reSee.it - Related Video Feed

Civil society, including the press, academia, special interest groups, and NGOs, plays a crucial role in addressing election security and countering malign influence. It is not enough for just the federal government, states, or tech and social media companies to tackle this issue. We need a collaborative effort from all sectors of society to understand and address the threats. This synergy is still a work in progress.

The Global Engagement Center, supported by allies, exposes Russian disinformation campaigns worldwide. Collaborating with tech companies, we combat false stories. Our focus is on getting truth to Russia amid a ban on independent news.

Charles (Speaker 0) and Mario (Speaker 1) discuss a wide range of intelligence topics, personal history, and contemporary covert operations, emphasizing experiences from the CIA and reflections on global security dynamics. Charles begins by outlining his background: growing up on a farm in Ohio, enlisting in the Navy as a law enforcement specialist at 17, studying East Asian languages and Mandarin, and eventually learning Persian. He joined the CIA in July 2001 as an operations officer, spending most of his career in the Middle East with stints in Europe and Asia, and leaving the CIA in 2019. Afterward, he worked at Tesla to set up an insider threat program and manage global information security investigations. He notes extensive experience with China, Russia, Israel, France, and South Korea, and emphasizes the prevalence of intellectual property theft and proprietary-systems concerns in the private sector, including the role of motivated individuals and cross-border actors seeking to commercialize advanced technology. The conversation turns to leadership targeting and decapitation concepts. Charles references how the Iraq War began with an attempted decapitation strike at Saddam, asking whether removing a center of gravity leadership could end a conflict decisively and whether that would be humane. He discusses Iran as a persistent factor across the region, arguing that Iran’s meddling contributed to problems in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and that without Iranian involvement, upheaval might be less intense, though turmoil remains possible. Mario expresses fascination with intelligence capabilities, particularly related to Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Maduro, and asks about Charles’s CIA background and roles. Charles explains that his work involved recruiting individuals with access to foreign governments to commit espionage and provide secret information—“human operations.” He emphasizes the dramatic realism of espionage as two people engaging in a life-changing conversation, rather than high-action TV tropes. They discuss border crossings and the reality of intelligence work. Charles notes that the hardest border crossings were often returning to the United States, when travel appearances didn’t match and documents or identities could be scrutinized. He stresses the difference between romanticized espionage and the real tension of crossing borders with non-legitimate materials, relying on confidence, charisma, and interaction under stress. On private-sector and national-security crossover, Charles highlights the complexity of cyber threats and corporate espionage. He describes a Tesla case involving a Russian criminal organization attempting to install malware, with FBI involvement and the arrest of a Russian national. He explains that in cyber threats, the distinction between government-sponsored and private actors is often blurred, with organized crime sometimes acting as proxies for larger state agendas. He notes that entrepreneurial actors seek to accelerate development by acquiring others’ material, not building entire systems from scratch. He also comments on the blurry boundary between nation-states and private actors in tech espionage and the difficulty of attributing responsibility. The Mossad’s capabilities are analyzed in depth. Charles argues Mossad excels by focusing on high-impact targets within a narrow geopolitical scope (Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq) and by strong locational intelligence—understanding where leaders live, work, and their access points. He emphasizes Mossad’s willingness to act decisively, using surrogates and superior technology for surveillance. He mentions the head of Mossad and a quote from his book about ubiquitous surveillance through devices like phones and watches. He notes the “pager operation” against Hezbollah as a case study in supply-chain manipulation and the use of compromised intermediaries, and he cautions that modern operations involve cyber manipulation and near-constant information-flow considerations. Both discuss real-world operations, including the 2010 Dubai operation targeting a Hamas logistics figure, and general lessons about operational security, noting that some details cannot be disclosed publicly. They reflect on the “gentleman’s rules of the game,” acknowledging that lethal operations and leadership-targeting can be controversial and legally complex; they discuss how different regimes and leaders are perceived and targeted. The Maduro operation is revisited. Charles describes gathering information through satellites, drones (including covert, stealth, and micro-drones), and human intelligence; he stresses determining a target’s pattern of life, where a leader lives, sleeps, moves, whom they meet, and what they eat. He notes that insider sources and the right informants are critical, and he discusses the balance between opportunities created by regime instability and the risk of compromised sources. He emphasizes that in times of turmoil, there is opportunistic recruitment, as some individuals see few options other than cooperating with outside powers. Privacy is a recurring theme. Charles asserts that privacy is not dead but requires effort to protect. He compares privacy to fitness, arguing that modern technologies make it easy to be public, but steps can be taken to reduce attack surfaces, including privacy consulting, careful metadata handling, and secure, layered security (physical security and cyber measures). He uses anecdotes about Strava revealing location data and a submarine commander whose Strava activity was linked to his demise, illustrating how personal data can reveal sensitive information. Towards the end, Mario and Charles discuss strategic ambiguity and unpredictability in political leadership, including Trump’s posture and international signaling. They touch on the potential paths for Iran if regime change occurs, debating the likelihood and consequences of upheaval, the role of Western policy, and how regional dynamics might shift if the mullahs and IRGC structures are altered. The conversation ends with mutual appreciation for the complexity of global security issues and the rapid pace of geopolitical change.

Speaker 0 explains that there are activities that are completely off the radar, done in collaboration with other organizations, producing content that they publish with their own anarch. Speaker 1 adds that the Israel project is supplying white label, i.e., unbranded content, to other outlets. Speaker 2 notes that they’re putting together a lot of pro-Israel media through various social media channels that aren’t the Israel Project’s channel. Speaker 3 and Speaker 2 describe many side projects aimed at influencing the public debate, and that these efforts are kept secret because they don’t want people to know these side projects are associated with the Israel project. Speaker 1 details that Tip runs a collection of Facebook communities covering topics from history and the environment to current affairs and feminism, with affiliations to the Israel project deliberately vague. Speaker 3 questions why these groups can’t be connected to the Israel project. Speaker 2 responds that the aim is for people to view them as objectively as possible. He states there’s a team of about 13 people working on a lot of videos and explainers on a range of topics, with only roughly 25% of the content being Israel or Jewish-state related. Speaker 4 comments that the Israel brand is increasingly toxic, so it’s not possible to sell Israel directly; instead, you need to have other hip, innocuous, fun material, into which Israel content is slipped from time to time. Speaker 3 suggests that the rest of the non-Israel material is meant to enable the Israel material to pass more easily, describing it as the key strategy to blend in everything. Speaker 2 reiterates the goal of blending in all content, ensuring the Israel-related material can pass as part of a broader, non-Israel-led narrative.

The discussion centers on a leaked document detailing private international focus groups and surveys funded by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to test messaging for Israel after the war and to regain international legitimacy. The project included 15 focus groups (six in the United States, three in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France each), plus quantitative testing with 8,050 interviews (3,250 in the US, 1,200 in the UK, Germany, France, and Spain) as a baseline, and animatic testing with 5,600 interviews (4,000 in the US and 1,600 in the UK and Europe) to test specific messages, tone, and delivery. The aim is to determine how to shift global perceptions of Israel and avoid further isolation. The document, attributed to the Stagwell Group (Mark Penn’s firm) and the MFA, shows substantial investment in audience research, including focus groups and telephone interviews, to identify levers that could move public opinion from current baseline views toward greater international legitimacy for Israel. A striking takeaway cited is a recommendation to ramp up Islamophobia in messaging, arguing that when Israel is compared to Iran or Hamas, people tend to prefer Israel. The research also surveyed European attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and found underlying hostility in parts of Europe, which the MFA’s messaging strategy suggests Israel should lean into by contrasting itself with Hamas and Iran as standing up against a perceived threat. Key findings highlighted include: - International attitudes toward Israel are consistently worse in Europe (UK, France, Spain) than in the US, with Spain showing particularly negative views. Most Europeans support the Palestinians, except in Germany where support for Israel is stronger, though they recoil against both Hamas and Iran. - When Israel is compared to Hamas or Iran, Israel polls relatively better; when asked to choose between Palestinians and Israelis, Palestinians generally win, especially among younger cohorts. - The juxtaposition Israelis versus Palestinians is more favorable to Israel in the US than in Europe. In Europe (UK, France, Spain) there is greater favorability toward the Palestinians, while Germany and the US show more favorability toward Israel. - Youth attitudes show a shift: Gen Z in the UK and Germany are more likely to support Palestinians over Israel, with stark percentages (e.g., UK Gen Z 65-35, Germany Gen Z 63-37; in Spain, a near-universal tilt toward Palestinians). - Page-level cross-national comparisons show the most powerful countries (US, Germany) still leaning toward Israel, while the least powerful (Spain) lean toward the Palestinians. Gen Z across European countries shows increasing Palestinian support relative to older cohorts. - The document also notes misperceptions about casualty figures in Gaza: Spaniards 40,000; French 30,000; British 25,000; Germans and Americans 10,000. It also asks respondents whether those killed were mostly Hamas terrorists or civilians, with a majority in all regions believing civilians were mostly killed, including the US being the lowest but still majority civilian casualties believed. - If actual casualty numbers are higher than perceived, Israel believes attitudes could shift; the research tracks what people think about who was killed to anticipate messaging impact. Additional context: - The MFA’s Hasbara efforts have received substantial funding since October 7, fueling this extensive research program. - The document discusses potential post-war strategies, including the controversial idea of elevating ISIS-linked groups (Abu Shabab) to portray Hamas as more moderate, thereby arguing that no partners for peace exist and reshaping regional narratives—though this raises concerns about long-term consequences. - The discussion notes that the research was leaked and was originally intended to remain private, with the Commission of the Israeli MFA funding this line of propaganda-adjacent work. The conversation concludes with reflections on how the tone and content of messaging may evolve, acknowledging that some strategies may not move the US as much as other audiences, and noting the potential for a new chapter in the propaganda effort.

We have an incredible array of possibilities of creating foreign companies that have no weight being traced back to Israel. Shell companies over shell companies who affect the supply chain to our favor. We create a pretend world. We are a global production company. We write the screenplay. We're the directors. We're the producers. We're the main actors. The world is our stage. This is Mossad's old office. Its motto from Proverbs twenty four six says in so many words, wage war through deception and trickery, kinda like the CIA smoke and mirrors, which is what this operation was all about.

Stop Antisemitism was built for confronting the global explosion of Jew hatred unleashed since the attacks of ten seven. Since that day, we have featured more than 1,000 antisemites on our platforms—not theorized about them, not quietly documented them, but featured them publicly, clearly, and with evidence. The results speak for themselves: approximately 400 of these Jew haters have faced real consequences including firings, suspensions, and expulsions. More than 300 remain in an active investigatory state across universities, corporations, DEI departments, unions, hospitals, nonprofits, and yes, federal government agencies. And five arrests to date tied directly to threats and violence of antisemitic conduct we helped expose. This is what accountability looks like. This is what action looks like. This is what pushing back hard looks like against the tidal wave of hate that has consumed The United States and global population. From our founding, Stop Antisemitism has operated on one guiding belief: Antisemitism thrives when there are no consequences. So we created consequences, a lot of them. We created visibility. We turned the spotlight towards those who targeted our community, making silence impossible. On campuses where Jewish students were hunted through libraries, where professors glorified Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists, where mobs shut down our buildings and administrators hid under desks, we stepped in. We documented the offenders. We worked with attorneys, lawmakers, and victim families, and we ensured the message was not unmistakable: If you target Jewish students, your actions will not disappear into the darkness. We will shine a light on you that thanks to Google and SEO, follow you for the rest of your life. When you look for a job, when you look for a spouse, when you look for a nanny, when you look for anything, our work will always be documented. Again, thanks to Google and SEO. In corporations where DEI leaders smeared Israel, excused Hamas, we pressured CEOs; some resigned, many were terminated, but policies were changed thankfully from governmental to art institutions. Online, where anonymous accounts spread violent threats, we traced patterns, elevated evidence, and worked with authorities leading to arrests from Florida, South Carolina, New York, California, and Texas. And we're not slowing down sadly. Today, Stop Antisemitism, I'm proud to say, runs one of the most robust antisemitic enforcement operations in The United States, monitoring campuses, digital networks, activist groups, and public officials, documenting incidents in real time and mobilizing millions of people, of allies that are quietly by our side. But the fight is bigger than the exposure, and it's about securing a future—A future where Jewish students can walk across a quad without being screamed at. A future where employers understand that anti Semitism is not activism. It's bigotry and it will cause you to lose your job. A future where fact, not propaganda, shapes policy. A future where global institutions from Google to chat, GPT, from governments to universities to media, finally treats Jew hatred with the seriousness of other minority-targeted hate. To get there, we need three things: action, real action as I listed; accountability; relentless vigilance, because antisemitism does not take breaks. It doesn't wait for elections. It doesn't disappear because we are exhausted and tired, and when I tell you myself and my team are exhausted and tired, that's the least of it. Stop antisemitism has never been more essential, more strategic, or more effective than it is now, but we cannot do this alone. The demand, the volume of tips, the number of investigations, sadly, it continues to grow instead of decrease. If we want a safer future for the Jewish people, this is the moment to stand together and act. We have to push harder to make it clear that Jewish safety is a nonnegotiable. Tonight, I'm asking you to always be in the fight with us, not just in spirit, but in true action. Participate in calls to action. Write letters to your governmental officials. Speak to the teachers and the college administrators that are making, if it's not your friends and kids, it's making other community members feel unsafe. When we act, lives change, And antisemites learn, sometimes for the very first time in their lives and history, that targeting Jews will come at a price, and together we can ensure that Jew hatred never goes unanswered again. As a former refugee from The USSR, I say this with all of my heart, God bless The United States, God bless Israel, and I'm Israel High. Thank you so much.

An Israeli intelligence company called First Health Infrastructure partnered with CISA, an organization responsible for protecting critical infrastructure in the US. Originally focused on American hospitals, they have expanded their services to include dams, water systems, and nuclear reactors. This foreign intelligence-founded nonprofit now has access to these crucial systems in the United States. The deep connections between Israel and the US seem to play a role in allowing this partnership.

On February 2025, Pam Bondi, on her first day as attorney general, disbands the Foreign Influence Task Force, the DOJ office responsible for enforcing FARA (Foreign Agents Registration Act). The change explicitly limits DOJ prosecutors from criminally charging individuals involved in public relations work and policy advocacy on behalf of foreign businesses and nonprofits. This move is described as an incapacitation of the enforcement mechanism, effectively giving a green light to foreign influence operatives and enabling the Knesset’s 2018 plan to skirt FARA to proceed with minimal risk of prosecution. The memo cited (attributed to Pam Bondi) is noted as containing this and other points, with Gen X Girl highlighted as having noticed this aspect. The memo directs shifting resources in the National Security Division to address more pressing priorities and to end risks of further weaponization and abuses of prosecutorial discretion. As a result, the foreign influence task force is to be disbanded. Recourse to criminal charges under FARA and 18 U.S.C. 951 is to be limited to instances of alleged conduct similar to traditional espionage by foreign government actors. The counterintelligence and export control section, including the FARA unit, is to focus on civil enforcement, regulatory initiatives, and public guidance. The implication is that there would be no more FARA enforcement unless it resembles espionage activity. The discussion then shifts to Havas Media Group, described as part of a complex web of companies and subsidiaries involving shell companies and LLCs that funnel money from the top down, primarily from Israel, to social media influencers, propaganda campaigns, and digital campaigns. This network is framed as enabling plausible deniability for the Israeli government. With the FARA enforcement landscape opened up by Bondi’s changes, the argument is that rather than the Israeli government paying directly for influence campaigns, it would pay through intermediaries—NGOs, nonprofits, foundations, LLCs—around the world, which would then target Americans with propaganda. The broader context notes a surrounding environment in which new organizations have proliferated, money has flowed more freely, and influencers have received compensation and embarked on trips with talking points. Additional related points include mentions of Israel’s concerns about FARA rules and how campaigns might be structured to avoid registration, and a claim that there was a prior focus on how to skirt FARA regulations. The narrative concludes by tying Bondi’s actions to a surge in new organizations, money, and influencer activity following the disbanding of the foreign influence enforcement framework.

Within these pillars, protect, advocate, educate, we are innovating. We are trying new ways to have an impact in the fight against anti Semitism. So let's talk about what that looks like. Within the first pillar, protect, not only has the team at the Center on Extremism expanded its ranks with data scientists and software engineers, but we use cutting edge AI tools to analyze the endless online chatter. And then when we identify salient trends or material threats, we route them to whomever may need it, could be journalists, policymakers, and very often law enforcement. Now I can't talk about all the times we do that. I can't divulge what's happened with every piece of intelligence shared, but just know there are real dangers that have been averted. Serious bad guys that have been put behind bars all over the world, And the information generated by Orin Siegel and the entire team on the Center on Extremism, it makes our communities safer.

Speaker 0: Number one, we measure and track. Number two, we monitor and disrupt. We have a whole apparatus. I have 40 analysts working full time, seven days a week, twenty four hours a day, monitoring extremists. We monitor them online, social media, messaging apps, video games, cryptocurrency, podcasts, short form video, Wikipedia, LLMs. We monitor these people and we share the intelligence with the FBI. You saw last month, you heard about the thing that happened at Wilshire Boulevard Temple. Our analysts investigated what happened. They said they were Koreatown for Palestine, this group of people. They weren't. We were able to ascertain they were from a group called the Turtle Island Liberation Front. Turtle Island is how, like, left wing activists refer to The United States. They don't call it America. They call it Turtle Island. Like the Iranians call it, Iranians call it the Zionist entity, or they only call by its name. The Turtle Island Liberation Front, we gave them a whole dossier. Who are what is Turtle Island Liberation Front? What are their ideas, their goals? Who are they? We identified the people who are in the synagogue. This was on Wednesday, December 10. On Monday, December 15, this is gonna ring a bell. Kashmattel announced they cracked a terror ring where they arrested four people who are playing New Year's Eve bombings, Turtle Island Liberation Front. At least one of the people I know for certain was in the building at Wilshire Boulevard Temple vandalizing it and disrupting the event. So we're monitoring left wing radicals like the DSA and the anti war crazies and the pro Palestine crazies. We're monitoring right wing extremists like white supremacists, armed militia groups. We're monitoring political Islamists and Christian nationalists, all of them. And then we train. We're the largest trainer of law enforcement in America. Extremism hate. We train 20,000 officers every year.

CISA lacked the capability and resources to address election disinformation. To bridge this gap, a project was quickly formed involving four institutions. The project collaborated with government partners like CISA DHS and local/state governments, civil society groups including NAACP, MITRE, Common Cause, and the Healthy Elections Project, and major platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, Reddit, and Nextdoor. Agreements for data access were made with some platforms, while analysts had to work individually with others.

We need to invest in intelligence to understand who are the anti-Semites, who's funding them, what's their plans, who are the leaders. Then once we have that, we can define who is an enemy we can attack. Obviously, we're not gonna go against Islam or leftists in The United States. It's too big. We need to define very specific organization, individuals, actions that we can fight against. For example, when we talk about Islam or leftist, it's clear that Qatar is behind all that. So we need to focus on Qatar, Muslim Brotherhood, CARE in The United States. When we talk about radical left, we need to focus on the Democratic Socialists of America, which are not Democrats. They're just socialist Marxists that are using democratic means to take over the Democratic Party. Mamdani is a Democratic Socialist of America. So we need to focus on DSA. We need to focus on other radical movement, anarchist movements, People City Council of the PP Forum, a lot of organization that are being sponsored by China and by Marxist billionaires. And once we have all this information, we need to empower and mobilize an ecosystem of many organizations that we can incentivize them to work together, to share, and to fight against our common enemies. We need to invest in pro-Israel organizations, and we need to invest in pro American organization.

We actively addressed disinformation and misinformation during the pandemic and the US election by collaborating with the editing community. This model will be used in future elections globally. We aim to identify threats early by working with governments and other platforms to understand the landscape.

The government created nongovernmental entities like the Election Integrity Project to address constitutional concerns and perform tasks that the government couldn't do alone. The head of the project explains that the government lacked funding and legal authorizations to tackle election disinformation. However, with input from this group, a project was quickly formed involving four institutions to bridge this gap. In essence, the government supported and funded NGOs to fulfill tasks beyond their own capabilities.

Speaker 0 outlines a framework for shaping America’s future by emphasizing intelligence to identify enemies and organize effective responses. He states that Jews will not lead this fight and that Americans must think and fight as Americans. The approach centers on two ecosystems, both supported by the Milsson Family Foundation and Gillan: the Pro Israel ecosystem and the Pro American ecosystem. In the Pro Israel ecosystem, which fights antisemitism, they support close to 100 organizations. In the Pro American ecosystem, organizations that have nothing to do with Jews and aim to fight for America are supported. The selection process focuses on identifying “the good ones”—organizations willing to collaborate with others and open to hearing ideas. They fund some organizations with large amounts and others with smaller grants; even small funding can open doors because donors’ input matters to organizations that would rather listen to donors than “dogs barking outside.” The foundation’s role includes sharing information, offering ideas, and making connections to strengthen collaboration. Specifically, they connect pro‑Israel/anti‑antisemitism organizations with pro‑American organizations to build broader coalitions. The speaker emphasizes that there is no silver bullet, but the goal is to mobilize and empower many groups to work together for America’s future. Overall, the message centers on intelligence-led identification of adversaries, strategic funding of organizations in two allied ecosystems, selective support of collaborative and receptive groups, donor influence as a catalyst for engagement, and proactive information sharing and inter‑organizational linking to foster a united effort for the country.

The transcript details a covert campaign by the Israeli government and pro-Israel lobby groups to gather information on American citizens and demonize the BDS movement. Adam Milstein, a major donor, is a central figure, working with organizations like the Israel on Campus Coalition and Stand With Us. The Israeli government has sub-campaigns focused on data gathering, activist organizations, and money trails, partnering with groups like the Foundation for Defensive Democracies (FDD). The FDD aims to link BDS supporters to Hamas by highlighting connections between American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) and former Holy Land Foundation volunteers. Jonathan Shanza from FDD testifies before Congress, insinuating that activists for Palestinian rights are tied to armed groups, despite admitting a lack of evidence of illegal activity. These allegations are used to portray BDS as a Hamas-driven movement, despite AMP's denial of foreign funding or affiliation with foreign organizations.

Disinformation requires a whole of society approach, not just governmental action. Some countries are more progressive in recognizing this challenge. A whole of society effort is key to empowering people with real and accurate information. This approach means sharing experiences and holding governments, social media platforms, and political leaders accountable. Democracy depends on a healthy information space achievable through this effort. The whole of society response includes the private sector, public sector, and civil society. Cooperation from tech platforms, good faith, and enforcement of terms of service are needed. It also requires government acknowledgment that the problem extends beyond foreign actors.

We have formed a counter propaganda group in collaboration with the IDF and the foreign ministry. We are working closely with their spokespeople to distribute their marketing materials. Carolina, who has a Telegram following of 185,000 people, will be using her resources to help with this.

Clayton discusses with Kevin Ship, a former CIA officer and author of Twilight of the Shadow Government, how false flags allegedly unfold and why they persist in public discourse. Key points: - False flags are planned for months in advance. Kevin suggests that covert operations typically identify a single boogeyman to avoid implying a broader conspiracy, arguing that a lone perpetrator allows authorities to claim “we got him” and deny wider conspiracy. - The pattern cited includes one individual who previously showed no criminal tendencies, who then commits a violent act, followed by quick attribution to a designated boogeyman, with the implication that the operation is over and left without further inquiry. - Specific incidents discussed include the Bondi Beach attack in Australia, with references to Mossad’s involvement and claims that Iran is behind the attack to push for war with Iran. The exchange questions the Australian government’s role and the relevance of Mossad’s presence in investigating the incident. - The conversation links these operations to broader intelligence ecosystem dynamics, noting a close collaboration and “frenemies” relationship between the CIA and Mossad. They describe Mossad as having a pervasive role in Middle East intelligence and describe a history of interactions where Mossad and the CIA share high-level information and sometimes operate in tandem, though at times Mossad may target the CIA as well. - The discussion points to prior examples of disinformation, such as the 9/11 events, where perceptions of evidence (e.g., a passport found near the World Trade Center) are presented as straightforward proof, while being described as an example of ineffective or misused disinformation to shape public belief. - In addressing media influence, Kevin references the CIA’s media liaison office and programs designed to influence how news is presented in the United States. He contends that “Mockingbird”-like media consolidation and complicit outlets help propagate these narratives, especially to audiences that rely primarily on television news. - The conversation notes a perceived pattern of actors or individuals appearing at multiple, unrelated events (e.g., a person claiming responsibility or being present at various incidents) as part of the alleged orchestration of false flag narratives. - They discuss the effectiveness of false flags: despite growing scrutiny and critical reporting, they argue that false flags continue to influence public perception, aided by psychological studies within intelligence communities and the reliance of many viewers on mainstream media for information. - Kevin reiterates his belief that the shadow government—particularly the CIA’s control of elected government and media propaganda programs—remains powerful, with ongoing operations designed to manipulate thinking and push narratives that serve certain geopolitical aims. He emphasizes that false flags are a recurring tactic and predict more of them in the future. - The conversation closes with Kevin urging readers to consider his book Twilight of the Shadow Government and to engage with his perspective on the CIA’s influence over media, politics, and public belief.

I founded Aletheia Group in 2019 after working on a Senate campaign. We developed strategies to combat disinformation and influence operations. This issue is a national security concern, not just political. Aletheia Group consists of diverse experts aiming to tackle this challenge. My background in government consulting and policy helped shape my approach. Disinformation targets voter turnout and candidate choice. Governments, especially the US, have the resources to combat disinformation effectively. We need to shift our approach to disinformation and address it legislatively.

We convinced Hezbollah to buy from us by ensuring they had no idea they were buying from Israel. We have an incredible ability to create foreign companies that can't be traced back to Israel, using shell companies stacked upon shell companies to control the supply chain in our favor. We essentially create a fictional world. We act as a global production company, crafting the screenplay, directing, producing, and playing the leading roles. The world is our stage.

The speaker works with the German Marshall Fund, which tracks Russian activities. The speaker directs the audience to hamilton68.com, a site created to monitor Russian trolls and bot armies. The goal is to provide the public with information to help them distinguish between legitimate speech and speech originating outside the country intended to create chaos. The speaker acknowledges the difficulty the country will face in discerning the origins and intent of different types of speech.

The Alliance for Securing Democracy is developing tools and strategies to counter attacks on the U.S. and its allies. They are tracking the toolkit Russia is using to undermine democracies. Their dashboard tracks Russian active measures and can be found at dashboard.securingdemocracy.org.