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Europe should have been negotiating with Russia, but now that Trump is, some are in an uproar. If the US stops sending arms and funding, the war will end. This all stems from American arrogance, going back decades to the US declaring itself the sole superpower and expanding NATO eastward, ignoring Russian concerns. The US participated in a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, further escalating tensions. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not one based on hate speech or Russophobia, but real diplomacy. NATO should have been disbanded in 1991. The US sees this as a game, but for Russia, it's about core national security.

Ukraine has been a path of invasion into Russia. To avoid this, Gorbachev agreed to allow Germany to reunify under NATO, but only if NATO didn't expand eastward. Despite this agreement, NATO expanded, and the US withdrew from nuclear weapons treaties, placing missile systems near Moscow. In 2014, the US allegedly overthrew Ukraine's government, leading Russia to annex Crimea to protect its naval base. When the new Ukrainian government attacked ethnic Russians, Russia intervened to protect them. Zelenskyy was elected on a promise of peace by signing the Minsk Accords, but he refused to sign the agreement. Russia intervened, seeking negotiations to keep Ukraine out of NATO. A treaty was drafted, but allegedly, Joe Biden sent Boris Johnson to force Ukraine to abandon it. The result has been a catastrophic loss of life, with the world viewing the US as the aggressor.

Glenn (Speaker 0) argues that the idea Russia started the war merely for territory is nonsense and that NATO’s involvement is not genuinely helping Ukraine; he says “This is NATO’s war. Nothing we’re doing is actually helping Ukraine. They’re an instrument. They’re a tool.” He contends the conflict began as a failure to build a common European security architecture, and that Russian demands are high, making a peace settlement unlikely. He defines victory in a war of attrition as exhausting the adversary first, suggesting Russia would prefer a neutral Ukraine without NATO, and that if Ukraine remains in NATO orbit, Russia would rather take Odessa. He asserts that NATO expansion revived Cold War logic and that Ukraine’s neutrality was the original Russian objective. He argues that Ukraine’s current war losses and economic strain indicate Russia’s advantage, and claims NATO support has not truly helped Ukraine, noting that in his view NATO and Western actions have been a driver of the conflict, including claims about Istanbul, Minsk, and the 2014 coup. Jonathan (Speaker 1) pushes back on several points. He says the war is not solely about territory and disputes Glenn’s claim that NATO’s role is responsible for the conflict. He emphasizes that if this were simply about NATO, NATO could have destroyed Russia by arming Ukraine more aggressively, yet “they could have done it so much more, effectively,” implying NATO has not fully acted. He sees both sides as losing in a prolonged attritional battle and notes that neither side has achieved decisive victory due to limits on production, economies, and allied support. He argues the conflict is about more than territory and rejects the idea that NATO guarantees Ukraine’s security; he questions whether NATO would credibly defend an attacked ally in Europe. He says the Maidan movement in 2014 was organic and not fully orchestrated by the US, though he concedes US influence existed. He disputes Glenn’s claims about Western NGOs and American orchestration, and he highlights that many Ukrainians initially favored non-NATO paths, with polls showing limited appetite for NATO membership before 2014. He also contends that Ukraine’s future lies beyond mere territorial concessions, pointing to the EU’s role and the broader security order, and he warns that negotiations with a “mafia cabal” running Moscow are unlikely to yield lasting peace, arguing that Putin’s governance frames negotiations as instrumental and potentially destabilizing. Speaker 2 (moderator) asks for reactions to ongoing developments, including Trump and Kushner’s involvement, Putin’s aides’ statements about known positions and lack of progress, and questions about what Russia truly seeks: Donbas control or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. The participants discuss definitions of “winning” in a war of attrition, the role and credibility of NATO guarantees, and the strategic importance of neutrality versus alliance membership. They debate whether Russia values a neutral Ukraine with security guarantees or insists on broader concessions, and whether Ukraine could ever be secure without a credible deterrent. Glenn asserts that there was never credible deterrence in Ukraine prior to 2014, while Jonathan argues that NATO’s efficacy and unity are questionable, with concerns about member states’ commitments and the real level of Western support. On NATO and security guarantees, Glenn maintains that true security for Ukraine would come from a non-NATO arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a future proxy battleground, suggesting limited, carefully designed guarantees could be acceptable, but that any path toward NATO-like intrusion would be unacceptable. Jonathan says NATO is not delivering credible security and emphasizes that EU membership and security arrangements also factor into Russia’s calculations, with the European Union potentially offering security commitments if Ukraine joined, though that possibility remains contentious for Moscow. They discuss the costs of war, civilian impact, and the global economic ripple effects, including potential impacts on food prices and shipping routes if Russia responds to Ukrainian actions against its maritime traffic. Towards the end, they forecast no immediate peace and emphasize unpredictability due to Western political shifts, central bank asset issues, and external actors like China, North Korea, and Trump’s stance. Glenn predicts Ukraine’s military unraveling and a weakening economy, while Jonathan stresses that a peace deal remains unlikely under current leadership, with outcomes dependent on Western resolve and external support. The conversation closes with a sense that the next months will be dangerous and uncertain, with the broader international order potentially shifting as the conflict persists.

Biden and Austin admitted that the purpose of the war in Ukraine was not about Ukrainian freedom, but rather to exhaust the Russian army and engage in a proxy war. The US repeatedly prevented Zelensky from signing the Minsk Accords, which could have prevented the war. The speaker believes that the US deliberately provoked Russia and that the war could have been avoided. They argue that the US's actions have led to negative consequences, such as pushing Russia towards China and risking the dollar's status as the world reserve currency. Additionally, the speaker highlights the danger of provoking a nuclear superpower and questions why the conflict was not resolved peacefully from the start.

The Ukraine war didn't begin with Putin's invasion; it's rooted in broken promises. In 1990, the US assured Gorbachev NATO wouldn't expand eastward, a pledge violated starting in 1994. NATO expansion, coupled with US actions like the 1999 bombing of Serbia and the 2002 withdrawal from the ABM treaty, fueled Russian insecurity. The US involvement in Ukrainian politics, including the 2014 coup, further escalated tensions. Putin's 2021 security proposal, seeking to prevent NATO expansion, was rejected. The US's "open door" policy for NATO enlargement, and its support for Ukraine's continued fight, directly contradicts the assurances made to Gorbachev, leading to the current conflict. This is not a simple case of Russian aggression, but a culmination of decades of broken promises and escalating tensions.

- Democrats' spending caused inflation, and Biden's administration ignited global unrest after a peaceful period under Trump. Biden's Afghanistan withdrawal was botched, and NATO expansion talks provoked Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Opportunities for peace were rejected, leading to a prolonged war with mass casualties and depleted US stockpiles. - The US has a history of military interventions, including the bombing of Belgrade, and illegal wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, as well as involvement in the 2014 coup in Kyiv. The US government cannot be trusted. - NATO expansion was promised not to move "one inch eastward" but Clinton signed off on plans to expand NATO to Ukraine. The US unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, leading to missile systems in Eastern Europe that Russia views as a threat. - Putin sought to force Ukraine to negotiate neutrality, aiming to keep NATO off Russia's border. The US rejected negotiations, and a draft Russia-US security agreement proposing no NATO enlargement. - Germany has aligned with the US, supporting NATO expansion, but previously had an independent foreign policy. Merkel knew NATO expansion was a bad idea but gave in to US pressure. - The US is in a hot war with Russia, with US personnel on the ground in Ukraine. Russia could disable critical American infrastructure. - The war in Ukraine is a US-Russia conflict provoked by the US with the aim of NATO enlargement. The American people have been told the opposite. - The war started in 2014 with US involvement in the overthrow of Ukraine's government. The US rejected off-ramps and continues to fund the war, resulting in Ukrainian deaths and territorial losses. - The US should negotiate with Russia, acknowledging mutual security concerns and halting NATO enlargement. - The US is trying to destroy Russia through CIA operations in Ukraine. Russia is defending its right to survive. - Globalists aim to exploit Ukraine's resources and destroy Russia. The BRICS nations are moving towards a gold-backed currency. - The US has invested billions in Ukraine since 1991 to support a democratic government. Zelenskyy's team is adding fuel to the fire. - The US blew up the Nord Stream pipeline, as promised by Biden. - The US is turning Ukraine into a de facto member of NATO.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the Ukraine conflict as part of a broader geopolitical strategy attributed to a globalist elite. Speaker 1 contends that globalists in the White House, in Congress, and in European capitals want BlackRock to take over Ukraine to strip its resources and subjugate it to a globalist agenda, and they also aim to destroy Russia. The claim is that the war has never been about Ukraine itself, but about destroying Russia. According to Speaker 1, the people in charge failed to perform strategic analysis, underestimating Russia by treating it as if it were the post-Soviet state of 1992—weak and prostrate. The reference to John McCain’s description of Russia as “Spain with a gas station” is invoked to illustrate this hubris. The argument continues that Russians warned against NATO on their border and about the dangers of Western actions in Eastern Ukraine, but these concerns were ignored. Speaker 1 asserts that the outcome is a dangerous, ongoing war that could become regional or global, with a consequence that the White House is not fully grasping. He predicts a massive Russian offensive when ground conditions permit, foreseeing that much of what is currently identified as Ukraine—especially the Kyiv government—will be swept away. He claims the Kyiv government represents the interests of the globalist elite seeking resources to exploit, not the Ukrainian people. The discussion shifts to broader economic implications, including the potential loss of the petrodollar as Putin engages with Saudi Arabia and China. Speaker 1 frames the war as both military and financial, suggesting that BRICS could expand dramatically and move to a gold-backed currency, whether a single currency or a basket. He asserts that this shift threatens the current global financial system and that the globalists are desperate as a result. The speaker fears that once Ukraine’s fate becomes clear, there will be pressure to deploy US forces into Western Ukraine, with Polish and possibly Romanian troops, which would escalate into a full-scale war with Russia. According to Speaker 1, Putin has shown restraint and does not want a war with the West, but intervention in Western Ukraine could end in open conflict. Speaker 1 also argues that Putin has repeatedly warned against advancing the border toward Russia and transforming Ukraine into a hostile actor, framing what happens in Ukraine as an existential strategic interest to the United States. He contrasts this with a claim that Biden’s stance has prioritized regime change in Russia and the division of Russia to exploit it, while alleging that oligarchs like Kolomovsky, Soros, and others are part of this globalist project. The discussion concludes with criticisms of U.S. military recruitment practices, suggesting the Army and Marines are not prepared for such a conflict, including comments about recruitment of illegals encouraged by the administration.

Checklist: - Identify core claims: war in Ukraine not about NATO; Putin’s draft treaty; democracy vs. other motives; sphere of influence; West’s actions. - Remove repetition and filler; keep unique points. - Preserve key phrases and claims from the transcript where feasible. - Include notable comparisons (Hitler) and the Lindsey Graham reference. - Produce a concise, neutral summary within 378–473 words. Several speakers insist the war in Ukraine is not about NATO enlargement. Speaker 0 notes that President Putin sent a draft treaty to NATO promising no further enlargement as a precondition for not invading Ukraine; we rejected that, and he went to war to prevent NATO from closing near his borders. A flashback reinforces the point: “This is fundamentally not about NATO expansion,” with repeated lines such as “It’s not about NATO,” “Nothing to do with NATO,” and “NATO is not the reason.” Others push an alternative framing: the conflict is about democratic expansion rather than NATO. “This is not about NATO expansion,” one speaker repeats, followed by, “This is about democratic expansion” and “Ukraine is banning political parties… Ukraine restricts books and music… Ukraine won’t hold elections. It’s about democracy.” Still others insist the war has nothing to do with NATO, reiterating statements like “It has nothing to do with NATO” and “Nothing to do with NATO expansion,” while acknowledging that “security purposes” are claimed by some. A thread develops that Russia seeks a sphere of influence over Ukraine, and that the West’s challenges to Russian interests may have contributed to the conflict. “Hang on. I mean, the two are not mutually exclusive. Obviously, Russia has wished for a sphere of influence over Ukraine. But if the West had not challenged Russian interests so directly, I think that there there was a chance to avoid this war.” Putin’s demand for a binding pledge never to enlarge NATO is contrasted with the claim that the invasion is driven by broader ambitions. Moral condemnations appear: “The reason why Putin invaded Ukraine is because of his evil,” with references to “evil” and Putin’s goal to rebuild a Soviet empire, echoed by a comparison to Hitler. “Hitler… He’s a Hitler,” and “We’re back when the Nazis invaded Poland,” are invoked to describe Putin as a new Hitler, a butcher “trying to kill people everywhere in the world, just not Ukraine, Syria.” The discussion closes with thanks to Senator Lindsey Graham and a transition to the next segment: “Alright. Straight ahead.”

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify and preserve the core causation chain from 1990 to the present. - Retain all direct claims about NATO expansion, treaties, regime changes, and key US actions. - Highlight unique or surprising elements (intercepted calls, personal connections, blunt quotes). - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic discussions. - Do not judge the claims; present them as stated, without added qualifiers. - Translate any non-English nuances into concise English where needed. - Aim for 395–494 words. According to the speaker, the Ukraine war is not a Putin-initiated attack as framed by common narratives, but a long sequence beginning in 1990. James Baker (Secretary of State) told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward if Germany unified; Gorbachev agreed. The speaker asserts the US then “cheated” with a 1994 Clinton plan to expand NATO to Ukraine, arguing that neoconservatives took power and NATO enlargement began in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Russia initially cared little, seeing no direct border threat beyond Kaliningrad, and NATO’s bombing of Belgrade in 1999 aggravated Moscow. Putin’s leadership is described as initially pro-European; he even considered joining NATO when a mutually respectful relationship existed. After 9/11, Russia supported the US in counterterrorism, but two decisive later actions altered it. In 2002 the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the speaker says triggered US missile deployments in Eastern Europe—Aegis systems—prompting Russia to fear a decapitation strike from missiles near Moscow. He claims the US then invaded Iraq in 2003 on phony pretenses. In 2004–2005 a “soft regime change operation” in Ukraine (the first color revolution) installed leaders connected to US interests; the speaker recalls advising Ukraine’s government in the early 1990s and knows Yushchenko personally. Yanukovych won Ukraine’s 2009 election and pursued neutrality; the US pressed NATO expansion despite Ukrainian public preference for neutrality amid ethnic divides. On 22 February 2014, the US actively participated in overthrowing Yanukovych, with a leaked call between Victoria Nuland and Jeffrey Pyatt discussing a preferred next government (names like Yatsenyuk/Yats, and influence from Biden) and vowing Western support; the speaker asserts the Americans told Yanukovych to fight on, promising “we’ve got your back” but “we don’t have your front,” pushing Ukraine into front lines and contributing to a high death toll—“six hundred thousand deaths now of Ukrainians since Boris Johnson flew to Kyiv to tell them to be brave.” The speaker contends the war is misrepresented as a madman invading Europe and criticizes it as “bogus, fake history” and a PR narrative by the US government; he claims NYT suppressed his commentary and argues the US ignores prudence in favor of open-ended enlargement. He cautions against pursuing China and Taiwan, warning about nuclear risk if a power challenges the US. He notes Putin’s 2021 security proposal to bar NATO enlargement, the White House’s rejection of negotiations, and NATO’s “open door” stance, which he decries as unstable. The narrative concludes with a focus on preventing further escalation and avoiding a nuclear confrontation.

- The discussion centers on whether European actions against Russia amount to a NATO-wide escalation and could lead to direct confrontation with Russia outside Ukraine, given recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and civilian ships in the Black Sea, including a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean with reports of drones launched from Greece. Putin reportedly vowed retaliation, and the guests consider how European and U.S./NATO support for Ukraine factors into this dynamic. - Daniel Davis argues that a segment of the Western alliance wants a conflict with Russia, framing it as peace on their terms from a position of weakness. He says there is little consideration for Russia’s security requirements or a mutually acceptable peace, and that ignoring Russia’s security concerns has driven the current cycle of escalation. He notes that Western actions since 2021–2022 have ignored the Russian side and pursued war aims on Western terms, contributing to a deteriorating situation and increasing casualties on the Ukrainian side. - Davis contends that Russia has been reticent to respond to many provocations with significant actions outside Ukraine, implying that Moscow has avoided a full-scale escalation that could threaten NATO. He predicts that Putin will respond to Western strikes on Russian targets, possibly increasing pressure on Odessa and other civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, with a tit-for-tat pattern as Russia leverages its greater capacity to hit Western shipping and infrastructure. - He asserts that since 2023, the West’s approach has not reversed the battlefield dynamics; sanctions, intelligence inputs, and heavy weapon transfers have not pushed Russia out of Ukraine and have allowed NATO and European stockpiles to deplete while Russia continues to build up in key categories (missiles, air defense, logistics). He claims Europe’s commitment of large sums to Ukraine will further strain their economies and shorten their stockpiles, potentially weakening Western readiness for a wider conflict. - The guest stresses that Russia’s strategy appears to be “go slow” in Ukraine to maintain pressure without triggering a broader European or NATO intervention, while building up stockpiles to prepare for a possible expansion of war if needed. He notes that Russia has generated a stockpile advantage in missiles (including Oreshniks) and air defense that could be decisive in a broader conventional war. - The discussion covers Oreshnik missiles, with Davis explaining Russia’s aim to maximize production and use if needed, not merely deter. He argues that Western air defenses would be ineffective against such systems and that Russia’s broader stockpiling and production could outpace Western depletion. He suggests Russia’s buildup is intended to enable a decisive move if NATO or Western forces escalate, and that the West’s capacity to sustain prolonged high-tempo combat is limited. - Both speakers discuss Odessa as a likely target if Russia deems it necessary to retaliate against Western support for Ukraine, noting that recent strikes on bridges, trains, and energy facilities in the region indicate growing Russian intent to disrupt Ukraine’s rear and logistics in the event of a front-line escalation. They consider whether Russia could seize Odessa if Western concessions are not forthcoming, and whether European leaders would respond decisively if Russia moves against Ukrainian ports. - The hosts warn that Western rhetoric about a “just and lasting peace” may be misaligned with Russia’s goals and that the risk of a broader conflict—potentially involving nuclear considerations—exists if provocations continue. They caution that if the conflict widens, all sides—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States—could suffer heavy losses, and express concern about the potential for miscalculation as new weapons systems and security arrangements come into play before the year ends.

Glenn opens by noting a year has passed since Jeffrey Sachs urged Europe to adopt a realistic foreign policy that understands Russia, Europe, and the United States, and to avoid being invaded by the U.S.—even suggesting Trump could land troops in Greenland. Glenn asks how to read the current situation, including Davos and Europe’s anger at U.S. hostility, and the revived emphasis on international law. Jeffrey Sachs responds with a version of the “ride on the back of a tiger” metaphor from Kennedy, arguing Europeans forgot that the United States is an imperial power that has acted brazenly and brutally for about twenty years. He lists U.S. actions: invasions, regime changes, and reckless interference in Ukraine, and U.S. complicity in Israel’s wars across Africa and the Middle East, along with involvement in overthrowing Ukraine’s Yanukovych and other interventions. He claims Europeans were silent or complicit as the United States bombed Iran, kidnapped its president, and pursued Greenland, calling the Greenland push a grotesque power grab by Trump. He asserts New York Times recognition of U.S. imperial tendencies and says Europe’s naivete and hypocrisy are evident. He states: “The United States is thuggish, imperialistic, reckless, and that The U. S. Has left a large swath of the world in misery. Europe has been mostly compliant or complicit.” He urges Europeans to understand what the United States is about, to stop Russophobia, and to keep lines of communication with Russia open; he argues Europe’s Russophobia made it boxed in with little diplomacy with Russia or the U.S. Glenn adds that Europe’s stance mirrors a Cold War-like unity against Russia, but that the current reality differs: the U.S. does not view Russia as its main adversary, and Russophobia deepens Europe’s dependence on the U.S. Glenn notes mixed reactions at Davos, including Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney signaling a shift away from a rules-based order that privileges the West, and Macron’s private message to Trump seeking a cooperative stance on Syria, Iran, and Greenland. He remarks that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised NATO while Trump hinted that the real enemy is within NATO, highlighting the chaos. He asks if this signals a decline of the U.S. empire or NATO. Sachs discusses Carney's stance as significant: Carney’s trip to China and a dialogue with Beijing indicating diversification with China, including a Canadian-Chinese investment plan. He credits Carney with being a rare straightforward statesman and notes instability ahead. Trump’s Davos retreat from threats (notably Greenland) may have been influenced by stock-market declines, according to Sachs’ theory. He mentions a possible European concession about U.S. sovereignty over parts of Greenland, though he doubts any negotiation has been meaningful. He cites Scott Bessent’s Fox Business interview as revealing: sanctions on Iran are a form of economic statecraft designed to crush the Iranian economy, with Iran’s currency collapse and bank failures cited as evidence; Sachs condemns this as a violation of international law and UN Charter, and calls Bessent’s pride in wielding currency-destabilization as alarming. He points to sanctions against Cuba and a broader pattern of “thuggish gangster behavior” by the U.S., noting Europeans’ silence on Iran and other regimes until it backfires on them. Sachs argues Europe’s Russophobia is self-destructive, and he emphasizes that diplomacy remains possible if Germany, France, and Italy adopt a rational approach. He criticizes Germany for duplicity in NATO enlargement and Minsk II, blaming Merkel for dropped commitments, and notes that Italy shows less Russophobia and could shift toward diplomacy. He believes Central Europe and some leaders (e.g., Orban, Czech and Slovak figures) favor diplomacy, but German leadership has been weak. He stresses that Europe must avoid dismemberment and choose diplomacy with Russia, warning that continued war policy will leave Europe isolated. He closes with optimism that there remains a path forward if key European powers act differently. Glenn thanks Sachs for the discussion and ends.

Jeffrey Sachs urges peace and denounces Western leaders as warmongers, arguing the war in Ukraine began eleven years ago when the United States backed a violent coup to overthrow Viktor Yanukovych because Yanukovych sought neutrality while the US sought NATO enlargement toward Russia. He recalls that in February 1990 Germany and the United States promised Gorbachev NATO would not move eastward, and claims they cheated to dominate Russia. After the coup, Minsk II (2015) envisaged autonomy for Eastern Ukraine with Germany and France as guarantors; the US and Germany allegedly ignored this, backing Ukraine against autonomy. In March 2022 negotiations ended the war, but the US urged Ukraine to fight on and reject neutrality, with Germany, France, and the UK backing that. He advocates Ukraine neutrality, diplomacy, and collective security, noting over a million dead and urging peace now.

Let me just say that all the major conflicts can be ended straightforwardly. The Ukraine war the causes of the Ukraine war is NATO enlargement, US coup, CIA operations all over Ukraine, even the New York Times reported that one a couple of months ago. We've got to stop being in Russia's face. They know all of it. They know who paid for the Maidan demonstrators. They've got everything. We've got to stop the provocations. And yes, by the way, there was no Russian demand for territory of any kind. Crimea, they wanted a twenty five year lease, which they negotiated, president Putin, and president Yanukovych. Not territory, not a claim. No NATO, you're not getting that base. In 2021, the war could have been avoided easily by president Biden saying to president Putin, NATO will not expand to Ukraine, and I will say so. I called Jake Sullivan. He teaches at Harvard. It's all consistent, after you fail in Washington, and I said, Jake, avoid a war. There’s not gonna be a war. Open door policy for NATO. Ukraine can be stopped when the president of The United States says publicly NATO will not enlarge.

Putin initially tried to prevent the war and sought a diplomatic solution. He negotiated with Ukraine, focusing on Crimea. However, his main concern was NATO expansion into Ukraine. If Ukraine had remained neutral, the war might have been avoided. But the US and UK intervened, pressuring Ukraine to abandon negotiations. In 2022, it seemed possible for Ukraine and the West to win, but 2023 has been disastrous for Ukraine, and now it appears Russia will emerge victorious.

Speaker 0 argues that this is not an attack by Putin on Ukraine in the way it is commonly framed. The speaker references 1990, stating that on 02/09/1990 James Baker III told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward if Germany unified, and that Gorbachev agreed, ending World War II. The speaker asserts that the US then cheated starting in 1994 when Clinton signed off on a plan to expand NATO all the way to Ukraine, marking the rise of the neocons and identifying Clinton as the first agent of this. NATO expansion began in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, at which point Russia did not see a direct threat. The speaker notes the US-led bombing of Serbia in 1999 as problematic, describing it as NATO bombing Belgrade for seventy-eight straight days to break the country apart, which Russia did not like. Putin became president, and the Russians initially tolerated and complained but were largely subdued. The speaker claims Putin started out pro-European and pro-American, even suggesting joining NATO when there was some mutual respect. After 9/11 and the Afghan conflict, Russia supported the effort to root out terror. Two decisive actions are highlighted: in 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, described as perhaps the most decisive event rarely discussed in this context. This led to the US placing missile systems in Eastern Europe, which Russia views as a direct threat. The speaker mentions a soft regime change operation in Ukraine in 2004-2005, followed by Yanukovych winning the election in 2009 and becoming president in 2010 on the basis of neutrality for Ukraine. This calmed tensions because the US was pushing NATO, while Ukrainian public opinion reportedly did not want NATO membership, citing a divided country between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians and a desire to stay away from certain conflicts. In 02/22/2014, the United States allegedly participated in the overthrow of Yanukovych, described as a typical US regime change operation. The Russians supposedly intercepted a call between Victoria Nuland (then at the State Department, now at Columbia University) and Jeffrey Piot, the US ambassador to Ukraine, discussing who would be in the next government. The speaker asserts that after these events, the US said NATO would enlarge, while Putin repeatedly warned to stop, noting that promises were made not to enlarge NATO. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia are listed as having joined NATO in 2004, before the broader enlargement. The speaker accuses the US of rejecting the basic idea of not expanding NATO to Russia’s border while placing missile systems after breaking a treaty, including walking out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. On 12/15/2021, Putin allegedly proposed a draft Russia-US security agreement with no NATO enlargement, which the speaker says he communicated to the White House, urging negotiations to avoid war. The speaker claims Jake Sullivan asserted an open-door policy for NATO enlargement, calling it “bullshit,” and asserts that they refused negotiations, leading to the special military operation, with Zelensky offering neutrality and Western leaders pushing Ukraine to fight, resulting in “600,000 deaths now of Ukrainians.”

Putin claims he wants to negotiate the war, but Zelensky refuses. Historically, Ukraine has faced invasions, including from Hitler. After the Soviet Union's fall, Gorbachev allowed Germany to reunify under NATO, seeking a commitment not to expand NATO eastward. However, NATO expanded into 14 countries, and the U.S. withdrew from nuclear treaties. In 2014, the U.S. supported a government change in Ukraine, prompting Russia to annex Crimea. Zelensky, elected on a peace platform, was pressured not to sign the Minsk Accords. When Russia invaded with a small force, they sought negotiations, but U.S. intervention led to the treaty's collapse. The conflict has resulted in significant casualties, with Ukraine suffering heavily. The perception is that the U.S. appears as the aggressor in this situation.

The Ukraine conflict didn't begin with Putin's 2022 invasion; it's rooted in broken promises dating back to 1990. The US, despite assurances to Gorbachev that NATO wouldn't expand eastward, violated this agreement, starting with NATO expansion in 1999. This was followed by NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the placement of missile systems in Eastern Europe, viewed by Russia as a direct threat. Further US involvement included the 2004 and 2014 Ukrainian regime changes. Despite Putin's initial pro-Western stance and his 2021 proposal for a security agreement barring NATO expansion, the West's continued support for Ukraine escalated the conflict. The narrative of Putin as a madman is a misrepresentation; this is a complex geopolitical game with potentially devastating consequences.

Putin's intention in the war was to force Zelensky to negotiate—Neutrality. "The idea was to keep NATO. And what is NATO? It's The United States off of Russia's border. No more, no less." When the Soviet Union ended in 1991, an agreement was made that NATO will not move one inch eastward, but "the decision was taken formally in 1994 when president Clinton signed off on NATO enlargement to the East, all the way to Ukraine and into Georgia." Enlargement continued: 1999 (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic); 2004 (Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia). Putin said "stop" in 02/2007; in 02/2008, "The United States jammed down Europe's throat enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and to Georgia." 02/2010, Yanukovych neutrality; US overthrow in 2014; Minsk accords; "autonomy for the Russian speaking regions" in the East. "Blinken told Lavrov in January 2022, The United States reserves the right to put missile systems wherever it wants." The war started; "Ukraine walked away unilaterally from a near agreement" because "The United States told them to." It's the pure proxy war; and "a million Ukrainians have died or been severely"

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.