reSee.it - Related Video Feed

I was 30, had never taken a business or marketing class, and I had never used PowerPoint. I bought a Mac to use Persuasion and tried to create a company presentation for venture capitalists. My first official day of work was my thirtieth birthday, February 17, and we got the company funded. We met every day, the three of us, in one founder’s townhouse in Fremont. There was nothing to do at first—just talking about what we did yesterday, what we had for dinner, or where to go for lunch. For several months, the big daily decision was whether to have Philly cheesesteaks or Chinese food, and eventually whether to put donuts in the fridge in the morning. That period lasted a few months. I read books about starting companies and tried to figure out how to raise money and what a venture capitalist is. I then met a lawyer at Cooley Godward who helped us incorporate. He asked how much money we had in our pockets; I said $200. He took $200 and got 20% of Nvidia for it. I went back to the house, and my two partners each gave me $200, each getting 20%. And that’s how it worked, liberally. I never finished my business plan. I know it. We never finished a business plan, to tell you the truth. If I had finished that thick Gordon Bell book, How to Start a High-tech Company, I would have been dead now; we would have run out of money and time. I read the first three or four chapters, then had to go to work. We incorporated, and they introduced us to two venture capitalists. I went to their office and explained what I wanted to do. The key to getting funded, I learned, is not a business plan; VCs don’t invest in business plans because business plans are easy to write. They invest in great people, and your reputation and history matter. Because I had done significant work with Andy Bechtolsheim, another Stanford graduate and founder of Sun, and because we had connections with the founders of Synopsys and LSI Logic, we were in a strong position due to our track record and relationships, even if my business plan writing skills were inadequate. Another crucial factor is the vision. They want to know there is a market large enough to justify the investment. The market size matters: if the market is $20 billion, an investment of $10 million may not be justifiable; but if the market is $200 billion, the dynamics are different. The size of the market is important, and having a clever idea that the market has never done before is compelling. Yet, the last point, perhaps the least important, is the market itself—because you may need to reinvent yourself over time. If you’re going to reinvent yourself, you need great people, which is why great people are so important.

The speaker states they were not a well-behaved employee and preferred independence. Clients of Sheersen at the time had great relationships with them and were willing to pay them directly, which allowed the speaker to start what they didn't view as a business, but as getting paid to play the markets. Over time, the speaker needed people to work with and acquired computers and other resources. The speaker states that it grew and became a company, but they never viewed it as such, instead seeing it as just doing "this thing."

Bill Gates did not invent anything, but built his empire by patenting software. He acquired the basic program and office operating system. Tax concessions from the WTO meeting in Singapore led to the IT industry moving to India, saving billions annually. Silicon Valley became India's tech hub due to lower wages. Gates' philanthropy benefits his future markets.

Palantir was started as a military-related software startup. Initially, venture capitalists were unwilling to invest, considering the idea insane. The lack of interest suggested either a high barrier to entry with no competition upon success, or simply that the idea was flawed. A decade later, Palantir still had no competition. While there is more activity in the defense space now compared to the mid-2000s, having zero competition can be beneficial if successful, but might also indicate the idea's unviability.

When we started PayPal, I decided not to hire any lawyers for the first year because I knew they would tell us we couldn't do what we were doing. We broke all the rules and built the system. After a year, we realized it's better to ask for forgiveness than permission. This approach has become a template that works in many similar cases.

John and the speaker, who are brothers and co-founders, attended startup school in October 2009. They had previously sold apps in the App Store easily. They contrasted this ease with the difficulty of conducting transactions or commerce on the broader internet. Walking home from dinner, John suggested building a prototype, downplaying the difficulty of starting a billion-dollar company. Almost a decade later, they reflect on this journey. They were initially unsure how seriously.

Jensen Huang opens by inviting an interactive conversation about building a company, noting that it is both gratifying and incredibly hard, with perspectives on company building shaped by diverse experiences. He recalls NVIDIA’s beginnings sixteen years ago with three engineers and introduces the idea that perspective, more than grand vision, drives entrepreneurial direction. He distinguishes vision from perspective, arguing that vision is not exclusive to a few, while everyone has a perspective—the way you see the world and identify opportunities. In 1993, with Windows 3.1 era and no networks or wireless tech, Huang explains NVIDIA’s perspective: a PC could run three-dimensional graphics programs to explore new worlds, enabling video games as the killer app. The business plan was to take advanced graphics technology from expensive workstations, reinvent it, and make it affordable. He recounts pitching to Sand Hill Road, who doubted a video game market existed, and a parental nudge to get a real job. Yet the team believed video games would be a large market, a view later validated by today’s status as the world’s largest digital media industry. They also anticipated broader uses for the technology beyond games, such as a notable example with Keyhole (which Google acquired to become Google Earth, the world’s largest downloaded application). He emphasizes that perspectives often differ even among seemingly obvious opportunities. He cites Yahoo!, AltaVista, Lycos, and others, illustrating how two similar cores (search) could lead to different outcomes based on what each company chose to become (destinations/portals, etc.). Competition was intense as hundreds of three-dimensional graphics startups emerged, yet NVIDIA remains the only surviving graphics company. The lesson is that perspective matters because different viewpoints shape strategic focus. Huang then discusses the core business principle: Moore’s Law—though framed as a competition-driven efficiency—drives GPU advancement. The early approach was to make three-dimensional graphics insatiable—improving performance year after year even if customers initially resisted due to cost. For the first five years, NVIDIA “turned off the blinders” and ignored customer constraints, eventually cannibalizing its own products when a new generation proved more capable and profitable. Innovation is risky, he notes, and sustaining a leading position required reinvention. By the late 1990s, NVIDIA shifted from a fixed-function graphics accelerator to a programmable shader architecture with the GeForce FX (a gamble that nearly killed the company but ultimately paid off). The introduction of programmable shaders kept NVIDIA at the forefront, enabling GPUs to be used for general-purpose computing (GPGPU), which has become a major trajectory. On company culture, Huang stresses the importance of fostering risk-taking and a tolerance for failure, teaching people how to fail quickly and cheaply, and maintaining intellectual honesty to pivot when necessary. He contrasts older, more rigid corporate cultures with modern, beta-form experimentation found in companies like Google, where many applications operate in beta to test ideas rapidly. Regarding cofounders and governance, he notes that equity was divided equally among the three founders (each initially contributing $200 and receiving 20% each). He explains that leadership should be clearly established (Jensen as CEO) to avoid decision-making gridlock, while still valuing collaboration with strong, trusted partners. Asked about the venture capital process, Huang explains that VCs invest in people and a sufficiently large, novel market, not just a polished business plan. He shares that their reputations and prior work with notable figures helped, and he emphasizes the ongoing importance of great people and a focused, strategic vision. He addresses mentors and best advice—focus intensely on a few things, learn from diverse sources, and remain adaptable. On succession, Huang argues against rigid, preselected succession planning, favoring the cultivation of future leaders within the company so that many internal options exist if leadership changes become necessary. Finally, he speaks about the finance side in the early days: cash is king and survival is paramount, constantly raising or conserving funds. He closes by reiterating the core message: ideas are plentiful, but a unique, passionate perspective and perseverance are what sustain a company, along with a culture that embraces calculated risk and continuous reinvention.

Brad made a compelling presentation to the commission and FTC, emphasizing the need for decentralization of the web. He highlighted the growing consolidation of power among Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon, making it impossible to compete by simply offering a better service. Drawing parallels to the mid-nineties when Microsoft dominated the PC software industry, Brad explained that a shift in venue to the web and a change in business model to open source ultimately disrupted Microsoft's hegemony. To compete with dominant data monopolies, such as Google and Facebook, the game needs to be changed. Blockchains, as open public data stores, offer the best chance for innovation and bottom-up startup growth. This argument was presented to the SEC as the next wave of technology.

Palantir was started as a military-related software startup, but initially, no venture capitalists wanted to invest, thinking the idea was insane. The lack of interest suggested that success would mean little to no competition, which proved true for a decade. While there's more activity in the defense space now compared to the mid-2000s, having zero competition can be beneficial if it works, but it might also indicate the idea is flawed.

I had a lot of freedom growing up and dropped out of school at 12. I convinced my mom to let me stay home, and I was self-directed. By high school, I was in a program for troubled kids. I wasn't a good student and focused on my interests. I was philosophical and read existentialism. I don't see myself as just an entrepreneur. I had a successful company but it's not my identity. I had the biggest website and sold it for a lot of money.