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We saw a man crawling on a roof with a rifle while Trump was speaking. We alerted the police and Secret Service, but they seemed unaware. Eventually, the man was shot by the Secret Service. The speaker is certain the shots came from the man on the roof.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

A Microsoft certified security expert provided evidence of a Dominion vote counting machine in a swing state with a wireless card connected to a thermostat's wireless network. The IP address traced back to a city in China, linked to a Chinese corporation involved in questionable dealings with American politicians. There is a thick binder of documented evidence showing foreign access and interference in the election, including public statements from the FBI and DHS warning about Iran's involvement. The evidence is undeniable, and those questioning it should argue with the FBI and DHS. The photographs and IPs provide conclusive proof of foreign interference in the voting systems.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

Speaker 0 recounts discovering a secret SCIF on campus, a secure facility with files nobody knew existed. An employee walked by a door, inquiries were made, the room was entered, and individuals were found working there with secret files on controversial topics. Those files have been turned over to attorneys and the speaker is pursuing what happened. The speaker notes that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) knows every traveler entering the country and every good that comes in, and they assess and collect tariffs. They highlight that information about travelers during COVID was with national labs under the speaker’s jurisdiction, and that scientists at those labs participated with the Wuhan lab. The speaker claims these scientists traveled back and forth between each other and worked on those experiments, describing this as eye-opening. Addressing Elon and his team, the speaker says they were extremely helpful since the speaker’s arrival in office, assisting in identifying a troubling issue: some of the speaker’s own department employees had downloaded software on the speaker’s phone and laptop to spy on them and record meetings. The speaker states that this had happened to several politicians and notes that bringing in technology experts helped reveal this software; without examining laptops and phones, the activity would still be ongoing. The speaker emphasizes a need to continue partnering with technology companies and experts to bring them in for assistance, as government work—especially within the department under the speaker’s jurisdiction—has been neglected and lagging behind what it should be. The speaker recalls that in the first four months, they couldn’t even email a PowerPoint from Department of Homeland Security servers if it was longer than six pages, illustrating what they view as backwards thinking that hindered national security. The speaker reflects on the concept of a deep state, admitting that they previously believed it existed but didn’t realize how severe it was. They describe daily efforts to uncover individuals who do not love America and who work within the Department and across the federal government. The overall message conveys uncovering secrecy, internal surveillance concerns, cross-agency connections involving CBP and national labs, collaboration with tech experts, and a strong critique of past departmental conduct and systemic protection failures.

Speaker 1 argues there are several issues with Brian Harpel’s narrative. First, a records request found 20 911 calls related to Charlie Kirk’s death and the Utah Valley University shooting; none of the calls came from Brian Harpold or anyone on his security staff. 911 does not have any record of their call, which is presented as problem number one. Second, the question is who could have called 911 if the five men in the car describe their actions during the drive to the hospital. Brian Harpole had dropped his phone at UVU, and Frank Turick’s phone was stuck on FaceTime the whole time, according to him. The listener is invited to determine who possibly made the 911 call, when it was made, and why Harpole would claim a call was made if it did not occur. Speaker 2 recounts the drive to the hospital: they ran toward the security team, got into the SUV with Justin driving, Dan in the front with GPS, Rick to the left holding Charlie’s head, and Brian at Charlie’s feet. Charlie is described as so large that the door wouldn’t close, prompting commands to “go, go, go.” The group heads to the hospital, driving without lights or sirens, breaking intersections, and beeping the horn. An ambulance is described as approaching from the venue; they decide to continue. Justin is praised as a trained driver, using exact directions for turns. Rick and the speaker are in the back; Charlie’s left leg is down in the door, preventing the door from closing. The speaker is on their knees doing medical care with Rick and Charlie’s life in danger, shouting and performing CPR. Speaker 3 adds details: they open the back door, drag Charlie in, Justin drives 60–100 mph, Charlie’s tallness prevents the door from closing, and they continue driving. The speaker describes continuing medical care in the car, including stopping to perform CPR, and the door not closing because of Charlie’s size. They reach the hospital, put Charlie on a gurney, and wheel him inside. The staff are described as unaware of their arrival, since they had called 911 but arrived in bloodied condition. The speaker notes his phone came out during unloading, and that he had been FaceTiming his wife and later Spencer during the event. He explains that he left the phone in his back pocket once the shooting occurred. Speaker 1 concludes: Turick’s phone was stuck on FaceTime and did not make any calls; Rick Cutler was praying and cradling Charlie’s head, and holding Harpole to keep him from flying out of the SUV while tending to Charlie. Brian Harpole did not make any call and did not use his own phone since it was left at UVU. Justin, the driver, drove aggressively through intersections, while Dan Flood directed from the passenger seat. The question remains whether any 911 calls were made during the high-speed conveyance, given 911 calls last 30 seconds to 2 minutes, and whether anyone had a free moment to place a call. The speaker questions if a 911 call was made at all, and why Harpole would misremember a 911 call if none occurred. The hospital’s lack of notification suggests the 911 call may not have been successful, or may not have been made, and the speaker commits to continuing the investigation, asking for input on what happened to the missing 911 call.

Every precaution was taken, yet a catastrophic failure occurred during a presidential event. Questions arose regarding the Secret Service's response, specifically the lack of sufficient personnel and communication breakdowns. Whistleblowers reported that the Secret Service denied requests for additional resources, and that crucial information about the shooter was not relayed to the protective detail. The shooter was observed for an extended period before firing. Concerns were raised about the size and location of the security perimeter, which excluded a building within rifle range of the stage. The Secret Service's response is being heavily scrutinized, with questions raised about decisions made regarding resource allocation, communication protocols, and response times. An investigation is underway.

This was a significant security failure. A man was murdered, and three people, including President Trump, were shot on live television. Despite the severity, media coverage has been minimal. Having worked in the Secret Service for 12 years, I see three major issues: 1. **Technology**: The agency relies on outdated systems and equipment, which is unacceptable. 2. **Budget Mismanagement**: The "more with less" approach is flawed; they received more funding but produced less effective security. 3. **Investigative Focus**: The Secret Service should prioritize protection over counterfeiting investigations, which can be handled by other agencies. We need to address these problems to prevent future failures. Thank you for your time.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker urgently called General Walker to request the National Guard's assistance at the Capitol. Despite the imminent danger, the speaker faced resistance from higher-ups who didn't like the optics of the National Guard's presence. The speaker pleaded for help, but was denied multiple times. Eventually, shots were fired, and the speaker had to hang up to handle the situation. The National Guard didn't arrive until 6 PM, and instead of being deployed at the Capitol, they were driven back to the DC Army. The speaker felt betrayed and questioned if there was a conspiracy against protecting the Capitol. The systematic denial of intelligence and support from various agencies led to the baffling conclusion of not protecting the capital.

The speaker was surprised to learn about Gwen Towers from Alexa. Gwen Towers, or the Ground Wave Emergency Network, are used to protect US communications during a high altitude nuclear explosion. They operate on low radio waves and are a backup when regular radio is disrupted.

In a coup situation, one way to chip away at the systems maintaining power is to take over a local TV station to broadcast a call for people to join. In New York, three antennas control all telecommunications. It's important to consider what communication systems "we" have versus "them." The speaker advocates getting ahead of potential issues by organizing resources and knowing what actions to take so that "we" can deploy rapidly.

The caller, Michael Khoury, reports a federal violation involving the Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson. He claims that Ericsson has admitted to funding and sponsoring ISIS for over 17 years. Michael believes that Ericsson's control over critical infrastructure, including the 911 system, is causing issues with emergency services. He has written a report on the matter and plans to speak before Congress. Michael also mentions that Ericsson has been sued for aiding in the killing of American soldiers. He provides details about Ericsson's subsidiary, Iconnective, and their contract with the FCC. Michael expresses concerns about the compromised security and urges action to address the situation.

Speaker 0: Five major threats make the grid extremely vulnerable: cyber, hackers, physical threats, solar EMP, and man-made EMP. The concern is that when they hear the risk analysis, officials may hear it but won’t take action. Speaker 1: There are 18 critical infrastructures in the United States (food, water, transportation, communications, etc.). All 17 of the others depend on electricity. Speaker 2: If our grid goes down, you can't cook, you can't heat anything, you can't run medical supplies, you can't talk on your phone, you can't take money out of a bank, and we turn into total chaos. Speaker 3: If this happens, the system stops. Stops. Speaker 2: If a transformer is taken down, we have to order it from Germany or China. It's going to take a year. Speaker 1: Up till recently, there were no comprehensive protective solutions available. Speaker 4: We know what the solutions are. They're not expensive. They're not difficult to employ. We just need the political will to do it and the follow through on the part of the electric utilities to get it done. Speaker 3: The White House is protected from an EMP. The congress and the CIA and the NSA, all of the areas that need to function at the government are protected. So why can't we be protected? Speaker 1: Around some of these facilities, you don't have much more than a chain link fence to keep people out. That seems absurd to me. Speaker 5: I think it is absurd when we now know that attack on as few as nine grid substations could bring down all three major interconnections for The United States grid. Speaker 3: If the power goes out, you get the generator. And if that goes out, you get another one. There's never been a plan for what happens after that. Speaker 1: Director of the National Security Agency, Admiral Rogers, came out and said, it's not a matter of if, it's a matter of when.

The discussion identifies five major threats to the electric grid: cyber attacks, hackers, physical threats, solar EMP, and man-made EMP. The speakers express concern that once this risk analysis is presented to congressional officials, they hear the warnings but are reluctant to take action. They note that there are 18 critical infrastructures in the United States (food, water, transportation, communications, etc.), and all 17 of the others depend on electricity. If the grid goes down, basic activities are disrupted: cooking, heating, medical supplies, phone communication, banking access, and overall societal function could deteriorate into chaos. A single transformer outage is especially critical because replacement would require ordering from Germany or China and could take a year. Historically, there were no comprehensive protective solutions available, but the speakers claim that the solutions exist now. They assert that the solutions are not expensive or difficult to implement; what is lacking is political will and follow-through by electric utilities. They contrast protection for the White House, Congress, the CIA, and the NSA with a lack of protection for many grid facilities, noting that around some facilities there is little more than a chain-link fence to keep people out, which they find absurd. A key point is that an attack on as few as nine grid substations could bring down all three major interconnections of the U.S. grid. The following consequence chain is described: if the power goes out, people would rely on generators, and if those fail, there is no plan for what happens next. The statement concludes with Admiral Mike Rogers of the National Security Agency saying that it is not a matter of if, but when a grid disruption will occur.

When dialing 911, your call is routed through iConnective, a subsidiary of Ericsson. An investigation revealed that Ericsson sought permission from ISIS to operate in their territories and engaged in corrupt practices in Iraq, leading to a $1 billion settlement with the U.S. Justice Department. Despite acknowledging their misconduct, Ericsson faced minimal accountability for executives involved. The investigation raised concerns about national security, especially given Ericsson’s control over critical telecommunications infrastructure. The lack of oversight allows potential vulnerabilities, as evidenced by past emergency failures. Current lawsuits involve families of veterans who died due to these failures, highlighting the urgent need for accountability and reform in telecommunications governance. The interconnectedness of these issues underscores the risks posed by foreign control over essential services.

The speaker found it alarming that Asheville was reportedly disconnected from all roads, with nobody allowed in or out. Upon arriving in Asheville, the speaker set up personal Starlink devices at hotels where state troopers were staying. The troopers then flocked to the Starlink devices because they lacked connectivity, their radios were unusable, and they hadn't been provided Starlinks. The speaker claims that Biden, Harris, and Governor Roy Cooper illegally canceled the contracts for these Starlinks, leaving first responders unable to communicate. The speaker believes this lack of communication cost lives and that private citizens had to provide their own Starlink devices.

Every precaution was taken, yet President Kennedy's assassination nearly repeated itself on July 13th. Cascading failures allowed the shooter to outmaneuver security. Questions arose regarding the Secret Service's response to the threat, particularly the disparity in resource allocation between First Lady Jill Biden's and former President Trump's events. Whistleblowers revealed unchecked IDs, obstructed lines of sight, and insufficient personnel at Trump's rally. Concerns emerged about communication breakdowns, delayed responses, and the possibility of a stand-down order. The lack of recorded communications and the absence of a vulnerability assessment further compounded the issues. Investigations are underway, but questions remain about the failures leading to the attempted assassination.

A US Senate report revealed security failures by the Secret Service during the assassination attempt on Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania. The Secret Service was notified about a suspicious person with a rangefinder 27 minutes before the shooting. A counter sniper saw law enforcement running towards the AGR building with guns drawn but didn't alert Trump's detail to remove him from the stage. Secret Service personnel claimed to be unaware of credible threat intelligence, despite being sent in response to such intelligence. Advanced agents denied responsibility for planning or security failures and couldn't identify who had final decision authority. Local law enforcement raised concerns about security coverage. The CEUAS system experienced technical problems, and officers reported radio issues. The committee found that the Secret Service failures were foreseeable, preventable, and directly related to the assassination attempt. The speaker then pivots to discussing tax relief, urging viewers to contact Tax Relief Network at tnusa.com/vnn or 1-800-958-1000 to address back taxes owed to the IRS.

- The speaker discusses a potential connection between electromagnetic radiation (EMR) and diabetes, noting that there has been a slight increase in diabetes rates associated with the rapid expansion of cellular towers, such as after Bill Clinton’s policy changes. - They acknowledge that EMR is not claimed to be the sole cause of diabetes, but suggest that historical data and curves make it tempting to believe EMR could be a significant factor. - The speaker points out that the topic has been present in scientific literature since at least 1931, and asserts that conventional medicine would push back against this viewpoint, with medical education focused on sugar and other factors. - They emphasize that they are not naive and do not claim EMR is the only cause; rather, the implication is that EMR could contribute to diabetes risk. - The argument culminates in a warning: if power systems and telecommunications infrastructure are not designed more carefully, there will be health and national budget costs, implying broader consequences for public health and economic burden.

Our technology teams discovered a concerning issue with connected devices at a polling location. Despite the devices not supposed to have Wi-Fi, they were found to be communicating in real time, both receiving and sending data. This should never happen, and we have documented the incident. We cannot disclose the location, but we have confirmed it in multiple places. There are three types of machines involved: a scanner, a ballot marking device, and a polling pad. The communication is happening through the polling pad, which is used for checking everything. This access could potentially allow someone to manipulate and modify the data being exchanged in the system.

Day 10 after the hurricane in North Carolina, the speaker is at an airport in Boone, where Elon Musk provided several hundred Starlink units. The speaker is deploying in a second wave on Blackhawk helicopters into isolated areas to deliver the units. The first deployment will provide internet access for prescriptions and allow residents to communicate their needs. Upon arrival, locals reported that no aid, including FEMA, had reached them yet, and they felt abandoned.

Foreign adversaries are using direct energy weapons on US citizens, known as Savannah Syndrome. A classified briefing revealed the severity of the situation, leaving the speaker, a former Navy SEAL, shaken. The speaker emphasizes the importance of the upcoming election due to leadership failures.