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Civil society, including the press, academia, special interest groups, and NGOs, plays a crucial role in addressing election security and countering malign influence. It is not enough for just the federal government, states, or tech and social media companies to tackle this issue. We need a collaborative effort from all sectors of society to understand and address the threats. This synergy is still a work in progress.

The speaker testified about the censorship industrial complex, revealing that it is worse than previously thought. Internal files from the Cyber Threat Intelligence League showed military contractors working to censor and use psychological operations against Americans. While some argue that social media platforms have the right to censor content, the First Amendment prohibits the government from abridging freedom of speech. Evidence suggests that the government encouraged private entities to engage in censorship. The Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency (CISA) played a central role, along with other government agencies. CISA created the Election Integrity Partnership, which urged platforms to censor posts, resulting in a 75% response rate. CISA and the White House also demanded censorship of COVID-related content. The speaker calls for defunding and dismantling these organizations, or implementing significant oversight to prevent future censorship. They also suggest making liability protections contingent on transparent moderation and public reporting of censorship requests.

The most alarming thing was the organized communication between the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and tech companies, involving flagging content in large numbers. Four federal judges have ruled that this violates the First Amendment. Former FBI officials within Twitter and other groups worked to censor the Hunter Biden laptop story, despite it not violating Twitter's terms of service. The FBI and CIA had their own internal groups within Twitter. The Aspen Institute held a workshop to discourage coverage of the Hunter Biden laptop story. Content moderators at social media platforms have too much power in determining what Americans can say and see. This collusion between unelected bureaucrats and tech companies is inappropriate and a form of election interference. The censorship organizations tend to have a biased leaning.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss government disinformation offices and transparency concerns. - CISA’s office of mis, dis, and malinformation (MDM) operated as a DHS unit focused on domestic threat actors, with archive details at cisa.gov/mdm. The office existed for two years, from 2021 to 2023, before being shut down and renamed after the foundation published a series of reports. - The disinformation governance board was formed around April 2022. The CISOs countering foreign influence task force, originally aimed at stopping Russian influence and repurposed to “stop Trump in the twenty twenty election,” changed its name to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation and shifted focus from foreign influence to 80% domestic, 20% foreign, one month before the twenty twenty election. - Speaker 1 argues that the information environment problems are largely domestic, suggesting an 80/20 focus on foreign vs domestic issues should be flipped. - A June 2022 Holly Senate committee link is highlighted, leading to a 31-page PDF that, as of now, represents the sum total of internal documents related to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation. The speaker questions why there is more transparency about the DHS MIS office from a whistleblower three years ago than in ten months of current executive power. - The speaker calls for comprehensive publication of internal files: every email, text, and correspondence from DHS MIS personnel, to be placed in a WikiLeaks/JFK-style publicly accessible database for forensic reconstruction of DHS actions during those years, to name and shame responsible individuals and prevent repetition. - The video also references George Soros state department cables published by WikiLeaks (from 2010), noting extensive transparency about the Open Society Foundations’ relationship with the state department fifteen years ago, compared to today. The claim is that Open Society Foundations’ activities through the state department, USAID, and the CIA were weaponized to influence domestic politics while remaining secret, with zero disclosures to this day. - Speaker questions why cooperative agreements from USAID with Open Society Foundation, Omidyar Network, or Gates Foundation have never been made public, nor quarterly or annual milestone reports, network details, or the actual scope of funded activities. USAID grant descriptions on usaspending.gov are often opaque or misleading compared to the true activities funded. - The speaker urges transparency across DHS, USAID, the State Department, CIA, ODNI, and related entities, asking for open files and for accountability. They stress the need to open these records now to inform the public and prevent recurrence, especially as mid-term political considerations loom.

Stanford University, University of Washington, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council were used as a front by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to manipulate social media during the 2020 election. The goal was to censor posts containing misinformation about mail-in ballots and other election-related topics. DHS lacked the legal authority to directly censor, so they set up the Election Infrastructure Partnership (EIP) to fill the gaps. These outside organizations received federal funding and worked closely with DHS to ban or throttle millions of posts and accounts. The entire operation was orchestrated to rig the election. The question now is whether there will be political accountability for these actions.

The Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), a relatively unknown agency, has been involved in a censorship operation. However, a court order froze its powers of mass censorship, with the 5th Circuit ruling that CISA likely violated the First Amendment by coercing social media companies to censor free speech. This case is part of a larger issue tied to the Missouri v Biden case, where attorneys general from Missouri and Louisiana filed a lawsuit against the Biden administration, arguing that government contact with social media companies for content removal violates the First Amendment. The court rulings have brought attention to the government's involvement in censorship through private companies. The battle over censorship is likely to continue to the Supreme Court.

The speaker testified about the censorship industrial complex, revealing that it is worse than previously thought. Internal files from the Cyber Threat Intelligence League showed military contractors working to censor and use psychological operations against Americans. While some argue that social media platforms have the right to censor content, the First Amendment prohibits the government from abridging freedom of speech. The whistleblower claims that the leader of the CTIL was present at the Obama White House in 2017 when instructed to create a counter disinformation project. The Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency played a central role in censorship, with other government agencies supporting it. The speaker calls for defunding and dismantling these organizations, as well as implementing oversight to prevent future censorship. They also suggest making liability protections contingent on transparent moderation and public reporting of censorship requests.

Renee DiResta of the Stanford Internet Observatory gave a presentation at the Cybersecurity Summit about the "power of partnerships" in combating "mis and disinformation." She highlighted the collaboration between CISA, Stanford, University of Washington, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council's DFR Lab. DiResta discussed the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP), which aimed to identify and respond to mis/disinformation targeting the 2020 election. The EIP involved students, government, and civil society organizations to flag concerns, analyze data, and track narratives. Social media platforms acted on 75% of flagged "tickets." Following the election, SIO launched the Virality Project to combat COVID-19 vaccine misinformation, partnering with federal, state, and local stakeholders. DiResta emphasized the need for a "center of excellence" within the federal government to coordinate efforts, prebunk narratives, and promote "resilience products." She argued for narrowly focused interventions on matters of national security, such as delegitimizing institutions. DiResta advocated for multi-stakeholder partnerships to facilitate communication and enable situational awareness while respecting civil liberties.

The speaker mentions that they have shared information with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding their findings. They have a relationship with local DHS personnel and have provided them with a significant amount of data. The DHS conducted scans and determined vulnerabilities. However, the speaker notes that the Elections division of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) did not participate in internal meetings or briefings on the presented material.

CISA lacked the capability and resources to address election disinformation. To bridge this gap, a project was quickly formed involving four institutions. The project collaborated with government partners like CISA DHS and local/state governments, civil society groups including NAACP, MITRE, Common Cause, and the Healthy Elections Project, and major platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, Reddit, and Nextdoor. Agreements for data access were made with some platforms, while analysts had to work individually with others.

The speaker emphasizes the importance of partnership between the federal government, state and local colleagues, and social media and tech firms in securing elections. They acknowledge the valuable information and opportunities that these firms possess, which the government does not have. The integration of these relationships has been a critical step forward since 2016. Speaker 1 expresses pride in the accomplishments of the past 2 years, particularly in the last 6 to 9 months, as a collaborative effort between the government and social media and tech firms. They believe this partnership will serve as a model for the future.

On January 7, 2017, the head of the Department of Homeland Security declared the electoral infrastructure of the United States as critical infrastructure, giving the federal government control over it. This move faced resistance from local electoral officials. Later, under the pretext of foreign disinformation, a small group of political officials gained unilateral power over the entire US political system. They seized control of the electoral system and social media platforms, using intelligence agencies to monitor and censor content. With the arrival of COVID, these measures were applied to combat what was called the "infodemic" of COVID disinformation. Government-led efforts to censor COVID disinformation were supported by companies like Facebook, who claimed to have censored millions of posts related to COVID disinformation.

Addressing disinformation requires a whole of society approach. It's not something that can be fixed by governments alone. This is a challenge recognized by some countries in Europe and North America. To combat disinformation, governments, multilateral institutions, social media platforms, and political leaders need to work together. Democracy relies on a healthy information space achieved through a collective effort. Countering disinformation requires a whole of society response, involving the private sector, public sector, and civil society. Cooperation from tech platforms and enforcement of terms of service are crucial, but government involvement is also necessary. The solution lies in a comprehensive approach that acknowledges the problem and involves all stakeholders.

The government created nongovernmental entities like the Election Integrity Project to address constitutional concerns and perform tasks that the government couldn't do alone. The head of the project explains that the government lacked funding and legal authorizations to tackle election disinformation. However, with input from this group, a project was quickly formed involving four institutions to bridge this gap. In essence, the government supported and funded NGOs to fulfill tasks beyond their own capabilities.

Disinformation requires a whole of society approach, not just governmental action. Some countries are more progressive in recognizing this challenge. A whole of society effort is key to empowering people with real and accurate information. This approach means sharing experiences and holding governments, social media platforms, and political leaders accountable. Democracy depends on a healthy information space achievable through this effort. The whole of society response includes the private sector, public sector, and civil society. Cooperation from tech platforms, good faith, and enforcement of terms of service are needed. It also requires government acknowledgment that the problem extends beyond foreign actors.

This hearing examines the Department of Homeland Security's role in censoring American voices through supposedly independent organizations. While protecting election infrastructure from foreign disinformation was the initial goal, it expanded to include countering domestic misinformation. The government created NGOs, like the Election Integrity Project, to do what it couldn't do directly. CISA acted as a switchboard to flag and notify social media platforms of misinformation, resulting in millions of tweets categorized as such. The same tools were used to censor COVID-19 narratives, some of which were later proven true. Concerns arise about DHS overreaching its jurisdiction and expanding censorship to various topics. The hearing questions the failure of leadership within DHS and the potential threat to civil liberties.

CISA lacked funding and legal authority to address election disinformation. A project involving 4 institutions was created to fill this gap. Government-tech cooperation has been effective, producing 60-70 papers on takedowns. Challenges include maintaining this collaboration. The federal government was unprepared to handle election misinformation and disinformation due to limitations in agencies like the IC and FBI. CISA lacked real capability and faced legal authority issues, including First Amendment concerns.

The Twitter files reveal that the federal government, including intelligence agencies like the FBI, used Twitter to censor Americans' speech. Twitter was closely connected to the FBI before Elon Musk took over. Documents show that Twitter engaged in information sharing with the intelligence community, and multiple agencies were involved. The FBI pressured Twitter to act on election-related tweets in 2020 and 2022, resulting in content censorship. Twitter executives restricted accounts, censored speech conflicting with the official narrative, and used internal tools to control and manipulate information. This should concern every member of Congress and American citizen, as it goes against the principle of free speech. Government and media fact checkers often make mistakes, so important debates should not be suppressed.

The FBI forced social media platforms to remove information from conservative sources, claiming it was disinformation. Speaker 0 asks for a definition of disinformation, but Speaker 1 avoids directly answering. Speaker 0 points out that Elvis Chan, a key witness, testified that 50% of alleged election disinformation was taken down or censored, including content from American citizens. Speaker 1 denies this and states that the FBI does not moderate content or influence social media companies. Speaker 0 insists that Speaker 1 should read the court opinion. The transcript ends abruptly.

To protect social media companies from government pressure to censor content, an incoming administration could issue an executive order on day one. This order would prohibit government grants and contracts to any private company or nonprofit involved in domestic disinformation. This approach addresses the issue of government-funded censorship, allowing for the elimination of grants and contracts that support censorship activities. Currently, there are tens of thousands of individuals in the U.S. whose livelihoods depend on censorship work, a field that emerged in response to the 2016 election.

The speaker testified about the censorship industrial complex, revealing that it is worse than previously thought. Internal files from the Cyber Threat Intelligence League showed military contractors working to censor and use psychological operations against Americans. While social media platforms have the right to censor content, the government is prohibited by the First Amendment from abridging freedom of speech. Evidence suggests that the government encouraged private entities to engage in censorship. The Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency (CISA) played a central role, along with other federal agencies. CISA created the Election Integrity Partnership, which urged platforms to censor posts, resulting in a 75% response rate. CISA and the White House also demanded censorship of COVID-related content. The speaker calls for defunding and dismantling these organizations, or implementing significant oversight to prevent future censorship. They also propose changes to section 230 liability protections and transparency in censorship requests.

To protect social media companies from government pressure to censor content, an incoming administration could issue an executive order on day one. This order would prohibit government grants and contracts to any private company or nonprofit involved in domestic disinformation. It effectively addresses the issue of government-funded censorship. By targeting grants and contracts across various agencies, this approach could dismantle the censorship industry, which has grown significantly since the 2016 election. Today, many individuals rely on this industry for their livelihoods, a situation that emerged in response to the political landscape following Trump's victory.

Multiple agencies within the intelligence community collaborate with social media platforms to address and remove inauthentic content. These agencies work tirelessly to collect intelligence and provide real-time information to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI and DHS take appropriate action by working with social media companies to remove such content.

Before the 2020 election, a coordinated censorship campaign was launched. This involved the Department of Homeland Security, NATO, and the DNC, leveraging institutions like Stanford University, the University of Washington, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council—many with ties to the Pentagon. These groups, many staffed by former intelligence officials, worked together to suppress discussion questioning the legitimacy of mail-in ballots. They used a multi-step plan to pressure social media companies into adopting a new policy banning content undermining public confidence in the election process. This involved threats of government action and leveraging media allies. Millions of posts across multiple platforms were censored or suppressed. The goal was to prevent questions about the election outcome, anticipating a potential crisis if initial results appeared to favor Trump before shifting to Biden.

Stanford researcher Renee DiResta and journalist Matt Taibbi discuss the revelation that Congress has access to people's emails through subpoena power. They also confirm that the Election Infrastructure Partnership (EIP) was a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operation from the beginning, as previously established. Twitter's Lisa Roman reveals that CISA received grants to build a web portal for reporting election-related misinformation. The committee report highlights gaps in legal authorities and coordination for addressing election misinformation. DiResta explains how DHS has taken on a role similar to a domestic CIA for information control. The federal government lacked preparedness and coordination in identifying and analyzing election misinformation, as the intelligence community and FBI have specific limitations.