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Civil society, including the press, academia, special interest groups, and NGOs, plays a crucial role in addressing election security and countering malign influence. It is not enough for just the federal government, states, or tech and social media companies to tackle this issue. We need a collaborative effort from all sectors of society to understand and address the threats. This synergy is still a work in progress.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss government disinformation offices and transparency concerns. - CISA’s office of mis, dis, and malinformation (MDM) operated as a DHS unit focused on domestic threat actors, with archive details at cisa.gov/mdm. The office existed for two years, from 2021 to 2023, before being shut down and renamed after the foundation published a series of reports. - The disinformation governance board was formed around April 2022. The CISOs countering foreign influence task force, originally aimed at stopping Russian influence and repurposed to “stop Trump in the twenty twenty election,” changed its name to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation and shifted focus from foreign influence to 80% domestic, 20% foreign, one month before the twenty twenty election. - Speaker 1 argues that the information environment problems are largely domestic, suggesting an 80/20 focus on foreign vs domestic issues should be flipped. - A June 2022 Holly Senate committee link is highlighted, leading to a 31-page PDF that, as of now, represents the sum total of internal documents related to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation. The speaker questions why there is more transparency about the DHS MIS office from a whistleblower three years ago than in ten months of current executive power. - The speaker calls for comprehensive publication of internal files: every email, text, and correspondence from DHS MIS personnel, to be placed in a WikiLeaks/JFK-style publicly accessible database for forensic reconstruction of DHS actions during those years, to name and shame responsible individuals and prevent repetition. - The video also references George Soros state department cables published by WikiLeaks (from 2010), noting extensive transparency about the Open Society Foundations’ relationship with the state department fifteen years ago, compared to today. The claim is that Open Society Foundations’ activities through the state department, USAID, and the CIA were weaponized to influence domestic politics while remaining secret, with zero disclosures to this day. - Speaker questions why cooperative agreements from USAID with Open Society Foundation, Omidyar Network, or Gates Foundation have never been made public, nor quarterly or annual milestone reports, network details, or the actual scope of funded activities. USAID grant descriptions on usaspending.gov are often opaque or misleading compared to the true activities funded. - The speaker urges transparency across DHS, USAID, the State Department, CIA, ODNI, and related entities, asking for open files and for accountability. They stress the need to open these records now to inform the public and prevent recurrence, especially as mid-term political considerations loom.

Disinformation on social media platforms poses challenges to democracy, bolstering authoritarians and silencing opposition. Countering disinformation is crucial for a thriving democracy. The steps countering disinformation guide provides 9 thematic sections and a comprehensive intervention database to promote information integrity and strengthen societal resilience. Key takeaways include the need for a whole of society approach, prioritizing programs addressing disinformation and societal cleavages, and utilizing mixed methods like fact checking and monitoring. Establishing norms, regulations, and better content moderation is essential. Political parties should be discouraged from engaging in disinformation. Explore the interventions database for organizations, projects, and donors combating disinformation worldwide.

Stanford University, University of Washington, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council were used as a front by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to manipulate social media during the 2020 election. The goal was to censor posts containing misinformation about mail-in ballots and other election-related topics. DHS lacked the legal authority to directly censor, so they set up the Election Infrastructure Partnership (EIP) to fill the gaps. These outside organizations received federal funding and worked closely with DHS to ban or throttle millions of posts and accounts. The entire operation was orchestrated to rig the election. The question now is whether there will be political accountability for these actions.

Renee DiResta of the Stanford Internet Observatory gave a presentation at the Cybersecurity Summit about the "power of partnerships" in combating "mis and disinformation." She highlighted the collaboration between CISA, Stanford, University of Washington, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council's DFR Lab. DiResta discussed the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP), which aimed to identify and respond to mis/disinformation targeting the 2020 election. The EIP involved students, government, and civil society organizations to flag concerns, analyze data, and track narratives. Social media platforms acted on 75% of flagged "tickets." Following the election, SIO launched the Virality Project to combat COVID-19 vaccine misinformation, partnering with federal, state, and local stakeholders. DiResta emphasized the need for a "center of excellence" within the federal government to coordinate efforts, prebunk narratives, and promote "resilience products." She argued for narrowly focused interventions on matters of national security, such as delegitimizing institutions. DiResta advocated for multi-stakeholder partnerships to facilitate communication and enable situational awareness while respecting civil liberties.

The speaker mentions that they have shared information with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding their findings. They have a relationship with local DHS personnel and have provided them with a significant amount of data. The DHS conducted scans and determined vulnerabilities. However, the speaker notes that the Elections division of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) did not participate in internal meetings or briefings on the presented material.

The speaker discusses the establishment of an election integrity partnership (EIP) at the request of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). They mention an email from Graham Brookie of the Atlantic Council, confirming the setup of the partnership. The speaker also highlights the connection between the Atlantic Council and the National Endowment for Democracy, which is linked to the CIA. They point out the involvement of various organizations with ties to intelligence agencies, such as Stanford, UW, and Graphika. The speaker asserts that EIP was not a secret operation and was formed due to funding and legal limitations of CISA. They express personal satisfaction in discovering and sharing this information.

These individuals, referred to as government cutouts, are not traditional academics but rather work closely with the government. The head of the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) consortium, which includes Stanford University, UW, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council, openly admitted that EIP was created to fill the gaps in government capabilities. They were given a $3 million government grant to continue their censorship work for the 2022 midterms and 2024 election. All four entities in the EIP consortium receive funding from the federal government, and there is a revolving door between government and academia, with individuals moving between positions. This close relationship and funding from the government raise questions about their independence and objectivity.

The speaker emphasizes the importance of partnership between the federal government, state and local colleagues, and social media and tech firms in securing elections. They acknowledge the valuable information and opportunities that these firms possess, which the government does not have. The integration of these relationships has been a critical step forward since 2016. Speaker 1 expresses pride in the accomplishments of the past 2 years, particularly in the last 6 to 9 months, as a collaborative effort between the government and social media and tech firms. They believe this partnership will serve as a model for the future.

Before the 2020 election, a group involving never-Trump Republicans, DHS, NATO, and DNC planned a mass censorship campaign using Stanford University, University of Washington, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council. These institutions, linked to the Pentagon, aimed to control social media to prevent questioning of mail-in ballots' legitimacy. The campaign involved threats to tech companies, resulting in a new censorship policy called delegitimization. This pre-censorship effort targeted 22 million pro-Trump posts on 15 platforms to ensure public acceptance of a potential Biden victory. The goal was to avoid election crisis due to mail-in ballot discrepancies.

Disinformation on social media undermines democracy, empowering authoritarianism and silencing opposition. To combat this, the CEPS countering disinformation guide offers nine key strategies and a database of interventions aimed at enhancing information integrity and societal resilience. Developed by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, International Republican Institute, and National Democratic Institute with USAID support, the guide emphasizes a whole-of-society approach. It highlights the need for urgency in collective action, balancing resources between institutions and civil society, and employing mixed methods like fact-checking and monitoring. Additionally, it stresses the importance of establishing norms, legal frameworks, and improved social media moderation to foster a healthy information environment. Political parties should also be discouraged from engaging in disinformation. For further resources, explore the interventions database.

Before the 2020 election, a group involving DHS, NATO, and DNC planned a mass censorship campaign on social media with 4 Pentagon-linked institutions. They aimed to prevent questioning of mail-in ballot legitimacy. The group coerced tech companies to censor content through threats and pressure, resulting in millions of posts being banned or limited. The campaign was set up months before the election to avoid a crisis if the election results were disputed. The group's actions were based on the belief that a Biden victory would rely on mail-in ballots.

We actively addressed disinformation and misinformation during the pandemic and the US election by collaborating with the editing community. This model will be used in future elections globally. We aim to identify threats early by working with governments and other platforms to understand the landscape.

CISA lacked funding and legal authorizations to understand election disinformation. To bridge this gap, four institutions collaborated to fill the void left by the government. The cooperation between government and tech platforms proved effective, resulting in numerous papers discussing takedowns. However, two challenges remain: how to sustain this collaboration and the lack of federal preparation in identifying and analyzing election misinformation and disinformation. The absence of a clear federal lead and limitations within the IC and FBI hindered progress. CISA provided support but lacked real capability due to unclear legal authorities, including concerns regarding the First Amendment.

On January 7, 2017, the head of the Department of Homeland Security declared the electoral infrastructure of the United States as critical infrastructure, giving the federal government control over it. This move faced resistance from local electoral officials. Later, under the pretext of foreign disinformation, a small group of political officials gained unilateral power over the entire US political system. They seized control of the electoral system and social media platforms, using intelligence agencies to monitor and censor content. With the arrival of COVID, these measures were applied to combat what was called the "infodemic" of COVID disinformation. Government-led efforts to censor COVID disinformation were supported by companies like Facebook, who claimed to have censored millions of posts related to COVID disinformation.

Addressing disinformation requires a whole of society approach. It's not something that can be fixed by governments alone. This is a challenge recognized by some countries in Europe and North America. To combat disinformation, governments, multilateral institutions, social media platforms, and political leaders need to work together. Democracy relies on a healthy information space achieved through a collective effort. Countering disinformation requires a whole of society response, involving the private sector, public sector, and civil society. Cooperation from tech platforms and enforcement of terms of service are crucial, but government involvement is also necessary. The solution lies in a comprehensive approach that acknowledges the problem and involves all stakeholders.

The government created nongovernmental entities like the Election Integrity Project to address constitutional concerns and perform tasks that the government couldn't do alone. The head of the project explains that the government lacked funding and legal authorizations to tackle election disinformation. However, with input from this group, a project was quickly formed involving four institutions to bridge this gap. In essence, the government supported and funded NGOs to fulfill tasks beyond their own capabilities.

Before the 2020 election, a group involving DHS, NATO, and the DNC planned a mass censorship campaign on social media to prevent disputing mail-in ballot legitimacy. They partnered with Stanford, University of Washington, Graphika, and the Atlantic Council, all linked to the Pentagon. Using threats and pressure, they forced tech companies to ban content questioning mail-in ballots. This was done to ensure public acceptance of a potential Biden victory due to mail-in ballots. The group aimed to control the narrative and prevent election crisis.

Disinformation requires a whole of society approach, not just governmental action. Some countries are more progressive in recognizing this challenge. A whole of society effort is key to empowering people with real and accurate information. This approach means sharing experiences and holding governments, social media platforms, and political leaders accountable. Democracy depends on a healthy information space achievable through this effort. The whole of society response includes the private sector, public sector, and civil society. Cooperation from tech platforms, good faith, and enforcement of terms of service are needed. It also requires government acknowledgment that the problem extends beyond foreign actors.

The speaker discusses the intelligence community's efforts to share information with social media platforms to address inauthentic content. They clarify that the office of the director of National Intelligence would only participate in approved election security briefings with private companies like Twitter, YouTube, Microsoft, and state election officials. These briefings focus on discussing threats and have nothing to do with content moderation or the Biden laptop as Russian disinformation. The speaker mentions that there were weekly meetings between the FBI, DHS, and Twitter, but only one reference to their office. They hope that this reference was part of the approved process for election security briefings.

CISA lacked funding and legal authority to address election disinformation. A project involving 4 institutions was created to fill this gap. Government-tech cooperation has been effective, producing 60-70 papers on takedowns. Challenges include maintaining this collaboration. The federal government was unprepared to handle election misinformation and disinformation due to limitations in agencies like the IC and FBI. CISA lacked real capability and faced legal authority issues, including First Amendment concerns.

Multiple agencies within the intelligence community collaborate with social media platforms to address and remove inauthentic content. These agencies work tirelessly to collect intelligence and provide real-time information to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI and DHS take appropriate action by working with social media companies to remove such content.

Before the 2020 election, a coordinated censorship campaign was launched. This involved the Department of Homeland Security, NATO, and the DNC, leveraging institutions like Stanford University, the University of Washington, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council—many with ties to the Pentagon. These groups, many staffed by former intelligence officials, worked together to suppress discussion questioning the legitimacy of mail-in ballots. They used a multi-step plan to pressure social media companies into adopting a new policy banning content undermining public confidence in the election process. This involved threats of government action and leveraging media allies. Millions of posts across multiple platforms were censored or suppressed. The goal was to prevent questions about the election outcome, anticipating a potential crisis if initial results appeared to favor Trump before shifting to Biden.

Addressing disinformation requires a whole society response involving governments, social media platforms, and individuals. Cooperation is needed from tech platforms and government to combat the issue. Collaboration across sectors is crucial for a solution.

Stanford researcher Renee DiResta and journalist Matt Taibbi discuss the revelation that Congress has access to people's emails through subpoena power. They also confirm that the Election Infrastructure Partnership (EIP) was a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operation from the beginning, as previously established. Twitter's Lisa Roman reveals that CISA received grants to build a web portal for reporting election-related misinformation. The committee report highlights gaps in legal authorities and coordination for addressing election misinformation. DiResta explains how DHS has taken on a role similar to a domestic CIA for information control. The federal government lacked preparedness and coordination in identifying and analyzing election misinformation, as the intelligence community and FBI have specific limitations.