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Glenn and Scott Ritter discuss the rapid-onset crisis in the Persian Gulf after the United States announced it would “open up the Strait Of Hormuz” by force, with reports of American warships being struck and Iran countering with drones and missiles. Ritter asserts that the Strait of Hormuz is not being opened by the U.S.; he cites claims of two American warships and two U.S.-flagged container ships transiting, while notes that ships attempting transit have been struck by Iranians. He says Iran has been striking targets in the United Arab Emirates, and the U.S. has claimed to sink at least six small Iranian boats. He calls it war, not a skirmish or ceasefire, and says the ceasefire is over. He adds Bahrain has declared a state of emergency and Kuwait is “on the cusp” of declaring one. He mentions Iran’s indirect communications and a one-and-a-half-hour call from Vladimir Putin to Donald Trump, indicating that continued U.S. action against Iran would be devastating for the U.S., the region, and everyone. Ritter assesses the situation as containable but requires the United States to back down. He notes extraordinary UAE measures, including Israel sending air defense missiles and troops to the UAE, signaling a key strategic shift toward the Abrams Accords and a broader Israeli project. He argues the UAE faces an existential gamble, tied to the notion that a failure would undo this new alliance structure. He hopes the U.S. avoids escalation but doubts it aligns with Donald Trump’s temperament. Glenn asks about the objectives behind U.S. actions, suggesting the possibility of probing Iran to see if it would permit ships to transit under threat, or provoking European engagement, and asks why the U.S. went forward. Ritter responds by criticizing Trump’s inner circle and policy origins: he claims the policy is shaped not by the CIA or DIA but by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), an Israeli-adjacent think tank, and by Scott Bessent, with economic strategies drawn from FDD papers. He contends there is no Iranian pressure and disputes claims about Iranian oil storage and revenue, pointing to a flourishing Iranian oil trade with Pakistan and arguing the blockade is propaganda. He asserts that three U.S. objectives—regime change in Iran, termination of ballistic missiles, and elimination of Iran’s nuclear program—have not been met: Iran’s regime remains in place, missiles are firing, and the nuclear program is not on the table; Iran would destroy regional oil infrastructure if the U.S. resumes military action. Ritter decries what he calls a culture of propaganda and says the president surrounds himself with “stupid people,” not smart ones, leaving the U.S. without a truthful understanding of reality. He claims Iran’s response to U.S. actions has been decisive and that the U.S. is losing credibility, with the broader geopolitical risk including potential disruption to global economies. He uses strong language about the president’s mental state and asserts that the current trajectory is a desperate gamble driven by narcissism, lack of integrity, and a distorted perception of power. Towards the end, Glenn notes the possibility of escalation continuing, while Ritter argues for a decisive Iranian response to signal that the U.S. cannot win, urging a forced political and strategic recalibration to prevent further degradation of regional stability. The conversation closes with mutual acknowledgment of the volatility and a sense of pessimism about near-term de-escalation.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and Seyed Mohamed Marandi discuss the posturing and developments in the Iran–US confrontation around May 2026, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, regional dynamics, and potential war trajectories. - Glenn notes that the United States had announced it would break open the Strait of Hormuz and that conflicting reports followed, seeking clarity on whether the conflict was moving toward all-out war. - Seyed Marandi says the situation is moving toward all-out war. He explains that the Americans initiated a new stage by attempting to carry out an operation to take ships out of the Strait of Hormuz, which did not succeed; instead, civilian boats were destroyed, and there were no military boats involved according to Iran. Iran is not using its military boats in these circumstances; it is using missiles as warnings, to avoid initiating a full war. - He states the Americans bombed boats carrying goods, resulting in five civilian deaths, citing news reports but noting Western media often follows the official narrative. Iran issued a statement blaming the Americans regarding Emirati targets being struck, though he acknowledges it could be read as either an American action or as American fault for the Emirati strikes. - Marandi asserts the operation was a failure for the United States: the Strait of Hormuz was not opened, and the Emiratis suffered damage. He describes the Emirates as an ally of the Israeli regime, noting its distancing from other Arab states, leaving OPEC, and paying for social media campaigns to shape public perception. He observes worldwide street sentiment toward Iran is largely supportive, except among Wahhabi/Salafi groups aligned with intelligence agencies and those who historically opposed Iran. - He contends that the global economy is entering a crisis phase: high oil and energy prices and rising food costs are the “fever,” with supply chains at risk of collapse and the global economy vulnerable to interruptions in any single link. He argues Iran’s economy is a “resistance economy” under siege for decades, while other global economies are more interlinked and fragile. - On troop movements and targets, Marandi says large US troop numbers and equipment have been deployed in the region, with many ground troops potentially based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates; air refueling and other assets involve Saudi Arabia, the Israeli regime, and Qatar. - Glenn asks why the UAE is disproportionately aggressive toward Iran compared with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Marandi explains the UAE’s alignment with Israel, its departure from OPEC, and the perception that striking Emirati targets amounts to striking Israeli targets. - They discuss predictability of Iran’s strategy: Marandi has long warned Iran would disrupt oil and gas production; he notes Iranian officials have historically warned about the Strait of Hormuz. He criticizes Western analyses of Iran’s capabilities as underestimating Tehran’s military and strategic sophistication, while Western narratives have repeatedly expected Iran to collapse in various wars, which Iran has repeatedly resisted. - On the potential course of a renewed war, Marandi outlines two broad scenarios: a short, intense clash with limited strikes on non-critical infrastructure could provoke a strong Iranian response, including missiles at Israel and allied targets; a more extensive war targeting Iran’s critical infrastructure, such as power plants and bridges, could devastate Persian Gulf countries and precipitate a global economic downturn. He emphasizes that Iran has historically avoided targeting civilians, but warns that destruction of critical infrastructure could force populations to flee. - Regarding escalation and timing, Marandi argues the Americans misjudged Iran’s resolve and that Tehran has rebuilt assets and developed new capabilities since ceasefire discussions. He suggests Trump’s aim may have been to probe whether Iran would capitulate or escalate, a calculation he believes underestimated Iran’s preparedness. - He predicts that the scale and duration of escalation will hinge on American choices: the Red Sea’s closure and Gulf actions depend on how far the United States escalates, what targets are attacked, and how long the strikes last. In general, he contends that the world economy’s vulnerability will intensify with any extended or severe conflict, particularly if critical infrastructure is targeted. - In closing, Glenn and Marandi acknowledge the peril of the situation, with Marandi urging awareness of the broader implications, including regional stability and global economic impacts, and both hoping for a path away from further escalation.

The dialogue centers on the current crisis between the United States and Iran, two weeks after a previous discussion. The speakers outline the evolution of events, the prospects for negotiations, and the broader political and ideological context driving the confrontation. Key events and the trajectory of negotiations - Speaker 1 describes recent moves as undermining talks: “Trump announced this blockade, which is an act of war under international law. … And then they were supposed to have a second round of negotiations … and The US shot at an Iranian ship, took over the ship, took the crew hostage.” Negotiations are framed as lacking good faith, with derisive language used by Trump toward Iran. - The atmosphere is described as deteriorating: “democracy diplomacy is not doing well. More chances of a military confrontation.” - There is concern over a potential new round of attacks by the US, and about the legality of continued operations beyond a sixty-day War Powers window without congressional authorization. Iran’s leverage, demands, and feasibility of a deal - The discussion centers on whether Iran’s demands—such as delaying nuclear negotiations, removing the blockade, and controlling who passes through the Strait of Hormuz and at what cost—are feasible for a deal. Speaker 0 notes Iran’s desire to delay negotiations and control Hormuz, while asking whether Trump would accept not getting any concessions and whether Iran’s price could be feasible for a settlement. - Speaker 1 counters that Iran has long-held leverage over Hormuz, which the US seeks to counter with pressure, and argues that both sides seek a diplomatic solution but with differing terms. There is an assertion that blockade of Hormuz is illegal and that Iran has a right to respond under self-defense if attacked. Strategic calculations and potential actions - The Strait of Hormuz is treated as a central strategic chokepoint; Iran’s coastal status and territorial waters are discussed at length. The possibility that Iran would shoot back if attacked is framed as legal self-defense, while the blockade is described as an act of war. - Speaker 1 entertains a mixed approach for Iran: “Both. I would advise Iranian leaders to do both. Give diplomacy opportunity if Trump is interested. … don’t accept bullying because if you accept bullying, then you have to hand over Iranian oil to Trump.” - There is acknowledgment that if Iran chooses to respond, it would be legal and within its rights to do so, given the blockade’s status. Regional dynamics and actors - The UAE’s actions are scrutinized: Israel’s presence and the UAE’s alignment with the US and Israel are discussed, including the UAE’s role in OPEC and broad regional ties. Speaker 1 characterizes UAE as having provided more support to US/Israeli aims and notes a “wrong decision” by the UAE in its current course, suggesting a potential recalibration. - Iran’s broader strategy of “resisting” is described as its single option, with emphasis on not accepting bullying or endless concessions, and with a call to pursue both diplomacy and sustained pressure. Ideology, governance, and internal critique - The conversation shifts to a discussion of the Iranian revolution’s ideology and its domestic implications. Quotes attributed to the late leader Ayatollah Khomeini are examined, with Speaker 1 arguing that translation matters matter and that Islam, properly understood, is a world religion that seeks justice, not domination. The claim is made that Islam is not inherently violent and that the misperception of Islam as a violent force is part of Islamophobia. - A critique is offered of Iran’s domestic social sciences: Iran’s engineering and medical achievements are praised, while the social sciences are described as underdeveloped and too reliant on Western frameworks. The suggestion is that Iran should develop indigenous social sciences to better guide policy and society, arguing that “Iran could do much more” in this area. Personal outlook and conclusions - The speakers acknowledge that both sides appear unwilling to yield on core issues, with a double-track approach suggested: pursue diplomacy when possible, but prepare to resist and potentially escalate if pressures persist. - The conversation closes with an openness to future discussions, including the possibility of a separate program focused on Iran’s internal dynamics and the revolution’s core tenets, to better understand regional concerns and policy decisions.

Ashwin Rutansi opens Going Underground from Dubai, noting that the UAE has been targeted by Iranian missiles and drones, and references former US President Trump’s threats to destroy Iran’s civilization. He frames the discussion around Iran’s targets in the region and broader regional dynamics, including BRICS’ influence and multipolarity, and mentions Iran’s enrichment moves and past statements by Ayatollahs on nuclear weapons. He previews a controversial claim from a participant: a plan “where every bridge in Iran will be decimated by 12:00 tomorrow night, where every power plant in Iran will be out of business, burning, exploding, and never to be used again,” followed by an acknowledgment that “we don’t want that to happen.” The host also notes the region’s strategic importance and asks what events mean for global scarcity in food and health care, as well as how Western media portrays Dubai. In the interview segment, the guest is Michel Kanu, chairman of the Kanu Group, a major UAE business conglomerate with divisions including Kanu Travel, Logistics, Shipping, and Real Estate. Rutansi begins with a provocative line about the “dream” being over and asks how international propaganda portrays the UAE, especially Dubai. Kanu responds by describing Dubai’s resilience through prior shocks—the Gulf War, the 2008 financial crisis, 2014 oil-price shock—and attributes Dubai’s strength to its diverse population of over 200 nationalities who come to create opportunities. He emphasizes that the “magic of Dubai” lies in the people and their drive to make things work, rather than external perceptions. The discussion then turns to why Dubai is perceived as a target and the motivations behind hostility toward the city. Kanu refrains from blaming particular actors, suggesting instead that envy and “sour grapes” from some media and observers exist, while noting that those who benefit most from Dubai’s success are its residents and international partners. He asserts that Dubai’s openness and tolerance extend to neighbors and stresses that prosperity for all neighbors reduces conflict. He recalls the region’s historical ties across the Gulf and argues that the UAE has historically balanced relations with Iran and other neighbors, even when the region’s leadership has shifted. He says Dubai “walks a tight rope” and wants all neighbors to prosper, insisting that antagonism from abroad is not in Dubai’s interest. The host and Kanu discuss the impact of hosting US bases in the UAE, comparing it to other countries with foreign bases (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Japan), and the potential consequences for regional security. They debate whether the presence of bases makes GCC states targets and how to assess retaliation prospects given Iran’s population and geography. On shipping and the Strait of Hormuz, the conversation covers whether passage must go through Iranian and Omani territories, with Kanu noting international maritime law but arguing the strait is a natural passage that should not be weaponized. They discuss how insurance costs and potential tolls could affect shipping, with traders weighing the economics of paying tolls against the value of cargoes. The possibility of a GCC reinsurance or state-backed insurance mechanism is raised, including ARIG, and whether a regional solution might emerge if traditional reinsurers refuse coverage. Towards the end, Kanu reflects on Dubai’s real estate, acknowledging a period of rapid price growth that raised affordability concerns. He argues for sustainable growth that supports first-time buyers and long-term stability rather than short-term flips, expressing a desire for a balance between investor returns and housing for residents. The interview closes with gratitude to Kanu and a pledge to continue geopolitical and investment coverage, with a note of sympathy for those affected by the Israeli-US conflict in West Asia.

Brandon and Kieran Andrew discuss the mounting regional dynamics as the Iran war drags into its fourth week. They agree on the possibility of serious unrest in at least one or two Arab countries in the coming years, though they caution not to overstate things. They note that the Gulf states lack a strong social contract, so economic volatility and external shocks could push instability, even if regimes recalibrate and survive. Kieran argues the perception in the region is that Iran has punched above its weight, pursuing a strategy of absorbing losses while raising costs for opponents, especially the US and Israel. Across the region, people are furious with the disruption and violence, privately blaming Israel and the United States for attacking Iran, even if publicly they maintain official narratives. Sovereignty violations against Iran are seen as justification for Iranian retaliation, with regimes prioritizing survival and counterattack. They touch on Bahrain as a case study: civil and political fragility, with Shiite civilians allegedly assisting Iranian targeting, and the Bahrain monarch’s status complicating regional dynamics. This feeds into the broader idea that a new Arab Spring is plausible in the Gulf as governments face popular pressures and a deteriorating social contract. Brandon reflects on the American role, noting the US prioritized defending Israeli targets over its own bases in the region, which erodes trust among Arab states. This feeds a fear that American retreat could materialize, altering long-standing regional alignments and making it harder to maintain bases or security commitments. The conversation shifts to the US-Israel relationship. They discuss the “wolf’s milk of nationalism” and how many Israelis are conditioned to view themselves as besieged and exceptional, which shapes policy and public opinion. They critique a top Israeli official’s stance that the Strait of Hormuz is not Israel’s concern, calling it insane and arguing that open sea lanes affect everyone. They contrast Israel’s unified national narrative with the region’s broader interests, suggesting that the Israeli leadership often acts in ways that may be unsustainable in the long run. They discuss the economics of the conflict. The IEA highlighted that oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 produced a combined loss of about 10 million barrels per day; in this war, about 11 million barrels per day have been lost on average. Gas losses are also significant, with 2022 spikes reversing and accelerating inflation. They warn about broader macro effects: rising inflation (Goldman Sachs predicting 4.5% in the US), higher interest rates, stock market risks, and potential AI-related energy and helium shortages that could undermine tech-driven growth. They emphasize that this energy shock could feed a broader recession in the West. They debate possible endgames. Scenario one: Trump constructs a narrative that the US won, reaching a face-saving deal with Iran to “cover up” a catastrophic outcome; Iran then consolidates a more entrenched, economically weakened regime, and the US must manage the fallout with bases and allies. Scenario two: deployment of US troops leads to a quagmire, with escalating casualties and a draw-out conflict that could push toward nuclear risk. Scenario three: arguably not distinct, but a continued escalation toward wider conflict, potentially drawing in adversaries or increasing regional volatility. They see scenario two as more likely, driven by Israeli pressure and ongoing US engagement, possibly culminating in escalation to nuclear threats. They consider Russia and China’s roles. Russia is viewed as aligned with China; China is playing a cautious, calculating game, avoiding direct involvement while expanding its influence through trade and joint exercises with client states. They argue China’s approach could accelerate American decline and shift influence toward Beijing’s orbit over the next 15–30 years, with Pacific allies and others gravitating toward China for stability and economic ties, even if not openly allied. Iran remains central. They discuss Iran’s resilience: even if economic conditions deteriorate, the regime could deepen its internal consolidation and broaden its persistence through institutions and praetorian guard support. If nukes were used or if retaliation escalates, the regime’s survivability would hinge on its decentralized structure and potential for hardline consolidation. Brandon asks about the possible brain drain and long-term sustainability of Israel if the conflict endures. Kieran warns that even if Israel survives militarily, it faces a Pyrrhic victory with existential threats from within, including demographic shifts, brain drain, and an economy sustained by a war footing and American aid, which may not be sustainable in the long run. Brain drain and domestic social fractures could undermine Israel’s stability and economic vitality, especially once the immediate military crisis subsides. Towards the end, they acknowledge that the war’s trajectory will likely redefine US influence, the Gulf’s political landscape, and Israel’s future. They conclude with mutual acknowledgment of the complexities, agreeing that the situation is poised to reshape regional and global power dynamics for years to come, and that the path forward remains uncertain and dangerous. They sign off with plans to reconnect, noting Kieran’s Navarra Live and other media appearances.

Professor Seyyed Muhammad Marandi and Glenn discussed the widening of the war and what Yemen’s entry means for the escalation, as well as how Iran interprets attacks on it and its own targeting. - Yemen’s entry into the war is described as very important. Marandi notes the United States previously waged war on Yemen last year and withdrew, which he says demonstrates Yemen’s significance. With the US engaged against Iran, its ability to focus on Yemen is reduced, giving Yemen more room to maneuver. Iraq’s resistance has been striking US targets and could go further; Yemen’s capabilities have likely grown, and its current targets are limited but could expand to striking Saudi oil facilities or entering the Arabian Peninsula, including potentially closing the Red Sea or striking Israeli and US assets. - He recalls past dynamics of the Yemen conflict, including the seven-yearSaudi-led campaign backed by much of the world, the blockade on Yemen that blocked medicine and food, and Yemen’s eventual leverage via strikes on Saudi oil and gas installations that contributed to a ceasefire. Today, Yemen could “easily take out Saudi oil installations and cut Saudi imports from the Red Sea completely,” and could blockade the Red Sea or strike Israelis or US assets in the Indian Ocean. He asserts Yemen has been developing capabilities swiftly, similar to Iran and Hezbollah, and argues the West consistently underestimates such actors. - The escalation ladder remains high, and if the US or Israel escalates, Iran’s side will escalate too. Global energy, fertilizer, and petrochemical shortages are increasing, intensifying international pressure on Trump and anger toward Israel and Netanyahu. Marandi believes Iran’s escalation dominance is present, although they have not yet demonstrated their maximum capabilities. - He references a book, Going to Tehran, as a contrast to US policy: if the US had chosen a different route a decade ago, the current critical situation might be different. Instead, he says policymakers listened to Zionist influence and a small oligarchy, leading to the current climate of possible catastrophe from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, Iraq, and Iran. - On the US-Israel coordination, Marandi suggests joint operation is likely, pointing to an Israeli strike on the South Pars gas installation as a test that led to Iranian retaliation, and argues President Trump’s stated deadlines to strike Iranian infrastructure were used to manage markets, notably oil prices. He asserts the pattern shows the US delaying or intensifying threats for market control, while Iran retaliates when threatened. - Ground forces and potential deployments: UAE signals strongest engagement among Gulf states, with islands claimed by the UAE that Iran took in 1971. Marandi argues that no Persian Gulf Arab regime is capable of fighting effectively; their role is to provide bases, airspace, and territorial access for the US. Iran, however, has prepared for potential ground operations for decades and believes it could counter any invasion with underground bases and a wide range of weapon systems that go beyond missiles and drones. He posits scenarios where Iraqi forces and Yemen could strike into Kuwait or Northern Saudi Arabia, complicating US options. - Regarding resilience, Marandi emphasizes Yemen’s and Iran’s enduring capacity to resist: Yemen “won the seven-year genocidal war” against the US-backed coalition and is now more prepared; Iran’s resilience is linked to its Islamic and Shia identity, symbols like martyrdom, and a population that remains mobilized despite leadership assassinations and external pressure. He cites public demonstrations in Tehran and widespread civilian backing, as well as ongoing strikes and bombings against Iranian targets, which he says continue to provoke Iranian retaliation rather than deter it. - In terms of outcomes and negotiations, Marandi says Iranian demands will have to be met, though the method is negotiable: reparations could be pursued from regional actors like the Emirates and Saudis rather than the US. Iran would require benefits for its regional allies (Hezbollah, Yemen, Palestinians, Iraqis). He warns that without concessions, further invasion remains a risk, implying that time is not on the side of the West because energy and petrochemical shortages will escalate. He also emphasizes that the real core issue is control over oil, LNG, petrochemicals, and fertilizer, and that the US would face severe economic and social disruption if those supplies are cut off. - The conversation ends with a note of hope that, despite the grim prospects, there is optimism for a better future, even if the days ahead look darker.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Larry Johnson, former CI analyst and writer at Sonar Twenty One. Where do things stand in the Iran war and the information war surrounding it? Larry: The Gulf is too wide for a negotiated settlement. Iran has positions of principle: sanctions lifted immediately and assets unfrozen; recognition that they control the Strait of Hormuz; attacks on Palestinians, Lebanon, and Hezbollah must stop. They won’t back off from enriching nuclear material within limits; they insist on being treated as a sovereign state and as a signatory to the NPT. The U.S. portrayal of Iran as a vicious terrorist state is, in his view, widely believed in the West, and Washington thinks continued pressure will force surrender. He argues the leadership in Iran is not as split as some claim; figures like Pozeskin and Arakchi and Golubov are IRGC-associated, contrary to “moderates” narratives. On the economy, the U.S. pretends Iran is blockaded, but Iran has opened land routes through Caspian Sea access, Pakistan (seven routes now into Iran), and connections to Russia; the largest deepwater port in Pakistan supports Iranian trade. China and Russia are quietly reshaping Gulf security dynamics. After Arakashi met Putin in Saint Petersburg, Putin spoke of the Gulf security architecture; Wang Yi echoed the theme with Oraqi. Project Freedom was ended after Saudis told the U.S. not to use their territory or base for it. A Pakistani ISI general told Glenn that Saudi Arabia and Qatar may cut ties with the U.S. militarily, or push the U.S. out of the region. If true, this aligns with China and Russia’s push to restructure the Gulf security framework, reducing U.S. military footprint. Iran’s ability to retaliate has so far been limited as China, Russia, and Pakistan counsel restraint. Glenn: The nonproliferation treaty is central here. Iran is a signatory and seeks its civilian nuclear program within limits; the U.S. demands no civilian program. The treaty’s articles and U.S. behavior are contentious, and the discussion underscores broader questions about security architecture in the region and whether Iran can be included in a new, inclusive security order. Larry: Regarding current fighting, it’s a tit-for-tat dynamic. Iran retains control of the Strait of Hormuz; U.S. ships are claimed to be active but in practice may avoid direct engagement in the gulf. Iran has supposedly neutralized several U.S. bases and radar systems; the Fifth Fleet HQ in Bahrain is reportedly out of action, and Al Udeid’s operations center may have shifted. The possibility of returning personnel remains doubtful, given the extent of damage and the host nations’ willingness to rebuild with China/Russia in the mix. The UAE’s stance stands out: they blocked flights supporting Project Freedom for a time, then re-opened under restrictions, signaling a shift toward diversifying security partners beyond the U.S. They face pressures related to strategic position and possible leverage by Iran. On oil and markets, Glenn notes that strategic reserves releases are perceived as signaling decisiveness but may fail to stabilize prices once reserves run dry. Larry explains that a supply shock, not just demand, drives price increases; with reserves exhausted, prices will rise unless demand collapses, which would be a sign of broader economic distress. He contends that Iran’s leverage is growing as Gulf states move away from U.S. protection and toward China/Russia, potentially seeking alternative security arrangements and currencies beyond the petrodollar. The war’s domestic branding in the U.S. is another theme. Trump declared victory after 60 days, then launched “Epic Fury,” later signaling “Project Freedom.” Larry suggests this is a rebranding to justify further U.S. intervention and to replenish defense-industrial stockpiles, rather than a substantive strategic settlement. The broader goal is to secure new round of allocations for weapons manufacturers, regardless of Iran’s position. Larry concludes that the move toward a more inclusive regional security architecture—recognizing security interests of opponents and reducing exclusive reliance on the U.S.—appears unlikely in current discourse, even as China and Russia push for such restructuring. Hormuz remains central to Iran’s strategic security, and without meaningful diplomacy, the region’s stability will continue to be threatened. Glenn signs off, thanking Larry for the discussion.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

Dubai is officially 83% turned off, with the city of gold described as a ghost town in less than a month, and the entire country framed as a political version of Disneyland. Larry Johnson is cited as exposing “the disgusting reality the travel influencers won’t tell you.” The narrative asserts massive high rises, most of them lacking a sewage system, requiring a fleet of trucks to haul human waste out into the desert every single day. It is claimed they built golden toilets for westerners but forgot the foundation, and now that foundation is crumbling. The UAE is labeled as not a nation but “an artificial mirage.” The transcript contends that international trade in the UAE is dead, tourism is dead, and the construction industry is a graveyard. It states that 25% of their oil isn’t even leaving the port. Larry Johnson is quoted as saying that “The UAE won’t survive the week as an intact country because they have no economic floor left to stand on.” The broader regional backdrop is described as the Gulf collapsing. In parallel geopolitical commentary, it is claimed that while the Gulf collapses, Donald Trump is posting that he is in serious negotiations with a new Iranian regime, but insiders say he is talking to ghosts. The excerpt describes this as the psychiatrist’s couch scenario, with Trump haggling over prices like a real estate deal, but Iran isn’t even in the room. The demands are asserted as 100% fixed: the United States out of the Gulf, end the sanctions, and pay reparations. It is stated there is no middle ground here. Regarding the U.S. administration’s posture, the White House is described as bragging about 9,000 strikes, even as oil prices are indicated to be “screaming toward $120 a barrel.” The narrative claims that people are being sold a fake victory while 5,000 Marines are being prepped for an April 6 invasion of islands that are described as literally pre-mapped kill zones. The speaker contends that the situation is a repetition of the two-thousand-three Iraq scud lie on a global scale.

The broadcast discusses the potential global attention shift away from Jeffrey Epstein as US-Israeli tensions with Iran escalate, with a focus on events planned for Saturday. The program promises to broadcast from Dubai in the Gulf, less than 100 miles from the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint of international trade Iran has threatened to shut down. Saturday is described as a day when NATO-nation type leaders, including Marco Rubio, will gather in a Munich hotel to discuss developments in West Asia, which the speaker implies may be overshadowed by the war situation. The show features a guest described as the senior adviser for Iran at the US State Department up until a couple of years ago, who is also a distinguished diplomatic fellow at the Middle East Institute and a 40-year U.S. Foreign Service retiree. The guest is said to discuss why, during the years of JCPOA nuclear negotiations, the talks with Iranian ministers and negotiators did not mention Israel’s nuclear weapons, and he is expected to share perspectives on what he thinks about recent developments described as the “Dimona earthquake” in the past few weeks, including whether Israel is testing more nuclear weapons and what the stakes are. The broadcast notes coverage from Abu Dhabi through a report: a senior UAE diplomat visits Iran amid fears of U.S. action, with UAE stating that it welcomes U.S.-Iran talks and calls for peace, aligning with a peace-oriented stance in contrast to what Netanyahu may want. It is stated that a decision was made on Wednesday in Washington during Netanyahu’s seventh meeting with Donald Trump, a meeting note that runs alongside references to Jeffery Epstein’s files in Washington, suggesting timing or political context related to Epstein’s case. The program identifies itself as Saturday’s Going Underground, hosted by Afshin Rattansi, and claims to be broadcast worldwide on RT except in NATO nation totalitarian Western European countries. It will also be available on Rumble, Odyssey, and Elon Musk’s X. The overall framing connects imminent Middle East tensions, nuclear issues, and high-profile political meetings with broader media attention that could be overshadowed by the unfolding crisis.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

- The discussion opens with trying to map a post-war world, considering both a quick end to the war and a prolonged one, with a focus on US–China relations, US allies, Iran, and the broader region. A participant notes a broader battle between a China–Russia–Iran alignment and the Western alliance, including financial systems. - A major regional shift is already underway: by 2000, the top banks were dominated by Japanese and European players; by 2025, China dominates the top four banks. The speaker argues that power is moving from Western banks to China, and that countries with US-dollar-denominated debt are converting debt into renminbi because it’s cheaper. - In the last week, Russia and China signaled to Iran a push to revisit the Gulf security architecture. Putin spoke to Iraq about Gulf security; Wang Yi did the same. The implied shift is toward a Gulf security framework less dependent on US protection. - The current Gulf security model is described as US bases guaranteeing protection from Iran, coupled with a demand that recipient states buy US Treasuries and military equipment. The speakers argue this model left Gulf states vulnerable and exposed as US defense systems failed to prevent Iranian attacks in the recent episode. - Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the UAE) are discussed as potentially moving away from the United States toward Russia and China. A Pakistani ISI general reportedly said Saudi and Qatari leaders are breaking from the US; one NBC report cited Trump canceling Project Freedom due to Saudi resistance to air operations from Prince Saud Air Base. The implication is a Persian Gulf broadly shifting into the Russian–Chinese sphere, potentially altering Gulf financial flows away from the US dollar toward gold and the yuan. - An opposing view, aired by another economist, suggests the US will strengthen its deterrence in the Gulf, with UAE as an indicator. The counterpoint argues that the Gulf countries previously supported Iran’s adversaries, including indirect funding for attacks on Iran, implying US deterrence remains necessary. - The conversation emphasizes the gulf’s deterrence history: Iran has largely avoided offensive military action in the Gulf against the region, while Gulf states have relied on US protection. The lack of a robust Chinese or Russian security guarantee in the region is highlighted as a real risk to Gulf security calculations. - There is a debate about whether US military power remains credible. One participant argues the US has not won a major war since World War II, with recent actions described as limited or draw outcomes; another contends that US protection remains essential despite past failures, given Iran’s capabilities and history. - Military-strategy discussions cover the feasibility of a ground invasion vs. airstrike-only approaches. The speakers outline logistical challenges (water, supply lines, mountainous terrain) and the scale of forces needed (potentially large, multi-month training and buildup) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Arguments are made that holding the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if Iran can still launch missiles and drones from interior positions. - The strategic importance of Gulf exports is quantified: Gulf oil about 32% of world supply; LNG around 20% (centered on Qatar and the Gulf), urea and sulfur for agriculture and industry (urea ~36%; sulfur for refining and semiconductors), and helium from Qatar at about 33%. Keeping the Gulf open is framed as essential to global energy, inflation, and agriculture. - A possible pathway to open the Hormuz is proposed: Iran could offer broad access to global markets except for countries allied with Israel or those that attacked Iran; Iran would leverage this to restart global flows, particularly to Asia. The idea is that a near-term crisis could force a negotiated settlement with Iran. - The timeline mentions a forthcoming peace negotiation in Beijing next week, with skepticism about it proceeding smoothly. If negotiations occur, Trump would not likely receive a warm reception due to recent sanctions and US actions against China; China has signaled resolve against US sanctions, instructing its companies not to acquiesce to pressure. - Overall, the dialogue frames the war as a potential catalyst for a broader realignment: power shifting toward China and Russia, a Gulf region hedging its security through new alliances, and the global economy recalibrating around yuan- and gold-based financial flows, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central strategic chokepoint.

Syed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, discussed diplomacy and “information warfare” surrounding US-Iran negotiations during ongoing conflict. He said the Iranian version of events is “usually… much more accurate,” noting that in his view the West misses the truth in mainstream media, while Iran often does not “lie” but instead “won’t talk about” matters it does not want to address. He said his conversations with participants in diplomacy indicate “a wide gap” between the Iranian side and the Americans, with the Americans showing “a much greater sense of urgency” than Iran. Marandi argued that Iran believes the situation will be “tough” and that either US strikes or US “flexible” behavior could follow. He emphasized that Iran’s “working assumption… is that there will be war,” and that suspicion is reinforced by past US behavior, including Iran’s account that the US “betrayed” Iran during previous dialogues and agreements. He said no side should put faith in messages transmitted through mediators such as Pakistan. On Iranian “demands” and possible red lines, Marandi said Iran’s position is hardened while still allowing flexibility in certain areas. He said Iran’s demands are “much more reasonable than the American demands” and do not include demands that the US give up sovereignty or US military presence in the Persian Gulf. He argued that Iran’s strongest leverage is the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as central to the defensive and offensive military engagement during the war, including efforts to control and keep control of the strait. He said Iran “never closed the Strait Of Hormuz,” maintaining that it only restricted it to countries “with The US in its assault on Iran,” while friendly states’ ships continued to pass. Marandi also described a scenario where Iran and the Americans might agree to “open the Strait Of Hormuz” under conditions, with Iran still controlling it and receiving a fee from passage under reasons such as “global warming, environmental protection or security cost.” He said Iran would no longer allow the US to turn the Persian Gulf into a military zone, even if some aspects appear on paper and others do not. He linked Iran’s negotiating strength to perceived victimhood, ideological motivation, public resilience amid economic pressure, and confidence that Iran can outlast the waiting game. When asked about nuclear red lines and maneuvering, Marandi said he was “very careful” about requesting details and framed his remarks as understanding rather than direct knowledge. He asserted Iran is in a “much stronger position now than before” and that Iran’s need for flexibility is “much less.” He also addressed sanctions, saying the US has “stolen a significant amount of Iranian assets” worth “many billions of dollars,” which he said limits leverage from that source. He said leverage “is mostly the sanctions,” while the threat of war is not what he said the Iranians fear. He claimed Iran’s military capability is “significantly stronger than it was three months ago,” and that if war restarts it would be “worse for the Americans,” with Yemen expected to be “much more active” than in the earlier phase. He stated that at the negotiating table Iran’s main offer would be passage through the Strait of Hormuz and that US miscalculations include misunderstanding Iran and underestimating the value of imposing a siege early in the war. Marandi discussed regional actors as mostly message-passing rather than decision-makers. He said Qatar sent a delegation but had “not much input,” and that Pakistan mainly passes messages “back and forth,” with Iran preferring written communications to avoid “loopholes.” He said regional narratives about differences between Trump and Netanyahu or about opposition to war are not taken seriously because similar claims were used as disinformation before the previous conflict. He argued that the UAE aligns with the Israeli regime and suggested this stance justifies Iran’s position and increases regional support for Iran during retaliation. He said Turkey is constrained as a NATO member and has not taken actions against the US, though he described Turkey as indirectly affected. He concluded that the regional situation is “not really” decisive compared with the confrontation between Iran, the US, and the Israeli regime. On timing and high alert, Marandi said Iran has been on high alert “for at least three weeks,” with repeated reports that an attack “could be tonight” or “tomorrow,” while he said it is difficult to determine if an assault will occur. He described the weekend timing as potentially relevant and stated that, in his view, Iranians are “not panicked” and are confident due to experience and capabilities displayed during the conflict. The conversation ended with discussion that US messaging about being optimistic or “getting close to peace” is a concern, and that disputes between Trump and Netanyahu are viewed as potentially preceding an attack. Marandi responded by hoping for peace “for everyone” and expressing hope that “after the hardship” things will “get better.”

The conversation centers on Iran, potential U.S. action, and the wider strategic spillovers across the Middle East and beyond. The speakers discuss what prompted a delay in striking Iran, the likelihood of a broader attack, and how regional and great-power dynamics might unfold. - On why a strike against Iran was postponed, the consensus from the guest is that Netanyahu asked for more time to prepare for defending against Iranian missiles and to enable a larger attack footprint. The guest also cites public statements by U.S. figures supporting a bigger operation: Lindsey Graham emphatically said last Friday that the delay was so we can go bigger; General Jack Keane stated that military operations would target political and military leaders and destroy their military infrastructure to take the regime out. The guest emphasizes that the most likely scenario is an expanded target set and greater combat power in the region to defend bases and improve the attack’s effectiveness, rather than a symbolic strike. - Regarding whether Russia or China would become involved, the guest doubts active involvement by either country, but suggests indirect support or intelligence help could occur. The logic is that direct involvement would be costly for these powers, though they might assist Iran indirectly. - On the readiness and capability of Iran, the guest argues Iran is now far more prepared than in the twelve-day war. They note that insiders were purged after the prior conflict, defenses were strengthened, and missile production likely accelerated since June, with production areas shielded from prior attacks. Iran’s ability to respond quickly and with significant damage is viewed as higher, and the guest warns that if Iran experiences an existential threat, it could abandon restraint and retaliate in a way that makes a broader war more likely. - The discussion covers U.S. bases in the region, where the guest concedes that the U.S. air defense is not at the level of Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling, THAAD, and other integrated systems. Some bases lack robust defense against ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats, and, while 30,000 U.S. troops remain in the area, the overall air-defense capability is described as insufficient to stop all Iranian missiles. - Would Iran strike Gulf nations directly to pressure them to push the U.S. to end the war? The guest says not likely, arguing that Iranian leadership has signaled a preference for good relations with Gulf states and that attacking Gulf bases or cities would create more enemies and complicate Iran’s strategic posture. - A decapitation strike targeting leadership is considered plausible by some but deemed risky. The guest notes Iran has continuity of government plans and could designate successors; even if leadership is removed, a power vacuum could ignite internal fighting. The possibility of an existential attack by Iran—coupled with a broader regional war—could be catastrophic and is something to avoid. - The discussion turns to Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and the broader spillover risk. The guest suggests that if Iran’s retaliation is strong and Hamas or Hezbollah see an opportunity, there could be escalations, including potential involvement by Turkey. However, Iran would likely avoid opening new fronts that would diffuse its capability to strike U.S. bases in the region. - The problem of Iran’s internal diversity is highlighted: Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmen, among others, complicate any post-regime-change scenario. The guest argues Iran could fragment, but emphasizes that a successful Western-backed regime change could still lead to civil strife rather than a stable replacement, warning of a “textbook failed regime change” akin to past Middle East interventions. - On NATO and Western unity, the guest asserts NATO is dead or in deep trouble, citing European leaders who doubt U.S. stability and reliability. He notes European politicians discuss building an autonomous European security architecture, implying growing European reluctance to rely on U.S. leadership for defense. - Greenland as a strategic issue: the guest argues there is no rational military need for Greenland for security, and that the notion of occupying or militarizing Greenland is driven more by Trump’s personal preferences than strategic necessity. He points out that even if Greenland were militarized, Russia and China would have little to gain, given logistical and strategic barriers. - Finally, the future trajectory: the guest predicts Iran will likely be pressed hard in a large strike but warns that the consequences could be severe, including regional destabilization, potential civil conflict inside Iran, and long-term strategic costs for the U.S. and its European partners. He suggests that as long as the U.S. overextends itself in multiple theaters (Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, Venezuela), global stability and the U.S. economic footing could be endangered. The guest closes by highlighting the uncertainty of Trump’s next moves, citing possible abrupt shifts and cognitive concerns that could influence decisions in unpredictable ways.

The conversation covers a wide, interwoven set of points about Iran, the Gulf, and international power dynamics, centering on how Iran’s posture and regional actions are shaping the future balance of power. - Strait of Hormuz and ownership: The speakers discuss whether Iran believes the Strait of Hormuz permanently belongs to Iran. There is mention of a deputy parliamentary speaker saying “the Strait Of Hormuz belongs forever to the great nation of Iran,” and the implications of Iran’s rhetoric for sanctions, cables, and fees. The dialogue notes that this rhetoric risks pushing Trump toward continued conflict and highlights a distinction between legal territorial claims and the practical control Iran seeks to exercise. - Leverage, sanctions, and war aims: Speaker 1 argues Iran faces immense pressure and has suffered enormous casualties and damage, and would use all leverage to prevent a US victory. The frame presented is that Trump cannot easily compensate Iran for its losses, and that Iran’s leadership seeks to deter further US action, potentially by threatening critical regional chokepoints and economic channels. - UAE, Israel, and regional bases: The discussion addresses UAE’s normalization and hosting Israeli assets, with Speaker 1 insisting that if a country starts an illegal war, “you get to hit these assets.” They note Israeli presence in the UAE before the war and Israeli bases in the region, arguing that alliance and bases do not equal occupation, and acknowledging the UAE’s sovereign choices amid a complex security environment. - Iranian strategy and volume of attacks: The participants discuss why Iran used hundreds of drones and missiles against the UAE and other targets, suggesting the aim was to overcome air defenses and to send a signal given the breadth of anti-missile systems in the region. There is acknowledgment that while such strikes cause damage, they occur within a context of a broader blockade and ongoing hostilities, including the broader war dynamics in Lebanon, Gaza, and beyond. - Fujairah and other theaters: The discussion turns to the Fujairah incident (and a similar strike in Qatari waters) and whether Iran officially claimed responsibility. Speaker 1 notes that Iran did not accept responsibility due to ceasefire constraints, invoking terminology from Persian/Arabic to describe such “shots that come out of the blue.” There is speculation about other potential targets along alternative routes to bypass Hormuz, including Fujairah and Yanbu, to deter or disrupt overflow routes. - Regional outlook and strategic lists: The speakers speculate that Iran may maintain a prioritized list of targets among those responsible for significant damage to Iran (including Fujairah and Saudi pipeline routes) and that it could pursue other routes as part of a broader strategy to constrain Hormuz and diversify its leverage. - Ideology vs national interest in Iran: A major thread concerns whether Iran’s Islamic-republic ideology should or will give way to more pragmatic, interests-based diplomacy (such as re-entering or renegotiating the nuclear deal, minimizing sanctions, and engaging with the US while criticizing its allies). Speaker 0 argues the ideology often appears to guide policy, while Speaker 1 contends that Iran’s ideology is an enduring element of its foreign policy, shaping its support for Palestinians, Lebanese groups, and other allies, and that this ideological frame is not easily separated from national interests. - JCPOA and US policy: The dialogue references missed opportunities to return to the 2015 JCPOA framework, highlighting Robert Malley’s position that a revised, longer, stronger agreement could have been pursued after 2015, and noting that the withdrawal under Trump and subsequent sanctions contributed to the current crisis. There is critique of US internal politics and alleged influence from various actors, including assertions about the role of the “Epstein class” and other external pressures. - Post-ceasefire expectations: Looking ahead, Speaker 1 anticipates Iran becoming more aggressive in advancing its interests after any ceasefire, while Speaker 0 probes how Iran’s approach might shift if diplomacy were more effective, and whether a more calibrated policy toward the US and Israel could ease sanctions and improve conditions for ordinary Iranians. - Concluding note: The dialogue closes with mutual reflections on the enduring competition between ideology and national interests, regional power dynamics, and the potential trajectories for Iran and its neighbors in a post-ceasefire or negotiated settlement environment.

Glenn welcomed Seyyed Muhammad Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiator adviser, and asked about the terms of the current ceasefire and why clarity is hard to get. Marandi explained the progression: the U.S. initially demanded unconditional surrender, then shifted to a “15 plan,” which Iran rejected. Iran developed its own plan, with the Supreme National Security Council sending a modified version to the leader, Ayatollah Bahamani, who finalized it and sent it to Pakistan. Trump ostensibly accepted Iran’s framework as the basis for negotiations, though “that doesn’t mean that we’re going to have peace” and there’s little faith in U.S. willingness to concede the 10 points Iran presented. He described the U.S. as an empire whose capitulation is unlikely, given internal and international pressure and the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He warned that the U.S. military footprint in the region would be hard to sustain and would face logistical and environmental strain, which could complicate any new war; nonetheless, Iran is preparing for the worst, having previously negotiated with the U.S. twice and seeing both efforts end in renewed conflict. He attributed recent Israeli actions against Lebanon as an effort to derail the ceasefire, noting that Israeli leadership (Netanyahu) appears motivated to induce more violence to gain leverage domestically, while Western media outlets largely abstain from criticizing these actions. Glenn pressed on how to interpret the two-week window for negotiations and whether Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire remains valid. Marandi reiterated skepticism that the full Iran-focused 10-point plan would be accepted by the United States, calling Trump inconsistent and unpredictable. He suggested the two-week period might be extended if negotiations progress modestly, but doubted any comprehensive agreement would be reached given the U.S. tendency to resist rights-based terms and to change positions rapidly. The two discussed the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran conflict, with Iran continuing to strike at Israeli targets and American assets in the Gulf if necessary. The conversation then moved to the question of who bears responsibility for the broader regional disruption. Marandi argued that Gulf regimes (the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar) are not in a position to fight Iran; without electricity and infrastructure, they would suffer cataclysmic losses. He asserted that the U.S. could not unify the Gulf states in a new campaign and that Iran would control the Strait of Hormuz if attacked. The UAE’s rumored strike on petrochemical facilities was cited as an example of the ongoing broader conflict. He also suggested Lebanon’s fate is tied to whether Israel continues striking Lebanon or shifts its focus back to Iran, and warned that a failure to constrain Israel would undermine any peace talks. Marandi asserted that the ceasefire’s terms could be undermined by the “Epstein class” influence over Western media and governments, arguing that the global media’s support for Israel’s actions betrays a broader humanitarian and democratic legitimacy crisis in the West. He also noted that Oman’s cooperation around Hormuz might be part of a negotiated arrangement, given Oman’s more favorable relationship with Iran and its geographic position on the strait. He stressed that Iran’s apparent victory could reshape global power dynamics, weakening the U.S. and empowering Iran and other Global South actors, with implications for the petrodollar system and regional alignments. Towards the end, Glenn and Marandi touched on the potential long-term regional changes, including borders and governance in the Gulf, and the broader economic and political costs for Gulf monarchies. Marandi attributed the crisis to Zionist influence on U.S. policy and lamented missed opportunities to pursue normal relations with the United States, referencing authors Flint and Leverett and their book Going to Tehran, which he suggested could have altered current events if heeded. He concluded by reiterating that lessons were not learned and that the war’s consequences would be lasting.

Afshan Rutansky presents Going Underground from the UAE, noting that seven weeks into the US-Israel war in Iran, the region faces continuing conflict and hardship. She claims the war began with Trump and Netanyahu assassinating Iran’s leader and his family, leading to millions killed, wounded, or displaced in Iran and Lebanon, and global disruption of fuel and petrochemical supplies. She marks Iran’s National Army Day, noting a traditional military parade and speech, but says this year’s observance comes after the US threatened to destroy Iran’s civilization in one night, and after a claimed “fake” Trump blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. She asserts adversaries of the US government have gained through destruction of US power and preferential pricing, citing visits of regional leaders to China and Moscow following visits by UAE’s MBZ and the Malaysian king. She introduces Bill Astoria (twenty-year US Air Force veteran, former professor of history, author of several works on militarism) from Yarmouth, Massachusetts, and asks why he says Iran has “won this war on Iran.” Astoria responds that while Iran may not have definitively won yet, the United States is losing the war because its stated rationales—regime change, nuclear threat elimination, destroying ballistic missiles—have not been achieved. He argues Iran is more unified and a bigger world player than before, while the US and Israel have failed to meet their war aims. He suggests long-term consequences indicate the United States is in decline, including unsustainable Pentagon spending (citing proposed rises to approximately $1.5 trillion plus $500 billion in the next fiscal year) and the war used to justify this expansion. From Iran’s perspective, he says, there is no imminent existential threat from Iran; rather, the existential threat is perceived to come from nuclear-armed Israel and America. Rutansky raises a Financial Times headline about Goldman Sachs clients benefiting from Iran diversion and “military Keynesianism” returning as a driver for wealth, implying the defense budget primarily enriches the rich oligarchy. Astoria counters that the American public mainly experiences propaganda, noting a 50% budget increase framed as defense, and calls the Pentagon budget a department for perpetual war rather than true defense. He contends Trump’s rhetoric and actions reveal a shift toward imperial aims, and points to multiple operations in places like Venezuela, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, Cuba, and Greenland. He also notes that diplomacy has been undermined by prior bombings and assassinations, reducing Iran’s trust in US negotiations. The conversation touches on the notion that Trump’s antiwar appeal was undermined by a militarized approach; Astoria stresses that military Keynesianism will not revive America and may increase authoritarianism and domestic repression, including harsher homeland security measures and militarized policing. He asserts Trump is a culmination of a warrior mentality in US policy, and that the Pope’s recent rejection of the war represents a related moral stance. Discussing Israel’s role, Astoria claims Israel poses a national security threat to the US in a nuanced way, suggesting Israeli influence over US foreign policy—particularly regarding Iraq, Iran, and the broader Middle East—casts doubt on whether Israel is a true friend to the United States. He argues the Ukraine war has faded from front-page coverage in US media, with continued support for Ukraine framed as necessary by American outlets. Toward the end, the host asks about censorship and media control; Astoria agrees that censorship is increasing as the conflict persists, noting that mainstream coverage emphasizes antiseptic imagery while omitting civilian casualties. He predicts more suppression of antiwar voices as the public becomes more aware of the war’s costs. The program closes with thanks to Astoria and a note that future guests will include a former Iraq War veteran now advising Robert Kennedy Jr. and working in Trump’s cabinet.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.

The Strait of Hormuz has been closed for eleven weeks, and the USA is poised to resume military strikes against Iran, with Israel expected to escalate further. A nuclear power facility in the UAE was struck by drones, which they say came from the West, though the speaker argues the drones could also be from Iran, from Iraq, or a false flag launched from a secret base in Iraq. The speaker says they do not believe Iran is taking responsibility, but notes they may be wrong. Overall, the speaker frames escalation as continuing without a resolution to the Strait. A limited development occurred when about a dozen ships were allowed to pass through after Trump met with China’s President Xi, with an arrangement that also involved Iran giving China permission to allow a certain number of ships to sail through. The speaker emphasizes this does not approach normal traffic levels (such as the previous 120/day figure). They argue that the crisis is not apparent to many Westerners because shipments already contained about eight weeks’ worth of supplies (oil, gas, fertilizer, helium, sulfuric acid, polyethylene, and other inputs). With week 11 underway, the speaker claims there are few remaining ships headed to Western countries. The speaker explains that even if countries have their own oil suppliers, global refining and crude type requirements create dependency on imported heavier crude while exporting sweet light crude. They predict scarcity issues if the supply chain runs out. They highlight shortages already affecting motor oil and describe how recovery will take easily the rest of the year even if the war ends quickly. The speaker urges people to buy motor oil immediately or within two days because blenders are reporting that orders for base oils are being rejected, meaning blended engine oil will not reach shelves. The speaker reports early warnings from retailers and manufacturers (including AutoZone, Honda, Nissan, and others) that engine oil supply problems are approaching. They also give guidance on oil labeling, stating that the first number (e.g., in 5W-30, 0W-20, 10W-40) indicates viscosity at cold start, while the second number indicates viscosity at 100°C, and that the second number matters more for matching what an engine needs. They advise matching the second number to avoid major issues, and they prefer oil that is slightly off spec over running dirty oil too long. Beyond motor oil, the speaker predicts broader shortages tied to polyethylene feedstock loss from the Persian Gulf (attributed to Qatar). They connect polyethylene to many supply chain items, including car parts, machine parts, barrels, containers for food storage, industrial shipping containers, and containers used to ship oil, arguing the resulting erosion of supply will cause widespread disruption. They compare the situation to COVID supply chain shortages but argue this is different because reopening factories would not solve it and the lag time will persist for months. They state shortages could continue into 2027. They recommend people prepare backup supplies and essential parts, and encourage neighbors and family to become aware as shelves begin to empty. The speaker also forecasts rising food and transportation costs, higher travel expenses, increased shipping fees for many items, higher e-commerce prices, and more common shipping delays. They say these effects may worsen around midterms, with political blame falling on GOP and Trump. They claim strategic petroleum reserve releases and attempts to keep energy prices low cannot last indefinitely and predict gasoline could reach around $10 per gallon. They add that EV sales may rise because driving costs are lower and EVs avoid engine oil. Finally, the speaker argues that shifting energy demand to the power grid could stress infrastructure already strained by data centers, and they cite California as vulnerable due to lack of local refining and reduced oil infrastructure, plus limited nuclear power capacity. They conclude that with week 11 and no solution in sight, the situation could continue for months and recommend preparedness for oil, water, gas, solar, and battery storage.

The discussion centers on the prospect of a renewed full-scale war in the Middle East, the motivations behind it, and the strategic implications for the United States, Israel, Iran, and regional partners. - Probability of renewed conflict: Speaker 1 argues that the chances of another US-Israeli assault are high and could be imminent. The war’s continuation is described as driven by Zionist policy, not by US national interests, and there is belief that “the forces surrounding Trump” are not rational. The capacity and readiness for a major operation are described as significant, with US equipment and ground-force preparations in Kuwait, the Emirates, and Bahrain, plus jets in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. - Iran’s stance and Hormuz: The conversation asserts that Iran did not intend to take control of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, that move came as a response to the war and hostile actions in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s side contends that the Strait should not be used as a foothold to wage war against Iran, and that its demand for secure passage is tied to preventing further attacks on Iranian infrastructure. The claim is that Netanyahu pushed for occupying the region and that the war’s origins relate to Zionism. - Netanyahu and policy: The speakers attribute the onset of the war to Netanyahu’s actions, arguing that his approach forced escalation and that the US reoriented its strategy in line with Netanyahu’s goals. The claim is made that the real policy of the US and Europe supports a scenario in which Israel could dominate the region, with the two-state solution presented as a long-standing facade. - Trump’s stance and rhetoric: The dialogue notes fluctuations in Trump’s rhetoric, including posts that reference military action against Iran. It is suggested that Trump wants to withdraw but is constrained by the gap between Iranian demands and what the US is willing to concede. There is a sense that Iran is not satisfied with limited concessions and that Tehran seeks broader sanctions relief plus a permanent adjustment to the Hormuz situation. - Negotiations and concessions: The speakers discuss the negotiations’ sticking points, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. There is a view that Iran should retain control over the Strait of Hormuz permanently, rejecting any plan to relinquish control or limit enrichment in a way that would be perceived as a concession to Trump or the West. The suggestion is that while limits could be easy to manage through the IAEA, the control of Hormuz must not be offered as a temporary concession. - UAE and Gulf dynamics: The UAE is described as strategically vulnerable and heavily aligned with the US and Israel, creating a target profile for Iran. Iran’s attacks are framed not as personal but as strategic, aiming to impact the global economy by targeting the UAE as a hub. The UAE’s role in regional politics is portrayed as aggressive in its push toward conflict, although the possibility of reconciliation with Iran is acknowledged. - Alaster Crook and decision-making: An anecdote about Alastair Crook is used to illustrate a point about Western decision-making, suggesting that rational analysis often does not drive policy; emotional factors and perceptions influence choices in Washington and European capitals. - Human costs and damage: The discussion references the human and infrastructural toll, including the destruction seen in Gaza and Lebanon, and alleges the US and Israeli campaigns have caused widespread harm, including to schools and civilians. The speakers assert that the war has inflicted severe economic and humanitarian costs and warn of deeper global recession or depression if conflict deepens. - Specific incident and online safety concerns: The host reveals that Speaker 1 has a bounty on his head, stemming from a Twitter account fundraising for kidnapping him; the account was initially not removed, drawing attention to online threats associated with the conflict. - Nuclear diplomacy and a potential deal: When considering a hypothetical deal, Speaker 1 asserts that Hormuz control must be permanent and rejects a proposal for temporary limits or enrichment concessions in exchange for sanctions relief or assets unfrozen. He emphasizes that Iran believes its nuclear program is a sovereign right and should be handled through international mechanisms like the IAEA rather than through punitive terms tied to Hormuz control. He also reiterates that the nuclear issue has long been used as a pretext for broader policy aims. - Final takeaway: The conversation closes with a sense of caution about the likelihood of avoiding a renewed war, a recognition of the high stakes involved, and an insistence that Hormuz control be non-negotiable for Iran, while acknowledging the potential for reconciliation if Gulf states reevaluate alignment with Israel and the US.

The conversation discusses recent developments and long-running concerns about regional security, especially around Iran, Turkey, and Israel. In Dubai, an alert was issued for a supposed drone or missile attack and people were told to seek shelter; it turned out to be a false alarm, which triggered memories of earlier periods when desalination targets and potential strikes were being openly debated during shows, though “it’s calmer times now.” The discussion then turns to Turkey and Israel. Trump has been praised for his reported engagement with President Erdogan, including the possibility of supplying F-35s to Turkey. The Israeli minister of science and technology is cited as saying he has “no doubt” that the Iranian regime will eventually fall and that after it ends, the Ottoman Empire’s ambition will expand influence, making Turkey a “real future threat” to Israel’s citizens. Foreign Minister Gideon Saar is also mentioned as requesting official recognition of the Armenian genocide in retaliation, with Netanyahu having recognized it personally but not the country yet. The speakers link these moves to Trump weighing possible F-35 sales to Turkey and to broader talk about the risk of Turkey and Israel clashing. The main guest argues that the war with Iran is not over, pointing to a “massive missile assault by the Iranians against Israel” as retaliation for Israeli attacks in northern Lebanon, and contends that assumptions of regional safety are mistaken. He further claims Iran is strong militarily and politically, and that Iran has powerful allies such as China and Russia. He also states that Turkey has historically been the principal threat to Israel’s existence and argues that Israel unnecessarily provoked the Iran conflict. He contrasts Iran’s and Turkey’s likely priorities, focusing on what he says are Turkish ambitions tied to former Ottoman territories and the central issue of Kurdistan and the Kurds. Trump’s reported idea to invite Sunni Islamists described as part of ISIS to kill Hezbollah is criticized as “asinine talk,” with the guest arguing it would insert a Turkish-relevant subordinate element into Lebanon, allowing Turkey to intervene later. He denies the idea of “friendship” in international relations and emphasizes “only interests,” claiming Turkey views Syria as a Turkish province and Northern Iraq as a Turkish area. He argues Turkey’s NATO membership is “nice but irrelevant,” asserting Turkey’s cultural foundation and future focus are in the Middle East and Central Asia rather than Europe, and that Turkey does not want war with Russia, instead cultivating good relations with it. The guest then addresses the possibility that an incentive-based arrangement could produce an outcome involving Lebanon: he references reporting that military buildup on the Lebanese border accelerated after Trump’s comments, and considers theories offered by other guests about border control or arms flow to Hezbollah through Syrian territory. He also describes Trump’s approval of a $700 million sale of General Electric jet engines for use by Turkey and its new fighter “Khan,” and suggests Trump is hoping to achieve a broader political outcome against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while arguing the larger picture makes control unrealistic. A central theme is proposed “disengagement.” The guest argues the only way to end the “mess” is unilateral withdrawal, saying Americans cannot protect forward bases under modern missile ranges and that any strategy of “doubling down” merely postpones outcomes. He argues Trump is under “duress,” explaining it not through specific allegations from files but through leverage from “Zionist billionaires” and the Israel lobby, suggesting support can be withdrawn if Iran is not destroyed, and that political consequences could follow. He also claims that Trump cannot simply “say no” because Congress cannot simply “say no,” citing the role of money in U.S. politics. In response to questions about whether disengagement is starting—citing Vance’s and Trump’s rhetoric, and discussions of F-35s to Turkey—the guest agrees there are internal indications that people think they must “get out,” including after demonstrating that the U.S. military approach failed to produce the desired outcome against Iran. Later, the discussion asks what would happen if the U.S. distances itself from Israel, lessening battlefield support. The guest says a looming U.S. financial crisis could be the event that disrupts engagement, because economic problems would constrain attention and priorities, potentially affecting alliance behavior. He suggests that absent such a financial shock, the alliance would not break up, framing it as a partnership sustained by mutual interests rather than a formal, easily separable alliance. Finally, the interview closes by asking the likelihood of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey over the next five to 10 years and what the biggest risks would be. The guest predicts Turkey will seek dominance over northern Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula and that Arabs either negotiate with Turkey or are “march[ed] in” upon. He portrays Iran’s focus as southern Iraq and protection of Shiites in the Gulf region. He concludes that these developments reflect shifting regional power centers and that Middle East borders created by Sykes-Picot are “on the road to extinction.”