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Speaker 1 stated they have not spoken about tariffs with the person in question, and suggests reading "The Art of the Deal." They believe the person is a negotiator who lays out tough terms, which sometimes works. Speaker 1 says we need to prioritize national security, resiliency, and diversified supply chains. They state tariffs are a tool that, if properly used, could help resolve these issues. Speaker 0 asks if tariffs are a legitimate negotiating tool, and Speaker 1 confirms they are.

The speaker discusses the lack of communication between Putin and Biden, highlighting the importance of maintaining open lines of communication between countries. They emphasize the need for strong leadership in the White House to address this issue and suggest bringing in someone like Donald J. Trump to improve the situation.

Washington is reacting to Modi amid these tariffs. "amid these 50% tariffs, which we know from hearing from economists in India, have really been detrimental to the country and long term will really hurt the country's economy." "president Trump has been taking out most of his frustration on Modi." "It was a signal that Modi said that was picked up by the White House." "a social post talking about this relationship saying it was one-sided, blaming the prime minister." "one of Donald Trump's top trade advisers who called the show of unity troublesome." The discussion frames the U.S.-India relationship within tariff disputes.

China and the United States have the potential to collaboratively address global issues. It's crucial for both nations to work together. I had a long-standing friendship with him, and we spent countless hours discussing various topics. He is truly remarkable. Have you had a chance to talk to him in private? The press often disapproves of my casual remarks, but I find him to be an extraordinary individual. Did you discuss the trailer from last week?

The president's strategy drove recent events. He and the speaker discussed it at length on Sunday. The president may have goaded China into a bad position, leading them to be perceived as bad actors. The U.S. is willing to cooperate with allies and trading partners who did not retaliate. The message was simple: don't retaliate, and things will turn out well.

India has been a high tariff nation, making it difficult to sell into their market due to strong trade barriers. We're now moving to a reciprocal system; whatever tariffs India imposes, we will match. Previously, during my first term, we had the strongest economy ever, but I held off on reciprocal tariffs due to global suffering caused by COVID. Now, after decades of abuse, it's time to implement this fairness mechanism with many nations, not just India. The European Union is very difficult, and China was terrible until we started collecting hundreds of billions of dollars from them. I discussed India's high tariffs in the first term but couldn't get concessions. So, we're simply matching their tariffs, which is fair to the United States and, I believe, fair to India as well.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

The discussion centers on India’s position in 2025 amid a shifting international order and U.S. efforts to recalibrate a multipolar world. - The year 2025 is characterized as eventful for India, with the country under pressure to choose a path in a world where power is more distributed. The conversation opens with a framing of the U.S. adjusting to multipolarity, the return of Trump, and various global tensions, noting that India’s role has received relatively less attention. - Speaker 1 reflects that 2025 was not a good year for India. At the start of the year, India expected to remain a fulcrum of U.S. policy to contain China and to shuttle between powers, maintaining a growing trade relationship with China while navigating U.S. pressures. The Trump presidency disrupted this balance. India perceived U.S. interference in its domestic politics, including alleged U.S. fingerprints in color revolutions in Bangladesh and Nepal, and a perception that U.S. entities like the National Endowment for Democracy were involved. The 50% trade tariff on India by the U.S. shocked New Delhi, and Trump’s public and private statements criticizing India complicated the relationship. - The discussion notes India’s sensitivity to becoming overly dependent on the U.S. for strategic protection against China, given Modi’s emphasis on Indian sovereignty and self-reliance. Modi’s perceived humility toward Trump, followed by a cooling of the relationship after Trump’s tariff threats, created a crisis of confidence in the U.S.-India alignment. Modi’s personal interactions with Trump—such as a cordial birthday exchange followed by threats of 100% tariffs on India—were seen as signaling mixed signals from Washington. - India’s options in 2025 include: (1) retrenchment and continuing to seek a balancing act between the U.S., China, and Russia; (2) charting an independent course by strengthening ties within BRICS and the Global South; or (3) aligning more with the U.S. with the hope of future U.S. policy shifts. The economic reality complicates choices: while India’s exports did reasonably well despite tariffs and some FDI, opening Indian dairy and agriculture to the U.S. market would threaten farmers’ livelihoods, potentially destabilizing an electorate sensitive to domestic issues. - There is a broader point about Washington’s approach: demand loyalty from regions and countries while using tariffs and pressure to shape alignment, and Trump’s approach is described as a fear-and-intimidation strategy toward the Global South. - On the China-India axis, the speakers discuss how China’s rise and India’s size create a power disparity that makes simple dominance difficult for either side. India’s strategy involves leveraging BRICS and other forums (including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) to expand multipolar governance and reduce dependence on a single power center. The interlocutors emphasize that BRICS operates by consensus and is not a vetoed UN-style body; thus, it offers a platform where major powers can cooperate without a single dominant voice. - The potential paths for India include growing within BRICS and the Global South, seeking mutual economic advantages, and developing a strategy that reduces vulnerability to U.S. coercion. One line of thought suggests using digital tools to help Indian small and medium-sized enterprises access global markets, and building coalitions using shared developmental and financial needs to negotiate better terms in global trade, similar to how an OPEC-like approach could coordinate commodity pricing for the Global South. - The conversation also touches on border and regional issues: a historical context where Russia resolved border tensions with China via settlements that altered the balance of power; the suggestion that India and China could adopt joint administrative arrangements for disputed border zones to reduce conflict risk and foster cooperation, though this requires careful handling to avoid loss of face for either side. - The role of China is described as patient and multipolar-friendly, seeking to buy more from India and to cultivate mutual trade, while recognizing India’s internal challenges, such as power reliability and structural issues like caste and crony capitalism, which affect India’s ability to produce and export higher-value goods. - The broader takeaway is a vision of a more integrated multipolar Eurasia, where India’s leadership within BRICS/SC0 and its ability to create innovative economic arrangements—such as “resource bourses” or shared supply chains—could alter the balance of power and reduce dependency on U.S. policy dynamics. There is an emphasis on avoiding a new Cold War by fostering dialogue and joint governance mechanisms that include China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and other Global South actors. - The speakers close with a cautious optimism: 2026 could be better if nations learn to push back against coercive power, redefine security around development and governance rather than force, and pursue multipolar institutions that preserve autonomy while enabling peaceful competition. The expectation is that seeds of hope exist within these analyses, even as the present year has been challenging.

Speaker 0 argues that the American government is trapped by the Israelis, using Jeffrey Epstein as a tool to constrain and manipulate U.S. leaders. He claims Epstein was used to trap multiple presidents and influence policy, stating, “Bill Clinton, Ehud Barak met Arafat in the nineties, and there was no deal. The reason was Epstein. They were being blackmailed by Epstein.” He adds that Ehud Barak, then Israeli prime minister, was also “a friend of Epstein” but was blackmailed by the Israeli right wing, and that this pressure stopped a potential two-state solution with Arafat. He asserts Epstein’s leverage extended beyond sex to financial concerns, questioning, “Where was the money coming from?” and contends that the Gaza issue is the focal point of much of the obstruction. He cites Rupert Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal reporting a birthday card Trump sent to Epstein as evidence of ties, and claims that Israelis have compromised the American government through Epstein and related past events. He also states that “I don’t think Trump wants to continue this war or the genocide” and that Israelis are inhibiting him. Speaker 1 asks what Dershowitz’s denial suggests, prompting Speaker 0 to elaborate with broader conspiracy implications, suggesting that Israeli influence has shaped U.S. policy and history, including why peace deals or normalization efforts may have stalled. Speaker 1 questions why those in power would use Epstein instead of other drastic measures like assassination, referencing theories about John F. Kennedy’s assassination and noting the possibility of broader intelligence involvement. He proposes that the GCC countries could leverage financial power to supplant traditional APAC lobbying in influencing U.S. policy and asks whether Trump could mobilize Arab world and BRICS power to end what is described as genocide. Speaker 0 answers that Trump could end the genocide “right now” if he stops fearing the Israelis, urging him to disregard accusations about his ethics, “Let them say whatever they say. He should stop the genocide. Let them do whatever they wanna do. Morality should take over.” He compares the Israeli pressure to historical leverage, asking Trump to act in the interest of the United States and the Middle East. Speaker 1 references Robert Maxwell as an example of Israeli intimidation, noting the dangers of challenging them. Speaker 0 closes by reiterating hope that Trump will prioritize U.S. and Middle East interests and “do the right thing.”

The transcript centers on a loud, multi-voiced discussion about the prospect of war with Iran, U.S. policy dynamics, and the influence of allied actors—especially Israel—on Washington’s decisions. - The opening segment features sharp, provocative claims about President Trump’s stance toward Iran. One speaker asserts that Trump gave Iran seven days to comply or “we will unleash hell on that country,” including strikes on desalinization plants and energy infrastructure. This is framed as part of a broader, catastrophic escalation in Iran under heavy pressure on Trump to commit U.S. forces to Israel’s war. - Joe Kent, a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center who resigned from the administration, presents the central prognosis. He warns that Trump will face immense pressure to commit ground troops in Iran, calling such a move a “catastrophic escalation” that would increase bloodshed. Kent urges the public to contact the White House and members of Congress to oppose boots on the ground in Iran, advocating for peaceful resolution and public pressure for peace. - The discussion shifts to Israeli involvement. The panel notes that Israeli media report Israel will not commit ground troops if the U.S. invades Iran, and some assert Israel has never, in any conflict, committed troops to support the U.S. The conversation questions this claim, noting counterpoints from analyst Brandon Weichert that Israel has undermined American forces in certain areas. - The debate then returns to Trump’s diplomacy and strategy. The host asks whether Trump’s stated approach toward Iran—potentially including a peace plan—is credible or “fake news.” Kent responds that Iran will not take diplomacy seriously unless U.S. actions demonstrate credibility, such as restraining Israel. He suggests that a more restrained Israeli posture would signal to Iran that the U.S. is serious about negotiations. - The program examines whether the MAGA movement has shifted on the issue. There is testimony that figures like Mark Levin have advocated for some form of ground action, though Levin reportedly denies calls for large-scale deployment. Kent explains that while he believes certain special operations capabilities exist—units trained to seize enriched uranium—the broader question is whether boots on the ground are necessary or wise. He emphasizes that a successful, limited operation could paradoxically encourage further action by Israel if it appears easy, potentially dragging the U.S. deeper into conflict. - A recurring theme is the perceived dominance of the Israeli lobby over U.S. foreign policy. Several participants contend that Israeli influence drives the war timeline, with Israeli action sometimes undermining U.S. diplomacy. They argue that despite public differences, the United States has not meaningfully restrained Israel, and that Israeli strategic goals could be pushing Washington toward conflict. - The conversation also covers domestic political dynamics and civil liberties. Kent argues that the intelligence community’s influence—infused with foreign policy aims—risks eroding civil liberties, including discussions around domestic terrorism and surveillance. The group notes pushback within the administration and among some members of the intelligence community about surveillance proposals tied to Palantir and broader counterterrorism practices. - Kent addresses questions about the internal decision-making process that led to the Iran policy shift, denying he was offered a central role in any pre-crime or AI-driven surveillance agenda. He acknowledges pushback within the administration against aggressive domestic surveillance measures while noting that the debate over civil liberties remains contentious. - The program touches on broader conspiracy-like theories and questions about whether individuals such as Kent are “controlled opposition” or pawns in a larger plan involving tech elites like Peter Thiel and Palantir. Kent insists his campaign funding was modest and transparent, and he stresses the need for accountability and oversight to prevent misuse of powerful tools. - In closing, the speakers converge on a common refrain: no U.S. boots on the ground in Iran. They stress that the priority should be preventing another ground war, avoiding American casualties, and pressing for diplomacy rather than expansion of hostilities. The show highlights public involvement—urging viewers to contact representatives, stay vigilant about foreign influence, and oppose a march toward war. - Across the exchange, the underlying tension is clear: competing visions of American sovereignty, the balance between counterterrorism and civil liberties, and the extent to which foreign actors (notably Israel) shape U.S. policy toward Iran. The participants repeatedly return to the need for accountability, restraint, and a peaceful path forward, even as they recognize the high stakes and the intense political pressure surrounding any potential intervention.

The European Commission's retaliatory tariffs are still on the table if a deal with President Trump cannot be made. Speaker 1 believes a deal can be made and offers to help. Their goal is to invite President Trump to Italy for an official visit and explore the possibility of a meeting with Europe, advocating for frank discussions to find mutually beneficial solutions. Speaker 1 believes that together, both sides are stronger and is committed to finding the best way to reinforce this strength on both sides of the Atlantic. Speaker 0 claims that making a deal with Europe will not be a problem because the U.S. has something that everyone wants.

Following a difficult period in the relationship, both nations commit to moving forward through candid and constructive engagement. The approach must be mutual on both sides, anchored in "mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interest." They insist that "'Differences must not become disputes nor competition conflict,'" and that progress depends on preserving this spirit of dialogue. The speakers frame this as a shared path to restore cooperation and avoid turning disagreements into disputes, underscoring the desire for constructive diplomacy and sustained, respectful interaction. They articulate a commitment to candid dialogue on shared interests and to establish mechanisms that manage differences without letting them escalate into disputes.

Following an invitation facilitated by Kid Rock, the speaker had dinner with President Trump, aiming to bridge divides. The speaker brought a list of 60 insults Trump had made about them, which Trump signed humorously. Trump showed the speaker the room off the Oval Office, formerly known as the "Blowjob Room," now a merch room, and gave hats without pressuring the speaker to wear them. The speaker found Trump self-aware, laughing and genuinely engaging in conversation, even seeking the speaker's opinion on Iran's nuclear situation. The speaker expressed support for some of Trump's policies, like moving the embassy to Jerusalem and border control, while disagreeing with others, such as his Gaza plan. Trump was receptive, not angered by the criticism. The speaker noted a contrast between the private Trump and his public persona, expressing confusion as to why the graciousness and measured behavior couldn't be consistent. The speaker concluded that Trump, in person, is not as "fucked up" as perceived, although the speaker anticipates future criticism and potential retaliation.

The speaker claims his administration brokered a historic ceasefire between India and Pakistan using trade as leverage, suggesting they trade goods instead of nuclear missiles. He praises the "very powerful," "strong," "good," and "smart" leaders of both countries. He expresses hope the ceasefire will hold and commends Marco Rubio, Marco Stanup, JD Vance, and the entire group for their hard work. He suggests arranging a dinner between the leaders. He states that millions of people could have died from the escalating conflict.

President Trump is likely the only person who can mediate peace between Ukraine and Russia because Putin respects and, in many ways, fears him. The speaker's discussions with Trump centered on the need for a ceasefire, suggesting April 20 as the date. If Putin, who is purportedly the only party not accepting a ceasefire, does not comply, the U.S. and Europe should impose colossal sanctions.

The European Commission's retaliatory tariffs are still on the table if a deal with President Trump cannot be made. Speaker 1 believes a deal can be made and aims to invite President Trump to Italy for an official visit, potentially organizing a meeting with Europe. The goal is to frankly discuss everyone's needs to find a mutually beneficial middle ground. Speaker 1 believes that together, both sides are stronger and is seeking the best way to reinforce both shores of the Atlantic. Speaker 0 claims that making a deal with Europe will not be a problem because the U.S. has something that everyone wants.

The speaker expresses disappointment that India would be buying so much oil from Russia, saying, "I've I've been very disappointed that India would be buying so much oil, as you know, from Russia," and adding, "And I let them know that." He states, "We put a very big tariff on India, 50% tariff, very high tariff." He emphasizes his good relations with Modi: "I get along very well with Modi, as you know. He's great." He notes Modi "was here a couple of months ago," and recalls, "In fact, we went to the Rose Garden and it was the grass."

First speaker: Iran doesn’t really need to attack American ships or force the strait to open because it could actually be advantageous for the strait to remain closed. There are floating oil reserves and cargo ships in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea that Iran could rely on. In fact, Iran has a substantial stockpile: 160,000,000 barrels of Iranian crude already floating at sea, outside the Persian Gulf, past the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. That amount could fuel a country like Germany for over two months, and most of it is headed to Chinese independent refiners. Exports remain high, and the blockade is real, even if the timing is late. Do you agree that Iran is prepped for this day? Second speaker: I do agree. I think this is not harming the Iranians as much as it is harming the United States and the rest of the world. First speaker: What is Trump’s thought process? He has spoken with secretary Besant and other advisers, so he’s already sought advice. What alternative could work in Trump’s favor? Second speaker: Whenever the first round of negotiations ended, the president believed that his style of brinksmanship would produce immediate capitulation and agreement by the Iranians. The Iranians have never negotiated like that. Even the first treaty in the late 2000s took a long time to negotiate, not one and done. This administration wants short-term gains, and that isn’t possible with the Iranians. In the short term, the Iranians are in the driver’s seat. Negotiating and diplomacy are very difficult work; you don’t bully your way through. There is no unconditional surrender. There is none of that except in the president’s mind, unfortunately.

Scott Horton introduces Joe Kent, formerly of the 75th Rangers and then the CIA’s Special Activities Division, who fought in the terror wars and later headed the Counterterrorism Center before resigning from the Trump administration over the war in Iran. Kent describes his background and why he came on the show, noting that he resigned over policy rather than personal animus, and emphasizes that his focus is on Iran policy and its intersection with Israeli interests. Kent asserts that the war with Iran was largely driven by the Israeli agenda and timeline. He points to statements from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the President, and the Speaker of the House claiming the attack was launched because they knew Israel would attack as well, arguing that this indicates Israel was driving U.S. policy and that the United States should not be bound to an Israeli timeline or to an outcome that serves Israeli objectives. He recounts his time at NCTC and in the White House, describing an ecosystem that included media figures, think tanks, and high-ranking Israeli officials, which he says influenced U.S. policy and reduced the president’s decision-making space, particularly concerning Iran’s red lines on enrichment. Kent explains his concern that the push for a hard line against Iran’s enrichment was an Israeli-led framing that equated any enrichment with a nuclear weapons program. He describes an alleged “Goldilocks methodology” by which Iran could enrich but not weaponize, a position the Israelis reportedly used to rally U.S. policymakers toward war. He argues that the Israelis wanted to remove any space for a negotiated deal and sought regime change, leveraging the U.S. military to accomplish that goal. He emphasizes that the war was not the first option and that a more pragmatic, slower approach could have yielded a deal if U.S. policymakers allowed it. In discussing the question of who was pressuring whom, Kent says the Israelis were trying to force a scenario where Iran’s red line would be seen as unacceptable, thereby pushing the United States toward war. He notes that Trump’s willingness to negotiate existed but was constrained by Israeli pressure and media echo chambers, and that the war’s timing undermined any potential for a peaceful settlement. He asserts that, if the president had space to negotiate, a deal might have been possible, but the Israelis’ push to force conflict narrowed that space. Kent also addresses the question of how the war affected American strategic interests, arguing that the United States should restrain Israel and align policy with broader American interests in the region, rather than facilitate regime change or allow broader chaos. He contends that an ongoing U.S.-Israel alignment over militarized actions in the Middle East risks destabilizing the region, jeopardizing energy security, and undermining U.S. partners in the Gulf and Europe. Regarding the Iraq war and Iran, Kent asserts that the Israeli lobby pressured for war in 2002-2003 and had broader influence in Syria and elsewhere, but he also acknowledges the complex mix of neoconservatives and various factions. He describes how, after the Iraq war, Iranian-backed Shiite militias and U.S. policy intersected with Iranian influence and regional dynamics, noting that many Iraqi Shias fought against Iran while others aligned with Tehran, and asserting that mishandling these dynamics contributed to instability. Kent discusses the handling of Iranian EFPs (explosively formed penetrators) and argues that Iran shaped many of the tactics, while local Iraqi groups adapted them. He emphasizes that the broader narrative around Iranian responsibility for attacks in Iraq should be tempered by on-the-ground complexities, including Iraqi dynamics and the role of other actors like Lebanese Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. The conversation turns to the question of whether there were Iranian assassination plots against President Trump, with Kent acknowledging a real threat after Soleimani’s killing but emphasizing that the most serious plan was not clearly linked to a large-scale operation; rather, one individual, Asif Mershand, was recruited by Iran and monitored by the FBI. Kent cautions that allegations of broader Iranian plots should be scrutinized, and he notes ongoing questions about linkage and DHS investigations. Throughout, Kent reiterates his core conclusion: the essential policy misstep was allowing Israeli leadership to drive U.S. policy on Iran, and a successful path forward would require restraining Israel and pursuing a negotiated deal with Iran under conditions that preserve American strategic interests, with a clear off-ramp and space for diplomacy. He endorses the notion that President Trump could secure a deal if given the political room to reset the dynamic with Israel and to recalibrate U.S. commitments in the region.

The speaker states they are in dialogue with the prime minister and believes he is happy with how they treated them with tariffs. The speaker addresses foreign leaders, urging them to terminate their tariffs, drop barriers, and stop manipulating currencies, which they claim is devastating. They request these leaders buy tens of billions of dollars of American goods. The speaker asserts tariffs protect the country from economic harm and will lead to unprecedented growth, adding that this growth has already started.

I've been in countless bilateral meetings with heads of state, but I've never witnessed behavior like President Zelensky's. He berated and interrupted his host instead of showing gratitude for the U.S.'s significant aid, which has essentially kept him alive and in power. This was very disappointing to see. I sincerely hope President Zelensky reconsiders his approach, reaches out to President Trump, expresses the gratitude he owes, apologizes for his recent behavior, and agrees to this mutual rights deal. It's the best path to peace in the region and serves the interests of both our countries.

The speaker asserts that India should not be dictated to by the U.S. President and that a common understanding of what works for both countries is needed. Donald Trump is described as acting like a bully due to India's relationships with Russia and China, and the strengthening of BRICS. The speaker understands Trump's frustration, but believes India's rise should not be determined by Trump's feelings about BRICS.

Glenn and Chas Freeman discuss the rapidly evolving Iran-Israel-Gulf crisis sparked by Donald Trump’s 48-hour threat to “open the Strait of Hormuz” and destroy Iran’s energy infrastructure, and the apparent push-and-pull over whether talks are actually taking place. - Trump’s maneuvering: Freeman notes Trump appears to be trying to walk back the threat, arguing there were “two days of good productive discussions,” while Iranian Foreign Minister says there have been no talks. Freeman emphasizes that diplomacy remains indispensable, even as Trump’s posture leans toward coercive tactics. - The wider pattern: Freeman argues the region’s dynamics have driven Israel and Iran toward force, with diplomacy sidelined. He contends Washington’s challenge now is the price of energy (gas at the pump) and domestic political concerns rather than allied welfare. The Strait of Hormuz currently operates as a toll booth: many countries can pass if they have the license and pay. - Escalation and responses: There is a recurring cycle of Israeli and American escalation met by Iranian counter-escalation (e.g., Iranian missiles fired near Dimona in response to Natanz, and Iran listing targets including Ras Al Khair desalination plant in Saudi Arabia). Iran’s stated willingness to devastate Gulf desalination capacity signals a readiness to impose extreme costs. - International diplomacy and actors: Freeman highlights quiet diplomacy behind the scenes with China, India, Japan, Turkey, and behind-the-scenes talks by Italy and France with Iran. He notes European leaders’ unease and questions whether Europe will push more assertively, with Spain showing some potential for distancing from US and a possible NATO rethink. He argues the Atlantic alliance’s conceptual basis has eroded, risking a shift from a defensive to an offensive posture in Europe, and suggests the Gulf states may gradually distance from the United States while privately leveraging Israel’s tech and security advantages. - The Gulf Arab position: Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states remain publicly tied to the United States but fear becoming casualties in a miscalculated conflict. Freeman posits that long-term strategists in Saudi Arabia recognize the need to reduce threat through diplomacy with Iran and diversify defense dependencies (including growing Chinese weapons collaboration) as U.S. security guarantees wane. - The question of a negotiated settlement: Freeman suggests two ingredients for any settlement: a regional security architecture and a credible path for a phased American withdrawal from the Gulf. He cites Iran’s proposals (e.g., postwar regional management, toll-sharing for Hormuz) and Iran’s openness to multilateral diplomacy through bodies like the OIC, coupled with Gulf-Arab cooperation. He acknowledges Washington’s current lack of credible diplomacy and worries about whether negotiators on both sides can imagine a stable framework that preserves balance without American military primacy. - Iran’s strategic posture: Freeman argues Iran is not deterred by American or Israeli pressure and may pursue a broader missile and nuclear-capable capability build, particularly after leadership changes. He notes Iranian restraint has lessened since the late supreme leader’s era, and Iran continues missile and drone activity despite escalation. He also references possible false-flag concerns and Israel’s assassination campaigns against potential Iranian interlocutors as obstacles to diplomacy. - U.S. strategy and domestic politics: Freeman observes Trump’s incentives are mixed—gas prices at home influence his political prospects, and MAGA backers are increasingly unhappy with the war. He suggests Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” approach is counterproductive: power without purpose, and tactics without a coherent strategy. He implies a negotiated solution is preferable to ongoing low-intensity conflict, but notes it would require both sides to accept a recalibrated security arrangement rather than total capitulation. - Saudi perspective and future: Freeman notes Saudi Arabia’s desire to link more closely with the United States in the short term while also seeking greater strategic autonomy—building domestic military production and reducing sole dependence on U.S. security guarantees. He warns that public alignment with Israel in any confrontation is politically untenable for Gulf publics. - Outlook: Freeman closes by acknowledging the difficulty of predicting Trump’s behavior, the credibility issues around interlocutors like Stephen Witkoff, and the urgent need for diplomacy. He emphasizes the indispensability of diplomacy and suggests that a pathway toward a new regional security architecture, with reduced U.S. troop presence and coordinated Hormuz governance, would be a constructive turn if pursued by capable diplomats.