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There are concerns about the security of electronic voting machines, as they can potentially be hacked without detection. While there is no evidence of this happening, it cannot be proven that it hasn't or won't happen in the future. Instances of machine errors have been reported, such as recording extra votes for a candidate or subtracting votes instead of adding them. It is unknown how many instances went unnoticed and what impact they had on elections. Legislation is being proposed to require a paper trail for every electronic machine, similar to ATM receipts, to ensure transparency and allow for verification. An investigation is also being requested to assess the effectiveness of voting machines and improve election systems.

"The use of some 19,000 electronic voting machines in the city of Chicago and Cook County primary on March 21 is now under intense scrutiny." "The US company that makes the machines, Sequoia, was bought in 2005 by Smartmatic, a private company primarily owned by Venezuelan businessmen." "I think that American elections ought to be run by American companies and ought to be run by American citizens, not Venezuelan nationals." "We believe this is a national security issue. There is no way that companies belonging to non US corporations should have access to our elections." "In the case of, Smartmatic, there are a number of unanswered questions." "Certainly, our government should know."

The speaker raises concerns about the security of the tabulation machines and the process of transferring votes. They question whether the votes can be manipulated before being saved on a flash drive and if the flash drive can be swapped. They also mention the issue of trusting the county commissioner to not edit the contents of the flash drive. The speaker highlights the importance of the digital devices that hold cryptographic keys, emphasizing that if these keys are lost, the entire precinct's security is compromised. They give an example of a theft in Philadelphia before the election, where USB drives and a laptop were stolen from a key precinct, potentially impacting the legitimacy of the election results.

I am concerned about the upcoming election because this voting machine, used in 18 states, can be easily accessed by anyone. I will demonstrate how it can be done in less than 2 minutes without any tools. By opening the machine, removing the card reader and unplugging it, then picking the lock with a ballpoint pen, I gain admin access. I encounter a few error messages, but by clicking Cancel and okay, I bypass them and gain full admin control.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

We need to address issues with computer voting, as seen in Antrim County, Michigan. Despite a programming error, it was caught and corrected the same day. There is no evidence of a statewide software glitch affecting other elections. Let's focus on winning elections instead of worrying about false claims.

The speaker states they are investigating dangerous and negative consequences with the "best of the best." They claim electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and open to exploitation, allowing manipulation of vote results. This vulnerability purportedly reinforces the need for paper ballots nationwide, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

Speaker 0: The election was stolen. A graph shows people who worked for ES&S, Hart, Dominion Voting Systems, ClearBallot, and Smartmatic, recycling through companies. People who worked at Dominion Voting Systems are entering the political sphere and taking over election offices; one county in Texas, after hiring someone who worked for Dominion, went blue for the first time. The speaker walks through information: Dominion using “Serbian technology with Chinese characteristics.” Huawei Bank is involved; there’s no public board saying Bank of China funds anything, but research on Roaming Networks—a relatively unknown Serbian company until 2013—shows it signed a value-added contract with Huawei Bank. Huawei is “the Bank of China.” Roaming Networks built ICT infrastructure and data centers in Serbia, with owner Nenad Kovac identified as the enterprise partner. Some Roaming Networks information may come off their site after this presentation. Dominion Voting Systems has a corporate office in Serbia; a screenshot of the office and a developer on their site is noted. A Serbian legislative leader said, “I know Dominion Voting Systems back in November. They have an office here.” Dominion started rapidly removing Serbian coders from their site/LinkedIn. Code is built in Serbia for a system used in the United States, using infrastructure funded by China, not just China but the Bank of China. A slide discusses Dominion’s enterprise partnership with Huawei, added to the restricted list on 05/16/2019. Roaming Networks references show Dominion Voting Systems using a pure flash storage solution in Dominion’s data center. A photo of Sacramento shows Dominion hardware coming from China, with a bill of lading from a Chinese supplier to Dominion’s McKinney, Texas office. Testing and approval of Dominion hardware show similarities with Smartmatic; the same hardware with different branding. They claim a “tail” behind the scenes—evidence of connections among ES&S, Hart, Dominion, ClearBallot, Smartmatic, with people cycling through these companies. People who once worked at Dominion are now entering election offices; in Texas, a county that hired a former Dominion employee “went blue” by accident with ES&S involved. The speaker calls out Gina Griswold for commenting on Tina Peters and Mesa, and Matt Crane’s role as Arapahoe County clerk and recorder, now head of the County Clerks Association; Crane’s wife previously worked for Dominion and Sequoia Voting Systems. The speaker asserts a public breach of trust requires an audit; if there’s nothing to hide, audits should restore trust. They argue, whether Dominion is the bad actor or not, removal of logs, altering code, and a “trusted build” are problematic, and emphasize the need for audits and investigations to restore trust in elections. Speaker 1: Indicators: a senior Dominion vice president’s name appears on patents; a software engineer involved in the Wayne County, Michigan tabulation center is connected to the software. Coincidences accumulate, suggesting there is a preponderance of evidence with affidavits across the country. The speaker asks which computer produced certain files analyzed yesterday; whether it came from the central count or precincts. Speaker 0: Answers with a non-answer, noting they imaged the main EMS and the tabulation system; servers in the county coordinate precinct information and house audit reports, cast vote reports, error reports, adjudication reports, and access logs. Thumb drives can contaminate the county and state systems if connected to a machine; it’s not unique to Dominion or voting systems but a general risk. They emphasize avoiding white noise and focusing on facts: Dominion is in Serbia; Huawei Bank funds the enterprise partnership and Serbia-based data centers; code is written in Serbia; imaging shows fingerprints of this. They call for audits, note deviations in Georgia (ballots appearing identical in different batches, a shredder truck before January 20 in Georgia, and a leaky arena water claim later proven to be a leaky toilet), and point to media silence. They argue against accepting the gold standard claim and highlight perceived connections to Soros-funded groups. They stress deviations in state and county behavior, urge audits, and compare the election system to a serial killer—unacceptable to let foreign systems run it. Speaker 2: Adds that with 100 indicators, a pattern emerges; reiterates the need to examine which files came from which computer, and questions the integrity of the central count. Speaker 3: Notes the risk of a non-internet-connected thumb drive introducing malware; emphasizes auditing all machines for that reason.

There have been mistakes in your office that have harmed voter confidence, such as sending mailers to 30,000 noncitizens inviting them to register in 2022, and using the ballot tracking system to send voting reminders to individuals who had already voted, which caused confusion. Now, there’s also a leak of voting system passwords. Given these repeated errors, will you resign? Absolutely not. You are mischaracterizing the situation and omitting crucial information.

Our current voting systems are complicated and messy. Votes are not reconciled and verified at the precinct level in many states. Instead, they are sent to third party entities or counted at centralized locations without public oversight. Mail-in ballots are not secure and can lead to fraud. We need to return to hand counting at the precinct level to ensure accurate accounting and transparency. This system worked for years before 2000 and is still used in France because it is secure. Our current system invites fraud and distrust, so we must act now to restore faith in our elections. Demand hand counting at the precinct level to stop fraud and build back trust in our elections.

In 2022, the speaker presents data on the Maricopa County elections. They show a slide with the names of polling centers and dots representing tabulators. None of the 446 tabulators in the county were compliant with the Election Assistance Corporation regulations. The error rate was significantly higher, with some tabulators failing at a rate of 95%. Despite these failures, they were still used to process 5,000 ballots.

Maggie Pesaro, a resident of Kingman, raises concerns about the use of electronic voting machines in elections. She shares a 53-minute video featuring Tori Morris, a credible contractor with expertise in gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence. Morris highlights her qualifications and provides detailed evidence that the machines have not been lawfully accredited since 2017. The hardware of the machines in Michigan, for example, has not been examined since then. Maggie urges viewers to watch the video before making any decisions regarding the use of electronic machines.

I spoke to law enforcement agencies, urging them to collect forensic evidence from computers to prove or refute election fraud claims. Despite my requests, the evidence was not gathered. Chain of custody logs and records in Delaware County are missing, making 100,000+ ballots questionable. There is no remedy for this situation, which could impact the presidential election certification.

I pleaded with multiple law enforcement agencies to collect forensic evidence from the computers to either prove or refute my claims. They could have easily done this by turning off the computers, using a device called a bit blocker to take a forensic image of the hard drive, and reassembling everything. However, this was never done, and all chain of custody logs and forensic evidence in Delaware County have mysteriously disappeared. This leaves around 100,000 to 120,000 mail-in and USB ballots in question, with no solution or remedy. I believe that certifying this vote would be unjustifiable.

A key priority is ensuring election integrity, which is crucial for many constituents. I am advocating for a comprehensive audit of Maricopa County's election system by a reputable firm. Recently, I participated in a conference call with the senate president, the speaker of the house of Arizona, and the Florida secretary of state to discuss the differences in our election systems and explore potential improvements.

I have some questions about the election in Arizona, specifically Maricopa County. I'm asking about the secret testing done on the machines. As Secretary of State, you're supposed to oversee election procedures and conduct additional testing. Did you authorize this? And what about the signatures on the mail-in ballot updates? Are you aware that they don't match the voter signatures? As Secretary of State, you oversaw elections in Maricopa County, so are those elections the best?

There are numerous reasons why our elections need to be secure. People who dedicate their lives to this cause are often dismissed as conspiracy theorists and technophobes. The vendors responsible for election systems are dishonest about the state of security. This is deeply concerning, and it brings me to tears. As someone I know once said, our country is pretending to be something it's not.

As a computer scientist specializing in election system security, I want to highlight the vulnerabilities in computerized voting equipment used in polling places. These systems can be easily compromised, allowing corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to disrupt elections and potentially alter vote tallies without detection. The poor design and implementation by equipment vendors contribute to these vulnerabilities. Additionally, voter registration databases and systems reporting final results are attractive targets for disruption, with even fewer standards for securing them. It is unrealistic to expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services. We need to address these issues to ensure the integrity of our elections.

- "The electoral systems of The United States can be manipulated by foreign agents or third parties." - "Are you in danger, physical danger, if your true identity is known?" - "Yes." - "We configured the transmission systems and the tally systems." - "I was the national coordinator for voting machines." - "You examined the forensic image of the election management server, that was used in the Mesa County twenty twenty election." - "In the case of Mesa, Colorado, all evidence, all log, all of that was deleted." - "We saw both images, the old one and the new one." - "And the structure changed, the structure of the program changed as compared to the version 5.5." - "Whoever gave the authorization for the system to be updated would be the person responsible for all the files that were deleted." - "It's easy to rig an election with it, and it's hard to audit."

I was surprised to learn that there was no signature verification done for the ballots. I questioned how ballots without signatures were handled, and the response was they were just sent back out. This made me uncomfortable certifying the results.

I witnessed a person inserting USBs into voting machines multiple times and reported it to law enforcement and election officials. Despite my objections, I learned that 47 USB cards are missing, and only a limited number of updates were made to the vote count. I demanded a forensic examination of the machines, which was never conducted. Recently, I discovered that all chain of custody records and forensic evidence from Delaware County have disappeared, and attempts to recreate these logs were unsuccessful. This raises serious concerns about 100,000 to 120,000 questionable ballots. There is no remedy for this situation at the presidential level, and I believe it is impossible to certify the vote with good conscience.

I have questions about the election in Arizona, particularly in Maricopa County. Did you authorize the secret testing on the machines, considering the election procedures manual states you should oversee additional testing? Also, are you aware of the signatures on the mail-in ballot updates and how they don't resemble the voter's signatures? As Secretary of State, you oversaw elections in Maricopa County and Arizona. Is it true you told someone to give it an "effing rest?"

The speaker highlights that the number of misfeeds in the voting system is much higher than the federal standard of one out of 500. They mention that the insertion errors were a significant issue throughout Election Day, contrary to reports claiming it was a minor problem. The system log files reveal that there were consistently over 7,000 ballot insertion failures every 30 minutes from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m., with some intervals exceeding 8,000 errors. The problem persisted throughout the day despite technicians attempting to fix it.

Nederlandse samenvatting: Al dingen mee doen die leiden tot verstoringen en dan misschien dus niet tot geslaagde verkiezingsfraude, dat is het allerergste, maar wel tot bijvoorbeeld onrust in het proces en daarmee mogelijk verlies van het vertrouwen in het proces. De Kiesraad zegt dat het veilig is, maar wat zeg jij dan? "Ja, dat is dezelfde Kiesraad die de stamcomputers in 2006 ook goed vond." De spreker vraagt: "Wat is jouw antwoord tegenover dan ik vertrouw je niet, maar hoe vind jij het niet veilig?" Hij noemt ontbrekende details: "Ik zie helemaal niks over bijvoorbeeld gedetailleerde eisen en normen over hoe de systemen ingericht moeten worden, waar die software op draait." Toezicht ontbreekt; "Je moet dat toch heel gedetailleerd en fanatiek inregelen." "En wie zijn dat dan?" "Als een gemeente IT grotendeels heeft uitbesteed, worden de computers die de stemmen tellen ingericht door medewerkers van een privaat bedrijf?" De zorg: zonder toezicht en zonder oplossingen voor eenvoudige softwarebugs "kunnen ... leiden tot heel veel risico's" en ons vertrouwen in dit proces. English translation: Doing things that lead to disruptions and then maybe not to successful election fraud, that is the worst, but also for example unrest in the process and thereby possible loss of trust in the process, and that is nearly as bad as fraud. The Electoral Board says it is safe, but what do you say? "Yes, that is the same Electoral Board that the stamcomputers in 2006 also found to be good." The speaker asks: "What is your answer to I don’t trust you, but how do you find it not safe?" He cites missing details: "I see nothing about, for example, detailed requirements and standards for how the systems should be configured, where the software runs." Oversight is missing; "you have to arrange this in very detailed and rigorous manner." "And who are those people then?" "If a municipality largely outsources IT, are the vote-counting computers then set up by employees of a private company?" The concern: without oversight and without solutions for simple software bugs, "they can lead to a lot of risks" and our trust in this process.