reSee.it - Related Video Feed

Insufficient attention is given to the potential impact of a major cyberattack, which could cripple essential services and society as a whole. Compared to such an event, the COVID-19 crisis would seem minor.

We are having high-level and low-level meetings to address the challenges of the virus. We have learned from the past and are working on improvements in operations. This situation highlights the importance of research to keep up with the virus's mutations as it spreads.

In 2019, preparations began for a new pandemic by searching for viruses globally. The aim was to create crisis situations for global management, rather than being limited to the United States or specific technologies.

"There's the transformative, if I might use that word, experience that we've all had now in year five of COVID." The speaker says, "The thought that we won't have another pandemic, I think is naive at best and just not completely unrealistic at worst." They add, "I'm convinced that there will be another pandemic and that's the reason why we have to be perpetually prepared to prevent the terrible impact of a pandemic."

Speaker 0: The election was stolen. A graph shows people who worked for ES&S, Hart, Dominion Voting Systems, ClearBallot, and Smartmatic, recycling through companies. People who worked at Dominion Voting Systems are entering the political sphere and taking over election offices; one county in Texas, after hiring someone who worked for Dominion, went blue for the first time. The speaker walks through information: Dominion using “Serbian technology with Chinese characteristics.” Huawei Bank is involved; there’s no public board saying Bank of China funds anything, but research on Roaming Networks—a relatively unknown Serbian company until 2013—shows it signed a value-added contract with Huawei Bank. Huawei is “the Bank of China.” Roaming Networks built ICT infrastructure and data centers in Serbia, with owner Nenad Kovac identified as the enterprise partner. Some Roaming Networks information may come off their site after this presentation. Dominion Voting Systems has a corporate office in Serbia; a screenshot of the office and a developer on their site is noted. A Serbian legislative leader said, “I know Dominion Voting Systems back in November. They have an office here.” Dominion started rapidly removing Serbian coders from their site/LinkedIn. Code is built in Serbia for a system used in the United States, using infrastructure funded by China, not just China but the Bank of China. A slide discusses Dominion’s enterprise partnership with Huawei, added to the restricted list on 05/16/2019. Roaming Networks references show Dominion Voting Systems using a pure flash storage solution in Dominion’s data center. A photo of Sacramento shows Dominion hardware coming from China, with a bill of lading from a Chinese supplier to Dominion’s McKinney, Texas office. Testing and approval of Dominion hardware show similarities with Smartmatic; the same hardware with different branding. They claim a “tail” behind the scenes—evidence of connections among ES&S, Hart, Dominion, ClearBallot, Smartmatic, with people cycling through these companies. People who once worked at Dominion are now entering election offices; in Texas, a county that hired a former Dominion employee “went blue” by accident with ES&S involved. The speaker calls out Gina Griswold for commenting on Tina Peters and Mesa, and Matt Crane’s role as Arapahoe County clerk and recorder, now head of the County Clerks Association; Crane’s wife previously worked for Dominion and Sequoia Voting Systems. The speaker asserts a public breach of trust requires an audit; if there’s nothing to hide, audits should restore trust. They argue, whether Dominion is the bad actor or not, removal of logs, altering code, and a “trusted build” are problematic, and emphasize the need for audits and investigations to restore trust in elections. Speaker 1: Indicators: a senior Dominion vice president’s name appears on patents; a software engineer involved in the Wayne County, Michigan tabulation center is connected to the software. Coincidences accumulate, suggesting there is a preponderance of evidence with affidavits across the country. The speaker asks which computer produced certain files analyzed yesterday; whether it came from the central count or precincts. Speaker 0: Answers with a non-answer, noting they imaged the main EMS and the tabulation system; servers in the county coordinate precinct information and house audit reports, cast vote reports, error reports, adjudication reports, and access logs. Thumb drives can contaminate the county and state systems if connected to a machine; it’s not unique to Dominion or voting systems but a general risk. They emphasize avoiding white noise and focusing on facts: Dominion is in Serbia; Huawei Bank funds the enterprise partnership and Serbia-based data centers; code is written in Serbia; imaging shows fingerprints of this. They call for audits, note deviations in Georgia (ballots appearing identical in different batches, a shredder truck before January 20 in Georgia, and a leaky arena water claim later proven to be a leaky toilet), and point to media silence. They argue against accepting the gold standard claim and highlight perceived connections to Soros-funded groups. They stress deviations in state and county behavior, urge audits, and compare the election system to a serial killer—unacceptable to let foreign systems run it. Speaker 2: Adds that with 100 indicators, a pattern emerges; reiterates the need to examine which files came from which computer, and questions the integrity of the central count. Speaker 3: Notes the risk of a non-internet-connected thumb drive introducing malware; emphasizes auditing all machines for that reason.

We must remain vigilant about current diseases, but an even greater danger is focusing too much on the last pandemic when preparing for future threats. Emerging infections can arise from various sources, and we are still vulnerable to intentional spread by those seeking to cause harm. Our global community's health faces numerous potential threats. It's crucial to consider a wide range of possibilities to effectively safeguard public health.

There will likely be a deadly airborne disease in the future, so we need to establish a global infrastructure to quickly detect, isolate, and respond to it. This was emphasized by multiple speakers. A document from 2010 predicted a pandemic similar to what we are experiencing now, with China being better prepared and implementing strict measures. The document also foresaw increased government control and oversight, which has become a reality. A simulation called Event 201, held in October 2019, accurately predicted the coronavirus outbreak. The speakers discussed the importance of managing misinformation and disinformation. They believe that controlling access to information is necessary to combat the pandemic. Some speakers expressed skepticism about the coincidences and the level of control being exerted.

Understanding the origins of the pandemic is not crucial for preventing future outbreaks, according to Speaker 1. The focus should be on implementing measures like masks, vaccines, and a different approach to handling cases. Speaker 1 is involved in discussions about advancements in diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccine production to eradicate not only COVID-19 but also the flu and common cold. Speaker 0 asks if it is important to know how the pandemic started from a justice or moral perspective, to which Speaker 1 agrees but doesn't elaborate further.

Speaker 0 notes: “Have them write the information.” Speaker 1 points out that two people were sitting together: George Gao, director general of the Chinese CDC, and the deputy director of the CIA, who later became head of the entire intelligence community, at an event during the Wuhan military games two months before the Wuhan outbreak. They remark on how conveniently they were seated near each other given how closely they would coordinate two months later. In this segment, social media is mentioned 19 times. Speaker 2 comments that social media is now the primary channel for news, that interruptions to platforms could curb misinformation but also limit access to legitimate sources, and that health ministries worldwide are trying to combat misinformation and disinformation. Speaker 1 describes the tabletop exercise: the deputy director of the CIA becomes head of the ODNI as soon as Biden takes office and is dealing with social media issues. The speaker notes that George Gao attended the exercise, asking why the simulation—which was about an animal-borne coronavirus outbreak in Latin America—had the China CDC head at the table and the U.S. ODNI head present, while the outbreak was said to start in Brazil, and there were no Latin American health officials present. The president of the UPS foundation is mentioned as the only Latin-named figure. The speaker questions why the Brazil CDC director isn’t in the exercise if it’s simulating a Latin American outbreak and points to the arrangement as contradictory to the premise. Speaker 3 repeats that experts agree new disinformation campaigns are generated daily, describing the problem as huge and potentially undermining pandemic response and governance. Speaker 1 emphasizes disinformation keeping us from ending the pandemic, noting the Wuhan games are ongoing in Wuhan, and describing rumors that the US military engineered the virus and that USAID funded work, with a web of claims about public health, vaccines, and pharmaceutical company misdeeds. The speaker asserts that Pfizer, Moderna, and Gates Foundation funding are involved, including claims that Moderna patented the coronavirus vaccine before the outbreak and that Moderna is a Pentagon arm with no prior successful vaccine. Speaker 2 warns that unrest from false rumors and divisive messaging is rising and undermining response efforts as trust declines. Speaker 1 mentions the “China CDC, in charge of the Wuhan lab,” and notes that healthcare workers, if poorly trained, might give wrong information or say “I don’t know,” which erodes public trust. Speaker 0 recalls a Sierra Leone radio interview about whether Ebola was man-made, highlighting the importance of the TOT (tabletop exercise) and ensuring that nobody suspects a man-made origin. Speaker 4: Proposes steps to prevent spreading misinformation on social media by collaborating with telecommunications companies to control information access and ensuring a trusted source floods the zone with messaging, including trained influential community leaders and health workers to disseminate the desired messaging. Speaker 1 questions the idea of flooding the zone with messaging and notes the need for a rapid response to disinformation, while acknowledging that there are intelligence sources identifying foreign disinformation campaigns as part of a larger effort to address the pandemic.

The speaker emphasizes the importance of technology and digital infrastructure for managing vaccines and future pandemics. They highlight the need for data on vaccinations and the necessity of a proper digital infrastructure, which many countries lack. The speaker suggests that the G20 should focus on creating partnerships and mechanisms for handling future pandemics effectively. They mention the role of formal institutions like the WTO and organizations without bureaucracy and politics. The speaker concludes by stating that politicians will prioritize a plan if they see its relevance in the near future.

In this exchange, the speakers reference the World Health Organization’s ten-year plan. The first speaker states that the plan has long warned: “for the coming 10 years, there will be a large infectious disease crisis,” and notes that “this was year 1.” The second speaker adds that the aim is to prepare and help, should a second pandemic occur, and asserts that, based on years of the speakers’ discussions, “the chance that a second pandemic comes is very large.” The first speaker reiterates that there is consensus and that the plan has anticipated a major infectious disease crisis over the decade, emphasizing that the warning has been a longstanding part of the plan.

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown us how vulnerable we are to biological threats, but we are overlooking similar risks in the digital world. A cyber attack with COVID-like characteristics would spread faster and further than any biological virus, with a reproductive rate 10 times greater than the coronavirus. While cyberattacks haven't impacted our health like pandemics, they have caused significant economic damage. To stop the exponential spread of a cyber threat, we need to quickly disconnect vulnerable devices from each other and the Internet. A single day without the Internet would cost economies over $50 billion. As the digital realm merges with our physical world, cyberattacks on essential services like transportation and healthcare pose even greater risks. We need to be better prepared for this digital equivalent of a pandemic. The time to act is now.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker demonstrated how they were able to boot up the Electionware system on a non-conforming laptop, highlighting violations of security protocols. They revealed that default passwords for election machines are easily accessible online, posing a significant security risk. The speaker emphasized the urgent need for updating security measures and changing passwords to enhance election security. They also pointed out the lack of antivirus protection on crucial election machines, putting counties at risk. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of immediate action to address these vulnerabilities.

In this video, the speakers discuss the need to prepare for future pandemics and the importance of taking action to address global warming and climate change. They also mention the possibility of a surprise outbreak and the need for global cooperation. The speakers touch on topics such as vaccine distribution, lockdown measures, and the impact of COVID-19 on the economy. There are also mentions of censorship and the importance of seeking out reliable information. Overall, the speakers emphasize the need for continued vigilance and adaptation in the face of ongoing health challenges.

We must support 40 countries to govern themselves to be prepared for future pandemics. Communication and disinformation are critical issues. Media must fulfill their responsibilities and science should guide decision-making. Top scientists should provide expertise to society through scientific institutions.

The pandemic has shown our vulnerability to biological threats, but we are overlooking similar risks in the digital world. A cyber attack could spread faster than a virus, with economic damages equal to or greater than those caused by pandemics. To stop a cyber threat, vulnerable devices must be disconnected quickly, costing billions of dollars. As the digital and physical worlds merge, the impact of cyberattacks on safety grows rapidly. We must prepare for this digital risk just as we did for COVID-19. The time to act is now.

The transcript discusses a 2010 Rockefeller Foundation document titled Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development, focusing on a scenario called Lockstep. In this scenario, a pandemic strikes in 2012, overwhelming even the best-prepared nations. Approximately 20% of the global population becomes infected and about 8 million people die within seven months. The pandemic devastates economies as international travel and global supply chains collapse, and even developed countries struggle with containment. China is highlighted as having greater success due to rapid, mandatory quarantines and near-closed borders, which saves millions of lives and enables a faster post-pandemic recovery. The account notes that highly intrusive real-time tracking of a largely compliant population was key to lifting lockdowns in Wuhan. The document also asserts that during the pandemic, leaders worldwide imposed airtight rules and restrictions, from mandatory mask-wearing to temperature checks at entry points to communal spaces. Even after the pandemic fades, there is a lasting shift toward more authoritarian control and oversight, with citizens accepting reduced sovereignty and privacy in exchange for safety and stability. In developed countries, biometric IDs and a suite of new regulations are introduced to restore order and economic growth, with the overall message that increased oversight helps achieve stability. The transcript then shifts to Event 201, a high-level pandemic exercise held on October 18, 2019, organized by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security in partnership with the World Economic Forum and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The exercise simulated the consequences of a pandemic and the societal and economic challenges it would pose, using a coronavirus-like pathogen codenamed Caps. Participants describe how a significant portion of identified cases require hospitalization, causing strain on health systems. They note that some individuals with mild symptoms can still spread the virus unknowingly, and emphasize that disinformation and misinformation undermine the response. There is discussion about how governments, international organizations, and businesses should counter misinformation and ensure reliable information reaches the public. It’s noted that social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook have identified and removed a large number of accounts spreading disinformation about the outbreak. Some participants argue that strong measures to manage information are necessary, even if it means restricting access to information, to prevent misinformation from jeopardizing the pandemic response or causing political instability. The video then intersperses commentary questioning the coincidence that the 2019 exercise apparently anticipated the 2020 outbreak, with a skeptical tone about whether the scenario was preplanned or predictive. Additional voices from public health organizations warn that an epidemic—whether naturally caused or intentionally—could cause massive harm, with the possibility of ten million excess deaths. A final note reflects on the sense that the world was already prepared in many ways before 2020, suggesting that the pandemic response was part of a long-standing preparation.

The speaker discusses the possibility of a cyber pandemic and references the World Economic Forum's prediction about it. They mention the Forum's previous accurate prediction of the coronavirus pandemic and suggest that it may be worth paying attention to their future predictions. The speaker explains that the cyber pandemic would involve a bug sweeping through the Internet, similar to a computer virus, and the potential need to shut down the Internet and power grid to prevent its spread.

The speaker argues that confronting future pandemics requires the development and integration of several new tools and capabilities, implemented continuously so societies are never caught off guard again. A central element is environmental surveillance conducted on an ongoing basis, forming a persistent early-warning system that can detect emerging threats before they escalate. A second key capability is the ability to produce diagnostics at an unprecedented scale: literally billions of diagnostics within a few months, with the combination of very low cost and high accuracy. The implication is that rapid, widespread testing would be feasible, enabling quick identification and response to infectious threats and reducing the chance of uncontrolled spread. Third, the speaker emphasizes the need for a worldwide network of vaccine manufacturing capacity. This network should include mRNA vaccine factories at multiple levels of capacity, designed to operate at very low cost and capable of producing vaccines that are affordable for broad populations. The emphasis is on creating scalable, geographically distributed production to ensure rapid deployment of vaccines during health emergencies. The speaker notes that recent advances funded by various foundations and organizations are enabling these capabilities, particularly in establishing such vaccine manufacturing infrastructure. These advances are described as enabling the global network to be established and to function efficiently when a new threat emerges. When these elements—surveillance, a global health core, diagnostics, antibody capacities, and other related capabilities—are integrated, the speaker asserts that if a pathogen like COVID-19 were faced again, the response would be dramatically better. The proposed combination of continuous monitoring, mass diagnostic production, and distributed vaccine manufacturing is presented as the key to substantially improving outcomes in future pandemics. Finally, the speaker asserts an aspirational outcome: every country should perform better in a future pandemic than even the very best countries did in the past. This sets a benchmark for international preparedness and underscores the belief that the described toolkit—surveillance, diagnostics, manufacturing capacity, and allied resources—can elevate global response to levels that surpass current best practices.

The video discusses evidence of foreign interference in the election, showing how votes were manipulated and which computers were involved. The speakers highlight the importance of cybersecurity experts uncovering the attacks in real-time, preventing potential election manipulation. They express gratitude for the proof of interference and emphasize the significance of having this information. The speakers marvel at the detailed documentation and consider it a miracle to have such insight into the attacks.

The panel discussion focused on the importance of preparedness in health systems for future crises. The speakers emphasized the need for global collaboration and participation to strengthen health systems. Key priorities identified included early warning systems, preparedness planning, and the expansion of health infrastructure. The speakers also highlighted the importance of primary healthcare, research and development, and community involvement in preparedness efforts. The role of technology, data management, and artificial intelligence in improving healthcare delivery and response was also discussed. The panelists emphasized the need for partnerships, equitable access to healthcare, and the integration of digital health systems. The discussion concluded with a call for investment in health systems and the promotion of sustainable improvements in healthcare worldwide.