals to manipulate mass meetings and assemblies, which can result in general violence. The guide states that the psychological war team must develop a hostile mental attitude among target groups so that at the given moment they can turn anger into violence against the regime the CIA aims to overthrow. - The document describes recruiting teachers, doctors, attorneys, and businessmen into clusters of influence (ten teachers, ten lawyers, ten captains of industry, ten medical professionals) who will, in a gradual process, fuse their spheres of influence to form a united front at the appropriate moment. It asserts that with a force of 200 to 300 agitators, one can create a demonstration in which 10,000 to 20,000 could participate, given 200 back channels and 200 capacity-built assets. - The discussion situates this in the context of Nicaragua in 1983, noting the broader significance of 1983 as the year the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was founded and a reorganization of intelligence work through NGOs and democracy-promotion fronts. - The host emphasizes that the document was declassified only seven years ago and reviews the index of the guide, including tabs on interaction with the populace through group dynamics, armed propaganda, religious framing of guerrilla movements, political awareness of guerrillas, prohibitions on gratuitous violence, and, notably, the use of agitators and back-channel control. - The host quotes and highlights key passages: the CIA’s instruction that case officers’ psychological war teams must pre-create a hostile attitude in target groups so that their anger can be turned into violence against the regime; the instruction to create ethnic minority anger to be triggered at the right moment; and the explicit description of “arhat propaganda” and coercive tactics to build a nationwide front. - The discussion connects these findings to broader patterns of U.S. political warfare: the guide’s emphasis on “development and control of front organizations,” the concept of capacity building (capacity built assets with a back channel for control), and the division of labor among State Department, USAID, NED, and CIA to produce a deniable, layered influence network. - The host argues that development means capacity building of front organizations (universities, hospitals, media outlets, unions, etc.) and control is exerted through back channels to ensure these assets follow a political program, avoiding direct government fingerprints. - The transcript traces the alignment of soft power (USAID, NED, NGOs) with intelligence and military back channels to create and mobilize resistance movements. The host notes that the document’s framework envisions not only external interventions but also domestic applications, referencing the Transition Integrity Project (2020), which modeled a domestic color revolution around racial justice movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter) to influence political outcomes in the United States. - The host cites passages from the document about cultivating “front organizations,” the role of clergy, universities, unions, and media as assets, and the concept of back-channel control to prevent rogue activity while enabling covert support for a resistance movement. - The host draws connections between the 1983 Nicaragua operations and later U.S. domestic applications, highlighting that the same cluster-cell approach (organized by sphere of influence such as labor unions, youth groups, professional associations) is used to manipulate group objectives from within, steering the masses toward a justified violence moment. - The document’s section on “control of meetings and mass assemblies” describes covert commando elements within the resistance, including bodyguards, incident initiators, poster carriers, and slogan shouters, all under external command. It emphasizes turning peaceful protests into violence through inside elements, with the aim of provoking a police crackdown that can be used to legitimize international sanctions and justify diplomatic actions against the target government. - Throughout, the host reiterates that the guide is explicitly about political warfare and “psychological operations” with the target being the minds of the population, the troops, and the civil population, and that it frames the mass movement as something to be guided and provoked from within by a controlled network of trained operatives.

The speaker reports aggressive military actions and ongoing negotiations with Iran. They state that they have “destroyed a lot of additional targets today” and that “the navy's gone” and “the air force is gone,” while noting that “we know that” and that they “destroyed many, many targets today” in what was “a big day.” Negotiations are described as both direct and indirect, with emissaries involved as well as direct dealings. On the diplomatic side, the speaker says Iran “agreed to send eight votes two days ago, and then they added another two, so it was 10 votes,” and that “today, they gave us as a tribute I don't know. Can't define it exactly, but they gave us, I think out of a sign of respect, 20 boats of oil.” These vessels would be moving “through the Hormoz Strait” and would begin “starting tomorrow morning over the next couple of days.” The speaker claims to be “doing extremely well in that negotiation,” while acknowledging uncertainty in dealings with Iran: “you never know with Iran because we negotiate with them and then we always have to blow them up.” Historical references are cited to explain current posture: the “b two bombers” and the termination of the “Iran nuclear deal done by Barack Hussein Obama, probably the worst deal we've ever done as a country, of the dumbest deals we've ever done.” The speaker asserts that the deal was terminated, otherwise “right now, they'd have a nuclear weapon,” and that an attack with the B-2 bombers was used to stop them from having nuclear capability. The speaker suggests a possible future deal with Iran but notes it is not certain: “I think we'll make a deal with them. Pretty sure. But it's possible we won't.” Regarding regime change, the speaker asserts that “we've had regime change, if you look already, because the one regime was decimated, destroyed. They're all dead.” The “next regime is mostly dead,” and the “third regime” involves “a whole different group of people” than any before. The speaker contends that this constitutes regime change and characterizes the first regime as “really bad, really evil,” which is claimed to be “done.” The second regime is described as “appointed, and they're gone.” The third group is described as “much more reasonable,” leading the speaker to say that regime change appears to be achieved and may be automatic.

To effectively create change in the world we desire. And side prop will argue that at times there's simply nothing else that can be required other than violent retaliation. And this is a view I wholeheartedly agree with. This view the view that some institutions are too broken, too regressive, too oppressive to be reformed like cancers of our society. They must and they should be taken down by any means necessary.

The speaker argues that sovereign governments are effectively under someone else’s influence. One major dynamic cited is that these governments are in a debt trap, which results in control by central banks through the mechanisms of credit and the need to trade in order to carry their debt. In addition to this financial leverage, the speaker notes the presence of substantial physical force as a contributing factor to the power structure. Beyond conventional power, the speaker emphasizes the role of an increasingly potent and “invisible” force delivered by invisible technology. The claim is that technology enables weather warfare, capable of causing floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, and other disasters that resemble natural events but are, in the speaker’s view, the result of other factors. This leads to the assertion that covert wars are being waged globally, with invisible weaponry representing a significant component of those conflicts. In summary, the speaker attributes widespread influence over sovereign governments to both financial mechanisms (debt and central bank control) and physical force, augmented by covert, technologically mediated methods that involve weather manipulation and other forms of invisible weaponry, contributing to ongoing covert warfare around the world.

Speaker 0 outlines a four-stage model of subversion arranged along a timeline: demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization. - Demoralization: This stage takes roughly fifteen to twenty years, enough to educate one generation. It features tendencies in society moving away from core moral values. The aim is to exploit these movements by the originator of subversion. Areas targeted include religion, education, social life, power structure, labor relations, and law and order. - Religion: destroy or ridicule established faiths, replace with fake organizations, erode the basic religious dogma that connects people with the supreme being. - Education: divert learning away from constructive subjects (mathematics, physics, languages, chemistry) toward topics like history of urban warfare, natural foods, home economics, sexuality, or other diversions. - Social life: replace traditional institutions with fake organizations; remove initiative and responsibility from natural social links, substituting bureaucratically controlled bodies; social workers are described as primarily motivated by paychecks rather than genuine social concern. - Power structure: replace legitimate, elected or appointed bodies with artificial, unelected groups; the media is highlighted as a key example. - Law and order: erosion of the enforcement of law, with media described as undermining trust in those who protect society. - Bureaucracy and media: a trend toward mediocrity and dependence on established establishments; the media is portrayed as having monopolistic power to shape public opinion. - The media and the state of power: The media are described as having enormous influence and being elected by no one, with a claim that they can “rape your mind.” A speaker’s aside notes a historical critique of media elites as mediocrity. - Sleeperness: The concept of sleepers is introduced: students sent abroad who sleep for fifteen to twenty years and then re-enter as leaders of groups, precipitating clashes between their groups and ordinary people, thereby destabilizing society. - Destabilization: The next stage narrows to economy, labor relations, law and order, and the military, with the media still playing a role. Key processes include radicalization and militarization of social relations, with public clashes (e.g., between passengers and strikers) becoming normalized. Compromise becomes nearly impossible, and traditional relations between teachers and students, workers and employers, deteriorate. The media positions itself in opposition to society, creating alienation. - Crisis: Destabilization leads to crisis when society can no longer function productively. The population seeks a savior, who presents a strong, centralized government, potentially socialist. - Normalization: The final stage stabilizes the country by force. Eliminations follow, removing those deemed disruptive (sleepers, activists, liberals, academics, etc.). The rulers aim for stability to exploit the country. It’s described as a reversal of destabilization. - Aftermath question/answer: Speaker 1 asks if those eliminated serve any purpose; Speaker 2 responds that leftists, professors, civil rights defenders are instrumental during destabilization, but once their job is done, they are no longer needed and may be eliminated. The closing line from Speaker 0 summarizes: “The first one demoralized country, the second destabilized, the third one brought it to crisis. Goodbye, comrade.”

The discussion centers on India’s position in 2025 amid a shifting international order and U.S. efforts to recalibrate a multipolar world. - The year 2025 is characterized as eventful for India, with the country under pressure to choose a path in a world where power is more distributed. The conversation opens with a framing of the U.S. adjusting to multipolarity, the return of Trump, and various global tensions, noting that India’s role has received relatively less attention. - Speaker 1 reflects that 2025 was not a good year for India. At the start of the year, India expected to remain a fulcrum of U.S. policy to contain China and to shuttle between powers, maintaining a growing trade relationship with China while navigating U.S. pressures. The Trump presidency disrupted this balance. India perceived U.S. interference in its domestic politics, including alleged U.S. fingerprints in color revolutions in Bangladesh and Nepal, and a perception that U.S. entities like the National Endowment for Democracy were involved. The 50% trade tariff on India by the U.S. shocked New Delhi, and Trump’s public and private statements criticizing India complicated the relationship. - The discussion notes India’s sensitivity to becoming overly dependent on the U.S. for strategic protection against China, given Modi’s emphasis on Indian sovereignty and self-reliance. Modi’s perceived humility toward Trump, followed by a cooling of the relationship after Trump’s tariff threats, created a crisis of confidence in the U.S.-India alignment. Modi’s personal interactions with Trump—such as a cordial birthday exchange followed by threats of 100% tariffs on India—were seen as signaling mixed signals from Washington. - India’s options in 2025 include: (1) retrenchment and continuing to seek a balancing act between the U.S., China, and Russia; (2) charting an independent course by strengthening ties within BRICS and the Global South; or (3) aligning more with the U.S. with the hope of future U.S. policy shifts. The economic reality complicates choices: while India’s exports did reasonably well despite tariffs and some FDI, opening Indian dairy and agriculture to the U.S. market would threaten farmers’ livelihoods, potentially destabilizing an electorate sensitive to domestic issues. - There is a broader point about Washington’s approach: demand loyalty from regions and countries while using tariffs and pressure to shape alignment, and Trump’s approach is described as a fear-and-intimidation strategy toward the Global South. - On the China-India axis, the speakers discuss how China’s rise and India’s size create a power disparity that makes simple dominance difficult for either side. India’s strategy involves leveraging BRICS and other forums (including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) to expand multipolar governance and reduce dependence on a single power center. The interlocutors emphasize that BRICS operates by consensus and is not a vetoed UN-style body; thus, it offers a platform where major powers can cooperate without a single dominant voice. - The potential paths for India include growing within BRICS and the Global South, seeking mutual economic advantages, and developing a strategy that reduces vulnerability to U.S. coercion. One line of thought suggests using digital tools to help Indian small and medium-sized enterprises access global markets, and building coalitions using shared developmental and financial needs to negotiate better terms in global trade, similar to how an OPEC-like approach could coordinate commodity pricing for the Global South. - The conversation also touches on border and regional issues: a historical context where Russia resolved border tensions with China via settlements that altered the balance of power; the suggestion that India and China could adopt joint administrative arrangements for disputed border zones to reduce conflict risk and foster cooperation, though this requires careful handling to avoid loss of face for either side. - The role of China is described as patient and multipolar-friendly, seeking to buy more from India and to cultivate mutual trade, while recognizing India’s internal challenges, such as power reliability and structural issues like caste and crony capitalism, which affect India’s ability to produce and export higher-value goods. - The broader takeaway is a vision of a more integrated multipolar Eurasia, where India’s leadership within BRICS/SC0 and its ability to create innovative economic arrangements—such as “resource bourses” or shared supply chains—could alter the balance of power and reduce dependency on U.S. policy dynamics. There is an emphasis on avoiding a new Cold War by fostering dialogue and joint governance mechanisms that include China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and other Global South actors. - The speakers close with a cautious optimism: 2026 could be better if nations learn to push back against coercive power, redefine security around development and governance rather than force, and pursue multipolar institutions that preserve autonomy while enabling peaceful competition. The expectation is that seeds of hope exist within these analyses, even as the present year has been challenging.

The speaker believes Europe is falling, and the United Kingdom is on the brink. The Prime Minister of Sweden stated his government has lost control of the monopoly of violence. The speaker believes Germany and France are in similar situations, and fears these countries will fall like dominoes. This has occurred through settlement and infiltration of institutions, including political parties. The speaker's nightmare is that the West starts to fall apart, and the current Labour government has done more to accommodate this in the last eight months than anything else.

In a coup situation, one way to chip away at the systems maintaining power is to take over a local TV station to broadcast a call for people to join. In New York, three antennas control all telecommunications. It's important to consider what communication systems "we" have versus "them." The speaker advocates getting ahead of potential issues by organizing resources and knowing what actions to take so that "we" can deploy rapidly.

The conversation centers on the idea that Europe’s leadership has deteriorated and that powerful voices from the past warned this would happen. Colin Powell, according to Speaker 1, told Speaker 0 in 1989 that Europe would end up with “horrible leaders,” and that those who replace them would be people “who have no conscience, people who have no sense of reality, people who have not been seasoned by warfare… who think they control their lives but don't.” Powell’s view, developed from his experience as a military and strategic analyst, was that once the pressure of the Cold War abated, there would be little rationale for NATO, and Europe would drift without a coherent security structure. Speaker 1 elaborates that Powell’s instincts led him to anticipate a dissolution of the postwar security order. Powell argued that NATO’s justification would erode, and a political debacle would accompany the military one as Europe’s leaders lacked direct experience of war. He advised creating a European security identity (ESI) consisting of a 3,000-person brigade, with its own equipment, training, and industrial base, divorced from NATO. The idea was that, over time (perhaps a 20–25 year period), the ESI could grow into a division, then a corps, with its own air power and arms industry, eventually allowing NATO to fade away while Europe managed its own security. Speaker 1 notes that Powell’s position was controversial with U.S. defense and defense contractors, who viewed him as dangerous for proposing such an independent European security framework. The discussion parallels George Kennan’s 1987 warning that if the Soviet Union collapsed, American society would face a shock because so much of its domestic and alliance structures depended on the external threat. The speakers discuss Clinton-era shifts, including Bill Perry’s attempts to revive cooperation with Russia, and the way Clinton’s policies altered the trajectory away from Powell’s envisioned framework. They mention a shift away from a fixed European security reliance on a NATO-centric model toward broader strategic engagement, but also criticize the departure from a legally grounded approach to world affairs. The conversation then turns to current tensions, including Europe’s involvement in Ukraine. The participants reflect on Powell’s broader aim of integrating security arrangements with law, noting that international law should guide actions, even if law alone cannot ensure outcomes. They discuss the possibility that the war in Ukraine could reflect the consequences of earlier decisions to preserve U.S. footprints in Europe and the Cold War security architecture, which in their view helped maintain stability but also embedded Europe within a security framework that relied on American leadership. The dialogue references the Balkans as an example of policy divergence: Powell warned that stabilizing the Balkans would require extensive forces, but President Bush was reluctant. Clinton eventually conducted a prolonged bombing campaign against Serbia, altering the dynamic with Russia and highlighting the tensions between ambitious security vision and political practicality. The speakers emphasize the importance of law and national security structures, the desire to rethink post–Cold War decisions, and the ongoing question of how Europe should secure its own stability while balancing relations with Russia and the United States.

Laws are essentially threats from the dominant socioeconomic and ethnic group in a nation, serving as promises of violence. The police function as an occupying force in society.

Speaker 0 argues that we are in an era of great power rivalry and a fading rules-based order, where the strong can impose their will and the weak suffer consequences. He cites Vaclav Havel’s The Power of the Powerless, using the greengrocer example to show how systems endure through ordinary people performing a shared illusion of legitimacy. The implication is that removing the sign in the window reveals the fragility of such a system, and that countries and companies must do the same. He notes that for decades Canada benefited from the rules-based international order, joining its institutions and enjoying predictability that supported values-based foreign policy. Yet the fiction of universal mutual benefit and evenly applied international law persisted only because of selective enforcement and American hegemony, which provided public goods like open sea lanes, a stable financial system, and dispute-resolution frameworks. That bargain no longer works, and the world is in rupture rather than gradual transition. Crises in finance, health, energy, and geopolitics have exposed risks of extreme global integration, and great powers are now using economic integration as weapons—tariffs, financial coercion, and coercive supply chains. Multilateral institutions—the WTO, UN, COP, and related architectural frameworks—are under threat, prompting middle powers to seek greater strategic autonomy in energy, food, critical minerals, finance, and supply chains. A world of fortresses would be poorer, more fragile, and less sustainable. If great powers abandon pretense of rules and pursue power unrestrained, transactional gains become harder to replicate, and allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty, rebuilding sovereignty based on resilience rather than rules. Collective investments in resilience and shared standards can reduce fragmentation. The question for middle powers, including Canada, is whether to build higher walls or pursue a more ambitious path. Canada has shifted toward value-based realism: principled commitments to sovereignty, territorial integrity, UN Charter norms, and human rights, coupled with pragmatic recognition that progress is incremental and not every partner shares all values. Canada is engaging broadly, strategically, with open eyes, calibrating relationships to reflect values, and prioritizing broad engagement to maximize influence amid global fluidity and risk. Canada has cut taxes, removed interprovincial trade barriers, fast-tracked a trillion-dollar investment program in energy and critical minerals, doubled defense spending, and diversified abroad. It has a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU, joined SAFE, signed 12 trade and security deals across six continents, and formed partnerships with China and Qatar while negotiating FTAs with India, ASEAN, Thailand, the Philippines, and Mercosur. Canada pursues variable geometry—coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests—and acts as a core member of the Ukraine coalition, supports Arctic sovereignty with Greenland and Denmark, remains committed to NATO’s Article Five, and invests in northern and western defenses. In plurilateral trade, Canada seeks to bridge the TPP and EU, and to form buyers’ clubs for critical minerals anchored in the G7, aiming to diversify away from concentrated supply. On AI, Canada cooperates with like-minded democracies to avoid choosing between hegemons and hyperscalers. This is not naive multilateralism but building effective coalitions issue by issue with partners who share sufficient common ground. The overarching message is to name reality, apply consistent standards to allies and rivals, build institutions that function as described, and reduce leverage that enables coercion by strengthening domestic economies and diversifying internationally. Canada’s path is to stop pretending, build strength at home, and act together with others willing to join.

The speaker argues that Venezuela has already been invaded, naming Russian agents, Iranian agents, and terrorist groups such as Hizbola and Hamas operating freely in alignment with the regime. They also point to the Colombian guerrilla and drug cartels as factors that have taken over 60% of the population, not only in drug trafficking but also in human trafficking and networks of prostitution. This, the speaker says, has transformed Venezuela into the criminal hub of The Americas. The regime’s sustainability, according to the speaker, relies on a powerful and heavily funded repression system. The speaker asks where this funding comes from, answering with multiple illicit streams: drug trafficking, the black market of oil, arms trafficking, and human trafficking. They assert that these flows must be cut, arguing that once repression is weakened, “it's over” because violence and terror are all the regime has left. The speaker urges the international community to cut these sources of funding and support. They claim that the other regimes that back Maduro and the criminal structure are active and have turned Venezuela into a safe haven for their operations, extending their influence into the rest of Latin America.

Democracies today often fail not through violence but when elected leaders dismantle institutions by installing loyalists over experts. These leaders politicize institutions like the military and Department of Justice, using them for personal and political gain. This pattern is evident in Hungary, Turkey, and Poland, where the ruling party attempted similar actions. Tactics include changing rules, appointing new personnel, and using the law or agencies like the IRS against unfavorable media or politicians. There are precedents for such actions in American history. People who support these leaders often dismiss or mock such concerns, unwilling to acknowledge the implications of their support.

Revolutions are set up with a semi-autocratic regime, an unpopular leader, organized opposition, media exposing falsified votes, mobilized demonstrators, and divided coercive forces. This pattern aligns with national elections, as seen in recent protest movements every 4 years.

Speaker 0 argues that there must be a change of direction, which is exactly what the Iranian people are demanding. He suggests that if the Iranian people receive support from the president for that idea, it would encourage them to take to the streets in even greater numbers and apply more pressure on the regime from within. He identifies the decisive factor as the instrument of repression that has been unleashed against the people and states that overcoming this obstacle is what could tilt the odds in favor of a movement that could push toward a complete collapse of the regime. He asserts that a decisive strike could alter the balance, describing it as the mechanism that would enable the people to prevail. Speaker 1 asks whether such decisive actions would involve American strikes, and whether Israeli strikes could play a role, implying that the Iranian people might view external intervention as cavalry coming to aid them. Speaker 0 confirms that it could be an American strike, an Israeli strike, or any force willing to act; he emphasizes that the cavalry is seen as necessary because the regime has to be confronted in ways that the regime cannot be confronted through ordinary means, and that the nation’s defenses can only be sustained up to a point without such intervention. Speaker 0 notes that the regime is so desperate that it has to import elements from Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq to act as instruments of repression, indicating that the regime is running out of its own capable personnel to carry out the dirty work. He asserts that the regime is on its last leg and on the verge of collapse, and that it will try every other means to survive. That is why a definitive strike could completely reverse the odds in favor of the nation and defenseless people, and such support is what is needed. Speaker 1 asks what should be struck: whether to target command and control facilities of the IRGC, or to launch a decapitation strike against the Ayatollah, and what either the United States or Israel, or any willing party, should do. Speaker 0 responds that from the perspective of the people on the streets, the priority is to neutralize every element that has been unleashed against them. He says anything connected to the regime’s mechanism of control or violence should be targeted, and that such action cannot be achieved through diplomacy or negotiation. He notes that the president’s promises have been heartening to the people of Iran, and if those promises are carried out, they would change the entire complexion of the situation. Speaker 1 then asks what would happen if the regime topples.

Power is dispersed in society and concentrated in pillars of support, which are organizations and institutions that provide the necessary resources for those in power to stay in power. These pillars consist of ordinary people who contribute expertise, labor, and buying power. If people in these pillars withhold their cooperation and engage in nonviolent tactics like protests and strikes, rulers cannot maintain power, as seen in cases like the Philippines, Serbia, Ukraine, and Sudan. The loyalty of individuals within these pillars varies, with those closer to the center being more obedient. The goal of effective people power is to shift loyalties and bring people from the center to the outside. Bureaucracy is a powerful pillar, with federal workers having knowledge and influence over policies.

The speaker argues that whenever a country defends its own people, the United States asks, “Who owns the resources?” and if the answer isn’t The US, a coup follows. The claim is that over 80 foreign governments have been overthrown or destabilized by the United States, and that most of them weren’t dictatorships, but democratically elected governments that threatened US corporate profits. The described playbook involves the CIA funding opposition groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda, planting stories in the media, bribing generals, arming rebels, or collapsing a country’s economy, with the coup replacing the leader with a pro-US dictatorship. The overarching assertion is that this is not about democracy but about power and control. Key historical examples cited include: - Iran in 1953: Mosaddegh attempted to nationalize oil; the CIA launched Operation Ajax, orchestrated protests, paid off politicians, and installed the Shah, resulting in twenty-five years of dictatorship and torture under US protection. - Guatemala in 1954: President Arbenz redistributed land from the United Fruit Company, a US corporation; the CIA branded him a communist, conducted a coup, and Guatemala descended into a civil war with over 200,000 deaths. - Chile in 1973: Allende was overthrown in a US-backed military coup, and Pinochet’s regime tortured and killed thousands after Allende’s attempts to nationalize copper. - Congo in 1961: Lumumba sought African control of African resources; the CIA helped orchestrate his assassination and installed a brutal dictator who was supported for decades. The speaker adds that there are “dozens of others” beyond these cases, including Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Bolivia, and beyond, arguing that the motive is not fighting tyranny but profits and control. When a country attempts to exit the system or nationalize resources to reduce inequality, they threaten profits and the idea that another world is possible, so the CIA sabotages such efforts to prevent successful example-making, such as Libya. The conclusion is that many nations don’t trust the United States because “we’ve been the villains throughout most of our history.” The speaker invites readers to comment to receive a “forbidden reading list” of books and documentaries that “they never wanted you to find.”

Speaker 1 and Speaker 0 discuss the current wave of protests in Iran and how it differs from past unrest, with a focus on causes, dynamics, and potential outcomes. - The protests are described as the strongest since 2022, sparked by economic distress and currency collapse. The immediate trigger was the volatility of the rial and the impact on bazaar merchants, who closed shops in Tehran and took to the streets, followed by university campuses and other cities. Youth participation has increased, with some behaving more courageously on the streets. - A key new element is the explicit rejection of the Islamic government. For the first time, crowds are reportedly shouting that they do not want this Islamic government or the regime of the supreme leader, and they are calling for change rather than merely better elections. There is also increasing mention of Reza Pahlavi (the former Shah’s son) as a symbol in chants, though the speakers caution that this does not necessarily reflect broad support for his leadership or a viable path to democracy. - The discussion notes a sustained gap between the regime and the Iranian people that has widened over two decades. The regime has failed to narrow this divide, especially among the younger, educated generation. The political system’s structure—where the supreme leader appoints half the Guardian Council and thus shapes presidential candidates—has contributed to this rift. The trend toward questioning the regime’s legitimacy contrasts with earlier protests, where calls to overthrow the regime were less explicit. - Differences from previous protests (2007, 2009, 2019, 2022) are highlighted: - Past protests rarely called for overthrow; current protests openly reject the Islamic government and the supreme leader. - There is a notable Kurdish involvement this time, though the degree and regional participation vary, and some Kurdish communities may be wary due to positions taken by monarchist factions and the regime’s stance on minority rights. - The protests are spreading from major cities to smaller towns and include diverse regions of the country. - Foreign influence and potential intervention: - Trump’s warnings to the regime are considered to have had some impact on Iranian youth, though the extent is unclear and cannot be measured without data. - There is debate about potential US cyber or military actions; the guest believes it would be difficult and risky, especially if a broader confrontation with the US and Israel occurred. He warns that foreign intervention could feed regime propaganda that protests are foreign-instigated. - Israel’s involvement is likewise seen as dangerous and potentially counterproductive, risking the perception of foreign manipulation and nationalistic backlash. - Internal security dynamics: - The relationship between the IRGC and the regular army is discussed as potentially fragile. A split, internal defections, or civil conflict within security forces could become an “Achilles heel” for the regime, though such scenarios are described as extreme and not imminent. - There is concern about what would happen after a regime change. The speaker argues that there is currently no robust, organized opposition with a clear program for governance post-overthrow, and monarchist groups around Reza Pahlavi may not represent a democratic alternative. The risk of chaos without a viable plan is highlighted. - The host and guest discuss personal risk and motivations: - The professor recounts his history of arrests under both the Shah and the Islamic regime, including a sentence to 18 months for criticizing the nuclear program, followed by a two-month prison term due to health concerns. He describes a cancer diagnosis and his relief at advances in cancer treatment, while noting that his health remains a concern. - He emphasizes that he does not support Trump or Netanyahu's positions and that his willingness to speak publicly stems from concern about Iran’s future, not alignment with foreign powers. - Final themes: - The protests reflect long-standing grievances but reveal a new willingness to reject the regime itself. - Questions remain about leadership, governance after potential regime change, minority rights, and the risk of civil conflict if the regime collapses or is weakened. - The discussion closes with acknowledgments of the personal risk involved in speaking out and a nuanced stance toward foreign involvement.

Speaker 0: Have you considered talking to the president of Colombia who you called a drop leader? Speaker 1: No. I haven't really thought too much about him. He's been fairly hostile to The United States, and I haven't given him a lot of thought. He's he's gonna have himself some big problems if he doesn't wise up. Speaker 2: Did you say Colombia is producing a lot of drugs. Have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into The United States. So he better wise up or he'll be next. He'll be next too. I hope he's listening. Speaker 0: So was this operation a message that you're sending to Mexico, to Claudia Scheinbaum, president there? Speaker 2: Well, it wasn't meant to be. We're very friendly with her. She's a good woman, but the cartels are running Mexico. She's not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico. We could be politically correct and be nice and say, oh, yes. Is no. No. She's very, you know, she's very frightened of the cartels that are running Mexico. And I've asked her numerous times, would you like us to take out the cartels? No. No. No, mister president. No. No, no, please. So we have to do something because we lost the real number is 300,000 people, in my opinion. You know, they like to say a 100,000. A 100,000 is a lot of people, but the real number is 300,000 people. And we lost it to drugs, and they come in through the southern border, mostly the southern border. A lot plenty come in through Canada too, by the way, in case you don't know. But but they come in through the southern border, and something's gonna have to be done with Mexico. Cuban government, the Trump administration's next target, mister secretary, very quickly. Speaker 3: Well, the Cuban government is a is a huge problem. Yeah. The the the the Cuban government is a huge problem for Speaker 2: some So is that a yes? Speaker 3: Cuba. But I don't think people fully appreciate. I think they're in a lot of trouble. Yes. I'm not gonna talk talk to you about what our future steps are gonna be and our policies are gonna be right now in this regard, but I don't think it's any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro. His entire, like, internal security force, his internal security opera apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. One of the untold stories here is how, in essence, you talk about colonization because I think you said Dulce Rodriguez mentioned that, the ones who have sort of colonized, at least inside the regime, are Cubans. It was Cubans that guarded Maduro. He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards. In terms of their internal intelligence, who spies on who inside to make sure there are no traitors, those are all Cubans. Speaker 0: He felt very strongly. We we needed for nationals. We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We had some we have so many sites for minerals and oil and everything. We have more oil than any other country in the world. We need Greenland for national security.

Momentum, and momentum is key to success. The third attribute of successful campaigns is they featured defections and loyalty shifts within key institutional pillars. Workers restricted their labor. Faith communities refused to allow their religion to be a tool of authoritarianism. Civil servants refused to carry out illegal orders. Businesses applied financial pressure. Security forces refused to obey orders to repress protesters. We're gonna talk through a lot of that tonight. Finally, successful movements have