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Россия поддерживает инициативу Председателя Си Цзиньпина и заинтересована приступить к конкретному обсуждению предложений наших китайских друзей. И думается, что именно ШОС могла бы взять на себя лидирующую роль в формировании в мире более справедливой и равноправной системы глобального управления, основанной на примате международного права и ключевых положениях Устава ООН, быть подлинно сбалансированной и учитывать интересы широкого круга стран, гарантируя возможности для их устойчивого развития и безопасности. Russia supports the initiative of Chairman Xi Jinping and is interested in beginning concrete discussions of the proposals expressed by our Chinese friends. It is thought that the SCO could take a leading role in forming a more just and equal system of global governance, based on the primacy of international law and the key provisions of the UN Charter, truly balanced and taking into account the interests of a broad circle of countries, and guaranteeing opportunities for their sustainable development and security.

Russian and Belarusian leaders agreed to approve decisive steps to deepen integration in socio-economic and humanitarian spheres. They marked eightieth anniversaries of the Leningrad blockade’s lifting, Belarus’s liberation, and the victory in the Great Patriotic War, and moved their work to Petersburg. They highlighted 28 union programs unifying law and economy, rising mutual trade (up almost 9.5%) nearing $43 billion, and over $4 billion of Russian investment with about 2,400 Russian companies in Belarus. The Belarusian nuclear power plant (completed 2023) and a cosmonaut training for the ISS were cited. A new Union State strategy through 2035 focuses on technological sovereignty and import substitution, alongside foreign-policy coordination through 2026 and a push for a multipolar world with equal security. The agenda includes 15 items, a planned Oktyabrskaya Railway upgrade, and the Vidybsk Forum in June.

Our meeting allowed a comprehensive review of the entire gamut of India Russia bilateral relations. We believe that the relations between India and Russia have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the world after the second world war. We reaffirmed our shared ambition to expand bilateral trade in a balanced and sustainable manner, by increasing India's exports to Russia. This requires swiftly addressing non tariff barriers and regulatory impediments. Enhancing Indian exports to Russia and sectors like pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and textiles will certainly help to correct the current imbalance. Steps to ensure long term supply of fertilizers was also taken up. The two the opening of two new Indian consulates in Kazan and Ekaterinburg need to be fast tracked. On global and multilateral cooperation, we reaffirmed our shared commitment to reform of global governance. On regional issues, we discussed developments in Ukraine, West Asia, Middle East, Afghanistan.

Yesterday, I addressed the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, emphasizing the importance of significantly reducing our country's accumulated net emissions by 2050 in the context of social and economic development. I also mentioned considering preferential treatment for foreign entities. It is crucial to highlight that Russia is genuinely interested in enhancing international cooperation.

Xu Qinhua, host of Dialogue at CGTN, joined Glenn to discuss Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing on 05/14/2026, including the atmosphere, objectives, and key issues shaping China–U.S. relations. Xu Qinhua said the day’s atmosphere was “very positive.” Trump was impressed by the welcoming ceremony, reviewing the ceremonial guards with Xi Jinping, visits to the Temple of Heaven, and a state banquet. The leaders spent the morning in discussions with their teams, then met at the Temple of Heaven in the afternoon. In the evening, they attended a state banquet hosted by the presidency. Xi Jinping’s speech emphasized that China–U.S. should be “partners rather than rivals,” while Trump’s warm response highlighted shared values between Chinese and Americans and referenced long engagement between the peoples over about 250 years. Trump cited early U.S. contact with China in 1784, including the arrival of a U.S. ship, Chinese terms for newcomers, Chinese workers helping link the Pacific and Atlantic through a continental railroad, the establishment of Tsinghua University, U.S.-China allied cooperation during World War II, and Confucius being respected in the U.S. Xu Qinhua said both sides agreed on a vision described as “strategic constructive… strategic stability” to guide the relationship for the next three years or even beyond. Glenn raised the broader concern that Trump’s administrations, and more broadly U.S. views that China is the main peer rival, often place China in the spotlight. He referenced Xi Jinping’s idea of overcoming the “Thucydides’ trap” and asked about prospects for easing the economic war shaped by trade, technology, and tariffs. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping meant overcoming the trap and setting a new model for major-power relationships. Xu described China and the U.S. as peers in terms of economy, high-tech development, innovation, and military capabilities, arguing that how they handle the relationship affects not only both countries but global stability. He said trade used to serve as a “ballast” stabilizer because of investment and exports, but the relationship is now again at a challenging time involving trade war, tech war, and tariffs. Xu said both sides were discussing the possibility of a “new model” of coexistence, emphasizing “cooperation” and limiting “zero sum” thinking. Glenn asked what specific issues must be resolved, including whether the focus is tariffs, chip export limitations, or China’s willingness to export rare earths, and noted U.S. interest in Chinese purchases of U.S. energy and agriculture. Xu Qinhua responded that they were discussing building a “border for trade” and a “board of investment” to institutionalize dialogues and communications to address individual issues regularly rather than in isolated cases. Xu said from China’s perspective the trade war has brought suffering to both sides; China’s exports continued to grow even as U.S. tariff efforts did not stop Chinese exports. Xu said the Chinese side was pragmatic about expanding trade in areas that are not sensitive, such as advanced chips, and that U.S. companies could be willing to sell items like oil, agriculture products (including soybeans and beef), and Boeing airplanes if trade targets fall outside high-tech and national-security sensitivities. He said China’s theme is cooperation-focused “strategic stability,” with limited competition, and communication across multiple areas including military and trade. Xu argued trade itself is mutually beneficial and that trade imbalance is not the real issue, tying underlying concerns to the U.S. role as the supplier of the major reserve currency. On energy security, Glenn described U.S. efforts to reduce exports from key energy exporters and replace them with U.S. supplies, including claims about Europe after Nord Stream and a push for U.S. centrality in energy infrastructure and sales. Xu Qinhua said China has concern about over-reliance on U.S. oil and LNG and forming reliance on the U.S. market amid negative U.S. media coverage and low trust. He said China has diversified exports to ASEAN, Southeast Asia, African countries, Latin America, and European markets, and diversified energy sources so reliance on a single source is usually not over 20%, with oil and gas coming from Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ghana, among others. Xu said China is rapidly developing renewable energy (EVs, solar panels, and wind turbines), investing in nuclear power plants under construction, and also has coal resources and technology to transform coal into gas so that coal can provide electricity in worst-case scenarios. He linked this to energy security being both about sufficient supply and access to energy resources globally. Glenn raised Taiwan as a central security issue and asked how central it was in talks and whether a reduced-tension common meeting point existed. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping raised Taiwan as expected in discussions with Trump, calling it the most important issue between China and the U.S. and warning that mishandling it could put the overall relationship in jeopardy. Xu said the Chinese side increased the volume and severity of its messaging, warning that Taiwan separatist activity threatens regional peace and stability; Xu said arms sales to Taiwan embolden secessionists and create security risks. Xu said the U.S. “one China” principle has been hollowed out, citing that while a 1982 communiqué foundation includes that the U.S. would reduce arms sales until zero, Xu claimed the U.S. has increased arms sales to Taiwan. Xu argued that if Washington truly cared about peace, it would make clear to separatists that it opposes Taiwan independence and support peaceful reunification efforts, which Xu said would remove a persistent irritant and allow cooperation on issues such as AI governance and crises including the Strait of Hormuz and Ukraine. Xu added that even with U.S. intervention, Taiwan purchases of arms would not match Mainland capabilities, and he said U.S. support for separatists would fail to slow China’s modernization. Glenn asked about Iran and the Strait of Hormuz as an issue discussed between Xi and Trump. Xu Qinhua said the leaders’ discussions covered the Iranian crisis. Xu said some U.S. media coverage claimed Trump should pressure China to pressure the Iranians, but Xu said the “wrong approach” would be pressure from Washington; Xu said Beijing has nothing to do with the crisis and that the crisis is tied to a war launched by Washington and the Israelis without UN authorization, without proper explanation, and without legitimacy. Xu said China and the U.S. share some common interest in opening the Strait of Hormuz because Gulf nations’ exports rely on it and because China purchases about 50–40% of its energy from the region. Xu said Washington would need to restrain demands, respect the fact that it launched the war and failed to achieve its goals, and accept reality, while the Chinese side would help seek a long-term deal and stable relationship between the U.S. and Iran. Xu said the U.S. side had not been seen as earnest or faithful in resolving the problem. When Glenn asked how this aligns with a common stance that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, Xu Qinhua said he did not see tensions upcoming between China and Iran. Xu said multiple oil tankers were navigating the Strait of Hormuz with limited disruption, and that about 90% of Iranian oil exports go to China, meaning there is no point for China to ask for tolls on tankers destined for China. Xu said if Iranian control or tolls occur, China would not oppose, especially if the U.S. refuses compromise, refuses to lift sanctions, and does not allow normal business with other countries. Xu described the key issue as how long the U.S. will tolerate inflationary pressure and how the U.S. continues its approach against what he characterized as an Iranian blockade against the U.S. blockade. In closing, Glenn asked whether the meeting would produce a “grand bargain” or only minor tweaks to resolve disputes. Xu Qinhua said the encounter was significant, not only between the leaders but also because top executives mingled and talked, which Xu said could increase understanding and opportunities for engagement that had been absent for nine years or longer. Xu said 2026 could be a milestone year for China–U.S. relations due to frequent future meeting opportunities: Trump’s invitation for Xi to visit the U.S. in late September, plus further opportunities on the sidelines of APEC in Shenzhen and the G20 summit in the U.S. Xu said they had found the “right approach” of constructive strategic stability with cooperation-focused limited competition, moving away from zero-sum mentality, which Xu said could benefit both sides and the world.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground from Dubai, discussing the World Government Summit in the UAE, which brought together 6,000 attendees, 35 heads of state, ministers, and leaders from civil society, academia, and business. The conversation centers on BRICS, its role on the world stage, and tensions in the region amid US naval activity in the Gulf. Victoria Panova, head of BRICS Expert Council (Russia), vice director of HSE University, and Sherpa of the G20 advisory group for Russia, shares her impressions and analysis. Panova’s first impression of the summit is the remarkable diversity and high level of organization, with attendees from various paths of life and countries, creating a vibrant environment for dialogue. She notes the forum’s focus on AI and technological challenges, even as regional security concerns linger behind the scenes due to US carrier presence and broader tensions in the region. She observes dual-use nature of AI and weapons and questions why security issues are not more openly addressed, pointing to the UN Security Council’s blockages and the existence of a “peace council” that is not fully formed. Discussing BRICS members and expansion, Panova explains that UAE and Iran are among the newer members and emphasizes BRICS’ need to demonstrate capacity during “count times.” She outlines the original six invited countries and the current mix of members, partners, and invited states, noting Argentina’s initial interest and its later hesitation. The question of why Saudi Arabia is not a full member while UAE and Iran are is explained in terms of historical invitations, internal Brazilian debates, and consensus-based BRICS governance, which requires broad agreement rather than unilateral action. Panova highlights the New Development Bank (NDB) as BRICS’ key financial instrument, distinguished by its lack of Western member states and absence of political conditionalities, although she acknowledges its current smaller scale and ongoing need for growth. Dilma Rousseff is noted as head of the NDB, with Putin’s influence cited in ensuring continuity of leadership. The discussion touches on Venezuela’s BRICS status, Maduro’s kidnapping incident, and the Brazilian veto influenced by internal Brazilian opinions and Mato Grosso considerations, with the BRICS civil council issuing a declaration in support of Maduro, though BRICS itself remains constrained by consensus requirements. On global order and currency systems, Panova argues that BRICS aims to reduce dependence on the dollar, noting that non-dollar trade is already significant (e.g., Brazil-China trade where 48% is non-dollar, Russia-India trade using rubles and renminbi). She emphasizes that while the dirham in Dubai is pegged to the dollar, BRICS members seek to diversify payment systems and currencies, including potential BRICS digital currency discussions at the sherpa level, with the first sherpa meeting in February to set detailed priorities. The dialogue also considers Donald Trump’s impact on BRICS. Panova suggests Trump’s stance against BRICS aligns with de-dollarization efforts and the pursuit of independent payment systems, although she acknowledges that Trump has used sanctions as bargaining leverage and that BRICS seeks to strengthen collective action rather than rely on any single country. The interview closes with expectations for India-hosted sherpas and the lead-up to the BRICS leaders’ summit, underscoring BRICS’ evolving role as a potential counterweight to Western-dominated institutions. Overall, the discussion emphasizes BRICS’ pursuit of financial autonomy, diversified currencies, and enhanced global influence through structured diplomacy, expansion, and alternative development financing, set against ongoing regional security complexities and Western geopolitical pressures.

На Валдайском клубе 22-го заседания обсуждался полицентричный мир: инструкции по применению. Участники отметили более открытое, творческое внешнеполитическое пространство, где решения зависят от точности выверенных действий и договорённостей между многочисленными участниками. Мир становится многополярным: растёт роль культурно-цивилизационных различий, региональных объединений (БРИКС, ШОС) и общего мирового большинства, которое настаивает на консенсусе и гармонии в решении вопросов безопасности. Гегемония Запада утративала хватку; формируется система договорённостей, а не принуждения. Россия подчёркнута как важный элемент глобального баланса и устойчивости, перенёсшая санкции. Вопросы ядерного сдерживания, возможной паузы в рамках соглашений с США и Китая, а также роль Европы обсуждались на фоне украинского кризиса и ближневосточных процессов. Подчеркивается значимость культуры, традиций и взаимного уважения для мирного сотрудничества. In the Valdai Club's 22nd meeting, the multi-polar world was discussed: how to apply it. Participants noted a more open, creative foreign policy space where decisions depend on precise, well-balanced actions and agreements among many players. The world is becoming multi-polar, with rising roles for civilizational differences, regional unions (BRICS, SCO), and the common world majority advocating for consensus and balance in security issues. Western hegemony has weakened; a system of agreements, not coercion, is forming. Russia is highlighted as a crucial part of global balance and resilience, having endured sanctions. Debates covered nuclear deterrence, the possibility of a pause in treaty regimes with the US and China, and Europe’s role amid Ukraine and Middle East conflicts. Emphasis is placed on culture, traditions, and mutual respect as foundations for peaceful cooperation.

We're excited about the math-based currency movement, which we believe could be a huge game changer in finance. Our currency supports a global payment system open to everyone. We focus on utility, ensuring a multicurrency payment system by solving the double spend problem with a global ledger and consensus process. This allows any currency, like bitcoin or dollars, to be used. The potential is incredible. Translation: We are enthusiastic about the math-based currency movement, seeing it as a significant innovation in finance. Our currency enables a global payment system that is accessible to all, with a focus on utility and the ability to support multiple currencies. By addressing the double spend issue through a global ledger and consensus process, we can incorporate various currencies like bitcoin and dollars. The potential for growth is immense.

Мы уделяем большое внимание увеличению доли национальных валют в торговле и инвестициях, а также разработке безопасных и надёжных финансовых инструментов и механизмов взаимных расчётов. Важной ролью в укреплении межгосударственных связей является налаживание гуманитарных контактов. We place great emphasis on increasing the share of national currencies in trade and investments, as well as on developing safe and reliable financial instruments and mutual settlement mechanisms. A key role in strengthening intergovernmental relations is played by the establishment of humanitarian contacts.

Warwick Powell says the Iran war is affecting East Asia in longer-term, structural ways. The immediate impact is through reduced oil and liquid fuel flows, which exposes Southeast Asian economies and Australia because they depend on Middle East crude and on fuels refined from it. He notes countries have adjusted by reaching out to other suppliers: Russia and Indonesia (Malaysia has done so), and Japan has sought to secure its position with the Sakhalin II project. He adds that Russian “European Urals” oil is chemically similar to Middle East oil and suits diesel manufacturing, while Singapore has refused Russian oil and therefore had to find other workarounds. He also highlights pressure on fertilizers and petrochemicals, with Japanese naphtha-market constraints already affecting related industries and pushing some firms to seek alternative supply options in China. Powell argues energy shocks do not end abruptly and that the downstream implications are likely to be manifold. He cites a consumer-level shift toward electrified transportation, especially Chinese EVs exported into Southeast Asia and Australia, which he says has increased dramatically over the last hundred days. He also says countries are increasing interest in energy technologies that support “energy sovereignty,” with Chinese clean-energy technologies positioned as central. He further emphasizes a defense and security dimension: the United States’ global power-projection base network is no longer defendable. He connects damaged or destroyed Persian Gulf bases with American pullbacks and says this has created shockwaves across Southeast Asia and Eastern North Asia. Powell argues Asia’s U.S. deterrence posture has relied on American bases across the First Island Chain (from Japan to the Philippines), so if those bases become unsustainable, the regional security architecture is forced to change while China expands its military posture over decades of modernization. Glenn links this to a broader post–Cold War U.S. hegemonic strategy and argues that in a multipolar world the U.S. cannot be everywhere. Powell responds by describing the effects of U.S. weapons and attention being diverted across multiple theaters, which he says reflects a failure to prioritize and contributes to European and Gulf states feeling betrayed or exposed, especially those portrayed as frontline states. He says that in East Asia, frontline states risk becoming targets for America’s adversaries while the U.S. cannot protect them as intended. Powell outlines differing regional responses. He says Japan has been remilitarizing for about a decade for domestic political reasons and for concerns about the U.S. security “blanket,” with similar pressures in South Korea, including public distrust about the American nuclear umbrella and growing demands for nuclearization. He also says this aligns with an American strategy of outsourcing funding, material responsibility, and frontline risk to allied states. He adds that U.S. basing in Japan and South Korea still helps keep them under U.S. influence, while he describes Philippine efforts to move closer to Washington and the economic pressures that have accompanied it. Powell claims oil-flow disruptions have caused significant economic problems in the Philippines, and that the Philippines reached out to China for support in fuel supply; he says Marcos indicated in late March that the Philippines was interested in re-engaging Beijing on joint exploration and development in the South China Sea. He notes public opposition building in multiple countries, including Australia’s renewed AUKUS debate at the Shangri-La Dialogues. Powell describes a public inquiry into AUKUS initiated by former federal labor minister Peter Garrett, arguing Parliament has not investigated the merits, handling, or process. He presents Pete Hegseth’s Shangri-La keynote as a “capstone” point, saying Hegseth described the U.S. role in Asia as ensuring no single power becomes a regional hegemon, and Powell contrasts this with the U.S. insistence in Powell’s memory that it was the sole hegemon in Asia. Powell then turns to whether Japan’s rearmament increases autonomy or becomes an instrument for U.S. frontline strategy. He says the outcome is double-edged, tied to whether U.S. bases remain defensible given shortages and Chinese capabilities, and he references U.S. force shifts such as relocating some forces away from Okinawa. He argues U.S. capability limitations suggest bases and stored airplanes might not last through the first week of serious conflict, and he says Japan will continue rearming, but autonomy depends on U.S. ability to keep Japan “under control.” He says Southeast Asia has lingering memories of Japanese militarization in the 1930s and 1940s and that this could make Asia tense. Powell also claims the Chinese economy’s scale limits the feasibility of balancing China militarily, stating he sees the real issue as how to live with China as the major power. On China’s ability to withstand attempts to disrupt its energy, Powell says China’s energy structure is less dependent on oil than 25 years ago, citing a diesel peak about two years ago and declining diesel consumption, plus a two-decade diversification through electrification, storage, renewables, and major expansion of coal and nuclear generation. He adds terrestrial transport across Eurasia improved, with Russia and Central Asia supplying oil and gas to China in ways that are harder to interdict than maritime choke points. He also says global energy markets are more fragmented than U.S. “energy monopoly” assumptions imply, and he argues that alternatives and new technologies make containment via energy choke points increasingly hard to execute. He concludes China should be “reasonably unscathed,” citing preparedness, growing global demand for Chinese clean-energy technologies, increased Chinese foreign direct investment, and deeper integration with Southeast Asia—especially through energy, commodities, finished products, and payment-system expansion that reduces reliance on American infrastructure and institutions like the dollar and SWIFT. When asked about India, Powell says India’s non-alignment tradition means it can appear to “waiver,” but that India faces challenges tied to economic development and elite relationships with the U.S., along with anxieties and unavoidable realities due to the land border and tensions with China. He says India’s key long-term problem is becoming a more autonomous economic actor with less exposure to U.S.-linked risk, including fertilizer and energy access problems and domestic infrastructure and industrialization gaps. He calls for a more cordial India-China relationship and says leadership is needed to transcend anxieties toward China. He also argues against bloc politics and describes the ASEAN-led approach as quietly successful in keeping a diverse region cohesive around economic development and prosperity, including RCEP and related expansions. He highlights payments infrastructure that can settle trade in national currencies and argues ASEAN—especially Indonesia—could be pivotal in maintaining a multipolar, “indivisible security” region. Powell says the Shanghai Cooperation Organization offers an institutional model that could be extended toward North Asia and Southeast Asia to support multipolar security, counter bloc politics, and reduce the risk of miscalculation and conflict. Powell closes by saying Asia-Pacific security could also benefit from engaging Russia, since Russia is a Pacific power, and he frames block politics as a path to suspicion, arms races, and eventual conflict. He ends by suggesting further discussion on Indonesia next time and directs readers to his Substack (warwickpaul.substack.com) and his book *Thermo Economics in the Time of Monsters*.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the strategic direction of U.S.-China economic engagement and the future of the dollar. Speaker 1 argues that Obama should seek a financial arrangement with China when he travels to China, stating that “this would be the time because you really need to bring China into the creation of a new world order, financial world order.” He contends that “you need a new world order that China has to be part of the process of creating it, and they have to buy in. They have to own it.” He envisions a more stable global financial order resulting from China’s participation, with “coordinated policies.” Turning to the U.S. economy and the dollar, Speaker 1 addresses concerns about dollar weakness. He states that “an orderly decline of the dollar is actually desirable.” He explains that “A decline in the value of the dollar is necessary in order to compensate for the fact that The U. S. Economy will remain rather weak.” He further predicts that “China will emerge as the motor replacing The U.S. Consumer,” suggesting a shift in economic engine from the United States to China. He concludes that “there would be a slow decline in the value of the dollar, a managed decline.”

China's involvement is crucial in establishing a new global financial order.

We did not ban the use of the dollar. The US decided to limit our dollar payments, which is absurd and harms their own economy and global power. Currently, we pay 34% in rubles and a similar amount in yuan, compared to the previous 3% in yuan. This decision can only be attributed to arrogance. They probably thought everything would collapse, but nothing did.

In the discussion about the Middle East and the search for possible pathways to address the urgent problems faced by the Palestinian people and the most acute humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, the speaker highlights a central priority. The main point is that the entire process should favor a long-term settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that is based on the relevant United Nations resolutions, and it must take into account the inherent needs and wishes of the Palestinian people. This concerns the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and its essential social infrastructure, including healthcare systems, water supply, and the establishment of reliable food security. Additionally, the speaker notes a concrete financial proposition tied to Russia’s role and its relations with the Palestinian population. Even prior to resolving questions about Russia’s participation in the composition and activity of the World Council, given Russia’s special relations with the Palestinian people, there is a suggestion that we could channel 1 billion U.S. dollars to the World Council. This funding would come from Russian assets that were previously frozen during the prior administration of the United States. In essence, the speaker is linking the pursuit of a durable peace framework—anchored in UN resolutions and attentive to Palestinian needs and desires—to practical steps in rebuilding Gaza’s vital infrastructure. At the same time, there is an initiative to redirect a substantial financial resource—1 billion dollars—from frozen Russian assets to support the World Council’s efforts, reflecting a strategic use of frozen assets in the context of international humanitarian and peace-building objectives.

The BRICS countries are implementing large scale initiatives in the area of nuclear energy and aviation, new materials and IT industry, robotics engineering, and artificial intelligence. Certainly, particular attention is being paid to strengthening connection within the BRICS block. Their mutual goods turnover of our countries has already exceeded 1,000,000,000,000 U. S. Dollars and continues to grow. All of that are elements of the global platform for growth. They are founded on the key principles of BRICS, that is primarily consensus, parity, accounting for the interest of one another. Russia welcomes all of its partners to make their contribution to shaping new global growth model.

Larry Johnson and Glenn discuss the shifting dynamics of the US dollar, the international financial system, and the rise of competing powers. - Johnson recalls the 1965 term exorbitant privilege describing the US dollar’s reserve-currency advantages. In 1971, the US closed the gold window, ending fixed gold value for the dollar; the dollar later became backed by “our promise,” enabling the petrodollar system as oil purchases were conducted in dollars. The dollar’s dominance rested on predictability, a stable legal system, and non-abusive use of the dollar as an economic tool rather than a political weapon. - Trump-era sanctions expanded broadly, impacting friends and adversaries alike, and BRICS nations began moving away from the dollar. Russia’s disconnection from SWIFT after its 2022 actions is noted as a turning point that encouraged the BRICS’ development of alternative financial infrastructure, including China’s cross-border interbank payment system (CIPS). This shift accelerates the decline of the dollar’s dominance. - Nations like Russia and China (and India, Brazil) are unloading US Treasuries and increasing gold and silver holdings. This is tied to concerns about the dollar’s reliability and the reduced faith in paper promises. The BRICS countries reportedly plan a currency tied to gold, with components of their reserves backing individual BRICS currencies, signaling a structural move away from the dollar. - The paper-gold issue is central: for every ounce of real gold, there is a range of 20-to-1 to 100-to-1 in paper gold. This disparity can undermine trust in the paper promise and create a run on physical gold. The price gap between New York (lower) and Shanghai (higher) for gold demonstrates a market dislocation and growing demand for physical metal. - Glenn emphasizes that a unipolar dollar system allows the US to run large deficits via inflation, which acts as a hidden tax on global dollar holders. Weaponizing the dollar through sanctions challenges trust and accelerates decoupling, prompting other nations to seek alternatives to reduce exposure. - Johnson argues that the US is confronting a historic realignment: the Bretton Woods order is dissolving, the dollar’s international dominance is waning, and sanctions and coercive policies are provoking pushback. He highlights Japan as a major remaining dollar treasuries holder that is now offloading, further increasing dollar supply and depressing its value. - The geopolitical implications are significant. Johnson warns that potential US actions against Iran—given their strategic position and the Gulf oil supply—could trigger a severe global disruption, including a price surge in oil. He notes that such actions would complicate global stability and magnify inflationary pressures. - The discussion also covers NATO’s cohesion, Western attempts to shape global alignments, and how rapidly shifting leverage could undermine existing alliances. Johnson suggests that Russia’s strategic gains in the war in Ukraine, combined with Western missteps, may prompt a rapid reevaluation of settlements and borders, while also noting that Russia’s position has hardened. - On Venezuela, Johnson argues that the stated pretexts (drug trafficking, oil control) were questionable and points to economic motives, including revenue opportunities for political allies like Paul Singer, and to Greenland’s strategic interests as possible motivators for US actions. - Looking ahead, Johnson predicts hyperinflation for the United States as the dollar loses value globally, while gold and silver retain value. He asserts that the ruble and yuan may hold value better, and that a mass shift toward de-dollarization is likely to continue, potentially culminating in a new multipolar financial order. - Both speakers agree that trust and predictability are crucial; the current trajectory—threats, sanctions, and unilateral actions—undermines trust and accelerates the move toward alternative currencies and stronger physical-commodity holdings. The overall tone is that a pivotal, watershed moment is unfolding in the global monetary system.

Ironically, it’s happening organically outside of BRICS anyway. For example, Enbridge and Brazil trade with China 48% in non-dollar terms. Russia–China trade is 95% in rubles and renminbi. Russia also trades with India similarly. BRICS is not driving this alone; these are individual developments. BRICS, a bit more than a decade ago, was the first to implement a framework agreement between them to move toward using national currencies more. It was still a time of less turbulence in the international scene, and the move was not for each country at once but addressed different pockets of activity. China, at that point, not only advanced this BRICS framework agreement but also struck agreements with 22 countries outside BRICS to use the renminbi. Russia did not abandon the dollar; it started using its own currency and other currencies as well. The aim was not to be against the dollar but to avoid being ordered by others about what they should or should not do. This shift occurred before Trump, though Trump contributed to the trend as well; the speaker notes they cannot simply blame Biden. The era of dollar and SWIFT being used as a weapon began to become explicit. The claim is that the dollar was promoted as a public good available to everyone no matter what happened, and then that expectation was broken. Russia has faced the most sanctions, over 20,000 in total, and the speaker suggests there may be more to come. There is large pressure from the US on each country. The UAE is mentioned as being cautious about moving too far, but each BRICS member now understands that this could be turned against them as well. That awareness is driving the direction toward greater use of national currencies and non-dollar transactions.

China’s president Xi Jinping has explicitly called for the renminbi (yuan) to attain global reserve currency status, stating that China must build a powerful currency that can be widely used in international trade, investment, and foreign exchange markets and that can be held by central banks as a reserve asset. This is a clear, definitive statement of intent that signals Beijing’s aim for the yuan to play a central role in the global monetary system and to reduce reliance on the US dollar. Beijing surfaced this message with intentional timing. The remarks, originally delivered in 2024 to senior Communist Party and financial officials, were only recently made public. Xi’s reserve currency ambitions and plans were published in Qiushi, the party’s most authoritative policy journal. The timing matters because the remarks appear as the US dollar faces pressure, global monetary uncertainty rises, and central banks worldwide reassess their exposure to the dollar. Trade tensions, the growth of sanctions, and rising political risk have contributed to this reevaluation, and China has moved from quietly expanding yuan usage for trade to explicitly naming its ultimate goal. Xi outlined the institutional foundations he believes are required to support reserve status: a powerful central bank with effective monetary control, globally competitive financial institutions, and international financial centers such as Shanghai and Shenzhen capable of attracting global capital and influencing global pricing. As for where things stand today, IMF data shows the yuan still has a long way to go. It currently makes up less than 2% of global foreign exchange reserves. The dollar still dominates with well over 57%, though it has declined from about 71% in 2000, and the euro is roughly 20%. China still has capital controls, and the currency is not fully convertible. Why would central banks want another fiat currency in their reserves? The attraction of the dollar and the euro lies in the backing of the United States and the institutional credibility behind them. The yuan’s appeal, according to the discussion, is that it is becoming a fiat currency with implicit gold backing. China’s officially reported gold holdings have risen to roughly 2,300 tons, per the World Gold Council, with steady year-after-year purchases, including at least fourteen consecutive months of net purchases through 2025. However, many analysts believe China holds more, with estimates based on trade flows, import data, and disclosure gaps suggesting true holdings closer to 3,005 tons, and some higher-end estimates proposing up to 10,000 tons or more. This gold accumulation serves as a hard asset anchor in an era where trust in fiat currencies is perceived to be weakening. China may be gearing up to offer an alternative linked to gold. It may not be ready to displace the dollar tomorrow, but it is clearly moving toward challenging King Dollar’s throne.

BRICS will continue to expand and may announce a new currency or trading system to counteract the American-led system. BRICS doesn't have to replace the dollar, it just has to threaten it, as finance is based on confidence. Putin will maintain a close relationship with China; he needs China to remain neutral so Russia can pressure the American empire. Over the next few years, the Ukraine war will continue without expanding. Iran will take the initiative against the United States. North Korea will become more belligerent, forcing America to focus on East Asia. The relationship between Putin and Xi Jinping will strengthen.

Rick and the other speaker discuss using financial warfare to destabilize Venezuela and Brazil and to influence the outcome in Ukraine with a projection of oil at $20 per barrel. They propose that a $20 oil price would grab Putin’s attention more than any weapon system. Venezuela is described as utterly dependent on oil, Brazil as dependent as well, making them vulnerable targets for financial pressure. They consider bombing labs and cartel depots in Venezuela but argue that financial techniques are the number one option, with the potential to destabilize both countries without kinetic action. The other speaker questions the practicality and broader consequences, noting that at $20 per barrel, frackers could be bankrupted and Saudi Arabia’s economic model—driven by high lifting costs and survival needs—could be jeopardized, suggesting that domino effects could occur beyond Maduro’s government. Rick responds that there are many approaches beyond bombing, and reinforces that oil prices could drop for reasons unrelated to financial warfare, which could still pressure the targets. He argues that oil may head toward low prices anyway and that there are numerous techniques—banking system disruption, hacking, power grid interference—that could destabilize these nations. He points to Russia as an example where sanctions or pressure did not fully work due to Russia’s alliances, resources, and China ties, while noting Brazil is more vulnerable and Venezuela absolutely vulnerable. They also touch on geopolitical dynamics: they agree with Brazil’s direction and Bolsonaro’s situation, signaling support for active measures against those trends. They emphasize that these measures do not need to involve bombs or kinetic methods, highlighting that powerful financial techniques can be used to achieve strategic goals. The conversation closes with a reaffirmation that aggressive financial strategies could be employed to influence both countries and, indirectly, the broader geopolitical landscape, including actions related to Ukraine.

Speaker 0 suggests that excessive activism is inappropriate, advocating for gradual, individual actions. Speaker 1 states that Russia did not abandon the dollar; instead, they were forced out of using it. They claim that 95% of Russia's external trade is now in national currencies. Speaker 1 asserts that this shift was a result of actions taken against Russia, and that predictions of Russia's collapse have been proven wrong.

On December 9, 2022, Xi Jinping reportedly stated during a state visit to Riyadh that Palestine should be addressed as a state with 1967 borders and a capital in Jerusalem, a claim not covered by Western media but reported in Middle East press. In the afternoon, he invited the six Gulf Cooperation Council states to trade oil and gas in Shanghai for yuan, signaling the end of the Bretton Woods system. The speaker published a commentary on their website asserting that Bretton Woods ended that day, a claim they felt Western media ignored, leading them to develop multicurrency mercantilism as a handbook for understanding future developments. The alternative to the dollar, according to the speaker, is the dollar plus all other currencies and commodities. The ruble, yuan, rand, UAE dirham, Malaysian ringgit, or any currency that two parties to a transaction accept, along with gold, oil, and recently silver and other commodities, can serve as stores of value or economic inputs. The transition to alternatives could be stable unless there is wider war. Historically, transitions from a hegemonic currency to a rival currency have been accompanied by world wars. The dollar replaced sterling after World War I and established dominance after World War II. The central question is whether a new hegemon will emerge and how the United States’ willingness to use violence to preserve hegemony will fare given its growing economic dependence on China and vulnerability. China is not forcing use of the yuan; it invites use, but participants are not obligated. Globalization, the speaker argues, accelerates as more than 40% of the global economy under sanctions (e.g., Iran, Russia) gains optionality to use other currencies, re-integrating with global trade. Russia is engaging in substantial trade with India and China, selling oil and gas, while Iran trades with China as its main oil buyer. Venezuela, previously a major oil supplier to China, faced sanctions; the speaker notes it was invaded yesterday, implying altered trade dynamics. The “Angel Paradox,” named after Norman Angell, posits that sanctions harm the sanctioner more than the sanctioned when interdependent economies go to war; this paradox has been reinforced, particularly with Russia, which has become more sovereign and less dependent on Europe after 19 rounds of sanctions, emerging stronger and contributing to Russia becoming the world’s fourth-largest economy, with the ruble performing well in 2025. Europe, the speaker contends, has weakened due to energy costs, and 19 rounds of sanctions have diminished its growth and industrial capacity. The concept of resiliency, stability, and inflation is highlighted: trading in one’s own currency with partner currencies yields more predictable flows, reduces volatility, and may lower inflation while enabling steadier long-run growth. The speaker notes that more countries have moved to local currency trade since 2022, illustrating the ongoing shift away from hegemonic currencies. Speaker 1 adds that Russia did not anticipate SWIFT exclusion and responded by mandating ruble payments for oil and gas, accelerating the development and globalization of Russia’s own payment system, MIRS, akin to SIPs, and praising Central Bank Governor Elvira Nebolmina for stabilizing the transition.

Vladimir Putin presents a long, historically framed justification for Russia’s actions and the Ukraine conflict, arguing that Ukraine’s status and borders have been shaped by centuries of Russian influence, foreign domination, and shifting empires. He begins by outlining Ukraine’s origins in a narrative of a centralized Russian state forming around Kyiv and Novgorod, with key moments including the adoption of Orthodoxy in 988, the fragmentation of Rus, and the subsequent rise of Moscow as the center of a unified Russian state. He asserts that lands now in Ukraine were historically part of Russia, and that Polish and Lithuanian unions, as well as later Polish oppression and colonization, shaped Ukrainian identity as a fringe or border region rather than a separate nation. He claims documents show Ukrainian lands and peoples sought Moscow’s rule in 1654 and that Catherine the Great later reclaimed those lands for Russia, reinforcing a line that Ukraine’s borders were continually redrawn by empires. Putin emphasizes that the Soviet period created a Soviet Ukraine, and that Lenin’s decisions and Ukrainianization policies made Ukraine an “artificial state” formed by Stalin’s later redrawing of borders after World War II, incorporating Black Sea lands and other territories into the Ukrainian republic. He questions whether Hungary or other neighbors should reclaim lands lost in earlier centuries, and shares a personal anecdote about Hungarians in Western Ukraine as evidence of long-standing ethnic ties there. He suggests that post-Soviet borders were decided under coercive international pressures and that NATO’s expansion violated assurances given to Russia in 1990 not to expand eastward. The interview then moves to the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s expectation of a welcoming partnership with the West that did not materialize. Putin contends that NATO expanded five times despite Russian hopes for cooperation, and recounts a perceived Western willingness to undermine Russia’s security through missile defense systems, support for separatists in the Caucasus, and a “special relationship” with Ukraine. He tells a story of a 2000s-era dialogue with US leaders about a joint missile defense system, describing assurances from US officials (Gates, Rice) that such cooperation might occur, which he says later failed and led Russia to develop its own hypersonic capabilities in response. He insists that the West’s treatment of Serbia in the 1990s—bombing Belgrade and overriding UN norms—demonstrates a double standard and a willingness to ignore international law when it serves Western interests. He asserts that the Bucharest 2008 agreement promised NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia, despite opposition from Germany, France, and others, and claims that President Bush pressured European partners to expand NATO anyway. He argues that Ukraine’s move toward association with the EU would harm Russian economic interests, given their interlinked industries, and that Yanukovych’s hesitation to sign the association agreement was abruptly exploited by the West, leading to the Maidan coup in 2014. On the Donbas and Minsk, Putin states that Ukraine’s leadership in 2014 declared they would not implement Minsk and that Western leaders openly admitted they never intended to implement Minsk. He says Russia’s goal was to stop the war started by neo-Nazis in Ukraine in 2014, not to invade in 2022, and he blames the West for pushing Ukraine toward militarization and for pressuring Kyiv. He claims the current Ukrainian leadership and its foreign backers refused to engage in negotiations and even banned talks with Russia, citing Istanbul negotiations as a missed opportunity that could have ended the war many months earlier. Denazification is presented as a central objective: Putin describes a nationalist Ukrainian movement that idolizes figures who collaborated with Nazi Germany, culminating in neo-Nazi iconography and the glorification of Bandera-era figures. He argues that Ukraine’s leadership and legislature have supported or tolerated neo-Nazi symbolism, including a Canadian parliament ceremony supporting a former SS member who fought against Russians. He insists denazification would mean prohibiting neo-Nazi movements at the legislative level and removing their influence in Ukraine, and says Ukraine’s leadership has refused to implement this, contrasting it with Istanbul’s negotiated proposals that supposedly prohibited Nazism in Ukraine. Regarding negotiations and settlements, Putin says Russia is open to dialogue and that Istanbul proposals could have ended the conflict eighteen to twenty-four months earlier if not for Western influence, particularly Johnson’s opposition. He states Russia is not seeking to humiliate Ukraine but wants a negotiated settlement, including the withdrawal of troops and protection for Russian-speaking populations. He suggests that Zelenskyy’s freedom to negotiate exists, but asserts Kyiv’s decrees and the influence of the United States and its allies have prevented meaningful talks. He contends that the Ukraine conflict is driven by a Western-led alliance system that seeks to deter Russia and preserve strategic advantages, while Russia seeks a multipolar world where security is shared. In discussing geopolitics and economics, Putin argues the global order is shifting. He notes a rising China and a growing BRICS, with the United States increasingly using sanctions and weaponizing the dollar, which he believes undermines American power. He provides statistics: Russia’s share of dollar-denominated trade has fallen, yuan and ruble use have risen, and he suggests the dollar’s role as a reserve currency is eroding as countries seek alternatives. He asserts that the world should not be split into two blocs and that cooperation with China is essential, highlighting a bilateral trade volume with China around 230–240 billion dollars and saying their trade is balanced and high-tech oriented. Finally, Putin discusses broader questions about religion and identity, linking Orthodoxy to Russian national character and arguing that Russia’s spiritual and cultural ties unify diverse peoples within the country. He rejects the notion that war contradicts Christian ethics, arguing that defending the homeland and its people is a form of protection rather than aggression. Throughout the interview, Putin reframes the Ukraine conflict as a consequence of Western expansion and security policy, presents Russia as seeking peace and dialogue, and positions Moscow as defending historical legitimacy, protecting Russian-speaking populations, and resisting a re-drawn European security architecture that he argues threatens Russia’s sovereignty. He repeatedly points to missed opportunities for negotiated settlement and emphasizes that additional talks remain possible if Western leadership chooses to engage in good faith.

The speaker argues that using the dollar as a tool of foreign policy is one of the biggest strategic mistakes by the US political leadership, stating that the dollar is the cornerstone of US power and that printing more dollars leads to their wide dispersion worldwide. Inflation in the United States is described as minimal, about 3% to 3.4%, and the speaker asserts that the US will not stop printing. The debt of $33 trillion is said to indicate emission, and the dollar is described as the main weapon used by the United States to preserve its power globally. Once the political leadership decided to use the US dollar as a tool of political struggle, the speaker claims a blow was dealt to American power. The speaker avoids strong language but calls the strategy a stupid thing to do and a grave mistake, pointing to world events as evidence. The speaker notes that US allies are downsizing their dollar reserves, and asserts that these actions cause everyone to seek ways to protect themselves. They claim that US restrictive measures—such as placing restrictions on transactions and freezing assets—cause great concern and send a signal to the world. A historical point is made: until 2022, about 80% of Russian foreign trade transactions were conducted in US dollars and euros, with US dollars accounting for approximately 50% of Russia’s transactions with third countries; currently, the share is down to 13%. The speaker emphasizes that Russia did not ban the use of the US dollar; it was a decision by the United States to restrict transactions in US dollars. The speaker contends that the policy is foolish from the standpoint of US interests and taxpayers because it damages the US economy and undermines US power, and notes that transactions in Yuan accounted for about 3%. Today, 34% of transactions are in rubles, and a little over 34% in yuan. The speaker asks why the United States did this, offering “self conceit” as the guess, claiming the US probably thought it would lead to full collapse, but nothing collapsed. Additionally, the speaker states that other countries, including oil producers, are thinking of and already accepting payments for oil in yuan. The question is posed to the United States about whether anyone realizes what is happening and what they are doing, as the speaker suggests that the US is cutting itself off. Finally, the speaker asserts that all experts say this, and that anyone intelligent in the United States should understand what the dollar means for the US, but claims the US is “killing it with your own hand.”

We will discuss the entry of new countries and I believe that if they comply with the established rules, we will accept their entry. Our president, Luiz Inácio Lourenço, has traveled to Saudi Arabia and I support the idea of having our own currency for trade between countries. Why does Brazil need the dollar to trade with China or Argentina? We can use our own currencies. Additionally, I think the BRICS Bank should be more effective and generous than the IMF. The bank exists to help save countries, not to establish them, which is what the IMF often does.