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Ashton Rifenski opens Going Underground from the UAE, referencing Antonio Gramsci and the idea of hegemony, and frames the day as one where the UN Security Council discusses maritime security in the context of what he describes as calls by Donald Trump that have “destroyed” that security, highlighting the Strait of Hormuz as half Iranian and half Omani owned and the broader global impact on prices for fuel, medicine, and food. He notes a visit by a “vassal state king” to Trump and contrasts it with the anticipated visit of Trump to the country with the largest economy by PPP powered by Iranian and Russian energy, suggesting that when Trump meets Xi Jinping, the U.S. life expectancy gap with Shanghai will be evident. Victor Gao, vice president of the Center for China and Globalization, joins from Beijing. Rifenski asks about a Financial Times headline claiming Tehran deployed a Chinese satellite to target U.S. bases in the Middle East and about U.S. claims that foreign entities, principally based in China, are engaged in deliberate industrial-scale campaigns, questioning whether China is supplying weapons to Iran. Gao responds by challenging the Financial Times’ premise, asserting that the UK paper is “owned by Japanese interests” and that China provides commercial satellite services openly available for international cooperation. He contends that China can engage in “commercial normal satellite services with any country,” including Iran, and says targeting versus weapons are distinct issues. He reiterates China’s position that it does not supply weapons to any country at war, and notes that China calls for an immediate end to the war and supports the UN Charter and international law, mentioning that the UN Secretary-General described the war as an aggression by the United States and Israel against Iran. Rifenski presses Gao on why China wouldn’t supply arms to Iran despite Iran’s energy ties with China. Gao emphasizes Iran’s capability to defend its sovereignty and notes no specific requests have been made by Iran for Chinese military aid, asserting China’s opposition to any allegation of arming Iran. He adds that Iran has demonstrated drones, missiles, and long-range capabilities, and states that China supports ending the war rather than escalating it. The discussion then shifts to whether China should have hosted negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. Gao notes Trump’s recent acknowledgment of China’s role in nudging Iran and the U.S. toward talks, highlighting Beijing’s diplomatic outreach via Wang Yi to over 20 foreign ministers to de-escalate. He mentions Pakistan as an intermediary and argues that China has sought a positive role, possibly facilitating or supplementing Pakistan’s efforts, while acknowledging uncertainty over Israel’s willingness to support a peace deal. Gao insists China’s commitment is to end the war and achieve peace. Rifenski and Gao discuss the broader implications of U.S.-China relations, the perception that the war is a test of U.S. strength, and the notion that China views a war with the United States as unwinnable for the U.S. He asserts that China aims to avoid headlined confrontations and prefers behind-the-scenes diplomacy, contrasting China’s approach with Western narratives. Gao argues that the global economy would suffer from U.S. aggression and asserts that the so-called Pax Americana is ending, accelerated by Trump’s policies. He notes China’s decreasing holdings of U.S. Treasuries and suggests the yuan’s growing role in international trade, predicting yuan settlement could rise from about 2.5-3% to 25-30% in the long term as more oil trades settle in renminbi. The interview closes with Gao offering advice to GCC countries, stressing that China’s involvement has historically led to peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia, while U.S. and Israeli involvement has led to hostility. He urges Middle Eastern actors to engage with China as a defender of free trade and peace, and to consider cooperation with China after the war to foster long-term regional stability.

Gilbert Doktorov is asked how the Iran war is reshaping dynamics in the East, especially for Russia and China, and what the broader implications are for global order. - On Russia’s stance and reaction: Doktorov notes a gap between the Kremlin’s official positions and what “chattering classes” discuss. He observes astonishingly limited reaction from President Putin and his close foreign-policy circle to dramatic developments that could redefine regional and global orders. He contrasts Putin’s cautious, “slow-war” approach with sharper criticisms from other Russian voices (e.g., Salaviyev and Alexander Dugin) who urge moving beyond a gradual strategy. There is a sense within some Russian circles that a more assertive stance may be required, yet official channels show restraint. - On Iran’s strategic position and alliances: He points out that Iran has withstood intense pressure and maintained the ability to threaten Gulf energy infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz, thereby sustaining global leverage despite severe attacks. Iran has managed to survive and press the global energy market, calling into question how meaningful Iran’s inclusion in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is in practice. He notes scant evidence of meaningful Russian or Chinese military or intelligence support to Iran in public accounts, and cites Israeli claims of Russian arms shipments being denied by Moscow. - On the West’s behavior and international law: The discussion highlights what is described as the United States’ “might makes right” posture and the dismissiveness toward traditional international-law norms, including UN Charter commitments. The panelists contrast American rhetoric about legality with its real-world actions, and discuss how Russia’s and China’s responses have been cautious or critical rather than conciliatory or confrontational. - On potential military cooperation and bloc dynamics: The conversation explores whether a deeper Russia-China-North Korea alignment could emerge in reaction to US and Israeli actions against Iran. Doktorov mentions that North Korea is viewed as a, “will and determination to act,” supplying munitions such as underwater drones and missiles to Iran, whereas Russia and China are characterized as more talk than action. He argues Moscow benefits from maintaining broad, non-aligned diplomacy, but acknowledges a shift in Russian thinking after recent events toward more decisive posture. - On Europe and the US-European split: The panel discusses the European Union’s fragility and its leaders’ inconsistent responses to the Iran crisis and to US pressure. They consider European solidarity rhetoric as a cover for avoiding hard choices, with examples including Belgian leadership suggesting normalization with Russia post-conflict. The discussion reflects concern that EU leaders may be forced to confront realignments as Gulf energy supplies and US LNG leverage reshape Europe’s energy security and political calculus. - On diplomacy and pathways forward: The speakers debate the prospects for diplomacy, including possible three-way or broader security arrangements, and whether Alaska or other meeting points could offer reprieve. They note a public split within Moscow’s foreign-policy establishment about how to proceed, with internal figures pushing for diplomacy and others advocating a stronger balance of power. There is explicit skepticism about the utility of negotiations with Donald Trump and the idea that the war could end on the battlefield rather than through diplomacy. - On the Ukraine war’s interconnection: The discussion emphasizes that the Iran crisis has global ramifications that feed back into Ukraine, noting that Russia’s current posture and Western responses influence the Ukraine conflict. Doktorov highlights that the depletion of US air defenses observed in the Israel-Iran context affects Ukraine, underscoring the interrelatedness of the two wars and their combined impact on global power dynamics. - Final takeaway: The dialogue reiterates that the Iran war has a global dimension with the two wars being intimately connected; the Iran conflict reshapes alliances, energy security, and strategic calculations across Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, while signaling a potential reconfiguration of Western alliances and multipolar governance.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Brandon and Kieran Andrew discuss the mounting regional dynamics as the Iran war drags into its fourth week. They agree on the possibility of serious unrest in at least one or two Arab countries in the coming years, though they caution not to overstate things. They note that the Gulf states lack a strong social contract, so economic volatility and external shocks could push instability, even if regimes recalibrate and survive. Kieran argues the perception in the region is that Iran has punched above its weight, pursuing a strategy of absorbing losses while raising costs for opponents, especially the US and Israel. Across the region, people are furious with the disruption and violence, privately blaming Israel and the United States for attacking Iran, even if publicly they maintain official narratives. Sovereignty violations against Iran are seen as justification for Iranian retaliation, with regimes prioritizing survival and counterattack. They touch on Bahrain as a case study: civil and political fragility, with Shiite civilians allegedly assisting Iranian targeting, and the Bahrain monarch’s status complicating regional dynamics. This feeds into the broader idea that a new Arab Spring is plausible in the Gulf as governments face popular pressures and a deteriorating social contract. Brandon reflects on the American role, noting the US prioritized defending Israeli targets over its own bases in the region, which erodes trust among Arab states. This feeds a fear that American retreat could materialize, altering long-standing regional alignments and making it harder to maintain bases or security commitments. The conversation shifts to the US-Israel relationship. They discuss the “wolf’s milk of nationalism” and how many Israelis are conditioned to view themselves as besieged and exceptional, which shapes policy and public opinion. They critique a top Israeli official’s stance that the Strait of Hormuz is not Israel’s concern, calling it insane and arguing that open sea lanes affect everyone. They contrast Israel’s unified national narrative with the region’s broader interests, suggesting that the Israeli leadership often acts in ways that may be unsustainable in the long run. They discuss the economics of the conflict. The IEA highlighted that oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 produced a combined loss of about 10 million barrels per day; in this war, about 11 million barrels per day have been lost on average. Gas losses are also significant, with 2022 spikes reversing and accelerating inflation. They warn about broader macro effects: rising inflation (Goldman Sachs predicting 4.5% in the US), higher interest rates, stock market risks, and potential AI-related energy and helium shortages that could undermine tech-driven growth. They emphasize that this energy shock could feed a broader recession in the West. They debate possible endgames. Scenario one: Trump constructs a narrative that the US won, reaching a face-saving deal with Iran to “cover up” a catastrophic outcome; Iran then consolidates a more entrenched, economically weakened regime, and the US must manage the fallout with bases and allies. Scenario two: deployment of US troops leads to a quagmire, with escalating casualties and a draw-out conflict that could push toward nuclear risk. Scenario three: arguably not distinct, but a continued escalation toward wider conflict, potentially drawing in adversaries or increasing regional volatility. They see scenario two as more likely, driven by Israeli pressure and ongoing US engagement, possibly culminating in escalation to nuclear threats. They consider Russia and China’s roles. Russia is viewed as aligned with China; China is playing a cautious, calculating game, avoiding direct involvement while expanding its influence through trade and joint exercises with client states. They argue China’s approach could accelerate American decline and shift influence toward Beijing’s orbit over the next 15–30 years, with Pacific allies and others gravitating toward China for stability and economic ties, even if not openly allied. Iran remains central. They discuss Iran’s resilience: even if economic conditions deteriorate, the regime could deepen its internal consolidation and broaden its persistence through institutions and praetorian guard support. If nukes were used or if retaliation escalates, the regime’s survivability would hinge on its decentralized structure and potential for hardline consolidation. Brandon asks about the possible brain drain and long-term sustainability of Israel if the conflict endures. Kieran warns that even if Israel survives militarily, it faces a Pyrrhic victory with existential threats from within, including demographic shifts, brain drain, and an economy sustained by a war footing and American aid, which may not be sustainable in the long run. Brain drain and domestic social fractures could undermine Israel’s stability and economic vitality, especially once the immediate military crisis subsides. Towards the end, they acknowledge that the war’s trajectory will likely redefine US influence, the Gulf’s political landscape, and Israel’s future. They conclude with mutual acknowledgment of the complexities, agreeing that the situation is poised to reshape regional and global power dynamics for years to come, and that the path forward remains uncertain and dangerous. They sign off with plans to reconnect, noting Kieran’s Navarra Live and other media appearances.

Glenn and Professor Zhang discuss the trajectory of global conflict and the transformation of the world order. Zhang presents several lines of evidence and reasoning for a destabilizing, multi-polar era that could culminate in a broader conflict akin to World War III, with 2026 identified as a period of potential flare-ups. Evidence and triggers pointing toward greater conflict: - The American National Security Strategy recently published argues that “the order has dissipated. It’s gone,” and that America must protect its own national self-interest, primarily in the Western Hemisphere, through a “mineral doctrine” and a Trump corollary to enforce it. China’s and Russia’s encroachment in South America, notably via China’s investments, is cited as a trigger for U.S. assertiveness, including the Caribbean concentration of naval assets and actions affecting Venezuela’s oil. - The Russia-Ukraine war is described as effectively over, with morale in Ukraine collapsed and large-scale desertions; Europe contemplates using seized Russian assets to fund Ukraine and avoid a peace that could allow Russia to consolidate gains. Europe’s intended loans to Ukraine and the fear that Russia could challenge European supremacy are highlighted. - In the Middle East, the Israel–Iran dynamic is seen as increasingly unstable, with predictions of Israel attacking Hezbollah and Lebanon within weeks, and ongoing friction around the Hamas peace deal. Iran is portrayed as a pivot in a broader Eurasian alliance that could threaten Western interests if Iran’s lines of trade and energy routes are integrated with Russia and China. - The overall global contest is framed as a struggle over the new world order: the shift from a liberal, rules-based order to multipolar competition where the U.S. seeks to maintain dominance through deterrence, sanctions, and allied proxies. Historical patterns and structural analysis: - Zhang invokes historical analogies, noting the rise and fall pattern of empires, the McKinder Heartland Thesis, and the dynamics of Britain’s naval supremacy that aimed to keep Eurasia fragmented to prevent a continental power from unifying the region. He argues that today China’s rise, paired with U.S. efforts to sustain dominance, pushes toward a similar pendulum where a Eurasian continental system could emerge if Russia, China, Iran, and possibly India align economically and politically. - The BRICS alliance and Iran as a pivot are emphasized: America’s debt-dominated reserve currency system pushes BRICS and Iran closer together, forming a potential continental trade network that could bypass Western-dominated channels. America’s strategy, in this view, is to “economically strangle China,” deny China access to South American minerals, and use allies to counter Beijing while promoting divide-and-rule tactics in Asia. - The discussion suggests that a war could be expanded by a domino effect: a Venezuela operation could draw Cuba, Nicaragua, Brazil, and other regional players into conflict; a wider confrontation could involve the Hormuz Strait, Odessa, and European troop commitments, creating a global escalation. Domestic dimension and leadership implications: - Zhang cites Arthur Spengler’s decline indicators for Western societies: over-urbanization, declining birthrates, extreme inequality, proxy warfare, and cultural decadence, coupled with immigration and fear-based policies that suppress open discourse (examples include social-media surveillance and visa requirements tied to political speech). - He asserts that Western leadership has become addicted to projection and proxy wars, shedding the liberal pretenses that once underpinned its strategy, and that a collapse of confidence and cohesion could accompany, or even drive, a broader conflict. Conclusion and prognosis: - The conversation converges on a bleak frame: the end of U.S. hegemony and a transition to a multipolar order with rising powers, where the possibility of a large-scale war remains real and not easily contained. Zhang argues that the current trajectory does not easily revert to a peaceful status quo and that the 2020s could be a period of sustained tensions and escalations, potentially lasting a decade or more. He acknowledges that he hopes to be proven wrong and would personally prefer a peaceful resolution, but maintains that the next period may be defined by a significant, multipolar contest in which proxies and great-power competition are central.

- The speakers compare Iran and its Revolutionary Guards to Japan in World War II in terms of fighting will and doctrine, arguing that Iran’s forces will fight with fervor similar to Bushido; they emphasize that the notion of American technological superiority or easily defeating Iran is dismissed as crazy. - They discuss Iranian tunnels and underground facilities: Iran allegedly has 40-foot ceilings in tunnels bored into granite, with entrances that can be re-excavated if one is blown. They argue Iran has planned excavator equipment and tunnels with missiles, trucks, and dual-use infrastructure, making superficial bomb damage insufficient to deny underground resilience. - The conversation covers Iran’s strategic geography: Iran is described as highly mountainous, with 18,000-foot peaks more numerous and higher than several U.S. states; the Hormuz coastline is compared to the Badlands. The implication is that Iran’s terrain favors defense and complicates invasion. - They contrast Vietnam-era bombing and lessons with current Iran: drawing parallels between Ho Chi Minh-era campaigns and Iran, they argue that overwhelming air power did not win in Vietnam and would not automatically prevail against Iran’s terrain and defense. They note that Iran could absorb leadership losses and continue resistance. - Iran’s long-term strategy and education are discussed: after forty years of Revolutionary Guard influence, Iran reportedly trains for a state-scale, persistent defense, with strong ideological motivation, and a leadership that refuses to retreat or surrender easily. They claim Khamenei’s public stance—refusing to go into a bunker—signals resolve. - They discuss warfare in the Gulf and across the Strait of Hormuz: the difficulty of a large-scale amphibious invasion is highlighted; the difficulty of moving large Marine units through the Strait is noted, given that Tripoli and Boxer amphibious groups would face serious risk and may not be able to operate in the Hormuz area. The navy’s willingness to risk operations in the Strait is questioned. - They argue that future warfare will rely on drones, precision mass, and non-traditional tactics: Shahed-type drones, sonar-like mine and sea-denial capabilities, and the use of mines with coded triggers are cited as capabilities Iran (and possibly others) could employ. They discuss the potential for drones to collapse airframes on the ground, the vulnerability of air bases to drone swarms, and the need for rapid, distributed, autonomous targeting. - The danger of decapitation-style strikes is debated: while discussing attempts to kill Iranian leaders, they argue that decapitation can backfire by elevating a more aggressive leadership, and that such strategies require accompanying political and military restraint. They note that Israel and U.S. policies in decapitation have not yielded stable regimes, and warn of “hostage” scenarios if larger invasions occur. - The Red Sea and Gulf disruptions are described as potential flashpoints: the speakers discuss the Houthis threatening to close the Red Sea; they argue that such actions would trigger cascades of fuel and food shortages globally and could prompt revolutionary pressures within Gulf states as water, energy, and basic services collapse. - They discuss the broader geopolitical reshaping: the world is seen as breaking into blocs, with a decline of U.S.-led order; Russia and China are described as pursuing energy and security strategies (e.g., pipelines from Russia to China) that bypass traditional sea-lane chokepoints. The Belt and Road initiative is cited as part of a broader shift toward alternative logistics and supply chains. - The contingent risk of economic and humanitarian collapse is stressed: the potential for famine and mass migration if the Strait of Hormuz or major Gulf infrastructure is disrupted is highlighted; the cascade effects would include fuel shortages, water scarcity, and social upheaval in the Gulf and beyond. - The plausibility of a direct US/Israeli invasion of Iran is discussed with cautions: landing Karg Island is described as high-risk and potentially catastrophic (a Gallipoli-like disaster), with arguments that large-scale amphibious landings would face entrenched Iranian defenses, tunnels, and coordinated local resistance. - They discuss strategic planning culture in the U.S. military: the importance of rank progression (O-5 to O-6) and the pressure to assign missions to elite units to justify promotions, which can distort strategic choices; bureaucratic dynamics may influence decisions about using special forces and taking on high-risk operations. - The panelists reference recent geopolitical events and media coverage to illustrate tensions: drone warfare in Ukraine, Israeli strikes and covert activity, naval incidents, and the potential use of false-flag operations or provocations to shape public opinion and political decisions. - In closing, the speakers emphasize that Iran, with its decentralized yet disciplined command structure, underground cities, chess-like strategic planning, and advanced drone capabilities, represents a formidable and evolving challenge. They stress the need to rethink assumptions about tech superiority, consider new paradigms of warfare (drone swarms, precision mass, non-traditional operations), and acknowledge the broader risk of a cascading global crisis should Gulf security collapse or major shipping lanes be disrupted. Matt Bracken and Brandon Weichert promote further discussion with their platforms and projects, inviting listeners to follow their analysis and work. - Notable names and affiliations appearing or referenced: Matt Bracken, Brandon Weichert, Steve Bannon, Joe Kent, Dan Davis, Farid Zakaria (Zakari), and Steve Weinstock-style contributors; the discussion is aired on National Security Talk and Nat Sec Hour with promotional notes for iHeartRadio and social channels.

Professor Zhang and the host discuss a era of rapid systemic upheaval in world order, centered on a peaceful yet unprecedented rise of China and the broader shift of power from West to East. They explore how likely it is that such a major redistribution of international power can occur without triggering major wars among great powers. Key points from the exchange: - Mark Carney’s Davos speech is used as a reference point to counter Donald Trump’s claim that Europe and Canada have free‑ridden on American defense. Carney argues the rules‑based order benefited the American empire but that America’s attitude has shifted away from multilateralism; middle powers must build a rules‑based order to survive, potentially aligning with BRICS. He suggests the Shanghai Gold Exchange and a global gold corridor function as a multilateral, reciprocal framework that could underpin a new financial system, with China emphasizing multilateralism, cooperation, and reciprocity. A central tension is that the American empire will not fade quietly, and the National Security Strategy envisions reshaping empire rule: no more liberal order, more national self-interest, vassalization of allies, and continued strategic challenges to China in all theaters, including Africa, Europe, and South America, even if military presence in East Asia declines. - The discussion contrasts the U.S.‑led multilateral consensus (post‑1945) with the current reality: an elite, close-knit club once governed global decisions, but Trump’s outsider status disrupts that club. This disruption incentivizes Western elites to seek China as a new protector, even as systemic fragility remains due to inequality, corruption, and a large disconnect between political leadership and ordinary people. - The speakers analyze Trump’s strategy as aiming to create a “Trump world order” by replacing the global elite with a new one, reshaping NATO leadership, and supporting more amendable European politicians who favor nationalism and tighter immigration controls. They describe Trump’s broader civil‑military plan, including using ICE to pursue a harsh domestic policy, potentially enabling emergency powers, and provoking a European political realignment through backing parties like Poland’s Law and Justice, Hungary’s Fidesz, Austria’s and Spain’s right‑leaning movements. They argue Trump’s Greenland focus is intended to embarrass NATO leaders and redraw European political loyalties, not merely to seize strategic real estate. - The conversation touches a perceived internal Western crisis: elite arrogance, meritocracy’s failure to connect with ordinary people, and the growing alienation and inequality. They argue this has contributed to the rise of Trump, who some see as a messianic figure for restoring Western civilization, while others view him as seeking to destroy the existing order to rule in a new form. - The guests reflect on the 1990s warning by Richard Rorty that globalization and liberalism could spark a political radicalism among previously disaffected groups, leading to the appeal of strongmen. They connect this to the contemporary surge of nationalist and anti‑elite sentiment across the West, and the collapse of faith in liberal institutions. - Asia’s prospects are examined with skepticism about a simple East Asian century. Zhang highlights four structural challenges: (1) demographic decline and very low fertility in East Asia (e.g., South Korea around 0.6, Japan, China) and its implications for a youthful labor force; (2) high savings rates and the risk this poses for domestic demand; (3) dependence on Middle Eastern oil for East Asian economies during potential global conflict; (4) long‑standing tensions among China, Japan, and Korea. He argues these factors complicate a straightforward rise of Asia and suggests Asia’s future is not guaranteed to outpace the West in global leadership. - Zhang emphasizes the need to recalibrate values away from neoliberal consumerism toward meaning, community, and family. He argues that both capitalism and communism neglected spirituality, leading to widespread alienation; he believes a healing approach would prioritize children, family, and social cohesion as essential to human flourishing. - On Iran, Zhang suggests the United States and Israel aim to destroy and fragment Iran to render it more manageable, while Iran exhibits resilience, unity, and a readiness to fight back against continued external pressure. He notes Iranian leadership now prefers resistance after previously negotiating, and he predicts strong Iranian defense and potential escalation if attacked. He also points to an anticipated false‑flag risk and the broader risk environment seeking a new status quo through diplomacy, not just confrontation. - Finally, the host and Zhang discuss the broader risk landscape: as U.S. leadership declines and regional powers maneuver, a multipolar, chaotic strategic environment could emerge with shifting alliances. They argue for a renewed focus on managing competition and seeking a civilized framework for coexistence, though there is skepticism about whether such a framework will emerge given strategic incentives and current political dynamics.

- The discussion centers on the Strait of Hormuz blockade amid a claimed ceasefire. The hosts question the ceasefire’s meaning, noting the blockade blocks Iranian ports while talk of abiding by a ceasefire continues. They describe the blockade as highly scripted and incomplete: “The US has a version of what’s going on… stopping every ship. There’s not a ship getting out.” Meanwhile, Iran appears to allow some ships to depart, and China-bound oil shipments have reportedly left the strait and were not stopped. - They compare the situation to “Japanese Kabuki theater,” with a security-guard-like role for some actors and limited real authority. The discussion emphasizes Iran’s multifaceted defense capabilities: coastal defense cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and drones (air, surface, underwater) that could threaten ships within about 200 miles of the coast. The Abraham Lincoln reportedly suffered damage within 220 miles of Iran’s coast, with Trump later acknowledging multiple attack sources. - On enforcement challenges, it’s noted that effective interdiction would require helicopters, destroyers, and other assets; however, aircraft carriers with helicopters still cover only limited areas. Tracking ships at sea is difficult without transponders, making enforcement complex. - The blockaded objective is debated. Early Trump administration moves lifted sanctions on Russia and Iran to keep oil flowing, but more recently sanctions on Russian oil have been reimposed while efforts to choke Iranian oil continue. The global oil market shows a dissonance: futures prices suggesting relief, but actual dockside prices for oil can be extremely high (up to around $140–210 per barrel). The economic impact is emphasized as potentially severe and not aligned with market signals. - There is critical discussion of Donald Trump’s leadership and decision-making: he is portrayed as emotionally volatile, with shifting beliefs and a tendency to see in headlines what he wants to see. A vivid analogy likens Trump to a child living with an alcoholic father, reacting to threats and stimuli rather than rational policy. J. D. Vance is highlighted as one of the few who has opposed Trump’s war approach and faced pressure from others close to Trump. - Diplomatic moves: Russia and China are described as stepping up efforts to broker peace, working with Saudis, Emiratis, and Iranians, and even approaching Turkey. There are signs that a peace process could be built around resurrecting or reformatting JCPOA-style arrangements, such as on-site IAEA inspections and nonproliferation commitments, potentially making them permanent. The possibility of a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah is discussed as part of broader regional negotiations. - The blockade is criticized as unsustainable, with concerns about maintenance bases (Diego Garcia) and the risk of escalation if ships are forced into closer proximity to Iran. It’s noted that China has warned it would treat interference with Chinese maritime traffic as an act of war; Iran could still route commerce through Turkmenistan and other corridors, limiting the blockade’s effectiveness. - The broader geopolitical shift is highlighted: the United States is losing influence in the Gulf. UAE resistance to Iran and the Saudis’ precarious balance are pointed out, with Iran signaling it could charge fees for entering the Gulf. The dollar’s waning influence is noted, along with rising Chinese and Russian influence in the Gulf region. - The wider consequences anticipated include energy and food shocks, with cascading economic effects globally. The prospect of extended conflict, internal U.S. political chaos, and potential impeachment pressure on Trump are discussed as factors that could influence the war’s trajectory. The hosts suggest that while a negotiated settlement could emerge, the path is fraught with contradictions, shifting alliances, and competing narratives between Washington, Tehran, and regional players.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the January 3 operation in Venezuela, the speakers explore initial reactions, possible motives, and the broader geopolitical implications. - Initial reaction and early concerns: The exchange begins with the worry that the events marked the start of a full amphibious assault or a new war. Speaker 1 recalls staying up late and being shocked by the “sheer gangsterism” of Maduro’s kidnapping, noting that Maduro was flown out of the country with little resistance. He models several theories around how such an operation could occur with minimal opposition and suggests the possibility of a negotiated exit that would keep the Chavista structure in place through a successor like Delsy Rodriguez. - The “deal” theory and who might be involved: Speaker 1 explains a theory that Donald Trump and Marco Rubio wanted a negotiated exit for Maduro that would allow the Pesuv (Chavista) structure to remain and enable the installation of a figure like Delsy Rodriguez to work within Chavismo to secure resource contracts for Trump’s allies. He cites sources close to negotiations and references coverage in the New York Times supporting elements of this narrative. He also notes Trump’s public dismissal of Maria Carina Machado as lacking support to rule, a point he says he predicted on a livestream. - The military stand-down hypothesis: The conversation delves into why no strikes targeted the helicopters, positing a stand-down order. Speaker 0 asks who would authorize such a stand-down and cites Ian Bremmer’s assessment as a possibility but unlikely due to the risk. Speaker 1 acknowledges the plausibility of many theories, including the idea that a stand-down could spare the country from greater U.S. violence, reminiscent of past operations in Baghdad or Raqqa, and emphasizes that the question of who issued any stand-down order remains unresolved. He mentions Delsy Rodriguez’s potential self-protection concerns and notes Diosdado Cabello’s visible signaling alongside military figures after Maduro’s abduction. - Delsy Rodriguez and potential motivations: The interlocutors discuss Rodriguez’s political stature, her management of Venezuela’s COVID response, and the perception she could pose a more direct challenge to U.S. interests due to her economic stabilization efforts and heavy ties to China. Speaker 1 underscores that Rodriguez stabilized the economy and was central to a revival that included substantial China-driven oil exports, a point supported by a New York Times profile. He clarifies that he did not speculate Rodriguez was the U.S. mole but stresses she would be asked by interviewers about such questions. - Maduro’s leadership and the economic crisis: The participants debate Maduro’s competence, acknowledging corruption and structural issues within a petro-state framework but arguing that the decline in living standards and oil production has deep roots, including U.S. sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Speaker 1 contends that while Maduro was not a “stupid” leader, Chavez-era and post-Chavez mismanagement, together with U.S. financial sanctions and regime-change tactics, contributed to Venezuela’s economic collapse. He insists the regime’s persistence does not hinge on one leader and cautions against simplistic characterizations of Maduro or Chavez as solely responsible for ruin. - Economic dynamics and sanctions: The discussion emphasizes that Venezuela’s economic trajectory has been shaped by sanctions and counter-sanctions, with Speaker 1 asserting that U.S. maximum-pressure campaigns and the theft of assets (including Sitco and gold reserves) severely impacted the economy. He argues the sanctions constitute financial terrorism and compares U.S. policy to broader imperial dynamics centered on dollar dominance and oil leverage. - Regime change prospects and future leadership: The speakers speculate about possible future leadership within the Pesuv or an alternative power structure, including the potential grooming of a candidate from within the regime or the return of Maria Carina Machado if conditions align. They note that a political shift would require military backing, and they discuss whether an eventual election could be staged or delayed to a more favorable time for U.S. interests. They emphasize that, absent military support, it would be difficult for any non-Maduro leadership to emerge. - China, Russia, and global signaling: The conversation covers the Chinese envoy’s presence in Caracas before the operation and the broader implications for China’s role in Venezuela. Speaker 1 argues the operation sent a global message to rivals (China, Russia, Iran) that the U.S. can seize leadership and resources, while also suggesting that China could be leveraged to avoid deeper conflict by permitting continued oil exports. The dialogue also touches on potential retaliatory moves by Russia or China and the broader geopolitical chessboard, including implications for Greenland and other strategic theaters. - Legal proceedings and comparisons to other regime changes: Maduro’s indictment in the Southern District of New York is discussed, with reflections on its weaknesses and how it compares to similar prosecutions (e.g., Juan Orlando Hernandez). The discussion concludes with a sense that Venezuela will likely face a prolonged, complex confrontation, with lingering questions about who will govern next and under what terms.

Mario interviews Professor Yasheng Huang about the evolving US-China trade frictions, the rare-earth pivot, Taiwan considerations, and broader questions about China’s economy and governance. Key points and insights - Rare earths as a bargaining tool: China’s rare-earth processing and export controls would require anyone using Chinese-processed rare earths to submit applications, with civilian uses supposedly allowed but defense uses scrutinized. Huang notes the distinction between civilian and defense usage is unclear, and the policy, if fully implemented, would shock global supply chains because rare earths underpin magnets used in phones, computers, missiles, defense systems, and many other electronics. He stresses that the rule would have a broad, not narrowly targeted, impact on the US and global markets. - Timeline and sequence of tensions: The discussion traces a string of moves beginning with US tariffs on China (and globally) in 2018–2019, a Geneva truce in 2019, and May/June 2019 actions around nanometer-scale chip controls. In August, the US relaxed some restrictions on seven-nanometer chips to China with revenue caps on certain suppliers. In mid–September (the period of this interview), China imposed docking fees on US ships and reportedly added a rare-earth export-control angle. Huang highlights that this combination—docking fees plus a sweeping rare-earth export control—appears to be an escalatory step, potentially timed to influence a forthcoming Xi-Trump summit. He argues China may have overplayed its hand and notes the export-control move is not tightly targeted, suggesting a broader bargaining chip rather than a precise lever against a single demand. - Motives and strategic logic: Huang suggests several motives for China’s move: signaling before a potential summit in South Korea; leveraging weaknesses in US agricultural exports (notably soybeans) during a harvest season; and accelerating a broader shift toward domestic processing capacity for rare earths by other countries. He argues the rare-earth move could spur other nations (Japan, Europe, etc.) to build their own refining and processing capacity, reducing long-run Chinese leverage. Still, in the short term, China holds substantial bargaining weight, given the global reliance on Chinese processing. - Short-term vs. long-term implications: Huang emphasizes the distinction between short-run leverage and long-run consequences. While China can tighten rare-earth supply now, the long-run effect is to incentivize diversification away from Chinese processing. He compares the situation to Apple diversifying production away from China after zero-COVID policies in 2022; it took time to reconfigure supply chains, and some dependence remains. In the long run, this shift could erode China’s near-term advantages in processing and export-driven growth, even as it remains powerful today. - Global role of hard vs. soft assets: The conversation contrasts hard assets (gold, crypto) with soft assets (the dollar, reserve currency status). Huang notes that moving away from the dollar is more feasible for countries in the near term than substituting rare-earth refining and processing. The move away from rare earths would require new refining capacity and supply chains that take years to establish. - China’s economy and productivity: The panel discusses whether China’s growth is sustainable under increasing debt and slowing productivity. Huang explains that while aggregate GDP has grown dramatically, total factor productivity in China has been weaker, and the incremental capital required to generate each additional percentage point of growth has risen. He points to overbuilding—empty housing and excess capacity—as evidence of inefficiencies that add to debt without commensurate output gains. In contrast, he notes that some regions with looser central control performed better historically, and that Deng Xiaoping’s era of opening correlated with stronger personal income growth, even if the overall economy remained autocratic. - Democracy, autocracy, and development: The discussion turns to governance models. Huang argues that examining democracy in the abstract can be misleading; the US system has significant institutional inefficiencies (gerrymandering, the electoral college). He asserts that autocracy is not inherently the driver of China’s growth; rather, China’s earlier phases benefited from partial openness and more open autocracy, with current autocracy not guaranteeing sustained momentum. He cites evidence that in China, personal income growth rose most when political openings were greater in the 1980s, suggesting that more open practices during development correlated with better living standards for individuals, though China remains not a democracy. - Trump, strategy, and global realignments: Huang views Trump as a transactional leader whose approach has elevated autocratic figures’ legitimacy internationally. He notes that Europe and China could move closer if China moderates its Ukraine stance, though rare-earth moves complicate such alignment. He suggests that allies may tolerate Trump’s demands for short-term gains while aiming to protect longer-term economic interests, and that the political landscape in the US could shift with a new president, potentially altering trajectories. - Taiwan and the risk of conflict: The interview underscores that a full-scale invasion of Taiwan would, in Huang’s view, mark the end of China’s current growth model, given the wartime economy transition and the displacement of reliance on outward exports and consumption. He stresses the importance of delaying conflict as a strategic objective and maintains concern about both sides’ leadership approaches to Taiwan. - Taiwan, energy security, and strategic dependencies: The conversation touches on China’s energy imports—especially oil through crucial chokepoints like the Malacca Strait—and the potential vulnerabilities if regional dynamics shift following any escalation on Taiwan. Huang reiterates that a Taiwan invasion would upend China’s economy and government priorities, given the high debt burden and the transition toward a wartime economy. Overall, the dialogue centers on the complex interplay of China’s use of rare-earth leverage, the short- and long-term economic and strategic consequences for the United States and its allies, and the broader questions around governance models, productivity, debt, and geopolitical risk in a shifting global order.

Chas Freeman, a former US assistant secretary of defense, and Glenn discuss the current state of diplomacy and security in West Asia, broader great-power dynamics, and Lebanon, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz. Freeman argues that West Asia shows an ongoing, long-running unraveling, with a core issue being whether the United States still understands diplomacy or relies on inexperienced envoys and “the cronies or the son-in-law” rather than seasoned diplomats. He asserts that the Iranians understand diplomacy and seized an opportunity when the Strait of Hormuz was opened under Iranian-controlled conditions, which could have set the stage for a long-term management arrangement for the strait. Instead, the Trump administration’s response—doubling down on the blockade—led Iran to retract its opening, returning to essential closure and increasing pressure on global economies, including higher gasoline prices for American consumers. Freeman contends the credibility of Iran in this context is greater than that of the United States, and he speculates that the blockade may have been a pretext for a military action that did not materialize. Freeman notes several shifting tactical realities: the U.S. blockade has drawn down the global oil market, and oil markets have changed with India paying Iranian oil in Chinese yuan, suggesting a potential move away from the petrodollar. He observes that a substantial portion of the US Navy is in the Arabian Sea or Gulf of Oman conducting the blockade, with deteriorating shipboard conditions. Iran, by contrast, appears better positioned in a war of attrition, with stored missiles and the ability to resume bombardment if needed. He mentions that Iran has oil to export and can sell it, highlighting the strategic geography beyond Hormuz. On Gulf states, Freeman says Saudi Arabia does not approve the blockade and has been in touch with Tehran; Saudi Arabia is the GCC’s best-positioned state but remains under pressure. The UAE is caught between blocs, Oman is relatively exempt, while Saudi Arabia acts as a conduit for Kuwait and Qatar. Iran has threatened to call on Ansar al-Law/Houthis to close the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea if needed. Even with an open strait and sailing ships, the global oil shock remains likely, and a broader energy realignment could benefit Russia and Venezuela, with Venezuela not yet seeing a substantial production rise. Freeman emphasizes that if the Strait of Hormuz is opened as a mere tactical victory for the U.S., it would be hard to argue for a comprehensive peace process in the region. Freeman asserts that Iran’s strategy emphasizes regime consolidation rather than collapse, with its missiles and energy reserves enabling continued pressure. He argues that China has a different position: China defends the UN Charter and the international system and benefits from a global, multinodal order. China seeks to preserve access to the Persian Gulf and aligns with Pakistan as an intermediary, while developing a broader regional strategy that can facilitate a Belt and Road integration, including energy routes and LNG imports. He notes that China is seen by regional actors as a defender of international law and a stabilizing interlocutor, contrasting with US actions that undermine the rule of law domestically and internationally. China is also doubling down on Central Asia routes and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, with the possibility of energy swaps from Iran. On Lebanon, Freeman describes an illegitimate Lebanese government aligned with Israel’s objectives and Hezbollah’s resistance to coercive measures. He views Israel’s strategy as destroying Hezbollah’s military and political influence in southern Lebanon, blowing bridges and imposing a Gaza-like model in Lebanon. He predicts a recurrence of a phony ceasefire with Israel continuing its operations, potentially triggering a new confrontation with the United States and Netanyahu’s government, unless the Trump administration capitulates to Israeli priorities. He frames Iran as achieving a regional peace objective through a comprehensive, region-wide approach, rather than mere truces. Regarding diplomacy and negotiations, Freeman criticizes “fantasy foreign policy” driven by media narratives rather than real negotiations. He argues that the Islamabad meeting with Iran’s delegation was not a true negotiation, and the American side lacked expert staff and real leverage. He contrasts this with Iran’s delegation, which arrived with hundreds of knowledgeable participants and full authority. He notes that the overall approach has been amateur, with no binding documents or real settlement. Freeman closes with reflections on historical U.S. grand strategy, noting the United States’ tradition of exporting its values, but arguing that today’s approach is inconsistent with the rule of law, international diplomacy, and lasting peace. He contends that the current trend favors Iran in the Gulf struggle and that China remains a stabilizing, influential actor amid US and Israeli actions.

Professor Robert Pape warned on X that within ten days parts of the global economy will start running short of critical goods, based on thirty years studying economic sanctions and blockades. He said this would bring not just higher prices but shortages, and that markets are not ready for this. The Kobelisi letter stated the world is experiencing its biggest energy crisis in history with 600,000,000 barrels of lost oil supply, US gas prices up 47% since December, and inflation approaching 4% in a path similar to the 1970s. The discussion then touched on Iran’s war potentially returning to open conflict. The United States seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship, which Larry Johnson described as piracy and an act of war aimed at clearing the Strait of Hormuz; Tehran called it armed piracy and promised a response. JD Vance was headed to Islamabad for talks, though Iranian officials said they had not agreed to anything. Fox’s Tel Aviv correspondent relayed that Trump told him they would blow up everything in Iran if they didn’t come to the table, saying the deal would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and prevent Iran from possessing highly enriched uranium. Professor Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago and author of Escalation Trap on Substack, joined the program. He referenced his April 12 post predicting shortages within forty-five to sixty days and described three stages: Stage one, the first ~45 days with price increases; Stage two (40–60 days) with shortages emerging; Stage three (day 60–90) with worsening shortages and then contraction, beginning around May 31. He explained that shortages would escalate into reduced production of commodities, fewer airline seats, and broader disruptions across supply chains. Pape detailed the implications for air travel and energy: jet fuel shortages could cause European and global aviation reductions, with Europe’s ~110,000,000 monthly air passengers dropping to potentially 80 million or fewer as fuel becomes scarce; cargo, mail, and just-in-time deliveries would be affected, and overall product availability would contract. He argued that 20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz and that Iran’s potential shutdown and the U.S. response would complicate efforts to keep that oil flowing. He emphasized that the contraction would begin even as oil access becomes more difficult and other nations (including the U.S.) struggle to secure energy. The conversation then shifted to China. Pape noted that in China, the impact on GDP could be modest (about 1%), but the U.S. could be drawn into a larger conflict that could benefit China. He observed China’s preparation for energy independence: stockpiling oil, relying on solar, nuclear, and coal, and maintaining a robust energy strategy even during tensions with the U.S. He suggested that tariffs and conflicts did not significantly disrupt China’s planning, which could lead to China gaining relative advantage as the U.S. faces a widening energy and economic crisis. There was discussion about the United States’ energy independence. Pape stated he has long advocated energy independence since 2005, but warned that the broader picture involves debt, energy policy, and strategic choices that could threaten American leadership. He stressed the need for a concrete five-year plan to navigate the crisis without harming the economy in the short term and cautioned against escalating war in Iran. In addressing the everyday impact, the speakers considered who would be hardest hit: the poorest, and particularly non-college-educated white working-class voters, who had experienced the largest deterioration in income since 1990. The conversation included proposals to mitigate consumer pain, such as targeted economic measures for working Americans affected by rising gas prices, potentially including tax considerations or subsidies for those whose jobs require fuel, while avoiding broad handouts. Pape reiterated that his Escalation Trap Substack presents a framework based on twenty-one years of modeling the bombing of Iran and indicates that the stages he predicted are unfolding faster than anticipated, with a focus on concrete policy options that could be enacted by May 1. He emphasized that his analysis centers on consequences for ordinary people and urged practical policy steps to address the crisis.

Glenn Deeson frames the Iran war as fundamentally about regime change, noting that this regime change could entail destruction or balkanization of Iran rather than a simple replacement government. He argues that irredentist fear and existential threats would drive Iran to respond aggressively, including closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking American bases in the region, if attacked. He emphasizes that this is about the survival of the regime and the country’s unity, suggesting that the conflict could escalate toward greater regional chaos, including potential actions around Kharg Island. On the broader geopolitical implications, Deeson discusses how four years of efforts to curb Russia failed and how European and American efforts have continued to try to sustain pressure on Russia. He explains that the Ukraine war has faced manpower and weapons shortages, and that economic strains in Europe—especially energy prices—compound the difficulty of maintaining support for prolonged conflict. He asserts that with the Iran war, there are even fewer weapons available from the US, worsening European energy and economic outlooks. He argues that Europeans’ and some policymakers’ failure to recognize Russia’s security concerns has contributed to escalatory dynamics. Regarding China, Deeson notes that China imports oil from Iran but would not welcome disruptions. He suggests that if the United States succeeds in regime-changing Iran, China would be adversely affected, whereas failure could push Iran to align more closely with Russia and China. He discusses potential shifts in global resource control and the petrodollar system, and he frames the conflict as part of a broader great-power competition where the United States seeks to preserve energy flows to allies. He highlights the possibility that successful US or Western pressure could backfire, as Iranian outcomes might push regional actors toward deeper cooperation with Russia and China. He also ties these dynamics to a broader transition from a unipolar liberal hegemon to a multipolar order, with BRICS-like groupings seeking to balance US influence. Deeson broadens the discussion to the potential death of American hegemony, arguing this would be a longer transition rather than a sudden collapse. He explains that after the Cold War the US promoted a liberal hegemonic framework with one center of power, but over time this leads other centers to balance against the US. He identifies the emergence of multipolar dynamics and institutions like BRICS as indicators of shifting power. He suggests that attempts to break China or Iran could backfire, since enemies may realign with Russia or China, and the US might eventually recalibrate to a more restrained role in Eurasia to rebuild domestic strength. He envisions a scenario where the US reduces its European and Middle Eastern footprint, potentially strengthening East Asia. On Israel’s perspective, Deeson says Israelis and Europeans similarly believe US capabilities can be leveraged to defeat adversaries, and Israel sees the opportunity to use US involvement to topple Iran and possibly Balkanize the country. He argues that this clashes with the United States’ need to prioritize its own strategic interests in a multipolar world, which would require pivoting toward East Asia and away from Europe and the Middle East. He cites strategic misalignment in Trump-era policy, noting that continuing engagement in Europe and the Middle East may divert resources from East Asia. He suggests that tolerance of prolonged conflict could exacerbate divergences between the US and Israel as American strategic priorities shift. The discussion ends with appreciation for Glenn Deeson and a plug for his channel.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson discusses the Iran conflict in depth, emphasizing that its outcome depends on multiple interconnected variables. He expands on a prior list of factors, adding his own: the actions of Russia and China, shortages of vital munitions, the resilience of the Iranian people, on-the-ground actors and energy facilities, the status of the Bab al-Mandab strait and the Strait of Hormuz, and the American public’s reaction to the war. He asserts that the conflict’s nature is central to understanding how events unfold. Wilkerson recounts his long experience in the U.S. military and in planning for war, noting his involvement in past U.S. positions toward Iran, including support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and later naval engagements in the Strait of Hormuz. He highlights a historical episode in which a U.S. Aegis cruiser fired missiles at an Iranian passenger airliner, a move he identifies as decisive in prompting Iran to accept a UN resolution and end the conflict. He argues that the current conflict is fundamentally misunderstood by U.S. policymakers, who he says fail to grasp the nature of a war against a "3,000 years old" and 90 million-strong people who would defend themselves violently, and who are willing to sacrifice to resist what they view as an imperial confrontation. Wilkerson criticizes public statements from U.S. officials—specifically Marco Rubio, Pete Hagseth, Donald Trump, and others in the administration—for lacking a coherent understanding of the conflict’s nature. He contends that Netanyahu’s objective is chaos in the region, extending beyond Iran to a broad Lavant corridor, and he adds that Turkey is watching closely, concerned about Israeli arming of Kurdish groups and the potential for battlefield shifts that could involve Turkey indirectly. He argues Turkey has already moved from being a bystander to a participant, given intelligence networks on the ground and potential strategic alignments. On the Kurdish issue, Wilkerson discusses U.S. considerations of arming Kurdish groups, noting that such moves would strain U.S. relations with Turkey and destabilize regional dynamics across Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. He recalls past U.S. actions—like support for Kurdish groups in Iraq after Operation Provide Comfort—and cautions that arming Kurds in multiple countries could provoke serious geopolitical fallout, including undermining Turkish cooperation and complicating Iran’s internal security. The conversation also delves into broader strategic implications. Wilkerson suggests a multipolar world is emerging, with China and Russia potentially benefiting from American overreach and regional chaos. He cites the Chinese decision to promote the renminbi as the world’s transactional reserve currency as indicative of China’s willingness to confront U.S. dominance, while acknowledging that China would avoid direct military engagement in a major war if possible. He warns that a nuclear-armed Israel alongside the United States attacking Iran presents a dangerous paradox, given Iran’s JCPOA-era transparency and nonproliferation commitments, contrasted with Israel’s undisclosed nuclear arsenal. Addressing U.S. military capacity, Wilkerson argues that the United States lacks sufficient munitions and will struggle to sustain an extended ground campaign in Iran. He contends that ground forces would face immense challenges, given Iran’s terrain, population, and the potential for civilian casualties. He also questions the credibility and consistency of U.S. political leadership, contrasting promises to restore the strategic oil reserve with failures to fund it, and he notes the potential consequences for allied countries like South Korea, which might reconsider its alliance given Washington’s willingness to reallocate defense assets. Wilkerson points to the broader humanitarian and strategic costs of the conflict, arguing that the war has already triggered civilian harm and that the narrative around supporting protesters and stopping missiles has evolved into a broader destabilization strategy. He emphasizes the risk that a limited victory could prompt renewed aggression elsewhere, and he suggests that the geopolitical chessboard in the region—Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Black Sea—could be poised for further turbulence if Western powers miscalculate. In sum, Wilkerson warns that the Iran conflict could escalate beyond a regional skirmish into a global confrontation, driven by misperceptions, overlapping national interests, and the strategic ambitions of major actors, including Israel, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and China.

Joe Kent, former director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, explains why he resigned over the war against Iran, arguing Iran posed no imminent threat and that the war was driven by Israeli influence and a regime-change agenda. Key points: - Imminent threat and escalation: In his view, Iran was not on the cusp of attacking the U.S. during Trump’s second term. Iran followed a calculated escalation ladder, stopping proxies during Operation Midnight Hammer and returning to negotiation afterward. After the attack on nuclear sites, Iran retaliated in kind, then returned to talks, indicating a calibrated approach rather than irrational behavior. The “imminent threat” cited by some officials was viewed as primarily tied to Israeli actions against Iran, not Iranian intent to attack the U.S. directly. - Regime-change as miscalculation: Kent contends that regime-change aims in Iran—similar to Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya—are flawed. He believes attempts to remove the Iranian regime strengthen it instead, and he personally did not want another costly war in the Middle East. - Israeli influence and the policymaking process: He describes a multilayered Israeli influence network—strong PAC presence, intelligence sharing, and media/think-tank leveraging—that shapes U.S. policy. Israelis push for no enrichment and regime-change outcomes, using media echo chambers and direct access to U.S. decision-makers to steer policy in a direction that aligns with their goals, sometimes at odds with longer-term U.S. interests or what Trump might publicly advocate. - Intelligence versus policy sales: He notes that intelligence briefings can inform or sell a policy. Israeli influence can bypass traditional channels, presenting threats in emotionally resonant terms (e.g., fear of Ayatollahs obtaining a bomb) to push for aggressive stances. This has contributed to a cycle of escalation and military action. - Negotiation space and red lines: The administration’s narrowing of red lines around enrichment (from broader nuclear nonproliferation to zero enrichment) limited potential deal space. The Iranians did show willingness to negotiate on enrichment levels, monitoring, and proxies, but the Israelis and policy ecosystem continually sought broader prohibitions, complicating any potential agreement. - The Iran-Israel dynamic: The Israeli objective appears oriented toward regime change or a state of chaos preventing Iran from leveraging its regional power. Kent argues the U.S. has enabled Israel by subsidizing its defense and offense, creating pressure that constrains U.S. policy and international leverage. - Strategic and regional assessment: The Gulf, Straits of Hormuz, and regional energy security are central. He argues that the U.S. cannot easily open Hormuz militarily in the long term and that any durable arrangement would require restraining Israel, easing sanctions relief for Iran, and returning to a sustainable regional security framework. - Iran’s current strategy: Iran has managed to deter substantial American escalation by threatening to disrupt energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz and by leveraging proxies and regional influence. The leadership has shown discipline in controlling proxies and presenting a credible threat that optimizes Iran’s strategic position. - Great power dynamics: China is seen as a major beneficiary of the current cycle, gaining leverage as global energy transactions shift away from the dollar and as U.S. attention diverts to the Middle East. Russia’s posture is also affected; sanctions and energy markets interact with Iran’s actions, while Russia and China could exploit the distraction and reframe influence in their favor. - Syria and broader war lessons: Kent emphasizes that regime-change in Syria contributed to instability, with various factions and external powers (Turkey, Israel, HTS, Al Qaeda offshoots) complicating the landscape. He remains skeptical about the future stability of Syria, warning that competing external interests could lead to further conflict. - Prospects for de-escalation: A path to de-escalation would require restraining Israel’s offensive actions, offering some sanctions relief to Iran, and engaging in constructive regional diplomacy to reopen Hormuz. He suggests a sustainable deal would avoid large U.S. troop commitments and focus on practical counterterrorism cooperation, stable oil flow, and avoiding regime-change rhetoric. Overall, Kent argues that the Iran war was driven by a dominant Israeli influence, a flawed regime-change impulse, and a diplomacy dynamic that prioritized aggressive measures over practical, balanced engagement. He advocates restraining Israel, pursuing a pragmatic, limited set of objectives with Iran, and reframing U.S. regional strategy to reduce perpetual conflict in the Middle East. He also warns that without de-escalation, the conflict risks drawing the U.S. into a prolonged and costly cycle with broad regional and global repercussions.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

Alexander McCurse and the host discuss the Iran showdown as shifting from regime-change aims to an energy-focused attrition war. McCurse notes that in the last few days Iran has faced extreme attacks—from the South Pars field to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant—and asks how to assess Iran’s retaliation. McCurse argues the Western campaign reflected “extreme frustration and bewilderment in Washington and in Israel,” with initial hopes that Iran’s leadership would fall quickly and a power vacuum would force concessions. Instead, Iran has sustained resistance, complicating Western aims and driving a broader energy-war dynamic that Western powers cannot win, since they “rely, depend on energy,” while Iran, Russia, and potentially China are better positioned to endure. McCurse explains that the Bushehr attack is significant and consequential: the reactor is largely Russian-built with Russian technicians nearby, and the strike served as a signal to Russia to reduce support and push Iran toward negotiations. He emphasizes that Iran’s response was to strike back, revealing a miscalculation by the West similar to earlier expectations at the war’s start. The result has produced an energy-focused attrition war that, in McCurse’s view, Western powers cannot prevail in. The host references public figures who downplayed Iran’s threats, including Trump and coverage in outlets like the Wall Street Journal, and asks why Western leaders failed to predict Iran’s capable retaliation. McCurse responds that a trend of overestimating Western willpower and underestimating adversaries’ capabilities has persisted, noting a broader pattern: a belief in near-unlimited Western power, with insufficient attention to adversaries’ true industrial and strategic capacities. He cites examples of North Korea-style simplifications and generalizations about Russia and Iran, and argues that the West has often overlooked Iran’s stable institutions and its willingness to endure in pursuit of its core interests. They discuss the broader security environment, including how Ukraine’s war mirrors this dynamic. McCurse argues that dialogue and mutual address of security concerns have eroded due to a narrative that frames opponents as fundamentally brittle or ideologically driven. He stresses the importance of acknowledging that Iran can defend itself and that progress toward negotiations requires recognizing the root causes as legitimate concerns, not simply dismissing them as irrational. Reflecting on Europe, McCurse suggests that the war in Iran is connected to the proxy war with Russia and to Europe’s energy and security policies. He notes sanctions’ potential to unravel as energy dependencies shift, with countries like Indonesia and South Korea seeking Russian energy, and Taiwan needing helium from the Persian Gulf, implying broader economic entanglements that complicate sanctions strategies. He argues that the West’s insistence on a punitive, unilateral approach—while ignoring the need to address root causes—undermines long-term security. He lauds the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a model that balanced preventing nuclear escalation with Gulf stability, and laments that Western governments reversed post–Cold War understandings, including NATO’s eastward expansion. The discussion turns to China’s role. McCurse explains that China, the Eurasian colossus, will “buy Russian oil,” provide chips, and support Iran “under the surface” without overtly challenging Western interests, maintaining a cautious but significant involvement. He argues China will avoid a full-on confrontation that escalates US tensions, balancing its interests across Russia, Iran, and the West to preserve security and economic continuity. Towards the end, they address public sentiment in Europe and the potential fragmentation of pro-war coalitions. McCurse cautions that hardliners still control the narrative, making durable peace unlikely in the near term, though a paradigm shift toward dialogue could emerge if confronted with economic and political reality. He concludes by reiterating that the Iranians view the conflict as forced upon them, while the West has undertaken a war of choice, and that both sides’ calculus will shape the duration and outcome of the crisis.

Mike Adams discusses China’s potential moves in the context of the US war with Iran, sharing thoughts from an interview with Eric Yong, a Chinese citizen living in Hong Kong who travels between Hong Kong, Beijing, and other Chinese cities, and who has family in Taiwan. Yong is described as an advocate of gold and silver and a successful former manufacturer. Key points: - China imports oil despite domestic production, with about 30% of its oil produced domestically. China maintains large oil storage and a diverse supplier list, but does not want its tankers interdicted or pirated by the US Navy on the high seas. - A Chinese official reportedly said the US should not interfere with China’s trade agreements with Iran. Trump is portrayed as opposing this, threatening to disrupt ships. - Yong’s view (not a military expert) is that China would likely provide naval escorts for its tankers to protect trade routes and agreements. Such escorts would aim to signal to the US Navy that these tankers are off-limits; according to Yong, this could avoid escalation. - Adams notes a broader shift in naval power dynamics: the US Navy’s role as global police may be waning. He references comments about the US Navy’s vulnerabilities, including equipment issues and the difficulty of maintaining access in conflicts like Iran or Yemen, where Iranian forces reportedly kept the US Navy at bay. - The future of warfare is described as moving away from traditional aircraft carriers toward drone carriers and missiles capable of striking ships globally. Iran’s actions are used to support the claim that the US Navy cannot easily project power near Iran or in key chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. - The potential for a reconfiguration of global naval strategy is discussed: if the US cannot enforce its will universally, other nations will consider escorting their own trade routes, possibly through multilateral or regional arrangements, and the dollar’s dominance could decline as the petrodollar system weakens. - The Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz are highlighted as critical chokepoints. Indonesia’s reported plan to impose fees on ships transiting the Strait of Malacca is mentioned as an example of new cost structures in maritime trade. The toll through Hormuz could be paid in Chinese yuan, Bitcoin, gold, or other currencies, rather than dollars, according to the discussion. - Adams predicts a multipolar world where the US is not the sole arbiter of global trade. He suggests that even major powers like Russia, China, and Iran are recalibrating their defense and economic strategies around drone and underwater drones, shore-based missiles, and other forms of non-traditional military capabilities. - The conversation emphasizes the need for states to secure sea lanes through self-defense measures, potentially including drones on transport ships, as the era of universal naval dominance by the US declines. He cautions against the world of “Mad Max ocean” where piracy and escalatory actions raise costs and risk for all, and notes a shift away from a unipolar policing model toward negotiated trade and multipolar cooperation. - Adams concludes with a call for a shift toward peaceful trade, reducing aggressive postures, and rethinking US reliance on the dollar, arguing for broader global trade partnerships and renewed domestic priorities. Note: The latter part of the transcript contains promotional content for gold and health products. This summary excludes those promotional sections and focuses on the discussion of geopolitics, naval strategy, and economic implications.

George Bibi and Vlad discuss the United States’ evolving grand strategy in a multipolar world and the key choices facing Washington, Europe, Russia, and China. - The shift from the post–Cold War hegemonic peace is framed as undeniable: a new international distribution of power requires the U.S. to adjust its approach, since balancing all great powers is impractical and potentially unfavorable. - The U.S. previously pursued a hegemonic peace with ambitions beyond capabilities, aiming to transform other countries toward liberal governance and internal reengineering. This was described as beyond America’s reach and not essential to global order or U.S. security, leading to strategic insolvency: objectives outpaced capabilities. - The Trump-era National Security Strategy signals a reorientation: U.S. priorities must begin with the United States itself—its security, prosperity, and ability to preserve republican governance. Foreign policy should flow from that, implying consolidation or retrenchment and a focus on near-term priorities. - Geography becomes central: what happens in the U.S. Western Hemisphere is most important, followed by China, then Europe, and then other regions. The United States is returning to a traditional view that immediate neighborhood concerns matter most, in a world that is now more polycentric. - In a multipolar order, there must be a balance of power and reasonable bargains with other great powers to protect U.S. interests without provoking direct conflict. Managing the transition will be messy and require careful calibration of goals and capabilities. - Europe’s adjustment is seen as lagging. Absent Trump’s forcing mechanism, Europe would maintain reliance on U.S. security while pursuing deeper integration and outward values. The U.S. cannot afford to be Europe’s security benefactor in a multipolar order and needs partners who amplify rather than diminish U.S. power. - Europe is criticized as a liability in diplomacy and defense due to insufficient military investment and weak capability to engage with Russia. European self-doubt and fear of Russia hinder compromising where necessary. Strengthening Europe’s political health and military capabilities is viewed as essential for effective diplomacy and counterbalancing China and Russia. - The Ukraine conflict is tied to broader strategic paradigms: Europe’s framing of the war around World War II and unconditional surrender undermines possible compromises. A compromise that protects Ukraine’s vital interests while acknowledging Russia’s security concerns could prevent disaster and benefit Europe’s future security and prosperity. - U.S.–Europe tensions extend beyond Ukraine to governance ideals, trade, internet freedom, and speech regulation. These issues require ongoing dialogue to manage differences while maintaining credible alliances. - The potential for U.S.–Russia normalization is discussed: the Cold War-style ideological confrontation is largely over, with strategic incentives to prevent Russia and China from forming a closer alliance. Normalizing relations would give Russia more autonomy and reduce dependence on China, though distrust remains deep and domestic U.S. institutions would need to buy in. - China’s role is addressed within a framework of competition, deterrence, and diplomacy. The United States aims to reduce vulnerability to Chinese pressure in strategic minerals, supply chains, and space/sea lines, while engaging China to establish mutually acceptable rules and prevent spirals into direct confrontation. - A “grand bargain” or durable order is proposed: a mix of competition, diplomacy, and restraint that avoids domination or coercion, seeking an equilibrium that both the United States and China can live with.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

Einar Tangin and Glenn discuss the forthcoming Xi Jinping–Donald Trump meeting and the broader strategic landscape shaping U.S.–China competition. - On the Trump–Xi meeting: Tangin expects very little substantive outcome. China’s strategy toward the United States is to keep engagement open rather than push Trump into a corner, despite Trump’s past actions and their consequences. He notes a narrow scope to be discussed in a California meeting, with Trump volunteers unprepared and pushing “the usual maximist stuff.” China is signaling that Taiwan will be a red line. Beyond that, the Chinese may accept limited concessions such as grain, gas, or oil purchases, but no sweeping arrangements. The overall takeaway: continued engagement, but not a game-changing breakthrough. - U.S. energy and global strategy: Tangin argues the United States uses energy as a tool of influence, aiming to control access and shape markets (the petrodollar legacy, strategic chokepoints). The Ukraine war has accelerated Europe’s decoupling from Russia and the U.S. seeks to expand similar dynamics in East Asia. He emphasizes that the energy game is dynamic: oil prices impact inflation, and long-term, demand destruction and a shift to alternatives (electricity, renewables) will reshape markets. He points to new energy tech and scale: batteries and storage (CATL’s battery capacity) enable large-scale decoupling from fossil fuels; China’s plans to deploy up to 50 nuclear plants at a time and to pursue commercially available fusion power could transform the energy landscape. The U.S. may face higher exploration costs and geopolitical risk in sustaining high oil output, while heavy reliance on fossil fuels could erode long-term economic viability. - Global consequences and who bears the pain: In the short term, countries without reserves (notably parts of the Global South, including India) will face fertilizer and diesel shortages during planting seasons, with potential 15–25% yield reductions and elevated inflation. Food security risks loom as energy costs ripple through fertilizer, transport, processing, and farming inputs. The analysis highlights fertilizer nitrogen production’s energy intensity and the cascading nature of energy in food supply chains. The discussion stresses that global south economies will be hit hardest early on, with food and fuel inflation compounding social and political pressure. - The Iran war and maritime strategy: The discussion connects the Persian Gulf crisis to broader blockades and maritime competition. A naval blockade approach risks escalation and confrontation with China, which has extensive trade links through ASEAN and other partners that would be harmed by disruption. Tangin notes that China cannot be easily forced into combat in Europe or the Middle East; any escalation involving tactical nuclear use would be dangerous. He suggests that Europe’s elites may push for confrontation against Russia, but the political climate and energy constraints could destabilize Western allies and push towards alternative alignments, particularly with China. - China’s strategic posture and alternative world order: Tangin emphasizes that China has a model that emphasizes no ideology between states, sovereignty, and mutual non-interference, echoing a Westphalian framework. He describes China’s global governance concept as a peer-to-peer, negotiation-centered approach, where disputes are settled at the table rather than through force. He frames China’s proposition as simple: “No more ideology between countries. Every country should be secure. Security should not depend on the insecurity of another country. Every country has the right to choose its own path of development.” This is presented as a peaceful, governance-based alternative to U.S.-led hegemony. - Europe’s strategic crossroads and the future: Europe faces existential economic strains, competitiveness challenges, and the temptation of isolationist or right-wing governance. The conversation predicts prolonged political volatility if energy prices and inflation persist, with potential swings between different leaderships. China’s strategy, in this vision, is to promote internal diversification and consumption-led growth while engaging with international partners on a governance framework that reduces the incentives for confrontation. - Concluding note: The speakers agree that Europe’s willingness to embrace China’s model, rather than clinging to a confrontational U.S.-led paradigm, could shape a more stable global order. They caution that the old order has ended, and creative destruction is underway, with China advocating a negotiated, governance-based path forward.

Chas Freeman and Glenn discuss the broader geopolitical implications of the ongoing war with Iran, focusing on perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States, and then turning to regional dynamics involving Israel, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and others. Freeman argues that China does not have a unified view on the Iran war. He notes that some in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are pleased to see the United States seemingly disarmed by its own stalemate and by depleting weapons stockpiles, including the pivot away from stationing intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific. Geopolitical thinkers fear the war destabilizes a central region for global commerce and energy, with the Hormuz Strait now effectively impassable. He asserts that Azerbaijan has become a primary route for Asia-to-Europe transit, while Iran’s control of the strait and safe passage for Chinese tankers complicate sanctions regimes. China, he says, is also recalibrating its economy toward renewables and away from fossil fuels due to the war’s effects. Freeman highlights how Asia-Pacific dynamics are affected: Japan is highly dependent on oil and gas imports and is stressed; Taiwan faces limits due to its own energy constraints; South Korea is economically hurt by the strait closure; Southeast Asia suffers from reduced petroleum exports; and the war pushes China closer to Russia, with Russia’s planned Siberia gas project gaining traction as a diversified supply route away from maritime routes. He also mentions Brazil and South Africa increasing military cooperation, noting potential Brazilian-Japanese collaborations and rising defense spending in Japan, with implications for US influence and global supply chains. Freeman then discusses Russia, noting Trump’s call with Putin and the possibility that Russia is seeking to influence or assist in ending the war with Iran. He asserts Iran seeks to deter or destroy Israel and to decolonize West Asia, including removing American forces from the Gulf. He emphasizes that Russia and China do not want Iran subjugated and abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning Iran, aiming to avoid offending Gulf Arabs while not endorsing the war. The war has drawn Iran closer to Russia, with Iranian drones and technology transfers now in Russian use, and Russia increasing influence in Iran as Gulf reconstruction becomes necessary. Freeman also points out that Iran has demanded reparations and sanctions relief, and that sanctions have deeply distressed the Iranian population. He argues that Russia benefits from higher oil and gas prices and European energy dependence on Russian supply, while the conflict complicates Western weapon stockpiles and European defense needs. He contends Putin benefits from divisions within the US and diminished American global leadership, while the war is not advantageous for the United States overall. Freeman emphasizes a broader moral and strategic dimension, criticizing what he sees as a departure from international law and ethical norms, including the suspension of targeting guidelines and collateral-damage assessments in certain operations. He cites concerns about human rights and humanitarian law, warning that the erosion of a universal moral order could have long-term consequences for Western diplomacy. He invokes historical and religious ethical frameworks (Kant, Grotius, and others) to argue for a return to principled conduct in war and postwar reconciliation. The conversation turns to Israel, with Freeman suggesting that Netanyahu’s long-standing aim to reshape Israel’s security and borders faces a difficult reckoning as Iran becomes a tangible military threat. Freeman contends that Israel’s plan for regime change in Iran is failing, and he questions what Plan B might be if Israel cannot secure its strategic goals. He warns that Israel could contemplate extreme options, including nuclear considerations, if it feels existentially threatened, while noting the potential for Israel’s positions to undermine American public support for Israel and complicate US domestic civil liberties and freedom of inquiry. Glenn and Freeman close by acknowledging that the situation has created a shifting web of alliances and rivalries, with European willingness to appease Trump waning and broader questions about coexistence in the Middle East. They stress the need for a more sustainable approach to regional security and a reconsideration of diplomatic norms to avoid escalating toward broader conflict.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.