reSee.it - Related Video Feed

The speaker states they are not defending Putin, but believes he has done a great job for Russia, better than any German leader. They claim Germany is declining while Russia is rising, and Germans should be angry at their own leaders instead of Putin. The speaker questions why Putin is considered a war criminal, while Angela Merkel, who they claim wrecked Germany through mass migration, is not. They assert Merkel let millions of people into Germany, which hasn't worked, and the country will not recover in the speaker's or the listener's lifetime.

Nikolay Petro and Gwen were discussing the Munich Security Conference and the broader shift in global order. The core theme is the destruction or breakdown of the post–Cold War order as the world moves toward multipolarity, with the United States and Europe following diverging paths. - The transition to multipolarity is described as chaos and a vacuum of strategic thinking. From a European perspective, this is an unwanted transition into something unfamiliar, while the US debates a more pragmatic approach that may bypass traditional institutions to position itself favorably. The multipolar world would be more democratic, with more voices in actual discussion of each nation’s needs and contributions, in contrast to the hegemonic, rules-based order. - The concept of multipolarity presumes multiple poles of interest. Nations at the top of the old order feel uncomfortable; they had a lead dog (the United States) and knew where they were going. Now the lead dog may be wandering, and the rest are lost. There’s a push to engage voices from the global South, or the global majority, though the term “global South” is viewed as imprecise. - At Munich, Kaia Kallas and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Mertz) urged order to avoid chaos. Kallas favored restoring or preserving the structures of the past, arguing the European Union should reconnect with the US and dominate collectively as the political West. Mertz used aggressive language, saying Germany’s army must be the most powerful in Europe and that the war in Ukraine will end only when Russia is exhausted economically and militarily; he argued Europe imposed unheard-of losses on Russia. - In response, the US role in Munich was anticipated to feature Marco Rubio as the delegation head, signaling a security-focused agenda rather than deep internal European discourse. The discussion suggested the US may push a strategy of returning to or reshaping a hegemonic order, pressuring Europe to align with American priorities, and highlighting that the old order is over. - There is a perception of internal German political dynamics: the rise of the anti-establishment party (IFD) could challenge the current SPD/CSU coalition, potentially altering the German stance on Russia and Europe’s strategy toward Moscow. The possibility exists that internal German shifts could counter aggressive German policy toward Russia. - In Europe, there is a tension between those who want to sacrifice more national autonomy to please the US and those who advocate diversifying ties to avoid total dependence on Washington. In practice, EU policy has often mirrored US priorities, thereby delaying a truly autonomous European strategy. - The EU’s foreign policy structure remains weak due to political diversity among member states, the need for cooperation with national governments, and resistance to surrendering power to Brussels. There is no cohesive grand strategy within the EU, making it hard to present a unified vision in a multipolar world. The EU’s reliance on crisis-driven centralization contrasts with those internal contradictions. - Ukraine’s war exposed tensions in Europe’s cohesion. Initially, there was a rallying effect and unified front against Russia, aided by US support, aiming for a rapid Russian defeat. Now the EU’s rhetoric shifts toward seeking a ceasefire and preserving what remains of Ukraine, labeling victory in terms of saving Ukraine rather than expelling Russia. EU funding for Ukraine—about €90 billion over two years—may be insufficient, with Ukraine claiming higher needs. - The discussion suggested that European leadership’s view of Russia and Putin is unstable: some European circles believe Russia could collapse economically, while others see Russia’s leadership as capable of countermeasures. Reports of France reestablishing high-level political contacts with Russia were noted as part of this flux. - The conversation contrasted backward-looking US/EU visions with a forward-looking multipolar vision promoted by BRICS, especially Russia, which could be more promising due to its forward outlook. The EU, dominated by internal divisions, struggles to articulate an autonomous multipolar path, while the United States appears intent on reviving its dominant position and reshaping the international order, sometimes in ways that delay the shift to multipolarity. - Overall, the speakers highlighted a shared but backward-looking orientation between the EU and the US, versus a forward-looking, multipolar alternative; they also underscored the strategic vacuum, internal European divisions, and the continuing tug-of-war between attempting to restore past structures and embracing a new global arrangement.

As European economies decline, young people can't afford homes, and energy costs are much higher, leading to a declining standard of living and low birth rates, which is a sign of civilizational collapse. There's a lot of rage in Europe, and the Russia-Ukraine war serves as a relief valve for European leaders to blame Putin. The UK's response to fighting a new war against Russia is sad because Russia could easily defeat the UK. Turning the population's rage towards Russia distracts from domestic issues. Intelligence sources believe Ukrainians were behind the Nord Stream pipeline attack.

- Democrats' spending caused inflation, and Biden's administration ignited global unrest after a peaceful period under Trump. Biden's Afghanistan withdrawal was botched, and NATO expansion talks provoked Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Opportunities for peace were rejected, leading to a prolonged war with mass casualties and depleted US stockpiles. - The US has a history of military interventions, including the bombing of Belgrade, and illegal wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, as well as involvement in the 2014 coup in Kyiv. The US government cannot be trusted. - NATO expansion was promised not to move "one inch eastward" but Clinton signed off on plans to expand NATO to Ukraine. The US unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, leading to missile systems in Eastern Europe that Russia views as a threat. - Putin sought to force Ukraine to negotiate neutrality, aiming to keep NATO off Russia's border. The US rejected negotiations, and a draft Russia-US security agreement proposing no NATO enlargement. - Germany has aligned with the US, supporting NATO expansion, but previously had an independent foreign policy. Merkel knew NATO expansion was a bad idea but gave in to US pressure. - The US is in a hot war with Russia, with US personnel on the ground in Ukraine. Russia could disable critical American infrastructure. - The war in Ukraine is a US-Russia conflict provoked by the US with the aim of NATO enlargement. The American people have been told the opposite. - The war started in 2014 with US involvement in the overthrow of Ukraine's government. The US rejected off-ramps and continues to fund the war, resulting in Ukrainian deaths and territorial losses. - The US should negotiate with Russia, acknowledging mutual security concerns and halting NATO enlargement. - The US is trying to destroy Russia through CIA operations in Ukraine. Russia is defending its right to survive. - Globalists aim to exploit Ukraine's resources and destroy Russia. The BRICS nations are moving towards a gold-backed currency. - The US has invested billions in Ukraine since 1991 to support a democratic government. Zelenskyy's team is adding fuel to the fire. - The US blew up the Nord Stream pipeline, as promised by Biden. - The US is turning Ukraine into a de facto member of NATO.

Speaker 0 describes Zelensky as an American hero and contrasts his public image with the underlying narrative. He explains Zelensky was totally apolitical, an outsider with no government experience, a comedian, and the star of a planned TV show called Servant of the People. In the show, the main character creates a YouTube video that calls out oligarchs and corruption, becomes popular, and is drafted as a protest candidate who eventually becomes president. In real life, the TV show is supported by oligarch Kolomoisky, who owned the channel and did a large, nonstop promotional push to make it the number one show, including primetime slots, ads, and crossovers with the news. In 2018, a year before the show ended, Zelensky formed a political party named Servant of the People, the same title as the show, and secretly produced another season of the show. In April 2019, he announced his candidacy on Instagram, with no campaign, no rallies, no real platform, and he skipped presidential debates; his few early press conferences were poor. Kolomoisky’s channel provided Zelensky with endless airtime and favorable polls while attacking his enemies. Speaker 0 continues that US intelligence agencies, CIA and NSA, helped by funding democracy campaigns in Ukraine—reportedly around $5 billion—funneled through NGOs, with USAID embedding advisers in Zelensky’s organization to assist the campaign. On election day, Zelensky wins with 73% of the vote. Afterward, the war with Russia occurs, he declares martial law, and elections are ended. An election in 2024 is anticipated as the result of democracy money. He asserts Zelensky is an actor in a carefully designed television show—“a construct,” akin to Epstein—an created entity that works, and asks what Americans think about his popularity. Speaker 1 responds that Americans are disappointed by the ongoing war and deaths, noting that the war’s human cost is a major failure of promises from the Trump administration, who claimed he would resolve it in 24 hours. He adds that conscripting 60-year-old men and Americans and others going to fight are part of the situation. He states that the Ukraine narrative, and wars in general, are not organic: wars like this are driven by demands for primacy, control, and wealth, rather than being spontaneous. He reflects that Putin didn’t suddenly decide to invade; similarly, the broader pattern of power is not organic. He notes the Russian soldiers were told they would be welcomed and that they had dress uniforms, and compares to expectations in Iraq, where it was promised that Iraqis would welcome forces. He asks what the Ukraine situation is really about, and comments that human war reduces to a few centers of power like NATO, China, the Soviet bloc, and oil-producing countries, ultimately converging to two leaders in a room who must kill each other, as part of the decay of empire, with the U.S. maintaining about 760 overseas military bases.

The speaker discusses the Alternative for Germany (AFD) party's experiences, claiming the party has faced media labeling, social exclusion, and economic hardship for its members. They state that the AFD's rise in popularity has led to increased institutional measures against them, including being labeled as extremist by the intelligence service. The speaker claims that the EU is a Soviet-style bureaucratic system disturbing free markets and democratic processes. They thank Elon Musk for providing an alternative to mainstream media, which they allege is government-funded and biased. They believe Germany is on the wrong path, particularly regarding energy policy and its stance on the Ukraine conflict. The speaker worries about the possibility of the AFD being banned and its leaders imprisoned, but remains hopeful that the German people will see through what they describe as a facade. They express concern over the undermining of democratic processes and the exclusion of the AFD from parliamentary representation.

Patrick Baab and the host discuss the perceived erosion of freedom of expression in Europe and the role of governments and institutions in pressuring speech. - Baab asserts that there is “no freedom of speech in the EU anymore,” citing a 160-page US Congress report published in February that allegedly finds the EU Commission created a system of complete censorship across the European Union. The report states the EU regime “pressured platforms in the Internet to suppress lawful speech, including speech that was true simply because it was politically inconvenient,” and that the Commission is transforming itself “into a censorship authority against democracy.” - The discussion moves to Jacques Baud (spelled Baud by Baab, sometimes Jacques Baud), a Swiss colonel and analyst who argued that the war in Ukraine had been provoked. Baab notes Baud was sanctioned by the EU, with consequences including travel bans, frozen assets, and limited monthly food funds (€500). Baud cannot travel to Switzerland; his bank accounts and property are frozen, and neighbors reportedly cook for him. Baab calls these measures extralegal, asserting they punish a person for an argument, not for crimes, and claims such sanctions illustrate a mechanism to suppress dissent. - Baab elaborates that Baud’s sanction is part of a broader pattern: “extralegal sanctions” against multiple individuals (Baud and 58 others) within and partly outside the EU, aimed at silencing those who challenge NATO or EU narratives. He argues this signals a “death of freedom” and a move to shut mouths through sanctions. - The host asks if the media’s shift toward propaganda is temporary or permanent. Baab responds that the transformation is structural: democracy in Europe is becoming anti-democratic and warmongering despotism. He cites Viktor Orban’s view that the EU intends to wage war against Russia, with propaganda and censorship as two sides of the same coin to close public debate. Baab says the war will be ugly, as Russia has warned it could escalate to nuclear conflict, and ties this to investments in Ukraine (Shell deal) that were lost when territories changed hands, implying economic motivations behind policy and casualties for profits. - The conversation turns to self-censorship. Baab describes widespread fear among journalists and academics; many refused to join a board intended to assist Baud, fearing repercussions. He cites a US Congress report alleging the EU manipulated eight elections, including Romania, Slovakia, and France. He also notes the EU Commission’s engagement with major platforms (Meta, Google, TikTok, X, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, Rumble, Reddit, OpenAI) to enforce content management under EU rules, threatening sanctions if not compliant. - Reputational attacks against critics are discussed. Baab shares experiences of smear campaigns, such as being misrepresented as a “Putin poll watcher” in Germany, and notes that state- and EU-funded NGOs sometimes amplify misinformation. He argues mainstream media generally ignores these issues, turning to “new media” and independent outlets as alternatives for information. - On Germany specifically, Baab identifies EU-level figures (German-origin leaders) who drive censorship: Ursula von der Leyen as EU Commission President (authorized COVID-19 disinformation monitoring), Vera Jorova (values and transparency), Thierry Breton (pressures on platforms), Prabhat Agarwal (Digital Services Act enforcement), and Renate Künast (translating DSA into practice). He says national governments decide sanctions but pass the burden to Brussels, creating a “kickback game.” He notes the German Bundestag extended EU sanctions into national law, punishing any helper of a sanctioned person with up to ten years’ imprisonment. - For optimism, Baab says Europe needs external help, such as the US Congress report, and citizens must seek alternative information sources and organize to defend democratic rights, including voting for different parties. He suggests that without broad public pushback, the propaganda system will persist. - The discussion closes with reflections on broader geopolitical dynamics, warnings about a multipolar world, and a dystopian vision of a Europe dominated by conflict and state control, with elites colluding with Western powers at the expense of ordinary citizens.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss Trump’s political project, the trajectory of US capitalism, and how Europe is adjusting to a perceived decline of Western hegemon. - Trump’s politics are, in Wolff’s view, more traditional Republican strategy than a wholesale break with the past. The core priority remains to “make money for the top one to 5%” of people—corporate executives and the employer class that the US census identifies as about 3% of the population. The first-term flagship was the 2017 tax cuts for corporations and wealthier individuals; in the second term, the “big beautiful tax bill” of April likewise serves the core financial base before other issues like immigration or tariffs. - Trump’s more radical or theatrical moves—anti-immigrant campaigns, ICE enforcement, heightened rhetoric toward immigrants, and provocative international actions—are political theater intended to mobilize the traditional Republican coalition and reassure the business constituency. This theater targets the mass voting blocs, while the core funders provide the money to sustain the spectacle. - The domestic political dynamic: while a sizable segment of his base remains supportive, there is growing election-time anxiety within the business coalition and among some voters who are unsettled by his handling of events, including the Epstein scandal. Still, his base numbers hover around 30–35%, giving him a platform to push ahead, though the broader economic critique remains largely taboo in US politics across parties. - The fundamental economic problem: US decline as a structural issue is not debated openly by Trump’s circle or rival parties; the decline persists as China continues to outpace the US in growth. Even with tariffs, China redirected exports to other markets, maintaining a large overall export footprint and signaling the limits of unilateral US pressure. - The “tribute economy” concept: Trump’s international approach can be read as trying to convert other countries into tributaries—using tariffs, coercive measures, and diplomacy to extract relative gains from others while protecting US interests. This aligns with a broader narrative Wolff attributes to a waning hegemon resorting to coercive leverage rather than genuine economic strategy. - Andrew Jackson frame vs. reality: Trump’s use of a Jacksonian nationalist rhetoric is a superficial political device, not a deep historical redefinition. The honest historical view is that Trump adopts a veneer of Jacksonianism to justify a broader, conventional Republican agenda oriented toward the business class, while the world has changed in ways that the Jacksonian frame cannot fully accommodate. - The European reaction: Europe faces a difficult, shrinking trajectory. Wolff argues Europeans are increasingly likely to become an adjunct to the United States, with growth constrained by dependence on outside high-tech powerhouses (the US and China), shrinking industry from auto to other sectors, and rising social strain as welfare states come under pressure. - European policy implications: leaders may resort to increased militarization and a stronger anti-Russia stance to justify repression and social control at home, even as Russia’s actual military threat is overstated as a rationale. Wolff foresees growing social fragmentation, a potential class split between ruling elites and the working/middle classes, and the risk that external threats become a justification for expanding state power and military spending. - A longer arc: Wolff suggests that the current European and American trajectories reflect a broader decline of liberal hegemonies post-World War II. The solution would not be to return to a full Cold War-style confrontation but to acknowledge new multipolar realities, diversify alliances, and address domestic social needs rather than pursuing an ever-expanding militarized security paradigm. - The Minneapolis example and domestic politics: events like the ICE deployment in Minneapolis reveal a troubling trend toward heavy-handed, performative state power that could backfire politically for Trump, especially as more Republicans question Epstein-related narratives and other scandal-driven headlines intensify. - In Europe, the declining empire dynamic suggests a potential return to earlier anti-establishment currents, but leaders face the dilemma of maintaining welfare states while contending with reduced imperial leverage. The conversation anticipates rising social tensions unless new economic strategies and political alignments emerge that recognize changing power structures.

Glenn opens by noting a year has passed since Jeffrey Sachs urged Europe to adopt a realistic foreign policy that understands Russia, Europe, and the United States, and to avoid being invaded by the U.S.—even suggesting Trump could land troops in Greenland. Glenn asks how to read the current situation, including Davos and Europe’s anger at U.S. hostility, and the revived emphasis on international law. Jeffrey Sachs responds with a version of the “ride on the back of a tiger” metaphor from Kennedy, arguing Europeans forgot that the United States is an imperial power that has acted brazenly and brutally for about twenty years. He lists U.S. actions: invasions, regime changes, and reckless interference in Ukraine, and U.S. complicity in Israel’s wars across Africa and the Middle East, along with involvement in overthrowing Ukraine’s Yanukovych and other interventions. He claims Europeans were silent or complicit as the United States bombed Iran, kidnapped its president, and pursued Greenland, calling the Greenland push a grotesque power grab by Trump. He asserts New York Times recognition of U.S. imperial tendencies and says Europe’s naivete and hypocrisy are evident. He states: “The United States is thuggish, imperialistic, reckless, and that The U. S. Has left a large swath of the world in misery. Europe has been mostly compliant or complicit.” He urges Europeans to understand what the United States is about, to stop Russophobia, and to keep lines of communication with Russia open; he argues Europe’s Russophobia made it boxed in with little diplomacy with Russia or the U.S. Glenn adds that Europe’s stance mirrors a Cold War-like unity against Russia, but that the current reality differs: the U.S. does not view Russia as its main adversary, and Russophobia deepens Europe’s dependence on the U.S. Glenn notes mixed reactions at Davos, including Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney signaling a shift away from a rules-based order that privileges the West, and Macron’s private message to Trump seeking a cooperative stance on Syria, Iran, and Greenland. He remarks that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised NATO while Trump hinted that the real enemy is within NATO, highlighting the chaos. He asks if this signals a decline of the U.S. empire or NATO. Sachs discusses Carney's stance as significant: Carney’s trip to China and a dialogue with Beijing indicating diversification with China, including a Canadian-Chinese investment plan. He credits Carney with being a rare straightforward statesman and notes instability ahead. Trump’s Davos retreat from threats (notably Greenland) may have been influenced by stock-market declines, according to Sachs’ theory. He mentions a possible European concession about U.S. sovereignty over parts of Greenland, though he doubts any negotiation has been meaningful. He cites Scott Bessent’s Fox Business interview as revealing: sanctions on Iran are a form of economic statecraft designed to crush the Iranian economy, with Iran’s currency collapse and bank failures cited as evidence; Sachs condemns this as a violation of international law and UN Charter, and calls Bessent’s pride in wielding currency-destabilization as alarming. He points to sanctions against Cuba and a broader pattern of “thuggish gangster behavior” by the U.S., noting Europeans’ silence on Iran and other regimes until it backfires on them. Sachs argues Europe’s Russophobia is self-destructive, and he emphasizes that diplomacy remains possible if Germany, France, and Italy adopt a rational approach. He criticizes Germany for duplicity in NATO enlargement and Minsk II, blaming Merkel for dropped commitments, and notes that Italy shows less Russophobia and could shift toward diplomacy. He believes Central Europe and some leaders (e.g., Orban, Czech and Slovak figures) favor diplomacy, but German leadership has been weak. He stresses that Europe must avoid dismemberment and choose diplomacy with Russia, warning that continued war policy will leave Europe isolated. He closes with optimism that there remains a path forward if key European powers act differently. Glenn thanks Sachs for the discussion and ends.

Speaker 1 argues there is a political revolution underway, stating: "The Germans have been on the national apology tour for eighty years, apologizing to everyone in sight for all the terrible evil things they did and for, quote, unquote, starting the second World War." He adds: "The truth is the Germans did not start the second World War." He claims: "Everything that happened in Germany was a reaction to communism, Bolshevism in Russia, the emergence of Stalin's Russia, and the fear of communism, and the mass murder programs in the Soviet Union and the interwar years." He notes: "The Germans and they're not the only ones. Virtually all the Europeans were horrified by it." He contends this is the phony narrative that was created, that this happened exclusively in a vacuum, that Hitler woke up and decided to start a world war, and calls it "phony" and "misleading" and "fundamentally wrong." He concludes: "The Germans need to put an end to the apology tour." He adds: "Perhaps they will because it's gotten them into this position they are now." "They are now a nation living on on the precipice of poverty and destruction."

The speaker discusses the Alternative for Germany (AFD) party's experience with media labeling them as right-wing extremists, leading to social exclusion and economic hardship for party members. Despite this, the AFD has grown in popularity, reaching 26% in polls and over 40% in Eastern Germany. The speaker criticizes Germany's intelligence service for labeling the AFD as extremist for holding conservative views. They also express concern over the EU's bureaucratic system and its impact on democratic processes. The speaker thanks Elon Musk for providing an alternative to mainstream media, which they claim is government-funded and biased. They lament Germany's energy policy, particularly the shutdown of nuclear power plants, and criticize Chancellor Merkel's green policies. The speaker believes the AFD represents normal conservative values and offers a perspective of freedom and wealth. They express worry about the possibility of the party being banned and its leaders imprisoned, drawing parallels to situations in Romania and the treatment of Donald Trump. They advocate for peace in Ukraine and criticize Germany's support for the war.

The speaker believes European globalist elites are in a panic because they realize the U.S. is no longer following the same path, and there is no future in Ukraine. Ukraine will never be a NATO member, and no one will go to war with Russia. European armies are "boutique forces" not designed for serious war. The leaked German military discussion is tragic and suggests a decline in professionalism. The conversation was amateurish, with no appreciation for the gravity of providing Taurus missiles to Ukraine, which risks a serious war by attacking Russian territory with Western assistance. Putin has made it clear that Berlin could face similar attacks if such actions occur.

The United States is in a state of decline, with no clear identity. Monuments are being defaced and destroyed, erasing our heritage. In Germany, Olaf Schulz is using the pretext of preparing for a fight with Russia to suppress opposition within the country. Similar fates await other Western governments, as their populations have had enough and will replace them with new leaders who are not like the current ones.

Alexander McCurryst interviews Alexander McCurryst podcast host Alexander McCurryst (“the Duran” host Glenn) about European and British political crises. Alexander McCurryst argues that across Europe there is a “denationalized political elite” that concentrates on foreign policy—especially Russia and the conflict in Ukraine—while losing attention to accumulating domestic problems. He connects this disengagement to declining approval ratings, weakening of opposition, and rising political volatility. On Britain specifically, he says the crisis stems from Prime Minister Kirst Palmer and the broader leadership being narrowly focused on “foreign policy” framed euphemistically, largely centered on Russia, Ukraine, and wider European integration rather than basic British concerns. He characterizes Palmer as constantly traveling abroad and “never hear kir,” implying disengagement from British problems. He argues that the established political elite is unlikely to change course even if Palmer’s time as prime minister ends, because successors would be expected to continue the same approach while only trying to become more popular. Regarding Nigel Farage and Reform, Alexander McCurryst says Farage comes from outside the elite and has previously suggested changes to British foreign policy, including writing that the Ukraine war was provoked by actions taken by the West. However, he argues that as Farage gets closer to power he talks more like the elite does—especially on relations with Russia and Europe—and he does not believe Farage would have the political authority or skills to carry out the major sea change required. He adds that Farage’s priorities include attracting defections from Conservative Party elites and that the link between foreign policy and the domestic policy crisis is not understood. Alexander McCurryst then describes Britain’s economic stagnation as particularly severe. He points to over-investment in the financial system in the 1980s, deindustrialization, reliance on North Sea oil, and exposure after the 2008 period as a “one-dimensional economy” lacking strategic depth. He lists long-running outcomes since 2008: flat or falling living standards, flat output, rising debt as government costs increase, rising taxes, and widening budget and trade deficits. He also claims Britain is more boxed in to the foreign-policy consensus than other European countries, lacking examples of strong domestic challengers akin to parties like National Rally, left-wing forces such as Melenchon, or Italy’s Salvini. He argues that this combination creates rising public anger and exasperation and could lead to sudden, sharper political shifts that are not moderated by consensus, likening Britain to a pressure cooker approaching an “almost pre revolutionary situation.” He suggests legitimacy crises are expanding across Europe and sees administrative and repressive measures as signs of insecurity and inability to adapt. The discussion turns to Germany as a comparative case. Glenn highlights the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as Germany’s most popular party, described as relatively new, and claims Chancellor Blackrock Mertz is less popular than Palmer. Glenn argues Germany is changing in ways that contradict post–World War II lessons and mentions targeting the opposition, including describing AfD as an extremist organization by intelligence services. Alexander McCurryst responds that in both Britain and Germany these legitimacy crises show the political system cannot adapt and tries to manage instability through repressive tools. He contrasts Germany and Britain’s historical orientation toward Russia: Germany is described as moving against the grain of policies aiming for stability with Russia, including “Ostpolitik” approaches associated with earlier decades, while Britain is described as having an “almost surfeit of policy” anchored in founding myths. Glenn then asks about France and other smaller states, mentioning attempts to cancel election results in Romania, a new election in Bulgaria, celebration of a possible end to Orban in Hungary that did not produce profound change, and Slovakia “holding the line.” Alexander McCurryst says smaller countries show more political agency and vitality partly because they have fewer security-state constraints and are easier for people to organize, but argues big countries still determine European direction. He lists Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Britain as decisive, while smaller states influence dialogue but cannot change overall direction alone. On diplomacy with Russia, Glenn notes a shift in rhetoric after years of arguing “weapons are the path to peace” and boycotting diplomacy, and asks whether it will go anywhere. Alexander McCurryst says events are pressing the elites but that they are not acting with conviction. He claims that by May they are still not agreed on who will lead negotiations with Russians and have not defined realistic objectives. He cites an episode where Macron sent two people to Moscow and says the Russians responded that it was not negotiation but a one-way dialogue. He argues that without deciding what to talk about and who represents Europe, talks cannot advance. Glenn adds that Europeans want a “seat at the table” but refuse to talk to Russia, citing Kaya Kallas’s statements about not talking to Putin and Russia being broken up into smaller countries. Alexander McCurryst agrees that the mindset driving domestic crisis also affects foreign-policy decision-making: elites insist their values must prevail and retreat into values language that blocks real solutions. He claims Western media narratives increasingly depict Ukraine as winning and portrays recurring stories about Putin being sick or dying and corruption in Ukraine as proof democracy is working, describing this as a “hope strategy.” Finally, Alexander McCurryst connects the crisis to Europe losing its place in the world and becoming less coherent with the United States. He argues Britain’s belief it remains a great power despite decline amplifies the struggle with Russia. He warns that without understanding with Russia Europe risks becoming a “backwater.” He says Europe still has time to change but that goodwill in Russia has been lost and that Russia controls the “gateway” to Eurasia. He concludes that despair should be avoided, claiming Europe is near a “tipping point,” with Britain and Germany already in crises and elections in France potentially bringing faster change, but that Europe must adapt to a post-American world; otherwise it risks remaining a small region left behind.

Speaker 0 argues there is a 'Soviet Union type bureaucratic system' that 'disturbs free markets' and 'democratic processes.' He says 'the media are not neutral anymore' and thanks Elon Musk for 'buying x to give people the chance to inform themselves differently than from mainstream media,' claiming 'the mainstream media... are all paid by our government.' He recalls Merkel's remark 'there are no alternatives to my politics' and links it to the party name 'Alternative for Germany.' The party has been labeled 'extremist' 'on probation,' then 'on suspicion,' now 'certified extremist,' with debanking and a possible ban. Polls show AfD rising to '21% almost' then '25, 26%,' 'double as strong as the CDU' in the East, 'over 40%.' He cites energy policy as destroying infrastructure: 'the last six were switched off' and 'gas pipelines... ripped out.' He cites Tocqueville and warns of worst-case bans and imprisonment, urging peaceful democratic renewal.

Yanis Orofakis and Glenn critique the trajectory of Europe and the European Union, arguing that Europe is on a path of long-term decline and stagnation financially, ecologically, and morally. They contend that the roots of current problems go back to the 2008 crisis, describing the response as a coup that bailed out banks and shifted losses onto weak taxpayers, with austerity imposed on the majority and “socialism for the bankers” justified in the name of European solidarity. Orofakis recounts his experience negotiating with the European Commission during Greece’s debt crisis, noting that the Commission was sidelined by a bureaucracy led by figures like Thomas Wieser, and that decisions were driven by a cabal aligned with Berlin to protect the taxpayers, especially in weaker economies. He asserts that this approach caused a collapse of aggregate demand, a lack of private investment, and a rapid rise in asset prices while wages and pensions fell, contributing to deindustrialization, including in Germany. He identifies the 2008 episode as an inflection point that began a broader European decline, with the ECB’s trillions not translating into productive investment. Instead, funds were used by corporations to buy back shares, while real investment stagnated. This dynamic, he argues, has fragmented the eurozone and undermined its viability, with Germany’s deindustrialization and a political class unable to articulate a coherent strategy for the Eurozone’s future. He points to energy and industrial policy shortcomings, and stresses that Germany’s pursuit of a higher value-added economy is undermined by a lack of demand for such products in Europe, leading to production shifts into arms manufacturing (e.g., Rheinmetall) as a stopgap for deindustrialization. On Germany specifically, Orofakis argues that German leaders realized austerity would wound their own economy, yet persisted, revealing a self-inflicted wound that could empower far-right currents. He cites Volkswagen’s production shifts and the use of Leopard tanks as evidence of a war-driven economic distortion, and he contends that ongoing war in Ukraine is leveraged to justify rearmament and a stalled industrial policy with no robust European plan for peace or diplomacy. Regarding Europe’s cohesion, he distinguishes between popular support for a common European space (freedom of movement, Erasmus) and the EU’s actual creation as a cartel of big business under U.S. influence. He argues the EU’s DNA is tied to NATO and U.S. strategic interests, with the Bretton Woods era and the dollar’s dominance providing macroeconomic stability that Europe increasingly lacks as a consequence of the dollar-based system’s erosion. The post-2008 decoupling from the U.S. is highlighted, with Trump’s tariffs framed as evidence that Europe can no longer rely on a seamless U.S. security and economic framework. Orofakis contends that the EU’s governance is characterized by clueless leadership and a lack of a credible industrial or strategic plan. He cites the absence of a banking union with a common deposit insurance, and the failure to implement a central fiscal mechanism like a European Investment Bank-supported growth program using ECB-backed bonds. He emphasizes the need for a peace-and-security agenda with Russia and Ukraine, criticizing those who demonize Russia and call for endless war without proposing a path to peace. In conclusion, while optimism is cautious, they argue that collective rational action could avert a century of humiliation. They advocate overthrowing current leadership to pursue a rational, united European strategy that prioritizes peace, sovereign economic policy, and a viable security architecture, rather than allegiance to a failed status quo.

Ray McGovern emphasizes the erosion of the post-World War II security architecture, especially the U.S.-led system that emerged after the Cold War and aimed to globalize the Transatlantic Partnership. He argues that this expansion has strained the United States economically, militarily, and institutionally, and that security has become more volatile as empires exhaust both capabilities and moral legitimacy. He uses NATO’s history to illustrate how shifting perceptions of threat—historically the Soviet menace versus modern Russian and German sensitivities—shape alliance dynamics. He notes that many Americans were taught a one-sided narrative: NATO was created to contain the Warsaw Pact, while the Soviets also felt threatened by Western actions. He recalls his own indoctrination, the evolution of NATO, and the Warsaw Pact’s creation in response to West German NATO entry in 1955, explaining that “security is indivisible” and that each side’s fears drive the other’s behavior. He observes that polls show the U.S. losing its status as Russia’s main adversary, with Germany becoming the more prominent concern, which complicates the security calculus. Speaker 0 adds historical context, referencing John Lewis Gaddis and the Cold War’s security competition, where blocs prompted mutual insecurity. He discusses the Helsinki Accords and the attempt to reduce security competition, contrasting that with post-Cold War optimism that NATO expansion would stabilize Europe. He notes opposition among some American leaders to expanding NATO and argues that the Ukraine conflict reveals a problematic belief in “force for good” through military blocs, suggesting that expanded NATO has contributed to the current crisis rather than preventing it. He highlights the potential consequences of continued reliance on NATO and U.S. guarantees, questioning the credibility of Article 5 guarantees in an era of waning U.S. commitment. Speaker 1 recounts his experiences in Munich (1968) with Radio Free Europe and his opposition to encouraging Czech resistance to Soviet tanks, arguing that the Brezhnev Doctrine has a modern analogue in Ukraine. He describes the sequence leading to Crimea’s annexation, including the 2014 Maidan events, Western negotiations (Minsk Accords), and the dynamic between Western leaders and Putin. He argues that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine arose from a perception of NATO encroachment and Western deceit, asserting that Moscow’s actions were a response to attempts to place Ukraine in NATO orbit and to secure a vital Black Sea port. He states that Russia halted further invasions in 2022 after Ukrainian negotiations to avoid NATO membership and a ceasefire, and he contends that Western actors, including Boris Johnson, pressured Ukraine to continue fighting. Speaker 0 contends that the war’s conduct was shaped by Western promises and the perception that NATO’s expansion would secure democracy. He criticizes European leaders like Kaya Kaltois (Kallas) and Zakharova’s exchange to illustrate the political theater around NATO and European security. He stresses that European leaders’ rhetoric—such as calls for “no Russian red lines”—and the reliance on U.S. military power created incentives for continued conflict. He also critiques the influence of the military-industrial complex, warning that profiteering from defense production drives war. Speaker 1 emphasizes the CIA’s dual role: one branch “for lying to the public” and overthrowing governments, and another “analysis division” that historically aimed to tell the truth. He cites the 2007 unanimous intelligence assessment that Iran had stopped working on a nuclear weapon at the end of 2003 and had not resumed, noting that later officials removed or reframed statements about immediate threats. He references George W. Bush’s admission that the 2007 estimate deprived him of a military option, and he points to Tulsi Gabbard’s 2019-2024 reluctance to label Iran as an imminent threat. He argues Iran is not a direct threat to the United States but is linked to Israel and regional dynamics, including Netanyahu’s role and the 2003-2007 Iran/Iraq/Israel calculus. He mentions Joe Kent’s resignation as a dissenting voice against continued war in Iran, suggesting that some military leaders and officials pushed back against aggressive policy. Speaker 0 wraps by noting the evolving U.S.-Israel relationship and the need for responsible diplomacy. He highlights the broader international realignment: NATO’s credibility waning, Europe reassessing security guarantees, and potential shifts in alliances with the Gulf States and Asia. He closes with a cautious note that genuine diplomatic leadership and intelligent intelligence analysis could help establish a more stable order, rather than perpetuating disruptive escalation.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn unpack how European security architecture evolved and why current moves toward a Europe-centered NATO, possibly including Ukraine and excluding Russia, look so perilous. - Sachs recounts a historic 1990 opportunity offered by Mikhail Gorbachev: a “common European home” stretching from Rotterdam to Vladivostok, with internal Soviet reforms, demilitarization, and, crucially, an end to NATO expansion. The promise by Germany and the United States in pursuit of German reunification was that “NATO would not move one inch eastward.” This indivisible-security concept echoed the Helsinki final act: no country would join an alliance threatening others. Yet NATO expanded, despite that explicit commitment, and that expansion contributed to the current Ukraine conflict. - Two motives behind NATO enlargement are highlighted. First, to keep the United States in Europe as a security defender, especially for Central and Eastern European states emerging from Soviet domination, which wanted continued U.S. protection despite no evident external threat. Second, the United States used NATO enlargement as a tool for projecting American power in a unipolar world after the Soviet collapse, turning NATO into the military branch of U.S. overseas power and serving a broader hegemonic aim. - Brzezinski’s influence is emphasized: in The Grand Chessboard (1997), he argued Eurasia centered on Ukraine; “he who controls Ukraine controls Eurasia.” Brzezinski advocated expanding Europe and NATO to diminish Russia, envisioning a weakened or divided Russia. This framed Ukraine as a geopolitical prize, with Ukraine’s joining NATO seen as a strategy to prevent a revived Russian power. - The expansion waves are traced: 1999 brought Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic; 2004 added seven states including the Baltic states and Romania; 2008 and the Bucharest summit sparked a pledge that Ukraine and Georgia would join NATO, a timetable Merkel later resisted but ultimately yielded to U.S. pressure. The 2004 expansion followed the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, further destabilizing the nuclear balance and fueling Russian resentment. - The Maidan coup of 2014 in Ukraine, aided by Western support, brought to power a government that favored NATO alignment, intensifying Russian pushback and making Europe’s pro-NATO stance more central to policy, even as Russia resisted. The aim was to bring Ukraine into NATO, which Sachs argues was not defense-driven but an assertion of American hegemony. - Sachs contrasts two mindsets: Eastern Europe’s Russophobia, rooted in decades of Soviet domination, especially among the Baltic states and Poland, driving a hardline stance; and a German role that has shifted from a historic commitment to make peace with Russia (Austrian-style realpolitik) to endorsing NATO expansion for commercial investments, a shift he finds dangerous. He criticizes Merkel for acquiescing to U.S. pressure on enlargement and labels Scholz and Merkel’s posture as failures to maintain a balanced European peace. British Russophobia also colors policy, he adds, underscoring a transatlantic appetite for confrontation. - The broader risk is a security dilemma: Europe’s defensive steps may provoke offensive reactions, potentially leading toward war, especially if a “European NATO” is formed to deter or strike at Russia without credible allied protection. Sachs argues the current direction shows a lack of political and security imagination in Europe, with a remilitarization path that could be a march to war. - In closing, Sachs notes the paradox: European leaders recognize risk but still pursue a path that could escalate conflict with a nuclear power, while the debate continues about deterrence, defense, and the future of European security architecture.

One country that concerns me is Germany. Historically, in the early 20th century, Germany went to war against the world, which was unexpected and surprisingly close. About 30 years later, Germany chose to go to war again, this time with a notorious leader at the helm. You would think the world would respond by saying to Germany, "You can’t keep attacking the world and expect to remain a country."

The speaker states they are not defending Putin, but believes he has done a great job for Russia, better than any German leader. They claim Germany is declining while Russia is improving, and Germans should be angry at their own leaders instead of Putin. The speaker questions why Putin is considered a war criminal, but Angela Merkel, who they claim wrecked Germany through mass migration, is not. They assert Merkel "literally wrecked" Germany, stating it will not recover in their lifetime, and accuses her of letting millions of people into the country in a way that "hasn't worked."

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.

Europe is the cradle of Western civilization, and the cultural and religious bonds between it and the U.S. will last beyond political disagreements. However, Europe is at risk of civilizational suicide. Many European countries are unable or unwilling to control their borders, but they are starting to push back, which is good. They are also starting to limit the free speech of their own citizens, even as those citizens protest against border issues. Europe needs to respect its own people and sovereignty, something America can't do for them. If a country like Germany takes in millions of immigrants who are culturally incompatible, Germany will have killed itself. The speaker loves Germany and wants it to thrive.

Mike Adams discusses energy on RT and expands on why energy extraction matters for the world and for countries like Colombia. He says he advocates for all forms of energy and for human abundance, opposing mass starvation and poverty, and asserts that hydrocarbons have created abundance, food, and infrastructure. He emphasizes that while he loves solar, wind, and hydro, you cannot power civilization on these green sources alone because there are no solar-powered tractors or fleets of electric long-haul trucks, and battery technology cannot yet match the energy density required for trains, ships, barges, and most transportation and construction. He notes there are developments like a Latvia/Estonia company with a partially battery-powered trailer that can save about 30% of diesel, and that such innovations are welcome, but diesel and kerosene are still necessary. He explains that fertilizer, specifically nitrogenous fertilizers, are made using the Haber-Bosch process, which requires energy to free bonds of atmospheric nitrogen (N2) to produce NH3, and that hydrogen for ammonia comes from natural gas. He argues this cannot be powered efficiently by sunlight or wind, and that cracking water to produce hydrogen adds another layer of inefficiency and higher fertilizer costs, reducing crop yields and potentially increasing starvation. He states that the economics of hydrocarbons are unbeatable for fertilizer and transportation, which include trucks, barges, ships, trains, and construction equipment. Regarding policy, he contends that Western European leaders advocate for green energy while lecturing developing nations to avoid fossil fuels, which he describes as hypocritical. He criticizes European policy as causing economic hardship and starvations, arguing that Europe built its railways and industries on fossil fuels like natural gas, diesel, oil, and coal. He asserts that Russia offers cheap, high-quality gas and that Germany’s economy relied on Russian gas; he questions Germany’s stance on energy and geopolitics, suggesting that reinstating pipelines or obtaining Russian gas is logical given the history. He claims Germany’s leaders are hypocritical and that Germany will collapse as an industrial and cultural leader, attributing this to energy policy. He discusses Russia’s resilience, energy, steel, and food, and argues Russia understands domestic self-reliance and supply chains. He contrasts this with Western Europe, calling leaders woke morons and a suicide cult, and he praises Trump for incentivizing domestic energy production in the United States, while still supporting multiple energy sources and diversification similar to China, which he says has wind, solar, hydro, coal, oil, and gas. He notes Ukraine’s price paid and says NATO sacrificed Ukraine to weaken Russia, while Russia paid a price in tens of millions of lives from past conflicts. He suggests that Russia would sell gas to Germany with reparations for past harms, but Germany won’t agree. He asserts Germany is done as an industrial leader and references historical scientific innovation from Germany and Berlin. He concludes that all human abundance comes from energy, especially hydrocarbons, and that removing hydrocarbons would mean destroying civilization. He accuses Western European leaders of opposing energy and contributing to crises, while acknowledging U.S. leadership under Trump was less retarded but still has work to do. Promotion and resources: Mike Adams promotes brightvideos.com and naturalnews.com, infographics, and rangerdeals.com with discounts, including firearms. He promotes Battalion Metals (metalswithmike.com) and explains their real-time prices, trust, and privacy, with Tucker Carlson as cofounder. He advocates gold and silver as counterparty-risk protection and mentions that gold and silver are an incredible buying opportunity. He closes by reminding viewers to do their own research and that he is not a financial adviser, signing off from The Health Ranger.