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Mister Miles Guo revealed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has expanded its military presence in South America and small countries near Australia. The CCP used tactics like selling advanced and affordable drones to these countries, establishing drone bases, and using blackmail and bribery to gain influence. They also parked cargo ships near the Bahamas and Cuba, filled with military devices. The CCP built a massive underground embassy in the Bahamas and established military bases in these countries, including missile systems and satellite launch bases. Meanwhile, Speaker 1 expressed concerns about the Biden administration's China-focused policies, including the potential stacking of the Supreme Court, abandonment of energy independence, and China's influence on the White House.

Feliz Navidad! We're at Fort Clayton, now called Ciudad de Sabana, near Miraflores Lock in the Panama Canal. The area has become a hub for NGOs and the UN, which some claim are facilitating immigration issues. If Trump is serious about addressing these invasions, he needs to shut down these organizations. The Panamanian government wants to collaborate with the U.S., but China's influence is growing due to U.S. absence. The Panamanian people are clear about their desire for partnership. I plan to reach out to the president of Panama for a discussion. Merry Christmas and goodbye!

China did not build, operate, or intend to weaponize the Panama Canal. The speaker intends to reclaim the Panama Canal from Chinese influence. This reclamation will be undertaken with capable allies and partners.

Back in 2017 and 2018, President Trump shifted our national security focus to address the threat posed by China, believing we can win economically through supply chains, markets, and fair trade. Simultaneously, we're rebuilding our military to be the most lethal in the world. Panama has rejected China's Belt and Road Initiative, signaling a change. We're also cracking down on cartels, securing our border with joint patrols by the Mexican army and our border police and military. We now have a team fully aligned with President Trump's vision, including a great Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Treasury. We are building the rocket as we are launching it.

The transcript asserts that NAFTA and trade deals with China led to a "giant sucking sound" of American jobs going overseas, enriching Wall Street and politicians while harming workers. It claims Trump is ending this by imposing triple-digit tariffs on China for unfair trade practices and retaliation, leveraging the US market size. China's alleged plan to dominate by dumping cheap goods and building its military is threatened, potentially leading to internal instability. The US is also allegedly countering China's influence by flexing the Monroe Doctrine at the Panama Canal, diminishing Russia's economic support, and negotiating deals with other countries. The White House is reportedly overwhelmed with requests for trade negotiations, prioritizing "tailored deals." South Korea and Japan are cited as examples of countries seeking deals involving investment and buying American. Trump's approach is described as a shock therapy to revive American industry, with the goal of preventing the return of the "giant sucking sound."

Today, we discuss the Panama Canal, a significant achievement in American engineering that cost over 35,000 lives and nearly $400 million in the final decade of construction. The canal is crucial for U.S. national security and economic interests, yet its importance has been overlooked. President Trump raised concerns about potential violations of the treaty made by President Carter, particularly regarding China's influence and high transit fees affecting American ships. Chinese companies are involved in building a bridge across the canal and controlling ports, posing risks to U.S. security. Additionally, Panama's reliance on high transit fees impacts American consumers and the economy. The Canal Authority has generated record revenue, and Panama has engaged in questionable practices, including flagging vessels linked to Iran and benefiting from Chinese investments under the Belt and Road initiative.

In this discussion, the guests analyze the implications of a United States military attack on Venezuela and its broader impact on Latin America, Asia, and the evolving world order. The Chilean ambassador to BRICS describes the event as a historic milestone: it is “the first time we have seen a US military attack on the South American mainland,” differing from past interventions in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. He notes that at a Saturday press conference, President Trump warned Colombia and Mexico that they might be next, and Secretary of State Rubio warned Cuba to watch out. This is presented as potentially the beginning of a larger shift, not an isolated incident like the 1989 invasion of Panama. The ambassador points to Trump’s 2025 national security doctrine, which places the Western Hemisphere at the center of US strategy, marking a significant departure from Bush’s focus on the Middle East and Obama’s pivot to Asia. He argues the motive is not humanitarian or stabilizing Latin America, but subjugation, resource extraction, and domination of governments in the region, a stance he characterizes as an attempt to reassert empire in the Western Hemisphere. On the macro level, the discussion addresses Latin America’s changing economic architecture, including a shift from the United States as the primary trading partner to China as a dominant partner for many countries. The US response, including the Venezuelan action, is framed as a mercantilist impulse to secure resources and influence, rather than a pro-democracy or pro-human rights initiative. The conversation emphasizes that the region’s instability is intertwined with oil, minerals, and strategic resources, and that the US move may be more about controlling these assets than about leaders’ legitimacy. The speakers then examine regional dynamics within Latin America. The region is fragmented, with SELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) weak and unable to unify a response. Some governments—Argentina, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Costa Rica—have openly sided with the US, while others are more cautious about Maduro’s leadership. The ambassador reiterates that Maduro’s regime was unpopular domestically due to authoritarianism and incompetence, yet the US action targets Venezuela’s oil and sovereignty more than Maduro’s personal legitimacy. He suggests that anti-American sentiment could grow across the region, regardless of specific governments. A key theme is the emergence of BRICS as a counterweight to US hegemony. The ambassador notes that Trump has attacked BRICS members—South Africa, Brazil, and India—through trade measures and visa policies, highlighting BRICS’ rise with the New Development Bank and expanding membership (including Indonesia). He argues that BRICS represents a shift toward a multipolar world where the Global South seeks to diversify dependencies and leverage different centers of power. He differentiates BRICS from the Global South, describing BRICS as a forum aligned with Global South demands, while acknowledging that neither China nor Russia are part of the traditional Global South, though China and India are influential within BRICS. The conversation argues for active nonalignment as a guiding principle for the Global South in a multipolar order. The ambassador cites examples like Brazil under Lula who resisted US pressure, and contrasts European concessions in trade deals (e.g., the EU-US golf-course agreement) with the need for greater strategic autonomy. He asserts that Europe’s capitulation has weakened its economic and political independence, while Latin America must avoid overreliance on the US and diversify with China and other partners. He argues that the long-term consequences of US military actions could be counterproductive, weakening US standing and strengthening China’s position by eroding a sense of predictable community in the Americas. In closing, the ambassador emphasizes that the Maduro-led Venezuela episode underscores the rise of Asia, the relative decline and fragmentation of the West, and the importance of multipolarity for smaller and medium-sized states. He reiterates the value of active nonalignment as a compass for Latin America, Africa, and Asia in navigating a turbulent, power-shifting world. He and the host note that the discussion will extend to the ambassador’s work on active nonalignment and BRICS, with a link to his writings provided.

Panama and the United States are less secure, less prosperous, and less sovereign, which is unacceptable. The Panamanian government is responding to threats and safeguarding the canal. President Molino's decision to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative reflects his government's understanding of the threat China poses. China did not build, does not operate, and will not weaponize the canal. Together, Panama and the United States will keep the canal secure and available for all nations through the deterrent power of the strongest fighting force in the world.

Speaker 0 argued that Maduro was not democratically elected and was not cracking down on drug trafficking to the U.S. and other countries, contrasting this with Honduras’ crackdown on drug trafficking supported by agencies like the DEA and Southcom, which earned praise for the Honduran government. The discussion then turned to U.S. policy. Speaker 0 asked whether the interviewee supports what the Trump administration did, or believes there is a line that should not be crossed. They noted that the U.S. military action against Maduro—bombing the country, entering, capturing Maduro, killing members of his government, and taking him to jail—was seen by some as positive, with Maduro described as a criminal who destroyed the country and economy. Speaker 1 responded by focusing on the human impact in Venezuela and other Latin American countries. They stated that a large portion of the population has suffered, with a notable number of people migrating from Venezuela and Honduras. They asserted that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, stating that the opposition’s poll results were stored in the cloud and the government did not want to see them because they knew they would lose. They described this as not democracy. They added that, since Hondurans left the country due to trafficking, vessels by sea and illegal flights were bringing jobs to Honduras, but also causing deaths and bloodshed. They argued that if the Trump administration framed Drug Trafficking as terrorism, it was warranted because the drug flow to the United States harmed not only U.S. citizens but also Honduras, which faced the highest death toll in fifteen years due to drugs coming through its borders, largely from Venezuela, and that nothing was done about this by prior administrations. Speaker 0 then asked for the stance on U.S. intervention in general: should intervention be allowed only in certain cases (e.g., Maduro), or should there be no U.S. intervention in Latin America under any president? Speaker 1 shared a Venezuelan friend’s view that there are no options to change Venezuela and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From a Honduran perspective, they believed Trump’s actions helped not only Honduras but also other Central American and regional countries along the drug-trafficking routes, by reducing corruption, bloodshed, and deaths. They argued that the political machinery Chavez created and used to stall elections in other Latin American countries had previously gone unchecked by the U.S., and that Trump faced Maduro with a confrontation. They concluded that many people in the world do not know what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. They stated that Trump confronted Maduro, who now has a chance to defend himself in a trial, and emphasized the issue of sovereignty for every country.

Speaker 0 argues that the United States has underestimated China's power across infrastructure, technology, and strategic planning. He notes the quality of Chinese infrastructure, citing high-speed trains that connect Beijing to Shanghai in four and a half hours over about 1,000 kilometers, comparing that favorably to Amtrak in the United States. Infrastructure strength is identified as a core strength, followed by China’s scientific and technological capacity, which he calls “the coin of the realm in our decade, in the next few decades.” He asks which society will turn out more scientists and engineers, presenting data to illustrate China’s lead: 34% of first-year Chinese university students study engineering or a STEM field, compared with 5.6% in the United States, noting China’s larger population. He references Harvard, where he teaches, observing that at graduation, chemistry, biology, and physics majors are largely Asian Americans, or more specifically Asians or citizens of Asian ethnicity, indicating a STEM-dominated profile among graduates. The speaker then points to the Trump administration’s gathering of tech titans at the White House, noting that a tremendous number of those tech leaders are Indian Americans and Chinese Americans, implying China’s tech influence extends into American leadership and industry. Addressing national security, he contends that the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) and China's overall power have been underestimated. He argues that the Communist Party of China (CPC) is strategic and unencumbered by free press constraints, allowing it to make long-term bets over decades (ten, twenty, thirty years) without the friction of media opposition. A specific strategic pattern is highlighted: for thirty-five consecutive years, the Chinese foreign minister’s first trip of the year has been to Africa in January to signal Africa as a priority. He contrasts this with U.S. presidents: President Trump did not visit Africa in his first term, while President Biden visited Angola for two or three days toward the end of his term. The speaker uses these examples to illustrate China’s consistent, long-term, strategic focus on Africa and broader global influence. Overall, he concludes that China’s technology, military, and economic power are stronger than commonly perceived, and that the United States must recognize this and adjust accordingly, as he asserts that underestimation is no longer viable.

Dmitry Sims junior introduces Brandon Weichert, a geopolitical analyst and author, and notes that Trump has floated annexing Greenland, the Panama Canal, and Canada, and the discussion aims to go beyond hype. Weichert argues that Trump’s approach is generally an art-of-the-deal tactic, starting with extreme positions to push concessions, and he breaks down the issues individually. On the Panama Canal Zone, Weichert says Trump is very serious about co-opting it. He notes the Canal was built by Americans and argues it should not have been handed over to Panamanians, who have allowed Chinese influence to grow in the area, including two large ports at both ends and $1 billion in infrastructure by state-owned Chinese firms. He suggests Chinese presence enables power projection and that the Canal Zone has been used for fentanyl flows and illegal migrants. Citing a colleague, Joe Humeyer, he asserts that a permanent U.S. hold could interdict fentanyl and migrant flows at the source, rather than at the border. On Greenland, Weichert describes the move as part of the art-of-the-deal dynamic, noting public opinion among Greenlanders is shifting toward independence from Denmark and could lead to rapid incorporation into the United States if independence occurs, drawing an analogy to Texas and California in the 19th century. For Canada, he contends the issue is likely a negotiation tactic: U.S. leverage over Canada’s trade benefits—which the U.S. says props up the Canadian economy—could destabilize Canada or trigger a regime change, potentially leading to U.S. annexation of parts like Alberta and Saskatchewan. He ties this to a broader Arctic great game among the United States, Russia, and China. Weichert adds a smaller, less widely reported point: Trump allegedly cut deals with tech magnates (David Sacks, Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, Marc Andreessen, Steve Bannon) to secure AI-dominance, including allowing tech workers (H-1B visas) and ensuring access to energy, with Canada’s geothermal resources (notably in Alberta) playing a key role, thereby linking energy to AI ambitions. On prioritizing the Arctic, Weichert ranks Greenland as the most important, as it is the geographical pivot around which the Arctic orbits, enabling power projection and deterring Chinese access to rare earth resources. Canada follows as a longer-term project; the Northwest Passage represents a strategic alternative to Russia’s Northern Sea Route, and pressure on Canada could push toward surrender or realignment over the Passage. Regarding Greenland’s Arctic significance, Weichert says Russian analysts view U.S. drilling in the Arctic as an attempt to counter submarine threats, including Poseidon, a nuclear torpedo, and to establish a base network to mitigate submarine threats. He agrees deterrence is a factor, noting U.S. neglect of northern deterrence and the need to project naval power in the Arctic. Weichert distinguishes the primary driver as China, while acknowledging Moscow and Beijing’s alignment has grown due to Russia’s Arctic foothold and the Ukraine war, which has pushed Russia and China closer. He doesn’t deny that squeezing Russia in the Arctic is a Washington aim, but argues the main impetus for Trump is countering China. On implementation, Weichert says the Panama Canal Zone could be reabsorbed via a national security clawback, regardless of Panama’s preferences. Greenland, if independence occurs, could be absorbed or granted statehood, with congressional movement underway. He notes potential opposition from Democrats and Republicans alike, but predicts House Republicans and Senate Republicans will largely back Trump on Greenland, while Canada faces stronger pushback. Macron’s EU opposition to Greenland annexation is dismissed by Weichert as Europe being subordinate to U.S. and Russian interests; he muses that ending NATO over Greenland and Canada could simplify the great-power dynamics, though he acknowledges such a move would be controversial. Weichert maintains Greenland’s development of natural gas, oil, and rare earth minerals is central; Greenland’s resources and environmental regulations could facilitate rapid U.S. development if Greenland becomes a U.S. territory or state. He addresses U.S. shipbuilding capacity and Arctic power, noting the U.S. defense industrial base lags behind Russia and the need to revitalize shipyards with a new mission and potential reforms under the Trump administration, possibly aided by experts like John Conrad of gCaptain, to dramatically increase production within two years.

USAID has been unresponsive and misaligned with U.S. foreign policy, which is concerning given that taxpayer dollars are at stake. There is a need for USAID to cooperate and provide transparency about its programs and funding. The agency must align its efforts with the national interest, as it has historically failed to do so. During a recent conversation with Panama's President Molina, frustrations were expressed regarding Chinese control of the canal. However, the discussion was respectful, and there is hope for positive outcomes. Panama's decision to end its relationship with the Belt and Road Initiative is a step in the right direction, and ongoing cooperation on migration issues is also important. Overall, the visit was productive, but further work remains.

We have underestimated Chinese power in the world. The trains are fabulous: Beijing to Shanghai in four and a half hours, roughly a thousand kilometers, unlike Amtrak’s typical long-haul experiences. The infrastructure strength is one key advantage. A second is their scientific and technological capacity, which is crucial for the coming decades. The question is: which society will turn out more scientists and engineers? A data point: 34% of first-year students in Chinese universities study engineering or a STEM field, while the United States is at 5.6%. And they are a much bigger country. At Harvard graduation, when we ask our graduate students to stand up as a class, chemistry majors, biology majors, physics majors largely consist of Asian Americans, or Americans of Asian ethnicity, or Chinese American citizens. Last week, when President Trump gathered all the tech titans of the United States in the White House, a tremendous number of those tech titans are Indian Americans and Chinese Americans. We’re not competing when it really matters for the future, and that’s on technology. The PLA, some have said, well, it hasn’t fought since 1978. What is it worth? I’ve seen the PLA and I think we’ve underestimated their military strength and their technology strength. And one other thing: the Communist Party of China is strategic, and they don’t have to worry about what the press says. That can be a good thing to have the press challenging the government, but they have nobody opposing them, so they can make big bets over ten, twenty, thirty years. Mary and I were mentioning one of them. For thirty-five consecutive years, the Chinese foreign minister, whoever that person is, has made his first trip of the year in January to Africa to show the Africans you are our priority. I think President Trump never went to Africa in his first term. President Biden went once to Angola for two or three days at the end of his term, just before he resigned. They’re strategic, and we’re not competing on that level. So, actually, I think the Chinese in technology, military, and economics are stronger than we think they are, and we’ve underestimated them, and we can’t do that any longer.

He got everything in Panama in record time, but the press won't report it because it's a victory for Trump. Chinese companies are out. The US got what it wanted out of Panama. The US has troops there providing security for the canal now. The speaker thought negotiations were ongoing.

Speaker 1 discusses the human toll of Venezuelan and regional instability, noting widespread Venezuelan suffering and massive migration from the region, including Honduras and other countries, driven by the situation in Venezuela. He contends that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, insisting that the opposition’s poll results were stored on cloud and the government refused to view them because they knew they had lost, labeling this as not a democracy. He adds that the drug trade through Honduras caused significant bloodshed and deaths, attributing much of this violence to shipments that originated in Venezuela and stating that the U.S. had not acted on that flow, which has cost Hondurans many lives. Speaker 0 then asks about the stance on U.S. intervention, whether intervention is sometimes warranted, such as against Maduro, or whether there should be no U.S. intervention in Latin America at all, across different administrations. Speaker 1 responds by recounting a Venezuelan friend’s view that options to change Venezuela are limited and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From the Honduran perspective, he says Trump’s actions helped Honduras and other Central American countries by addressing drug trafficking routes that harmed regional security, corruption, and lives. He asserts that Maduro created a political machine used to stall elections in regional countries, a tactic previously overlooked by the Obama-era U.S. administration but confronted by the Trump administration. He believes Trump’s administration provided options to Maduro, who did not accept them, leaving Maduro to defend himself in his upcoming trial. Speaker 1 emphasizes the sovereignty of countries and argues that many people worldwide do not understand what has happened in Venezuela and how it affects both Venezuelans and neighboring nations. He states that Maduro is going to have a chance to defend himself in court, and reiterates that intervention has implications for sovereignty and regional stability, implying that the situation has prompted broader regional consequences and debates about the legitimacy of elections and governance in Venezuela.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of a coup in Venezuela and the implications of U.S. actions. They emphasize naval movements as a signal of U.S. seriousness, noting the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and associated ships as a trigger that indicates a real threat or action. They remark that if Maduro steps down, chaos could follow, and acknowledge that Maduro has discussed amnesty with the U.S. that Trump reportedly refused. Speaker 2 repeatedly highlights naval movements as a metric for U.S. intent to attack a country, recalling lessons from the CIA. He argues the U.S. is not strategically benefiting from intervention in Venezuela, given that the U.S. has decided not to buy or refine Venezuelan oil, and questions what upside there is for the U.S. in such action. He asserts that drugs in Venezuela originate from Colombia and Ecuador and transit through Venezuela to West Africa and Europe, rather than serving the U.S. market, and he links this to broader critiques of U.S. foreign policy. Both speakers discuss the regional calculus: China’s increasing influence in Latin America, including a Caribbean refinery operation that refines Venezuelan crude, challenging U.S. refinery interests. They suggest China’s refiners and pipelines complicate U.S. strategies. They also discuss the potential role of Pakistan, Iran, or other powers in shaping outcomes, noting that many regional players (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and others) oppose U.S. intervention. Speaker 1 notes that a regime-change operation could undermine U.S. trust as an ally and references a platform called Polymarket where Maduro’s potential departure had been speculated, though newer developments show Maduro mobilizing the military. They raise a question about whether Maduro sought amnesty for the U.S. to step down, and say Trump’s refusal could reflect a desire for a political “scalp” to prove anti-drug policy, comparing this to the Panama case of Manuel Noriega. Speaker 2 elaborates that covert action programs are highly classified, and that even discussing them publicly is risky. He suggests that any coup would require a limited force to seize the presidential palace, pacify the military, and control key communications, with no clear plan for post-coup governance. They discuss the opposition leadership, noting Maria Machado as potentially not more effective than Juan Guaidó and suggesting the military would likely take power after Maduro’s departure. They compare possible futures to Libya post-NATO intervention, warning that anticipated constitutions and reforms often do not materialize in practice, leading to prolonged conflict. Speaker 2 emphasizes the international unpopularity of regime-change in Venezuela and argues that U.S. actions could provoke regional instability and further migration. The dialogue ends with reflections on the inherent dangers of regime change, the lessons from past interventions, and the possibility of Venezuelan instability if Maduro leaves. They caution against assuming flowers will greet invading forces and stress that historical outcomes often diverge from planners’ expectations, with a warning that a hypothetical post-regime-change period could be chaotic and military-led.

Panama Canal concerns are rising. Donald Trump previously discussed reclaiming the canal, citing its historical significance and alleging that Panama broke its treaty with the U.S. by allowing China significant influence, including control of ports and infrastructure projects. Panamanians express strong opposition to losing the canal, emphasizing its national importance. Some Panamanians believe the U.S. is overcharged for canal usage compared to other nations, fueling Trump's claims. However, others maintain Panama manages the canal effectively, despite Chinese involvement in port operations and infrastructure. Recent protests against a U.S. official's visit highlight the tension surrounding the canal's future. The Panamanian president's announcement to not renew a China contract leaves the situation's long-term outcome unclear.

The speaker argues that whenever a country defends its own people, the United States asks, “Who owns the resources?” and if the answer isn’t The US, a coup follows. The claim is that over 80 foreign governments have been overthrown or destabilized by the United States, and that most of them weren’t dictatorships, but democratically elected governments that threatened US corporate profits. The described playbook involves the CIA funding opposition groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda, planting stories in the media, bribing generals, arming rebels, or collapsing a country’s economy, with the coup replacing the leader with a pro-US dictatorship. The overarching assertion is that this is not about democracy but about power and control. Key historical examples cited include: - Iran in 1953: Mosaddegh attempted to nationalize oil; the CIA launched Operation Ajax, orchestrated protests, paid off politicians, and installed the Shah, resulting in twenty-five years of dictatorship and torture under US protection. - Guatemala in 1954: President Arbenz redistributed land from the United Fruit Company, a US corporation; the CIA branded him a communist, conducted a coup, and Guatemala descended into a civil war with over 200,000 deaths. - Chile in 1973: Allende was overthrown in a US-backed military coup, and Pinochet’s regime tortured and killed thousands after Allende’s attempts to nationalize copper. - Congo in 1961: Lumumba sought African control of African resources; the CIA helped orchestrate his assassination and installed a brutal dictator who was supported for decades. The speaker adds that there are “dozens of others” beyond these cases, including Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Bolivia, and beyond, arguing that the motive is not fighting tyranny but profits and control. When a country attempts to exit the system or nationalize resources to reduce inequality, they threaten profits and the idea that another world is possible, so the CIA sabotages such efforts to prevent successful example-making, such as Libya. The conclusion is that many nations don’t trust the United States because “we’ve been the villains throughout most of our history.” The speaker invites readers to comment to receive a “forbidden reading list” of books and documentaries that “they never wanted you to find.”

China is positioning itself to replace the US as the world hegemon by hosting a summit attended by 130 countries, including Vladimir Putin. The summit celebrated the 10th anniversary of China's belt and road initiative, which has invested $1 trillion in infrastructure in 70 countries. This serves to make China's exports cheaper and buy countries out of the US orbit. China offers a menu of infrastructure projects, such as ports, trains, power plants, and telecom networks, in exchange for influence. Chinese companies also gain control over the infrastructure they build. China is selling US treasuries and cracking down on US firms in China, suggesting it sees conflict with the US as likely and potentially beneficial.

Feliz Navidad! We're at Fort Clayton, now known as Ciudad de Sabana, near Miraflores Lock of the Panama Canal. Behind me is the IOM headquarters, which has taken over the former U.S. Army base. If Trump is serious about stopping the invasion, he needs to close down these NGOs and cut their funding. The real issue isn't Panama; it's the organizations facilitating the migration. I've spent time in the Darien Gap and know the local tribes involved. The U.S. has neglected its influence here, allowing China to gain a foothold. Panama wants to collaborate with us, and I plan to reach out to the president soon. Merry Christmas!